

Ph.D. Dissertation

**IMPACT OF EVOLVING DOCTRINES ON CONFLICT
TRANSFORMATION BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN**

By

Muhammad Saeed Uzzaman



Department of International Relations

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF MODERN LANGUAGES

ISLAMABAD

May, 2024

**IMPACT OF EVOLVING DOCTRINES ON CONFLICT
TRANSFORMATION BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN**

By

Muhammad Saeed Uzzaman

M.Phil-IDS, Iqra University-Islamabad, 2017


Thesis submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)
in International Relations (IR)

To

Department of International Relations
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES



NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF MODERN LANGUAGES
ISLAMABAD



Thesis/Dissertation Approval Form

The undersigned certify that they have read the following thesis, are satisfied with the overall performance, and recommend the thesis to the Faculty of Social Sciences for acceptance.

Thesis/ Dissertation Title: **Impact of Evolving Doctrines on Conflict Transformation between India and Pakistan**

Submitted by: **Muhammad Saeed Uzzaman** Registration #: **731-PhD/IR/S18**

Doctor of Philosophy
Name in Full

International Relations
Discipline

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Rizwana Karim Abbasi
Research Supervisor

Signature of Supervisor

Prof. Dr. Muhammad Riaz Shad
HOD (IR)

Signature of HOD (IR)

Prof. Dr. Khalid Sultan
Dean (FSS)

Signature of Dean (FSS)

Maj. Gen. Shahid Mehmood Kayani HI (M), (Retd.)
Rector NUML

Signature of Rector

Dated: _____

Candidate Declaration Form

I, Muhammad Saeed Uzzaman

Son of Muhammad Zaman

Registration No; 731-PhD/IR/S18

Discipline; International Relations

Candidate of **Doctor of Philosophy** at the National University of Modern Languages do hereby declare that the thesis: **Impact of Evolving Doctrines on Conflict Transformation between India and Pakistan** submitted by me in partial fulfillment of PhD degree, is my original work, and has not been submitted or published earlier. I declare that the thesis is composed by myself and that the draft is not submitted for any other degree or professional qualification. I confirm that the work submitted is my own, except where work which has formed part of single or jointly-authored publications has been included. I confirm that appropriate credit has been given within this thesis where reference has been made to the work of others.

I also understand that if evidence of plagiarism is found in my thesis dissertation at any stage, even after the award of degree, the work may be cancelled and the degree revoked.

Signature of Candidate

Dated

Muhammad Saeed Uzzaman

Name of Candidate

Plagiarism Undertaking

I solemnly declare that research work presented in the thesis titled "**Impact of Evolving Doctrines on Conflict Transformation between India and Pakistan.**" is solely my research work with no significant contribution from any other person. Small contribution/help wherever taken has been duly acknowledged and that complete thesis has been written by me.

I understand the zero-tolerance policy of the HEC and university

NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF MODERN LANGUAGES

towards plagiarism. Therefore, I as an Author of the above titled thesis declare that no portion of my thesis has been plagiarized and any material used as reference is properly referred/cited.

I undertake that if I am found guilty of any formal plagiarism in the above titled thesis even after award of PhD degree, the University reserves the rights to withdraw/revoke my PhD degree and that HEC and the University has the right to publish my name on the HEC/University Website on which names of students are placed who submitted plagiarized thesis.

Student / Author Signature: _____

Name: _Muhammad Saeed Uzzaman_



National University of Modern Languages
 Quality Enhancement Cell
 Sector H-9, P.O. Shaigan, Islamabad, Pakistan
 Tel: +92-51-9265100 Ext 2246/2247
 Web: www.numl.edu.pk

Dated: Sept 21, 2023

Faculty of Social Sciences


Subject: Turnitin Similarity Test Report of PhD Thesis of Mr M Saeed Uzzaman
(International Relations) 2nd Attempt

1st Attempt: The subject thesis was run through Turnitin software on August 22, 2023 under ID-1885318077 and similarity index was 13%. However, external evaluator suggested major changes in the subject thesis.


2nd Attempt: This is to state that **PhD** thesis of **Mr Muhammad Saeed Uzzaman** has been run through **Turnitin Software on September 21, 2023**. Paper ID is 2172562698 and similarity index is 14%. This is within the limit prescribed by the Higher Education Commission.

The subject similarity test report is attached for further processing, please.

Dean/FSS


 25/09/2023





(Dr. Khushbakht Hina)

Director

Quality Enhancement Cell

HOD IR:

Acknowledgments

When I look back at the last six years of thesis writing, I feel that it was a distinct experience of life, simply matchless. The topic of the thesis with all its complexity put me under tremendous pressure time and again. It was tough to comprehend the philosophical and theoretical foundations of the topic. I am ethically bound to thank all scholars who supported me throughout my journey. First and foremost, I am thankful to my Supervisor Dr. Rizwana Abbasi for her invaluable guidance, encouragement, and mentorship. My special thanks to Dr. Muhammad Riaz Shad for his amazing intellectual and moral support. I am indebted to Dr. Sarwat Rauf for her appreciation and support that will always remain a source of strength. I would like to thank Dr. Adnan Sarwar Khan for his vital contributions in building the foundation of my studies as former supervisor. I am also indebted to Ms. Pashmina Mughal for all the administrative support from the department. I would like to thank my Ph.D. batch fellows and friends who have been a constant source of strength for me. I am highly grateful to all the respondents of this study for sharing their valuable opinions and making my research credible. Last but not least, I am deeply indebted to my beloved late parents and, entire family for their spiritual, emotional and moral guidance towards the completion of this dissertation.

Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to the worldwide victims of violence.

Abbreviations

A2/AD	Anti-Access Area Denial
AAD	Advanced Air Defense
ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
ADMS	Air Defence Missile System
AFSPA	Armed Forces Special Powers Act
APHC	All Parties Hurriat Conference
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASW	Anti-Submarine Warfare
BCIM	Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar
BECA	Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement
BMD	Ballistic Missiles Development
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
BSF	Border Security Force
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
BVR	Beyond Visual Range
CBMs	Confidence Building Measures
CDP	Composite Dialogue Process
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CIA	Central Investigation Agency
CJCSC	Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee
CIRUS	Canadian-Indian Reactor, US
CMD	Credible Minimum Deterrence
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
COMCASA	Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement

CSD	Cold Start Doctrine
CPEC	China Pakistan Economic Corridor
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
DCC	Development Control Committee
DCL	Direct Communication Links
DGMO	Director General Military Operations
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DND	Draft Nuclear Doctrine
DRDO	Defense Research Development Program
DTTI	Defense Trade Treaty Initiative
ECC	Employment Control Committee
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
EU	European Union
FMCT	Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
FSD	Full Spectrum Deterrence
FU	First Use
GPS	Global Prompt Strikes
HGV	Hypersonic Glide Vehicle
IAF	Indian Air Force
IBG	Integrated Battle Group
ICBMs	Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
IOK	Indian Occupied Kashmir
IOR	Indian Ocean Region
IND	Indian Nuclear Doctrine
IPRI	Islamabad Policy Research Institute

ISI	Inter Services Intelligence
ISPR	Inter Services Public Relations
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
IT	Information Technology
JeM	Jaish-e-Mohammad
JDIAF	Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces
LAC	Line of Actual Control
LEMOA	Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba
LOC	Line of Control
LRSO	Long Range Standoff Missile
LWD	Land Warfare Doctrine
MAD	Mutual Assured Destruction
MIRVs	Multiple Independent-Targetable Reentry Vehicles
MR	Massive Retaliation
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NASB	National Security Advisor Board
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Origination
NCA	Nuclear Command Authority
NCBMs	Nuclear Confidence Building Measures
NFU	No First Use
NIA	National Investigation Agency
NNWS	Non-Nuclear Weapon States
NPT	Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
NWFZ	Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
NWS	Nuclear Weapon States
PAD	Prithvi Air Defense
PAF	Pakistan Air Force
PGMs	Precision Guided Munition
PLA	Peoples Liberation Army
POW	Prisoners of War
PSA	Public Safety Act
PTBT	Partial Test Ban Treaty
QPQP	Quid Pro Quo Plus
RAND	Research and Development
RSS	Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
RAW	Research and Analysis Wing
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SAM	Surface to Air Missile
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SPD	Strategic Planning Division
SLBM	Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles
SEATO	South East Asian Treaty Organization
TNW	Tactical Nuclear Weapon
UAVs	Unmanned Air vehicle
UNCIP	United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan

UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
NACVENT	US Naval Force Central Command
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Abstract

This thesis analyzes the impact of military doctrines on the conflict transformation between India and Pakistan through the prism of the stability-instability paradox and coercive spectrum. The nuclear weapons development and subsequent cross-border terrorism/proxies guided the two states to introduce offensive military doctrines which in turn led to conflict transformation by increasing military interaction while decreasing the level of violence. The primary questions addressed in the study are why has Indo-Pakistan reliance on offensive military doctrines increased after the development of nuclear weapon programs? How have evolving military doctrines led to conflict transformation between India and Pakistan? Case study design with mixed method and deductive reasoning are used in the thesis. Both the primary and secondary sources of data are used while adhering to in-depth interviews and document analysis techniques. The study finds that India and Pakistan fought large-scale wars employing brute force in the pre-nuclear era while both states employed coercive strategies such as compellence and deterrence to fight a low-intensity conflict (LIC) in line with the logic of stability-instability paradox in the post nuclear era. The study further finds that there is a significant transformation in the conflict where large-scale wars might not be possible due to Mutual Assured Destruction but offensive military doctrines have made the surgical strikes as a renewed pattern of bilateral likely engagement. The introduction of offensive military doctrines has reduced the intensity of violence and increased space for military operations with serious accidental and escalation risks attached. Thus, a new mechanism is offered to transform the two states' offensive doctrines into defensive mode for regional strategic stability.

Key Words: *Military Doctrine, Conflict Transformation, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, Crisis*

Contents

Thesis/Dissertation Approval Form.....	iii
Candidate Declaration Form.....	iv
Acknowledgments	vii
Dedication.....	viii
Abbreviations.....	ix
Abstract.....	xiv
List of Tables	xviii
List of Figures.....	xviii
Glossary	xix
Introduction.....	1
Background	1
Statement of the Problem	12
Research Questions	13
Core Argument.....	13
Objectives of the Study	13
Literature Review.....	14
Research Methodology.....	31
Delimitation of the Study	37
Significance of the Study	37
Organization of the Study	38
Chapter One	42
Conceptual Framework: Stability-Instability Paradox and Coercive Spectrum	42
Philosophical Debate: Military Doctrines	42
Theoretical Debate: India-Pakistan Conflict.....	44
Conclusion.....	66
Chapter Two.....	68
Pre-Nuclear Era: Military Strategies and Bilateral Confrontation (1947-1973).....	68
India-Pakistan War 1948: Strategies and Intensity of Violence	73
India-Pakistan War 1965: Strategies and Intensity of Violence	85
India-Pakistan War 1971: Strategies and Intensity of Violence	91
Conclusion.....	97
Chapter Three	99
Covert Nuclearization: Nuclear Weapons Development and Conflict Transformation (1974-1997)	99

India's Nuclear Test: Road to Pokhran-I:	99
India's Military Mechanization: Road to Offensive Military Doctrine	102
Sundarji Doctrine: Lightning Campaign	105
Operation Meghdoot	107
Brasstacks Crisis: First Test of Nuclear Deterrence.....	109
Violent Uprising in Kashmir: The Eruption of Compound Crisis	112
CTBT and FMCT: India-Pakistan Road to Overt Nuclearization.....	118
Conclusion.....	121
Chapter Four.....	123
Overt Nuclearization: Nuclear Weapons, Offensive Doctrines and Conflict	
Transformation (1998-2015).....	123
India's Nuclear Doctrine	124
Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine.....	128
Kargil Crisis: Transformed Conflict Dynamics	134
Twin Peaks Crisis 2001-2002	141
India's Offensive Cold Start Doctrine (CSD)	146
Mumbai Attacks – 2008	155
Pakistan's Offensive Response to India's CSD	159
Conclusion.....	167
Chapter Five.....	170
India's Evolving Offensive Doctrines: Manifestation of Compellence Strategy.....	170
India-US Strategic Partnership: A Boost to India's Doctrinal and Military Capabilities ..	170
Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces: Surgical Strikes to Counter Insurgency	175
Land Warfare Doctrine-2018: Supplement to JDIAF-2017.....	180
India's Offensive Doctrinal Changes: Aspiration to Join the US Club.....	183
A Critical Appraisal of Pakistan's Capability to Counter Terrorism.....	187
Conclusion.....	195
Chapter Six.....	196
India's Quest to Establish Surgical Strike as a New Normal (2016-2020)	196
Recurring Violent Incidents in Nuclearized South Asia	197
The Uri Attacks	200
Surgical Strike in 2016: Continuation of Old Normal?.....	201
Pulwama Terrorist Incident: Violence as a Recurring Pattern.....	209
Implementation of Offensive Approach: Surgical Strikes as a New Normal	212
US Crisis Management.....	220
Adequacy of Stability-Instability Paradox and Coercive Spectrum.....	224

Is India on a Road to Shift Nuclear Posture?	227
Conclusion.....	232
Chapter Seven	234
New Mechanism for Strategic Stability Amidst Offensive Doctrinal Changes.....	234
Minimizing Reliance on Offensive Military Doctrines and War Fighting Strategies.....	234
Curbing Proxies to Constrain Adventurism	236
US Role as a Crisis Manager and Peacebuilder	238
Kashmir Dispute: Thinking Out of the Box	240
Minimizing the Production of Offensive Technologies.....	242
Minimizing Risks of Accidental War.....	243
Reviving Comprehensive Confidence Building Measures	246
Risk Reductions Measures	247
Reducing Regional Asymmetries.....	248
Reviving a Strategic Restraint Regime	249
Role of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC).....	250
Conclusion.....	251
Conclusion	253
Bibliography	262
Annexure I: Respondents (In-depth Interviews).....	310
Annexure II: In-depth Interview Guidelines.....	315

List of Tables

Table 1: Variables Of The Study.....	34
Table 2: Pre Nuclear Era-India Pakistan 1 st War	76
Table 3: Pre Nuclear Era-India Pakistan 2 nd War	89
Table 4: Pre Nuclear Era-India Pakistan 3 rd War	95
Table 5: Pre Nuclear Era-Large Scale Wars, Strategies and Intensity of Violence	98
Table 6: Post Nuclear Era-Brasstacks Crisis	112
Table 7: Post Nuclear Era-Role of the US in Compound Crisis.....	115
Table 8: Post Nuclear Era-Compound Crisis	116
Table 9: Post Nuclear Era-Crises, Strategies and Intensity of Violence	122
Table 10: Post Nuclear Era-Kargil Crisis	138
Table 11: Post Nuclear Era-Role of the US in Kargil Crisis.....	140
Table 12: Post Nuclear Era-Twin Peaks Crisis	144
Table 13: Post Nuclear Era-Role of the US in Twin Peaks Crisis.....	146
Table 14: Post Nuclear Era-Mumbai Crisis.....	158
Table 15: Post Nuclear Era-Role of the US in Mumbai Crisis	159
Table 16: Post Nuclear Era-Crises, Strategies and Intensity of Violence	169
Table 17: Pakistan Counter Terrorism Operations	188
Table 18: Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan (2003-2016)	189
Table 19: Direct and Indirect Cost of Terrorism (2002-2014).....	189
Table 20: India's Funding to Terrorist Organizations.....	193
Table 21: Post Nuclear Era-Small Military Operations/ Raids (1991-2013)	202
Table 22: Post Nuclear Era-Uri Crisis	207
Table 23: Post Nuclear Era-Role of US in Uri Crisis	209
Table 24: Post Nuclear Era-Pulwama Balakot Crisis	219
Table 25: Nuclear Era-Role of the US as a Crises Manager (1986-2019)	224
Table 26: Adequacy Of Stability-Instability Paradox and Coercive Spectrum	226

List of Figures

Figure 1: Methodological Model	36
Figure 2 Theoretical Model: Stability-Instability Paradox And Coercive Spectrum	51
Figure 3: Coercive Spectrum.....	65

Glossary

S. No.	Concept	Definition
1	Military Doctrine	Military doctrines are “authoritative documents military forces use to guide their actions containing fundamental principles that require judgment in application.”
2	Conflict	It is a competition between two or more than two parties with conflicting goals. The parties pursue opposing objectives which means each belligerent party desires to achieve what the adversary also wants to get it. Thus, only one belligerent party can meet the demand making the competition zero-sum phenomenon.
3	Conflict Transformation	This thesis conceptualizes conflict transformation such as the doctrinal changes led to conflict transformation by creating space to launch small military operations, thereby converting large-scale wars into small military operations and surgical strikes under the nuclear domain, pointing to a reduction in the scale of violence.
4	Large-scale War	A conflict in which belligerents use all-out resources and are prepared to pay any cost in term of men and material to secure complete victory.
5	Limited War	A conflict in which state does not use all-out resources against the adversary and is short of total war with limited use of forces and force in perusal of narrow objectives.
6	Surgical Strike	It is a small military operation involving surprise that is conducted to engage specific target.
7	Counter-value	Counter-value strategy is aimed at attacking civilian value targets including population centre, cities and economic resources.
8	Counterforce	Counterforce strategy is aimed at attacking military installation including nuclear weapons.

Introduction

Background

India and Pakistan experienced conflictual relations since their inception. The rivalry between the two South Asian countries is still one of the most enduring and unsettled. Kashmir dispute and terrorism are the two prominent causes of protracted conflict between them. The animosity and militarism between the two states led to the nuclearization of the South Asian region. Despite the introduction of nuclear weapons, the rival states continued to engage in military confrontations even in the post-nuclear era. India and Pakistan revised their war-fighting strategies and introduced military doctrines to fight and win wars in both pre and post-nuclear era. For instance, the two rival states fought three large-scale wars employing brute force to win the wars in the pre-nuclear era while both the rival states experienced numerous crises including fighting a limited war in the post-nuclear era. India and Pakistan might have successfully managed to avoid large-scale wars due to Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), nevertheless, they continued to engage in low-intensity conflicts (LIC) and small military operations. Nevertheless, both states used the threat of use of force or actual use of limited force to resolve the conflict in the post-nuclear era.

While many scholars have conducted numerous studies¹ covering multiple dimensions of conflictual relations, however, little focus has been given to exploring the impact of doctrines on the conflict transformation between India and Pakistan. Evidently, the introduction of nuclear weapons made large-scale wars out of options due to the MAD, nevertheless, this acted as an impetus to devise doctrinal foundations to fight a limited war or launch small

¹ Sumit Ganguly, *Deadly Impasse: Indo-Pakistani Relations at the Dawn of a New Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Stephen P. Cohen, *Shooting for the Century: The India-Pakistan Conundrum* (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2013); Moeed Yusuf, *Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments: US Crisis Management in South Asia* (Stanford University Press, 2018); Yogesh Joshi, and Frank O'Donnell, *India and Nuclear Asia: Forces, Doctrine, and Dangers* (Georgetown University Press, 2018); and Feroz Hassan Khan, *Subcontinent Adrift: Strategic Futures of South Asia* (Cambria Press, 2022).

military operations without crossing the nuclear thresholds. This makes the India-Pakistan case study distinct and interesting where on the one hand, these states engaged in frequent small military operations while on the other hand, a reduction in the intensity of violence was observed between the two states. Thus, this thesis majorly investigates the question such as how and why evolving military doctrines led to conflict transformation between India and Pakistan particularly under the nuclear domain. Before moving ahead, it is important to conceptualize evolving doctrines and conflict transformation for the convenience of the readership.

Conceptualization of Military Doctrine

Military doctrines are “authoritative documents military forces use to guide their actions containing fundamental principles that require judgment in application.”² To be specific, the military doctrine is a set of concepts regarding how, when and, which types of military operation can be appropriately employed to achieve the national security objectives.³ The doctrine covers various levels of engagement such as strategic, operational, and tactical, thus, it covers the entire spectrum of the conflict. Doctrinal innovation is a common phenomenon, especially at the tactical and operational levels, nevertheless, major doctrinal changes require more budget, new equipment, and changed structures are tougher, infrequent, and more consequential.⁴ In broader terms, the doctrines are not just a collection of concepts or guidelines; these are developed by states to implement in both peace and war times to secure national security objectives.

² Harald Høiback, *Understanding Military Doctrine* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 11.

³ Christopher Twomey, *The Military Lens: Doctrinal Difference and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 21-2.

⁴ Stephen Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 7-8.

Few studies have been conducted to find answers to questions such as why a military doctrine is sometimes implemented and at other times states failed to do so.⁵ Notably, it is difficult to measure to what extent a specific state in a certain conflict implemented a military doctrine, nevertheless, focusing on ends (objectives) could justify the means (strategies employed). For the convenience of understanding the logic of research employed in this study, the evolving doctrines are conceptualized by narrowing it down to the particular type of military operations along with its intended objective. For instance, India long searched for a space to wage a limited war or carry out precision strikes to counter alleged terrorist outfits across the border under the nuclear domain. Subsequently, India introduced military doctrines such as the Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces (JDIAF-2017)⁶ and Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD-2018)⁷ to achieve national security objectives including counter-insurgency within the country or across international borders. Thus, the doctrinal changes provide requisite guidelines to carry out conventional operations on a limited scale conceptualized as small military operations in this thesis.

The JDIAF-2017 notes the provision of surgical strikes across the border to target terrorist groups allegedly involved in terrorism in Indian Administered Kashmir or elsewhere in India.⁸ Whereas, the LWD-2018 not only acknowledges the existence of JDIAF-2017 but also mentions the launch of military operations with depth, effect, sophistication, and precision.⁹ The common intended objective of India's evolving military doctrines is to carry out limited military operations such as surgical strikes to target terrorist outfits across the

⁵ See John Nisser, "Implementing Military Doctrine: A Theoretical Model," *Comparative Strategy* 40, no. 3 (2021): 305-14, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2021.1912514>.

⁶ See *Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces* (New Delhi: Directorate of Doctrine, Headquarters Integrated Defense Staff).

⁷ See *Indian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 2018* (Government of India, December 2018).

⁸ See *Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces*, 14.

⁹ See *Land Warfare Doctrine 2018*, 3.

borders without crossing Pakistan's nuclear redlines, thereby directing the two states to renewed patterns of bilateral engagement. The nuclear weapons and terrorism guided the states to introduce offensive military doctrines by increasing military interaction while shrinking the intensity of violence pointing to the conflict transformation between India and Pakistan.

Conceptualization of Conflict Transformation

To be clear, the concept of conflict transformation employed in this study is different from the connotation used in the discipline of peace and conflict studies. For instance, John Paul Lederach,¹⁰ an expert in peace and conflict studies views conflict transformation as a holistic and all-inclusive approach to resolving conflicts. He focuses on structural aspects of the conflicts and emphasizes including all stakeholders, initiating a dialogue process, and inculcating a sense of responsibility and ownership to find the solutions to the conflict. Peace and conflict scholars focus on the significance of cross-cultural sensitivities, negotiations, and cooperation to resolve conflicts. Thus, in the traditional sense, the conflict transformation is considered to be in the domain of peace and conflict studies as a subject.

Notably, the concept of conflict transformation employed in this study is distinct from the lexicon of peace and conflict studies and is used in the literal sense only. Further, this study seeks guidance from Saira Khan's¹¹ interpretation of the conflict transformation. For instance, she assumes conflict transformation such as the introduction of nuclear weapons did not end tensions between India and Pakistan that led both countries to fight LIC. Nevertheless, this thesis conceptualizes conflict transformation such as the doctrinal changes led to conflict

¹⁰ John Paul Lederach, *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation across Cultures* (Syracuse University Press, 1996); and John Paul Lederach, *Reconcile: Conflict Transformation for Ordinary Christians* (MennoMedia, Inc., 2014).

¹¹ Saira Khan, *Nuclear Weapons and Conflict Transformation: The Case of India-Pakistan* (London: Routledge, 2009).

transformation by creating space to launch small military operations thereby converting large-scale wars into small military operations such as surgical strikes under the nuclear domain, pointing to a reduction in the scale of violence.

Evolving India-Pakistan Conflict: Identifying the Problem

India and Pakistan fought three large-scale in 1948, 1965, and 1971 in the pre-nuclear era. The rival countries employed brute force involving strategies of offense and defense to win the wars. The two states did not announce official military doctrines in the pre-nuclear era. Although, India initially employed a defense-in-depth strategy¹² while Pakistan followed a defensive offensive strategy.¹³ India's strategic thinking transformed after the Indo-Sino 1962 war. India shifted to an offensive-defensive strategy majorly to counter China's threat with less focus on Pakistan.¹⁴ The enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan continued to strengthen its roots, thereby, the two states fought their second war in 1965 in the wake of an uprising in Indian Administered Kashmir, the conflict ended only in a stalemate. The Indian armed forces efficiently employed a lightning campaign based on an offensive-defensive strategy in the 1971 war. India secured significant strategic success against Pakistan by dissecting the latter into two halves, which ultimately led to the creation of Bangladesh.

Indisputably, India enjoyed conventional superiority vis-à-vis Pakistan in the pre-nuclear era, nevertheless, it perceived China as a major threat particularly, in the wake of the 1962 war. India conducted first nuclear test in 1974 and termed it a Peaceful Nuclear

¹² Major K. C. Praval, *Indian Army after Independence* (New Delhi: Lancer International 1987), 218.

¹³ Author's Interview with Lieutenant General (Retd.) Tariq Khan, June 05, 2022. Lieutenant General Khan, HI (M) is a retired Pakistan Army General Officer who was the Commander of I Strike Corps at Mangla. A war hero, he has been the Inspector General of the Frontier Corps from September 2008 till October 2010.

¹⁴ Tapakshi Magan, *Analysis of Indian Defense Approach in Last 70 Years* (New Delhi: KW Publishers New Delhi, 2018), 9.

Explosion.¹⁵ India's successful military expeditions in the 1971 war, acquisition of nuclear technology, and enhanced military mechanization boosted its confidence to undergo much-needed doctrinal changes to meet its national security objectives. For instance, India introduced the Sundarji doctrine in 1981, with the objective of launching deep and swift offensive military operations against the adversary.¹⁶ Subsequently, Pakistan introduced new war-fighting strategies such as Preemptive Operations and Reposte to counter India's threat. India tested its newly developed doctrine by launching Operation Brasstacks in 1986-7. The military exercise involved massive mobilization of forces; one of the largest in South Asia and even comparable to military maneuvers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe, that ultimately converted into a crisis reckoned as the Brasstacks Crisis.¹⁷ Islamabad perceived that India's military maneuver is aimed to target Pakistan's nuclear installation to halt its nuclear program. Significantly, in the aftermath of the East Pakistan debacle, Pakistan covertly acquired nuclear weapons in the mid-1980s to ensure its territorial sovereignty. Pakistan for the first time threatened India with the use of nuclear weapons in case of any eventuality from India's side. India failed to implement any military offensive against Pakistan, thus the crisis did not escalate to large-scale war or use of nuclear weapons majorly due to nuclear deterrence.

India and Pakistan experienced yet another crisis in the wake of covert nuclearization, reckoned as the Compound Crisis in 1990 amidst the violent uprising in the Indian Administered Kashmir.¹⁸ India blamed Pakistan for supporting the militants while Pakistan denied the charges, adding a new pattern in the conflict dynamics between India and Pakistan.

¹⁵ J. Samuel Walker, "Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation: The Controversy over Nuclear Exports, 1974–1980," *Diplomatic History* 25, no. 2 (March 2001): 220, <https://doi.org/10.1111/0145-2096.00260>.

¹⁶ Aghijnan Rej, and Shashank Joshi, *India's Joint Doctrine: A Lost Opportunity* (Observer Research Foundation, 2018), 11-12.

¹⁷ Devin T. Hagerty, *The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia* (MIT Press, 1998).

¹⁸ Vipin Narang, "Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability," *International Security* 34, no. 3 (2010): 38-78, <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2010.34.3.38>.

Nevertheless, the conflict did not escalate to convert into limited or large-scale wars due to nuclear deterrence. More particularly, the United States (US) for the first time diplomatically engaged both countries' leadership and played an efficient role in averting the conflict escalation.

Both India and Pakistan detonated their nuclear devices in 1998. Subsequently, India based on the principle of credible minimum deterrence (CMD) declared a nuclear posture of No First Use (NFU).¹⁹ Pakistan did not officially announce its nuclear doctrine. Apparently, based on officials statements it seems Pakistan adheres to the principle of minimum credible deterrence (MCD) while pursuing First Use (FU) as a nuclear posture.²⁰ Ostensibly, India and Pakistan introduced their nuclear postures mainly to avoid wars. Nevertheless, the two rival states fought the Kargil War in the immediate aftermath of overt nuclearization,²¹ though limited in its scale and objective. Pakistan's ambitiously crafted compellence strategy resulted in one of the most riskiest military confrontations between the two nuclear-armed countries that carried serious escalation risks. Like the Compound Crisis, the US intervention (due to overt nuclearization) in this crisis also contributed to de-escalate the conflict between the two rival states. Few scholars categorized the Kargil Crisis as the result of the stability-instability paradox while others claimed that this may not necessarily be the case.²²

¹⁹ Kumar, Sundaram, and M. V. Ramana, "India and the Policy of No First Use of Nuclear Weapons," *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament* 1, no. 1 (2018): 152-168, <https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2018.1438737>.

²⁰ Zafar Khan, "Pakistan's Nuclear First-Use Doctrine: Obsessions and Obstacles," *Contemporary Security Policy* 36, no. 1 (2015): 149-170, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2015.1012349>.

²¹ Mark S. Bell, and Julia Macdonald, "How Dangerous was Kargil? Nuclear Crises in Comparative Perspective," *The Washington Quarterly* 42, no. 2 (2019): 135-148, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1626691>.

²² Christopher J. Watterson, "Competing Interpretations of the Stability–Instability Paradox: The Case of the Kargil War," *The Nonproliferation Review* 24, no. 1-2 (2017): 83-99, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2017.1366623>.

India and Pakistan started to experience sub-conventional warfare including proxies and insurgencies with the acquisition of nuclear weapons, making it an interesting case to study through the lens of the stability-instability paradox. For instance, two successive terrorist attacks in the Indian Administered Kashmir and India in 2001 and 2002 led to the eruption of the Twin Peaks Crisis. India blamed Pakistan for supporting militant groups such as Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) to be involved in the terrorist incidents while Pakistan denied the charges.²³ India launched Operation Parakram based on compellence strategy involving massive mobilization of forces with an aim to punish Pakistan which the latter responded with counter-mobilization to deter the former.²⁴ The US engaged in the war on terror campaign in Afghanistan saw the tensions between India and Pakistan against its interests in the region. Thus, the US this time again succeeded in de-escalating the conflict between the two states.

Both India and Pakistan refrained from going into large-scale wars or acting in a way that might provoke the other to use nuclear weapons in retaliation. Importantly, India learned a lesson that there is space available to fight below the nuclear overhang. India devised a new force employment strategy such as the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) in 2004 with the objective of fighting a limited war to punish Pakistan for its alleged support of terrorism.²⁵ The idea behind the offensive force employment strategy expressed India's intention, to shrink the scale of violence that would not activate the escalation ladder to an extent that it might cross the nuclear thresholds of Pakistan. Correspondingly, Pakistan offensively responded to India's

²³ Michael Krepon, and Nate Cohn, *Crises in South Asia: Trends and Potential Consequences* (Henry L. Stimson Center, 2011), 3.

²⁴ See P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Stephen P. Cohen, *Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2007), 153.

²⁵ Walter C. Ladwig III, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine," *International Security* 32, no. 3 (2007): 158-190.

CSD. Pakistan introduced Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) and developed Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW), thereby bringing down the nuclear thresholds.²⁶ The real test for India was to implement the newly developed offensive force employment strategy. Significantly, terrorism continued to jolt the nuclear South Asia in the shape of terrorist incidents such as the Mumbai Attacks. Nevertheless, India exercised a restraint response and did not decide to implement the offensive force employment strategy in the wake of the Mumbai Attacks. Thus, the introduction of nuclear weapons and terrorism led to the development of offensive war-fighting strategies, thereby making the conflict dynamics more complex and peace volatile.

The doctrinal and structural lacunas of the Indian armed forces pushed India to adopt a restraint response. Since the start of the twenty-first century, India has been facing double threats such as terrorism occurring on a regular basis in the Indian Administered Kashmir and elsewhere in India while the other was even more threatening, that the China factor. China's growing influence in the region further added up to India's security concerns. Luckily, the post-9/11 scenario came up as an opportunity for India. For instance, the US found India a natural ally to counter rising China. This is why, the convergence of interests between the US and India led to building closer ties since the start of the century. India gathered vital US support in its quest to counter the violent insurgency in Indian Administered Kashmir and elsewhere in India. In turn, the US wanted India to act as a net security provider to stabilize the region against China. The Indo-US ties assisted India in improving its economic and military capabilities. India underwent massive force modernization which ultimately altered the security parameters for Pakistan. For instance, India adopted a more offensive approach to counter-terrorism in the

²⁶ Adil Sultan, "India's Nuclear Doctrine: A Case of Strategic Dissonance or Deliberate Ambiguity," *Islamabad Policy Research Institute Journal* 18, no. 2 (2018): 26-52.

wake of a changing US interest in the region where the latter supported the former's stance on terrorism.

Terrorism remained a significant cause of sparking conflict escalation in the South Asian nuclearized environment. The two nuclear-armed states blamed each other for supporting and perpetrating terrorism in their respective territories. Particularly, India introduced new offensive military doctrines and war-fighting strategies with the objective of punishing Pakistan for its alleged involvement in terrorism. Nevertheless, India failed to launch a limited war or aerial surgical strikes in the Twin Peaks Crisis, and the Mumbai Attacks. Contrarily, India with the explicit US approval evident via statements of the US officials, in the aftermath of the Uri terrorist attack, based on a compellence strategy, carried out a raid or surgical strike involving ground troops across the LOC in 2016. Pakistan denied any involvement in the terrorist incident and further invalidated any Indian troop's targeted military operation on its side of LoC. It is important to mention here, that India and Pakistan carried out these kinds of raids or surgical strikes involving ground troops across the LoC in the past, nevertheless, neither state publicized it.²⁷ This thesis categorizes small military operations such as raids or surgical strikes across the LoC under the nuclear domain, as old normal.

Notably, the terrorist incidents continued to occur in a nuclearized environment. India long searched for a space to fight LIC under the nuclear domain. India introduced offensive doctrinal changes such as JDIAF-2017 and LWD-2018 to address its national security objectives such as to counter two-front threats. Nevertheless, the new offensive military doctrines changed India's approach to counter-insurgency. The Indian armed forces

²⁷ Patrick Bratton and David Smith, "India's Joint Doctrine: Hopeless Muddle, or the Start of Strategic Articulation?," *War Room* (June 6, 2017), <https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/indias-joint-doctrine-hopeless-muddle-start-strategic-articulation/>.

documented doctrines provide the requisite guidelines to launch small military operations and surgical strikes to target militants in the country and across international borders.

Consequently, India based on a compellence strategy launched an aerial surgical strike to target an alleged terrorist outfit located at Balakot deep inside Pakistani territory in 2019.²⁸ India claimed to have destroyed the training camp of JeM, a terrorist outfit, allegedly based in Pakistan that accepted responsibility for the terrorist incident in Pulwama, in Indian Administered Kashmir, killing about forty troops on February 14, 2019.²⁹ Pakistan Air Force (PAF) on the next day retaliated by locking and hitting targets in its aerial strikes in the Indian Administered Kashmir and also shooting down an Indian Air Force (IAF) fighter jet in a dogfight.³⁰ Thus, the eruption of the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis in the wake of terrorist incidents became one of the most dangerous crises since the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the two states. India based on doctrinal changes launched aerial surgical strikes across the international border, crossing new frontiers, the first of its kind since 1971. Previously, India and Pakistan used to carry out raids or surgical strikes across the LoC, involving ground troops, termed as old normal. Nevertheless, the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis indicates that the surgical strikes is a new normal in India-Pakistan conflict, pointing to the renewed pattern of bilateral military engagement.

Theoretically speaking, MAD has contributed to ensure stability by deterring all-out war between India and Pakistan, however, the strategic stability provided the caution to both countries to fight LIC based on coercive strategies (compellence and deterrence) involving

²⁸ Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, *India's Surgical Strike Stratagem: Brinkmanship and Response* (Khursheed Printers (Pvt) Ltd – 2019), 147.

²⁹ Joanna Slater, "India Strikes Pakistan in Severe Escalation of Tensions between the Nuclear Rivals," *The Washington Post*, February 26, 2019, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/pakistan-says-indian-fighter-jets-crossed-into/>.

³⁰ Air Cdre Kaiser Tufail (Retired), "Changing Dynamics of Air Warfare in South Asia and Future Challenges for PAF," in *Pulwama-Balakot Crisis & Operation Swift Retort*, ed. Saima Aman Sial (Islamabad: Centre for International Strategic Studies, 2020), 5-6.

limited war, sub-conventional warfare and surgical strikes. Despite numerous crises, not a single event escalated to large-scale war which point out to the efficacy of deterrence, as it continues to prevent escalation to large-scale war. Nevertheless, India's compellence strategy generates an interesting theoretical and doctrinal question, Is India's compellence strategy, an indication of change in its nuclear posture, as compellence contradicts minimum deterrence?³¹ The shift in the military doctrines is indicative of conflict transformation which in turn makes small military operations and surgical strikes more likely, thereby creating enormous risks for regional crisis stability.

Statement of the Problem

The introduction of nuclear weapons could not secure peace between India and Pakistan but rather guided them into sub-conventional warfare i.e., adventurism of cross-border terrorism and proxies to exploit peace. The two states in turn increased their reliance on the offensive doctrines to win peace instead of adhering to defensive doctrines to avert military engagement. The offensive doctrines led to conflict transformation by increasing the frequency of bilateral military confrontation while decreasing the scale of violence. This further led to making precision strikes a new normal between the two states. Additionally, India's employment of a compellence strategy in the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis involving limited use of force generates an interesting theoretical and doctrinal debate about how surgical strikes are visibly becoming a new normal and how India's coercive strategy points to an indication of the change in its nuclear posture turning it into war-fighting mode. Based on the above rationale, this thesis deeply analyzes Indo-Pakistan's increased reliance on offensive doctrines and their resulting impact on conflict transformation.

³¹ Rajesh Basrur, *Minimum Deterrence, and India's Nuclear Security* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 100.

Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the study are:

1. To analyze the compelling factors behind India-Pakistan's increasing reliance on offensive military doctrines.
2. To investigate the impact of evolving doctrines on conflict transformation between India and Pakistan.
3. To provide a roadmap for achieving strategic stability in the backdrop of changing military doctrines.

Research Questions

The research questions investigated in this study are:

1. Why has India-Pakistan's reliance on offensive doctrines increased after the development of nuclear weapon programs?
2. How have evolving military doctrines led to conflict transformation between India and Pakistan?
3. How can strategic stability be achieved between India and Pakistan in the backdrop of their changing military doctrines?

Core Argument

The nuclear weapons development and subsequent cross-border terrorism/proxies have increased states' reliance on the offensive military doctrines. The offensive military doctrines in turn have led to conflict transformation by increasing the frequency of small military operations while decreasing the level of violence thus making peace volatile and strategic stability fragile.

Literature Review

This thesis primarily focuses on the impact of evolving doctrines on conflict transformation between India and Pakistan. The existing body of literature is organized below thematically on the subject under investigation for the convenience of readership.

Effects of Military Doctrine on Interstate Disputes

The impact of military doctrines on interstate disputes is a complex topic. It has drawn significant interest of scholars from across the international intellectual community. This section of the literature review generally discusses the effect of military doctrine on interstate crises.

Barry Posen³² in his book systemically elaborated nature and characteristics of the military doctrine. The publication mainly attempted to discuss different aspects that influenced doctrinal developments and their subsequent execution during the interwar period through the lens of organizational theory and balance of power theory. The case studies of German, French, and Britain military doctrines indicated that factors such as history, geopolitics, domestic political conditions, and military organizations played an influential role in devising the nature and type of military strategies. Further, the study proposes that the learning lessons of past conflicts played a significant role in introducing new military doctrines. The book is a substantial contribution to the existing body of knowledge particularly to understand the correlation between the military doctrine and subsequent, execution to analyze its impact on the character of warfare.

³² Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars* (Cornell University Press, 1984).

Dan Reiter³³ investigated the role of military strategies on the initiation of interstate wars. The author used quantitative empirical case studies with sample size covering the timespan from 1903 to 1992. The study concluded that the states with maneuvering military strategies such as blitzkrieg in World War II, are more prone to initiate disputes. The dispute is likely to escalate, particularly, if the adversary's military strategy is based on attrition. The study findings are beneficial to broaden understanding regarding the role of the military doctrines and their impact on conflict dynamics between India and Pakistan, as both continuously developed new warfighting strategies and military doctrines to achieve escalation dominance in the region.

Stephen Van Evera³⁴ argues that the cult of offense is the significant cause of the outbreak of World War I. He highlighted that the military strategists adored offensive military doctrines while the civilian leadership and the masses perceived the offensive approach to be the most effective solution to manage security concerns. The study concluded that the offensive military doctrines do influence the outbreak of the war. The author scholarly linked the consequences of the offensive military doctrine to counter-force strategies and pointed to the risks associated with counter-force including as well as going beyond the problems of crisis instability and preemptive war in the context of Cold War dynamics. The findings are beneficial to this thesis as both India and Pakistan have developed offensive military doctrines, particularly under the nuclear domain which demands further inquiry.

³³ Dan Reiter, "Military Strategy and the Outbreak of International Conflict Quantitative Empirical Tests, 1903-1992," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43, No. 3 (June 1999): 366-387, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002799043003005>.

³⁴ Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," *International Security* 9, no. 1 (1984): 58-107, <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.9.1.58>.

Evera,³⁵ in another study pointed out the significance of factors such as military capabilities, geography, technology, military doctrine, diplomatic engagement, balance of power, alliance-making, and strategic thinking that inclusively influence the states' decision-making processes to adopt offensive or defensive strategies in a certain conflict. The author tested the efficacy of offense-defense theory in explaining the interstate crisis covering the three centuries of the great power rivalries. The study concluded that the state's potential gains can act as an impetus to lead it to adopt the offensive approach which ultimately increases the likelihood of interstate conflict. Evidently, in the India-Pakistan case, the two rival states have introduced offensive war-fighting strategies and military doctrines to get their potential gains even in the post-nuclear era. For instance, Pakistan launched the Kargil War based on a revisionist approach to get territorial gains vis-à-vis India.

Damon Coletta³⁶ provides a detailed analysis of the relationship between the security doctrine and force employment in the international crises. The study selected two case studies, one from the British Empire and the other from the Cold War. The author argues that the security doctrine is an important guiding document that affects the state's strategic calculations, planning, and associated decision-making processes regarding the force employment in interstate crises. The study finds that the security doctrines provide requisite guidelines to the states about the use of force but also play a role in determining the outcome of the crises.

Douglas M. Hart³⁷ provides a critical understanding of the Soviet crisis management approaches. The study is focused on questions such as how the Soviet Union military perceived

³⁵ Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," *International Security* 22, no. 4 (1998): 5-43, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539239>.

³⁶ Damon Coletta, *The Power of Security Doctrine over the Use of Force in International Crises* (Duke University, 1999).

³⁷ Douglas M. Hart, "Soviet Approaches to Crisis Management: The Military Dimension," *Survival* 26, no. 5 (1984): 214-223, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338408442196>.

and retorted to different crises in the Cold War era. The study concluded that the Soviet military doctrines are event-based and more focused on conflict initiation through preemption strategy, however, this is not the case in all previous crises, for instance 1973 war. At times, the Soviet employed offensive action to support diplomatic signals but that would place it in a better position if the efforts failed to avert war. An effective strategy against the Soviet is by reducing ambiguity, thereby dampening the Soviet fear of losing control over the conflictual event. Even though the research work is a substantial contribution to understanding Soviet crisis management, nevertheless, the India-Pakistan conflict dynamics are distinct vis-à-vis Cold War patterns, which demands further investigation.

Shashank Joshi³⁸ offers a detailed analysis of why India failed to implement CSD. Joshi pointed to obstacles such as the presence of nuclear weapons, fear of limited war escalation to a strategic level, and a few other factors related to organizational and structural problems. The author argues that India's doctrinal posture is in split and lacks clarity. The study concluded that India cannot respond to Pakistan's asymmetric proxy war, as a massive retaliation response is disproportionate while Pakistan's nuclear response to a limited war makes it unfeasible for India to implement CSD. Nevertheless, the focus of this thesis is India's new developed military doctrines such as JDIAF-2017 and LWD-2018 to introduce new options to counter insurgency within India and across the international border.

Dong Sun Lee³⁹ investigated the relationship between power shift and the outbreak of war. Lee selected twelve power shifts between the rival great powers covering the timespan from 1860 to 1945. The author made a comprehensive analysis through the prism of four

³⁸ Shashank Joshi, "India's Military Instrument: A Doctrine Stillborn," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, no. 4 (2013): 512-540, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2013.766598>.

³⁹ Dong Sun Lee, "When are Power Shifts Dangerous? Military Strategy and Preventive War," *Journal of International and Area Studies* 13, no. 2 (2006): 53-71, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43111457>.

different theories to understand the intricate relationship between military strategies, power shifts, and the initiation of war. The author argues that the war is likely if the decliner state has a maneuver strategy, nevertheless, if it pursues an attrition strategy, peace will be the likely outcome. The study concluded that the declining state military strategy remained the causal factor in determining the outcome of the power shift.

Arzan Tarapore⁴⁰ critically dissected the efficacy of India's military doctrine to counter the two-front threat. The author highlighted the existing security challenges to India. He emphasized the need to reevaluate Indian military doctrine concerning the use of force. The author stresses the need for a change in military doctrine from a territorial-based conventional approach to a more robust and flexible approach that integrates new technologies and associated asymmetric warfare strategies. The study concluded that the Indian Army needs to develop its military doctrine to fight a two-front war, covering the entire spectrum of threats from fighting large-scale conventional war to limited incursions across the border to counter insurgency.

Walter C. Ladwig III⁴¹ analyzed the correlation between India's military modernization and conventional deterrence between India and Pakistan. The author argued that India's military modernization might be problematic on the surface, however, the critical examination indicates that the conventional deterrence is intact so far. Alarming, Pakistan is using India's force modernization as a justification to undertake initiatives including the development of TNW which severely hampered upon the strategic stability of South Asia. Further, Pakistan's collaboration with China and the US mitigated conventional asymmetries and even plugged

⁴⁰ Arzan Tarapore, *The Army in Indian Military Strategy: Rethink Doctrine or Risk Irrelevance* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2020).

⁴¹ Walter C. Ladwig III, "Indian Military Modernization and Conventional Deterrence in South Asia," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 38, no. 5 (2015): 729-772, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1014473>.

the gaps. The author rejected pessimist's logic of eroding deterrence in South Asia. Instead, he asserted that there are numerous factors such as geography, armed forces capability, deployment, and lack of surprise element which are successfully upholding Pakistan's conventional deterrence posture vis-à-vis India. The study concluded that despite having the capability, India is unlikely to wage a limited war or carry out aerial surgical strikes, where each action will lead to deterrence failure. This thesis looks into India's surgical strike deep inside Pakistan, in its quest to establish surgical strike as a new normal in India-Pakistan bilateral military engagements.

A group of Pakistani scholars⁴² analyzed evolving Indian military strategy and its likely impact on Pakistan's security environment. The authors looked into India's continuous doctrinal changes such as CSD and JDIAF-2017 to fight a limited war or launch a surgical strike under the nuclear domain. The authors argued that Indian armed forces are integrating their warfare capabilities via emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, cyber warfare, and space-based weapons to get an edge over adversaries. Thus, the doctrinal changes and force modernization are generating strategic instability in South Asia. The study concluded that these developments have generated serious security concerns in Pakistan. The authors further recommended that Pakistan is required to undergo strategic recalibration to counter the emerging threats.

Ali Ahmed⁴³ offers a detailed analysis of India's doctrinal developments and subsequent impact on the interstate relations. The author argues that the introduction of nuclear weapons poses a significant threat in conflict-prone South Asia. The study examines India's

⁴² Masood ur Rehman Khattak, Muhammad Khan, and Ghulam Qumber, "Evolution of New Indian Military Strategy: Implications for Pakistan," *Margalla Papers* 23, no. 1 (2019): 29-39.

⁴³ Ali Ahmed, *India's Doctrine Puzzle: Limiting War in South Asia* (London: Routledge, 2014).

doctrinal evolution with a focus on factors linked to strategic thinking such as nuclear weapons, technological developments, force modernization, and regional hostilities. For instance, India introduced changes in conventional and nuclear doctrines in the wake Kargil War. The study concluded by deliberating upon India's intentions to wage a limited war and/ or preemptive strikes and raised questions about its efficacy in gaining national security objectives.

Richard K. Betts⁴⁴ investigated the uncertainties linked with deterrence, mainly in the conventional warfare realm. The author claimed that the existing body of knowledge overestimated the NATO's reliance on conventional military capabilities. The real source of deterrence was the US commitment to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union if the latter launched a conventional attack on Western Europe. The author indicated the limitations of conventional deterrence in dealing with a range of threats. He recommended that the ever-increasing intricacies and uncertainties linked to modern warfare demand a reevaluation of deterrence theory. The study concludes that the only inclusive doctrine that can hedge versus all variants holds a nuclear element.

Ryan French⁴⁵ critically scrutinizes the phenomenon of nuclear deterrence with a particular focus on terrorism and India's offensive CSD. India developed offensive force employment strategy with an objective to wage a limited war against Pakistan without crossing the latter's nuclear redlines. India's doctrinal innovation is based on the premise that it will be able to establish escalation control and prevent the succeeding conflict from going out of hands. The study concluded that any limited military operation has the potential to convert into a conventional, further leading to the use of nuclear weapons putting deterrence stability of the

⁴⁴ Richard K. Betts, "Conventional Deterrence: Predictive Uncertainty and Policy Confidence," *World Politics* 37, no. 2 (1985): 153-179, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010141>.

⁴⁵ Ryan French, "Deterrence Adrift? Mapping Conflict and Escalation in South Asia," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 10, no. 1 (2016): 106-137, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26271089>.

South Asia in danger. While the study offers valuable understanding regarding the challenges posed by terrorism and CSD, however, it leaves space for additional research mainly focused on recent doctrinal developments such as JDIAF-2017 and phenomena like the February episode 2019.

General V. P. Malik⁴⁶ in his book elaborates on various military conflicts; such as Operation Pawan with disastrous results for India in Sri Lanka, and successful Operation Cactus to thwart a coup d'état in the Maldives. Drawing from the past experiences, the author shared a valuable account of India's political and military leadership complex decision-making process in military operations with the corresponding diplomatic initiatives undertaken for peaceful conflict resolution. The study is an important source for understanding India's military engagements and the intricacies involved in the decision-making processes during the crisis, nevertheless, it does not cover all of the military conflicts, particularly in the post-nuclear such as the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis which demands further inquiry.

Zafar Nawaz Jaspal⁴⁷ in his book comprehensively analyzes the philosophical bedrock behind India's doctrinal changes, organizational evolution, and employment of surgical strike stratagem. The author argues that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led government used surgical strikes as a means to establish its hegemony in the South Asian region. He further critically analyzes the legal status of India's surgical strike strategy in the context of International Law and concludes that the surgical strikes are risky and illegal for peace and stability in the region.

⁴⁶ V. P. Malik, *India's Military Conflicts and Diplomacy: An inside View of Decision-Making* (HarperCollins India Publishers Pvt Limited, 2019).

⁴⁷ Jaspal, *India's Surgical Strike Stratagem*.

