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Title
The US Intervention and Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan (2001-2020): Strategies and Outcomes
Author(s)
Sajid Iqbal
Abstract
Abstract This thesis relates game theory as a conceptual framework to analyze the varying U.S. strategies for conflict resolution in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2020. Despite almost two decades of the U.S. intervention, Afghanistan remained unstable and lacks peace, indicating the failure of the U.S. strategy to resolve the conflict. Existing research lacks a clear linkage between the varying U.S. strategies, the reasons for the failure of old strategies, and the rationale for adopting a new strategy. This case study research adopts a qualitative approach using descriptive-explanatory design to analyze the success/failure, prospects, and challenges of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, specifically with reference to conflict resolution. The study identifies the independent variable as the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and the dependent variable as conflict resolution. The initial objective of the U.S. intervention was to eradicate Al-Qaeda and its affiliated Taliban, but later expanded to include state-building projects on the Weberian democratic model. Throughout the period of intervention, the U.S. relied heavily on military force and failed to consider the socio-economic and political realities of Afghanistan. The pursuit of a zero-sum outcome of the conflict, specifically the total defeat of Taliban and the establishment of a pro- U.S. democratic government, hindered any meaningful settlement of the conflict. Taliban's resurgence resulted in a similar zero-sum objective of unconditional troops withdrawal. However, the 2020 peace agreement between Taliban and the U.S. marked a shift in strategy towards a non-zero-sum outcome. Nevertheless, the situation of prisoner’s dilemma among the U.S., Taliban, local, regional, and international stakeholders impeded conflict resolution, allowing Taliban to establish a government without sharing power with opposition stakeholders or allowing the presence of any international force. The ongoing irritants among the contending local and regional players, and the indirect influence of the U.S. via economic sanctions, created a situation of prisoner’s dilemma that obstructs the conflict resolution in Afghanistan in the long run. The study recommends further investigation of the challenges and prospects of intra-Afghan power-sharing for sustainable peace and stability in Afghanistan. Keywords: Intervention, Conflict Resolution, Zero-Sum, Non-Zero-sum, U.S. Strategies.
Type
Thesis/Dissertation PhD
Faculty
Social Sciences
Department
International Relations
Language
English
Publication Date
2023-08-08
Subject
NA
Publisher
NA
Contributor(s)
NA
Format
Chicago Style 17th Edition
Identifier
NA
Source
NA
Relation
NA
Coverage
NA
Rights
NA
Category
NA
Description
Attachment
Name
Timestamp
Action
aba08169f9.pdf
2023-08-30 10:29:08
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