Christopher Clary, and Vipin Narang⁴⁸ focuses on the notion of India's counterforce temptations aimed at developing requisite capabilities to directly target rivals' strategic installations. It critically analyzes India's doctrinal evolution, nuclear posturing, and force modernization initiatives undertaken to increase conventional military and nuclear capabilities to counter China's threat in particular. The study concluded that India's counterforce posture could dent strategic stability in South Asia.

Effects of Nuclear Proliferation on Inter-state Crises

This part of the literature review majorly focuses on understanding the effects of the nuclear proliferation on the inter-state crises.

Jacek Kugler⁴⁹ examines the role of nuclear deterrence in the preservation of peace. The study rejected the traditional understanding that the nuclear weapons act as a reliable deterrent in interstate conflicts. The author analyzed the historical incidents that occurred since 1945 and provided the empirical evidence to prove his argument. He finds that there is no significant difference in the behavior of nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states in the crisis. And also, there is no substantial evidence that refers to the role of the nuclear weapons in ensuring stability between the great powers. The study concluded that the nuclear weapons might not evade crises as hitherto understood.

Mark S. Bell and Julia Macdonald⁵⁰ tries to understand the role of the nuclear weapons in interstate crises by focusing on two variables such as the incentives to use nuclear weapons

⁴⁸ Christopher Clary, and Vipin Narang, "India's Counterforce Temptations: Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine, and Capabilities," *International Security* 43, no. 3 (2018): 7-52, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00340.

⁴⁹ Jacek Kugler, "Terror without Deterrence: Reassessing the Role of Nuclear Weapons," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28, no. 3 (1984): 470-506, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002784028003005>.

⁵⁰ Mark S. Bell and Julia Macdonald, "How to Think about Nuclear Crises," *Texas National Security Review* 2, no. 2 (February 2019): 41-64, <http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/1944>.

and other is the degree of control the leaders have on conflict escalation. The study used the case studies of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Kargil War, the Doklam Crisis, and the US-North Korean Crisis. The author argued that based on two dimensions, there are four types of crises such as staircase, stability-instability, brinkmanship, and firestorm. Nevertheless, none of the models discussed is correct. The author concluded that the variation in data indicated that different models apply to different cases, thus, each nuclear crisis should be understood concerning its peculiar dynamics. The findings are beneficial in understanding the role of nuclear weapons in interstate crises, however, this thesis goes beyond its scope and systematically focuses on the connection between nuclear weapons, terrorism, and military doctrine to understand the conflict dynamics between India and Pakistan through the prism of stability-instability paradox and coercive spectrum.

Michael S. Gerson⁵¹ evaluated the concept of conventional deterrence under the nuclear domain. The author argued that the conventional military capabilities play a vital role in preventing offensive military action and ensuring stability between states under the nuclear domain. The study elaborated, the changing patterns of warfare to relate it with the nature of deterrence strategies to counter security threats in the second nuclear age. The author recommended that the increased role of conventional forces demands changed approaches such as conventional capabilities, new war-fighting strategies, and military doctrines, force employment, and strategic communication to ensure deterrence against conventional and nuclear forces. Nevertheless, the nuclear weapons will remain relevant, and integration between conventional military capability and nuclear power is mandatory for effective deterrence in a range of conflicts.

⁵¹ Michael S. Gerson, "Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age," *Parameters* 39, no. 3 (Autumn 2009): 32-48, doi:10.55540/0031-1723.2486.

Mark S. Bell and Nicholas L. Miller⁵² examined the role of nuclear weapons in interstate conflict and challenged the traditional understanding about it. The study used historical data and quantitative methodology. It challenged the applicability of the stability-stability paradox including the nuclear pessimist and nuclear optimists where the nuclear dyad is not evaded to fight a conventional war, nor are they likely to engage in LIC. Further, in the nuclear asymmetric dyads, the nuclear weapons states are likely to engage in LIC against the non-nuclear weapons states. The study concluded that the nuclear weapons are neither threatening nor stabilizing as traditionally believed. Bell and Miller highlighted the increasing skepticism in the recent scholarship on the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. Thus, it demands further study to understand the impact of the nuclear weapons in the context of prolonged conflicts such as India and Pakistan.

Robert Rauchhaus⁵³ quantitatively examined the nuclear peace hypothesis using cross-section time-series data covering timespan from 1946 to 2000. The author argued that both nuclear optimists and nuclear pessimists find the application of some of their propositions, nevertheless, the role of nuclear weapons is complex and difficult to generalize. The results indicated that when there is an asymmetry between the rival states, the likelihood of war and dispute increases. When there is symmetry between states and also have nuclear weapons, the likelihood of wars decreases, nevertheless, the belligerents may still engage in LIC in line with the stability-instability paradox. Notably, the conclusion applies to India-Pakistan conflict dynamics where both states are involved in fighting LIC. Nevertheless, the introduction of new

⁵² Mark S. Bell, and Nicholas L. Miller, "Questioning the Effect of Nuclear Weapons on Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59, no. 1 (2015): 74-92, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713499718>.

⁵³ Robert Rauchhaus, "Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 2 (2009): 258-277, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002708330387>.

doctrines based on coercive strategies to counter terrorism in the presence of nuclear weapons is a distinct phenomenon that this thesis is looking into and demands further inquiry.

Todd S. Sechser and Matthew⁵⁴ examined the influence of the nuclear weapons in coercive diplomacy. The study looked into an extensive range of past case studies and used quantitative methods. The authors challenged the traditional notion that the possession of nuclear weapons increases states' coercive capabilities. The nuclear-armed states introduce substantial risks and costs within the conflict dynamics to achieve escalation dominance vis-à-vis rival countries. The study concluded that the nuclear weapons have played a significant role in international politics, nevertheless, they do have limitations and are considered to be a poor match with coercive diplomacy.

Victor Asal and Kyle Beardsley in their article titled, *Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior*,⁵⁵ examined the relation between nuclear proliferation and state behavior with a huge dataset of 434 crises covering the timeframe from 1960 to 2001. The study used a quantitative method and concluded that the crises involving nuclear weapons states are not likely to end up in violence. Further, as the number of nuclear actors increases in a certain conflict, the likelihood of dispute or war continues to decrease. The introduction of nuclear weapons increases restraint in the conflict. Nevertheless, the findings of the study do not recommend that increasing the number of nuclear weapons, states in a certain crisis can avert war. Lastly, the study recommended that the cost of deterrence failure is so high, that the policymakers should take all measures to decrease the likelihood of deterrence failure.

⁵⁴ Todd S. Sechser, and Matthew Fuhrmann, *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge University Press, 2017).

⁵⁵ Victor Asal, and Kyle Beardsley, "Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior," *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 2 (2007): 139-155, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343307075118>.

Sameer Lalwani and Hannah Haegeland⁵⁶ investigated the complicated nature of the evolving India-Pakistan conflict in the post-nuclear era. This book is an empirical study that investigated the causal processes, patterns, and lessons extracted from previous crises between the two states under the nuclear overhang. This edited volume carries ten chapters, and authors from various countries such as China, India, Pakistan, and the US to assess South Asian crises from 1987-2017 and also consider the implications for the future of crisis management on the subcontinent. Nevertheless, this thesis goes beyond it and focuses on the impact of evolving doctrines on conflict transformation between India and Pakistan.

Toby Dalton and George Perkovich⁵⁷ concluded that India's nuclear posture of massive retaliation is appropriate to deter Pakistan from initiating a conventional or strategic war, provided that the Indian Army does not indulge in the ambitious strategic adventure of penetrating into Pakistani territory or use the IAF to carry out aerial strikes in reaction to a terrorist incident in India. In case, India desires to pursue strategic policies and capabilities to launch major conventional military maneuvers against Pakistan then for that purpose, it requires a significant increase in capabilities and plans to execute limited nuclear operations to target military forces in Pakistan. Still, India needs to work on synchronization of an offensive limited conventional military doctrine and a defensive nuclear doctrine for the reason to prepare for possible escalation of a limited war to nuclear levels. The authors rightly identified that there is a lack of compatibility between the Indian conventional and strategic doctrines as far now. Nevertheless, the study did not cover recent doctrinal changes and their subsequent implementation in the shape of the surgical strike in the wake of the Pulwama terrorist attack.

⁵⁶ Sameer Lalwani and Hannah Haegeland, *Investigating Crises: South Asia's Lessons, Evolving Dynamics, and Trajectories* (Washington: Stimson Centre, 2018).

⁵⁷ Toby Dalton and George Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Options and Escalation Dominance* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 32.

The Pulwama-Balakot Crisis contradicts the conclusion of the study as India launched an aerial surgical strike deep inside Pakistan under a nuclear overhang. Thus, it demands further research to understand the impact of new war-fighting strategies and military doctrines on India-Pakistan conflict dynamics.

George Perkovich and Toby Dalton⁵⁸ pointed out that India seeks inspiration from the US and Israel and tries to imitate their military models to hit the enemy targets across the border. The author highlighted that in contrast to the US and Israel, the India-Pakistan conflict dynamics make it difficult for India to carry out precise surgical strikes against a nuclear-armed Pakistan. The study concluded that India can force Pakistan or motivate it, to take action against terrorist outfits involved in terrorism in India, however, the aerial strikes are not a viable option for India now and shortly. The scope of the study does not cover the doctrinal changes such as JDIAF-2017 and LWD-2018 which officially documented the launch of surgical strikes to counter terrorist outfits and more importantly, the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis goes beyond the conclusion of the study.

Sumit Ganguly, in *Deadly Impasse*⁵⁹ revisited the nature of the India-Pakistan rivalry with more focus on the post-nuclear era. Ganguly discussed various schools of thought (pessimist and optimist) to explain the Kargil Crisis in the wake of nuclearization. He noted, that while one assumes that the escalation to a full-blown war was averted due to some idiosyncratic conditions, the other believes that the possession of the nuclear weapons majorly deterred the large-scale wars. However, the author highlighted that this debate has yet to find a clear-cut answer. He further argued that the security dilemma might explain little as he

⁵⁸ George Perkovich and Toby Dalton, "Modi's Strategic Choice: How to Respond to Terrorism from Pakistan," *The Washington Quarterly* 38, no. 1 (2015): 41-42, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2015.1038172>.

⁵⁹ Ganguly, *Deadly Impasse*, 12-13.

categorized Pakistan as a greedy state that is involved in military endeavors to maximize its territory and termed India a status quo state expressing conciliatory gestures which the revisionist state is considering its weakness.

Paul Kapur⁶⁰ in his book majorly focuses on ascertaining the impact of nuclear proliferation on the security environment of South Asia. The author provided a detailed account of internal and external factors that pushed India and Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapons. The book discusses the impact of nuclear deterrence on crisis stability and the likely nuclear conflict between the two rivals in the future. Kapur digs into the influence of the nuclear weapons on the wider security setting, including factors such as conventional military capabilities and nonproliferation efforts. The author concluded that the stability-instability paradox does not apply to India-Pakistan conflict dynamics.

Saira Khan⁶¹ investigated the correlation between the nuclear weapons and conflict transformation. The study used impressive methodological tools and covered the time period from 1947 to 2008. The author concluded that the nuclear weapons transformed conflict from large-scale wars to LIC between India and Pakistan. India remained defensive to avoid conflict escalation while Pakistan remained engaged in aggressive attempts to acquire territorial gains in the post-nuclear era. Theoretically, the author argued that realism and deterrence are short of explaining the enduring rivalry between the two nuclear-armed countries. Majorly, there are few limitations in the study: One, the scope of the study is limited to 2008, thereby the introduction of doctrinal changes and India's surgical strike becomes out of its scope. Two, the thesis devised conceptual framework including theories from realism school of thought such

⁶⁰ S. Paul Kapur, *Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007).

⁶¹ Khan, *Conflict Transformation*.

as coercive strategies and stability-instability paradox to explain the impact of evolving doctrines on the conflict transformation between India and Pakistan.

Research Gap

Numerous studies have been conducted on India-Pakistan relations covering multiple aspects i.e., nuclear weapons development, stability-instability paradox, escalation dynamics, and doctrinal evolution. There is a dearth of literature to comprehend the impact of evolving offensive military doctrines on conflict transformation. The study goes beyond the history while focusing on the contemporary key literature on the subject which in turn reflects the impact of evolving doctrines on conflict transformation between India and Pakistan. The thesis tries to answer questions such as Why both states' reliance on offensive military doctrines increased in the post-nuclear era. How have offensive doctrines led to conflict transformation between India and Pakistan? Keeping in view the recent doctrinal developments such as JDIAF-2017 and LWD-2018; where both doctrines focused on counter-insurgency operations across international borders, and the subsequent eruption of the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis, more focused research to understand the renewed patterns of bilateral military likely engagements under the nuclear overhang is the need of the time. For instance, the doctrinal changes have led to a transformation in the conflict where large-scale wars are converted into small military operations and surgical strikes, thereby reducing the intensity of violence and introducing surgical strikes as a new normal in India-Pakistan bilateral military engagements.

India and Pakistan are experiencing numerous crises occurring at regular intervals in the post-nuclear era, thereby the tensions between the two countries increased with the introduction of nuclear weapons. Theoretically speaking, no single event escalated to large-scale war or the use of nuclear weapons, pointing to the efficacy of the stability-instability

paradox. Few nuclear pessimists such as Michael Krepon⁶² acknowledged the importance of the stability-instability paradox to understand the India-Pakistan conflict dynamics, nevertheless, he highlighted that the generalization of the stability-instability paradox logic requires further time. It's been more than two decades since overt nuclearization, therefore, the researcher views this as the appropriate time period to understand the efficacy of the stability-instability paradox particularly in the wake of doctrinal developments aimed at launching small military operations and surgical strikes across borders. Nevertheless, India's quest to establish surgical strikes as a new normal under the nuclear domain itself indicates the significance of the stability-instability paradox logic. Further, the point that makes the case of India-Pakistan conflict dynamics further distinct as well as which goes beyond the scope of the stability-instability paradox is the employment of a coercive spectrum involving compellence and deterrence strategies. The thesis analyzes the impact of evolving doctrines on conflict transformation between India and Pakistan through the prism of the stability-instability paradox with a particular focus on the coercive spectrum (compellence and deterrence strategies). Lastly, the study focuses on the question i.e, Is India's compellence strategy points to the change in nuclear posture as compellence contradicts CMD. Keeping in view the continuous doctrinal evolution and changing conflict dynamics, particularly in the aftermath of the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis, this thesis provides a roadmap for achieving strategic stability in the backdrop of changing military doctrines and risks of preemptive disarming strikes. Apropos, this study broadly investigates the impact of evolving doctrines on the transforming nature of conflict in the context of a conceptual framework comprised of the stability-instability paradox

⁶² Michael Krepon, "The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia," *Prospects for Peace in South Asia* 1 (2003): 261-279; and Michael Krepon, and Alex Stolar, "Outlook for Regional Security in South Asia," *Pakistan Horizon* 60, no. 3 (2007): 73-82.

and coercive spectrum to understand the evolving crises and escalation dynamics and further endeavors to provide a roadmap for regional strategic stability.

Research Methodology

This part of the thesis discusses the research methodology devised to understand the impact of evolving doctrines on conflict transformation between India and Pakistan. Before moving ahead, it is imperative to clear the philosophical foundations and positionality of the researcher. Ontology deals with the nature of reality and discusses questions such as what is out there?⁶³ Generally, realism and nominalism are the two ontological positions. The realist position views reality to be “out there in the world” as independent of actor and the latter can merely discover and explain it. Whereas the nominalist position proposes that reality in the world is socially constructed and cannot be viewed directly without understanding inter-subjective aspects such as beliefs and culture.⁶⁴ This study utilized the realist ontological position to describe and explain the phenomenon under study as India-Pakistan conflict dynamics are considered to be embedded in geopolitics and not socially constructed.

Moving ahead, epistemology deals with how we know what we know about the world.⁶⁵ Broadly, there are three distinctive epistemological positions such as approaches of positivism, postpositivism, and interpretivism.⁶⁶ As this research is conducted based on the realist ontological position, so therefore, the respective epistemological positions are positivism and postpositivism. Positivism considers empiricism as the only means to create knowledge and

⁶³ David Marsh and Paul Furlong, “A Skin, not a Sweater Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science,” in *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, ed. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 185.

⁶⁴ Lawrence Newman, *Social Research Method: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches* (Edinburgh: Pearson Education Limited, 2014), 94.

⁶⁵ Marsh and Furlong, “A Skin, not a Sweater,” 19.

⁶⁶ Jonathan Grix, “Introducing Students to the Generic Terminology of Social Research,” *Politics* 22, no. 3 (2002): 178, <https://doi.org/10.1111%2F1467-9256.00173>.

rejects everything that is beyond observation and measuring.⁶⁷ This rigorous nature of the positivistic approach led to frustrations among social scientists as severe limitations in the acquisition of knowledge were observed while conducting the research in the social world which has its own characteristics and is distinct from the physical world. Thus, this critique on positivism led to the emergence of postpositivism.

Postpositivism also reckoned as postempiricism, is a meta-theoretical position that criticizes, amends, and extends positivism.⁶⁸ Postpositivism assumes reality to be external of the actor, nevertheless, while knowing reality, it give due space to subjective dimension of the social world, thereby going with a mix of objectivism and subjectivism. It proposes that a combination of empirical observation and logical reasoning can serve the purpose of reasonable inferences about a social phenomenon.⁶⁹ Positivism underscores the independence of a researcher from the objective phenomenon under study while postpositivism emphasizes that theoretical orientation, hypotheses, core argument, background knowledge, and social life can impact the observation in a research study.⁷⁰

For instance, as a Pakistan-based researcher, there is a possibility that the positionality of the researcher might affect the viewpoint when looking into the case study of India-Pakistan conflictual relations. The personal association may lead to certain predispositions or biases that can influence the analysis of the study. This is why postpositivism calls for pursuing objectivity

⁶⁷ Anol Bhattacharjee, *Social Science Research: Principles, Methods, and Practices* (Florida: Textbook Collection, 2012), 18.

⁶⁸ Alexander M. Clark, "The Qualitative-Quantitative Debate: Moving from Positivism and Confrontation to Post-Positivism and Reconciliation," *Journal of Advanced Nursing* 27, no. 6 (1998): 1242-1249, <https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1365-2648.1998.00651.x>; and Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Making Sense of International Relations Theory," in *Making Sense of International Relations Theory*, ed. Jennifer Sterling-Folker (Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2013), 7-10; and Mats Bergman, "Positivism," in *The International Encyclopedia of Communication Theory and Philosophy* (2016): 1-5, <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118766804.wbiect248>.

⁶⁹ Bhattacharjee, *Social Science Research*, 18.

⁷⁰ Colin Robson, *Real World Research. A Resource for Social Scientists and Practitioner-Researchers* (Malden: Blackwell, 2002), 624.

by understanding the likely impact of factors such as human bias etc.⁷¹ Nevertheless, it is important to study the topic with a critical mindset, seeking varied standpoints and examining a variety of sources (primary and secondary). Discussing the positionality of researcher here makes readers understand the possible effect this might have on study and further, supports a systematic understanding of the broader findings of the research.

Nevertheless, positivism focuses on quantitative methods only while postpositivism gives space to both quantitative as well as qualitative methods to explain the world outside.⁷² As the India-Pakistan rivalry is an established and observable phenomenon this study utilized the postpositivism approach to devise a research methodology for the conduct of this study. The researcher has applied the postpositivism epistemological position with the selection of a qualitative approach in particular and also used the quantitative data to understand the social phenomenon under study.

Quite rightly said that the research design plays a significant role in enlarging the authentic existing body of knowledge.⁷³ Appropriate research methodology based on the nature and purpose of research serves to meet the requirements mandatory for the conduct of the study. This study used a qualitative case study design. Therefore, the India-Pakistan conflict is selected as a case study to describe and explain the impact of evolving doctrines on the conflict transformation between India and Pakistan. The major focus of the study is the post-nuclear era (1974-2020), nevertheless, it also covers the pre-nuclear era (1947-1973) to understand the transformation in the war fighting strategies and conflict dynamics between the two states. The study is descriptive and explanatory as well. It describes and explains the phenomenon under

⁷¹ Katherine Miller, *Communication Theories: Perspectives, Processes, and Contexts* (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2007), 35–45; Colin, *Real World Research*, 624; and Thomas R. Lindlof and Bryan C. Taylor, *Qualitative Communication Research Methods* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE, 2011), 5-13.

⁷² Lindlof and Taylor, *Research Methods*, 5-13.

⁷³ Arthur Cropley, *Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods* (University of Hamburg: Research Gate, 2015), 21.

study by focusing on questions such as how and why the evolving doctrines impact the conflict transformation between India and Pakistan.

The study analyzes the factors such as evolving doctrines, the introduction of nuclear weapons, terrorism, and the role of the US as a crisis manager and further, tries to comprehend their relation with the conflict transformation between India and Pakistan. The research is based upon conceptual and theoretical explanations to relate descriptive and explanatory accounts of the issue under study before guiding what one can reasonably expect from the future. The research follows the deductive reasoning, subsequently, it favors the top-bottom approach.

The independent variable in the study is evolving doctrines where the indicator for measurement is a small military operation and surgical strike. The dependent variable is the conflict transformation where the indicator for measurement is intensity of violence. Three intervening variables are used in the study. The first intervening variable is Mutual Assured Destruction where the indicator for measurement is the presence of nuclear weapons. The second intervening variable is terrorism where the indicator for measurement is terrorist incident. The third and last intervening variable is the US Interests where the indicator for measurement is the role of the US as a crisis manager.

Table 1: Variables of the Study

S. No.	Variable Type	Concept	Indicator
1	Independent Variable	Evolving Military Doctrines	Small Military Operation and Surgical Strikes
2	Dependent Variable	Conflict Transformation	New Normal (Intensity of Violence)
3	Intervening Variables	MAD	Nuclear Weapons
4		Terrorism	Terrorist Incidents
5		US Interests	Role of the US as a Crisis Manager

The research study used a qualitative method for the collection and analysis of data. Nevertheless, the quantitative data is also used to increase the authenticity of the research. The techniques employed for the collection of the data are In-depth Interviews and Document Analysis. Purposive sampling is used to select the relevant interview subjects in the study. For instance, In-depth Interviews of relevant experts such as civilian and military bureaucrats and academicians (International, Indian, and Pakistani) have been conducted to enrich the valid knowledge about the phenomena under study.


Importantly, the safety/ reputation of the interview subjects was duly considered in the study. In this regard, an informed consent was obtained from the relevant experts. The interview subjects were informed about the nature of the study. It is important to mention here that the researcher shared the images of the documented opinions with some of the interview subjects on their demand which further added to the trust building and ethics of the research. Further, the interview subjects were not made anonymous in this study for reasons such as: keeping interview subjects anonymous could raise questions on the genuineness of the collected data while sharing these details increases the authenticity of the data. Revealing interview subjects allows other researchers to validate the source of information. Lastly, respecting interview subjects' independence and choice is also an important ethical consideration in the research, as the interview subjects may desire to be recognized and accredited for their intellectual contributions.

Both primary and secondary sources are used for the collection of data. The value of these primary resources in drawing attention to such substantial evidence is reflected in the praise offered by Steve Smith.⁷⁴ The primary sources are considered instrumental in highlighting key facts regarding the evolving doctrines and their impact on the conflict

⁷⁴ Steve Smith, "Positivism and Beyond," in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 11.

transformation prevailing in the universe of the study. It is important to mention that despite giving significance to the primary data, one of the limitations of the study is availability of data related to the key variable such as doctrines on both sides particularly on Pakistani side. Moreover, this study primarily focuses on the India's doctrinal changes with corresponding response/s of Pakistan. Nevertheless, the primary sources include a range of memoirs, diplomatic documents, strategy papers, speeches, statements and opinions shared by the relevant experts. Secondary data is collected from books, journal articles, newspapers, magazines, electronic media, and official documents and further, are referred to understand evolving crises situation and escalation dynamics in South Asia. The data is analyzed through a thematic analysis technique by focusing on the variables and indicators under study. Lastly, it is imperative to mention here that theoretical model is discussed in Chapter One.

Figure 1: Methodological Model



Source: Developed by Author

Delimitation of the Study

The delimitation of the study shapes the real focus of the study. It defines the boundaries of the study concerning space, time, and scope. For instance, the space of the study is India-Pakistan conflictual relations. The major focus of the study is the post-nuclear era (1974-2020), nevertheless, it also covers the pre-nuclear era (1947-1973) to understand the transformation in the war fighting strategies and conflict dynamics between the two states in the context of the stability-instability paradox and coercive spectrum. The study looks into evolving doctrines and their impact on conflict transformation between the two rival states. On one hand, peace and conflict scholars focus on management, resolution, transformation, and termination while on the other hand pessimist and optimist school of thought discusses the role of nuclear weapons in international politics, this study goes beyond these two dimensions. For instance, it analyzes the doctrinal changes involving coercion strategies to launch small military operations and surgical strikes under the nuclear domain as a renewed pattern of bilateral military engagement proving the efficacy of the stability-instability paradox. This study also generates a debate about whether India's doctrinal changes and its compellence strategy point towards a shift in its NFU policy or not.

Significance of the Study

The significance of research work lies in describing and explaining the transforming nature of the India-Pakistan conflict. Indeed, the existing body of knowledge analyzed the established patterns of enduring rivalry but very little study has been conducted on the impact of evolving doctrines on conflict transformation between India and Pakistan. The research study to a large extent thoroughly and systematically examines past, current, and future security configurations; about evolving doctrines and their impact on the conflict transformation between the two states. More specifically, the study aims to assess the introduction of new war-fighting strategies and military doctrines based on coercive strategies and the transforming

nature of the conflict with the assistance of relevant research material and the opinions of the experts. The distinctiveness of research work lies in looking into the doctrinal changes which led to convert large-scale wars into surgical strikes under a nuclear overhang, thereby shrinking the intensity of violence and introducing surgical strike as a renewed pattern of bilaterally likely engagement. The study is innovative in a way that it explains the swiftly changing security environment based on rigorous research methods. The thesis is theoretically driven empirical research where a conceptual framework including stability-instability paradox and coercive spectrum is applied to seek guidance in the research. This study is well-timed, detailed, substantial, systematic, and also futuristic concerning the evolving crisis and escalation dynamics in South Asia. It is a valuable addition to the existing body of knowledge and vital in the enhancement of understandings for the academicians as well as practitioners specifically concerning the Pakistani perspective.

Organization of the Study

For ease of understanding, reading, and rationality, the thesis is organized into seven chapters.

The introduction of the thesis is vital in understanding the basic framework and research design of the study. It puts forward the core argument-building rationale on how the evolving doctrines impact the conflict transformation between India and Pakistan. It includes background, statement of the problem, research questions, objectives of the study, core argument, research methodology, literature review, delimitation of the study, significance of the study, and organization of the study. This part of the thesis principally elaborates the nature of the study.

Chapter One is titled, “Conceptual Framework: Stability-Instability Paradox and Coercive Spectrum.” This chapter elaborates devised conceptual framework including the theories of the stability-instability paradox, and the coercive spectrum. It discusses the core

propositions, and concepts of the theories to understand the social phenomenon under study. The conceptual framework provides necessary guidance in interpreting the observations, and further maps its relevance to the study. It assists the researcher in describing, and explaining the findings of the study. This chapter elaborates, and further applies the conceptual framework to analyze the variables of the study to understand the impact of evolving doctrines on the conflict transformation between India, and Pakistan.

Chapter Two titled, “Pre-Nuclear Era: Military Strategies and Bilateral Confrontation (1947-1973)” builds debate on the bilateral confrontation and war-fighting strategies in the pre-nuclear era. This chapter specifically assesses the conflict dynamics between India and Pakistan in the pre-nuclear era to build the foundational understanding and analyze the impact of military doctrines on conflict transformation in the post-nuclear era.

Chapter Three titled, “Covert Nuclearization: Nuclear Weapons Development and Conflict Transformation (1974-1997),” builds debate on understanding the evolving nature of conflict and war-fighting strategies in the post-nuclear era (covert nuclearization). It discusses the impact of the introduction of nuclear weapons, and doctrinal changes on the conflict dynamics between the two states. This chapter critically analyzes the eruption of crises such as the Brasstacks Crisis and the Compound Crisis to understand the change in patterns of conflict with the acquisition of nuclear weapons. It also focuses on uprising in the Indian Administered Kashmir particularly in the late 1980s which apparently coincided with the introduction of nuclear weapons in South Asia. Lastly, it analyzes the role of the US as a crisis manager between India and Pakistan in a nuclearized environment.

Chapter Four titled, “Overt Nuclearization: Nuclear Weapons, Offensive Doctrines and Conflict Transformation (1998-2015),” focuses on assessing the conflict dynamics and military confrontation from 1998 to 2015. This chapter discusses the beginning of the sub-conventional

warfare under the nuclear domain. It analyzes the different dimensions of crises such as the Kargil Crisis, the Twin Peaks Crisis, and the Mumbai Crisis to understand the bilateral confrontation in the post-nuclear era. Further, this chapter explains the factors such as the presence of nuclear weapons and terrorism, responsible for the development of India's offensive doctrine reckoned as Cold Start Doctrine. It discussed the core objective of CSD and further, analyzed the Indian armed forces' capability to implement it. The chapter also analyzes Pakistan's response to CSD such as FSD and the development of TNW. It also bring into debate why India failed to launch a limited war in the wake of terrorist incidents such as Mumbai Attacks. Lastly, it makes a critical assessment of the role of the US in crisis de-escalation throughout this era to avert a large-scale war or use of nuclear weapons, between India and Pakistan.

Chapter Five, titled "India's Evolving Offensive Doctrines: Manifestation of Compellence Strategy," discusses the India's doctrinal changes such as JDIAF-2017 and LWD-2018. It generates a debate on how Indo-US ties emboldened India to adopt a more offensive approach to deal with militancy. Nevertheless, this chapter majorly focuses on the doctrinal changes such as JDIAF-2017 and LWD-2018 and critically analyzes the objectives and motivations behind India's doctrinal changes.

Chapter Six is titled, "India's Quest to Establish Surgical Strike as a New-Normal (2016-2020)". This chapter focuses on India's shifted approach to deal with terrorism evident in the Uri Crisis and the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis. It also analyzes the role of the US in the last two crises (the Uri Crisis and the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis) and subsequently, the impact of US reluctant approach to play a crisis manager role, on the conflict dynamics between India and Pakistan. The chapter critically evaluates the establishment of surgical strikes as a new normal in India-Pakistan bilateral engagement, thereby introducing renewed patterns of bilateral likely engagements. Lastly, this chapter generates a theoretical and doctrinal debate on whether

India's doctrinal changes and compellence strategy indicates a change in its CMD or NFU posture.

Chapter Seven is titled, "New Mechanism for Strategic Stability Amidst Offensive Doctrinal Changes." This chapter provides a roadmap for achieving strategic stability in the backdrop of changing military doctrines and risks of preemptive disarming strikes.

The concluding section sums-up the discussion and provides a detailed conclusion of the study.

Chapter One

Conceptual Framework: Stability-Instability Paradox and Coercive Spectrum

It is exceptionally complex to theorize the military doctrines, and conflict dynamics; particularly in the presence of factors such as nuclear weapons and terrorism, anything more than in probabilistic terms. Generally, the positivist approach is considered suitable to analyze the relationship between the variables, nevertheless, to rely exclusively on cause-effect phenomenon would not be an appropriate option, particularly in this study. Thus, there was a need to devise a conceptual framework comprehensive enough to guide the research in analyzing the impact of military doctrines on conflict transformation. Before discussing the conceptual framework, it will be helpful to generate a brief debate on the philosophical foundations of military doctrine to better understand the concept and nature of the study.

Philosophical Debate: Military Doctrines

The military doctrine assists in developing an institutional basis to prepare troops for conducting missions. The concept of military doctrine is not as ancient as the war itself is, yet it can be traced back to the works of Sun Tzu.⁷⁵ In an academic sense, the military doctrine emerged in the 17th century.⁷⁶ It is defined as “Doctrine is a tangible representation of a military’s institutional belief system regarding how that military understands, prepares for, and (in theory at least) conducts military activities.”⁷⁷ The military doctrine sketches what means to be used, how the troops are required to be organized, where the troops might be positioned, and the methods of collaboration among a variety of forces.⁷⁸ Significantly, the doctrines are

⁷⁵ Sun Tzu, “The Art of War,” In *Strategic Studies*, pp. 63-91 (Routledge, 2008).

⁷⁶ M. D. Feld, “Middle-Class Society and the Rise of Military Professionalism: The Dutch Army 1589-1609,” *Armed Forces & Society* 1, no. 4 (1975), 419–442. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X7500100404>.

⁷⁷ Aaron P. Jackson, “The Nature of Military Doctrine: A Decade of Study in 1500 Words,” *The Strategy Bridge* (November 15, 2017), <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/11/15/the-nature-of-military-doctrine-a-decade-of-study-in-1500-words>.

⁷⁸ Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine*, 13-24.

not dogmatic, instead, they guide and advise to carry out specific military activities such as large-scale wars, battles, and engagements, etc. All these military engagements are part of objective reality by any definition.

Military doctrines are linked to empiricism in a manner that the doctrines are the effect of lessons learned in the past conflict and wars, the previous experiences help to escape similar mistakes in future conflicts. Though, the military doctrines are cognitive, nevertheless, it is a tangible manifestation of the organizational belief system. Aaron P. Jackson asserted that the military doctrines are ontologically realist while epistemologically positivist, for the last four hundred years of doctrinal evolution. He further indicated that positivism is the most dominant paradigm, however, he also highlighted that since the start of the 21st century, an anti-positivism epistemological position focusing on understanding the influence of relativity and subjectivism has emerged. Jackson considered anti-positivism a valuable addition to doctrinal evolution, nevertheless, it is required to resolve certain issues before moving ahead to adopt the complete shift.⁷⁹ Thus, a middle space between objectivity and subjectivity might be the better option to study cognitive doctrine. This makes postpositivism a more relevant philosophical foundation to use in this thesis to analyze the impact of military doctrine on the conflict dynamics between the two states.

Postpositivism is developed with the criticism of the positivist paradigm. For instance, positivism focuses on empiricism as the only means to create scientific knowledge.⁸⁰ For many, this rigorous positivist approach is incompatible with social sciences, so here comes the postpositivism for the rescue. To be clear, postpositivism is a metatheoretical position that

⁷⁹ Aaron P. Jackson, *The Roots of Military Doctrine: Change and Continuity in Understanding the Practice of Warfare* (Combat Studies Institute Press).

⁸⁰ Bhattacharjee, *Social Science Research*, 18.

criticizes, amends, and extends positivism.⁸¹ Thus, postpositivism is a middle ground between the two competing philosophical foundations such as positivist and interpretivist. Postpositivism postulates that a combination of empirical observation and logical reasoning can serve the purpose of reasonable inferences about a social phenomenon. The postpositivism methodologies seek to go beyond the constricted emphasis on empirical facts and objective analysis and to include a diverse array of standpoints and approaches to make reality more comprehensible. Postpositivism philosophical foundations to International Relations use qualitative techniques and also interpretive methods to comprehend the complexity of international politics. Thus, this thesis has employed a postpositivism approach to study the impact of military doctrines on conflict dynamics between India and Pakistan. To build on the philosophical debate, the below discussion is focused on a theoretical debate such as constructivism (interpretivism) vs. realism (positivism) to make the philosophical debate more interesting and understandable in the context of the topic under study.

Theoretical Debate: India-Pakistan Conflict

The theory is a set of interconnected concepts that systematically views the relationship between various observations to understand and explain a certain social phenomenon.⁸² In social sciences and more specifically in international relations, theory plays a significant role in understanding and creation of knowledge. It guides the researcher to understand the relation between various concepts about the subject matter under study. With the evolution of the discipline, various theories emerged on the scene of International Relations to describe and explain inter-state relations. Before moving ahead to elaborate the conceptual framework of the study, it is imperative to generate a theoretical debate by discussing different theories for a

⁸¹ Clark, "The Qualitative-Quantitative Debate,"; and Sterling-Folker, "International Relations Theory," 7-10; and Bergman, "Positivism," 1-5.

⁸² W. Lawrence Newman, *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches* (Essex, UK: Pearson, 2014), 57.

comprehensive understanding of India-Pakistan relations. The debate in the below section is focused on the theories of constructivism and realism concerning analyzing the efficacy of these theories in comprehending interstate relations.

Constructivism, as a theory was introduced in the discipline of International Relations in the aftermath of the Cold War as the existing perspectives could not predict the end of the Cold War.⁸³ Nicholas Greenwood Onuf coined the term “Constructivism” in the field of International Relations in 1989. Onuf proposed that the agents, and structures are connected through an interactive process, and behave in similar patterns.⁸⁴ Alexander Wendt developed the philosophical foundations of a new theory aiming to augment understanding of the functioning of the international system by building a connection between neorealism and constructivism.⁸⁵ Constructivism assumes that interstate relations are not embedded in geopolitics but are socially constructed. The constructivists believe that characteristics such as norms, values, beliefs, and identity of state actors determine behavioral patterns of interstate relations. Constructivism rejects the realistic assumption that material factors or human nature alone determine international relations.⁸⁶ Broadly speaking, constructivism focuses on ideational factors while realism gives significance to material forces.

There is a significant difference between the core aspects of constructivism, and other perspectives of International Relations particularly realism. One, the existing theories such as realism view conflict as something embedded like humans. Further, it assumes that the state’s main focus is power in the anarchic structure, whereas the fundamental aspect of

⁸³ Ganjar Nugroho, “Constructivism and International Relations Theories,” *Global & Strategis* 2, no. 1 (2008): 85-98.

⁸⁴ Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, “Constructivism,” in *International Relations in a Constructed World*, ed. Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul Kowet, pp. 35-65 (London: Routledge, 2012).

⁸⁵ Ramazan Erdag, “Security Studies and International Terrorism,” *European Scientific Journal* 9, no. 23 (2013), 65.

⁸⁶ See Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics, *International organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425.

constructivism is the social construction of a political system based on ideas and beliefs. Two, the traditional theories assume that the state's national interest is the guiding star in the international system. However, constructivism views it as a socially constructed phenomenon and further, as an outcome of states' identity-based socialization process. Three, constructivists connect the structure and agent in a distinct way such as, how both interact and influence each other to construct a social phenomenon that determines state behavior. Fourth, traditional theories such as realism see the international system as anarchic, however, constructivism views it as socially constructed based on the interaction among the states.

Constructivism offers valuable understanding regarding interstate relations, however, it has few limitations in explaining India-Pakistan conflict dynamics. For instance, constructivism focuses on inter-subjectivity and puts significant emphasis on ideational factors such as ideas, norms, beliefs, and identity in determining state behavioral patterns. Although, these ideational factors are certainly vital in a certain context in shaping interstate relations, nevertheless, these aspects do not offer a comprehensive explanation of the conflict dynamics between the two nuclear-armed rivals which are certainly based on objective realities such as wars, terrorism, and nuclear weapons.

Moreover, there are a few other features such as material interests, power politics, convoluted history, and strategic thinking which play vital roles in influencing interstate relations such as the enduring rivalry between India, and Pakistan. Material factors like military capabilities have a significant impact in determining the security environment of South Asia, quite evident in the shape of military modernization, arms racing, and alliance making. Other material factors such as geographical issues are also vital in shaping the states' behaviors, For instance, the Kashmir dispute is the core problem between India and Pakistan, and both rival states have fought three large-scale wars and limited war over it. Nevertheless, the constructivist theory focuses exceedingly on the ideational aspects, which makes it difficult to

predict states' behavioral patterns reliably. Although constructivism recognizes that state behavior is not exclusively determined by material factors, still it offers inadequate guidance on how to envisage state actions based on ideational factors. Thus, this makes it challenging to create accurate, and testable premises about India-Pakistan conflictual relations in the military domain.

On the other hand, realism is the dominant family of theories to explain the patterns prevailing in the global political system.⁸⁷ It is one of the oldest perspectives and can be traced back to the works of Thucydides,⁸⁸ Niccolo Machiavelli,⁸⁹ Thomas Hobbes,⁹⁰ E. H. Carr,⁹¹ Kautilya Chanakya,⁹² and Hans J. Morgenthau.⁹³ The realist perspective uses an explanatory approach and by this analytical orientation offers a realistic framework for the investigation of social phenomena in international politics.⁹⁴ Realism is not a single theory but it is a school of thought which has evolved over the years, more particularly, during the Cold War era.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, almost all realists believes in four assumptions that are the core theoretical foundations for analyzing interstate relations. One, the state is the most significant actor in the international system. Two, the state is considered as a unitary actor, and further, it is treated as a black box. Three, the state is a rational actor with the focus on maximizing its gain and minimizing the loss during the process of opting for the policy decisions among various

⁸⁷ Jill Steans, Lloyd Pettiford, Thomas Diez and Imad El-Anis, *An Introduction to International Relations Theory Perspectives and Themes* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 53.

⁸⁸ Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1989).

⁸⁹ Nicollo Machiavelli, *The Prince (1513)* (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 1993).

⁹⁰ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Penguin Books, Baltimore, MD, 1968).

⁹¹ Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

⁹² R. Shamsastry, *Kautilya's Arthashastra* (Mygore: Wesleyan Mission Press, 2016).

⁹³ Hans Joachim Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, (1978 [1948]).

⁹⁴ Emanuela Voinea, "Realism Today: Can the Pessimistic Perspective Account for Current Events in International Relations?," *E-International Relations*, (2013): 1, <https://www.e-ir.info/2013/03/01/realism-today/>.

⁹⁵ Stephen M. Walt, "International Relations: One World Many Theories," *Foreign Policy*, No. 110 (Spring, 1998): 31, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1149275>.

available alternatives related to a specific situation at intrastate, and interstate levels. Fourth, security is the most prioritized phenomenon among various issues faced by the state with more focus on hard politics in comparison to low politics.⁹⁶ Both India and Pakistan have been engulfed in stern conflict throughout their history. Thus, realism as a perspective is comprehensive enough to comprehend and elucidate the patterns prevailing in the enduring rivalry between nuclear-armed South Asian states. T.V Paul maintains,⁹⁷

“The enduring rivalry is characterized by a persistent, fundamental and long-term incompatibility of goals between two states which manifest itself in basic attitudes of the parties towards each other as well as in the recurring violent or potentially violent clashes over a long period.”

The enduring rivalry between the neighboring states is full of misunderstandings, apprehensions, mistrust, ambiguity, and antagonism.⁹⁸ The conflict between India and Pakistan is attributed to multiple factors such as convoluted history, the partition,⁹⁹ water dispute, divisions of financial and military assets, refugee crisis, India’s annexation of princely states, the two states’ inclination for alignment with extra-regional powers and subordinating their policies (external balancing) and major powers ‘nefarious designs’, security dilemma– based on misplaced suspicion, fear, and competition to reduce power differential to maintain equilibrium and maximize security and power against each other; and importantly, the Kashmir Dispute, and India’s recent revocation of the autonomous status of Indian Administered

⁹⁶ Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory* (New York: Pearson, 2012), 39-40.

⁹⁷ Thazha V Paul, “Causes of the India-Pakistan Enduring Rivalry,” in *The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry*, ed. Thazha V Paul (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3-6.

⁹⁸ Rizwana Abbasi and Zafar Khan, *Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: New Technologies and Challenges to Sustainable Peace* (London: Routledge, 2019), 115.

⁹⁹ Stephen P. Cohen, “India, Pakistan and Kashmir” in *India as an Emerging Power*, ed. Sumit Ganguly (London: Routledge, 2004), 30.

Kashmir¹⁰⁰ which further deteriorated the relations between the two nuclear-armed states. Thus, the conflict between India, and Pakistan is multifaceted.

It seems that the fundamental conflict lies in the imbalance in the South Asian state system. Undisputedly, India remained conventionally superior vis-à-vis Pakistan since independence. This nature of imbalance in the state system pushes India to establish its dominance while Pakistan resists it to protect its autonomy. Both rival states have used force as a tool based upon their respective strategies (offence and defense) to secure their national interest throughout conflictual history. For instance, India and Pakistan have fought three large-scale wars (1948, 1965, and 1971) in the pre-nuclear with two over the Kashmir dispute. While in the post-nuclear era, the two states experienced numerous crises (1986, 1990, 1999, 2001-02, 2008, 2016, and 2019) including a limited war reckoned as the Kargil Crisis and surgical strikes during the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis under a nuclear overhang. The MAD might have averted large-scale wars with the acquisition of nuclear weapons, nevertheless, the two states continued to fight at a lower scale based on coercive strategies such as compellence and deterrence over the Kashmir Issue.

In recent times, India's military upgradation, doctrinal changes, and economic might have pushed it to adopt an offensive posture to establish its dominance vis-à-vis Pakistan. The manifestation of India's growing assertiveness is much more evident concerning its Kashmir policy. For instance, in the aftermath of the Pulwama terrorist attack, India carried out an aerial surgical strike deep inside Pakistan, across the international border, the first of its kind since 1971, pointing to crossing new frontiers in India-Pakistan bilateral military engagements. Two,

¹⁰⁰ On August 5, 2019, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) announced the revocation of Articles 370 and 350A from the country's constitution. These two connected pieces of legislation grant the state of Jammu and Kashmir—the Indian-controlled portion of the overall Kashmir region—special semi-autonomous status.

India unilaterally revoke article 370 and 35A of its constitution to annex Kashmir. To be clear, these assertive steps indicate India's stance to reject any revision in the international borders, thereby going with maintaining the status quo to keep its domination intact vis-à-vis Pakistan.


Kenneth Waltz, a nuclear deterrence advocator maintained that nuclear weapons ensure peace and stability among the nuclear-armed countries.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, the India-Pakistan nuclear dyad challenges this Waltzian assumption to the extent that both states experience threat perception, and arms racing, even after the nuclearization. Interestingly, the two states developed military doctrines, and war-fighting strategies to use force as a tool to resolve their crises in both pre- and post-nuclear eras. For instance, India, and Pakistan tried to resolve their crises by fighting large-scale wars involving brute force based on offense and defense strategies in the pre-nuclear era. Contrarily in the post-nuclear era, both rival states used limited war, mobilization of forces, and surgical strikes involving coercive strategies such as compellence and deterrence, as crisis management tools. Thus, this makes India-Pakistan conflict dynamics more complex and demands a rigorous conceptual framework to explain the renewed patterns of military engagement particularly in the post-nuclear era. Apropos, the author devised a conceptual framework comprising the theories of stability-instability paradox, and coercive spectrum (brute force and coercion). It is presumed that the devised conceptual framework is appropriate to study the impact of evolving doctrines on the conflict transformation between India and Pakistan.

Conceptual Framework: Stability-instability Paradox, Coercive Spectrum, and Conflict Transformation

¹⁰¹ See Sagan and Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*.

The detailed description and application of the conceptual framework are discussed in the section below to develop a logical linkage in the study.

Figure 2 Theoretical Model: Stability-instability Paradox and Coercive Spectrum



Source: Developed by Author

Stability-Instability Paradox

Stability-instability paradox greatly appeals the scholars of International Relations due to its relevance and compatibility with contemporary strategic developments in international politics. Many scholars espouse it as a variant of structural realism. It maintains that the international system is anarchic due to a lack of central authority which in turn pushes states to pursue their interests based on a self-help approach. Since there is no central authority that will rescue states in the needing hours the primary concern of a state is to ensure their survival. The anarchic structure compels states to maximize their security to ensure survival. Nevertheless, the essence of the stability-instability paradox is linked to the role of nuclear weapons in interstate relations.

Different authors have contributed to the development of the stability-instability paradox. Glenn Snyder was the first to coin the term, “Stability-Instability Paradox”, in his book titled, *Defense and Deterrence: Towards a Theory of National Security*. Snyder maintains that “the greater the stability of the strategic balance of terror, the lower the stability of the overall balance at lower levels of violence”.¹⁰² Liddell Hart also conceptualized the concept of the stability-instability paradox in his works. Hart recognized this phenomenon in the wake of World War II, and stated that “the number of nuclear weapons mitigates the probability of full-scale war,” and “it increases the likelihood of limited war.”¹⁰³ Robert Jervis in his book titled, *The Illogic of Nuclear Strategy*, writes that “the extent that military balance is stable at the level of all-out nuclear war, it will become less stable at lower levels of violence.”¹⁰⁴ Michael Krepon articulates that when the two rival states acquire nuclear weapons the chances of a direct conventional conflict between them decrease while the probability of unconventional

¹⁰² Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961).

¹⁰³ Henry Basil Liddell Hart, *The Revolution in Warfare* (London: Faber and Faber, 1947).

¹⁰⁴ Robert Jervis, *The Illogic of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1984).

warfare—indirect conflicts, proxy wars, secret operations, and some other types of adventures increases significantly.¹⁰⁵ Paul Kapur further unfolded the concept of the stability-instability paradox. Kapur maintained that nuclear weapons reduce the war at the upper, conventional level, and its chances at the lower, unconventional level increase because the adversary aims to deter for its survival.¹⁰⁶

This means the states' acquisition of nuclear weapons creates a paradoxical condition. On one hand, nuclear weapons decrease nuclear stability which is a measure of the probability of the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict; For instance, as the probability of use of nuclear weapons increases, nuclear stability decreases. On the other hand, even as nuclear weapons decrease nuclear stability, nevertheless, the states obtaining nuclear weapons increase the conventional stability. The conventional stability is a measure of the probability of conventional military conflict; as the probability of conventional conflict decreases, conventional stability increases. A state's acquisition of nuclear weapons increases the conventional stability by decreasing the probability of engaging in a conventional war.

The nuclear and conventional stability are inversely related to each other. As the probability of use of nuclear weapons increases that decreases nuclear stability, and then the probability of conventional conflict decreases which increases conventional stability. Furthermore, as the probability of the use of nuclear weapons decreases, nuclear stability increases. In turn, the probability of conventional conflict increases.

Importantly, there are two core assumptions of stability-instability used in the study: One, the acquisition of nuclear weapons will increase the tensions between the two rival states. Two, despite the increased level of tensions and crises, both rival states will evade a large-scale

¹⁰⁵ Krepon, "The Stability-Instability Paradox,".

¹⁰⁶ Kapur, *Dangerous Deterrent*.

conflict or use of nuclear weapons against each other. The debates over the phenomenon of stability-instability paradox began during the epoch of the Cold War. That was the time when debates over the concept of why and how the stability at the conventional level between the giants remains intact, and in the meanwhile, there is a significant increase in the probability of minor or indirect confrontation between the nuclear-armed rivals. This happens for the reason that the nuclear weapon states as rational actors intend to evade large-scale wars or nuclear use, hence the states neither fight a large-scale war nor let minor conflicts or crises escalate into large-scale wars or strategic levels—therefore generating space to involve in minor conflicts. For instance, the US, and the Soviet Union succeeded in evading nuclear, and large-scale conventional warfare, although, both great powers competed to gain dominance in numerous ways such as proxy wars, and a series of crises that turned into substitutes for confrontation.

The stability-instability paradox was identified at the start of the Cold War. For instance, Hart stated that “to the extent that the H[hydrogen] bomb reduces the likelihood of full-scale war, it increases the possibility of limited war pursued by widespread local aggression.”¹⁰⁷ This is why the US declared a massive retaliation policy to deter the Soviet Union from any sort of eventuality. The US incorporated requisite measures in its force structure, and doctrinal posture to increase the probability of nuclear use. However, the US massive retaliation doctrine was not credible, and could not be counted on to deter the undesirable eventualities that encouraged its development. The reason attributed to this point is that both the US and Soviet Union could retaliate in a gigantic manner, so this threat invited a bluff that could be called. Snyder maintains that the Soviet Union could still be involved in “a range of minor ventures which they can undertake with impunity, despite the objective

¹⁰⁷ B. H. Liddle Hart, *Deterrent or Defence A Fresh Look at West’s Military Position* (London: Stevens and Sons, 1960), 23.

existence of some probability of retaliation.”¹⁰⁸ Massive retaliation posture gave space to the pursuit of flexible war-fighting options, and limited war doctrine under the nuclear umbrella, nevertheless, these settings never actually changed the central principles of the stability-instability paradox. Jervis explained this phenomenon by stating that, “To the extent that the military balance is stable at the level of all-out nuclear war, it will become less stable at lower levels of violence.”¹⁰⁹ Thus, the MAD may have refrained the US and USSR from fighting a direct war during the Cold War era, however, the threat of nuclear exchange could not plausibly avert them from fighting proxy wars across the world.

The question arises, Is the stability-instability paradox applicable to South Asia? It seems a useful framework for analyzing the India-Pakistan conflict, which has been characterized by a synergy of stability and instability over the past few decades. Both countries have a long history of conflicts, particularly over the Kashmir dispute. The rivals have fought three large-scale wars in the pre-nuclear era. However, the introduction of nuclear weapons ensured deterrence at the strategic or the upper conventional level as either side avoided fighting a large-scale war under the nuclear overhang.

One of the core assumptions of the stability-instability paradox such as the acquisition of nuclear weapons will increase the tensions between the rival states, seems applicable to the India-Pakistan conflict dynamics. The existence of nuclear weapons has arguably deterred India, and Pakistan from engaging in all-out war, however, both nuclear-armed states experienced numerous crises including a limited war (1999), and surgical strikes (2019) under a nuclear overhang. Nevertheless, one of the key factors that remained at the center of all crises is the role of non-state actors. Both countries accuse each other of involvement or supporting

¹⁰⁸ Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense*, 226.

¹⁰⁹ Jervis, *Illogic of Nuclear Strategy*, 31.

terrorism against the other state. For instance, India accuses Pakistan of supporting terrorist groups that have carried out terrorist attacks in Indian Administered Kashmir and elsewhere in India. While, Pakistan blames India for its support of terrorist groups in Balochistan, a troubled province of Pakistan. Interestingly, the presence of nuclear weapons has not deterred non-state actors from engaging in terrorism or other forms of violence. Ostensibly, the phenomenon of terrorism has coincided with the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The region has witnessed an increased role of violent non-state actors since the nuclearization of South Asia, pointing towards the efficacy of the stability-instability paradox.

The second core assumption of the stability-instability paradox is that despite the increased level of tensions and numerous crises, the nuclear-armed states will evade a large-scale war or use of a nuclear weapon. One of the primary ways in which nuclear weapons have contributed to stability in the India-Pakistan conflict is by serving as a powerful deterrent against all-out war between the two rival countries. India and Pakistan experienced numerous crises in the post-nuclear era, however, no single crisis escalated to large-scale war or use of nuclear weapons. Thus, the stability-instability paradox is a suitable lens to study the India-Pakistan conflict. On the one hand, the possession of nuclear weapons has contributed to a degree of stability in the region by deterring an all-out war between India and Pakistan. On the other hand, the presence of nuclear weapons has also contributed to ongoing instability by encouraging smaller-scale conflicts, and by failing to deter non-state actors from engaging in violence. The stability-instability paradox is suitable for understanding India-Pakistan conflict dynamics, however, how and why the low-intensity conflict is fought demands further deliberation and assistance from another theory such as the coercive spectrum.

Coercive Spectrum

Since the introduction of nuclear weapons, numerous crises erupted (1986-1987, 1990, 1999, 2001-2002, 2008, 2016, and 2019) but no single crisis converted into a large-scale war. Evidently and much in line with the stability-instability paradox, large-scale military confrontation seems to become a receding phenomenon due to the MAD, however, what makes India-Pakistan distinct is the development of new war-fighting strategies and doctrines to fight based on coercion under a nuclear overhang. For instance, India introduced offensive force employment strategies and doctrines such as CSD, JDIAF-2017, and LWD-2018 to fight a limited war or carry out small military operations to counter terrorism, pointing to controlled escalation.

The doctrinal innovations provided the required space to fight an LIC under the nuclear umbrella. India's evolving doctrinal changes provided the requisite foundations to carry out small military operations and surgical strikes in the wake of any terrorist incident in Indian Administered Kashmir or elsewhere in India. For instance, India based on compellence strategy used limited use of force in recent crises such as the Uri Crisis and Pulwama-Balakot Crisis pointing towards the establishment of surgical strike as a new normal between India and Pakistan, a renewed pattern of bilateral likely engagement. In addition to the stability-instability paradox, this thesis incorporates strategic coercion (deterrence and compellence) to study the changing patterns of conflict and the shifting character of the war between India and Pakistan.

The use of coercive power to influence the adversary's behavior is an art and science. It got significant prominence after the World War II. During the Cold War era, in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, US President J. F. Kennedy was willing to reconcile the issue, but he believed that it was important, to begin with coercive threats and action to avert

the Soviet Union's plans, considered against the interest of the US. Thus, President Kennedy used coercive diplomacy to put the adversary in a position favorable to the US interests without using direct power.¹¹⁰ So, strategic coercion is an art of bargaining where the opponent is retained under the influence without hurting it. The opponent is intended to be compelled through the efficient manipulation of threats. In the course of coercion, one may use potential threats but not the actual use of force on a large scale. Furthermore, it relates to relate with the purpose of action where one party decides to proceed on the course of coercion. It means that there is a certainty of violence as the cause of one's desired behavior but not the use of power.

Strategic coercion is a two-way approach, for instance, there is an action over reaction such as interdependent interaction. For example, the strategic approach of India vis-à-vis Pakistan involving coercion is that Pakistan should follow and take serious actions against terrorist outfits based on its territory, otherwise India has the absolute right to target, and vanish those terrorist outfits who are involved in perpetrating terrorism across the border in India or Indian Administered Kashmir. In this case, India desires to drag Pakistan via a two-way policy. Its either Pakistan should consider India's demands to take the desired action or be prepared to bear the costly (expected) injury from India. Apropos, this makes India-Pakistan conflict dynamics an interesting case to study in the context of strategic coercion. Before moving ahead, it is imperative to discuss coercive strategies such as compellence and deterrence.

Deterrence vs Compellence

For the convenience of the study, basic assumptions of deterrence theory are discussed here to analyze and apply them to India-Pakistan conflictual relations. Deterrence theory is an offshoot of realism. George Quester rightly maintains that although deterrence is mostly associated with

¹¹⁰ Jack S. Levy, "Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy: The Contributions of Alexander George," *Political Psychology* 29, no. 4 (Rutgers University: 2008): 541, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00648.x>.

the nuclear age it could be found to function even in ancient times.¹¹¹ Deterrence as a concept can be traced back to 6th-century Chinese strategist Sun Tzu's classic book "*The Art of War*." He argued that "to win one hundred fights is not the peak of skill instead to subdue enemy without fighting is the peak of skill."¹¹² According to Patrick Morgan, the essence of deterrence lies in the situation where one power averts the other from committing an act that is unwanted for the first party by using a threat of punishment to the second party, if it tries to do an undesirable act.¹¹³ As per Stephen L. Quackenbush, deterrence is the use of a threat that can be latent or manifest in nature, by one party to persuade the other party to not endeavor to change the prevailing status quo.¹¹⁴

From a theoretical perspective, strategic deterrence can be broken down and organized into four distinctive categories of deterrent threats. Broad deterrence aims to deter war in general, whereas narrow deterrence involves deterring a particular type of military operation amid a conflict where certain thresholds have not been crossed.¹¹⁵ Central deterrence involves the use of threats by a state to deter a direct attack against itself whereas extended deterrence aims to deter aggression against allies. Immediate deterrence involves the urgent use of threats throughout a crisis to deter aggressive actions that appear highly possible to occur. General deterrence, on the other hand, is more flexible and is designed to deter enemies from even considering active hostilities without the need for explicit threats.¹¹⁶ Finally, deterrence by punishment depends on the ability to threaten unacceptable consequences in response to certain

¹¹¹ George Quester, *Deterrence before Hiroshima: The Airpower Background of Modern Strategy* (New York: Wiley, 1966), 1.

¹¹² Keith B. Payne, *Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996), 4.

¹¹³ Patrick M. Morgan, *Deterrence Now* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1.

¹¹⁴ Stephen L. Quackenbush, "General Deterrence and International Conflict: Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory," *International Interactions* 36, no. 1 (2010): 60, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620903554069>.

¹¹⁵ Lawrence Freedman, "War in Iraq: Selling the Threat," *Survival* 46, no. 2 (2004): 32 <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2004.9688597>.

¹¹⁶ Freedman, "War in Iraq," 40-42.

courses of action, whereas deterrence by denial involves the implementation of policies that would prevent an adversary from being able to attain their objectives.¹¹⁷

In broader terms, deterrence depends on a combination of physical and psychological components, and both are linked to the behavior of the state. The physical component is represented by an adequate military capability to threaten the opponent and from a psychological point of view, the opponent must be convinced that deterrence not only can inflict unacceptable costs but also irrevocable commitment to use capabilities to express credible response. It is stated that “in the absence of a credible response, deterrence becomes a façade” and further “it is the capacity to threaten a credible response that makes deterrence effective.”¹¹⁸ In other words, deterrence could have all the military capabilities but if the opponent does not believe that it has the actual commitment to use the force then the threat carries no weight. Effective deterrence, therefore, depends on the deterrence appearing capable, and credible through the process of effective communication.

At the most basic level, it is a communicative process involving threats of punishment, and assurance to make adversaries think rationally, and prevent them from pursuing certain courses of action. The objective of deterrence is generally to prevent aggressive challengers from behaving aggressively by convincing them that the cost of aggression will outweigh any potential gains. It is pertinent to mention here that for the functioning of deterrence, the adversary has to be aware of the actions it is to be deterred from taking, with the belief that crossing red lines will result in retaliation, and that avoiding such actions will prevent the execution of the deterrent threat. If the adversary is averted from taking aggressive action

¹¹⁷ Roger W. Barnett, *Asymmetrical Warfare: Today's Challenge to US Military Power* (Virginia: Brassey's Inc, 2003), 97.

¹¹⁸ David M. Kunsman and Douglas B. Lawson, *A Primer on US Strategic Nuclear Policy, Sandia Report 2001-2003* (Sandia National Laboratory, 2001), 9-10.

because of the perception that unacceptable losses will result, the deterrence would be declared highly successful.

For deterrence to function, the opponent must be rational in the sense that its behavior is generally consistent and therefore, predictable. It is important to note that “rational” behavior does not necessarily have to be synonymous with what one interprets as “reasonable” behavior for others. Interestingly, the opponent can be rational in their terms and make cost-benefit calculations according to their standing points to which we find it very difficult to relate. What is important here is that there is an element of predictability in how they link behavior with the goals regardless of whether we relate to them.¹¹⁹ In this regard, the significant point is to convince the adversary by molding their perceptions through the tool of communication to think rationally. For example, Pakistan has adopted a minimum credible deterrence policy against India. Pakistani leadership has been communicating to India in the past that in case of any misadventure to test the conventional and nuclear capabilities of Pakistan, this will prove very devastating as it would not be reluctant to use all its power to counter India. Logically, Indian strategic policymakers will think twice before crossing the nuclear redlines of Pakistan. Nevertheless, India recently introduced doctrinal changes to wage a limited war or small military operations in the wake of terrorist incidents. It carried out a surgical strike deep inside Pakistan in February 2019 which raises questions on the efficacy of deterrence. This thesis endeavors to study the situation of deterrence in the changing conflict dynamics between India and Pakistan.

¹¹⁹ Keith B. Payne, “Deterring the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” *Comparative Strategy* 14, no. 4 (1995): 348, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495939508403042>.

Along with deterrence, compellence is another strategy within the coercive spectrum. Thomas Schelling¹²⁰ described compellence as a direct action that persuades an opponent to give up something that is desired. Schelling distinguished compellence from deterrence, which is designed to discourage an opponent from action by threatening punishment. The compellent threats involve threats of using force or actual use of limited force combined with a demand from the targeted state to meet. If the target state does not comply with the demands may be possessions or an altered behavior, the threat can be activated. Deterrence involves a threat to keep an adversary “from starting something,” or “to prevent [an adversary] from action by fear of consequences.” Compellence is “a threat intended to make an adversary do something.” In deterrence, the punishment will be imposed if the adversary acts; in compellence, the punishment is usually imposed until the adversary acts. For example, the Versailles Treaty of World War 1, where Britain and France promoted punitive conditions on Germany to deter it from the repetition of its actions compelled Germany to create further problems rather than solutions to the issues that ultimately led to World War II.¹²¹

Alexander Downes describes coercion as “the art of manipulating costs and benefits to affect the behavior of an actor.” Explaining its two forms, Downes writes, “Deterrence consists of threats of force designed to persuade a target to refrain from taking a particular action. Compellence, by contrast, utilizes force — or threats of force — to compel a target to take an action, or to stop taking an action it has already started.”¹²² Many scholars believe that it is

¹²⁰ Thomas C. Schelling is the author of *Arms and Influence*. Thomas Schelling (1921–2016) taught in the economics department at Yale at the beginning of his career and then moved to the economics department at Harvard. He also served in the government and worked for the RAND Corporation. He ended his career at the University of Maryland. In 2005, he won the Nobel Prize in Economics.

¹²¹ Mark P. Sullivan, *The Mechanism for Strategic Coercion Denial or Second Order Change?* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1995), 05.

¹²² Alexander Downes, “Step Aside or Face the Consequences: Explaining the Success and Failure of Compellent Threats to Remove Foreign Leaders,” in *Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics*, ed. Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018), 96.

more difficult to compel than to deter due to multiple reasons. One, deterrence is less provocative because the deterring state needs only to set the stage for action. It incurs little cost by making the threat. Indeed, costly actions are precisely taken to avoid the adversary's offensive action which deterrence is supposed to prevent. Compellence, on the other hand, requires some form of costly action or a commitment to act. Second, the state that is the target of compellence may fear for its reputation if it complies with a threat. Third, forcing states to act is difficult, because states are large, complex bureaucracies. They move more slowly than individuals, and slowness may be confused with reluctance to comply.

In broader terms, there are two basic forms of compellence: One, diplomatic, or immediate, compellence involves verbal threats and promises. Show of force also assists this kind of coercion; realist scholars note that most diplomacy is underwritten by the unspoken possibility of military action. Two, demonstrative compellence involves a limited use of force coupled with the threat of escalating violence (which may also include large-scale war) to come if demands are not met. This kind of compellence is what Schelling referred to as the "diplomacy of violence."¹²³ A state does not unleash its full military potential; instead, it wages a limited campaign while instituting pauses to make the adversary consider the consequences if it does not comply. In the India-Pakistan context, the example of a diplomatic threat is India's mobilization of forces during the Twin Peaks Crisis and the Mumbai Crisis to compel Pakistan to take action against the terrorist groups allegedly involved in the terrorist incidents in Indian Administered Kashmir or elsewhere in India. An example of demonstrative compellence is the Indian use of limited force in the shape of surgical strikes during the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis

¹²³ Thomas C. Schelling, "The Diplomacy of Violence," In *Theories of Peace and Security: A Reader in Contemporary Strategic Thought*, pp. 64-84 (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1970).

to compel Pakistan to take action against the alleged terrorist outfits based on its soil involved in perpetrating the Pulwama attack.


This thesis used the coercive spectrum (brute force and coercion) based on the work of Schelling coupled with the stability-instability paradox as a conceptual framework to study the changing nature of conflict dynamics between India and Pakistan. Schelling in his work conceptualized the phenomenon of “compellence.” He classified the methods through which military objectives are achieved.¹²⁴ Compellence and deterrence are linked in a way that both are considered to be the major stratagems within the framework of the coercive spectrum.¹²⁵ While brute force is a direct use of force to achieve a military objective. For example, during World War II, the Allied forces led by the US captured several positions and strategic zones from Japan through the direct use of force. The Japanese forces were cut from their main routes of supply. Thus, Japan was brought on conditions favorable to its enemies and compelled to take a certain course of action.¹²⁶ On the other hand, coercion is a method utilized to make threats to put certain actions in the favor of the demanding party or a state. For example, one state aims to convince the other to abandon or give up against the coercive demands based on the threat of the use of force, or actual use of limited force. Interestingly, Schelling linked the strategies of brute force and coercion with the respective objective which is either to change or sustain the status quo in a specific conflict situation (see model below).

¹²⁴ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

¹²⁵ O'Donnell, "Review Essay," 2.

¹²⁶ Sullivan, *Mechanism for Strategic Coercion*, 34-35.

Figure 3: Coercive Spectrum



(Prepared by author in line with Thomas C. Shelling Work)¹²⁷

While employing the brute force strategy, change in the status quo is achieved by using offence measures involving the direct use of (brute) force while maintenance of the status quo is achieved by using brute force based on defense measures. On the other hand, Coercion is defined as “the deliberate and purposive use of overt threats of force to influence another's strategic choices.”¹²⁸ The coercion also uses two strategies to secure the objectives such as changing the status quo or maintaining the status quo. Compellence strategy based on the offense approach involves the threat of using force or actual use of limited force to bring the change in the status quo while in the other case, deterrence strategy based on the defense approach involves deterrence by denial or deterrence by punishment to prevent the aggression of the compelling party, thereby, deterrence is an attempt to maintain the status quo. It is aimed at making the compelling party understand that taking certain punitive actions will come with severe consequences. Thus, compellence is the art of achieving or changing the status quo

¹²⁷ Kin Ohsishi “Compellence and Coercive Diplomacy: Concepts and Characteristics,” *Research Fellow, Global Security Division, Policy Studies Department*, (2019): 01.

¹²⁸ Freedman and Raghavan, “Coercion,” 217.

while deterrence is about the maintenance of the status quo. Nevertheless, within the coercion spectrum, compellence in comparison to deterrence strategy is difficult to implement, as “compliance will be blatant, and will carry with it the added reputational significance of humiliation.”¹²⁹

Conclusion

To sum up the debate, the theories of the stability-instability paradox and coercive spectrum are appropriate for studying India-Pakistan conflict dynamics. The stability-instability paradox proposes that the increase in nuclear stability led to conventional instability. This is why India and Pakistan experienced increased tensions after the acquisition of nuclear weapons mostly due to the phenomenon of terrorism. The role of non-state actors acted as an impetus particularly for India to modify force employment strategies and military doctrines such as CSD, JDIAF-2017, and LWD-2018. One of the core objectives was to wage a limited war or carry out small-scale military operations under the nuclear overhang against Pakistan for its alleged involvement in terrorism to compel the latter to stop supporting terrorism and to take action against the terrorist outfits based on its soil. While Pakistan responded offensively by introducing FSD and the development of TNW to keep deterrence intact, in case of any eventuality from the Indian side. Nevertheless, the eruption of crises occurred at regular intervals in the wake of the introduction of nuclear weapons and doctrinal changes. In line with the assumption of the stability-instability paradox, India and Pakistan witnessed increased tensions in the post-nuclear era. Further, the point that makes the case of India-Pakistan conflict dynamics distinct as well as which goes beyond the scope of the stability-instability paradox is the employment of a coercive spectrum involving compellence and deterrence strategies. For instance, India based on compellence strategy involving limited use of force, for the first time

¹²⁹ Freedman and Raghavan, “Coercion,” 218.

carried out aerial surgical strike deep inside Pakistan to compel the latter to take action against the alleged terrorist outfits based on Pakistani territory. Apropos, this study analyzes the impact of evolving doctrines on the conflict transformation between India and Pakistan through the prism of the stability-instability paradox and coercive spectrum.

Chapter Two

Pre-Nuclear Era: Military Strategies and Bilateral Confrontation (1947-1973)

India and Pakistan remained engaged in protracted conflict since independence. There are multiple causes for the enduring nature of rivalry between the two states, nevertheless, the Kashmir dispute is the core cause of the conflict. Both India and Pakistan have fought three large-scale wars in the pre-nuclear era. Unquestionably, India manifested conventional superiority in military confrontations against Pakistan. India initially pursued defense in depth strategy in 1948 war while Pakistan followed defensive offensive strategy. Nevertheless, India in the aftermath of defeat in Indo-Sino 1962 war, shifted to offensive defensive strategy mainly to counter China threat. While, India perceived defensive strategy to be enough against a conventionally weaker Pakistan. Both rivals fought their second war in 1965, only ending in stalemate. Nevertheless, India successfully implemented its lightning campaign against Pakistan in 1971 war, which resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh. India and Pakistan fought three large-scale wars (1948, 1965 and 1971) with first two over Kashmir dispute. Both states used brute force involving strategies such as offence and defense to resolve the dispute. This chapter tries to focus on uncovering the conventional military strategies and capabilities while assessing how military strategies impact on the nature of conflict dynamics between India and Pakistan in the pre-nuclear era.

Origin of India-Pakistan Disputes

India and Pakistan got independence from the British Raj in August, 1947. The rivalry remains one of the most enduring and unresolved conflicts of the times. The enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan is full of misunderstandings, apprehensions, mistrust, ambiguity and

antagonism.¹³⁰ Thazha V. Paul defined enduring rivalry as, “the enduring rivalry is characterized by a persistent, fundamental and long-term incompatibility of goals between two states which manifest itself in basic attitudes of the parties towards each other as well as in the recurring violent or potentially violent clashes over long period of time.”¹³¹ Both India and Pakistan are engulfed in stern conflict right from the start of their history. After the independence, the distribution of resources was one of the important issues among the two newly born states. Nevertheless, India in comparison to Pakistan, received more than its allocated financial and military resources.¹³² India at the outset enjoyed conventional superiority over Pakistan. The conventional superiority assisted India to secure its strategic objectives in the immediate aftermath of partition, leading to inherent imbalance in the state system, where India established its domination and Pakistan remained in quest to protect its autonomy.

British left around 565 princely states to decide their fate to join India or Pakistan or remain as an independent state. India rejected the option of independence that was given to the princely states. Evidently, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, who later on became the first Prime Minister of India, in the annual address on April, 18, 1947, publicly declared that any princely state which will go against joining India would be treated as an enemy and would have to face the consequences for it.¹³³ Contrarily, Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, emphasized freedom of princely states in deciding their future to join either India or Pakistan and even they are free to go for independence as a state.¹³⁴ Nevertheless, the choices available

¹³⁰ Abbasi and Khan, *Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia*, 115.

¹³¹ Paul, “India-Pakistan Enduring Rivalry,” 3-6.

¹³² S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, “The Jihad Paradox, Pakistan and Islamist Militancy in South Asia,” *International Security* 37, no. 1 (Summer, 2012): 115, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00090.

¹³³ Navnita Chadha Bahera, *Demystifying Kashmir* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 8.

¹³⁴ Wayne Ayres Wilcox, *Pakistan The Consolidation of a Nation* (New York: Columbia University Press), 47.

to the rulers of the princely states were not many with the end of British Raj specifically in context of threats by Indian National Congress (INC), so they either by choice or coercion made the decision. Consequently, majority of the states joined India to ensure their survival as newly born conventionally weaker Pakistan was not in position to provide them with security.¹³⁵ Thus, the India's policy to pressurize princely states to join it could be categorized as start of Indian domination in the South Asian region.

Reason for Enduring Conflict: The Cases of Junagarh, Hyderabad and Kashmir

INC successfully discouraged rulers of the princely states to declare their independence and/or joining Pakistan. In broader terms, three cases are worth mentioning which became the reasons for India-Pakistan enduring rivalry. In the first case, Maharaja Hari Singh, the Hindu ruler of a Muslim majority state of Kashmir, who was finding it difficult to decide the future of the state, ultimately joined India. The second case is of Junagarh where Muslim ruler with Hindu population expressed intentions to join Pakistan. In third case, the Muslim Nizam in Hyderabad with majority of Hindu population decided to remain independent. Interestingly, India implemented policies deriving source of power from one nation theory, in all three cases of Kashmir, Junagarh and Hyderabad.

India signed instrument of accession with ruler of Kashmir, without bothering to take consent of its Muslim majority population. In contrast to the first case, the Muslim ruler in Junagarh decided to join Pakistan which was refused with forced ratification after a plebiscite in February, 1948. Lastly, India put Hyderabad on economic blockade followed by Indian military intrusion in September, 1948 to punish Nizam for his decision to remain

¹³⁵ Bahera, *Demystifying Kashmir*, 12-13.

independent.¹³⁶ Thus, India employed three different approaches to forcefully annex the princely states which became the core reason of India-Pakistan enduring rivalry.

Kashmir Dispute: A Major Reason for India and Pakistan Rivalry

Among all three cases discussed above, the most significant remained the Kashmir dispute. Kashmir is territorially connected with both India and Pakistan. This is why Kashmir dispute became an arena of conflict as territorial proximity assisted Pakistan to extend necessary opposition to India. Maharaja Singh inability to decide the future of the Kashmiri state led to a severe conflict between India and Pakistan.¹³⁷ Amidst fear and uncertainty among Kashmiri people about the future of their state, an armed revolt generally reckoned as Poonch uprising erupted against Maharaja's administration. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of Muslims were killed in massacres and large body of Muslim population was forced to flee to the west Punjab (Pakistan). This was the time when Pathan tribes from the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) who were providing arms to Kashmiri people, joined the conflict. Therefore, the interaction between the Kashmiri people and Pathan tribes acted as a stimulus for tribesmen to join the conflict in Kashmir around October, 19, 1947.¹³⁸ Pakistan also intervened and helped the Kashmiri rebels to counter conventionally superior Indian forces. Thus, Pakistani support to the Kashmiri rebels generated severe tensions between newly independent India and Pakistan, ultimately leading to war.

Maharaja escaped to Jammu on October, 26, 1947 and requested Indian government for military assistance to counter the uprising. As per India's claim, the ruler of the princely state decided to join India and signed instrument of accession on October, 26, 1947. India deployed

¹³⁶ Alastair Lamb, *Crisis in Kashmir* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), 15.

¹³⁷ Rashmi Sehgal, "Kashmir Conflict: Solution and Demand for Self-determination," *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 1, no. 6 (June, 2011): 2, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2390419.

¹³⁸ Lamb, *Crisis in Kashmir*, 37-38.

its forces to support Maharaja's rule in Kashmir on October, 27, 1947. However, the dubious way of signing instrument of accession to troop's deployment raised questions about the legitimacy of the act.¹³⁹ Alastair Lamb in his book writes that India pressurized Maharaja Hari Singh to sign instrument of accession after Indian troops landed in Srinagar.¹⁴⁰ He further mentioned that Indian forces landed in Srinagar on October, 17, 1947.¹⁴¹ Ostensibly, it seems that Indian troops entered earlier in the Kashmiri territory than other parties to the conflict including the Pathan tribesmen.

Conversely, few scholars interpreted the situation otherwise and asserted that Indian forces landed in Kashmir after intrusion of Pathan tribes and accession of the princely state with India.¹⁴² The question arises here is that if Pathan tribesmen were the cause of Indian troop's deployment in Kashmir than what about the Indian aggressive military strategy in other princely states such as Junagarh and Hyderabad where the local rulers desired to joined Pakistan or remain independent, respectively. The matter of fact is that India adopted strategy of using stick and carrot to gain its strategic objectives by acceding princely states into Indian Union.¹⁴³ Evidently, India launched various military campaigns against the princely states to maximize its territory, such as the states of Kashmir and Junagarh in 1947, Hyderabad in 1948 and Goa in 1961.¹⁴⁴ Thus, India's military campaigns proved to be beneficial for its national security objectives and further, domination in the Southern Asian region.

¹³⁹ Fahmida Ashraf, "Jammu and Kashmir Dispute: Examining Various Proposals for its Resolution," *Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad*, Series Paper 20, (2000): 5.

¹⁴⁰ Alastair Lamb, *Incomplete Partition: The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute 1947-1948* (Oxford: Roxford Books, 1997), 175.

¹⁴¹ Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990* (Hertfordshire: Roxford Books, 1991), 131.

¹⁴² Sunil Dasgupta and Stephen P. Cohen, "Is India Ending Its Strategic Restraint Regime," *The Washington Quarterly* 34, no. 2 (2011): 164, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2011.562442>.

¹⁴³ Bahera, *Demystifying Kashmir*, 9.

¹⁴⁴ Chris Ogden, *Indian Foreign Policy: Ambition and Transition* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014), 43.

India-Pakistan War 1948: Strategies and Intensity of Violence

The strategic location of the state of Kashmir is the major source of conflict between India and Pakistan.¹⁴⁵ The Kashmir dispute created fear, mistrust and uncertainty between the two states that ultimately resulted in fighting their first large-scale war in the immediate aftermath of independence. Initially the battle was fought between the forces of state of the Jammu and Kashmir, and India,¹⁴⁶ however, the Kashmiri state forces faced severe challenges to defend its grounds against the conventionally superior Indian armed forces. The Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir declared independence from Maharaja's regime on October, 24, 1947. Meanwhile, the fight between Indian forces and state forces, continued.¹⁴⁷ As the talks between the top leadership of India and Pakistan failed to decide the fate of state of Kashmir, Indian armed forces launched massive military offensive against Kashmiri rebels and tribal fighters and defeated them. Subsequently, Indian armed forces took control over the Srinagar. While the situation Gilgit was different in a way that Major W. Brown, the commander of Gilgit Scouts declared to join Pakistan, putting an end to Gogra rule.¹⁴⁸ In these circumstances, India and Pakistan fought their first large-scale war over Kashmir dispute in 1948.

Indian Army conveniently pursued its national security objectives in 1948 war. It is imperative to mention that both India and Pakistan had not announced any military doctrines in the aftermath of independence. Indian military (Army) doctrine is inherited from British Empire, thus, India followed the same military traditions after the independence of the subcontinent. It is important to mention two related aspects of inherited military doctrine to understand the course of evolving Indian military doctrine. One, the mechanization of British

¹⁴⁵ Lamb, *Kashmir A Disputed Legacy*, 2.

¹⁴⁶ Victoria Schofield, *Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan, and the Unending War* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 80.

¹⁴⁷ Lamb, *Kashmir A Disputed Legacy*, 135.

¹⁴⁸ Musarat Javed Cheema, "Pakistan-India Conflict with Special Reference to Kashmir," *Social Asian Studies* 30, no. 1 (January-June, 2015): 49.

Indian Army was less in relation to British Army core. Further, the British Army in broader terms was less mechanized in comparison to its other peers in Europe and the reason attributed to it is huge Indian compulsions.¹⁴⁹ Nevertheless even in aftermath of World War II, British Indian Army was much familiarized with mechanized warfare doctrine. Further, the syllabus taught in Indian Staff College located in Quetta and British Staff College located in Camberley was the same. Nevertheless, the British Indian Army was not in requirement of tank regiments to fight and triumph against its adversaries of World War II on the frontier, and consequently, mechanization was not a priority for the British.¹⁵⁰ Two, British doctrinal inheritance provided the Indian Army with the best strategy to safeguard its frontiers. The British military posture at the time of independence devised the defense-in-depth strategy before initiation of a counterattack.¹⁵¹ Although, the British Army strategy in the pre-1938 era had been devised for a possible major offensive military operation on Afghanistan. Subsequently, the military plans were developed to safeguard British India's western frontier, presumed on the basis of an Afghan initiated attack that would be dealt primarily by defensive Indian Army retorts together with probable small localized counteractions.¹⁵²

India based in these British doctrinal traditions fought its first large-scale war with Pakistan over Kashmir dispute in 1948. British military traditions and inherited weaponry assisted Indian Army to get an edge over Pakistan Army in the fight. The war started in October, 1947 and ended after more than a year time in January, 1949. The war was fought almost all across the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Both India and Pakistan employed brute

¹⁴⁹ Jonathan M. House, *Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2001), 71.

¹⁵⁰ Pradeep Barua, "Strategies and Doctrines of Imperial Defence: Britain and India, 1919-1945," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 25, no. 2 (1997): 249-52, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03086539708583000>.

¹⁵¹ Amit Gupta, "Determining India's Force Structure and Military Doctrine: I want my MiG," *Asian Survey* 35, no. 5 (1995): 443, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2645747>.

¹⁵² Lorne J. Kavic, *India's Quest for Security: Defence Policies, 1947-1965* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 13-6.

force against each other to resolve the conflict based in their respective national objectives. Each belligerent desired to achieve complete victory over the other with an aim to have full control over the strategically important state of Kashmir. The war ended, with India gaining control over two-third and Pakistan over one-third of Kashmir.¹⁵³

India took Kashmir dispute to the United Nations (UN) for conflict resolution in January, 1948.¹⁵⁴ Ultimately, the UN backed ceasefire agreement put an end to the conflict on January, 01, 1949.¹⁵⁵ The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 39 established a Commission reckoned as United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) on April, 1948. The major purpose was to mediate between India and Pakistan and bring about a cessation of fighting in Kashmir and further, to make necessary arrangements for a popular plebiscite in Kashmir. After negotiations with the two sides, the UNCIP passed a three-part resolution in August, 1948. The three parts dealt with ceasefire, terms for truce, and procedures for negotiation regarding the conduct of public plebiscite. The belligerent countries accepted the resolution, and a ceasefire was achieved on December, 31, 1948. Further, the Karachi Agreement formally called the *Agreement between Military Representatives of India and Pakistan Regarding the Establishment of a Cease-Fire Line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir*, was signed on July, 27, 1949, supervised by the Truce Subcommittee of the UNCIP.¹⁵⁶

India and Pakistan faced huge losses in the first war of their history. For instance, On Indian side, 1500 Indian officers and men lost their lives with 3500 were wounded and 1000

¹⁵³ Devin T. Hagerty, *South Asia in World Politics* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 161.

¹⁵⁴ Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya, *The Making of India's Foreign Policy: Determinants, Institutions, Process and Personalities* (New Delhi, Allied Publishers, 1979), 291-298.

¹⁵⁵ Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Unending, India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 27.

¹⁵⁶ Robert Wirsing, *War or Peace on the Line of Control? The India-Pakistan Dispute over Kashmir Turns Fifty* (University of Durham, International Boundaries Research Unit, 1998), 9-11.

others were found missing. While on Pakistani side, it endured 20,000 casualties that included 6000 deaths.¹⁵⁷ Thus, the first India-Pakistan war is categorized as a large-scale war where the intensity of violence was high. The two states adopted brute force where India employed offence strategy and Pakistan employed defense strategy.

Table 2: Pre Nuclear Era-India Pakistan 1st War

Year	War	India's Strategy		Pakistan's Strategy		Intensity of Violence
		Brute Force		Brute Force		
		Offence	Defense	Offence	Defense	
1948	1 st Large Scale Conventional War	Offence	-	-	Defense	High

Source: Developed by Author

To sum up, the Indian Army following the doctrinal legacy of British Army, did not focused on mechanization until the wars of 1962 and 1965. Indian Army was equipped with the World War II arsenal and focused more on infantry. In the wake of 1948 war, Indian policy makers started to deliberate upon having a forward defense policy. Subsequently, major changes in India's military strategy and capabilities occurred in the 1950s and 1960s. While, Pakistan remained continuously engaged in maximizing its capabilities counter conventionally superior adversary.

Indian Changing Military Posture: China Factor

Jawahar Lal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, remained highly influential personality in devising foreign and strategic policies in the early period of independence.¹⁵⁸ India's strategic

¹⁵⁷ Ashok Krishna, *India's Armed Forces: Fifty Years of War and Peace* (London: Lancer Publishers, 1998), 160.

¹⁵⁸ Magan, *Indian Defense Approach*, 7.

policies were based on the policy pillars such as: one, maintaining military dominance over Pakistan; two, friendly relations with China; three, avoiding participation in Cold War politics; and lastly, focusing on the developing world.¹⁵⁹ Further, India's relations with external world revolved around three coaxial spheres such as super powers, developing world and neighboring countries, with more focus on the first sphere to less on third, in hierarchical terms.¹⁶⁰ The reason of this preference is rooted in Indian policy makers desire to become great power in the world.

India maintained neutral stance in early years of independence. And it preferred to become part of Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) to represent the voice of the developing world during the Cold War. India managed its diplomacy pragmatically well and achieved success in maximizing its space at international level.¹⁶¹ To be clear, India was more suspicious of the US and expressed warmth towards Soviet Union, particularly during Nehruvian era.¹⁶² Whereas, Russia majorly favored India vis-à-vis Pakistan. Soviet Union initially avoided to play any practical role in resolving conflict between India and Pakistan.¹⁶³ Significantly, close Indo-Soviet and Indo-Sino relations altered security parameters for Pakistan which had to find alliances to maintain balance of power in the region.

¹⁵⁹ Rajat Ganguly, "India's Military: Evolution, Modernization and Transformation," *India Quarterly* 71, no. 3 (2015): 189, <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0974928415584021>.

¹⁶⁰ Harish Kapur, *India's Foreign Policy, 1947-92, Shadows and Substance* (Sage Publications: New Delhi, 1994), 20-24.

¹⁶¹ Harsh V. Pant and Julie M. Super, "India's 'Non-Alignment' Conundrum: A Twentieth-Century Policy in Changing World," *International Affairs* 91, no. 4 (2015): 749, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12336>.

¹⁶² Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesi, "Explaining Sixty Years of India's Foreign Policy," *India Review* 8, No. 1 (2009): 5, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14736480802665162>.

¹⁶³ Feroz Hassan Khan, "Russia-Pakistan Strategic Relations: An Emerging Entente Cordiale," *Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs* (January 15, 2021), <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2473361/russiapakistan-strategic-relations-an-emerging-entente-cordiale/>.

India's cordial relations with great powers created mistrust and uncertainty between the two neighboring countries. The systemic forces from the very start of India-Pakistan history remained a significant factor in determining the security policies of the two states. Being conventionally weaker country majorly due to imbalance in the state system, Pakistan perceived an existential threat from India. In order to maintain balance of power, Pakistan had to enter into alliance system to ensure survival vis-à-vis conventionally superior rival. Subsequently, Pakistan signed SEATO¹⁶⁴ and CENTO during the peak of Cold War politics.¹⁶⁵ Thus, Pakistan joined these alliances to maximize its security, particularly in context of the outcome of 1948 war.

While China and India enjoyed friendly relations in the early years of independence. India recognized China in December, 1949 and was second country to Myanmar in doing so. India recognized sovereignty of China over Tibet in 1951. The two countries signed historical Panchsheel Agreement in 1954. India portrayed this understanding between the two countries as an appropriate policy tool for achieving regional and international peace.¹⁶⁶ Nevertheless, in few years' time, China and India got involved in military confrontations such as in 1959 and 1962 over a border dispute.

Both China and India signed two major agreements to maintain cordial relations, nevertheless, non-demarcation of border over the Himalayan mountainous range converted the friendship into hostility. India raised question regarding Chinese road construction built to connect Xinjiang and Tibet passing through Aksai Chin region located in Ladakh which India

¹⁶⁴ Mussarat Jabeen and Muhammad Saleem Mazhar, "Security Game: SEATO and CENTO as Instrument of Economic and Military Assistance to Encircle Pakistan," *Pakistan Economic and Social Review* (2011): 119, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41762426>.

¹⁶⁵ Jabeen and Mazhar, "Security Game," 121.

¹⁶⁶ Ganguly, "India's Military," 189.

claimed to be part of its territory. In a tit for tat manner, China challenged the legality of McMahon Line; a boundary between the Tibet and India since British times. And with this position, China claimed Arunachal Pradesh to be part of its territory. This conflictual episode was basically followed by an uprising in Tibet in 1959. The situation further deteriorated between the two countries when India granted asylum to Dalai Lama.¹⁶⁷ Ultimately, the differences resulted in a direct military confrontation between the two regional powers.

Initially, India established military posts behind Chinese claim line in Ladakh region. India did so to strengthen its claim of Aksai Chin as part of its territory. India built numerous new posts even beyond Chinese claim line in Tibet region. On the other front, few more posts were built across the McMahon Line beyond Chinese claim line. Chinese viewed the Indian proactive approach as against the principles of the Panchsheel agreement. Significantly, the friendly relations between China and India dramatically deteriorated in the recent years. Evidently, China declined to refurbish much chanted agreement with India in 1961, which ultimately acted as last nail in the coffin leading the two countries towards first war of their history.

The Indo-Sino deteriorating relations brought intensive change in Indian strategic culture. Nevertheless, after the embarrassing defeat in 1962 war, India had to bring major changes in its military strategies to counter China threat. The Indo-Sino war significantly altered the geopolitical setting in the region¹⁶⁸ particularly for Pakistan. For instance, the relations between China and Pakistan dramatically improved in the wake of first Indo-Sino

¹⁶⁷ Magan, *Indian Defense Approach*, 3.

¹⁶⁸ Lorenz Luthi, "Sino-India Relations 1954-1962," *Eurasia Border Review* 3, Special Issue (2012): 95, <http://hdl.handle.net/2115/50965>.

war. From this point on, India started to pursue its policies based on realist orientation explicitly to counter two-front war.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Nehru remained a powerful political leader who used to interfere in military affairs to extensive depth. In the early years of independence, he significantly shrunk the size of the military budget to invest more in the human development. Prime Minister Nehru was of the view that India faces a threat from Pakistan only and it could be dealt with meek military spending. Keeping in view the limited budget size, India's military strategy remained defensive in nature. The major focus of Indian Army was on Pakistan, meanwhile, no preparedness was deemed necessary against China.¹⁶⁹ Amidst reserved funding situation, the Indian armed forces advanced without some serious and clear strategic contemplation, let alone any significant doctrinal transformations. Significantly, Indian war fighting defense-in-depth strategy was considered compatible to less funding capabilities. Prime Minister Nehru emphasized that the Indian Army should focus on Pakistan only and further asserted that "no military preparation against China was necessary."¹⁷⁰ Thus, India give little weightage to threat from Pakistan while the latter perceived existential threat from the former.

Nehru's way of thinking changed drastically in the wake of border clashes with China in October 1959.¹⁷¹ Before these border skirmishes with China, India deployed an inadequate number of troops at Indo-Sino border. Indian Army was majorly positioned at the border to counter insurgency.¹⁷² Afterwards, Indian Army changed its approach and it increased the

¹⁶⁹ Christopher Clary, "Personalities, Organizations, and Doctrine in Indian Military," *India Review* 17, no. 1 (2018): 9, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14736489.2018.1415283>.

¹⁷⁰ Praval, *Indian Army*, 218.

¹⁷¹ Steven A. Hoffman, *India and the China Crisis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 62.

¹⁷² General V. R. Krishna Rao, *Prepare or Perish: A Study of National Security* (New Delhi: Lancer, 1991), 85.

number of troops in the border region. Due to poor logistical supportability, lack of infrastructure and infrequent air transportation for resupply of manpower and equipment placed severe limitation on any troop buildup. Indian troop's deployment, quality of equipment and requisite infrastructure to accommodate them could have been improved with supplementary funding. Indian Army requested to increase the budget resources to meet the requirements, interestingly, most of the requests were not approved due to serious current account deficit crisis that forced India to halt arms imports.¹⁷³

The China threat forced India to upgrade its military capabilities and strategy. Indian strategic culture significantly changed in the wake of Indo-Sino 1962 war. For instance, Henderson Brooks analyzed Indian strategy in the postwar period in his report pointing to devising of "three-tier system of defense" against the Chinese. For instance, the forward most tier consisted of border outposts which were not meant to fight, but to delay and fall back to firm bases in the rear. In the middle tier were the vulnerable points on which the border outposts were dependent and to which they would fall back, when attacked. These vulnerable points were sufficiently in depth so as to increase the logistic problems of the Chinese. The last tier was the defense line, where the main battle would be fought and from where offensive action would be launched.¹⁷⁴ Nevertheless, the defense-in-depth strategy was technically not enough to give a military response to the Chinese military over the border dispute. There was huge difference between the military capabilities of China and India. Moreover, the resources available to them were not enough for implementing such a forward policy. One of the retired Indian Army Chief, General K. S. Thimayya, while discussing Indian capabilities vis-à-vis

¹⁷³ Srinath Raghavan, *War and Peace in Modern India: A Strategic History of the Nehru Years* (Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2010), 270-278.

¹⁷⁴ Praval, *Indian Army*, 239.

Chinese threat stated that the present strength of the Army and Air force of India are even below the minimal insurance we can give to our people.¹⁷⁵

Conversely, Indian resources were more than enough vis-à-vis Pakistan but the fact is India remained incapable to counter Chinese capabilities, generating a security trilemma among China-India-Pakistan. India failed to undergo doctrinal innovation which possibly could have overcome the challenge of inadequate resources to compete China. Major General D. K. Palit recommended that the Indian Army could have endeavored to closely involve the local tribes at border region in the defense as well as resupply of the area. He further highlighted that instead of this approach India behaved like an imperial force, a posture unsurprisingly assumed from its inherited identity.¹⁷⁶ Nevertheless, this stance might have been adopted due to the inadequate doctrinal foundations or Indian rhetorical narrative of viewing itself a great power without looking into ground realities.

For instance, without having doctrinal clarity together with inadequate military capabilities, the political leadership seems to have forced the Indian Army to deploy the troops in forward positions to counter easy Chinese advance into the Indian claimed territory. Nevertheless, India remained indefensible in many positions because of the limited manpower, logistical supportability issues, and lack of withdrawal planning if confronted with greater enemy forces. To be clear, this specific stance was not about doctrinal change, but rather overlooking the doctrine and interestingly thinking for the best without focusing on the doctrine as well as military capabilities. This is why, China a conventionally strong state, when decided to attack India, the outcome was disastrous for India. Raghavan rightly stated that, “the puny

¹⁷⁵ Thimayya quoted in Srinath Raghavan, *War and Peace in Modern India*, 268.

¹⁷⁶ Stephen Peter Rosen, *Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 241.

forward policy posts stood no chance and were rapidly wiped out.”¹⁷⁷ The result of Indian military strategy with respect to inadequate doctrinal foundations and capabilities led to embarrassing defeat to the India in Indo-Sino war in 1962.

Chinese People Liberation Army (PLA) attacked India on October, 20, 1962. The PLA inflicted humiliating defeat to ill-prepared Indian Army by penetrating deep inside Indian Territory and torn apart India’s so called aggressive proactive forward policy.¹⁷⁸ Significantly, India failed to answer Chinese attack. Former senior armed officials pointed out to factors such as lack of requisite military capabilities and doctrinal innovations which led to the devastating failure. Importantly, the Indian defeat did not result in any doctrinal innovation but led to significant increase in allocation of resources to defense in 1963 onwards to strengthen its military capabilities.¹⁷⁹ The increase in military budget was not sufficient to counter Chinese but for sure it further intensified the security dilemma between India and Pakistan. Thus, Indian strategic thinking transformed from defensive to somewhat offensive posture based in realist school of thought.

Indian Military Strategies and Force Modernization after 1962 War

The India’s devastating defeat in 1962 war did not lead to serious doctrinal changes. Nevertheless, the embarrassing outcome of the war significantly increased the Indian defense budget. The defense budget allocation in 1963 rouses more than twofold in comparison to the budget in 1960 in terms of the percentage to Indian GDP.¹⁸⁰ India drastically changed its security polices and moved on towards military modernization by building a million men Army, a capable modern Air Force and expansion of Navy.¹⁸¹ Importantly, the great powers

¹⁷⁷ Raghavan, *War and Peace*, 304.

¹⁷⁸ Ganguly, “India’s Military,” 190.

¹⁷⁹ Clary, “Personalities, Organizations, and Doctrine,” 9-10.

¹⁸⁰ See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” [SIPRI Military Expenditure Database | SIPRI](#); and Kavic, *India’s Quest for Security*.

such as the US and Soviet assisted India in its military modernization process. For instance, Soviet Union provided MiG-21 jet fighters and constructed industrial units in India to assemble advanced weapons. Whereas, the US equipped Indian armed forces eight new mountain divisions to counter Chinese threat and additionally, re-established its military production facilities.¹⁸² There was substantial increase in Indian Army where personnel size grew fifty percent such as from a sanctioned 550,000 to 825,000 soldiers. The large chunk of the increase is attributed to the creation of ten mountain divisions that was equipped with vehicles and lighter weapons with an aim to fight on the plains.¹⁸³ Thus, in the aftermath of 1962 war, the Indian army started to upgrade its capabilities to counter Chinese threat.

The strategic environment of Indian armed forces in general and Army in particular was more or less the same where additional resources were sanctioned to start defense plans mainly in line with pre-1962 doctrine. India continued to pursue the same doctrine which was quite visible in India's plans on the western border against Pakistan. The aim was "a holding action in Kashmir," that was required to be followed by a counterattack on advantageous areas in southern Kashmir or Punjab across the international border to release pressure on Indian defense lines, with the Indian attack on Pakistani Punjab basically designed to preempt any Pakistani horizontal escalation into Indian Punjab.¹⁸⁴ India's counteroffensive force had undoubtedly grown bigger with enhanced mechanization, then it was in the late 1940s or 1950s, however, the core foundations of the doctrine remained the same that is to absorb the enemy

¹⁸¹ Ganguly and Pardesi, "India's Foreign Policy," 8.

¹⁸² Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, *Arming without Aiming: India's Military Modernization* (Washington: Brookings Institutions Press, 210), 8.

¹⁸³ Vivek Chadha, *Even if it ain't Broke Yet, Do Fix it: Enhancing Effectiveness Through Military Change* (New Delhi: Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, 2016), 34-5; and Amit Gupta, *Building an Arsenal, The Evolution of Regional Power Force Structure* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), 40.

¹⁸⁴ Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 38; and Rao, *Prepare or Perish*, 128.

attack and afterwards launch counterattack on advantageous terrain. Thus, India started to adopt realpolitik approach during this time frame.

In contrast to “Defensive Posture” practiced initially specifically in the aftermath of independence, India moved on to adopt “Offensive-Defensive Posture” from 1962 to 1971.¹⁸⁵ Interestingly, the nonalignment policy remained a fashionable slogan even after the death of Nehru. Nevertheless, Indian security policies became more realistic in nature.¹⁸⁶ Thus, Indian military modernization based in realistic orientation to counter China threat further intensified the security dilemma between India and Pakistan, particularly increasing the fear and mistrust in the latter.

India-Pakistan War 1965: Strategies and Intensity of Violence

In 1963, India and Pakistan experienced tense relations due to widespread protests in Kashmir. The uprising continued for the next two years and only ended-up with initiation of second war between India and Pakistan. One of the contributing factors that led to war was a threat perception among Kashmiri people and Pakistan regarding India’s intentions to integrate Indian Administered Kashmir into the Indian Union by taking unilateral action.¹⁸⁷ India came hard at Kashmiri masses which resulted in heavy bloodshed and violence in the valley. India blamed and criticized Pakistan for military operation reckoned as Gibraltar. India accused that Pakistani soldiers are fighting along with Kashmiri people against the Indian forces in Indian Administered Kashmir. Subsequently, India attacked Pakistan crossing international border at the western front, what the latter categorized as unprovoked military action.¹⁸⁸ Assistant

¹⁸⁵ Magan, *Indian Defense Approach*, 9.

¹⁸⁶ Ganguly and Pardesi, “India’s Foreign Policy,” 9.

¹⁸⁷ Lamb, *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy*.

¹⁸⁸ Muhammad Ilyas Khan, “Operation Gibraltar: The Pakistani Troops who Infiltrated Kashmir to Start a Rebellion,” *BBC NEWS* (September 5, 2015), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34136689>.

Professor Dr. Christopher Clary when asked about strategies of India and Pakistan in 1965 war commented,¹⁸⁹

India employed offensive strategy during India-Pakistan 1965 war. Pakistan was hoping that India will restrict it to LoC, however, India launched offensive military operations at the international border and reached Lahore Canal but could not make it to get significant success, and faced serious difficulties to implement its offensive strategy against Pakistan. While Pakistan too had faced huge difficulties in defending against a conventionally superior enemy. Later on, India continued to work with developing and implementing offensive strategy in the future.

While fighting inside Indian Administered Kashmir, Indian armed forces crossed Cease Fire Line on August, 15 and 24, 1965. India captured few strategic mountain points located in the northern sector of Kashmir. Pakistan retaliated by targeting the Indian troops in the northern sector and moved close to the Cease Fire Line. As India captured strategic positions in the northern sector, Pakistan in a compulsive response launched attack in the southern sector of Kashmir on September, 1, 1965. Pakistan's counteroffensive inflicted heavy losses to Indian armed forces and also penetrated 14 miles across the Cease Fire Line on September, 5, 1965. Nevertheless, the localized conflict escalated into a full-scale war which lasted for seventeen days.¹⁹⁰ Thus, the conflict at a sub-conventional level being fight in Kashmir, escalated to a large-scale war between India and Pakistan.

¹⁸⁹ Author's Interview with Assistant Professor Dr. Christopher Clary. Clary is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University at Albany, State University of New York. His research focuses on the sources of cooperation in interstate rivalries, the causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation, U.S. defense policy, and the politics of South Asia. Previously, he was a postdoctoral fellow at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University (2015-2016), a predoctoral fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University (2014-2015), a Stanton Nuclear Security predoctoral Fellow at the RAND Corporations (2013-2014), and a Council of Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow in India (2009). Clary also served as country director for South Asian affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (2006–2009), a research associate at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California (2003–2005), and a research assistant at the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, D.C. (2001–2003). He received his PhD in Political Science from MIT, an MA in National Security Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a BA in History and International Studies from Wichita State University.

¹⁹⁰ Cheema, "Pakistan-India Conflict," 53-54.

India attacked Pakistani Punjab (international border) by launching a major offensive military operation on the important cities of Lahore and Sialkot. In a compulsive response, Pakistan launched a counter attack at Khem Karan in Punjab. This battle became the major strategic engagement of 1965 war, particularly in relation to the use of tanks, though it is considered to be inconclusive.¹⁹¹ The two rival states used all-out resources to undo other in the war. Pakistan's defensive offensive strategy against Indian offensive strategy worked well. Its symmetric conventional balance together with vast irrigation system assisted in countering Indian forces offensive momentum.¹⁹² One of the senior Pakistani retired military officials stated,¹⁹³

Pakistan adopted defensive offensive strategy against India in the India-Pakistan 1965 war. India used unrest in Kashmir as a reason and escalated the conflict to international border by attacking Pakistan. Pakistan restricted the conflict to Kashmir, however, it was India who escalated it. Pakistan provided a hardened response to India specifically in the desert area. Pakistan efficiently defended it then conducted counter attack and achieved significant success against the Indian forces.

On the air front, India and Pakistan used their air power against each other. A small sized Pakistan Air Force (PAF) was comparatively better in planning, operating, and supporting its ground troops than large sized Indian Air Force (IAF). IAF could have easily gained superiority, if the war would have been extended to East Pakistan, however, the US sought assurance from India for not attacking the conflict to eastern front. This was for the reason that the US feared Chinese intervention in the conflict.¹⁹⁴ Kenneth Werrell praised PAF for its efficient operation throughout the war and argued that it had a significant edge over the

¹⁹¹ Sumit Ganguly, "Deterrence Failure Revisited: The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 13, No. 4 (1990): 89-90, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402399008437432>.

¹⁹² Clary, "Personalities, Organizations, and Doctrine," 13-14.

¹⁹³ Author's Interview with Lieutenant General (Retd.) Tariq Khan.

¹⁹⁴ Farooq Bajwa, *From Kutch to Tashkent: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965* (London: Hurst & Company, 2013), 392-393.

adversary.¹⁹⁵ Thus, Pakistani armed forces showed significant war fighting capacities against a conventional superior force.

The war ended only due to the intervention of the great powers. The war almost reached to stalemate by mid of September when UNSC collectively passed a resolution on September, 20, 1965, calling for an end of the antagonism.¹⁹⁶ The UN, the US and more particularly Soviet Union forced India and Pakistan to abide by the preceding agreement and accept *status quo ante bellum* return back the captured territory in accordance with the Ceasefire Line agreed upon in 1949.¹⁹⁷ The 1965 war was fought amidst the systemic competition during the Cold War. The US majorly remained aloof due to its engagement in the Vietnam War, leaving the space for other great powers to intervene in the conflict. Evidently, the Soviet Union seized this opportunity and expanded its political influence in the South Asia by brokering Tashkent declaration between the two archrivals in 1966.¹⁹⁸

Pakistan expected that its ally, the US will support it in the war, however, it did not come true. Subsequently, with the obvious disengagement of the US, Pakistan approached China to maintain balance of power against India.¹⁹⁹ The way India enjoyed conventional superiority over Pakistan; in the same manner, Chinese superiority over India was unquestionable. China's acquisition of nuclear power in 1964 further endorsed its superiority over India.²⁰⁰ On the other hand, India started to rely more on the Soviet Union. The relations between Soviet Union and India gradually developed. Further, the split between Soviet Union

¹⁹⁵ Kenneth Werrell, *Sabres Over MiG Alley: The F-86 and the Battle for Air Superiority in Korea* (Naval Institute Press), 188.

¹⁹⁶ Russell Brines, *The Indo-Pakistani Conflict* (London: Pall Mall, 1968), 315-45.

¹⁹⁷ Bajwa, *Kutch to Tashkent*, 361.

¹⁹⁸ Bruce Riedel, *Avoiding Armageddon America, India and Pakistan to The Brink and Back* (Washington D.C: Brooking Institution Press), 67-70.

¹⁹⁹ Ganguly and Pardesi, "India's Foreign Policy," 8.

²⁰⁰ Ganguly, "India's Military," 192.

and China contributed majorly in building cordial relations between Soviet Union and India. To be clear, India's "Offensive Defensive" approach was successfully implemented due to the Soviet support.²⁰¹ Thus, the regional and extra-regional factors continued to alter the security environment of South Asia.

Both India and Pakistan experienced heavy losses in the second war of their history. Independent sources maintains that Pakistan lost 3800 men, approximately loss of 700 square miles of geographical area, 20 fighter jets and 200 tanks. While, loss on Indian side was 3000 men, approximately 300 square miles of geographical area and at least 60-75 fighter jets and 175 tanks.²⁰² Thus, keeping in view the objective, the intensity of violence remained high. India employed brute force involving offence strategy and correspondingly, Pakistan responded by employing brute force involving defense strategy to resolve the conflict.

Table 3: Pre Nuclear Era-India Pakistan 2nd War

Year	War	India's Strategy		Pakistan's Strategy		Intensity of Violence
		Brute Force		Brute Force		
		Offence	Defense	Offence	Defense	
1965	2 nd Large Scale War	Offence	-	-	Defence	High

Source: Developed by Author

For India, the apparent experience of 1965 war was the advantage of strong defense, emphasizing India's doctrinal predispositions together with the requirement of armor forces for counterattack. While Pakistan's success in defending Lahore along the Ichogil Canal in east of the city directed both rival states to invest more resources in building such hindrances to

²⁰¹ Magan, *Indian Defense Approach*, 9-10.

²⁰² Thomas M. Leonard, *Encyclopedia of the Developing World Vol 2 F-N Index* (London: Routledge, 2006), 806.

resist enemy forces. In India, the defenses are recognized to as ditch-cum-bundh (DCB), whereas in Pakistan the collection of hindrances is recognized to as the canal defenses line (CDL). Lieutenant General (Retd.) V. K. Sood while assessing the defense lines of the two countries stated that India-Pakistan border is comprised of the vast land of irrigated agriculture. He further stated these hindrances “cannot be outflanked because it is a continuous stretch of over 2,000 kilometers from Chamb in Jammu and Kashmir to the middle of Rajasthan.”²⁰³

In the aftermath of 1965 war, India started to build its own DCB adjacent to its western border. The Border Security Force (BSF) and military personnel worked together to safeguard the territory although the large bulk of the force deployed at the back of the linear defense. Thus, the strategy was, India would absorb attack first and then launch counterattack against the enemy.²⁰⁴ Brigadier S. K. Sinha while explaining the significance of the nature of strategy stated that, “Defense does not merely mean waiting to be attacked at the enemy’s point of own choosing. It requires the defender to retaliate so that through counter-offensive the aggressor may be frustrated and defeated.”²⁰⁵

To sum up, India in the aftermath of defeat in Indo-Sino 1962 war, shifted to offensive defensive strategy while Pakistan followed defensive offensive strategy. Nevertheless, the systemic factors such as US-Soviet and Sino-Soviet competition altered security parameters for both India and Pakistan during the Cold War which become evidently visible in the India-Pakistan 1971 war.

²⁰³ Lieutenant General (Retd.) V. K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney, *Operation Parakram: The War Unfinished* (New Delhi: Sage, 2003), 150-151.

²⁰⁴ Praval, *Indian Army*, 520; and Rao, *Prepare or Perish*, 126.

²⁰⁵ Sinha quoted in Ali Ahmed, *India’s Doctrine Puzzle: Limiting War in South Asia* (New Delhi: Routledge India, 2014), 42.

India-Pakistan War 1971: Strategies and Intensity of Violence

India's offensive strategy came under test in third India-Pakistan war fought in December, 1971. India employed offensive approach and subsequently, interfered in the East Pakistan amidst the civil unrest. Indian armed forces covertly supported, trained, and equipped Mukti Bahini (nationalist group) that revolted against Pakistani state.²⁰⁶ Mukti Bahini, a non-state actor carried out violent attacks against people and state of Pakistan. It launched operation searchlight to target and destroy Mukti Bahini capabilities on March 26, 1971. Initially, Pakistan successfully managed to counter Mukti Bahini, nevertheless, it later on turned out to be a chaotic decision for Pakistan. For instance, India launched Operation Jackpot to reorganize Mukti Bahini and equipped the insurgents with heavy weaponry such as artillery and fighter aircrafts to carryout violent activities against the Pakistani armed forces in the East Pakistan. Thus, India's interference in Pakistan created severe crisis in the East Pakistan that ultimately led to the creation of Bangladesh.

Significantly, India signed *Treaty of Peace and Friendship* with Soviet Union in August, 1971. The two states agreed that Soviet forces will come to join Indian forces against Pakistan and its allies, if and when they attack India.²⁰⁷ While, the Soviet Union publicly used to support the territorial integrity of Pakistan but in real extended vital strategic support to India in implementing its offensive approach. Three factors linked to Soviet Union played an important role in making India victorious in 1971 war. One, Soviet military assistance to India increased latter's capabilities to launch offensive against Pakistan. Two, Soviets assurance to dissuade Chinese intervention in the conflict made India more confident in the war. Three, Soviet Union ambivalent role in UNSC towards India to avoid imposition of ceasefire till the

²⁰⁶ Rajat Ganguly, *Kin State Intervention in Ethnic State: Lessons from South Asia* (New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 1998), 120.

²⁰⁷ Seymour M. Hersh, *The Price of Power Kissinger in the Nixon White House*, (University of Michigan: Summit Books, 1983), 450-452.

time Indian forces entered in Decca made the strategic environment conducive for India's success in the 1971 war.²⁰⁸ Thus, India successfully exploited the systemic opportunities during the Cold war. India used close Indo-Soviet ties to adopt offensive posture against Pakistan that subsequently led to its success in the 1971 war.

India used coercive measure to pressurize Pakistan even well before the employment of brute force strategy in 1971. For instance, India employed coercive blackmailing strategy against Pakistan. India banned Pakistan for using its airspace amidst unrest in East Pakistan. India offensively interfered in the internal affairs of the East Pakistan and successfully implemented carefully crafted strategy against Pakistan.²⁰⁹ This severely hampered the economic and military connectivity including logistical supportability between the West Pakistan and East Pakistan. And further, India heavily deployed Army and Air Force along East Pakistan border to pressurize Pakistan. Thus, Indian strategy weakened Pakistan, both on internal and external fronts.

In these circumstances, the third major war broke out between India and Pakistan on December, 3, 1971. It is argued that war is one of the significant political tools to gain power against the adversary. Although the war is costly, Mearsheimer²¹⁰ asserted that the rational states might pick war as a strategy, if the gains are more than costs. Significantly, a success in war may overthrow a rival state, thereby, making the attacker safer. India was ready for war and launched massive and swift military actions across the international border to cut the country into two halves. India immediately recognized Bangladesh as an independent state on

²⁰⁸ Zubeida Mustafa, "The USSR and The Indo-Pakistan War," *Pakistan Institute of International Affairs* 25, no. 1 (1972): 45-46, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41393112>.

²⁰⁹ Ali Ahmed, "Indian Strategic Culture: The Pakistan Dimension," in *India's Grand Strategy* ed, Kanti Bajpai, Saira Basit and V. Krishnappa (New Delhi: Routledge, 2014), 294.

²¹⁰ Mearsheimer, *Great Power Politics*, 147–152.

December, 6, 1971.²¹¹ Thus, India successfully implemented its offensive strategy to cut Pakistan into two halves and evidently, strengthened its domination in the region. Like in 1965 war, once again there was no practical support from either of Pakistan's allies be that the US or China. And Pakistan had to face the tragedy of its breakage. Based on ill support from the US and Western allies, Pakistan withdrew it from SEATO on November 8, 1972.²¹² As, Pakistan perceived alliance with the west as irrelevant and non-beneficial in ensuring its security and survival.

India successfully implemented its offensive strategy to dismember Pakistan. India carried out lightning campaigns against Pakistan that led to latter's tragic defeat in the third war of their history.²¹³ India enjoyed conventional superiority over Pakistan. Indian Armed Forces were far superior in terms of number of forces and military technology. In addition to it, India had the support of thousands of trained rebels fighting within East Pakistan against latter forces. These factors made Indian task easier to implement its offensive military operation without any significant fear or threat from the Pakistani forces in the East Pakistan. Conversely, the case of West Pakistan was quite different. India avoided to implement its offensive strategy on the western front.

There are few reasons related to India's approach to limit it to East Pakistan. One, India's strategic ally Soviet Union emphasized for putting rapid end to the conflict in the East Pakistan. Two, Pakistan's military capabilities in the West Pakistan were considered to be stronger in comparison to East Pakistan. Three, the irrigation system in Punjab remained a significant hindrance in the mobilization of Indian troops. Four, there was no masses support

²¹¹ Ganguly, "India's Military," 191.

²¹² S. M. Burke, "The Post-War Diplomacy of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971," *Asian Survey* 13, no. 11 (November, 1972): 1045, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2642858>.

²¹³ Ahmed, *India's Doctrine Puzzle*, 42-3.

to welcome the Indian penetration deep inside Pakistan's territory on the western front. Lastly, India focused its Armed Forces in the East Pakistan to such an extent that shift of theatre to West Pakistan was beyond its capabilities.²¹⁴ Therefore, India based on its offensive strategy decisively and swiftly launched military operation in Eastern Pakistan only, and did not shift the theatre to Western Pakistan.

The war was fought for consecutive fourteen days until it ended with a ceasefire agreed upon on December 17, 1971. The war came out to be a total disaster for Pakistan particularly in terms of geographical loss. For instance, Pakistan suffered deaths of 9000 officers and men, lost 200 tanks, 75 aircrafts and a submarine. While India suffered deaths of 2500 officers and men, 80 tanks, 45 aircrafts and a frigate.²¹⁵ Pakistan lost one half of its territory that ultimately led to the creation of Bangladesh as an independent state. The leadership of the two belligerent states met at Simla to negotiate from June 28 to July 3, 1971. India and Pakistan signed Simla Agreement on July, 2, 1972 which brought an end to the conflict. The two countries agreed to withdraw troops to their respective international borders, respect of LoC and release of 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war (POW).²¹⁶ To sum up, India employed brute force involving offence strategy to change the status quo and correspondingly, Pakistan responded by employing brute force involving defense strategy to maintain the status quo. Thus, intensity of violence remained at high level in 1971 war.

²¹⁴ Cohen and Dasgupta, *Arming without Aiming*, 9.

²¹⁵ Leonard, "Encyclopedia of the Developing World," 806.

²¹⁶ Burke, "The Postwar Diplomacy," 1037.

Table 4: Pre Nuclear Era-India Pakistan 3rd War

Year	War	India's Strategy		Pakistan's Strategy		Intensity of Violence
		Brute Force		Brute Force		
		Offence	Defense	Offence	Defense	
1971	3 rd Large Scale War	Offence	-	-	Defense	High

Source: Developed by Author

The successful Indian military campaign in 1971 war motivated India to introduce offensive changes in military strategies. India developed a lightning campaign with an aim to defeat Pakistani armed forces in the east, and further that could be deployed in the west.²¹⁷ Nevertheless, this lesson was learnt without catering into account the devastating superiority of Indian armed forces in the East Pakistan. For instance, India enjoyed a 2-to-1 advantage over seriously outnumbered Pakistani armed forces. Though, this possibly devalues Indian armed forces numeric advantage due to the presence of Bangladeshi guerilla forces that were numbered in thousands. Further, Pakistan's strategy in the East Pakistan was complicated for two reasons; One, the non-availability of defensive hindrances such as the DCB in the West Pakistan. Two, an operational plan pursued to repudiate India any significant territorial intrusions out of a fear that India could exploit even a small portion of liberated Pakistani territory and declare it a newly independent state.²¹⁸

Evidently, Indian Army progress on the on western front was much slower than eastern front. For instance, Indian forces in the wake of attacking West Pakistan advanced at an estimated rate of 1 kilometer per day near the bordering city of Sialkot. Even, Indian armed

²¹⁷ Ahmed, India's Doctrine Puzzle, 42-43.

²¹⁸ John H. Gill, *An Atlas of the 1971 India-Pakistan War: The Creation of Bangladesh, Near East-South Asia Center Occasional Paper* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2003), 16-21.

forces advance was only round about 4 kilometers a day, and further, it appeared to slow significantly near the end of the 1971 war. One of the other reasons for this slow troop advance is definitely linked to Indian strategy that concentrated on the East Pakistan as a main theater. And the objective of offensive campaigns on the West Pakistan was just to avoid any Pakistani military gains that could remove India's gains in the East Pakistan.²¹⁹ The most important factor responsible for slow Indian advance is considered to be a more symmetric conventional balance of forces, coupled with the defensive advantages due to widespread canal system and the difficulties of preserving offensive thrust in the desert areas along the India-Pakistan borders in the South. Indian military leadership came to understanding that depending on the DCB in various sectors, allowed Pakistani forces territorial gains that it could possibly use during the negotiation.²²⁰ Major General Sukhwant Singh, the Deputy Director Military Operations in 1971 war asserted that, "The DCB system "proved its worth" in the war, but Army Chiefs beginning with G. G. Bewoor, were unnecessarily fearful the DCB would create a "Maginot line mentality" and a "defensive outlook," and pushed Army doctrine in a more offensive direction."²²¹

To sum up, successful employment of Indian offensive strategy acted as an impetus to bring doctrinal changes, and subsequent military modernization of the Indian armed forces in the wake of 1971 war.

²¹⁹ Christopher Clary, "Deterrence Stability and the Conventional Balance of Forces in South Asia," in *Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia*, ed. Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, December 2013), 137.

²²⁰ Praval, *Indian Army*, 520.

²²¹ Sukhwant Singh, *India's Wars since Independence, The Liberation of Bangladesh* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1981), 32-33.

Conclusion

India and Pakistan did not officially announced any military doctrines, while they fought three large-scale wars in the pre-nuclear era. Both India adopted defense in depth strategy while Pakistan followed defensive offensive strategy in the 1948 war. India used brute force involving offence strategy while Pakistan used brute force involving defense strategy, thereby, the intensity of violence remained high in the war. In the aftermath of 1948 war, India started to deliberate upon developing a forward defense policy while little focus was given to structural and organizational capacities. While, Pakistan joined the western bloc by joining SEATO and CENTO majorly to counter India threat while the latter avoided participation in the Cold War politics, and joined NAM. India after devastating defeat in Indo-Sino 1962 war, shifted to adopt offensive defensive strategy mainly to counter China. Afterwards, Indian leadership started to think and act in realistic orientation and underwent massive military modernization with an aim to counter two-front war. The military upgradations and change in India's strategic culture further widened the conventional capabilities gap between India and Pakistan, thereby increasing mistrust and uncertainty between the two states. In 1965, India and Pakistan fought their second war over Kashmir dispute. India used brute force involving offence strategy while Pakistan used brute force involving defense strategy, thus the intensity of the violence remained high. Pakistan with the obvious disengagement of the US in the 1965 war, approached China to balance against India. While, India started to rely more on the Soviet Union. India signed friendship treaty with Soviet Union and successfully implemented offensive lightning campaign in 1971 war, dissecting Pakistan into two halves that led to creation of Bangladesh as an independent state. India used brute force involving offence strategy while Pakistan used brute force involving defense strategy, thus the intensity of the violence remained high. To sum up, India and Pakistan fought three large-scale wars and used brute force strategies involving offence and defense. Thus, the intensity of violence remained high in the pre-nuclear era.

Table 5: Pre Nuclear Era-Large Scale Wars, Strategies and Intensity of Violence

Year	Number of Wars	India's Strategy		Pakistan's Strategy		Intensity of Violence
		Brute Force		Brute Force		
		Offence	Defense	Offence	Defense	
1948	03					High
1965		03	-	-	03	
1971						

Source: Developed by Author

Chapter Three

Covert Nuclearization: Nuclear Weapons Development and Conflict Transformation (1974-1997)

India conducted nuclear test termed it as Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in 1974, underwent massive military modernization and introduced conventional military doctrine during this era. Particularly, the successful military expeditions of 1971 war acted as an impetus for India to introduce its military doctrine reckoned as Sundarji Doctrine. From 1974 to 1998, the Indian armed forces approach underwent significant modernization. Importantly, India introduced military doctrine such as Sundarji Doctrine with an objective to launch swift war against Pakistan. India's military approach expressed its enhanced confidence in the wake of successful military expedition of 1971 war and acquisition of nuclear technology. While Pakistan on the other hand, in the aftermath of 1971 war debacle, covertly acquired nuclear weapon in the early 1980s to ensure territorial sovereignty vis-à-vis India. Two crises such as Brasstacks Crisis and Compound Crisis erupted during covert nuclearization era, nevertheless, not a single converted into large-scale war, thereby pointing to shrinking intensity of violence. This chapter assesses how doctrinal developments and introduction of nuclear weapons impact the conflict dynamics between India and Pakistan, covering events from 1974 till 1998.

India's Nuclear Test: Road to Pokhran-I:

India in the immediate aftermath of independence started to make efforts to acquire nuclear technology. The credit for laying the etymological base of nuclear research can be duly given to the Indian physicist Homi J. Bhabha. The Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR) had been established in 1945 for the basic research in this modern discipline.²²² Dr. Bhabha, established this Research Centre only after earning the support of Indian policy makers. He

²²² Kamal Matinuddin, *The Nuclearization of South Asia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 60.

lobbied with the ruling core to convince them for the development of nuclear energy.²²³ Nuclear scientists such as Bhabha and Shanti Swarup Bhatnagar convinced Prime Minister Nehru for investing the requisite resources in building an institution for nuclear research and development.²²⁴ Thus, India's nuclear program took a taxi on the runway even before its independence in 1947.

In August 1948, India developed Indian Atomic Energy Commission. As a step forward, India created Department of Atomic Energy Commission in August, 1954. Further, India brought all nuclear activities under one roof, Atomic Energy Commission was taken into the same institution in 1958. India also developed Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in 1954. India developed its first nuclear reactor reckoned as APSARA with the support of the British government in 1956. India built its second nuclear reactor, Canadian-Indian Reactor, US (CIRUS) with the support of Canadian government in 1960. Both nuclear program related developments were significant indicators to predict India's future nuclear ambitions. The opening of reprocessing plant in Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in 1964 was a milestone in this regard. By then, the US administration highlighted that India set itself in a position to initiate the process of developing a nuclear weapon.²²⁵ In 1966, Pakistan raised concerns on relevant international forums regarding India's ambition of acquiring nuclear capabilities.²²⁶

India was ready to conduct nuclear test in 1973. The only thing required was backing of political leadership. The domestic situation was not deemed feasible to go for such a big step. Deteriorated economy, famine and rise of separatist movements in India, were the constraints in the way of conducting nuclear test. Some of the closest advisers of Indira Gandhi,

²²³ Arpit Rajain, *Nuclear Deterrence in Southern Asia: China, India and Pakistan* (New Delhi: Sage, 2005), 208.

²²⁴ Ashok Kapur, *Pokhran and Beyond Indian Nuclear Behaviour* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 25.

²²⁵ Kapur, *Pokhran and Beyond*, 35.

²²⁶ Itty Abraham, *The Making of Indian Atomic Bomb, Science Secrecy and Post-Colonial State* (London: Zed Books, 1998), 141.

Prime Minister of India, suggested her to not go for the nuclear test as acquisition of the nuclear power will come up with international sanctions. As, these sanctions will further lead to toughen the situation on domestic and international fronts in achieving national goals. Prime Minister Gandhi viewed the political situation with a different lens. While delivering a speech at Lok Sabha in 1972, she stated that the Atomic Energy Commission is finalizing the conduct of nuclear test. Prime Minister Gandhi emphasized that India is in need of demonstrating nuclear power.²²⁷ Consequently, India conducted a nuclear test at Pokhran in Rajasthan desert on May 14, 1974. Ironically, India named it as Peaceful Nuclear Explosion. India deliberately kept the facts vague regarding its nuclear development plan and the number of nuclear weapons.²²⁸ Nevertheless, India's successful nuclear test gave a clear indication of its capability to design and build nuclear weapons. The perceived connection between superpower status and nuclear arsenal based on the prestige of technological prowess carried with it,²²⁹ made Operation Smiling Buddha a symbol of national achievement.

Indira Gandhi's unquestionable position as a political leader enabled her to carry her father's legacy and kept all the details of nuclear test highly secret.²³⁰ This could be regarded as one of the reasons why the nuclear test was conducted smoothly and successfully. While India declared the nuclear test to be for peaceful purposes, it did catch the major powers and other international actors by surprise. Both the US and Canada reacted negatively to Indian nuclear development. Since, India's acquisition of nuclear power was only possible due to the nuclear agreements which India had signed with US and Canada. These agreements coincided

²²⁷ Abraham, *Indian Atomic Bomb*, 141-142.

²²⁸ Ayesha Ray, *The Soldier and the State in India Nuclear Weapons Counter Insurgency and the Transformation of Indian Civil-Military Relations* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2013), 69.

²²⁹ See Varun Sahni, "Going Nuclear: Establishing an Overt Nuclear Weapons Capability," in *India and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options*, ed. David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo (New Delhi: D.K. Fine Art Press, 1996).

²³⁰ See Bharat Karnad, *Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy* (New Delhi: Macmillan Publishers, 2002).

with the negotiations between the US and Canada and India on the NPT, nevertheless, India did not agree to sign NPT. Pakistan strongly condemned India's nuclear test. The demonstration of nuclear power further increased the mistrust and uncertainty between the two rival states, particularly in the wake of 1971 war. Thus, it acted as an impetus to intensify the stern security dilemma and led to vicious arms racing in the South Asian region.

India's Military Mechanization: Road to Offensive Military Doctrine

The Indian armed forces were highly charged with the massive success in 1971 war. India desired to further enhance its capability to an extent where Indian Army could launch swift military actions on western border against Pakistan. Evidently, Indian armed forces successfully implemented their offensive strategy on eastern front in East Pakistan; however, Indian troops advance was significantly slowed on the western front (West Pakistan). Indian senior military official, Lieutenant General (Retd.) B. N. Sarkar stated that the warfare remained "slow and static due to the inability" of the Indian Army to "master the technique of mobile warfare."²³¹ Importantly, if the Indian military strategy was characterized by defense supplemented by counteroffensive prior to the 1971, then the doctrinal focus shifted towards maneuver warfare in the aftermath of 1971 war.

Ahmed quoted K. K. Hazari, who stated that the defenses in Punjab necessitated shifting the main thrust of any future Indian attack further South "to the Rajasthan Sector" and that the "offensive component... should consist of three Army corps —two for the main offensive and one for the subsidiary one."²³² The US Central Investigation Agency (CIA) revealed that Indian strategists ostensibly desired to acquire the requisite ability to carry out swift military action and defeat Pakistan prior to the intervention of superpower.²³³

²³¹ Lieutenant General (Retd.) B. N. Sarkar, "Indian Military Leadership: Past Lessons Yet to Be Imbided," *The Times of India* (May 23, 1975).

²³² Hazari quoted in Ahmed, *India's Doctrine Puzzle*, 43.

Subsequently, a study group was formulated under the headship of Lieutenant General Krishna Rao who was assigned with the task to examine the requirements to develop one more strike corps on the western front to gain “adequate counter offensive capability.”²³⁴ Rao subsequently stated, “The main point that came out in [the 1971] war was that Armored Formations should be employed concentrated in order to get the best results.... It was necessary that infantry divisions had their own integral Armor, so that Armored Formations are not depleted.”²³⁵ The study group included ambitious infantry officer, K. Sundarji, who was highly interested in mechanization of the forces, so that service arm and armor units could operate more effectively with each other. Ahmed stated that all of this Indian strategic rethinking was going on amidst a period of global “doctrinal effervescence.” For instance, the great powers like the US and the Soviet Union were also undergoing the process to develop new, with more offensively capable Army structures.²³⁶ Thus, India based on the success of 1971 war and also following the footsteps of great powers focused on the mechanization of Indian Army with requisite support of airpower that is capable to launch offensive campaigns against Pakistan.

India first dissected Pakistan into halves in 1971, then acquired nuclear power and further, continued to enhance its offensive capabilities by modernizing and mechanizing its military. Importantly, India kept on testing its offensive strategy which is evident with respect to various military operations. India’s successful strategic endeavor of 1971 (that led creation of Bangladesh) and acquisition of nuclear status in 1974 further promoted its ambitious plans such as annexation of Sikkim. With massive use of Armed Forces, the Himalayan princely state of Sikkim was forcedly dragged into India’s territory as its 22nd state in 1975.²³⁷ Meanwhile,

²³³ Central Investigation Agency, “Indian Army Modernization Efforts: Progress and Problems,” Document No CIA-RDP06T00412R000504820001-1 (October 1, 1985), 1; and also see Rao, *Prepare or Perish*, 394.

²³⁴ Rao, *Prepare or Perish*, 400, 406-7.

²³⁵ Rao, *Prepare or Perish*, 248.

²³⁶ Ahmed, *India’s Doctrine Puzzle*, 42-3.

²³⁷ Ganguly, “Indian Military,” 193.

Indian military doctrine and strategy based on the experiences and successes of the recent past continued to blossom to meet the strategic objectives. Subsequently, India underwent force modernization at a much faster pace to acquire the offensive military capabilities.

India extensively increased its defense budget to meet the doctrinal and strategic changes. For instance, the defense budget was 9 billion USD in 1970 that rose to 12 billion USD in 1980. And within a time of 10 years, the defense budget reached to 17.5 billion USD in 1990. All three forces massively procured weapons and associated equipment. For instance, Indian Army replaced its old tanks fleet with new ones, procured armored vehicles, modernized artillery, acquired advanced ground attack missiles, inducted air defense systems and inclusion of fighting helicopters.²³⁸ During this era, the policy makers also gave significance to the buildup of naval capacities. Indian Navy procured Soviet-made anti-submarine frigates, naval patrol boats and diesel/ electric submarines for the purpose of patrolling in Indian Ocean Region (IOR). India majorly procured weaponry from the Soviet Union, however, it initiated huge indigenization process to build naval warships and submarines and also, to extend maintenance facilities to its fleet. While, IAF took steps to modernize its flying inventory majorly comprising of Mig-21 and Sukhoi Su-7. These fighter jets were heavily used against Pakistan in the war of 1971. Later on in this era, India also procured modern weapon systems such as fighter jets including Jaguar, and Mirage 2000 from Britain and France, respectively. Nevertheless, India kept on relying on Soviet technology and for the said purpose purchased fighter jets such as Mig-27 and Mig-29, to upgrade its flying fleet.²³⁹ To conclude, India's Defense Approach from 1972 to 1980 can be succinctly summarized as the phase where all the

²³⁸ Cohen and Dasgupta, *Arming without Aiming*, 55.

²³⁹ Cohen and Dasgupta, *Arming without Aiming*, 77-78.

services underwent massive modernization and mechanization that ultimately assisted India to introduce desired doctrinal changes.

Sundarji Doctrine: Lightning Campaign

Since 1969, India was working on devising offensive strategy to make its force well-mechanized and mobile that is able to strike preemptively and surgically deep inside Pakistani territory with lightning speed. Dr. Masood ur Rehman Khattak while responding to a question related to India's strategic thinking after 1971 war stated,²⁴⁰

A big change can be observed in India's strategic thinking after 1971 when it defeated Pakistan. After that India came up with an idea that it needs to develop three strike corps and overwhelming capability to build mechanized forces to penetrate again into Pakistan and cut it into two halves. This idea later on came up as a Sundarji Doctrine.

In 1981, India developed Sundarji Doctrine. It was named after Indian Chief of Army Staff, General Krishnaswamy Sundarji. The doctrine acted as an impetus for Indian armed forces to proceed at a faster pace on a mechanization path. For instance Dr. Clary stated, "Based in the Indian success in India-Pakistan 1971 war and also seeking inspiration from the Israeli strategy employed in Arab-Israeli 1973 war, India initiated an ambitious plan to mechanize the Army and introduced Sundarji Doctrine."²⁴¹ The major objective of the new doctrine was to carry out deep and swift offensive military operations with an aim to move 100 kilometers within a short time of 72 hours only. As per the new developed doctrine, holding corps and strike corps were deployed to counter any aggression from Pakistani side. Seven holding corps with an objective to provide defense against Pakistan's military intervention were deployed adjacent to India-Pakistan border region.²⁴² Each holding corps was comprised of multiple

²⁴⁰ Author's Interview with Dr. Masood ur Rehman Khattak. He is Lecturer at the Department of International Relations, in International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan. He has specialization in Strategic Studies. His papers have been appeared in various national and international peer-reviewed journals.

²⁴¹ Author's Interview with Assistant Professor Dr. Christopher Clary.

²⁴² Tariq M. Ashraf, "Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces," *Military Review* 84, no. 6 (2004): 54.

types of divisions such as: One, infantry divisions for the purpose of static defense; Two, countering enemy's penetration was the task of mobile mechanized divisions; and lastly, armored units were part of each holding corps.²⁴³ The basic objective of holding corps was to defend India's territory but these corps were also capable to take offensive actions, if/ when required against the adversary.

For the offence purpose, three strike corps were deployed but far away from international border. Each strike corps was comprised of an armored division supported by mechanized infantry and extensive associated weaponry. The strike corps were deployed at a significant distance from the international border in the Central India such as I Corps at Mathura, II Corps at Ambala and XXI Corps at Bhopal. The strike corps was required to operate once the holding corps has successfully countered the Pakistani attack and stopped their forces progression. The strike corps is to adopt counter attack strategy and will enter into Pakistani territory by destroying its strike corps reckoned as Army Reserve North and Army Reserve South, through employment of brute force strategy such as deep sledgehammer blows in a battle of high-intensity attrition.²⁴⁴ Meanwhile, IAF will closely provide the requisite air assistance to the strike corps during counter attack with two associated strategies such as: One, IAF will gain air superiority over PAF in the aerial fight; and Two, after gaining air superiority, IAF will provide close air support to its ground forces that have penetrated in the enemy territory.²⁴⁵ Thus, India's doctrinal changes strengthened its capabilities quantitatively and also the formation of Strike Corps as a tool that could threaten Pakistan's existence as a state.

²⁴³ V. R Raghavan, "Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia," *The Non-proliferation Review* 8, no. 3 (Fall-Winter, 2001): 8, <https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/10736700108436865>.

²⁴⁴ Sawhney and Sood, *Operation Parakram*, 81.

²⁴⁵ Ladwig III, "A Cold Start for Hot Waters?," 160.

The whole idea was that in war against Pakistan, once the holding corps halt a Pakistani attack, the strike corps with air support would counterattack in the Rajasthan sector and further penetrate deep into Pakistani territory to destroy its two-strike corps through deep sledgehammer blows in a high-intensity battle of attrition. India's doctrinal developments created fear and uncertainty in the Pakistan, particularly in the aftermath of 1971 war debacle. Pakistan responded to doctrinal changes with its own measures to maintain balance of power between the two states. One of the senior Pakistani retired military officials while responding to a question regarding Pakistan's response to Sundarji doctrine stated,²⁴⁶

Sundarji doctrine was basically about network-centric warfare and deep strikes. Pakistan responded to it by developing strategies such as Preemptive Operations and Reposte. The Preemptive Operations was developed to target logistical bases across the border which were built to implement offensive doctrines against Pakistan. The Reposte strategy was devised to conduct counter attack within 4 to 6 hours in a tit for tat manner.

To sum up, India's doctrinal developments increased fear and mistrust in Islamabad as Pakistani leadership perceived that India intends to carry out preemptive strikes to target nuclear installations with an objective to halt its nuclear program.

Operation Meghdoot

India continued to carry out offensive military operations based on its offensive designs. For instance, Indian forces secretly launched offensive Operation Meghdoot at uninhibited Siachen Glacier in the spring of 1984. India claimed to preempt Pakistan's military strategic designs; however, it was an Indian justification which could not be substantiated. Although, Pakistan failed to timely respond to the India's military aggression. Pakistan did mobilized its troops to recapture the area, later on.²⁴⁷ Ultimately, Indian troops captured the Siachen Glacier. It is

²⁴⁶ Author's Interview with Lieutenant General (Retd.) Naeem Khalid Lodhi, June 05, 2022. He is retired three-star rank Pakistani General. He also served as the Federal Minister for Ministry of Defence, Minister for National Security, and Chief Executive Officer Fauji Fertilizer Company.

²⁴⁷ Aarish U. Khan, "Siachen Glacier: Getting Past the Deadlock," *Regional Studies* XXX, No. 3 (2012): 6, <http://irs.org.pk/journal/3RSSummer12.pdf#page=5>.

important to mention here that 16 major expeditions including 11 from Japan, 3 from Austria and 1 each from the Britain and the US climbed up to the Siachen Glacier and even beyond by taking authorization from Pakistani government in between years 1974 to 1981. Thus, the India's justification to launch an offensive in the Siachen region as a self-constructed reason to pursue its expansionist designs in the region.

Before 1984, there was no permanent military stationing of any country. India airlifted a complete battalion to the conflict zone and secured control of the strategic mountains in the Siachen Glacier. Pakistan lost 985.71 square miles of its territory.²⁴⁸ India celebrated this operation as success, however, its ambitious military campaign inflicted huge cost in terms of military expenditures to both countries.²⁴⁹ Despite extreme conditions and issues of logistic supportability, India deployed troops over the strategically important Siachen region including the top of the highest peaks to observe Pakistani and Chinese military movements. The two rival states waste their soldiers at the frozen mountains at the top of the world. Alarming, the number of deaths were more due to medical reasons than military confrontation because of the extreme environmental conditions.²⁵⁰ Siachen issue is linked to the Kashmir dispute. It is one of the core disputes between the two states, which is yet to be resolved, and has all the potential to generate crises. To sum up, India's offensive Operation Meghdoot was first of its kind since 1971 war and particularly, in the wake of doctrinal developments such as Sundarji Doctrine, creating further fear in Islamabad about New Delhi's expansionist designs.

²⁴⁸ Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir* (London: Free Press, 2006), 68-69.

²⁴⁹ Magan, *Indian Defense Approach*, 16.

²⁵⁰ Sajad Padder, "Siachen Stalemate," *International Journal of Peace and Development Studies* 4, no. 3 (2013): 36, DOI: 10.5897/IJPDS12.010.

Brasstacks Crisis: First Test of Nuclear Deterrence

India in the backdrop of successful dismemberment of Pakistan, capturing Siachen Glacier and development of new military doctrine, launched Operation Brasstacks in 1986-87 to establish its strategic assertion in the region. This time India for the first time employed compellence strategy to coerce Pakistan to bring its nuclear program to halt. India mobilized 100,000 to 450,000 troops near India-Pakistan border region in its Rajasthan province to conduct one of the largest military exercises, even more than any of the military exercises of NATO, since World War II.²⁵¹ Significantly, India left it open ended that could have been converted into attacking Pakistan.²⁵² It was a well-planned military endeavor for testing electronic warfare apparatus, and also manifestation of mechanization.²⁵³ Pakistani leadership feared that India is all ready to launch attack against Pakistan. The Pakistani leadership feared that India intends to dismember it much in a similar manner as it did in the 1971 war.²⁵⁴ Thus, the scale of operation and demonstration of conventional superiority aroused uncertainty about India's intentions, in conventionally weaker Pakistan.

India tested its newly developed military doctrine with the dangerous Brasstacks exercise that led to eruption of first crisis between India and Pakistan in the wake of covert nuclearization. For instance, Dr. Clary stated that "India in line with its Sundarji Doctrine, carried out offensive military operation using massive Strike Corps formations."²⁵⁵ Evidently, Indian military maneuver rang alarms in the capital of Pakistan. And in a compulsive response, Pakistan mobilized its armed forces to counter the Indian threat. Few western scholars argued

²⁵¹ Saania Abdullah, "Cold Start in Strategic Calculus," *IPRI Journal* XII, no. 1 (2012): 6.

²⁵² Sunil Dasgupta and Stephen P. Cohen, "Is India Ending its Strategic Restraint Doctrine?," *The Washington Quarterly* 34, no. 2 (2011), 166, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2011.562442>.

²⁵³ Steven R. Weisman, "On India's Border, A Huge Mock War," *New York Times*, March 6, 1987, <https://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/06/world/on-india-s-border-a-huge-mock-war.html>.

²⁵⁴ Bandyopadhyaya, *India's Foreign Policy*, 272.

²⁵⁵ Author's Interview with Assistant Professor Dr. Christopher Clary.

that the Brasstacks Crisis was not an outcome of Pakistan's misinterpretation but the fact is, India intended to provoke Pakistan to act offensive against it, so that India use this as an excuse to launch preemptive strikes to neutralize Pakistan's nuclear weapons.²⁵⁶ While a Pakistan based scholar also shared almost the similar view point while asserting that attacking Pakistan's nuclear installations was part of the India's decision-making process.²⁵⁷ India devised the new military doctrine to act preemptively and surgically against Pakistan. Dr. Clary while responding on the efficacy of Sundarji Doctrine stated that as per new military doctrine, India intended to penetrate deep inside Pakistan and cut it into two halves, however, this model of warfare was incompatible due to introduction of nuclear dimension in the conflict.²⁵⁸ Thus, Pakistan's nuclear weapons based on nuclear deterrence assumption assisted to achieve its national objective to secure territorial sovereignty.

Significantly, at the most basic level, the deterrence is a communicative process involving threats of punishment and assurance to make adversaries think rationally and prevent them from pursuing certain course of action. The objective of deterrence is generally to prevent aggressive challenger from behaving aggressively by convincing them that the cost of aggression will outweigh any potential gains. During unfolding of the Brasstacks Crisis in 1986-87, Pakistani leadership clearly communicated to India that Pakistan has acquired the nuclear power to defend its territorial sovereignty.²⁵⁹ For instance, Indian journalist Kuldip Nayar interviewed Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistan's chief nuclear scientist during the peak of the crisis on January, 28, 1987. The Pakistani scientist stated with assertion that nobody can

²⁵⁶ Robert J. Art and Kenneth Neal Waltz, *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009): 380-390.

²⁵⁷ Iram Khalid, "Brasstacks Crisis 1986-87," *South Asian Studies A Research Journal of South Asian Studies* 27, no. 1 (January-June, 2012): 35-36, <http://journals.pu.edu.pk/journals/index.php/IJSAS/article/view/2839>.

²⁵⁸ Author's Interview with Assistant Professor Dr. Christopher Clary.

²⁵⁹ Russel J. Leng, "Realpolitik and Learning in the India-Pakistan Rivalry," in *The India-Pakistan Conflict, An Enduring Rivalry*, ed. T. V. Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 114.

undo Pakistan or take us for granted. We are here to stay and let it be clear that we shall use the bomb if our existence is threatened.²⁶⁰ Pakistani leadership communication regarding its nuclear capabilities was taken seriously by India which ultimately led to the culmination of the crisis. The Brasstacks Crisis was the first case in the wake of nuclearization, when the nuclear deterrence came into play in the conflict dynamics between India and Pakistan.

Dr. Khattak while commenting about the objectives of Sundarji Doctrine and the logic of nuclear deterrence stated,²⁶¹

The Sundarji Doctrine has two main objectives: One, to defeat Pakistan conventionally. Two, to target Pakistan's nuclear installations with the help of Israel. Pakistan successfully deterred in both situations and survived because it countered the Indian threat conventionally and non-conventionally. Conventionally, Pakistan conducted Zarb-e-Momin exercises near the international border in the wake of India's Brasstacks exercise. The exercise actually prevented India to attack Pakistan. And at non-conventional level, Pakistan's nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan threatened India in an interview that Pakistan will use nuclear weapon in case of any eventuality from Indian side.

Nevertheless, both India and Pakistan initiated important measures leading to conflict de-escalation. For instance, the use of hotline remained beneficial in reducing the tensions between India and Pakistan. Further, General Zia ul Haq, President of Pakistan, used sports as a tool famous as cricket diplomacy to normalize the situation during the peak of the crisis. The Brasstacks Crisis was followed by a series of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). For instance, one of the most significant initiative was, "Agreement on the Prohibition of the Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities," which was signed by the Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan in 1988.²⁶² To sum up, the nuclear deterrence averted conflict to escalate to a large-scale war or use of nuclear weapons. Instead, the two states started negotiation to

²⁶⁰ Kuldip Nayar, "We have the A-Bomb, Says Pakistan's Strangelove," *The Observer*, London, March 1, 1987.

²⁶¹ Author's Interview with Dr. Masood ur Rehman Khattak.

²⁶² Abdullah, "Cold Start," 7.

establish peace and stability in the region.²⁶³ To sum up, India adopted compellence strategy involving threat of use of force to change the status quo. Correspondingly, Pakistan employed deterrence strategy to maintain the status quo. This was the first crisis in the wake of covert nuclearization and it did not escalate to large-scale war. Thus, the nuclear deterrence averted the war between the two nuclear states, thus the intensity of violence remained low during the Brasstacks Crisis.

Table 6: Post Nuclear Era-Brasstacks Crisis

Year	Crisis	India's Strategy		Pakistan's Strategy		Intensity of Violence
		Coercion		Coercion		
		Compellence	Deterrence	Compellence	Deterrence	
1986-87	Brasstacks Crisis	Compellence	-	-	Deterrence	Low

Source: Developed by Author

Violent Uprising in Kashmir: The Eruption of Compound Crisis

Both India and Pakistan fought two large-scale wars over Kashmir dispute in the pre-nuclear era, however, the dispute remained unresolved and a reason to generate crises under the nuclear overhang. Since 1947, the Kashmiri people were raising voice for the right of self-determination. Significantly, the situation changed speedily in Kashmir in 1987 when resistance movement reached to all-time high against the Indian occupation. The Kashmiri people particularly the youth viewed India as an oppressive colonial power as they perceived that India destroyed their unique identity. In the late 1980's, the Kashmiri resistance movement which involved large body of youth got more intensive due to factors such as poor governance, lack of political participation in combination with New Delhi's interference and manipulation in Kashmiri politics. In this scenario, the Kashmiri people initiated a vibrant resistance

²⁶³ Abbasi and Khan, *Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia*, 122.

movement to get the right of self-determination.²⁶⁴ Interestingly, the global events such as Iranian revolution, Soviet-Afghan war outcome, independence movements in the Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union, coincided with uprising in Kashmir. These developments further added to restiveness in the Kashmiri masses. It acted as an impulse to initiate arms struggle against the Indian forces in Kashmir. India, in order to crush this new wave of Kashmiri resistance movement responded with brutal use of force and deployed more than half a million troops literally transforming the valley into battle ground.²⁶⁵

India adopted offensive approach and came hard at the resistance movement. India used fierce tactics to curtail uprising in Kashmir such as creation and deployment of *Rashtriya Rifles* in the Kashmir valley in 1990. Soon, it started to be recognized as a terrifying force using excessive force to counter Kashmiri resistance movement. Even, the UN took notice of it and highlighted Indian security apparatus brutal tactics in oppressing Kashmiri people. The UN found severe violation of national and international laws that are considered mandatory in using force in any conflict.²⁶⁶ India introduced new laws to counter the uprising in the Kashmir. The laws such as Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1990 (AFSPA) and Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 (PSA) impede ordinary course of law, obstruct accountability and further put the right to protect victims of human rights violation in danger.²⁶⁷ Despite Indian strategy covered by controversial legal framework, the law and enforcement agencies failed to suppress the Kashmiri uprising.

²⁶⁴ Cohen, "India, Pakistan and Kashmir," 50.

²⁶⁵ Amin, "Kargil Crisis in Kashmir," 321-322.

²⁶⁶ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Kashmir: Developments in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir from June 2016 to 2018, and General Human Rights Concerns in Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan* (Geneva, 2018), 17, <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/IN/DevelopmentsInKashmirJune2016ToApril2018.pdf>.

²⁶⁷ See United Nations, *Human Rights in Kashmir*, 4-5.

Various Kashmiri groups took up against the Indian occupation to achieve right of self-determination. In broader terms, two types of goals were pursued by different factions of the secessionist movements. For instance, one focused on creation of independent state of Kashmir and the other desired to make Kashmir as a part of Pakistan or creation of independent state of Kashmir with closer ties with Pakistan.²⁶⁸ These violent movements in Kashmir intensively strained already deteriorated India-Pakistan conflictual relations. Sumit Ganguly and Kanti Bajpai rightly argued that the violent uprising revived enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan in the late 1980's.²⁶⁹ India blamed Pakistan for supporting Kashmiri militants which India viewed as terrorism. From this point onward, a new pattern emerged in a regional threat spectrum where India used to blame Pakistan for fighting sub-conventional war in Indian Administered Kashmir. While, Pakistan in response used to deny these charges by asserting that Pakistan only provides moral assistance to the Kashmiri fighters against the occupation of Indian forces. Thus, violent activities against Indian forces remained common recurring pattern in Kashmir throughout last decade of the 20th century. And time and again militancy in Kashmir generated tensions between the two South Asian archrivals.

For instance, amidst ever-deteriorating situation in the Kashmir, another crisis erupted between India and Pakistan in 1990, reckoned as the Compound Crisis. India blamed Pakistan for supporting violence in Indian Administered Kashmir while Pakistan denied any involvement. The two states underwent massive military mobilization across the LoC. The world saw high tensions between the two nuclear possessing states with serious concerns due to risk of nuclear use. In May 1990, the US President, George H.W. Bush, was convinced that Pakistan is going to use a nuclear weapon against India. The impending apocalypse—which

²⁶⁸ Ganguly, "India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute," 5.

²⁶⁹ Sumit Ganguly and Kanti Bajpai, "India and the Crisis in Kashmir," *Asian Survey* 34, no. 5 (1994): 402, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2645054>.

would have dwarfed Hiroshima and Nagasaki—had to be prevented at all costs.²⁷⁰ The US administration dispatched Robert Gates, Deputy Director of Intelligence, to South Asia to de-escalate the crisis between India and Pakistan. The US diplomacy played a significant role in averting the large-scale war and bringing end to the crisis. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan pushed the US to play a positive role in the crisis management in South Asia.²⁷¹

The Deputy Director Gates, convinced Prime Minister of India that law and order situation in Kashmir is highly alarming. Any further provocative aggression in the Kashmir valley could lead to dangerous consequences for the region. The US diplomacy pushed both rival states to take reciprocal actions for the normalization of the situation. Subsequently, few CBMs were struck that initiated negotiation process and further, assisted two states in reducing the tensions in a nuclearized environment.²⁷² Thus, India and Pakistan with the efficient US diplomatic efforts successfully deescalated the Compound Crisis, and it did not escalate to war. This was the very first instance, when the US assumed the role of crisis manager after the nuclearization of the South Asia. Nevertheless, the US as a third-party continued to play a significant role in the future crises.

Table 7: Post Nuclear Era-Role of the US in Compound Crisis

Year	Crisis	Role of US		Outcome of Conflict
		Active	Inactive	
1990	Compound	Yes	-	Conflict de-escalated.

Source: Developed by Author

²⁷⁰ C. Uday Bhaskar, "The Forgotten India-Pakistan Nuclear Crisis: 25 Years Later," *The Diplomat*, May 18, 2015, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/05/the-forgotten-india-pakistan-nuclear-crisis-25-years-later/>.

²⁷¹ Abbasi and Khan, *Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia*, 122-123.

²⁷² Sumit Ganguly, "Nuclear Stability in South Asia," *International Security* 33, no. 2 (Fall, 2008): 53, <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2008.33.2.45>.

During the Compound Crisis, India employed compellence strategy involving threat of use of force to coerce Pakistan to stop its alleged support to the Kashmiri fighters. While Pakistan denied the Indian allegation and employed deterrence as a tool to counter latter's coercive strategy. The crisis did not escalated to large-scale war or use of nuclear weapon, thus the intensity of the violence remained low.

Table 8: Post Nuclear Era-Compound Crisis

Year	Crisis	India's Strategy		Pakistan's Strategy		Intensity of Violence
		Coercion		Coercion		
		Compellence	Deterrence	Compellence	Deterrence	
1990	Compound	Compellence	-	-	Deterrence	Low

Source: Developed by Author

Despite all India's efforts, the violent incidents began to happen as a recurring pattern in Kashmir valley. Even after 1990, a series of events that are considered smaller in scale in comparison to the previous crises such as the Brasstacks Crisis and Compound Crisis, continued to occur in the years 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994. None of the crisis led to major conflict while the clouds of war continue to roam around in the skies of nuclearized South Asia.²⁷³ Nevertheless, the continuously worsening law and order situation pushed India to change its policy towards Kashmir. For instance, one of the significant indicators in this regard is return of civilian rule in 1996. Further, India and Pakistan initiated Secretary level dialogue to sort out a possible solution to the Kashmir dispute. Despite efforts, the two states failed to achieve any significant success.²⁷⁴ Meanwhile, Indian Prime Minister, Inder Kumar Gujral and his counterpart in Pakistan, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif initiated Composite Dialogue

²⁷³ P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Stephen Philip Cohen, *Perception, Politics and Security in South Asia, The Compound Crisis of 1990* (London: Routledge, 2003), 3.

²⁷⁴ Rajat Ganguly, "India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute," Working Paper (Asian Studies Institute, 1998), 9.

Process (CDP) in 1997.²⁷⁵ This framework is recognized as a structured mechanism to discuss and resolve issues responsible for India-Pakistan hostility. Importantly, the CDP included Kashmir dispute and terrorism issue, pointing a “middle-path” for the rival parties. In principle, it was agreed that progress on all disputes would be sought in tandem. Thus, amidst large-scale wars and crises, both India and Pakistan continued to take peace initiatives for the resolution of the conflict, nevertheless, the two states remained engulfed in intensive arms racing to get their respective strategic objectives.

Modernization of Missile System

In parallel, India and Pakistan were moving very fast on road to acquire new missile technologies. India initiated major drive to modernize its missile program stretched in the mid of 1990s. The plan to nuclearize Indian armed forces fundamentally increased the research and development program of missile system. During this time period, the Defense Research Development Program (DRDO) produced a limited series of missiles which were deployed in the battlefields. India initiated numerous other missile programs to develop submarine launched ballistic missile such as Sagarika (K-15),²⁷⁶ BrahMos cruise missile system,²⁷⁷ Dhanush missile system.²⁷⁸ The Indian missile programs from 1970s to 2000s, transformed into a modernized and self-sufficient character.²⁷⁹ Indian missile modernization programs put

²⁷⁵ Ashutosh Misra, *India-Pakistan Coming to Terms* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 35-36.

²⁷⁶ Sagarika also known by the code names K-15 or B-05, is an Indian submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) with a range of 750 kilometers that was designed for retaliatory nuclear strikes. It belongs to the K missile family and forms a part of India’s nuclear triad.

²⁷⁷ The BrahMos (also designated as PJ-10) is a medium-range stealth ramjet supersonic missile that can be launched from submarine, ships, aircraft or land, notably being the fastest supersonic cruise missile in the world.

²⁷⁸ Dhanush is a variant of the surface-to-surface or ship-to-ship Prithvi III missile, which has been developed for the Indian Navy.

²⁷⁹ Gaurav Kampani, “Stakeholders in the Indian Strategic Missile Program,” *Non-proliferation Review* 10, no. 3 (2003): 48-70, <https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/10736700308436943>.

Islamabad under severe pressure to meet its security requirements vis-à-vis conventionally superior rival, consequently, leading to intense arms racing in the region.

For instance, the planning to initiate Pakistan missile program started in 1987 to deter Indian threat. Pakistani intelligence reported the existence and swift development of the Indian missile program. The primary objective of Pakistan missile program was to counter ingeniously developed Prithvi missile system, successfully tested for the first time in 1988.²⁸⁰ In order to maintain balance of power, Pakistan launched Hatf missile program in 1987–88.²⁸¹ However, strict restrictions and severe constraints on technology transfer; scrutinized by the Missile Technology Regime (MTCR) and few other western stake holders including the US, decelerated the Pakistani missile program.²⁸² In order to compete with India technologically, Pakistan's missile program was majorly focused on ingenuity.²⁸³ Pakistan used all out diplomatic resources to ensure the successful feasibility of the missile program in the 1990s.²⁸⁴ The missile program ultimately met a success with the development of the cruise missiles and other associated strategic level weapons. To sum up, Pakistan missile program majorly aimed at developing the short and medium range missile systems to counter Indian missile threat to ensure deterrence in the South Asian region.

CTBT and FMCT: India-Pakistan Road to Overt Nuclearization

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) are important initiatives of the nuclear nonproliferation propagators. Since entry into force, the NPT had successfully

²⁸⁰ Lieutenant General S. F. S. Lodhi, "Pakistan Missile Technology," *Defence Journal*, May 31, 1998.

²⁸¹ Ghazala Yasmin Jalil, "Missile Race in South Asia: Security Challenges for Pakistan in the 21st Century," *Strategic Studies* 40, no. 1 (Spring, 2020), 39-57, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48732326>.

²⁸² M. G. Chitkara, *Benazir, A Profile* (New Delhi: APH Publication Corporation, 2014).

²⁸³ Hanif Khalid, "How Shaheen was Developed," *Jang Newspapers*, April 19, 1999.

²⁸⁴ Bhumitra Chakma, *Strategic Dynamics and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in South Asia: A Historical Analysis* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2004).

prevented horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, but failed to prevent the vertical proliferation. The Treaty has failed to accomplish its disarmament objective due to its non-specific executing language of Article-VI. The steady advances in the arsenals of nuclear weapon states and the vitality of nuclear deterrence capability in the making of defense strategy of the Great Powers not only obstruct the implementation of Article-VI of the NPT, but also encourage the security conscious states, either to develop their indigenous nuclear weapons or secure the positive security guarantees from the nuclear weapon states. NPT failed to attract India and Pakistan for different reasons. Although, the two states participated in the negotiations of NPT draft discussions. Since the NPT entered into force, the two states have maintained different policies on the Treaty. India declared the Treaty as discriminatory that divides the world into nuclear 'haves' and 'have-nots'. While, Pakistan refrained from joining the NPT, yet it did not reject the Treaty in totality. For instance, Pakistan proposed India for simultaneous adherence to the NPT and acceptance of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) full scope safeguards. Rizwana Abbasi, one of the Pakistani scholars on nuclear issues stated,²⁸⁵

In 1974, Pakistan had proposed to establish a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in South Asia; in 1978 it proposed to India a joint Indo-Pakistan declaration renouncing the acquisition and manufacture of nuclear weapons and in the same year also proposed mutual inspections by India and Pakistan of nuclear facilities, simultaneous adherence to the NPT by India and Pakistan and also simultaneous acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards.

Nevertheless, India simply rejected all Pakistani proposals. Had India accepted these proposals of Pakistan, certainly the South Asia could be a region free from nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan are members of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT). The two states have, however, espoused different positions on the CTBT. India, despite being one of the real

²⁸⁵ Rizwana Abbasi, "Why the NPT needs a Makeover," *Dawn Sunday Magazine*, June 14, 2015, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1187551>.

originators of the struggle for the constitution of CTBT, refused to sign the Treaty in September 1996. New Delhi had earlier enthusiastically participated in the negotiations for writing the CTBT draft from 1994 to 1996.²⁸⁶ While, Pakistan also took part in the CTBT negotiations and also made useful contributions in drafting the Treaty.²⁸⁷ Nevertheless, India's refusal to join international and regional disarmament initiatives including the CTBT, becomes a justification for Pakistan to link its stance with India due to its security concerns.²⁸⁸ Evidently, the mistrust and fear influenced the decision making process even to nuclear related issues between India and Pakistan. Since 1972, Pakistan took numerous initiatives to prevent South Asia from nuclear cataclysm. First, in the beginning, Pakistan remained an ardent supporter of establishing Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in South Asia. In response to India's so-called Peaceful Nuclear Explosion on May 18, 1974, Pakistan tabled a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) calling for the establishment of a NWFZ in South Asia in December 1974. Second, Islamabad forwarded the proposal to New Delhi for a bilateral or regional nuclear test ban treaty in 1987. Third, Pakistan initiated proposal to make South Asia Zero-Missile Zone in 1994.²⁸⁹ India rejected all these proposals because these initiatives obstructed India's quest for the domination in the region. To sum up, India's run for acquisition of nuclear weapons is beyond the region and is basically rooted in its desire to become a great power in the international system.

²⁸⁶ Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "Comparative Analysis of India-Pakistan Proliferation Contours," *JSSA IV*, no. 1 (2018): 18, <https://ojs.thesvi.org/index.php/ojs/article/view/82>.

²⁸⁷ Muhammad Sadiq, "International Non-Proliferation Regime: Pakistan and Indian Perspective," *IPRI Journal XIII*, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 24, <http://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/art2saw13.pdf>.

²⁸⁸ Malik Qasim Mustafa, "CTBT: A Critical Evaluation from a Pakistani Perspective," *Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad 33*, no. 3/4 (Autumn/ Winter, 2013): 41, <https://www.proquest.com/openview/5562ea7034c83028795d971ffad2ce87/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=616527>.

²⁸⁹ Feroz Hassan Khan, "Pakistan's Perspective on the Global Elimination of the Nuclear Weapons," in *Pakistan and Israel*, ed. Barry Blechman (Washington DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2009), 25-26.

Conclusion

India's successful military offensive in 1971 war and the demonstration of nuclear power in 1974 boosted its confidence to initiate force modernization and introduce a military doctrine to meet its national security objectives. India developed Sundarji doctrine, with an objective to carry out deep and swift offensive military operations to dissect Pakistan into two halves. While Pakistan responded offensively to it and developed strategies such as Preemptive Operations and Reposte to counter Indian threat. Also, Pakistan in the wake of 1971 debacle, covertly acquired nuclear weapons. In parallel, both India and Pakistan launched their missile programs and got involved in arms racing, creating further mistrust and uncertainty between the two states. Evidently, the nuclear weapons influenced the nature and character of conflict. For instance, two crises such as the Brasstacks Crisis and the Compound Crisis erupted involving massive mobilization of troops, nevertheless, not a single crisis escalated to large-scale war or use of nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan employed coercive strategies involving compellence and deterrence instead of employing brute force. India employed compellence strategy involving threat of use of force while Pakistan maintained deterrence strategy to counter the Indian offensive. Thus, the intensity of violence remained low in the pre-nuclear era. Lastly, this era witnessed introduction of the third party such as the US to play a crisis manager role to avert nuclear war between the two states. Theoretically speaking, the introduction of nuclear weapons led to high tensions due to increase number of crises, nevertheless, no single crisis escalated, pointing to the relevance of stability-instability paradox. Critical analysis indicates that keeping in view the short time-span since the acquisition of knowledge, the generalization of stability-instability paradox demands further investigation.

Table 9: Post Nuclear Era-Crises, Strategies and Intensity of Violence

Year	Number of Crisis	India's Strategy		Pakistan's Strategy		Stability-Instability Paradox
		Coercion		Coercion		
		Compellence	Deterrence	Compellence	Deterrence	
1986-7	02	02	-	-	02	Instability: Low Intensity of Violence
1990						

Source: Developed by Author

Chapter Four

Overt Nuclearization: Nuclear Weapons, Offensive Doctrines and Conflict Transformation (1998-2015)

The acquisition of nuclear weapons certainly made South Asia a nuclear flashpoint. Both India and Pakistan introduced offensive doctrines to fight and win wars under the nuclear overhang. Certainly, while there is an increase in the number of crises including a limited war, not a single crisis escalated to large-scale war or use of nuclear weapons, pointing to the efficacy of stability-instability paradox. The MAD did play a part to avert large-scale wars nevertheless, the South Asia rivals experienced LIC including proxies under the nuclear domain. Both states blamed each other for supporting terrorism. The two states experienced numerous crises such as the Kargil Crisis, the Twin Peaks Crisis and Mumbai Attacks. Based on the learning lessons from the crises, India introduced offensive force employment strategy such as CSD with an objective to take punitive measures against Pakistan for its alleged involvement in perpetrating terrorism. While Pakistan also offensively responded to CSD by introducing FSD and development of TNW, thereby bringing the nuclear threshold to low level. Instead of employing brute force, India and Pakistan employed coercive strategies (compellence and deterrence) in the post-nuclear era. This chapter investigates impact of nuclear weapons and doctrines on conflict transformation between India and Pakistan covering the events and strategies from 1998 to 2015. It focuses on question such as why India-Pakistan's reliance on offensive doctrines increased after the development of nuclear weapon programs.

Overt Nuclearization of South Asia

India tested its nuclear device for the first time in an Operation code named as Smiling Buddha in May, 1974. While, India re-demonstrated its nuclear capability in May, 1998.²⁹⁰ India, after a break of 24 years surprised the world with a second phase of nuclear tests at a time when international community under the mandate of CTBT, was making intensive efforts to abstain countries from acquiring the nuclear capabilities.²⁹¹ India tested nuclear devices on 11th and 13th, May, 1998. And in compulsive response, Pakistan conducted nuclear tests on 28th and 30th, May, 1998.²⁹² The two states developed their nuclear doctrines majorly to avert wars, nevertheless, the introduction of nuclear weapons became an impetus to fight LIC and subsequently, introduce offensive doctrines. The acquisition of nuclear weapons and terrorism put significant impact on nature of doctrinal changes and the conflict dynamics. Before moving ahead to analyze the conflict dynamics during this era, it is imperative to discuss the nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan.

India's Nuclear Doctrine

India released Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) produced by the National Security Advisor Board (NASB) in August 1999.²⁹³ The draft was basically an unofficial report, however, it broadly set the direction of India's nuclear posture with respect to "development, deployment and employment."²⁹⁴ The DND emphasized the need to ensure CMD. It also proposed to devise appropriate retaliatory measures in case of deterrence failure. Significantly, a pledge to pursue

²⁹⁰ Zafar Khan, "Conceptualizing China and India's Transforming Strategic Forces Postures under the Essentials of Minimum Deterrence," *Journal of Contemporary China* 26, no. 105 (2017): 403, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2016.1245898>.

²⁹¹ Ashley J. Tellis, "The Strategic Implications of Nuclear India," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, (2002): 13.

²⁹² Khan, *Pakistan's Nuclear Policy*, 1.

²⁹³ Rajesh Rajagopalan, "India's Nuclear Doctrine Debate," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (June 30, 2019): 1-2.

²⁹⁴ Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, "India's Nuclear Doctrine A Critical Analysis," *Strategic Analysis* 33, no. 3 (2009): 406, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160902790084>.

NFU was also undertaken in the DND. Further, it was asserted that deterrence can only be ensured by developing forces that are operationally prepared to meet any challenge from the enemy country.²⁹⁵ Thus, the major objective of the India's nuclear doctrine was to avoid fighting wars as it would lead to deterrence failure between the two states.

The major policy declarations made in the DND were: One, the fundamental purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by any state or other political entity against its armed forces. Two, India will not resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear weapons state or those not aligned with rival nuclear weapon state. Three, India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike or use nuclear weapon against the enemy state. Four, India shall pursue a policy posture of a CMD. Any nuclear attack on India and its armed forces shall result in massive retaliation from India. Five, the nuclear weapons shall be tightly secured and controlled. Further, the instruction for the use of nuclear weapons against the enemy state should be at the discretion of highest authorized political figure. Lastly, India's nuclear arsenal will be based on the triad concept to ensure the success of deterrence. Thus, the DND indicates that India projected itself to be opting defensive posture. The reason for it can be attributed to avoid pressure from the international community in the wake of second phase of nuclear tests.

Over the years, India's nuclear doctrine evolved and developed to take a more dynamic shape. Keeping in view the lessons learnt during the Kargil War and Twin Peaks Crisis, India and Pakistan developed offensive conventional and nuclear doctrines to secure the national security objectives. Thus, the two nuclear armed countries instead of focusing on averting wars,

²⁹⁵ P. R. Chari, "India's Nuclear Doctrine: Confused Ambitions," *The Nonproliferation Review* (Fall-Winter, 2000): 126, <https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/10736700008436829>.

enhanced their reliance on offensive postures to fight and win the wars under the nuclear overhang.

India made few changes in the previous nuclear draft. India officially declared its nuclear doctrine reckoned as Indian Nuclear Doctrine (IND) in 2003.²⁹⁶ The newly announced doctrine confirmed the basic elements of DND. Nevertheless, India created somewhat space for offensive elements in the existing nuclear doctrine. For instance, the main points of the revised official nuclear doctrines were: One, India's strategic posture will be maintained on a principle policy of a CMD. Significantly, India focused on the element of credibility as it did not specify what is minimum for China and Pakistan, thereby, creating intentional ambiguity. Two, India's nuclear posture will be based on NFU, nevertheless, the nuclear weapons will be used in case there is any nuclear attack on Indian Territory or its forces anywhere outside the country. Three, the retaliation will be of massive nature designed to inflict unbearable damage to the enemy state. Four, the civil-political leadership can only permit the retaliatory attack under the mandate of Nuclear Command Authority (NCA). Five, the nuclear weapons will not be used against non-nuclear weapons states. Six, India will have the option to use nuclear weapons in the case biological and chemical weapons are used against it. Seven, strict measures will be undertaken to control the export of fissile material in line with FMCT declaration, participation in the FMCT negotiations and further, adherence to the commitment to cessation of nuclear tests. And lastly, India will firmly pursue principle of nuclear weapons free world based in nondiscriminatory approach across the globe.²⁹⁷ Thus, some of the elements of DND were reiterated including the NFU. However, the provision of nuclear retaliation in case India

²⁹⁶ Bharat Karnad, *India's Nuclear Policy* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 85.

²⁹⁷ Amir Latif, "A Comparative Study of Nuclear Doctrines of India and Pakistan," *Journal of Global Peace and Conflict* 2, no. 1 (June, 2014): 136, http://jgpcnet.com/journals/jgpc/Vol_2_No_1_June_2014/7.pdf.

is attacked by chemical and biological weapons, considerably undermined the NFU stance.²⁹⁸

Thus, the doctrinal changes points to the evolving nature of Indian nuclear doctrine based on its changing strategic environment and geopolitical realities. M.V. Ramana and Zia Mian argues that,²⁹⁹

In this it (India) appears to be following the lead of the USA, which had also announced that it would consider responding to Chemical Biological Weapon attack with nuclear weapons. This policy may also reflect the advice of the National Security Board, which had argued that India should drop the No First Use policy. The caveat about Chemical Biological Weapons attack may well be the first step in completely repudiating the No First Use policy.

Consequently, the ambiguity in India's nuclear doctrine shaped the threat perception in Pakistan, thereby increased mistrust and uncertainty between the two states. Pakistan's response to Indian nuclear doctrine can be understood with the statement of Major General (Retd.) Jamshed Ayaz Khan, while relating the US preemptive strike policy with the one devised by India, he stated,³⁰⁰

While earlier, to show its 'non-violent' nature, India was categorical in its No First Use Policy, however India now says, 'In the event of a major attack against India, it will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons. That means 'No First Use' is out, India has now made it more ambiguous. Whenever they decide to use nuclear weapons against any state, they could just say that state X was planning to launch a major biological or chemical attack on India – the theory of unilateral preemptive strike formula could be commissioned. The US – the only Superpower has retained a similar option to prevent nations with chemical and biological weapons from it if the use of these weapons of mass destruction will not invite a nuclear response. India has taken out this part from the US nuclear doctrine.

This indicates that India had the offensive intentions to use nuclear weapons against Pakistan. The US preemption strategies declared prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and

²⁹⁸ Rifaat Hussain, "Nuclear Doctrines in South Asia," *South Asian Strategic Stability Unit Research Report*, no. 4 (2005): 25, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/99918/RR%20No%2004.pdf>.

²⁹⁹ M.V. Ramana and Zia Mian, "The Nuclear Confrontation in South Asia," in *SIPRI Yearbook 2003, Disarmament, and International Security* (London: Oxford University Press, SPRI, 2003): 201.

³⁰⁰ Major General (Retd.) Jamshed Ayaz Khan, "India's Nuclear Doctrine," *The Nation*, 31 January 2003.

received acceptance as a precept subsequently. It appears to be a dangerous pattern for a conflict prone South Asia. The point is, the US used preemption strikes against less capable non-nuclear weapon state, nevertheless, the situation is totally different in context of India-Pakistan conventional and nuclear capabilities. Interestingly, when the US invaded Iraq, Indian Foreign Minister, Yashwant Sinha asserted that India holds the right to use coercive measures against Pakistan. He stated that “there were three reasons which drove the Anglo-US forces to attack Iraq; possession of weapons of mass destruction, export of terrorism and an absence of democracy all of which exist in Pakistan.”³⁰¹ Meanwhile, George Fernandes, the Defense Minister of India, endorsed the statement of the External Minister. He stated that India has a much better case to go for preemptive action against Pakistan than the US has in Iraq.³⁰² Thus, Indian official statements to launch preemptive strikes points to shift in nuclear posture from countervalue to counterforce, thereby pointing to warfighting, not war avoidance.

To be clear, India’s adoption of preemption strategy is dangerous for the strategic stability in the region particularly due to Pakistan’s weak conventional capabilities. In order to counter India’s offensive, Pakistan had to rely and further modernize its nuclear capabilities at a much faster pace. This situation led both states to indulge in vicious arm racing, which increased the probability of intentional or accidental nuclear exchange between the two South Asian rivals, already trapped in intense security dilemma.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine

Pakistan covertly acquired nuclear weapons in 1980’s. Significantly, Pakistan did not announced nuclear doctrine as far now. While Pakistan adopted non-weaponized deterrence or existential deterrence posture to deter India in the 1980’s and 1990’s; though, this nuclear

³⁰¹ Quoted in Mike Ryan, “Facing the Failures of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime,” *Nuclear Age Peace Foundation* (April 23, 2003), <https://www.wagingpeace.org/facing-the-failures-of-the-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-regime/>.

³⁰² Quoted in Ryan, “Facing the Failures,”.

policy underwent significant changes with the overt nuclearization in 1998. In broader terms, Pakistan's nuclear strategy is a mix of three systemic effects that are generally linked to the presence of nuclear weapons in inter-state relations. One, the nuclear weapons possession ensures the security and independence of Pakistan. With the acquisition of nuclear weapons, Pakistan has achieved the reassurance of existential deterrence.³⁰³ Two, the nuclear deterrence between nuclear rivals places a significant constraint on the use of violence. Pakistan's primary objective to get nuclear weapons was to deter India from taking any sort of offensive action.³⁰⁴ Third, the acquisition of nuclear weapons makes it possible for weaker states to ensure their security against powerful adversaries. Thus, these elements are the core foundations of Pakistan's nuclear posture which depicts its unwillingness to pursue the NFU.

To be clear, few of the core claims regarding Pakistan's nuclear doctrine are:³⁰⁵ One, nuclear weapons are viewed as the ultimate guarantors of Pakistan's territorial integrity, national independence and sovereignty. Pakistan with the acquisition of nuclear weapons ensured existential deterrence.³⁰⁶ Two, keeping in view Pakistan's Indo-centric nature of threat perception, the sole aim of these nuclear weapons appears to be deterrence vis-à-vis India.³⁰⁷ Pakistan considered nuclear weapons mandatory to counterbalance India's conventional superiority. It is important to mention that Pakistan's policy to use nuclear weapons is due to the mistrust and uncertainty based on unpredictable nature of balance of power prevailing between the two South Asian rivals. The success or failure of nuclear deterrence seems to be

³⁰³ Ian Smart, "The Great Engines: The Rise and Decline of a Nuclear Age," *International Affairs* 51, no.4 (1975): 548, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2615835>; and Lawrence Freedman, "I Exist, Therefore I Deter," *International Security* 13, No. 1 (Summer 1988): 184, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/446771>.

³⁰⁴ Zafar Iqbal Cheema, "Pakistan's Nuclear Use Doctrine and Command and Control," in *Planning the Unthinkable*, ed. Peter Lavoy, Scott. D Sagan and Jim Wirtz (New York: Cornell University Press): 169.

³⁰⁵ Hussain, "Nuclear Doctrines in South Asia," 13-14.

³⁰⁶ Freedman, "I Exist," 184.

³⁰⁷ Cheema, "Pakistan's Nuclear Use Doctrine" 169.

hugely dependent on the conventional force ratios between India and Pakistan.³⁰⁸ Three, Pakistan's nuclear deterrence is based on the threat of punishment with counter-value targets.³⁰⁹ Four, Pakistan follows a strategic posture of minimum credible deterrence.³¹⁰ The policy of minimum indicates the fact that the primary role of nuclear weapons for Pakistan is to avoid the adversary from taking certain course of offensive action against it and avoid war. Moreover, the credibility of nuclear deterrence is not dependent on the number of nuclear weapons but the will of political leadership for defensive use of weapons in a war against India.

General Khalid Kidwai, former Head of Pakistan's Strategic Planning Division, discussed the likely scenario in which Pakistan could consider use of nuclear weapons and reportedly delineated four options in case of any eventuality from Indian side. These four scenarios are "Red Lines" to make decision regarding use of nuclear weapons only if "the very existence of Pakistan as a state is at stake." General Kidwai stated, "One, if India attacks Pakistan and its forces occupy a huge part of Pakistan's territory; two, if India inflict heavy losses to Pakistan's armed forces; three, Indian imposition of an "economic blockade" on Pakistan; and lastly, if India forces Pakistan in to political or domestic destabilization."³¹¹ The fifth claim regarding Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is, Pakistan was pushed to adopt FU to ensure credibility of the minimum deterrence.³¹² Pakistan could not go for opting NFU because if it does so, this would assist India to fight a conventional war without the fear of punishment. Keeping in view, India's conventional superiority and Pakistan's geographical constraints, the FU posture assisted Pakistan almost in the same manner as it served the purpose of the US to

³⁰⁸ Brian Cloughley, *A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 340.

³⁰⁹ Matinuddin, *Nuclearization of South Asia*, 242.

³¹⁰ Khan, *Pakistan's Nuclear Policy*, 5.

³¹¹ See Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini, "Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan: A Concise Report of a Visit by Landau Network-Centro Volta," *Pugwash Organization* (January 14, 2002), <https://pugwash.org/2002/01/14/report-on-nuclear-safety-nuclear-stability-and-nuclear-strategy-in-pakistan/#footnote1>.

³¹² Khan, "Pakistan's Nuclear First-Use Doctrine," 152.

ensure deterrence against the Soviet to protect its European allies.³¹³ Six, Pakistan has the credible capability to wreak assured destruction on counter-value targets in India. Seven, the NCA is the decision-making body in Pakistan that is comprised of the Employment Control Committee (ECC), Development Control Committee (DCC) and Strategic Planning Division (SPD). Eight, the nuclear arsenals are to be kept safe and secure to avoid any accidental use.³¹⁴ Nine, Pakistan is agreed to formulate a restraint regime, “predicted on the lowest level of nuclear capability, non-weaponization and non-deployment.”³¹⁵ Thus, Pakistan adopted an offensive nuclear doctrinal posture majorly to ensure deterrence and avoid wars.

In technical terms, it was not pragmatic for Pakistan to opt offensive deterrence posture which required a robust, huge and complex command and control system. Nevertheless, Pakistan being conventionally weaker state exploited India’s uncertainty and intended to keep India think regarding its intentions in a war like situation.³¹⁶ Pakistan’s former Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi on ambiguousness of Pakistan’s nuclear posture stated,³¹⁷

What could be the moment of last resort would be difficult to precisely define, given the asymmetry in conventional as well as nuclear arms in relation to India and its lack of geographical depth. Whether a limited war imposed by India would warrant Pakistan’s nuclear response would turn on the scale and gravity of the threat to Pakistan’s existence. In these circumstances...a policy of ambiguity would appear to be best for Pakistan’s security. Spelling out its nuclear doctrine would detract it from the imperative of uncertainty about when a nuclear strike is to be resorted to. Not precluding First Strike as a last resort would...reinforce maximally credible nuclear deterrence by raising the threshold of India’s calculation of unacceptable nuclear risk.

³¹³ Rasul Bakhsh Rais, “Conceptualizing Nuclear Deterrence Pakistan’s Posture,” *India Review* 4, no. 2 (2005): 156, <https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/14736480500225632>.

³¹⁴ Hussain, “Nuclear Doctrines in South Asia,” 14.

³¹⁵ Agha Shahi, “Pakistan’s Response to the Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” *Strategic Issues* (March 2000): 10.

³¹⁶ Michael Ryan Kraig, “The Political and Strategic Imperatives of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia,” *India Review* 2, no. 1 (January 2003): 37, <https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/714002322>.

³¹⁷ Agha Shahi, “Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia,” *Strategic Issues* (March 2000): 56.

Pakistan's nuclear doctrine revolves around three policy objectives. One, Pakistan primary objective is to deter India with its FU. Two, it enables Pakistan to deter India's major conventional attack. Lastly, to allow Pakistan the "capacity to use the nuclear weapons as a power demonstration instrument to internationalize the crisis and invite outside intervention if the circumstance prove unfavorable to Pakistan."³¹⁸ In addition to these policy objectives, few scholars have pointed one more policy objective to acquire nuclear weapons such as, the use nuclear deterrence to fight sub-conventional warfare against India under the nuclear domain.³¹⁹ Thus, this indicates the relevance of the stability-instability paradox logic between nuclear armed India and Pakistan which is the focus of this thesis.

To sum up, the selection of certain type of doctrine whether conventional or nuclear, the freedom of choice does not lie entirely with the states as they are constrained by their geography, the size of populations, economic resources including strategic raw materials and the industrial potential. Pakistan for instance, is constrained by its geographical shape, size, location and orientation to adopt a forward defensive posture vis-a-vis India as it does not have the luxury to trade space to gain time particularly due to the fact that some of Pakistan's politically important cities and strategic communication arteries lies very close to its border with India. Again, in terms of adopting a nuclear posture and nuclear use doctrine, Pakistan is mindful of India's advantages in the size of conventional forces. As a natural corollary of the desire to deny India the opportunity to exploit this advantage it makes perfect sense for Pakistan to refuse NFU nuclear posture. Thus, Pakistan introduced offensive nuclear doctrine majorly to deny India an incentive for India to attack it in any crisis or war.

³¹⁸ Andrew C. Winner and Toshi Yoshihara, *Nuclear Stability in South Asia* (Tufts University: IFPA, 2002), 38.

³¹⁹ Hussain, "Nuclear Doctrines in South Asia," 14.

What Makes South Asia Distinct?

Historical analysis suggests that since the nuclear catastrophe of World War II, the nuclear rival states have shown restraint to avoid the destructive consequences. In the aftermath of the US nuclear attacks on Japan, Barnard Brodie stated that “thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It could have no other useful purpose.”³²⁰ During the Cold War, the US and Soviet Union acted rationally and successfully achieved the stability by mutual enforcement of norms that led to avoid fighting large-scale war. The great powers did experience numerous crises such as the 1961 Berlin Blockade, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1974 Yom Kippur³²¹ and the Ussuri River Clashes 1969.³²² Significantly, not a single crisis led to direct confrontation between the two great powers during the Cold War era.

Nevertheless, the case of South Asia is distinct vis-à-vis US-Soviet conflict dynamics. One, the Cold War rivals fought proxies far away from their borders or other strategically important territories. While India-Pakistan geographical proximity and the role of non-state actors generating crises at regular basis, makes it a totally different case. Two, the US-Soviet enjoyed somewhat balance in conventional and nuclear domain while in case of South Asia, India is indisputably leading in conventional capabilities leaving no other options for Pakistan but to rely on nuclear arsenals including TNW. Three, India and Pakistan based on doctrinal changes, frequently move away from war-avoidance-mode to war-fighting-mode. To sum up, the introduction of nuclear weapons and doctrinal changes converted the large-scale wars into limited war, proxies and insurgencies and surgical strikes pointing towards increased number of crises but reduction in intensity of violence, thereby making it relevant to analyze through

³²⁰ Barnard Brodie, *The Absolute Weapon* (New York: Harcourt, 1946), 76.

³²¹ Rajaram Nagappa, Arun Vishwanathan and Aditi Malhotra, *HATF-IX/ NASR- Pakistan Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Implications for Indo-Pak Deterrence* (Bangalore, National Institute of Advanced Studies, 2013), 6.

³²² Rajain, *Nuclear Deterrence*, 42.

the prism of stability-instability paradox. Further, India and Pakistan are employing coercion to resolve the conflicts under the nuclear domain which further add-up uniqueness of South Asia.

Kargil Crisis: Transformed Conflict Dynamics

In the wake of Lahore Declaration which certainly created a hope of peace in a nuclearized environment, the eruption of the Kargil Crisis was unthinkable.³²³ The Kargil Crisis was fourth war between India and Pakistan, though limited in scale but first military confrontation since the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Critical analysis indicates that the nuclear deterrence has remained a contested social construct which continues to be debated amongst nuclear optimists and pessimists with different conclusions drawn by either side. Certainly, the Cold War nuclear lexicon remains a useful guide to understanding the nature of the deterrence relationship between nuclear-armed adversaries, however, it has several inherent limitations, and may not necessarily have universal application due to the different nature and scope of military competition between India and Pakistan.³²⁴ This is the reason, India and Pakistan experienced numerous crises in the post-nuclear era. The introduction of nuclear weapons did avert large-scale war, nevertheless, it led them to fight a limited war leaving the conflict dynamics more complex between the two states. Thus, the Kargil War is an appropriate case of the stability-instability paradox, which postulates that nuclear weapons ensure stability at the strategic level while instability prevails at lower levels of conflict.

The Kashmir dispute is lies at the heart of India-Pakistan enduring rivalry. The two states have fought two large-scale wars employing brute force involving strategies such as offence and defense to resolve the Kashmir dispute in the pre-nuclear era. After the acquisition

³²³ Shireen M. Mazari, *The Kargil Conflict, 1999: Separating Fact from Fiction* (Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies, 2003), 27.

³²⁴ Adil Sultan Muhammad, "India-Pakistan Crises and the Evolving Dyadic Model," *IPRI* (2017): 22.

of nuclear weapons, still the arch rivals fought a limited war reckoned as the Kargil Crisis.³²⁵ There are numerous interpretations about the occurrence of the Kargil Crisis. For instance, few see the Kargil Crisis as a Pakistan's compulsive reciprocal reply to India's offensive military operation at Siachen in 1984.³²⁶ Other say, Pakistan basically planned and initiated the Kargil War to pressurize India.³²⁷ Most of the details available in the existing literature pointed to the factors such as: Pakistan's intentions to gain international community attention towards Kashmir dispute;³²⁸ to capture strategic Kargil-Dras highway and dissecting Srinagar from the Leh to trap Indian Army at the deadly Siachen region; stir an uprising in the valley; and lastly to make sanctity of LoC questionable, even if not in a position to bring change in it. Thus, Pakistan based on revisionist approach intended to alter the international borders, thereby changing the status quo. Dr. Khattak categorized the Kargil Crisis as a compulsive response of Pakistan. He opined,³²⁹

Kargil was a response to India's offensive military adventure of 1984 when it captured certain part of Siachen region. India violated Simla Agreement signed between India and Pakistan and captured Siachen. So, Pakistan in a compulsive response captured back few of the peaks and the idea was to pressurize India to leave Siachen and negotiate with Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Importantly, if Pakistan would have accepted that its troops are fighting in Siachen, then the situation may have turned in favor of Pakistan, however, India exploited this as a Pakistan's weakness and engaged in active diplomacy specifically with the US to put pressure on Pakistan for withdrawal of fighters.

³²⁵ See Robert Wirsing, *India and Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflicts and its Resolutions* (New York: NY: St Martin's Press, 1998).

³²⁶ Zafar Khan, "Crisis Management in Nuclear South Asia A Pakistani Perspective," in *Investigating Crises*, ed. Sameer Lalwani and Hannah Haegeland (Washington: Stimson Centre, 2018): 146; and Robert G. Wirsing, *Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in the Nuclear Age* (New York: M.E Sharpe, 2003), 38.

³²⁷ S. Paul Kapur, "Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia," *International Security* 33, no. 2 (Fall, 2008): 73, <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2008.33.2.71>.

³²⁸ Prasun K. Sengupta, "Mountain Warfare: The Kargil Experience," *Asian Defense Journal* 10 (October, 1999): 42-46.

³²⁹ Authors Interview with Dr. Masood ur Rehman Khattak.

The Kargil War lasted from May 3 to July 26, 1999. The war zone covered the geographical area of around 200-kilometers elsewhere on the LoC.³³⁰ Pakistan claimed that the Kargil Crisis started when about 600 militants took over Indian Army posts located in the high mountainous region reckoned as Kargil-Dras. The Indian Army regularly used to leave these security posts in the winter season every year. Conversely, India claimed that infiltrators were not the militants but a group of Pakistan Army regular soldiers and the Afghan Mujahidin. As the war started, more than 300 casualties were recorded, mostly on the Indian side. The control of militants over the strategic posts led to significant loss of Indian troops.³³¹ Indian Army faced serious difficulties right at the start of the conflict such as, huge losses, hard fighting landscape and heavily armed militants holding strategic peaks which compelled India to deploy IAF fighter jets to launch airstrikes to target the enemy. Additionally, India Army deployed huge number of troops to launch counter offensive. India increased the intensity of military operation involving aerial strikes, using massive artillery fire and infantry offensive attacks to take back control of strategic peaks from the militants. Indian Army recapture two very important strategic points of Dras and Batalik. Both strategic positions were significant for extending the logistical supportability to the Indian Army at Siachen Glacier.³³² Thus, this military success helped Indian armed forces to take back the driving seat in the conflict.

Both India and Pakistan did not intend to escalate the conflict to a large-scale war which makes it relevant with the stability-instability paradox logic. The two arch rivals stayed limited to the Kargil region, only. Even, India exercise cautious restraint not to cross the LoC. Pakistan in response to IAF airstrikes, did not used PAF to counter Indian troop's significant advances, thereby intentionally evading the conflict escalation in a nuclearized environment. Pakistan

³³⁰ J. N. Dixit, *India-Pakistan in War and Peace* (London: Routledge, 2002), 33.

³³¹ Amin, "Kargil Crisis in Kashmir," 322.

³³² Ganguly, "Nuclear Stability in South Asia," 57; and Wirsing, *Kashmir in the Shadow of War*, 36.

Army claimed a total of 500 deaths in the conflict; nevertheless, there were some speculations estimating the number to be 1000. On the other hand, India claimed lesser casualties such as 265 deaths and 451 wounded, while Pakistan suffered death toll of 486.³³³ Pakistan Air Defense shot down 2 IAF fighter jets (MIG-21 and MIG-27) during the Kargil Crisis. Pakistani troops also captured one of the aircrews who was later on released by the Pakistani authorities on June 3, 1999.³³⁴ The Kargil Crisis significantly altered the conflict dynamics between India and Pakistan, as it provided a new window to fight limited war or sub-conventional warfare under the nuclear overhang, thereby creating dangers to the strategic stability of South Asia.

Pakistan hastily crafted compellence strategy led to the most dangerous confrontation in the nuclearized environment – thus climbing the road to a major misadventure with considerable escalatory potential attached. Pakistan for the first time employed Compellence strategy involving limited use of force to change the status quo, while India successfully employed deterrence strategy to maintain the status quo involving calculated use of force to punish Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan, if not ample, however had significant amount of nuclear stockpiles. Evidently, the MAD forced the two nuclear armed states not escalate to conflict to large-scale war or use of nuclear weapons, thereby confirming the application of stability-instability paradox in the South Asia.

³³³ Nasim Zehra, *From Kargil to the Coup: Events that Shook Pakistan* (Lahore: Sang-e, Meel Publisher, 337-338).

³³⁴ See "World South Asia: India Loses Two Jets," *BBC*, May 27 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/354120.stm.

Table 10: Post Nuclear Era-Kargil Crisis

Year	Crisis	India's Strategy		Pakistan's Strategy		Stability- Instability Paradox
		Coercion		Coercion		
		Compellence	Deterrence	Compellence	Deterrence	
1999	Kargil Crisis	-	Deterrence	Compellence	-	Instability: Low Intensity of Violence

Source: Developed by Author

Role of the US as a Crisis Manager

Intensive US diplomatic engagement during the Compound Crisis led to successful de-escalation of the crisis in 1990.³³⁵ Similarly, the US played a significant role in the Kargil Crisis too. Particularly, once Chinese expressed neutrality in the conflict and emphasized both India and Pakistan to resolve the issue at bilateral levels, it was the US which once again took the driving seat to play a role of the crisis manager to end the conflict. The US officials initiated active diplomacy and met with ambassadors of India and Pakistan number of times to avert use of nuclear weapons. The US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, diplomatically engaged Prime Minister Sharif and Indian Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, while the Commander in Chief of the US Central Command (CENTCOM), General Anthony C. Zinni held meeting with Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Pervez Musharraf. During these diplomatic engagements, the US officials accused Pakistan for the initiation of the crisis and also pressurized Pakistani leadership to evacuate its forces from the war zone. Evidently, on the other hand, the US urged India to exercise restraint to avoid further widening of the

³³⁵ Narang, "Posturing for Peace," 52.

conflict.³³⁶ For instance, the US President, Bill Clinton, communicated with the Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and emphasized to avoid crossing the LoC as it could lead to conflict escalation. In return, President Clinton provided assurances to the Prime Minister Vajpayee regarding the US commitment to pressurize Pakistan for the swiftest conceivable withdrawal of the Pakistani troops from the Kargil region. Afterwards, President Clinton communicated with the Prime Minister Sharif and offered mediation between India and Pakistan, if the Pakistan give assurance about the withdrawal of the Pakistani troops from the war zone.³³⁷

Significantly, efficient US diplomacy give enough face-saving environment to both countries to deescalate the crisis, particularly Pakistan. Evidently, Prime Minister Sharif visited the US and signed July 4 Declaration. Afterwards, Prime Minister Sharif acted upon his pledge and made an appeal to the fighters to evacuate the mountains which ultimately brought an end to the conflict.³³⁸ The leadership in India and Pakistan rationally acted with circumstances and terminated the hostilities in an orderly manner, although the US pressure indubitably catalyzed this process.³³⁹ The Kargil Crisis left significant impact on the existing and future peace initiatives.³⁴⁰ For instance, India and Pakistan understood that there is no military solution to Kashmir dispute. India unilaterally announced ceasefire which Pakistan reciprocated. Pakistan further proposed a truce of pulling back troops from LoC which both states complied on. Thus, the US diplomatic engagement successfully led to conflict de-escalation. It apparently seem

³³⁶ Srinath Raghavan, "Nawaz Sharif's Pleas and Bill Clinton's Intervention in the Kargil War," *The Print*, June 24, 2018, <https://theprint.in/pageturner/excerpt/nawaz-sharifs-pleas-and-bill-clintons-intervention-in-the-kargil-war/74007/>.

³³⁷ Myra MacDonald, *Defeat is an Orphan: How Pakistan Lost the Great South Asian War* (London: Hurst & Company, 2017), 66.

³³⁸ Rajain, *Nuclear Deterrence*, 51-52.

³³⁹ Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, *Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behavior and the Bomb* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 156.

³⁴⁰ Verghese Koithara, *Crafting Peace in Kashmir: Through A Realist Lens* (SAGE Publications, 2004), 45.

that the US had adopted the role of a crisis manager between India and Pakistan where both countries started to rely more on the US in the future crises to come.

Table 11: Post Nuclear Era-Role of the US in Kargil Crisis

Year	Crisis	Role of US		Outcome of Conflict
		Active	Inactive	
1999	Kargil Crisis	Active	-	Conflict De-escalated

Source: Developed by Author

To sum up, the intensity of violence decreased in the post-nuclear era in comparison to the pre-nuclear era. Nevertheless, the non-state actors continued to increase their space in India-Pakistan conflict dynamics in a nuclearized environment. Both India and Pakistan employed coercive strategies in the Kargil Crisis. Nevertheless, this time it was Pakistan that used the compellence strategy involving limited use of force to change the status quo with the support of non-state actors while India employed the deterrence strategy to maintain the status quo. Ostensibly, India and Pakistan introduced nuclear weapons and doctrines to avoid fighting wars, nevertheless, the Kargil Crisis seems to challenge the doctrinal predispositions where both countries switched from war-avoidance-mode to war-fighting-mode. Interestingly, the MAD did play a part to influence the two countries leadership to act rationally and exercise restraint during the crisis. Also, the risk of use of nuclear weapon pushed the US to mediate between India and Pakistan to avoid conflict escalation. The Kargil Crisis did not escalated to a large-scale war or strategic levels, thereby setting new trends in the nature and character of conflict such as: the Kargil Crisis pointed to the establishment of stability-instability paradox logic in the South Asia. Second, the Kargil Crisis not only transformed the character of conflict but also acted as an impetus to brought doctrinal changes to wage a limited war, referring to the shrinking scale of violence under the nuclear domain.

Twin Peaks Crisis 2001-2002

Both India and Pakistan took numerous peace initiatives, but the terrorist incidents occurring at regular basis ruined all such efforts.³⁴¹ For instance, the Kargil Crisis erupted in the immediate aftermath of Lahore Declaration. In a similar pattern, Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf held two-day Agra Summit from 14 to 16 July, 2001 to normalize the relations in the wake of the Kargil Crisis. While meeting did not come out with some tangible results, the two countries leadership expressed their willingness to continue the negotiation process for the resolution of the conflict. Nevertheless, the Agra Summit was followed by the episodes of terrorism upsetting the hopes for peaceful South Asia. For instance, two successive terrorist incidents occurred such as, first terrorist attack on Legislative Assembly of Indian Administered Kashmir on October 1, 2001, killing thirty-eight people³⁴² and the second attack on Indian Parliament in New Delhi on December 23, 2001, leaving fourteen dead including five attackers.³⁴³ In another terrorist incident, the militants intruded into Indian military base at Kaluchak town in Indian Administered Kashmir on May 14, 2002, killing 31 people.³⁴⁴ Ultimately, these terrorist incidents led to Twin Peaks Crisis that created high tensions between India and Pakistan, reaching almost at the brink of a war.

The application of stability-instability logic apparently confirmed in the Twin Peaks Crisis, where India and Pakistan started to experience LIC after the acquisition of nuclear weapons. For instance, India pointed towards terrorist groups such as LeT and JeM for the

³⁴¹ Ashley J. Tellis, "Are India-Pakistan Peace Talks Worth a Damn?," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, September 20, 2017, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/09/20/are-india-pakistan-peace-talks-worth-damn-pub-73145>.

³⁴² See "12 Die as Gunmen Storm Indian Parliament," *Dawn News*, December 14, 2001, <https://www.dawn.com/news/404644/12-die-as-gunmen-storm-indian-parliament>.

³⁴³ Rajesh M. Basrur, "The Lessons of Kargil as Learned by India," In Peter R. Lavoy, ed. *Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 326.

³⁴⁴ Steve Cool, "The Stand-Off: How Jihad Group Helped Provoke the Twenty-First Century's First Nuclear Crisis," *The New Yorker*, February 5, 2006, <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/02/13/the-stand-off>.

terror incidents in Indian Administered Kashmir and India. Indian government accused Pakistani intelligence agencies such as Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for allegedly supporting terrorist groups in perpetrating terrorism in the Indian Administered Kashmir to pressurize India to give up Kashmir.³⁴⁵ India employed coercive diplomacy to malign and pressurize Pakistan. India successfully engaged international community including the US to present Indian case of being victim of terrorism. Conversely, Pakistan condemned the terrorist incidents and repudiated India's allegations to be involved in terrorism in any shape or form.

India launched Operation Parakram to punish Pakistan on December 18, 2001. Indian armed forces initiated one of the largest military mobilization of troops since 1971 war.³⁴⁶ India deployed almost 500,000 troops at the LoC and international border to compel Pakistan to stop supporting terrorism and eliminate terrorist network allegedly based on Pakistani soil.³⁴⁷ Thus, India employed compellence strategy involving coercive diplomacy and threat of use of force to compel Pakistan to meet India's demands. Like the Kargil Crisis, the Twin Peaks Crisis too generated high tensions between India and Pakistan. The two states experienced increase number of crises after the acquisition of nuclear weapons, thereby showing the applicability of stability-instability paradox.

India's compellence strategy involving massive mobilization of forces put Pakistan in a troublesome situation. Nevertheless, Pakistan in a compulsive response counter mobilized its armed forces. Additionally, Pakistan used two other factors to counter India's offensive such as: One, Pakistan strategically communicated to the US that India-Pakistan tensions at the eastern border would divert Pakistan's attention from the western border, which was the focus

³⁴⁵ Krepon and Polly, "US Crisis Management," 16.

³⁴⁶ Ladwig III, "A Cold Start for Hot Waters?," 161.

³⁴⁷ Kapur, "Ten Years of Instability," 80.

of the US led coalition in the wake of war on terror. Pakistan made it clear that it would be bound to shift its troops to counter Indian offensive on the eastern border, ultimately leading to put detrimental impact on the war on terror campaign in Afghanistan. Second, Pakistan generated nuclear signals by conducting several missile tests during the crisis to ensure the nuclear deterrence.³⁴⁸ Also, Pakistan communicated through the statements of its top level officials that Pakistan would use all its options including the nuclear use if India attacked Pakistan.³⁴⁹ Consequently, India failed to launch offensive punitive military operation against Pakistan due to reasons such as, US interest in the region in the wake of war on terror, efficient US diplomatic engagement as a crisis manager, structural and organization impotency to execute on the existing military doctrine and lastly, the logic of stability-instability paradox.

India clearly intended to wage a war against Pakistan to punish it for alleged support to terrorist groups involved in perpetrating terrorism in Indian Administered Kashmir or elsewhere in India. India and Pakistan held sufficient nuclear weapons to wreak unimaginable destruction in case of any eventuality. Contention is that the crisis did not converted into large scale war or use of nuclear war. In line with stability-instability paradox, India and Pakistan experienced high tensions with the acquisition of nuclear weapons with increase in the number of crises, nevertheless, not a single time conflict escalated due to MAD. The Kargil Crisis and the Twin Peaks Crisis indicated the existence of space for proxies and insurgencies, thereby making scale of conflict limited and nature of peace more volatile and precarious. To sum up, Twin Peaks Crisis did not escalated to large scale war or use of nuclear weapons, thereby

³⁴⁸ P. Menon, *The Strategy Trap: India and Pakistan under Nuclear Shadow* (New Delhi: Wisdom Tree, 2018), 112-123.

³⁴⁹ Rahul Roy Chaudhury, "Nuclear Doctrine, Declaratory Policy, and Escalation Control," *Stimson Center* (2004), <https://www.stimson.org/2004/nuclear-doctrinedeclaratory-policy-and-escalation-control/>.

pointing to the reduced scale of violence and increased frequency of crises in the nuclear domain that expresses the efficacy of the stability-instability paradox logic.

India failed to implement its existing military doctrine and started to deliberate upon the introduction of new force employment strategy majorly for the two reasons. One, India intended to overcome the short comings in the existing doctrine observed during the Operation Parakram. Two, India desired to devise a strategy to take punitive measures against Pakistan in a swift manner under the nuclear domain. Nevertheless, India-Pakistan war fighting strategies became more complex because of the Twin Peaks Crisis. To sum up, India employed compellence strategy involving massive mobilization of forces (threat of use of force) to threaten Pakistan to stop its alleged support to militant groups. While, Pakistan employed deterrence strategy involving counter mobilization to keep deterrence intact.

Table 12: Post Nuclear Era-Twin Peaks Crisis

Year	Crisis	India's Strategy		Pakistan's Strategy		Stability- instability Paradox
		Coercion		Coercion		
		Compellence	Deterrence	Compellence	Deterrence	
2001-2002	Twin Peaks Crisis	Compellence	-	-	Deterrence	Instability: Low Intensity of Violence

Source: Developed by Author

Role of the US as a Crisis Manager

The assumption of MAD did play a role in the conflict de-escalation in the Twin Peaks Crisis, nevertheless, it would have not been possible without the active diplomatic engagement of the US. During the Twin Peaks Crisis, both India and Pakistan apparently waited for third-party intervention to deescalate the crisis due to the trend set by the US in the Compound Crisis and the Kargil Crisis. Evidently, the tensions between India and Pakistan during the Twin Peaks

Crisis forced the US who appeared to be seriously involved in taking crisis manager role to avoid war and restore peace in the nuclearized South Asia.³⁵⁰ Significantly, this time the US was eager to play the role of crisis manager due to its strategic interest in the region in the wake of 9/11 and war on terror campaign. Based in fine but critical pivotal deterrence diplomacy,³⁵¹ the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell visited Islamabad and New Delhi to tame down the temperatures. The US administration engaged Pakistani leadership on cross-border terrorism issue. The US emphasized to take effective action against the terrorist outfits based on Pakistan. Meanwhile, the Secretary of State assured Pakistani leadership to engage India on the resolution of the Kashmir dispute for durable peace in the region.³⁵² Dr. Clary in a response to a question on the role of US in the conflict de-escalation in the wake of terrorist incidents stated, “The international community specifically the US pressurized Pakistan to take serious actions against the terrorist outfits based in Pakistan.”³⁵³

The US Secretary Powell visited New Delhi to take India into confidence. The US shared a strong resolve of Pakistan to not allow its territory to be used for cross border terrorism in the future.³⁵⁴ The US timely and efficient diplomatic engagements brought softness in India’s offensive approach. The armed forces of two nuclear states remained engaged face-to-face for 10 months until India finally called-off the offensive military operation in October, 2002.³⁵⁵ Thus, the US efficient crisis management convinced India to exercise restraint, which ultimately led to conflict de-escalation between India and Pakistan.

³⁵⁰ For further detailed analysis on this crisis see, Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, “US Crisis Management in South Asia’s Twin Peaks Crisis,” Report 57, Second Edition 2014 (Washington D.C: Stimson Center, September 2014).

³⁵¹ Timothy W. Crawford, *Pivotal Deterrence, Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace* (London: Cornell University Press, 2003), 12.

³⁵² Iftikhar H. Malik, “The Afghanistan Crisis and the Rediscovery of the Frontline State,” *Asian Survey* 42, no. 1 (2002): 210, <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2002.42.1.204>.

³⁵³ Authors Interview Assistant Professor Dr. Christopher Clary.

³⁵⁴ Jawed Naqvi, “India Soften Tone after Powell’s Visit: Jaswant Want Action on Terrorists’ List,” *Dawn News*, January 19, 2002.

³⁵⁵ Rajesh Basrur, “India’s Pakistan Problem: Operation Parakram Revisited,” *India Review* 18, no. 5 (2019): 503, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14736489.2019.1703362>.

Table 13: Post Nuclear Era-Role of the US in Twin Peaks Crisis

Year	Crisis	Role of US		Outcome of Conflict
		Active	Inactive	
2001-2002	Twin Peaks Crisis	Yes	-	Conflict De-escalated

Source: Developed by Author

India's Offensive Cold Start Doctrine (CSD)

Operation Parakram was primarily aimed to punish Pakistan for its alleged support to terrorist outfits involved in the terrorist incidents in Indian Administered Kashmir and in India that led to eruption of the Twin Peaks Crisis. Indian political and military leadership perceived that the planned military operation would be swiftly conducted, so that there is no space available for Pakistan and international mediatory efforts to save the day for Pakistan. Nevertheless, India failed to implement the plan and the strike corps took three weeks to reach the India-Pakistan international border which allowed Pakistan with enough time to counter mobilize its forces.³⁵⁶

Dr. Clary in an interview stated,³⁵⁷

In the wake of terrorist events in 2001-02, India blamed Pakistan for supporting non state actors in perpetrating violence. India launched Operation Parakram, however it took a while in deployment of forces, losing the element of surprise and also giving enough space to international community to initiate mediatory efforts to deescalate the crisis.

The failure of Operation Parakram generated a debate within Indian policy makers regarding the efficacy of Sundarji Doctrine. Subsequently, India developed a new force employment strategy that could overcome the shortcomings observed during the Operation Parakram. The lessons learnt in the Kargil Crisis and the Twin Peaks Crisis resulted into replacing Sundarji Doctrine with introduction of new offensive force employment strategy

³⁵⁶ Ladwig III, "A Cold Start for Hot Waters?," 161.

³⁵⁷ Author's Interview with Assistant Professor Dr. Christopher Clary.

reckoned as Cold Strat Doctrine. Professor Dr. Rajesh Basrur when asked about the objectives of the CSD stated,³⁵⁸

The Cold Start doctrine was developed in response to the asymmetric strategy adopted by Pakistan to pressurize India to negotiate on Kashmir. In a nuclear environment, India found it difficult to respond militarily to the Pakistani strategy as Indian conventional forces were too slow to mobilize, which was demonstrated in 2001-02. Hence, India opted for Cold Start. Strictly speaking, this is no longer a term used by the Indian Army, which now focuses on Integrated Battle Groups that are designed for rapid and technology-driven action.

India developed offensive force employment strategy, reckoned as CSD in 2004.³⁵⁹ However, India never officially announced the CSD. The new force employment strategy was aimed at bringing huge changes in India's military posture. The major objective of CSD was to counter Pakistan's alleged sub-conventional warfare by waging a limited war against Pakistan as a punitive measure without crossing Pakistan's nuclear redlines. Seeking inspiration from the offensive strategy such as Blitzkrieg,³⁶⁰ India intended to fight a limited conventional war in a sharp and swift manner to inflict huge damage to Pakistan's armed forces, before the great powers intervene for conflict de-escalation. Further, the objective of the

³⁵⁸ Author's Interview with Professor Dr. Rajesh Basrur. Dr. Basrur is Senior Fellow in the South Asia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He is also a research associate with the University of Oxford's Contemporary South Asian Studies Programme (CSASP). He has obtained MA and MPhil in History (Delhi) and MA and PhD in Political Science (Bombay). Prior to joining RSIS in 2006, he was Director, Centre for Global Studies, Mumbai (2000-2006), and taught History and Politics at the University of Mumbai (1978-2000). He has held visiting appointments at the University of Oxford, the University of Birmingham, the University of Hull, Stanford University, Sandia National Laboratories, the Brookings Institution, the Henry L. Stimson Center, Simon Fraser University, and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. His work focuses on South Asian security, global nuclear politics, and international relations theory. He has authored five books, including (with Kate Sullivan De Estrada) *Rising India: Status and Power* (Routledge, 2017), *South Asia's Cold War* (Routledge, 2008) and *Minimum Deterrence and India's Nuclear Security* (Stanford University Press, 2006). He has also edited ten books, including (with Sumitha Narayanan Kutty) *India and Japan: Assessing the Strategic Partnership* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018) and (with Anit Mukherjee and T. V. Paul), *India-China Maritime Competition* (Routledge, 2019). He has published over 100 papers in various journals and edited volumes.

³⁵⁹ Firdaus Ahmed, "The Day after Cold Start," *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies*, Military- Article, no. 2424 (November 23, 2007), http://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=2424.

³⁶⁰ John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), 35-52.

military operation would be narrow enough so that it eliminates any sort of justification for Pakistani authorities to take the conflict towards spiral escalation.³⁶¹ Ms. Haleema Saadia on responding to a question on the possibility of limited war under nuclear overhang stated,³⁶²

Pakistan's nuclear weapons have created a strategic parity with India which did not exist prior to overt nuclearization of 1998. India is constrained by Pakistan's nuclear capability and cannot launch an all-out war with its arch rival. By introducing such aggressive war fighting doctrines, India is trying to find space to fight a limited war without triggering Pakistan's nuclear threshold.

Basically, India seek inspiration from successful lightning campaign in 1971 war as a confidence boosting factor to move away from its defensive posture to a more offensive war fighting strategy.³⁶³ To be clear, the new force employment strategy is visualized as a tri-service offensive strategy involving all parts of the Indian armed forces indicating a shift from traditional defensive posture to offensive. Thus, the new force employment strategy expressed changing India's posture with more focus on taking punitive measures against Pakistan. For a punitive military operation, the offensive power of the holding corps and strike corps were required to be further increased to meet the operational requirements.³⁶⁴ Thus, the new force employment strategy led to the reorganization of its offensive strategic posture to a significant level.³⁶⁵

As per the Sundarji Doctrine, the strike corps comprised of the core elements such as an infantry division to control territory, well-mechanized infantry troops and tanks to launch

³⁶¹ Ladwig III, "A Cold Start for Hot Waters?," 164.

³⁶² Author's Interview with Ms. Haleema Saadia. She is practitioner turned academician. Currently, Ms. Haleema Saadia is Lecturer at the Department of International Relations in National University of Modern Languages, Rawalpindi. She is former Assistant Director Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs Branch at Strategic Planning Division.

³⁶³ Stephen P. Cohen, *The Indian Army Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation*, Revised edition (Delhi: OUP, 2001), 207.

³⁶⁴ Zafar Khan, "Cold Start Doctrine: The Conventional Challenge to South Asian Stability," *Contemporary Security Policy* 33, no. 3, (2012): 579, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2012.727685>.

³⁶⁵ Ladwig III, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars," 164.

operations like counter-penetrations and counter-attacks, respectively. Further, these three strike corps were designed to get a close support and cover from a sizeable artillery and offensive airpower.³⁶⁶ The strike corps were positioned in Central India such as: I Corps in Mathura, II Corps in Ambala and III Corps in Bhopal. Whereas, the holding corps were deployed adjacent to the India-Pakistan border.³⁶⁷ In contrast to the previous doctrine, theoretically speaking, the new force employment strategy is consisted of eight division-sized Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs). The eight IBGs were planned to be positioned at near LoC and international border. Evidently, the new force employment strategy marked a clear shift from defensive to offensive posture. Fundamentally, the CSD was devised to overcome operational drawbacks such as delayed mobilization revealed during Operation Parakram in the Twin Peaks Crisis that ended-up in a stalemate in 2002. Thus, the conversion of large sized strike corps into eight smart IBGs, was majorly aimed at securing the objective of swift troop's mobilization.

CSD, a clear departure from defensive to offensive approach. It is summarized as: One, Indian armed forces with its all elements would continuously participate in military operations till securing the military objectives. Two, the forwardly deployed division sized formations would be maneuvered and also mobilized swiftly in comparison to the larger units to secure the operational objectives. Three, Indian armed forces would wreak a disastrous blow to adversary (Pakistan) by using "bite and hold territory tactics" like dissecting Pakistan into two halves and capture 50-80 kilometers territory to be used in the negotiations for the post-conflict concessions. Four, Indian armed forces would need the requisite capabilities to quickly build-up land and airpower to wreak a shocking punishing knock to rival Army. Five, prompt and

³⁶⁶ Ragavan, "Limited War," 8; and Sood and Sawhney, *Operation Parakram*, 81.

³⁶⁷ Ladwig III, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars?," 160.

swift military operations would be carried out to terminate counterforce targets. Six, limited lightning conventional war designed with an aim to keep India's objectives hidden. Nevertheless, the military operation would not in any means threaten the annihilation of Pakistan as a state. Thus, this would avert use of nuclear weapon by Pakistan as a weapon of last resort. Lastly, Indian Army would launch offensive preemptive military operations that is short of the risk of nuclear war. To sum up, the new force employment strategy is majorly aimed at waging a limited conventional war without crossing the nuclear red lines.³⁶⁸

Ladwig made a very interesting comparison between the Sundarji Doctrine and CSD. The author categorized the new force employment strategy advantageous for numerous reasons: One, the closeness of IBG's and pivot corps to international border that assist in creating element of surprise in launching war. Two, the IBG's are designed to perform a range of military operations in line with the objectives of CSD such as to capture Pakistan's territory without allowing any room to be used as a reason to employ nuclear weapons. Three, eight IBG's simultaneous penetration in different sectors across international border will make it difficult for Pakistan to respond Indian armed forces. Four, Pakistani intelligence would face it difficult to get the information about the operational preparedness of eight IBG's which would assist India to keep the element of surprise during the attack. Further, the military objectives to wage a limited conventional war would be less foreseeable which would puzzle Pakistani leadership to devise strategy to counter India, leaving the latter with a pivotal edge in the war. Lastly, Pakistan's use of nuclear weapon to target IBG would assist India to avoid huge material losses, as each IBG is small-sized in comparison to strike corps.³⁶⁹

³⁶⁸ Jaspal, *India's 'Surgical Strike' Stratagem*, 57-58.

³⁶⁹ Ladwig III, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars?," 166-167.

To sum up, the most significant element of new force employment strategy is swift troop's mobilization to fight a limited war against Pakistan. The limited war is planned to be swift enough leaving no space for the international actors such as the US or China to intervene, as the Indian troops would have crossed the international border reaching the important Pakistani city of Lahore before the start of diplomatic efforts by international community.³⁷⁰ Traditionally, the US mediated between the India and Pakistan in conflict de-escalation in the post-nuclear era. In technical terms, the CSD has put severe limitations on the mediatory space in the future conflicts. Significantly, since the eruption of the Kargil Crisis and more particularly the Twin Peaks Crisis, India was finding it hard to counter terrorism. Thus, new force employment strategy was devised to deter terrorist incidents where the major focus was on launching a swift limited military operation across the international border to target alleged terrorist outfits based on Pakistani territory. To be clear, this has been the Indian armed forces strategy for last four decades, however, the only new tactic was the swiftness of response to achieve the surprise element against the adversary to overcome the failures observed during the Operation Parakram. Nevertheless, the implementation of new force employment strategy was a real challenge for India. Theoretically speaking, India's change in war fighting strategy to fight a limited war under a nuclear overhang without crossing the nuclear redlines in itself proves the efficacy of stability-instability paradox logic.

India's Response to Terrorism: Implementation of CSD?

Apart from the anticipated theoretical objectives of new force employment strategy, the real challenge for India was its execution in the theatre. The recurring terrorist incidents in Indian

³⁷⁰ John H. Gill, "India and Pakistan: A Shift in the Military Calculus?," in *Strategic Asia, 2005–06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty*, ed., Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Seattle, Wash.: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005), 253; and John E. Peters et al., *War and Escalation in South Asia* (RAND Corporation, 2006), 30.

Administered Kashmir and elsewhere in India was a real test of political-will to execute CSD. Significantly, India variedly responded to the incidents of terrorism. For instance, Mumbai Train Attack, a series of 7 bombs blasted, killing 200 and leaving hundreds of injured in 2006.³⁷¹ The terror attacks occurred in a few hours' time in the immediate aftermath of grenade attacks, leaving 7 dead and 35 injured in the Srinagar.³⁷² The Home Secretary of India, V. K. Duggal declared in a statement that no connection between the two terrorist events was found. Around 350 suspects were arrested for the investigation.³⁷³ Indian authorities claimed that LeT accepted the responsibility for the terrorist act via an email to a media house on July 14, 2006. As per the email, the motive of the terrorist outfit seems to be a reaction to the situation in Indian Administered Kashmir and Gujarat where Muslims were victimized by the state forces. Initially, India suspected LeT, few other religious extremist organizations operating within India and Pakistan's intelligence agency for the bombing attack.³⁷⁴ Importantly, LeT denied any responsibility for the terrorist act,³⁷⁵ leading to controversy about the real perpetrator of the terrorist incident. Nevertheless, the Mumbai bombing attacks repeated the same cycle of action-reaction on part of India, Pakistan and the US, ultimately ending in conflict de-escalation.

For instance, India expressed anguish on the violent event, and blamed Pakistan for its support to terrorism. However, India find it short of options to deal with terrorism. Pakistan too in grave situation condemned the terrorist incident, expressed condolences and further;

³⁷¹ See "Mumbai Train Blasts: Death for Five for 2006 Bombings," *BBC News*, September 30, 2015, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-34398810>.

³⁷² See "7 Tourists Killed in Kashmir," *Dawn News*, July 12, 2006, <https://www.dawn.com/news/201081/7-tourists-killed-in-kashmirm>.

³⁷³ See "350 Rounded Up in Maharashtra," *The Tribune*. India, July 17, 2006.

³⁷⁴ See *BBC* "Mumbai Train Blasts,".

³⁷⁵ Jayshree Bajoria, "Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure) (aka Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Lashkar e-Toiba; Lashkar-i-Taiba)," *Council on Foreign Relations*, Last Updated on January 14, 2010, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/lashkar-e-taiba-army-pure-aka-lashkar-e-tayyiba-lashkar-e-toiba-lashkar-i-taiba>; and See "Police Raids Seek Mumbai Bombers," *BBC NEWS*, July 12, 2006.

desired not to stop the composite dialogue process. Finally, the US expressed its solidarity with Indian government and people in their war against terrorism. The episodes of violence indicated the vulnerability of peace process between the two nuclear armed states as small peace gestures are succeeded by the catastrophic terrorist incidents on frequent basis.³⁷⁶ India blamed Pakistan based non-state actors for it, however, there was no military response from India what so ever.³⁷⁷ Thus, India did not opt to implement its newly devised war fighting strategy to punish Pakistan. Instead, it employed diplomatic compellence to pressurize Pakistan to take action against the terrorist outfits based in Pakistan.

In 2007, Samjhauta Express Bombings incident occurred, killing 70 people and injuring dozens. Importantly, most of the fatalities were of Pakistani nationals, however, it also included Indian nationals and three police officers.³⁷⁸ Both India and Pakistan strongly condemned the brutal violent attack. The officials of both countries pointed towards the non-state actors who desired to sabotage the improving India-Pakistan relations. The terror attack happened one day prior to the arrival of Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri to India to recommence dialogue.³⁷⁹ Initially, Indian government and main stream media pointed towards Pakistan for involvement in the terror incident. However, Indian intelligence agency, National Investigation Agency (NIA) accused Swami Aseemanand; a Hindu cleric who had association with Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), including eight others to be involved in the terrorist attack.³⁸⁰ Clearly, the investigation report pointed towards Hindu extremist group for its

³⁷⁶ Michael Krepon, "The Meaning of the Mumbai Blasts," *Stimson Centre*, August 7, 2006, <https://www.stimson.org/2006/meaning-mumbai-blasts/>.

³⁷⁷ Sarang Shidore, "India's Strategic Culture and Deterrence Stability on the Subcontinent," in *Instability and Nuclear Rivals in South Asia*, ed., Michael Krepon, Joshua T. White, Julia Thompson and Shane Mason, (Washington D.C: Stimson, 2015), 134.

³⁷⁸ See "Samjhota Express Bombing: India's Special Anti-Terror Court Acquits 4 Accused," DAWN, March 20, 2019, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1470809>.

³⁷⁹ Muneeza Naqvi, "66 Die in India-Pakistan Train Attack," *The Washington Post*, February 19, 2007, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/18/AR2007021801136.html>.

alleged involvement in the terrorist act.³⁸¹ The Minister of Railways, Lalu Prasad Yadav condemned the terror incident. He further stated that it is “an attempt to derail the improving relationship between India and Pakistan.”³⁸² Indian Home Minister, Shiv Raj stated that “whoever is behind the incident is against peace and wants to spoil our growing relationship with other countries.” The Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh, condemned the terror attack and expressed “anguish and grief” on the loss of precious human lives. Prime Minister Singh promised to bring culprits to the justice.³⁸³ Interestingly, in contrast to past times, Indian authorities’ statements seem less targeted towards Pakistan, might be due to the NIA investigation report which pointed to the Hindu extremists for the alleged involvement in the terrorism.

The Foreign Minister, Kasuri, declared that the terrorist act is required to be investigated by the relevant Indian authorities. He expressed that terrorism would not stop him to visit India. He further stated that “I am going to India and there is no change in my plan. No change at all.” He highlighted, “The timing is very, very indicative of the mind of those who did it. I do not think the governments of India and Pakistan would or definitely should not allow this incident or perpetrators of the incident to achieve their objective. We should hasten the peace process.” President Musharraf, in the wake of terrorist attack stated, “We will not allow elements, which want to sabotage the ongoing peace process, to succeed in their nefarious designs.” He further added that, “such wanton acts of terrorism will only serve to further strengthen our resolve to attain the mutually desired objective of sustainable peace between the

³⁸⁰ See “Samjhauta Express Blast Verdict Held Up Over Pakistani National’s Last-Minute Plea,” *Hindustan Times*, March 11, 2019, <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/samjhauta-express-blast-verdict-held-up-over-pakistani-national-s-last-minute-plea/story-3JU1XExtGftHcwNMj0Bk9I.html>.

³⁸¹ See “Samjhauta Express Blast: Separating Fact from Fiction,” *The Express Tribune*, February 18, 2022, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2344153/samjhauta-express-blast-separating-fact-from-fiction>.

³⁸² Somini Sengupta, “Train Bombing Tests India-Pakistan Ties,” *New York Times*, February 19, 2007, <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/19/world/asia/19cnd-india.html>.

³⁸³ See “Dozens Dead in India Train Blast,” *BBC NEWS*, February 19, 2007.

two countries.”³⁸⁴ President Musharraf called for comprehensive investigation of the terrorist attack.³⁸⁵ Importantly, with a short stoppage in dialogue process, the two countries not only resumed talks but also signed an agreement on building India-Pakistan Joint Antiterrorism Mechanism.³⁸⁶ This time, the leadership of India and Pakistan responded rationalistically and did not indulge in the traditional blame-game which emerged as an unparalleled pattern in the conflict dynamics between India and Pakistan. Thus, the two countries understood that terrorism is a joint problem and it cannot be countered without collaboration.

Mumbai Attacks – 2008

A series of violent attacks rocked Metropolitan city of Mumbai on November 26, 2008. The terrorist attack cost 172 lives including 6 US citizens with injuring more than 300 people. Moreover, 9 out of 10 attackers were killed in the counter terror operation. India at once claimed that the terrorists were trained in Pakistan and were linked to a Pakistani banned non state actor, LeT.³⁸⁷ The Indian Foreign Minister, Pranab Mukherjee stated that terrorists had connection to Pakistan, Afterwards, State Deputy Home Minister, R.R. Patel Maharashtra declared that the arrested terrorist was a Pakistani national.³⁸⁸ The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Yousaf Raza Gilani condemned the terrorist attacks and declared, “I condemn these attacks strongly. Our grieves are with the families and friends of those killed and injured. Pakistan and India will continue their joint struggles to counter the actions of terrorists.”³⁸⁹ The President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari also condemned the terrorist incidents and pointed out non-state

³⁸⁴ See “Attack Underlines Need to Fast-Track Peace, Says Pak,” *Business Standard*, June 14, 2013, https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/attack-underlines-need-to-fast-track-peace-says-pak-107022001117_1.html.

³⁸⁵ See BBC NEWS, “Train Blast,”.

³⁸⁶ Khan, “Conflict Resolution,” 80-81.

³⁸⁷ Abbasi and Khan, *Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia*, 126.

³⁸⁸ Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, *The Unfinished Crisis: US Crisis Management after the 2008 Mumbai Attacks* (Washington: Stimson Centre, February 2012), 20.

³⁸⁹ See “The Death Toll Climbs Past 150 as City Reels from Terror Attack,” *The Guardian*, November 29, 2008, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/nov/29/mumbai-terror-attacks-terrorism2>.

actors for the deadly attacks. President Zardari further stated that the terrorists are threat to Pakistan and their agendas are challenging the state of Pakistan, too. Thus, terrorism remained a menace to the regional peace and stability in nuclearized environment.

The Indian government initiated coercive diplomacy against Pakistan emphasizing the world community to pressurize the latter for taking concrete action against terrorist outfits based on Pakistani soil. India blamed Pakistan for Mumbai Attacks and successfully slander Pakistan in the international community. Additionally, India also threatened to launch military action to target terrorist's camps across the LoC or international border. Indian officials aggressive statements and subsequent, military mobilization rang alarm bells not only Islamabad but also Washington. Meanwhile, India shared with Pakistan and international media a database claiming it as an evidence of Pakistan's involvement in Mumbai terror incidents.³⁹⁰ India gathered vital support from the international community and remained successful in portraying it to be victim of cross-border terrorism.

Significantly, India failed to implement CSD which was primarily developed to take punitive measures against Pakistan, in the wake of any terror incidents. India did exploit diplomatic and military advantage as a compellence tool to force Pakistan to take desired actions. Pakistan, on the other hand, appears to have used the deterrence by denial model by mobilizing its forces particularly PAF to deny the incentive for India to launch surgical strikes across the international border. There are three major reasons for the culmination of the crisis in 2008. First, the mediating role of the US majorly assisted in de-escalation of tensions between the nuclear rivals. Secondly, the MAD played its part to convince India not to go offensive against nuclear armed Pakistan. Thirdly, India's inability to launch any punitive

³⁹⁰ Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "Paradox of Deterrence: India Pakistan Strategic Relations," *Strategic Studies* 29, no 4 (2009): 23-36.

action against Pakistan due to its impotent military capabilities. Lacking capacity to launch an efficient military operation to get desired objectives made India to take steps towards conflict de-escalation.

Nevertheless, India started to look into the policy options of carrying out offensive tactics such as surgical strike in future, in case of any Pakistan based terrorist attack.³⁹¹ Pakistan's COAS, General Ashfaq Kayani, opined that full operationalization of CSD would take few years of time.³⁹² It apparently seems that the new force employment strategy was not more than a concept. Indian armed forces lacked the requisite military capabilities and also failed to put Pakistan in a complete diplomatic isolation, thereby resulting in failure to launch punitive military operation against Pakistan.³⁹³ While few opine that India did not have the exact intelligence for likely response of Pakistan's security establishment. And further, despite India's integration into international community in the post 9/11 security scenario, Pakistan's crucial role in Afghanistan forced India not to implement CSD.³⁹⁴ Broadly speaking, the CSD seems to be in developing stage as Indian armed forces lacked structural and organizational compatibility to wage a limited war against Pakistan in line with its new force employment strategy.

To sum up, India employed compellence involving both diplomatic pressure and threat of use of force while Pakistan employed deterrence strategy. Thus, the intensity of violence remained low during the Mumbai Crisis. Further, the Mumbai Crisis proved the relevance of

³⁹¹ Bruce Reidel, "The Mumbai Massacre and Its Implication for America and South Asia," *Journal of International Affairs* 63, no. 1 (2009): 111, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24384175>.

³⁹² Meenakshi Sood, "Pakistan's (Non-Nuclear) Plan to Counter 'Cold Start'," *The Diplomat*, March 25, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/pakistans-non-nuclear-plan-to-counter-cold-start/>.

³⁹³ Muhammad Ali Baig and Hamid Iqbal, "A Comparative Study of Blitzkrieg and Cold Start Doctrine: Lessons and Countermeasures for Pakistan," *Islamabad Policy Research Institute XVIII*, No. 1 (2018): 21.

³⁹⁴ Major Muhammad Zeeshan Ali, *Strategic Delusions – The Cold Start Doctrine: Proactive Strategy* (School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2016), 20.

stability-instability paradox where the nuclear armed rivals continued to experience high tensions due to increase number of crises without escalating to large-scale war or use of nuclear weapons, thereby pointing to the shrinking scale of violence.

Table 14: Post Nuclear Era-Mumbai Crisis

Year	Crisis	India's Strategy		Pakistan's Strategy		Stability-Instability Paradox
		Compellence	Deterrence	Compellence	Deterrence	
2008	Mumbai Crisis	Compellence	-	-	Deterrence	Instability: Low Intensity of Violence

Source: Developed by Author

Role of the US as a Crisis Manager

Immediately after the Mumbai attack, the US administration dispatched their diplomats to South Asia for the crisis de-escalation. By that time, when the US military operation in Afghanistan was in a critical phase in the war on terror campaign. Pakistan was acting as a frontline state in the war. Any tensions between India and Pakistan could have severe impact upon the conduct and success of the US strategic objectives in Afghanistan, ultimately hampering upon the US interests. The US top leadership visited both India and Pakistan in parallel. The US pressurized Pakistan to launch operations against the terrorist groups based on its soil. This might be the indication of India's successful diplomatic compellence to malign Pakistan for its alleged involvement in terrorism.

Consequently, based on the US pressure, Pakistan launched military operations against the terrorist outfits such as LeT and JuD across the country. The US praised Pakistan's counter terrorism operations, particularly the detaining of members of terrorist outfits, blamed by India. Washington's efficient and active diplomacy assisted both New Delhi and Islamabad to act rationally and take measures to avoid conflict escalation. Thus, the US active role as a mediator

in the Mumbai Crisis defused the tensions between the two rival states. And Pakistan focused back on its western border to counter terrorism operations. The de-escalation assisted the US to pursue its strategic goals with Pakistan's support in Afghanistan.³⁹⁵ Nevertheless, like the Twin Peaks Crisis, India and Pakistan made symbolic promises to cooperate in fighting terrorism and subsequent, withdrawal of forces took place.

Table 15: Post Nuclear Era-Role of the US in Mumbai Crisis

Year	Crisis	Role of US		Outcome of Conflict
		Active	Inactive	
2008	Mumbai Crisis	Active	-	Conflict De-escalated

Source: Developed by Author

Pakistan's Offensive Response to India's CSD

To be clear, Pakistan strategic culture has been India-centric since its inception as a state.

India's offensive CSD increased fear in Islamabad. Lieutenant General Lodhi, while sharing Pakistan's response to CSD stated,³⁹⁶

Pakistan created threshold ambiguity. Pakistan did not clearly mention when and how First Use would be employed or how it would be responding conventionally against India however one thing was for certain that it would use all strength of its forces whenever required to counter Indian offensive operations based in CSD. Pakistan developed Integrated Brigade Groups to conduct counter attack and counter offensive in a conventional war. Further, Pakistan already had First Use policy to deter India from implementing its ambitious CSD. Thus, Pakistan efficient response ruined the overall objectives of CSD and this is why it continued to look for waging a limited war under a nuclear umbrella.

Pakistan offensively responded to India's new force employment strategy, doctrinally and practically to counter the security threat. For instance, Pakistan in a compulsive response

³⁹⁵ Abbasi and Khan, *Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia*, 126-127.

³⁹⁶ Author's interview with Lt. Gen. Naeem Khalid Lodhi (Retd.).

countered the Indian threat by steps such as introduction of FSD, development of TNW, increasing nuclear stockpiles, and conducting military exercises.

Full Spectrum Deterrence

Pakistan introduced FSD to counter the emerging threats in the wake of India's new force employment strategy, thereby to ensure strategic stability in the region. Pakistan's National Command Authority (NCA) on September 5, 2013, emphasized that it adheres to Credible Minimum Deterrence policy. It would not involve in arms-racing against any state. Yet, Pakistan would be fully cognizant to observe the evolving security patterns in the region. It would pursue FSD to counter all threats to its security.³⁹⁷ The FSD is comprised of smart fighting strategy covering entire spectrum of conflict from tactical to strategic levels. Pakistan's NCA did include the options of nuclear use in the war plans of FSD. One of the senior Pakistani retired military official stated that,³⁹⁸

Pakistan has always maintained its defensive capability to absorb and then beat back any offensive overture from the Indian side. It has been monitoring the development of various doctrines/ strategies by its adversary with a keen focus and has developed its counter strategies through consistent operational thought processes. It is the superior operational thought of the Pakistan military that has forced India to come up with new doctrines and strategies every now and then.

The primary objective of FSD was to avert India's offensive punitive actions. Pakistan's new nuclear policy stresses more on obtaining the objectives such as: One, avert all sort of foreign threats posed to the national borders of the state; Two, advancement of conventional and strategic forces is the foremost requirement for achieving the credible nuclear deterrence;

³⁹⁷ See "Inter Services Public Relations Pakistan Press Release," No. PR-133/2013-ISPR, September 5, 2013, <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=2361>.

³⁹⁸ Author's Interview with Brig. (Retd.) Javed Hassan Hashmi SI (M) on June 05, 2022. He is a one-star rank retired army officer. He is a graduate of Command and Staff College. He has served on various Command and Staff appointments in army. He also holds Master degree in Strategic Studies, International Relations and M. Phil. In International Relations. Currently, he is pursuing his PhD in International Relations.

Three, averting India from carrying out (pre-emptive) strikes against the state's strategic forces via retaliation; and lastly, maintaining strategic parity within South Asian belt.

General (Retd.) Khalid Kidwai, former Director of Strategic Planning Division, mentioned three core fundamentals of the FSD such as: ³⁹⁹ One, Pakistan is pursuing a “full spectrum of nuclear weapons in all three categories; tactical, operational, and strategic, with full range coverage of the enormous Indian land mass and its outlying territories” that take in to account the targets such as strategically significant islands of Nicobar and Andaman Islands. Two, Pakistan focuses to develop the nuclear stockpile sufficient enough quantitatively and qualitatively to avert adversary's massive retaliation policy. Lastly, Pakistan intends to choose any target across the spectrum of conflict. ⁴⁰⁰ Thus, Pakistan developed offensive war fighting strategy to counter India's possible aggression based on its CSD.

Development of Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Since the acquisition of nuclear weapons, Pakistan gradually increased its nuclear warheads. Also, following the footsteps of India which achieved nuclear triad in 2003, Pakistan maximized efforts to complete its own nuclear triad since then. After works of years, Pakistan finally conducted successful test of submarine-based cruise missile and announced completion of its nuclear triad on January 9, 2017. ⁴⁰¹ Technically speaking, Pakistan countered the threat emanating from CSD by developing TNWs. The intention was to acquire precise striking ability against India, in case of any eventuality from Indian side. ⁴⁰² Dr. Basrur while

³⁹⁹ See The Newspaper's Staff Reporter, “Rare Light Shone on Full Spectrum Deterrence Policy,” *Dawn* (December 7, 2017), <https://www.dawn.com/news/1375079>.

⁴⁰⁰ Sannia Abdullah, “Pakistan's Full-Spectrum Deterrence: Trends and Trajectories,” *South Asian Voices*, December 13, 2018, <https://southasianvoices.org/pakistan-full-spectrum-deterrence-trends-trajectories/>.

⁴⁰¹ Hafeez Ullah Khan and Ijaz Khalid, “Indian Cold Start Doctrine: Pakistan's Policy Response,” *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan* 55, no. 1 (2018): 336.

⁴⁰² Abdullah, “Pakistan's Full-Spectrum Deterrence,”.

commenting on the impact of CSD opined, “In my view, the main impact of Cold Start on Pakistan has been to cause it to develop a closer conventional-nuclear linkage, particularly with respect to nuclear weapons.”⁴⁰³

Pakistan successfully tested a short-range ballistic missile named Nasr Missile System, with a particular objective to deter India’s offensive force employment strategy.⁴⁰⁴ Pakistan as a conventionally weaker nuclear state, majorly relies on nuclear weapons to overcome its conventional vulnerabilities. For example, the US and European Union (EU) under the security architecture of NATO deployed 200 TNW’s in Europe for deterrence purpose, whilst Russia, a conventionally inferior power deployed 2000 TNW’s to maintain its security.⁴⁰⁵ Thus, this very strategy deterred the rivals from going into war during the Cold War era. In the same context, conventionally weaker Pakistan started to replace older fleet of missiles with technologically advanced delivery system and developed short range missiles that could be put into use for tactical purposes to deter India from launching an offensive limited war.

Pakistan developed short-range missiles such as Hatf-8 Ra’ad and Hatf-9 Nasr, with range of 350km and 60km respectively.⁴⁰⁶ Other than TNWs, Pakistan developed some other nuclear technologies that would serve purpose to ensure security vis-à-vis India in the wake of CSD. For instance, Pakistan’s developed and deployed missile system such as, Abdali-I supersonic missile with a range of 150-190km and Abdali-IIIA ballistic missile with a range of

⁴⁰³ Author’s Interview with Professor Dr. Rajesh Basrur.

⁴⁰⁴ Ashfaq Ahmed, Muhammad Jawad Hashmi, and Saima Kausar, “Pakistan Nuclear Doctrine from Minimum Deterrence to Full Spectrum Credible Minimum Deterrence (FSCMD),” *Pakistan Social Sciences Review* 2 (2019): 94.

⁴⁰⁵ Zafar Khan, “The Arrival of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in South Asia: Deterrent Stability or Instability?,” *Comparative Strategy* 32, no. 5 (2013): 4, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2013.840205>.

⁴⁰⁶ Peter Crail, “Pakistan Test Short Range Missile,” *Arms Control Today*, May 2011, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011-05/pakistan-tests-short-range-missile>.

180-200 Km, Babur a land attack cruise missile with a range of 700 km.⁴⁰⁷ Whereas, Shaheen-III ballistic missile with a range of 2750km and Ababeel Multiple independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV) with a range of 2200 km, are conceived to be a part of the strategic level of conflict spectrum.⁴⁰⁸ Shaheen-III renders full coverage of Indian Territory, including the strategically important islands such as Andaman and Nicobar.⁴⁰⁹ For Pakistan, the significance of TNWs is based on three reasons such as: One, these systems have the capacity to carry nuclear arsenals; Two, it is considered as a perfect answer to India's offensive strategy; and lastly, Pakistan believed that the short-range weapons are suitable for deterring and keeping the CSD, cold.

Pakistan strategic importance to TNWs indicates its possible use in the war against India.⁴¹⁰ Jaspal maintains that, "it would be used to deter to inflict punishment on mechanized forces such as an armored brigades and divisions envisioned in India's CSD."⁴¹¹ Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) stated that the development of TNW is to "addresses the need to deter the evolving threats."⁴¹² In line with the same spirit, the former Director General SPD, General Kidwai stated that the (missile) test was very important milestone in consolidating Pakistan's strategic deterrence capability at all levels of the threat spectrum... the NASR Weapon System now provides Pakistan with a short-range missile capability in addition to the already available medium and long-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles in its inventory.⁴¹³ While Rodney

⁴⁰⁷ See Inter Services Public Relations Press Release No. PR94/2011-ISPR (April 19, 2011), <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=1721>.

⁴⁰⁸ See Inter Services Public Relations Press Release No. PR17/2013-ISPR, February 11, 2013, <https://ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=2239>.

⁴⁰⁹ Sannia Abdullah, "Pakistan's Evolving Doctrine and Emerging Force Posture: Conceptual Nuances and Implied Ramifications," *Pakistan Horizon* 71, no. 1/2 (2018): 79-93.

⁴¹⁰ Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Stability in South Asia," *Weekly Pulse*, September 23, 2011.

⁴¹¹ Jaspal, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons,"

⁴¹² See Inter Services Public Relations Press Release No. PR94/2011-ISPR, April 19, 2011, <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=1721>.

⁴¹³ Abdullah, "Cold Start," 23.

Jones opined that in case of any eventuality from India side and further lack of de-escalatory efforts from international community, Pakistan will not be passive in defense but will rather react with escalatory, punitive maneuvers of its own in order to avoid loss of political and territorial sovereignty and military defeat.⁴¹⁴ Thus, Pakistan's development of TNW in line with its offensive nuclear doctrine substantially countered India's offensive doctrinal changes, nevertheless, generated severe risks to strategic stability in the region.

To sum up, in broader terms, Pakistan pursues FU to counter India's conventional military might.⁴¹⁵ India's offensive limited war option based in CSD against Pakistan seems to challenge the credibility of Pakistan's offensive nuclear doctrine. That is why Pakistan introduced TNW in the nuclear calculus. The development of the short-range missile systems played an important role of stabilizer particularly in context of Pakistan policy to ensure nuclear deterrence. To be clear, Pakistan intends to use TNW in case of any offensive endeavor from India, which is considered risk for the former territorial sovereignty.

Military Exercises

Pakistan remained a front-line state in fighting war on terror. It was actively engaged on the western border in counter terrorism operations. However, the introduction of CSD, generated additional security threats from eastern border. Pakistan perceives that India would take punitive measures, if any terrorist incident such as Mumbai Attacks happen in Indian Administered Kashmir or elsewhere in India. In order to counter the threat, Pakistan introduced offensive doctrinal changes and developed new technologies amidst the changing strategic

⁴¹⁴ Rodney W. Jones, "Nuclear Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia: Structural Factors," in *Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia*, ed. Michael Krepon, Rodney W. Jones, and Ziad Haider (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004).

⁴¹⁵ Feroz Hassan Khan, "Minimum Deterrence: Pakistan's Dilemma," *RUSI Journal* 156, no. 5 (October/November, 2011): 46, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2011.626274>.

environment in South Asia. In addition to these steps, Pakistan's armed forces organized military exercises to ensure and enhance operational preparedness to counter any eventuality from the Indian side. The military exercises are apparent indication of power capability and assists the states in preserving deterrence against the adversary.

Pakistan organized Azm-e-Nau III, also reckoned as New Resolve, conducted in the April, 2010. It is strategically important because of the reason that Azm-e-Nau III was first of its nature since Zarb-e-Momin, also reckoned The Sword of Faithful, which was conducted in 1989.⁴¹⁶ Azm-e-Nau III lasted for more than one month that started from April 10 and concluded on May 20, 2010. It involved tri-services with more than 50,000 troops together with involvement of PAF fighter jets to create synchronization among the Pakistan armed forces. The military exercise covered large geographical areas from Punjab to all across Sindh.⁴¹⁷ The main objectives of Azm-e-Nau revolved around three aspects such as: One, Pakistan's armed forces capability to repeal India's offensive posture in the wake of CSD. Two, the military leader's decision making during the counter-attack to resist deep hammer sledges as mentioned in CSD. Three, Pakistan's operational readiness, professionalism, well-structured and well-equipped organizational structure that has the all the capacity to fight two-front wars.⁴¹⁸ Thus, the military exercises uplifted Pakistan's confidence to counter any threat from within or across the borders, either eastern or western.

Pakistan's military endeavors indicated its threat perception in the wake of India's CSD. Pakistan armed forces gave unprecedented importance to war preparedness and operational readiness. For instance, Pakistan's COAS, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, declared the year of

⁴¹⁶ See "Army, PAF Start Azm-e-Nau War Games," *Defence PK*, July 14, 2009.

⁴¹⁷ Jaspal, *India's Surgical Strike*, 173.

⁴¹⁸ Subhash Kapila, "Pakistan's Army Politico-Military Signals to India through Azm-e-Nau," *South Asian Analysis*, April 21, 2010.

2009-2010 as, “the year of training.” The COAS further announced that “we are focused to the defense of Pakistan and fully capable to defend Pakistan today.”⁴¹⁹ He further highlighted that India’s offensive CSD has the potential to amplify the probability of “sudden spiral escalation” between India and Pakistan.⁴²⁰ Correspondingly, Pakistan armed forces organized joint military exercises to increase integration, operational preparedness and professionalism to counter the Indian threats across the conflict spectrum.

PAF organized a major exercise, code named High Mark 2010, to ascertain and further, enhance its war fighting capabilities. PAF employed Information Technology (IT) to check real-time inputs and outputs covering all levels of military operations. Pakistan deployed JF-17 Thunder, Air-to-Air Refueller, the Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AEW&CS), advanced Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAVs) and fire power demonstration to meet the requisite requirements to implement offensive and defensive strategies in a conflict situation.⁴²¹ Moreover, PAF used motorways to conduct landing-takeoff operations to counter the security contingencies, if and when the new force employment strategy is implemented against Pakistan.⁴²² The major objectives of the military exercises were to polish the armed forces capabilities to counter Indian offensive designs. Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee (CJCSC), General Tariq Majid stated,⁴²³

We have to be mindful of the blatant pursuit of military preponderance in our neighborhood. Growing power imbalance due to the continuing buildup of massive military machine, including both hi-tech conventional and nuclear forces, adoption of dangerous Cold Start Doctrine and proactive strategy, more assertive posturing especially after very exceptional civil nuclear deal and notions of the two-front wars

⁴¹⁹ Iftikhar A. Khan, “Army Plans Largest Exercise since 98 Zarb-i-Momin,” *Dawn*, April 6, 2010, <https://www.dawn.com/news/529108/army-plans-largest-exercise-since-ae98-zarb-i-momin>.

⁴²⁰ Cyril Almeida, “Kiyani Spells Out Threat Posed by India,” *World Press*, February 4, 2010.

⁴²¹ S. M. Hali, “PAFs Exercise High Mark 2010,” *The Nation*, March 17, 2010.

⁴²² Abdullah, “Cold Start,”; and Lubna Umar, “Azm-e-Nau and Renewed Security Trends,” *Pakistan Observer*, April 9, 2010.

⁴²³ See Inter Services Public Relations Press Release No. PR-235/2010-ISPR, June 17, 2010, <https://ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=1333>.

are all destabilizing trends, carrying implications for Pakistan's security. Therefore, retention of essential nuclear capability to maintain credible minimum deterrence against any possible aggression is our compulsion and not a matter of choice.

To sum up, Pakistan armed forces through military exercises intended to gather the technological accomplishment, innovations in intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and communication, to meet the requirements of revolutionized warfare. These exercises were designed to launch counter-attacks against India.⁴²⁴ The broader aim was to prepare to give an appropriate response to India's offensive military operation be that tactical, operational or strategic levels. Ostensibly, it seems that Pakistan's responses such as offensive FSD, development of TNW, and armed forces operational preparedness put cold water on India's offensive CSD. Nevertheless, the doctrinal changes and development of new technologies severe risks to regional strategic stability. Thus, India and Pakistan put deliberate delusion to instability via offensive doctrines, aimed to fight and win wars under the nuclear domain.

Conclusion

It seems that South Asia has hit on the road of stability-instability paradox since the acquisition of nuclear weapons. For instance, on the one hand, India and Pakistan have experienced high tensions due to increase number of crises while on the other hand, no single event escalated to large-scale war. Apparently, it seems that sub-conventional warfare has coincided with the nuclear weapons. Evidently, terrorism remained the root cause of all crises, for instance, the Kargil Crisis, the Twin Peaks Crisis, and the Mumbai Attacks. The two rival states blame each other for fighting proxies and sub-conventional warfare. Significantly, the Kargil War and the Twin Peaks Crisis not only transformed the character of conflict but also acted as an impetus to undergo doctrinal changes to fight under the nuclear overhang. India announced CSD with

⁴²⁴ Subhash Kapila, *India's New Cold Start War Doctrine* (note-4); and Gurmeet Kanwal, *Indian Army Vision 2010* (New Delhi: Harper Collins), 2008.

the major objective to waging a limited war to take punitive action against Pakistan for its alleged involvement in terrorism without crossing the latter's nuclear redlines. Nevertheless, India did not implement CSD in response to recurring violent incidents such as the Mumbai Attacks. Theoretically speaking, India's intentions to fight under a nuclear overhang in itself points to the efficacy of stability-instability paradox. Nevertheless, in response to CSD, Pakistan based on offensive approach, introduced FSD and also developed TNW to counter Indian threat bringing the nuclear threshold to low level. Both India and Pakistan introduced offensive doctrines and technologies to fight and win wars under the nuclear domain.

To sum up, India and Pakistan adopted coercive strategies during this time-period. Pakistan employed compellence strategy during the Kargil Crisis for which India responded with deterrence with punishment strategy. While India employed compellence strategy during the Twin Peaks Crisis and the Mumbai Crisis to pressurize Pakistan, to take concrete action against the terrorist outfits. In both crises, Pakistan responded with deterrence with denial strategy. Theoretically speaking, in line with stability-instability paradox, the two countries due to MAD ultimately refrained from taking conflict to major level. Further, in all three crises, the US played an efficient crisis manager role to avoid conflict escalation and restored peace majorly due to fear of use of nuclear weapons and also to safeguard its strategic interests linked to war on terror, particularly in Afghanistan. Contention is that the three crises did not escalate into large-scale war, thereby, the intensity of violence remained low pointing. To conclude, India-Pakistan war fighting strategies and conflict dynamics became more complex under the nuclear domain.

Table 16: Post Nuclear Era-Crises, Strategies and Intensity of Violence

Year	Number of Crisis	India's Strategy		Pakistan's Strategy		Stability-Instability Paradox
		Coercion		Coercion		
		Compellence	Deterrence	Compellence	Deterrence	
1998	03	02	01	01	02	Instability: Low Intensity of Violence
2001-02						
2008						

Source: Developed by Author

Chapter Five

India's Evolving Offensive Doctrines: Manifestation of Compellence Strategy

India's CSD remained not more than a concept. India failed to launch a limited offensive military action against Pakistan in the wake of terrorist incidents in Indian Administered Kashmir or elsewhere in India. For instance, India expressed to carry out limited military operations against the terrorist outfits across the border, however, it did not implement the offensive force employment strategy at a practical level. The structural and organizational lacunas together with the non-availability of support from international stakeholders such as the US to launch a limited offensive against Pakistan are the two prominent reasons for India's restraint. Nevertheless, the US-China systemic competition acted as an opportunity for India. The US and India built closer ties primarily to contain China. India successfully integrated into the Western world in a post-9/11 security environment, thereby exploiting the systemic forces to maximize its capabilities and influence. The US wanted India to act as an offshore balancer while India needed US assistance to counter growing Chinese influence in the region. India's force modernization particularly in the wake of Indo-US ties assisted the former in overcoming the organizational and structural shortcomings in the way of implanting its offensive military action against Pakistan. Indo-US cordial relations boosted India's confidence to adopt an offensive approach to counter-terrorism within the country and across international borders. India introduced new doctrinal changes such as JDIAF-2017 and LWD-2018 to gain escalation dominance.

India-US Strategic Partnership: A Boost to India's Doctrinal and Military Capabilities

India views China as a principal security threat due to reasons such as territorial disputes, and geoeconomic and geopolitical competitions. India perceives China to be pursuing assertive

policies to establish hegemony in the region. Further, Chinese strategic relations with Pakistan particularly defense cooperation and assistance in the missile and nuclear programs are a matter of serious concern for India. India looks up to the China-Pakistan strategic partnership as a two-front security threat. While, the US is concerned about Chinese growing influence and what the US call, Chinese assertiveness in the global political system, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. The rise of China is a significant challenge to the strategic interests of the US.⁴²⁵ Continuous US administrations purposefully formulated policies to balance China. What the US has done to counter China is uplift other states' capabilities located in the periphery of China to moderate the latter's behavior.⁴²⁶ Ashley J. Tellis reckoned US strategy is simple and comprehensive, for instance, if the US assists states like India, Australia, Japan, Vietnam, Singapore, and Indonesia, to maximize capabilities to achieve their strategic potential and additionally, support these countries to cooperate then it would result in creation of regional equilibrium that could balance China.⁴²⁷ Thus, the US started viewing India as an anchor that could serve its strategic interests in the Indian Ocean.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War led to a unipolar world order where the US became the sole superpower in the system. In the post-9/11 era, the security environment significantly changed in the international system with the rise of new powers, more particularly China. The US assisted India in increasing its influence in Asia and countering China in the region.⁴²⁸ Since, the start of the 21st century, India experienced significant economic growth largely due to its integration into the Western world. India's

⁴²⁵ Ashley J. Tellis, "Balancing without Containment: A US Strategy in Confronting China's Rise," *The Washington Quarterly* 36, no. 4 (Fall, 2013): 109.

⁴²⁶ James Shinn, *Introduction to Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China* (New York: Council on the Foreign Relations Press, 1996), 4.

⁴²⁷ Tellis, "Balancing without Containment," 112.

⁴²⁸ Frederic Grare, "Looking Back at Three Decades of India-U.S. Relationship," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, July 27, 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/07/27/looking-back-at-three-decades-of-india-u.s.-relationship-pub-79779>.

increase in defense budget primarily focused on the procurement of modern military apparatus from technologically modernized states.⁴²⁹ The US played a pivotal role in India's quest for economic and military modernization.

For instance, the two countries signed an Indo-US nuclear deal in February 2006, to provide civilian nuclear assistance to India, the first of its kind as India is not a member of NPT.⁴³⁰ The US openly supported India's membership in the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) while declining to support Pakistan for the same.⁴³¹ Recently, the US surpassed China by becoming India's largest trading partner. As per the data, the trade between the US and India is \$191 in 2022-23. Further, the Biden administration expects to reach the threshold of \$500.⁴³²

The defense sector also saw a surge in cooperation in the last two decades. The US and India have initiated numerous cooperation programs of Security Dialogue and aircraft production. For instance, the two states inked an agreement on military hardware exchange LEMOA.⁴³³ The deal promotes the process of sharing facilities and the capabilities of refueling. In September 2018, both countries signed an agreement with COMCASA under the two-plus-two agenda.⁴³⁴ The US and India signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) in October 2020, marking the completion of the triumvirate of foundational pacts for

⁴²⁹ Jaspal, *India's 'Surgical Strike Stratagem*, 106.

⁴³⁰ Moeed Yusuf, "The Indo-US Nuclear Deal: An Impact Analysis," *ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs* 3, no. 2 (2007): 47.

⁴³¹ Muhammad Faisal, "Pakistan-China Relations," *Strategic Studies* 40, no. 2 (2020): 40, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48732331>.

⁴³² Ambassador (ret.) Atul Keshap, "How the U.S. and India Can Reach \$500 Billion in Trade," *U.S Chamber of Commerce* (June 13, 2023), <https://www.uschamber.com/international/how-the-u-s-and-india-can-reach-500-billion-in-trade>.

⁴³³ Anik Panda, "India, US Sign Logistics Exchange Agreement: What You Need to Know," *The Diplomat*, August 30, 2016, <https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/india-us-sign-logistics-exchange-agreement-what-you-need-to-know/>.

⁴³⁴ See Sigdi, "India & US Sign COMCASA,".

the defense cooperation between the two states.⁴³⁵ In 2012, the two states signed the Defense Trade Treaty Initiative (DTTI) focusing on joint production of military technologies.⁴³⁶ India's total procurement from the US is expected to cross US\$25 billion. The two countries are eyeing a deal to jointly produce GE F 414 engines that would help India in its indigenization drive to the fighter jets development industry.⁴³⁷ The major US objective is to prepare India to counterbalance China on all fronts.

Both China and India, as transforming their influence in the region not only aim at projecting force modernization to safeguard their recognized commercial interest, but also project reach-out in the Asian region. The power projection would compel the two states to go for advanced deterrent force, and introduce offensive doctrinal changes. Professor Dr. Bharat Karnad while responding to a question regarding India's strategic posture stated,⁴³⁸

A new comprehensive doctrine may be on the way centered primarily on the China threat, and the consequent deprioritisation of the danger from Pakistan, which I have long argued has never been, is not now, and can never be other than only a notional, threat. There is evidence of this change of thinking on the ground with the shifting of the leading I Strike Corps (armored) from the western border to the east. I had made a case for such military reorientation from my time as a Member of the First National Security Board when I was involved in drafting the 'credible minimum nuclear doctrine'.

⁴³⁵ Misbah Mukhtar, "Issue Brief on "India-US Military Agreement: BECA and its Implications for the Region," *Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad* (November 17, 2020), <https://issi.org.pk/issue-brief-on-india-us-military-agreement-beca-and-its-implications-for-the-region/>.

⁴³⁶ Hemal Shah, "US-India's Defense: Pivoting the Strategic Partnership Forward," *Foreign Policy*, January 23, 2015, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/23/in-u-s-indias-defense-pivoting-the-strategic-partnership-forward/>.

⁴³⁷ Huma Siddiqui, "India-US Military Trade to touch \$25 billion! Know the Man behind Big Bilateral Deals," *Financial Express* (June 2, 2023), <https://www.financialexpress.com/business/defence-india-us-military-trade-to-touch-25-billion-know-the-man-behind-big-bilateral-deals-3109839/>.

⁴³⁸ Author's Interview with Professor Dr. Bharat Karnad. Dr. Karnad is an Emeritus Professor for National Security Studies, at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, and a Distinguished Fellow at the United Service Institution of India. His most recent book, *Staggering Forward: Modi and India's Global Ambition* was published by Penguin in September 2018. Previous books include *Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)* (Oxford University Press, October 2015), *Strategic Sellout: India0US Nuclear Deal* (2009), *India's Nuclear Policy* (Praeger, 2008), *Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy*, now in its second edition (Macmillan, 2005, 2002), and *Future Imperilled: India's Security in the 1990s and Beyond* (Viking-Penguin, 1994).

As India-China strategic competition and particularly, India's hedge against China continue to occur, Pakistan in turn perceives the increasing India's defense modernization as a threat to its security. Being that noted, the chance of conflict, between China and India may look less lethal but the fact of the matter is that power competition between the two states and particularly, Indo-US strategic partnership has altered the security parameters for Pakistan in South Asia. The contention here is, that India's power accumulation and defense modernization against China or power projection in the broader region in turn increases its asymmetries with Pakistan. India perceives a two-front threat meaning, China and Pakistan fighting a war with India simultaneously on eastern and western borders. It seems that Indian armed forces would adopt an offensive military posture against Pakistan while assuming a defensive military posture against China to avoid a loss of territory.

To sum up, the cooperation initiatives between the US and India are majorly against China, however, it assisted India in adopting an offensive approach against Pakistan. In addition to the US, India has strategic ties with France, Israel, and Russia. Indo-US strategic partnership has assisted India in acquiring sophisticated military technology from the Western world. These strategic partnerships are not limited to procuring weapons but also India enjoys diplomatic support in line with its national goals. In recent times, India seems to have adopted a more offensive approach towards Pakistan for its alleged support of terrorism. Earlier, India introduced the offensive force employment strategy in 2004 and the Indian Airforce doctrine in 2012 to take punitive measures. However, India did not decide to implement these doctrines in the wake of terrorist incidents,⁴³⁹ majorly due to organization loopholes of the Indian armed forces doctrinally and capability-wise. Indo-US strategic partnership helped India to acquire

⁴³⁹ Kokab Al-Saba and Dr. Noor Fatima, "Doctrinal Shift in the Indian Army after 2018: Implications for Pakistan," *NDU Journal* (2023): 17.

sophisticated weaponry to meet the requirements mandatory for the operationalization of its offensive doctrines aimed at waging a limited punitive war against Pakistan. Consequently, India brought doctrinal changes such as JDIAF-2017 and LWD-2018 to counter threats covering the entire spectrum of the conflict. Thus, the change in the international strategic environment in post 9/11 era, became an opportunity for India to overcome the doctrinal and structural loopholes to meet its national security objectives.

Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces: Surgical Strikes to Counter Insurgency

India announced the Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces in 2017. The doctrine is majorly focused on India's national security and war-fighting strategies to counter threats over the entire conflict spectrum. For instance, the doctrine covers all the domains from counter-insurgency to nuclear posture. It is aimed to provide an interconnected framework for launching joint military operations, where all three branches of armed forces such as the Army, Navy, and IAF function smoothly to secure national security objectives. The new military doctrine is developed to increase the Indian Armed Forces' integration and operational readiness to efficiently counter a range of threats and geopolitical challenges in the changing security environment at the regional and systemic levels. For instance, the new doctrine is developed to tackle a broad range of internal and external security threats including traditional security threats such as terrorism. When Dr. Basrur was asked about the objective of the newly announced doctrine, he stated,⁴⁴⁰

The Joint Doctrine and other reforms were developed in response to broader changing circumstances, which incentivized (a) the incorporation of high technology into military strategy; and (b) the need for an integrated approach to military planning, organization, and operations.

⁴⁴⁰ Author's Interview with Professor Dr. Rajesh Basrur.

In broader terms, the JDIAF-2017 covers both national security objectives and national military objectives. For instance, the main source of the national security objective is rooted in India's national interest. Four objectives are outlined in JDIAF-2017 such as: One, maintain a credible deterrent capability to safeguard national interest. Two, ensure the defense of national territory, air space, and maritime zones including trade routes and cyberspace. Three, maintain a secure internal environment to guard against threats to unity and development. Lastly, expand and strengthen constructive engagement with other nations to promote regional, and global peace and international stability.⁴⁴¹ Thus, the national security objectives cover both internal and external dimensions to secure national interests.

The national military objectives documented in JDIAF-2017 are developed in line with India's national security issues which are to, "Prevent war through strategic and conventional deterrence across the full spectrum of military conflict, to ensure the defense of India, our national interests and sovereignty. Prosecute military operations to defend territorial integrity and ensure a favorable end state during the war to achieve stated/ implied political objective(s). Assist to ensure internal security, when called upon to do so. Be prepared for contingencies at home and abroad to render Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), aid to civil authority, and international peacekeeping, when called upon to do so. Enable the required degree of self-sufficiency in defense equipment and technology through indigenization to achieve the desired degree of technological independence in 2035."⁴⁴²

The JDIAF-2017 aims to preserve a useful conventional and nuclear deterrence.⁴⁴³ It contemplates the advantages and risks associated with limited war and deterrence. Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), an Islamabad-based think tank emphasizes that India's new

⁴⁴¹ See *Indian Armed Forces*, 3.

⁴⁴² See *Indian Armed Forces*, 4.

⁴⁴³ Jaspal, *India's Surgical Strike Stratagem*, 58-59.

war-fighting doctrines are aimed against China and Pakistan.⁴⁴⁴ On one hand, the doctrine is focused on developing practicable deterrent capabilities vis-à-vis China and Pakistan, while on the other hand, it is finding ways to counter terrorist attacks domestically and across the border. Traditionally, India pursues “Credible Minimum Deterrence” while adhering to NFU. Nevertheless, in recent years, India has been maximizing nuclear arsenals to counter Chinese threat. Significantly, India in new doctrine shifted its policy principle stance from “Credible Minimum Deterrence” to “Credible Deterrence.” Thus, this development indicated that India intends to bring change in its nuclear policy. This is why India is interested in maximizing nuclear capabilities and transforming its nuclear posture.

The most significant dimension of the new doctrine is the possibility of surgical strikes as a punitive action against Pakistan.⁴⁴⁵ India long searched for a space to carry out a short, speedy, limited, and forceful military operation against Pakistan. For instance, Dr. Clary in an interview stated, “India announced CSD to conduct limited and swift offensive operations against Pakistan. It was difficult to implement CSD due to multiple factors such as the proximity of Pakistan's military bases to the border. Importantly, with time, some other terms are being used for it or replaced such as Proactive Operations.”⁴⁴⁶ Thus, India’s inability to implement CSD led it to introduce new doctrines that emphasize the use of technological sophistication to counter conventional and sub-conventional threats from Pakistan. Dr. Khattak in an interview on India’s doctrinal evolution stated,⁴⁴⁷

India originally coined the idea of carrying out surgical strikes in the Indian Airforce Doctrine in 2012. The US employed surgical strikes against numerous targets across

⁴⁴⁴ See Press Release, “Indian Armed Forces Joint Doctrine 2017: A Critical Appraisal,” *Islamabad Policy Research Institute*, February 28, 2018.

⁴⁴⁵ See *Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces-2017*.

⁴⁴⁶ Author’s Interview with Assistant Professor Dr. Christopher Clary.

⁴⁴⁷ Author’s Interview with Dr. Masood ur Rehman Khattak.

the world so India thought it could do the same. Significantly, there is a huge difference between the capabilities and status of the US and India and the latter cannot do it. However, India kept on working on the idea because the large scale was out of the question due to nuclear weapons. The limited war was also neutralized by Pakistan conventionally by organizing military exercises to check its offensive-defensive strategy and non-conventionally, Pakistan developed TNW to counter India's CSD. Pakistan's response compelled India to devise a new war-fighting strategy at the sub-conventional level and introduced the Indian Air Force Doctrine focusing on carrying surgical strikes against Pakistan.

Correspondingly, India announced new doctrines to overcome the politico-military challenges in conducting operations in a synergized manner to counter alleged terrorist outfits across the border without risking a nuclear war of deterrence failure. India continuously employed diplomatic compellence to gather support from the international community and put pressure on Pakistan for its alleged support of terrorism in Indian Administer Kashmir and elsewhere in India. India successfully gathered international support, nevertheless, it failed to counter insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir. For instance, Dr. Basrur opines, "The rising level of risk is demonstrated by (a) Pakistan's asymmetric strategy of backing non-state actors attacking Indian targets; and (b) India's frustration and hence resort to a more proactive response. Mutual deterrence remains, but the possibility of slipping into a major conflict is greater."⁴⁴⁸ To be clear, the development of JDIAF-2017 is a gigantic step forward in demonstrating how India's strategic culture has evolved. Professor Dr. Zafar Khan, while responding to a question regarding India's objective behind the offensive doctrinal changes stated, "India desires to do all these strategic imperatives for prestige, power projections, escalation dominance, and dominance purposes in South Asia so that it prevails against its potential adversaries including that of Pakistan."⁴⁴⁹

⁴⁴⁸ Author's Interview with Professor Dr. Rajesh Basrur.

⁴⁴⁹ Author's Interview with Professor Dr. Zafar Khan. Dr Khan (Ph.D. Strategic Studies, University of Hull, UK) authored the book "Pakistan Nuclear Policy: A Minimum Credible Deterrence" (Routledge: London, 2015) and also Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia New Technologies and Challenges to Sustainable Peace (Routledge: London, 2020). His areas of interest include proliferation/nonproliferation, nuclear policy, security strategy,

To narrow it down, two characteristics of the new doctrine have severe implications for conventionally weaker Pakistan. One, India's nuclear posture has evolved and shifted from Credible Minimum Deterrence to Credible Deterrence. This indicated that India no longer believes in keeping their "Triad" to the minimum deterrence posture. Further, India intends to modernize their armed forces horizontally as well as vertically. Hence, there are no limits to increase their nuclear stockpiles. Two, the new doctrine announced surgical strikes to counter terrorism in Indian-administered Kashmir and even across the border deep inside Pakistan, crossing new frontiers. Ostensibly, considering that India looked for a surgical strike as an option in the nuclear domain, it is proving the efficacy of the stability-instability paradox. Nevertheless, India long searched for a space to carry out small military operations against Pakistan as the former perceives that the use of nuclear weapons or waging a large-scale war is a hard decision, and this is why India intends to exploit the room for a surgical strike as a tactic of sub-conventional warfare.

Consequently, the new doctrine blatantly announces to carry out of small military operations such as surgical as an official part of punitive measures against the adversary. Further, it validates the presence of India's CSD clarifying all ambiguities about its reality. Additionally, it indicates a shift in Indian nuclear strategy such as moving away from Credible Minimum Deterrence to Credible Deterrence. These two dimensions of JDIAF-2017 are most significant as they can seriously hamper the strategic stability of South Asia. India exploited Indo-US cordial ties which created a favorable environment for India to carry out surgical strikes targeting terrorists across the border deep inside Pakistan. Thus, India seems to adopt an offensive approach to go beyond the traditional frontiers of India-Pakistan bilateral military

engagement such as to execute aerial surgical strikes against Pakistan. Nevertheless, India failed to comprehend Pakistani response to any misadventure as even a very narrow military objective would be huge which may further push India to escalate, and eventually, a limited war or small military operation may convert into a large-scale war. Contrarily, India continued to bring doctrinal changes and introduced another doctrine in a year time reckoned as the Land Warfare Doctrine in 2018.

Land Warfare Doctrine-2018: Supplement to JDIAF-2017

India's military announced the Land Warfare Doctrine on December 18, 2018. To understand the relevance of LWD-2018 with the previous doctrines; it is clearly stated on the title page of the document that this doctrine is required “to be read in conjunction with the Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces-2017.”⁴⁵⁰ The new doctrine focuses on the threat perception and potential response of the Indian army in limited war situations.⁴⁵¹ By the new doctrine, the Indian Army is required to be focused on the development of multi-domain capabilities and facilitation of enhanced integration amongst the tri-services along with optimization of forces and resources that are well prepared to launch efficient and forceful responses in the war.⁴⁵² The Indian doctrine emphasizes multiple drives to fight war simultaneously against China and Pakistan, reckoned as a two-front war. Nevertheless, the Indian armed forces major deployment is on the western border indicating Pakistan as the main target.

The LWD-18 provides the doctrinal foundation to launch a precise strike against terrorist groups in the wake of any terror incidents. The doctrine identified that the Indian Army would, “enhance punitive response options to greater depth, effect, sophistication, and

⁴⁵⁰ Jaspal, *India's Surgical Strike*, 60.

⁴⁵¹ Masood ur Rehman Khattak, “The Indian Army's Land Warfare Doctrine 2018: A Critical Analysis,” *Islamabad Policy Research Institute XX*, no. 1 (2020): 110.

⁴⁵² See *Indian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine-2018*, 13.

precision.”⁴⁵³ Dr. Khattak while responding on the nature of LWD-2018 stated, “LWD-2018 intends to counter alleged Pakistan’s proxy war and will launch a punitive response in the wake of terror incident. This means the doctrine is formulated to carry out a surgical strike against Pakistan allegedly involved in supporting terrorist outfits.”⁴⁵⁴

As per the new doctrine, “all combat operations will be as Integrated Battle Group (IBGs), under command of combined arms operational headquarters,” to meet the conventional warfare requirements.⁴⁵⁵ The doctrine aimed that, “the Indian Army will employ composite IBGs comprising a mix of five to six battalions to execute conventional combat operations for the greater flexibility in force application.” Further, “each IBG, which would be larger than the existing 3,000 personnel-strong brigades but smaller than a 10,000-strong division, would be headed by a two-star officer and include infantry, armored, artillery, air-defense, and support units, all of which would be backed by attack helicopters.”⁴⁵⁶ The philosophy behind the strategy of employing the IBGs is that it will complement the fighting muscle of the pivot corps deployed alongside the international border against Pakistan. The IBGs and pivot corps would penetrate 3 to 5 kilometers deep inside Pakistan within a timeframe of 72 hours. In the meantime, the strike corps would further excel on the accomplishments gained in the initial offensive.⁴⁵⁷ Dr. Khattak while responding to a question about the nature and objective of LWD-2018 stated,⁴⁵⁸

The LWD-2018 aimed to reform the military and change its orientation. It brought drastic changes in CSD for instance as per the previous doctrine the IBG was comprised

⁴⁵³ See *Indian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine-2018*, 3.

⁴⁵⁴ Author’s Interview with Dr. Masood ur Rehman Khattak.

⁴⁵⁵ See *Indian Army: Land Warfare Doctrine-2018*, 13.

⁴⁵⁶ Rahul Bedi, “Indian Army Announces New Land Warfare Doctrine,” *Jane’s Defense Weekly*, December 21, 2018.

⁴⁵⁷ Pravin Sawhney, “New Land Warfare Doctrine is not a Credible Deterrent to China or Pakistan,” *The Wire*, December 28, 2018.

⁴⁵⁸ Author’s Interview with Dr. Masood ur Rehman Khattak.

of 25,000 personnel but the new doctrine brought it down to 9,000 personnel to have a smaller, well-equipped, quick response and indeed modernized force. This indicates that India wants to shrink the level of warfare bringing down the threshold. Pakistan intended to use TNW against the IBG comprising 25,000 personnel if it penetrates deep inside Pakistani territory but now as the IBG size has been reduced to 9,000 personnel Pakistan will have to engage Indian forces conventionally. This makes the nuclear weapon a weapon of last resort because it will be used at the last, if needed. It is important to understand that nuclear weapon is not for use but only for deterrence as argued by Brodie. But there are a few challenges amidst this whole scenario. One, India is economically stable and will become a five trillion-dollar economy by 2025. Two, India is well connected with the US, Russia, Europe, and Israel and has strong alliances with the great powers. So, India can afford a limited war in South Asia but Pakistan cannot. This means Pakistan's reliance will increase on nuclear weapons.

The doctrinal changes indicate that India is focused on hybrid warfare and intends to integrate the same in conventional and sub-conventional warfare. It also acknowledged to develop and enhance its capabilities in multiple domains such as cyber, space, and information to inflict huge losses on the rival state.⁴⁵⁹ Kulbhushan's arrest is an important aspect of understanding India's strategy which through hybrid warfare aimed to create chaos in Karachi (the economic hub of Pakistan), finance Baloch separatist organizations and other terrorist groups to sabotage CPEC, and lastly, to attack military forces and installations.⁴⁶⁰ Professor Dr. Tughral Yamin stated,⁴⁶¹

“India's force modernization and offensive doctrine can unbalance the very fragile strategic stability in South Asia. But more worrisome is the fact that India is fueling the insurgency in Balochistan and erstwhile FATA and continuing to demonize and isolate Pakistan at the international forums for aiding and abetting terrorism.”

It seems that India alongside employing limited war or small military operations against Pakistan, intends to use a hybrid warfare strategy to create internal instability in Pakistan to

⁴⁵⁹ See *Indian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine-2018*, 6.

⁴⁶⁰ See “Transcript of RAW Agent Kulbhushan's Confessional Statement,” *DAWN*, March 30, 2016, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1248786>.

⁴⁶¹ Authors Interview with Professor Dr. Tughral Yamin. He is the Associate Dean Centre for International Peace and Stability (CIPS) National University of Sciences & Technology (NUST). His papers have appeared in various national and international peer-reviewed journals.

weaken it on the internal front. One of the other significant aspects of LWD-2018 is its special focus on diplomacy and close ties with the great powers.⁴⁶² As discussed above, Indian integration in the Western world specifically Indo-US strategic partnership significantly altered the security parameters for Pakistan.

To sum up, doctrinal changes such as JDIAF-2017 and LWD-2018 are aimed at launching small military operations and surgical strikes to target terrorist outfits inside and across the border. The newly developed doctrines depict an offensive military approach based on compellence as it concentrates on waging swift, smart, and limited wars under the nuclear overhang. Critical analysis indicates that India has brought doctrinal changes in line with the stability-instability paradox which points to fighting sub-conventional warfare in the presence of nuclear weapons without escalating to strategic levels. On one hand, the doctrines point to the launch of small military operations and surgical strikes to counter insurgency while on the other hand, it guides to use of hybrid warfare against Pakistan.

India's Offensive Doctrinal Changes: Aspiration to Join the US Club

The question such as, can India implement the doctrinal changes such as JDIAF-2017 and LWD-2018? There is no simple answer to it. Nevertheless, the doctrinal changes emphasize on “force modernization, resource optimization, and innovation conceptual processes leading to winning strategies for future wars.”⁴⁶³ As discussed above, Indian armed forces underwent massive military modernization in the post-9/11 era, mainly to achieve the requisite capability to carry out small military operations to counter-terrorism across the borders including deep inside Pakistan. India's enhanced military capabilities have assisted it to overcome organizational inadequacies observed in the past such as in Operation Parakram, to meet the

⁴⁶² See *Indian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine-2018*, 7.

⁴⁶³ See *Indian Army: Land Warfare Doctrine-2018*, 13.

operational requirements required to launch a limited and swift military offensive against Pakistan. India's force modernization might have boosted its confidence and conventional strength to go offensive against Pakistan. India's integration into the Western world provided it with a favorable political environment to use alternative measures such as surgical strikes to deal with militancy.

Perkovich and Dalton in their article published in 2015 stated that if India carries out surgical strikes to counter terrorist outfits in Pakistan, it would bring India to join the group of the US and Israel to fight terrorism.⁴⁶⁴ The US and Israel carried out surgical strikes in the Middle East and Africa to counter terrorism. The US and Israel with the assistance of sophisticated technological power and military strength transformed the abnormal act of breaching the states' sovereignty into a new normal. Both the US and Israel considered the targeted states either incapable or reluctant to carry out operations against the terrorist outfits, allegedly operating from targeted states' territories and serving as proxies for other powers.⁴⁶⁵ Thus, the US and Israel used their offensive military power to target terrorist outfits beyond the borders, thereby eliminating the terrorists while violating the state sovereignty.

Despite Pakistan being an ally of the US in the war on terror is not an exception to the latter's offensive strategy to counter terrorism. For instance, the US carried out hundreds of drone strikes in counter-terrorism operations during the war on terror.⁴⁶⁶ One of the most important yet distinct events in the US war on terror campaign is its smart secret military operation codenamed, Operation Neptune Spear, launched to target Osama bin Laden, leader

⁴⁶⁴ Perkovich and Dalton, "Modi's Strategic Choice," 25.

⁴⁶⁵ Imran Iqbal, "India's New-Normal," *The News*, March 7, 2019, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/440614-india-s-new-normal>.

⁴⁶⁶ Patrick B. Johnston, "The Impact of US Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan," *International Studies Quarterly* 60, no. 2 (2016): 203–219, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqv004>.

of Al-Qaeda, in the city of Abbottabad, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan on May 2, 2011.⁴⁶⁷ President Obama authorized the military operation and closely observed its implementation from the White House.⁴⁶⁸ A total of 24 Navy SEALs flew in two helicopters equipped with stealth technology from a military base in Afghanistan to carry out a military operation in Abbottabad to do it swiftly with a focus on precision involving minimum collateral damage. The US special troops took less than an hour time to kill bin Laden. The US administration on the same day announced that the US special troops in a military operation killed bin Laden. The operation targeting the top leader of al-Qaeda was greeted by world leaders as a huge success in the war against terrorism.⁴⁶⁹ Nevertheless, the US secret military operation was not free of controversy Pakistan met severe criticism for not detecting the presence of the world's most dangerous terrorist hiding in Abbottabad and the US for launching a military operation like a criminal thug.⁴⁷⁰ Significantly, the US administration did not seek approval or involve Pakistani leadership in the launch of the military operation on the latter's soil, which further strained their complex relationship.

President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani held an emergency meeting in the aftermath of Operation Neptune Spear. Prime Minister Gilani stated that "Pakistan will not allow use of its soil for terrorism against any other country." In an interview with international media, Pakistan's Prime Minister emphasized that Pakistan played a vital role in the war on terror and we lost thousands of soldiers, and innocent civilians including women and children in this war. Further, Prime Minister Gilani said that "it was an embarrassment for the whole

⁴⁶⁷ Amna Yousaf Khokhar, "Operation Neptune Spear," *Strategic Studies* 31, no. 3 (2011): 109-123, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48527651>.

⁴⁶⁸ See Macon Philips, "Osama Bin Laden Dead," *The White House, President Barack Obama*, May 2, 2011, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-dead>.

⁴⁶⁹ CNN Wire Staff, "World leaders React to News of bin Laden's Death," *CNN*, May 3, 2011, <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/05/02/bin.laden.world.reacts/index.html>.

⁴⁷⁰ Jon Bonne, "Bin Laden Killing: Official Report Criticizes Pakistan and the US," *The Guardian*, July 9, 2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/08/osama-bin-laden-pakistan-criticised>.

world that Osama could not be captured earlier despite the latest technology.”⁴⁷¹ Later on, the Pakistani government criticized the US by claiming that the latter had taken an “unauthorized unilateral action” and this kind of military operation would not be tolerated in the future times. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs further stated that “Such an event shall not serve as a future precedent for any state, including the United States.”⁴⁷² Thus, Pakistan feared that India might take the US drone strikes particularly Operation Neptune Spear as a precedent to launch such smart military operations against the alleged terrorist outfits based in Pakistan.

Indian Prime Minister Singh hailed the killing of Bin Laden and stated “I welcome it as a significant step forward and hope that it will deal a decisive blow to Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. The international community and Pakistan, in particular, must work comprehensively to end the activities of all such groups who threaten civilized behavior and kill innocent men, women, and children.”⁴⁷³ Indian Minister of Home Affairs, Palaniappan Chidambaram, expressed that bin Laden presence in Pakistan was a matter of serious concern for the international community. He further added that this is significant evidence that Pakistan is a haven for terrorist outfits. The Internal Minister demanded that Pakistan “arrest many of the perpetrators of the Mumbai terror attacks, including the controllers and the handlers of the terrorists who carried out the attack,” who according to him “continue to be sheltered in Pakistan.”⁴⁷⁴ In the aftermath of Bin Laden’s killing, there were deliberations within India for

⁴⁷¹ See “Pakistan will not allow Use of its Soil for Terrorism, Says PM,” *Dawn News*, 5 May 2011, <https://web.archive.org/web/20110505061304/http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/02/zardari-gilani-security-chiefs-in-emergency-talks.html>.

⁴⁷² Jane Perlez, “Pakistan Pushes Back Against the U.S. Criticism on Bin Laden,” *The New York Times*, May 3, 2011, <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/04/world/asia/04pakistan.html>.

⁴⁷³ See “For Indians, Bin Laden Still a non-no,” *Dawn News*, May 13, 2011, <https://www.dawn.com/news/628392/for-indians-bin-laden-still-a-no-no>.

⁴⁷⁴ Tom Wright, “India Uses Osama Death to Pressure Pakistan,” *The Wall Street Journal*, May 2, 2011, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704569404576298211101277924>.

a similar sort of military operation to target Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and others allegedly involved in terrorism in India.⁴⁷⁵

To sum up it seems that India has assumed Operation Neptune Spear and drone strikes as a precedent to target alleged terrorist outfits in Pakistan. Thus, India introduced offensive doctrinal changes to deal with counter-insurgency, thereby intending to join the US and Israel Club. India views Pakistan as incapable or unwilling to eliminate terrorism from its territory while on the other hand, Pakistan remained a frontline state in the war on terror. Before moving ahead toward analyzing India's implementation of offensive doctrinal changes, it is imperative to discuss Pakistan's success, incompetence, and challenges in fighting terrorism on its soil for a comprehensive understanding of the menace of terrorism in the region.

A Critical Appraisal of Pakistan's Capability to Counter Terrorism

The case of India-Pakistan vis-à-vis US-Pakistan or other targeted states in the Middle East is utterly distinct, particularly with the presence of nuclear weapons in South Asia. Nevertheless, there are a few other reasons for instance: One, the military capabilities of the US and Israel to launch offensive action are matchless in comparison to India. Two, Pakistan's defensive capabilities are far superior in comparison to the states that are targeted by the US and Israel to counter-terrorism. Nevertheless, apart from the debate of the military capabilities to launch an attack, in broader terms, the US and Israel failed to counter terrorism with punitive surgical strikes in the Middle East.⁴⁷⁶ Three, the unresolved Kashmir dispute and frequent uprisings against heavily deployed Indian troops in Indian Administered Kashmir, make the Indian case challenging to employ an offensive strategy against Pakistan, particularly under the nuclear

⁴⁷⁵ See "Why can't India do the US to the likes of Dawood, Saeed?" *The Times of India*, May 3, 2011, https://web.archive.org/web/20110830221935/http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-05-03/india/29499048_1_indian-intelligence-special-forces-anti-india.

⁴⁷⁶ Perkovich and Dalton, "Modi's Strategic Choice," 25.

overhang. Fourth, the presence of nuclear weapons makes the case of South Asia different than the one in the Middle East due to the phenomenon of MAD. Nevertheless, the most significant aspect that makes the India-Pakistan case different from the US-Israel vis-à-vis targeted states in the Middle East is Pakistan's recognized role and capability to counter terrorism as a frontline state in the war on terror. Pakistan has been facing terrorism for the last two decades since the start of the war on terror. Since 2001, Pakistan has launched numerous major and minor anti-terrorism operations and achieved significant successes in the war on terror.

Table 17: Pakistan Counter Terrorism Operations

S No	Military Operation Name	Period
1	Operation Enduring Freedom	2001–2002
2	Operation Al Mizan	2002–2006
3	Operation Zalzala	2008
4	Operations Sher Dil,	2007–2009
5	Rah-e-Haq	2007–2009
6	Rah-e-Rast	2007–2009
7	Operation Black Thunderstorm	2009
8	Operation Rah-e-Nijat	2009–2010
9	Operation Koh-Safaid	2011
10	Operation Zarb-e-Azb	2014-2017

Source: Developed by Author

As per the data of the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), the war on terror cost Pakistan 83,000 lives.⁴⁷⁷ The South Asian Terrorism Portal indicates the number of killings in the violence from 2003 to 2006 as 61, 464.

⁴⁷⁷ See National Counter Terrorism Authority, <https://nacta.gov.pk/pakistans-national-narrative-against-terrorism-and-extremism/#:~:text=2%2D%20Pakistan%20has%20been%20facing,intolerance%20have%20increased%20in%20society>.

Table 18: Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan (2003-2016)

	Civilians	Security force personnel	Terrorists/insurgents	Total
2003	140	24	25	189
2004	435	184	244	863
2005	430	81	137	648
2006	608	325	538	1471
2007	1,522	597	1479	3598
2008	2,155	654	3906	6715
2009	2,324	991	8389	11,704
2010	1,796	469	5170	7435
2011	2,738	765	2800	6303
2012	3,007	732	2472	6211
2013	3,001	676	1702	5379
2014	1,781	533	3182	5496
2015	940	339	2403	3682
2016	608	290	872	1770
Total	21,485	6660	33,319	61,464

Source: South Asian Terrorism Portal.

Pakistan has experienced significant losses in all sectors of life. Pakistan's economy received huge damages in the wake of the war on terror. Since 9/11, terrorism activities have severely hampered the economic growth of Pakistan. The government of Pakistan estimates the total economic loss to be \$126.79 billion since 9/11.

Table 19: Direct and Indirect Cost of Terrorism (2002-2014)

Years	\$ billion	Rs. billion	% change
2001-02	2.67	163.9	—
2002-03	2.75	160.80	3.0
2003-04	2.93	168.80	6.7
2004-05	3.41	202.40	16.3
2005-06	3.99	238.60	16.9
2006-07	4.67	283.20	17.2
2007-08	6.94	434.10	48.6
2008-09	9.18	720.60	32.3
2009-10	13.56	1136.40	47.7
2010-11	23.77	2037.33	75.3
2011-12	11.98	1052.77	-49.6
2012-13	9.97	964.24	-16.8
2013-14	7.7	791.52	-22.8
2014-15	9.24	936.30	20.0
2015-16	6.49	675.76	-29.8
2016-17	5.57	572.60	-15.7
2017-18	2.07	223.32	-62.2
Total	126.79	10762.64	

Source: Pakistan Economic Survey year book 2015–2016.

Pakistan has suffered a lot due to the menace of terrorism. Despite all these setbacks, Pakistan's effective counter-terrorism operation resulted in peace and stability across the country.⁴⁷⁸ That is reflected even in the betterment of the economy. For instance, the financial losses decreased by 62% from 2014 to 2018.⁴⁷⁹ The counter-terrorism operations successfully targeted terrorists associated with different terrorist groups, nevertheless, some of the militants succeeded in fleeing across the border to Afghanistan.⁴⁸⁰ In 2017, the Chief Executive of

⁴⁷⁸ Sana Jamal, "Once Terror-Hit Region Now Ready to Welcome Students," *Gulf News*, March 21, 2019, <https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/pakistan/once-terror-hit-region-now-ready-to-welcome-students-1.62810352>.

⁴⁷⁹ See "62PC Cut on War on Terror Losses," *Dawn News*, April 27, 2018, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1404161>.

Afghanistan, Abdullah Abdullah acknowledged the presence of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Afghanistan.⁴⁸¹ In 2019, the US Administration claimed the presence of around 3,000 to 5,000 terrorists associated with TTP in Afghanistan.⁴⁸² Thus, the terrorist groups remained operational in Afghanistan and launched terrorist attacks in Afghanistan and also across the border in Pakistan.

Pakistan blames India and Afghanistan for their alleged support of terrorism in its territory. For instance, the US troops carried out a raid on an Afghan convoy that was taking Latif Mehsud, a senior TTP leader, to Kabul in 2013.⁴⁸³ The Spokesperson of the Afghan President, Aimal Faizi, told the media that the Afghan Intelligence Agency, National Directorate of Security (NDS) was working with Latif. Notably, the TTP leader was a channel for providing funding to TTP. Thus, it seems that NDS might have been involved in funding the TTP.⁴⁸⁴ Nevertheless, the terrorist incidents continued to occur across the region leading to deteriorated relations between the regional countries.

For instance, an Indian Naval officer, turned spy, Kulbhushan Jadhav, arrest further increased mistrust and uncertainty between India and Pakistan. Pakistani authorities claimed that he was operating in Baluchistan under a false Iranian passport. Jadhav publicly

⁴⁸⁰ Zia ur Rehman, "Pakistani Taliban: Between Infighting, Government Crackdowns, and Daesh," *TRT World*, 2019, <https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/pakistani-taliban-between-infighting-government-crackdowns-and-daesh-25976>; and Ayaz Gul, "US Drone Kills Afghan-Based Pakistani Taliban Commander," *Voice of America*, July 4, 2018, <https://www.voanews.com/a/us-drone-kills-afghan-based-pakistani-taliban-commander/4467419.html>.

⁴⁸¹ Anwar Iqbal, "TTP has Foothold in Afghanistan, Says Abdullah," *Dawn News*, November 17, 2017, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1371039>.

⁴⁸² See Report, "Lead Inspector General for Operation Freedom's Sentinel I Quarterly Report to the United States Congress | January 1, 2019 – March 31, 2019," *Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoDIG)*, May 17, 2019, OCO, <https://www.dodig.mil/Reports/Lead-Inspector-General-Reports/Article/1853337/lead-inspector-general-for-operation-freedoms-sentinel-i-quarterly-report-to-th/>.

⁴⁸³ Matthew Rosenberg, "U.S. Disrupts Afghans Tack on Militants," *New York Times*, October 28, 2013, <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/29/world/asia/us-disrupts-afghans-tack-on-militants.html>.

⁴⁸⁴ Umar Farooq, "Afghanistan-Pakistan: The Covert War," *The Diplomat*, January 1, 2014, <https://thediplomat.com/2014/01/afghanistan-pakistan-the-covert-war/>.

confessed⁴⁸⁵ on Pakistan Television for promoting sabotage in Karachi. According to Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Government of Pakistan has approached the UN to stop India from interfering in activities designed to destabilize it. Pakistan through diplomatic means handed over the dossier to the UN containing requisite information and evidence of India's alleged interference and involvement in terrorism in Pakistan including Baluchistan, tribal areas, and Karachi. The Government of Pakistan emphasized that Pakistan remained a frontline state in the war on terror and achieved significant successes against the terrorist outfits on the domestic front. Further, Pakistan had paid a huge cost for this success and faced the loss of thousands of human lives including the civilian population and soldiers. Pakistani government emphasized that India's interference in Pakistan seriously undermines these gains.⁴⁸⁶ Thus, states seem to be involved in proxies, insurgencies, and sub-conventional warfare, pointing to the efficacy of the stability-instability paradox.

Pakistan often blamed India for operating Terror Training Camps in Afghanistan to train and support internationally banned terrorist groups, to perpetrate terrorism in Pakistan. Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Shah Mehmood Qureshi in a joint press conference with ISPR's representative, Major General Babar Iftikhar stated that Pakistan has "irrefutable evidence" of India's involvement in carrying out numerous terrorist attacks in Pakistan. Major General Iftikhar presented the evidence to the national and international media, including bank transactions, documents, audio clips, and other necessary details of interactions between Indian diplomats and Intelligence operators with banned terrorist outfits that were operating from

⁴⁸⁵ See "Kulbhushan Jadhav Makes, Second 'Confession', Files Mercy Plea before Pakistan Army Chief," *The Wire*, June 22, 2017, <https://thewire.in/diplomacy/kulbhushan-jadhav-files-mercy-petition-before-pakistani-army>.

⁴⁸⁶ See Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Pakistan, "Pakistan Hands over Dossier on Indian Interference and Terrorism in Pakistan to UN Secretary-General," no. 008/ 2017, January 06, 2017, <https://mofa.gov.pk/pakistan-hands-over-dossier-on-indian-interference-and-terrorism-in-pakistan-to-un-secretary-general/>.

Afghan soil. Major General Iftikhar stated, “Uncontrivable evidence reveals that Indian embassies and consulates operating along Pakistan’s borders have become hubs of terror sponsorship against Pakistan. We have verifiable evidence of terrorist funding by India. Indian ambassadors in Afghanistan have been regularly supervising various terrorist activities.”⁴⁸⁷

Foreign Minister Qureshi pointed out that Indian Intelligence Agencies such as the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) are providing finance and training to terrorist groups. As per the claims of Pakistani diplomats, the major objective is to commit state terrorism to destabilize Pakistan by disrupting peace with promotion of the sub-nationalism, creating economic chaos and political instability. Foreign Minister Qureshi stated, “India is sabotaging CPEC as they know the project’s success can be an economic game changer for Pakistan.” The Foreign Minister highlighted that India had developed special cells to disrupt CPEC. He said that “the cell works under the supervision of the Indian Prime Minister and its mandate is to disrupt CPEC projects. A sum of Rs 80 billion has been allocated for this purpose. There are also reports that India has established a 700-strong militia to target CPEC projects.”⁴⁸⁸ As per the statistics provided by Pakistani officials, India has provided approximately Rs. 22 billion to terrorist outfits for perpetrating terrorism in Pakistan. The details of funding are tabulated below:

⁴⁸⁷ Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan Claims ‘Irrefutable Evidence’ of Indian Links to Terrorism on Pakistani Soil,” *Voice of America*, November 14, 2020, https://www.voanews.com/a/south-central-asia_pakistan-claims-irrefutable-evidence-indian-links-terrorism-pakistani-soil/6198372.html.

⁴⁸⁸ See “Pakistan Presents ‘Irrefutable Evidence’ of India’s Sponsorship of Terror to Sabotage CPEC,” *The Express Tribune*, November 14, 2020, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2272201/pakistan-presents-irrefutable-evidence-of-indias-sponsorship-of-terror-to-sabotage-cpec>.

Table 20: India's Funding to Terrorist Organizations

S. No.	Terrorist Organization	Indian Funded Amount
1	Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	2.88 Billion PKR
2	Balochistan Militant Organizations	18.57 Billion PKR
3	Altaf Hussain Group	0.51 Billion PKR
4	Azad Jammu Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan	0.02 Billion PKR
		21.98 Billion PKR

Source: Developed by Author

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan stated, “Pakistan has always been highlighting to the international community the politicization of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and undermining of its processes by India. The recent Indian statement is just further corroboration of its continued efforts to use an important technical forum for its narrow political designs against Pakistan.”⁴⁸⁹ Nevertheless, India denied Pakistani official charges of former involvement in terrorism on Pakistani territory. The Foreign Ministry of India termed the allegation as “fabricated” and “figments of imagination.” The Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Anurag Srivastava stated, “This desperate attempt will find few takers as the international community is aware of Pakistan’s tactics.” He further said that Pakistan itself is involved in funding terrorism. This indeed is an allegation that Pakistan also denies.⁴⁹⁰ Nevertheless, India introduced doctrinal changes to employ Hybrid Warfare including tactics such as supporting anarchy, media warfare, psychological warfare, cyber warfare, economic warfare, etc. against the adversary. Pakistan faced severe internal and external threats in the

⁴⁸⁹ See Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Pakistan, “Indian External Affairs Minister’s Confession of Politicizing FATF Against Pakistan,” no. 338/ 2021, July 19, 2021, <https://mofa.gov.pk/indian-external-affairs-ministers-confession-of-politicizing-fatf-against-pakistan/>.

⁴⁹⁰ See “‘Fabricated’: India Denies Pakistan ‘Terror’ Funding Allegations, ALJAZEERA, November 16, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/16/india-denies-pakistans-allegations-over-funding-of-militant-grou>.

war on terror where it fought as a front-line state to counter terrorism, while India employed Hybrid Warfare to destabilize Pakistan.

For instance, the EU DISINFO LAB report highlighted, India's driven widespread network active in Brussels and Geneva. It included dead people, dead media, dead think tanks, and NGOs, developed to spread disinformation and propaganda to target different countries, including Pakistan.⁴⁹¹ As per the report, the Indian Chronicles remained active for 15 years to defame Pakistan internationally. The network created and spread a massive volume of content across various platforms in the West in particular to shape public opinion and impact decision-makers. The campaign majorly maligned Pakistan as a country that supports extremism and terrorism while promoting India as a secular peaceful nation. The false stories and constructed narratives were augmented via a lethal combination of dead NGOs, dead think tanks, social media, and fake news websites thereby making it difficult to find the exact source of the information. Indian Chronicles significantly contributed to Pakistan's tarnished image for its role in the war on terror and its successes and sacrifices to counter-terrorism are systematically underestimated. Nevertheless, both states blame each other for involvement in supporting terrorism, insurgency, and proxies.

To sum up, for the last three decades, India has blamed Pakistan for the terrorism in the Indian Administered Kashmir and India. Based on this justification, India introduced offensive doctrinal changes to counter-insurgency such as surgical strikes as a punitive measure across LoC and international borders, by categorizing Pakistan as incapable or unwilling to counter-terrorism. Nevertheless, India's alleged support of proxies in Pakistan and naming-shaming

⁴⁹¹ See Gary Machado, Alexander Alaphilippe, Roman Adamczyk, and Antoine Gregoire, "Indian Chronicles: Subsequent Investigation: Deep Dive into a 15-year Operation Targeting the EU and UN to Serve Indian Interests," *EU DISINFO LAB*, December 9, 2020, <https://www.disinfo.eu/publications/indian-chronicles-deep-dive-into-a-15-year-operation-targeting-the-eu-and-un-to-serve-indian-interests/>.

campaigns based on coercive diplomacy indicates the complexity of the situation in South Asia. To conclude, the use of proxies under the nuclear overhang points towards the efficacy of the stability-instability paradox.

Conclusion

India failed to implement an offensive force employment strategy reckoned as CSD to fight a limited war against Pakistan due to its structural and organizational limitations. Nevertheless, India exploited the systemic forces and integrated into the Western world in a post-9/11 security environment. The convergence of interests between the US and India led to the development of a strategic partnership mainly to contain Chinese growing influence in the region. India underwent massive force modernization in the wake of Indo-US ties which boosted its confidence to adopt an offensive military posture in dealing with militancy. Importantly, India continuously upgraded its war-fighting doctrines to fight a limited war or launch small military operations such as surgical strikes in the nuclear domain. For instance, India introduced offensive doctrinal changes such as JDIAF-2017 and LWD-2018 to gain escalation dominance. Significantly, India's new offensive doctrines officially recognized small military operations and surgical strikes as a new tool to counter-insurgency within the country and across the borders. Critical analysis indicates that India intends to follow in the footsteps of the US and Israel to establish surgical strikes as a new normal in India-Pakistan bilateral military engagement. Both India and Pakistan blamed each other for supporting terrorism as a tool to achieve their respective gains. Importantly, India's offensive doctrinal changes to fight a limited war or launch small military operations such as surgical strikes based on coercive strategies in a nuclearized environment prove the efficacy of the stability-instability logic.

Chapter Six

India's Quest to Establish Surgical Strike as a New Normal (2016-2020)

India kept a constant eye on finding a space to fight LIC under the nuclear domain. Correspondingly, India introduced military doctrines such as JDIAF-2017 and LWD-2018, covering the entire spectrum of conflict. Two doctrinal provisions remained very significant with respect to the crisis and strategic stability of South Asia. First, India's doctrinally documented to shift from Credible Minimum Deterrence to Credible Deterrence. Second, the two doctrines officially acknowledged the launch of small military operations and surgical strikes as a part of a toolkit to counter terrorism in the Indian-administered Kashmir and also across the border, deep inside Pakistan. Traditionally, both India and Pakistan blame each other for supporting the proxies, insurgency, and other sub-conventional tactics including Hybrid warfare. Interestingly, the increased role of non-state actors coincided with the acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan. Few nuclear optimists argue⁴⁹² that the violent non-state actors do not represent the state. This is why they challenge the application of the stability-instability paradox between India and Pakistan. While other scholars such as Krepon, do include the aspect of non-state actors such as JeM and LeT in the calculation when analyzing India-Pakistan conflict dynamics in context of stability-instability paradox. This chapter focuses on impact of offensive doctrinal changes on conflict dynamics between the India and Pakistan covering the time period from 2016 to 2020.

⁴⁹² Adil Sultan, "South Asian Stability-Instability Paradox: Another Perspective," *IPRI Journal* XIV, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 31.

Recurring Violent Incidents in Nuclearized South Asia

Terrorism continues to occur as a recurring pattern in the Indian Administered Kashmir. For instance, four terrorists attacked a military base at Pathankot, leaving seven dead including the four terrorists.⁴⁹³ The terrorist incident occurred a week, after a surprise visit of the Prime Minister Modi to meet his counterpart in Pakistan. The high official visit was seen as a positive development to start talks between the two states that ceased due to the militant attacks.⁴⁹⁴ Indian officials blamed Pakistan-based terrorist groups for the terrorist incidents. Indian Home Minister, Rajnath Singh said that India desires to have peaceful relations with all of its neighbors including Pakistan but India will not tolerate terrorism and will give a befitting response to any terrorist incident.⁴⁹⁵ Thus, terrorism trashed the hope of peace that was emerged in the wake of Prime Minister Modi's visit to Pakistan.

Indian Minister of Defense Affairs, Manohar Parrikar, accused Pakistan of supporting terrorist groups in perpetrating terrorism in Indian Administer Kashmir.⁴⁹⁶ India diplomatically engaged the international community including the US to put pressure on Pakistan to eliminate terrorist outfits based on its territory. Subsequently, the world leaders condemned the terrorist incidents and expressed solidarity with Indian government and people. President of the US, Barack Obama extended condolences to the Indian leadership and to the people of India. The US President blamed Pakistan-based terrorist groups for the violent incident. President Obama said "Pakistan has an opportunity to show that it is serious about delegitimizing, disrupting, and dismantling terrorist networks. In the region and around the world, there must be zero

⁴⁹³ Khan, "Crisis Management in Nuclear South Asia," 153.

⁴⁹⁴ See "Punjab attack threatens India-Pakistan peace progress," *Aljazeera News*, January 2, 2016, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/1/2/punjab-attack-threatens-india-pakistan-peace-progress>.

⁴⁹⁵ See "Pathankot Attack JeM Role not Ruled Out, India will give Befitting Reply," *The Indian Express*, January 2, 2016, <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/pathankot-gun-battle-any-attack-will-be-given-befitting-reply-says-rajnath-singh/>.

⁴⁹⁶ See "Indian Defense Minister Blames Pakistan for Attack in India-held Kashmir," *Dawn*, June 26, 2016, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1267374>.

tolerance for safe havens and terrorists must be brought to justice.”⁴⁹⁷ To be clear, India efficiently employed a coercive diplomatic campaign against Pakistan to gather vital support from the international community which ultimately led to increase pressure on Pakistan to launch counter terrorism operations in its territory.

The US engaged leadership of the both countries to resume talks. The US particularly pressured Pakistan to eliminate terrorist networks from its territory. Subsequently, Prime Minister Modi and Prime Minister Sharif held a telecom conversation to discuss the situation in the aftermath of the terrorist attack. Prime Minister Sharif extended his condolences to Prime Minister Modi. He further expressed his resolve that Pakistan will not allow anyone to sabotage the peace process between India and Pakistan. The Prime Minister of Pakistan guaranteed in a meeting with his Indian counterpart that Pakistan would initiate an investigation to punish the terrorists involved in the terrorist incident, based on the information provided by India.⁴⁹⁸ President Obama emphasized both leaders to continue peace initiatives despite recurring violent episodes. Significantly, the US President appreciated Pakistan for its cooperation over terrorism with India.⁴⁹⁹ Pakistan launched an offensive operation against the terrorist groups and even arrested few of the members belonging to JeM. Additionally, Pakistan forwarded a proposal for a joint investigation team to look into the terrorist incident which India accepted. Thus, India and Pakistan with the active diplomatic engagement of the US cooperated to jointly tackle the menace of terrorism in the region.

⁴⁹⁷ See “Pakistan ‘Must’ Dismantle Terror Networks: Obama,” *The Hindu*, January 24, 2016, <https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/US-President-Barack-Obama-interview-with-PTI-at-Washington/article60540429.ece>.

⁴⁹⁸ Irfan Haider, “Nawaz-Modi Call: India Urges Pakistan to Act after Pathankot Airbase Attack,” *Dawn*, January 5, 2016, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1230945>.

⁴⁹⁹ Abdul Manan, “Kerry Urges Pakistan, India to Continue Talks despite Pathankot Attack,” *The Express Tribune*, January 9, 2016, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1024712/kerry-urges-pakistan-india-to-continue-talks-despite-pathankot-attack>.

Subsequently, Pakistan dispatched an investigation team to visit the incident site to probe into the Pathankot terrorist event.⁵⁰⁰ Everything was going normal between the two countries until Pakistani team shared their official stance that no proof had been found regarding Pakistan's connection with the terrorist attack and declared the event as a "drama staged by India to malign Pakistan."⁵⁰¹ It is important to mention here that the Pakistani investigation team's finding was endorsed by the Director General of the National Investigative Agency, India.⁵⁰² Consequently, the drop scene of the joint investigation team acted as a severe setback to the cooperation process and ended only with a blame game. For instance, India External Minister, Sushma Swaraj said that "terror and talks cannot go hand-in-hand."⁵⁰³ Thus, the two states once again indulge in the accusation-denial cycle between India and Pakistan.

To sum up, the peace process derailed where India focused on the elimination of proxies and terrorism while Pakistan emphasized the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Thus, peace and stability in a nuclearized South Asia remained a precarious phenomenon and terrorist incidents continued to happen such as the Uri Attack.

⁵⁰⁰ Salman Masood, "Pakistan Arrests Jaish Militants over Attack on Indian Air Base," *The New York Times*, January 13, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/14/world/asia/pakistan-india-pathankot-jaish-muhammad.html>.

⁵⁰¹ See "Diplomatic Disaster: Modi Govt under Fire over Pak Report on Pathankot" *Hindustan Times*, April 6, 2016, <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/modi-govt-under-fire-after-pak-media-claims-pathankot-attack-was-staged/story-lzUQdnhV5VdBoOAicZlul.html>; and Mian Abrar, "JIT Report Pokes Holes in India's Pathankot Theories," *Pakistan Today*, April 4, 2016, <https://archive.pakistantoday.com.pk/2016/04/04/jit-report-pokes-holes-in-indias-pathankot-theories/>.

⁵⁰² Shafqat Ali, "No Evidence of Pak Hand in Pathankot Attack: India," *The Nation*, June 3, 2016, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1262304>.

⁵⁰³ See "Sushma Swaraj Rules out Talks with Pakistan, John Kerry Says No Good or Bad Terrorist," *The Indian Express*, August 31, 2016, <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/sushma-swaraj-pakistan-terrorism-john-kerry-india-visit-3004565/>.

The Uri Attacks

The Uri terrorist incident occurred on September 18, 2016, amid a vibrant uprising in the Jammu and Kashmir. Four terrorists attacked an army installation located in Uri, in Indian Administered Kashmir, leaving 17 soldiers dead. During the military operation, Indian troops killed all of the attackers.⁵⁰⁴ In the aftermath of the terrorist incident, much like the past, both India and Pakistan engaged in the process of accusation and denial. India accused Pakistan of its alleged support to terrorists involved in the Uri attack whereas Pakistan denied the Indian allegation.⁵⁰⁵ Thus, terrorism continues to occur as a recurring pattern of violence, generating crises between India and Pakistan frequently under the nuclear domain, pointing to the efficacy of the stability instability paradox.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan (MOFA) stated that India is habitual in blaming Pakistan for any sort of violence that occurs in Indian Administered Kashmir or elsewhere in India. The MOFA pointed to the terror elements operating within India and emphasized that India should focus inside to counter terrorism.⁵⁰⁶ The MOFA called the Indian officials “vitriolic.”⁵⁰⁷ Significantly, India at that time was facing severe resistance in the valley. Prime Minister Sharif highlighted that “the Uri attack can be a reaction of atrocities in Kashmir, as the close relatives and near and dear ones of those killed and blinded over the last two months, were hurt and outraged. How could India accuse Pakistan only hours after the Uri

⁵⁰⁴ See “Militants Attack Indian Army Base in Kashmir ‘Killing 17’,” *BBC News*, September 18, 2016, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-37399969>.

⁵⁰⁵ Abbasi and Khan, *Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia*, 128.

⁵⁰⁶ Syed Sammer Abbas, “Pakistan Rejects India’s Allegations of Involvement in Terrorist Attack in Held Kashmir,” *Dawn News*, September 18, 2016, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1284555>.

⁵⁰⁷ See “Kashmir Attack: Pakistan Hits Back at India Accusations” *BBC News*, September 19, 2016, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37405719>.

incident without holding any inquiry or investigation?”⁵⁰⁸ Pakistan’s military leadership communicated Pakistan’s military preparedness to counter threats covering the entire spectrum of conflict.⁵⁰⁹ India based on compellence strategy halted cooperation over the Indus Water Treaty. Pakistan categorized it as an act of aggression and highlighted that it would take the case to the UNSC if India unilaterally withdrew from the Indus Water Treaty, which would be a clear violation of international law.⁵¹⁰ However, India continued to employ coercive diplomacy to force Pakistan to meet its demands such as elimination of proxies.

Surgical Strike in 2016: Continuation of Old Normal?

In the pre-nuclear era, India and Pakistan fought three large-scale wars employing brute force involving offence and defense strategies. In the post-nuclear era, the large-scale wars converted into limited war and sub-conventional warfare where the two states employed coercive strategies such as compellence and deterrence. The data indicates that both India and Pakistan have carried out small military operations such as raids across the LoC in the post-nuclear era. Interestingly, these small military actions were not publicized by the both governments due to political reasons.⁵¹¹ For instance, Shashank Joshi claimed that there are numerous such instances when the Indian Army crossed the LoC to attack the intended target, covering the period from 1991 to 2013.⁵¹² The details of those events are tabulated below:

⁵⁰⁸ See “Uri Attack Could be ‘Reaction’ to Situation in Kashmir: Nawaz Sharif” *The Economic Times*, July 14, 2018, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/uri-attack-could-be-reaction-to-situation-in-kashmir-nawaz-sharif/articleshow/54494539.cms>.

⁵⁰⁹ See “India propagating a ‘hostile narrative’ about Uri attack: Pak Army Chief,” *Hindustan Times*, September 19, 2016, <https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/india-propagating-hostile-narrative-about-uri-attack-pak-army-chief/story-LFHNI2z8BFDPOw4xtjMGSM.html>.

⁵¹⁰ See “Violation of Water Treaty Risks War, Senior Pakistan Official Warns, PM’s Adviser Aziz Says Country will not Accept any Form of Aggression,” *Gulf News*, September 27, 2016, <https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/pakistan/violation-of-water-treaty-risks-war-senior-pakistan-official-warns-1.1903026>.

⁵¹¹ Bratton and Smith, “India’s Joint Doctrine,”.

⁵¹² Shashank Joshi, “Everything that We Know about India’s Cross-LoC Strikes before Uri,” *Scroll.in* (October 5, 2016), <https://scroll.in/article/818324/everything-that-we-know-about-indias-cross-loc-strikes-before-uri>.

Table 21: Post Nuclear Era-Small Military Operations/ Raids (1991-2013)

S No	Year	Location	Details
1	1991	Nazar Pur, Azad Kashmir	Indian troops raided Pakistani posts across LoC 3 and killed 3 Pakistani soldiers.
2	1998	Bandala Seri Village, Azad Kashmir	Irregular forces backed by Indian troops raided across the LoC and killed 22 Kashmiri civilians. This event occurred in the aftermath of an attack carried out by LeT across the LoC killing 26 Indian civilians in Prankote and Dhakikot villages, Indian Administered Kashmir.
3	1999	Munawar Tawi River	Indian troops attacked across the LoC and destroyed the complete Pakistani post leading to a vicious cycle of revenge killings and counter-killings.
4	2000	Nadala Enclave, Neelam River	Indian troops raided and captured 7 Pakistani soldiers, taking them across the Neelam River. Later, the soldier bodies were returned to Pakistan.
5	2003	Baroh Sector, Near Bhimber Gali in Poonch	Indian troops in a raid killed 4 Pakistani soldiers including a Junior Commissioner Officer.
6	2008	Bhattal Sector in Poonch (Salhotri Village)	Indian troops in a raid killed 4 Pakistani soldiers. This violent event occurred in the aftermath of Pakistani troops' raid on the Kranti border observation post killing 2-8 soldiers.
7	2011	Sharda Sector, Kel	Indian troops in a raid killed 3 Pakistani soldiers.
8	2013	Sawan Patra	Indian troops raided a Pakistani post and killed one soldier.

9	2013	Neelam Valley, Azad Kashmir	4 Kashmiri people living on the Pakistani side of LoC disappeared. India denied any involvement. However, India killed 5 Kashmiri civilians at the same place, with an accusation that targeted people were guiding the Jihadists to cross the LoC.
---	------	-----------------------------	---

The small military operations such as raids or hot pursuits happened at regular intervals before the ceasefire agreement, signed in November 2003. Nevertheless, these limited offensive military actions continued to happen even after 2003. These small military operations of Indian and Pakistani troops across the LoC are categorized as old normal where both sides used to cross the ceasefire line to carry out raids involving ground troops to destroy the planned target. It is imperative to mention that not a single such raid or hot pursuit escalated to a serious crisis level, however these military actions do represents a distinct pattern of warfare between the two nuclear armed states. To sum up, both India and Pakistan did not publicize the old normal until India for the first time brought it to the limelight in the Uri Crisis. This thesis assumes that Uri's surgical strike is the continuation of the old normal. Significantly, the Uri surgical strike seems to be an upgraded shape of the old normal, nevertheless, the intensity of violence remained low.

India responded to the Uri terrorist incident in less than two weeks on September 28, 2016. India claimed that Indian troops carried out a surgical strike across the LoC, into Pakistani Kashmir to target terrorists who were engaged in planning to launch terrorist attacks in India.⁵¹³ In the aftermath of the claimed surgical strikes, the Ministry of External Affairs and

⁵¹³ Sophia Saifi, "Kashmir: Pakistan Calls Emergency Meeting amid 'Deteriorating Situation'," *CNN News*, September 30, 2016) <https://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/29/homepage2/kashmir-pakistani-soldiers-killed-india-surgical-strikes/index.html>.

the Ministry of Defense interacted with the media in a joint press conference to talk about the military action. The Director General of Military Operations (DGMO), Lieutenant General Ranbir Singh said “Some terrorist teams had positioned themselves at Launchpads along the Line of Control. The Indian army carried out a surgical strike last night at these Launchpads. Significant casualties have been caused to these terrorists and those who are trying to support them...The operations aimed at neutralizing the terrorists have since ceased.”⁵¹⁴ The limited military operation continued for four hours, starting at 12:30 AM till 04:30 AM. Indian authorities claimed that after the end of the special military operations, the special troops crossed LoC into Indian Administered Kashmir, where helicopters were ready to airlift them.⁵¹⁵ Thus, Indian authorities claimed and celebrated the offensive military operation to target terrorist outfits across the LoC. Critical analysis indicates that the Indian special troops were not dropped across the LoC inside Azad Kashmir, which makes the operation more like a raid than surgical strike. The troops did cross the LoC at certain points but not more than 1 kilometer inside Azad Kashmir to attack the nearby Pakistani military posts, for instance, the Madarpur-Titritnot area in the Poonch sector, Mundakali village in Leepa Valley, and Dudhnial area of Neelum Valley.⁵¹⁶ Apparently, it seems that India might have taken the US Operation Neptune Spear launched to target bin Laden, as a precedent to carry out small military operations across the LoC into the Pakistani side of Kashmir, nevertheless, there is a difference in the nature and character of the two military operations.

⁵¹⁴ Syed Sammer Abbas, “Army Rubbishes Indian ‘Surgical Strikes’ Claim as Two Pakistani Soldiers Killed at LOC,” *Dawn News*, September 29, 2016, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1286881>.

⁵¹⁵ Arka Biswas, “Surgical Strikes and Deterrence Stability in South Asia,” *ORF Occasional Paper*, no. 115 (June 2017): 7.

⁵¹⁶ Muhammad Ilyas Khan, “India’s ‘Surgical Strikes’ in Kashmir: Truth or illusion?” *BBC NEWS*, October 23, 2016, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-37702790>.

Interestingly, both Pakistan and the UN mission positioned at LoC to monitor the ceasefire situation also denied any such surgical strikes.⁵¹⁷ Further, India avoided sharing full details about the nature of the operation or any substantial evidence to support the claim of carrying out a surgical strike, thereby making things uncertain. Riaz Muhammad Khan categorized India's surgical strike in 2016 as dubious.⁵¹⁸ Pakistan Army arranged a visit for national and international media to show few of the sectors where the Indian Army claimed to carry out surgical strikes and destroyed alleged 'launch pads of terrorists'. Lieutenant General Asim Saleem Bajwa, Director General of Inter-Services Public Relations, had a detailed communication with the journalists during the visit. The Pakistani General stated, "No such incident took place nor will we allow any such incident to happen in the future." The DG ISPR further added, "If the adversary attempted so, it will be responded with an ever stronger force."⁵¹⁹ Pakistan's stance seems to have been validated by the report of an international agency such as the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan which claimed that it has not observed any such incident.⁵²⁰ Further, reputable international media such as the Washington Post,⁵²¹ and BBC,⁵²² who interacted with the local residents reported that India's claim to launch a surgical strike involving ground troops is contested.

Pakistan's former military intelligence service chief, General Asad Durrani, viewed the situation differently. He stated that the Indian armed forces were confronting a violent uprising

⁵¹⁷ Jaspal, *India's Surgical Strike*, 167.

⁵¹⁸ Khan, "Conflict Resolution and Crisis Management Challenges," 92.

⁵¹⁹ See "Journalists Debunk India's Claim of Surgical Strikes," *Daily Pakistan*, October 2, 2016, <https://dailytimes.com.pk/54228/journalists-debunk-indias-claim-of-surgical-strikes/>.

⁵²⁰ Hamza Rao, "No Proofs of Any 'Surgical Strikes' on LoC: UN Monitoring Group (UNMOGIP)," *Daily Pakistan*, October 1, 2016, <https://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/01-Oct-2016/no-proofs-of-any-surgical-strikes-on-loc-un-monitoring-group-unmogip>.

⁵²¹ Aamir Iqbal and Pamela Constable, "In Kashmir, Doubts that Indian Soldiers Infiltrated Across the Border," *The Washington Post*, October 2, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-kashmir-doubts-that-indian-soldiers-actually-infiltrated-across-the-border/2016/10/02/cbf46cec-88ac-11e6-8cdc-4fbb1973b506_story.html.

⁵²² Muhammad Ilyas Khan, "India Kashmir Strike: The View from Pakistan," *BBC News*, September 30, 2016, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37518200>.

in the valley. And the tactic of surgical strike is more like a face-saving act for New Delhi. Interestingly, the former intelligence chief referred Indian offensive operation as a hot pursuit rather than a constructed surgical strike rhetoric. Pakistan being cognizant of the situation in Indian Administered Kashmir and subsequent pressure on India, accepted the so-called description.⁵²³ Significantly, General Durrani's usage of the term hot pursuit, adds weightage to the speculation regarding the happening of this kind of limited military operations in the past (old normal discussed above). Interestingly, India intended to manifest an end to its strategic restraint and go offensive to counter-insurgency. Nevertheless, these small military operations such as raids or hot pursuits involving ground troops as a pattern of military confrontations remained confined to the LoC, between India and Pakistan.

To sum up, India employed a compellence strategy involving limited use of force to compel Pakistan to take action against the terrorist outfits allegedly based on its territory while Pakistan invalidated the action. Ostensibly, Pakistan acted rationalistically and absorbed the strike to avoid conflict escalation. Nevertheless, Pakistan mobilized its forces to skip the possibility of another Indian troop's offensive action across the LOC and international border, thereby keeping deterrence intact. Thus, the Uri Crisis did not escalate to large-scale war or strategic levels, thereby pointing to the decreasing intensity of violence and efficacy of stability-instability paradox logic.

⁵²³ Amarjit Singh Dulat, Aditya Sinha and Asad Durrani, *The Spy Chronicle: RAW, ISI and the Illusion of Peace* (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2018), 210.

Table 22: Post Nuclear Era-Uri Crisis

Year	War	India's Strategy		Pakistan's Strategy		Stability- Instability Paradox
		Coercion		Coercion		
		Compellence	Deterrence	Compellence	Deterrence	
2016	Uri Crisis	Compellence	-	-	Deterrence	Instability: Low Intensity of Violence

Source: Developed by Author

Role of the US as a Crisis Manager

The Uri crisis proved to be the higher point of confrontation between India and Pakistan since the 2008 Mumbai attacks. This time, India carried out targeted small military operation across the LoC on Pakistan's side of Kashmir, which of course the latter invalidated. The US explicitly supported India's stance on terrorism evident through the official statements during the Crisis.⁵²⁴ This further crystallized Pakistan's persistent uncertainties about the Indo-US ties to damage former's national interests. Though, the US officials were in regular communication with Islamabad during the crisis, a high-level interaction took a gap while India was preparing itself to launch offensive operation across the LoC. Pakistan had made an official request of a call between the US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo and Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah

⁵²⁴ Moeed W. Yusuf, "The Pulwama-Balakot Crisis: Flirting with a War in a Nuclear Environment," *Arms Control Association* (May, 2019), <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-05/features/pulwama-crisis-flirting-war-nuclear-environment>.

Mehmood Qureshi, nevertheless a delay from Washington compelled few in Islamabad to think if it was an intentional attempt to give space to India to launch offensive military action.⁵²⁵

Additionally, the US and Pakistan were not on good terms over the war on terror campaign in Afghanistan. The US troops were facing intensive insurgency within Afghanistan. The US blamed Pakistan for its alleged support of the Taliban. Meanwhile, violence continues to occur in Indian Administered Kashmir and India. Both the US and India blamed Pakistan for not taking action against the terrorist outfits based on its soil. The cold US-Pak relations due to the latter's support for the Taliban and Indo-US strategic partnership to contain China influenced the US behavior during the Uri Crisis. The US initially adopted a reluctant approach to playing its traditional role of a crisis manager. India showed off the strike as a preemptive nature against the terrorists engaged in planning terrorist attacks inside India. India diplomatically engaged the US to support its counter-terrorism operation. Washington did not discourage or criticize New Delhi for its offensive military action, instead blamed Islamabad as a problem creator. Later on, the US administration initiated diplomatic efforts and engaged both India and Pakistan to de-escalate the tensions.⁵²⁶ The US assured Pakistan that India would not carry out any further offensive military action, thereby the crisis led to its logical end with US diplomatic engagement.

⁵²⁵ Yusuf, "The Pulwama-Balakot Crisis,".

⁵²⁶ Moeed Yusuf, "An India-Pakistan Crisis: Should We Care?," *War on the Rocks* (November 29, 2016), <https://warontherocks.com/2016/11/an-indian-pakistan-crisis-should-we-care/>.

Table 23: Post Nuclear Era-Role of US in Uri Crisis

Year	Crisis	Role of US		Outcome of Conflict
		Active	Inactive	
2016	Uri Crisis	-	Inactive	Conflict Escalated

Source: Developed by Author

Pulwama Terrorist Incident: Violence as a Recurring Pattern

The killing of Burhan Wani led to a renewed cycle of violence in the Indian Administered Kashmir.⁵²⁷ For instance, three militants attacked the Nagrota military base, located in Indian Administered Kashmir on November 29, 2016, leaving seven Indian soldiers and all attackers dead.⁵²⁸ The terrorist incident further deteriorated relations between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, which had already received a severe blow due to the Uri Crisis. India charges Pakistan with arming and training militants fighting for independence, which the latter denies. The Kashmir dispute remained at the heart of the conflict between India and Pakistan throughout their history.

In another terrorist incident, four militants attacked the Indian military base in Sunjuwan, located in Jammu City, on February 10, 2018.⁵²⁹ The military operation which lasted for two days ended with the killing of all four attackers and leaving five Indian soldiers and dozens wounded.⁵³⁰ Once again, the same pattern of allegation-denial functioned between India and Pakistan. For instance, India blamed Pakistan-backed terrorist groups to be

⁵²⁷ See BBC NEWS, "Kashmir Attack: What's behind the Deadliest Militant Raid in Years?," (September 19, 2016), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37404372>.

⁵²⁸ Geeta Anand and Hari Kuma, "Militants Attack Indian Army Base in Nagrota, Inflaming Tensions with Pakistan," *The New York Times*, November 29, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/29/world/asia/kashmir-jammu-attack.html>.

⁵²⁹ Rifat Farid, "Indian Soldiers Killed in Kashmir Gun Battle," *Aljazeera News*, February 12, 2018, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/2/12/indian-soldiers-killed-in-kashmir-gun-battle>.

⁵³⁰ See "Jammu Army Camp Attack: 4 Militants Killed, 5 Soldiers Martyred as Operation Continues," *India Today*, February 11, 2018, <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/sunjuwan-terror-attack-3-terrorists-killed-1-still-holed-up-inside-army-camp-1166976-2018-02-11>.

responsible for attacking the Sunjuwan military base while the latter denied the accusations.

The MOFA responded to the Indian allegation and stated,⁵³¹

On the recent comments of the Defence Minister of India, it is stated that the now familiar Indian tendency of apportioning blame on Pakistan, without concrete evidence, is regrettable. The Indian allegations are premature and inopportune, especially as India itself admits that the operation continued and investigations had just started when these comments were made. We have repeatedly seen India arrogating to itself the role of judge, jury, and executioner. The reflex assignment of blame and smear campaigns, based on unfounded allegations, carry no credibility.

Significantly, terrorism continues to produce shocks in a nuclearized South Asian environment. For instance, a suicide bomber, named Adil Ahmad Dar, a local Kashmir young man, hit himself into an India security convoy in Pulwama, on February 14, 2019, killing forty security personnel. A few hours after the suicide bombing, JeM, a terrorist group, released a video of Dar, in which he expressed his association with JeM since 2018.⁵³² The Pulwama attack was one of the most serious terrorist incidents since the introduction of nuclear weapons in South Asia. Consequently, the terrorist incident created high tensions between enduring archrivals.⁵³³ In the aftermath of the Pulwama terrorist incident, the High Commission of India, Islamabad, Pakistan stated,⁵³⁴

In a heinous and despicable act of cross-border terror attack on the convoy of Indian security forces in Pulwama, Jammu & Kashmir on 14 February 2019, 40 security personnel were martyred. This terrorist act was perpetrated by Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), a Pakistan-based and supported terrorist organization proscribed by the United Nations and other countries, which is led by UN-designated and internationally proscribed terrorist Masood Azhar.

⁵³¹ See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, "Record of the Press Briefing by Spokesperson on 15 February 2018," February 15, 2018, <https://mofa.gov.pk/record-of-the-press-briefing-by-spokesperson-on-15-february-2018/>.

⁵³² See "Kashmir Attack: Tracing the Path that led to Pulwama," *BBC NEWS*, May 1, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-47302467>.

⁵³³ Vinay Kaura, "India's Pakistan Policy: From 2016 'Surgical Strike' to 2019 Balakot 'Airstrike'," *The Round Table* 109, No. 3 (2020): 280, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2020.1760499>.

⁵³⁴ See High Commission of India, Islamabad, Pakistan, "Bilateral Brief: India-Pakistan Relations," <https://india.org.pk/pages.php?id=16>.

India continuously blamed Pakistan for supporting terrorism. India employed coercive diplomacy by reaching out to powerful Western capitals and international institutions to compel Pakistan to stop supporting terrorist groups or otherwise India would take offensive punitive measures against it. While Pakistan rejected India's accusation of Pakistan's involvement in the terrorist incident. For instance, MOFA spokesperson, Dr. Muhammad Faisal stated, "We strongly reject any insinuation by elements in the Indian media and government that seek to link the attack to Pakistan without investigation."⁵³⁵ Pakistan condemned terrorism in all shapes and manifestations and extended cooperation to jointly tackle the menace of terrorism. The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan, shared the proposal with his counterpart in India, for cooperation and assistance in the investigation process. Prime Minister Khan expressed the resolve to take action against the alleged terrorists and requested Prime Minister Modi to share tangible proof. The Prime Minister of Pakistan stated, "If you (India) have any actionable intelligence that a Pakistani is involved, give it to us. I guarantee you that we will take action not because we are under pressure, but because they are acting as enemies of Pakistan."⁵³⁶ Prime Minister Khan also emphasized avoiding any irrational approach in the heat of time as it can lead the region toward catastrophic consequences. He further made a clear communication to India and the international community by stating that Pakistan would provide a befitting response if India preferred going offensive against it.⁵³⁷

⁵³⁵ Reuters Staff, "Pakistan Rejects Links to Attack in Indian Controlled Kashmir," *Reuters*, February 15, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/india-kashmir-attacks-pakistan-idINKCN1Q32S4>.

⁵³⁶ See "Imran Khan's Offer to Prosecute Pulwama Perpetrators a 'Lame Excuse': India," *The Wire*, February 19, 2019, <https://thewire.in/diplomacy/imran-khan-india-pakistan-pulwama>.

⁵³⁷ Nayanima Basu, "Open to Probe, but will retaliate if India attacks: Pakistan PM Imran Khan on Pulwama," *The Print*, February 19, 2019, <https://theprint.in/diplomacy/open-to-probe-but-will-retaliate-if-india-attacks-pakistan-pm-imran-khan-on-pulwama/194982/>.

However, India did not welcome Pakistan's offer and continued to use coercive diplomatic campaigns based on diplomatic compellence to pressure Pakistan. The Indian External Affairs Ministry declared the request of Prime Minister Khan about the provision of substantive evidence for investigating to bring the perpetrators to justice as a lame excuse.⁵³⁸ Thus, the continuing terrorism episodes created severe mistrust and uncertainty between India and Pakistan. Nevertheless, there is a visible change in India's approach to dealing with counter-insurgency. India's reluctance to accept Pakistan's offer to cooperate indicated that India is thinking of implementing a punitive strategy against Pakistan, based on the recent doctrinal changes such as JDIAF-2017 and LWD-2018. Consequently, the Pulwama terrorist incident finally led to the February episode, one of the serious military confrontations of the last two decades under a nuclear domain between India and Pakistan.

Implementation of Offensive Approach: Surgical Strikes as a New Normal

The introduction of nuclear weapons due to MAD successfully averted large-scale wars, thereby leading to stability at the strategic level and instability at the lower level of conflict. The instability in shape of sub-conventional warfare remained a common pattern of conflict in the post-nuclear era, pointing to the presence of stability-instability logic in South Asia. Interestingly, Indian doctrinal changes mentioning surgical strikes in the category of sub-conventional warfare to counter-terrorism inside and across the borders in the nuclearized environment, in itself strengthen the stability-instability paradox logic.

In the aftermath of Pulwama terrorist incident, India blamed Pakistan for backing militants involved in the Pulwama attack while Pakistan repudiated such allegations.⁵³⁹ India

⁵³⁸ See "India Spurns PM Khan's Olive Branch, Says Offer to Investigate is 'Lame Excuse'," *Dawn News*, February 19, 2019, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1464803>.

⁵³⁹ See "Balakot: Indian Air Strikes Target Militants in Pakistan: *BBC NEWS*, February 26, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47366718>.

as a punitive measure launched surgical strike across the international border at Balakot, Mansehra, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, on February 26, 2019. India claimed to have destroyed the training camp of JeM, a terrorist outfit, not only involved in carrying out the Pulwama terrorist incident but also blamed for being involved in planning more terrorist attacks in India.⁵⁴⁰ India for the first time employed aerial surgical strike since the 1971 war. India's surgical strike indicated a changed approach to dealing with militancy. It pointed to an end of the strategic restraint approach and practically crossed new frontiers in the India-Pakistan bilateral engagement. On February 27, Pakistan responded by carrying out surgical strikes targeting open fields across the LoC, generating signals of its resolve to counter India's actions across the entire spectrum of conflict based on FSD. Dr. Clary while responding to the question on India's objective behind the surgical strike said that,⁵⁴¹

India's surgical strike is a risky strategy in a nuclearized environment. Since the acquisition of nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan have avoided major wars in the post-nuclear era, nevertheless, India in particular is searching for ways to carry out small military operations such as aerial surgical strikes without crossing international borders and even if crossed, little intrusion is made.

Nevertheless, the IAF did make an intensive incursion in the aftermath of the Pulwama attack and crossed international borders to target the alleged terrorist group which Pakistan responded on the next day in kind. Also, India and Pakistan engaged in aerial warfare, traditionally seen as escalatory by leaders on both sides. India deliberately chose to strike Pakistan beyond Kashmir, signaling a willingness to cross new frontiers. India's surgical strike indicated that India would not take into account the threat of the use of nuclear weapons from the Pakistani side. Pakistan too had not responded in such a tit-for-tat manner in the previous

⁵⁴⁰ See High Commission of India, Islamabad, Pakistan, "Bilateral Brief: India-Pakistan Relations," <https://india.org.pk/pages.php?id=16>.

⁵⁴¹ Author's Interview with Assistant Professor Dr. Christopher Clary.

crisis (Uri Crisis) in the post-nuclear era, making this military engagement distinct as well as risky in comparison to past.

The events in the aftermath of the Pulwama terrorist attack do indicate a change in India-Pakistan military engagements. Previously, India used to employ a compellence strategy involving the threat of use of force or actual use of limited force involving ground troops to destroy targets across the LoC, reckoned as old normal. India based on offensive doctrinal changes such as JDIAD-2017 and LWD-2018, carried out surgical strikes to target the JeM camp, deep inside Pakistan to replicate the new normal in South Asia. Nevertheless, in contrast to the US and Israel where the targeted states failed to respond to them, Pakistan retaliated on the very next day to keep deterrence intact. This cyclical action-reaction military engagement points towards the establishment of surgical strikes as the new normal in India-Pakistan military engagements. Thus, the offensive military doctrines have made the surgical strikes a renewed pattern of bilateral likely engagement.

In the aftermath of the Pulwama terrorist attack, Indian Prime Minister Modi expressed its resolve to provide a befitting response. He stated, “This is an India of new convention and policy.”⁵⁴² India did express this changed approach to dealing with militancy by taking offensive military action to introduce a new normal in the India-Pakistan conflict. India dispatched 12 fighter jets (Mirage 2000) to hit targets across the international border deep in the Pakistani territory at Balakot.⁵⁴³ Nevertheless, there is mixed sort of information about aerial surgical strikes. For instance, India is celebrated its surgical strike as a new normal in

⁵⁴² Toby Dalton, “Signaling and Catalysis in Future Nuclear Crises in South Asia: Two Questions after the Balakot Episode,” *Carnegie Endowment for Endowment*, June 25, 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/06/25/signaling-and-catalysis-in-future-nuclear-crises-in-south-asia-two-questions-after-balakot-episode-pub-79373>.

⁵⁴³ See “19 Minutes, 12 Jets, a Big Target: This is what the IAF did in Pakistan While You Were Asleep,” *The Economic Times*, February 26, 2019, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/19-minutes-12-jets-3-targets-this-is-what-the-iaf-did-in-pakistan-while-you-were-asleep/articleshow/68164179.cms>.

India-Pakistan conflict dynamics, however, it is still not clear whether the fighter jets have destroyed terrorist camps or was it just a face-saving show to tame public sentiments in the wake of the Pulwama terrorist incidents.⁵⁴⁴ To be clearer, the satellite imagery also indicated that the IAF failed to destroy any important target in the aerial strikes. It is assumed that, as Indian general elections were about to be held, the incumbent government might have carried out a surgical strike to gain political mileage in the domestic elections.⁵⁴⁵ Thus, India did cross the international border yet its claim to target terrorist outfits planning further terrorist attacks inside India seems dubious. The contention is, that whether India successfully destroyed the target or not, it did indicate the resolve to implement offensive doctrinal changes developed with an objective to counter-insurgency within or across the borders.

It is imperative to mention that Pakistan did not introduced any doctrine in the wake of JDIAF-2017 and LWD-2018. Pakistan continued to rely on previous military posture, nevertheless, it did declare a policy to respond to India's small military operations and surgical strikes, reckoned as Quid Pro Quo Plus (QPQP). Lieutenant General Kidwai (Retd.) stated Pakistan has a "declared policy of 'Quid Pro Quo Plus' against a limited Indian attack."⁵⁴⁶ Pakistan's offensive military posture including FSD and QPQP express their resolve to climb the escalation ladder to keep deterrence intact. Thus, in response to India's surgical strikes, Pakistan launched "Operation Swift Retort" on February 27, 2019. PAF fighter jets (JF-17s and Mirages) hit 6 non-military targets dropping Stand-off Weapons (SOW) in the open

⁵⁴⁴ See "Get Ready for our Surprise: Pakistan Warns India it will Respond to Airstrikes" *The Guardian*, February 26, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/26/pakistan-india-jets-breached-ceasefire-line-kashmir-bomb>.

⁵⁴⁵ Sameer Lalwani and Emily Tallo, "Did India Shoot Down a Pakistani F-16 in February? This Just Became a Big Deal," *The Washington Post*, April 17, 2019, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/17/did-india-shoot-down-pakistani-f-back-february-this-just-became-big-deal/>.

⁵⁴⁶ Lieutenant General Deependra Singh Hooda (Retd.), "Three Years after Balakot: Reckoning with Two Claims of Victory," *Stimson Centre*, February 28, 2022, <https://www.stimson.org/2022/three-years-after-balakot-reckoning-with-two-claims-of-victory/>.

ground. PAF fleet also deployed F-16 aircraft, Electronic Warfare Aircraft, and Erieye AWACS in operation with the technical support of radars and AEWG.⁵⁴⁷ The senior Army officers hardly get away with PAF fighter jet strikes.⁵⁴⁸ Lieutenant General (Retd.) Khan, while responding to the nature of the strategy employed by Pakistan during the February episode, stated that,⁵⁴⁹

Pakistan introduced a range of warfighting doctrines and strategies including Full Spectrum Deterrence covering the entire spectrum of conflict nevertheless selecting a particular strategy to counter an enemy threat is fully dependent on a specific scenario. For instance, India carried out a surgical strike on February 26, 2019; it received Pakistan's befitting response on February 27, 2019. Nevertheless, the appropriate term for Pakistan's strategy is "situational response".

IAF scrambled fighter jets to counter PAF incursion that led to a dogfight between the two Air forces. During the aerial clash, PAF downed the IAF MiG-21 while Pakistani troops captured the parachuted IAF aircrew.⁵⁵⁰ PAF professionally employed electronic warfare technology, thereby limiting the effectiveness of IAF interceptors on February 27, 2019.⁵⁵¹ It seems that the IAF did not use its Integrated Air Defense System properly. More alarmingly, the Israeli-origin Spyder SAM system struck the IAF Mi-17 helicopter, leaving six aircrews onboard dead.⁵⁵² PAF hit MiG-21, and its wreckage fell into Pakistani Kashmir. While IAF claimed downing F-16 aircraft, an assertion denied by the US-based technical experts and officials.⁵⁵³ The February episode reflected IAF organizational and structural loopholes,

⁵⁴⁷ Ahmed and Ashraf, "The Pulwama-Balakot Crisis," 7.

⁵⁴⁸ See "Indian Army Commanders left Brigade HQ 'minutes before' PAF Bomb fell in the Compound 27 Feb," *The Print*, May 27, 2019, <https://theprint.in/defence/indian-army-commanders-left-brigade-hq-minutes-before-paf-bomb-fell-in-compound-27-feb/241324/>.

⁵⁴⁹ Authors' Interview with Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Tariq Khan.

⁵⁵⁰ Tufail, "Changing Dynamics of Air Warfare", 5-6.

⁵⁵¹ Air Cdre (Retd) Kaiser Tufail, "Pulwama – From Bluster to Whimper," *Kaiser Tufail Blogspot*, June 1, 2019, <http://kaiser-aeronaut.blogspot.com/2019/06/pulwama-from-bluster-to-whimper.html>.

⁵⁵² Dinaker Pari, "How did an Indian Airforce Mi-17 Helicopter get Shot Down by the IAF?," *The Hindu*, June 2, 2019, <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/how-did-an-indian-air-force-mi-17-helicopter-get-shot-down-by-the-iaf/article27400844.ece>.

traditionally considered superior to PAF. Thus, the short battle between the two Air Forces in February 2019 turned out to be in favor of PAF. After the dogfight, Pakistan's ISPR spokesperson, Major General Asif Ghafoor stated, "Staying within our jurisdiction, six targets were locked. And we carried out the strike. Today's action was in self-defense; we do not want to claim any victory. The way we set out the target and made sure that there was no collateral damage, the inbuilt message was that despite our capability, we look towards peace."⁵⁵⁴

The Pulwama-Balakot Crisis has all the potential to convert into a limited or large-scale war. India envisaged launching missile strikes across the international border, deep inside Pakistan.⁵⁵⁵ Though, it remained unclear, what exactly Indian leadership was planning at that time. For instance, did India desire to target more alleged terrorist outfits or planning to target Pakistan's military installations? Prime Minister Modi later on in a public gathering on April 22, 2019, acknowledged the fact India was all-prepared to fire 12 missiles across the border into Pakistan in a "qatal ki raat" – "a night of bloodshed".⁵⁵⁶ Also, India deployed a Naval Submarine on March 4, 2019, which the Pakistan Navy intercepted near its territorial waters.⁵⁵⁷ Indian leadership's contemplation of launching missile attacks against Pakistan and deployment of Naval Submarine did raise concerns about the possible shift in India's nuclear posture. Nevertheless, many Indian scholars have repudiated the claims that India is moving towards an FU posture.⁵⁵⁸ Significantly, Pakistan denied the incentive for India to further escalate.

⁵⁵³ Seligman, "Did India Shoot Down a Pakistani Jet?"

⁵⁵⁴ See "2 Indian Aircraft Violating Pakistani Airspace Shot Down; Pilot Arrested," *Dawn*, February 27, 2019, <https://dikhawa.pk/blogs/dawn-news/2-indian-aircraft-violating-pakistani-air-space-shot-down-pilot-arrested>.

⁵⁵⁵ Sanjeev Miglani and Drazen Jorgic, "India, Pakistan Threatened to Unleash Missiles at Each Other: Sources," *Reuters*, March 17, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/india-kashmir-crisis-page-idINKCN1QZ0F1>.

⁵⁵⁶ Salman Bashir, "The China–India–Pakistan Nuclear Triangle: Consequential Choices for Asian Security," *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament* 5, no. 2 (2022): 343, <https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/25751654.2022.2141053m>.

⁵⁵⁷ Naveed Siddiqui, "Pakistan Navy Foils an Attempt by Indian Submarine to Enter Pakistani Waters," *Dawn*, March 5, 2019, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1467778>.

Lieutenant General Kidwai (Retd.) pointing to the efficacy of deterrence stated,⁵⁵⁹ “It’s precisely these nuclear weapons which have deterred India from expanding operations beyond a single unsuccessful airstrike.” India exercised restraint to avoid further escalation of the conflict, however, India’s missile attack could have seriously endangered the deterrence stability in the region. Few Indian scholars such as Dr. Karnad views nuclear deterrence with a different lens. He opined that,⁵⁶⁰

I have long contended that Pakistan is incapable of following through with action in case of deterrence breakdown with India because, in a nuclear war, the cost-exchange ratio does not work for Pakistan. Because the certainty is this: For the loss of two Indian cities (say, Delhi and Mumbai) all of Pakistan will become extinct (as a social organism). This is a realistic prospect GHQ, Rawalpindi, is mindful of, and, therefore, Pakistani nuclear weapons are for Islamabad’s peace of mind because they provide foolproof security for which the threshold for initiation is very, very high.

Initially, both India and Pakistan celebrated their surgical strikes as a success.⁵⁶¹ India viewed surgical strikes as the new normal, pointing to its changed approach to dealing with terrorism while Pakistan perceived that it was capable of dealing with any sort of aggression from India, covering the entire spectrum of conflict in line with FSD and QPQP. Pakistan too in a way accepted and also established surgical strikes as a new pattern of military engagement, by responding to India in kind the next day. This study predicts that surgical strikes as a new normal are a renewed pattern of likely bilateral engagement in the future times. Any terrorist incident in Indian-administered Kashmir or elsewhere in India could trigger India to carry out raids or surgical strikes across the LoC or international borders. India enjoys international

⁵⁵⁸ Abhijnan Rej, “India Is Not Changing Its Policy on No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,” *War on the Rocks*, March 29, 2017, <https://warontherocks.com/2017/03/india-is-not-changing-its-policy-on-no-first-use-of-nuclear-weapons/>.

⁵⁵⁹ Quoted in Hamza Azhar Salam and Murtaza Ali Shah, “Lt Gen (r) Kidwai warns India not to take Pakistan's nuclear capability as a 'bluff',” *The News International*, February 7, 2020, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/610366-lt-gen-r-kidwai-warns-india-not-to-take-pakistans-nuclear-capability-as-a-bluff>.

⁵⁶⁰ Author’s Interview with Professor Dr. Bharat Karnad.

⁵⁶¹ Moeed W. Yusuf, “The Pulwama Crisis,” *Arms Control Today* 49, no. 4 (2019): 6-11, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26732415>.

support which remained evident during the Uri Crisis and Pulwama-Balakot Crisis, which would further encourage India to adopt an offensive posture vis-à-vis Pakistan. Pakistan would have no choice but to retaliate to India's small military operation or surgical strikes, thereby creating problems for crisis stability in the region. Miscalculation by any party during the crisis could come up with serious consequences for the regional strategic stability. Thus, the new normal holds all the potential to escalate a limited conflict to large-scale war or even reach strategic levels.

Interestingly, India absorbed Pakistan's offensive response on February 27, 2019. India did not escalate the crisis during the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis. India's rationalistic approach to avoid any further course of offensive action averted conflict escalation. To sum up, India employed a compellence strategy involving limited use of force, to compel Pakistan to stop alleged support to terrorism and take action against the alleged terrorist outfits based on its territory. In contrast to the Uri crisis, Pakistan responded in a much more compulsive mode in the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis by employing limited use of force to keep deterrence intact. It could, therefore, be concluded that during the Pulwama-Balakot crisis, India's compellence was overridden by Pakistan's 'deterrence by denial' strategy.

Table 24: Post Nuclear Era-Pulwama Balakot Crisis

Year	Crisis	India's Strategy		Pakistan's Strategy		Stability- Instability Paradox
		Coercion		Coercion		
		Compellence	Deterrence	Compellence	Deterrence	
2019	Pulwama-Balakot Crisis	Compellence	-	-	Deterrence	Instability: Low Intensity of Violence

Source: Developed by Author

US Crisis Management

The US remained active as a consistent crisis manager in the post-nuclear era (covert and overt) except the last two crises (Uri Crisis and Pulwama-Balakot Crisis). Dr. Zeb while responding to a question on the role of the US during the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis stated,⁵⁶²

American role as a crisis manager has gradually been eroded in South Asia. Although during the Kargil Crisis, Washington DC completely sided with the Indians that was mostly due to a lack of clarity on how to respond to the new developments in the region and also because the Clinton administration was unsure how to keep both sides engaged and not adversely affect its newly achieved goodwill with the Indians. However, since the USA has recognized India's position as a strategic ally and acknowledged it as a counterweight to China, it cannot be taken as an honest or impartial broker in South Asia. Balakot crisis is a prime example of this.

The US reluctant approach to play a crisis manager role is due to multiple reasons such as: First, the US after the Mumbai Attacks expressed sympathy towards India and viewed Pakistan as a problem creator. Further, the US blamed Pakistan for playing a dubious role in the war on terror, where the latter was accused of supporting the Taliban. Significantly, the terrorism in the Indian Administered Kashmir and India coincided with the US's lack of success against the Taliban in Afghanistan, ultimately paving the way for the US to support India's stance on terrorism. Second, Indo-US developed closed ties in the post-9/11 security scenario, majorly to contain the growing influence of China. The US views India as an offshore balancer to China in the Indo-Pacific region. Thus, the US changing interests in the region amidst the US-China systemic competition altered its role as a crisis manager.

⁵⁶² Author's Interview with Associate Professor Dr. Rizwan Zeb. Dr. Zeb is DS (Research) Air War College Institute, Karachi. He is a former Benjamin Meaker Professor in Politics, University of Bristol. He is currently finalizing his book on strategic stability in South Asia. His papers have appeared in various national and international peer-reviewed journals.

For instance, contrary to its traditional role of consistent crisis manager, the US supported India's changed approach to deal militancy which further boosted the latter's confidence to act aggressively. Consequently, India launched a surgical strike across the international border to punish Pakistan. Dr. Yamin, a senior Pakistani expert, while responding to a question related to the US during the Pulwama-Balakot crisis commented, "The Americans have chosen Indians as their strategic partners and any expectations that they will act as honest brokers to defuse an India-Pakistan crisis are misplaced. The Indian air attacks in Jabba in Balakot took place after the India got a nod from the US for a so-called Counter Terror strike."⁵⁶³ The US officials' accommodative statements in favor of India amidst the crisis crystallized Pakistan's perpetual fears regarding the Indo-US partnership hampering the interests of Pakistan.⁵⁶⁴

Pakistan's retaliatory air strikes and further, downing of the IAF fighter jet made the US tone and tenor quickly revert to its traditional unequivocal priority of immediate de-escalation. For instance, the US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, in the aftermath of Pakistan's retaliation emphasized both parties to "avoid escalation at any cost." Further, the international community also understood the gravity of the situation and aligned their messaging with the US in equally unequivocal terms to avoid further escalation of the conflict.⁵⁶⁵ On persuasion of the US, Pakistan released the IAF pilot as a goodwill gesture for peace on March 1, 2019. The US praised Pakistan's rationalistic gesture and this initiative assisted in the de-escalation of the crisis. If Pakistan had not released the IAF aircrew; the conflict could have escalated. For instance, Dr. Clary realized the sensitivity associated with IAF aircrew during the crisis,

⁵⁶³ Author's interview with Professor Dr. Tughral Yamin.

⁵⁶⁴ Yusuf, "The Pulwama Crisis,".

⁵⁶⁵ See "From US to UK, Major World Powers Urge India, Pakistan to Avoid Further Military Action," *Indian Express*, February 27, 2019.

he stated, “Any of the offensive military moves can result in nuclear use. He further pointed out if pilot would have been killed during the dogfight or on the ground by local people, and the escalatory patterns could have been out of control. The US played a significant role in the whole process.”⁵⁶⁶

Nevertheless, the belated US role as a crisis manager did assist in averting further escalation. While few of the Indian scholars opines otherwise. For instance, Dr. Basrur while responding to a question related to the role of the US during the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis opined that in any case, India has not and will not allow a third party including the US to mediate between India and Pakistan.⁵⁶⁷ Almost the same perspective was shared by Dr. Karnad who opined that as time passes, the US will be less and less relevant as a South Asia crisis manager because the Indian government is progressively less willing to entertain an American mediatory or any such role.⁵⁶⁸ Contrarily, the evidence indicated that the US diplomatic efforts were vital in releasing the IAF pilot which subsequently led to ease in tensions between the two rival states. Dr. Clary while responding to a question on the role of the US during Pulwama-Balakot Crisis stated,⁵⁶⁹

There is no better crisis manager available other than the US. Gulf countries played some sort of role in the February episode to de-escalate the tensions but no significant evidence is out there. Both China and Russia are not in a position to replace the US. Russia is possibly to play a role between India and Pakistan shortly. Trump administration was not ready for the role of crisis manager due to its commitments across the world such as Afghanistan. Senior Trump administration handled the crisis with boredom and further, John Bolton expressed sympathetic statements in favor of India. Nevertheless, the US successfully de-escalated the crisis. Both countries need to understand that the US may express reluctance to play the role because of its commitments.

⁵⁶⁶ Author’s Interview with Assistant Dr. Christopher Clary.

⁵⁶⁷ Author’s Interview with Professor Dr. Rajesh Bathe srur.

⁵⁶⁸ Author’s Interview with Professor Dr. Bharat Karnad.

⁵⁶⁹ Author’s Interview with Assistant Professor Dr. Christopher Clary.

To sum up, India's offensive approach is linked to Indo-US strategic partnership amidst US-China systemic competition. The US played a significant role in shaping the crisis outcomes in the post-nuclear era (covert and overt). The US initially remained reluctant to play its traditional role as a crisis manager in the last two crises, nevertheless, it got active later on which assisted in avoiding further conflict escalation. To be clear, since the acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan, the US actively played a crisis manager role in four instances such as the Compound Crisis, the Kargil Crisis, the Twin Peaks Crisis, and the Mumbai Crisis. Whereas, the US initially remained reluctant to play an active role but reverted to crisis management during the last two crises such as the Uri Crisis and the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis. The US prioritized conflict de-escalation, once both India and Pakistan in an action-reaction used limited force against each other. Critical analysis indicates that, the US role as a crisis manager has declined for several reasons: One, the US-Pakistan trust level has decreased as the US interest has shifted away from Pakistan to India; Two, the US degree of influence and leverage over India has decreased as the US does not want to go against India's aspiration that is a key player in the Asia-Pacific region to outweigh China's influence; Three, the US has no economic and diplomatic aptitude to play a role as a crisis manager as its interest has shifted from South Asia to Indo-Pacific; finally, the crisis was new in a way that in the absence of the US mediation, India carried out aerial surgical strikes against militants deep inside Pakistan to prove a new war-fighting tactic based on its offensive doctrinal changes to establish surgical strikes a new normal between India-Pakistan bilateral military engagement.

Table 25: Nuclear Era-Role of the US as a Crises Manager (1986-2019)

S. No.	Year/ Crisis		Role of US		Outcome of Conflict
			Active	Inactive	
1	1986	Brasstacks Crisis	-	-	Conflict De-escalated
2	1990	Compound Crisis	Active	-	Conflict De-escalated
3	1999	Kargil Crisis	Active	-	Conflict De-escalated
4	2001-02	Twin Peaks Crisis	Active	-	Conflict De-escalated
5	2008	Mumbai Crisis	Active	-	Conflict De-escalated
6	2016	Uri Crisis	-	Inactive	Conflict Escalated. Nevertheless, the belated US crisis manager role led to conflict de-escalation.
7	2019	Pulwama-Balakot Crisis	-	Inactive	Conflict Escalated. Nevertheless, the belated US crisis manager role led to conflict de-escalation.

Source: Developed by Author

Adequacy of Stability-Instability Paradox and Coercive Spectrum

The states' doctrinal changes and nuclear weapons led to a change in the character and nature of war where large-scale wars converted into small military operations and surgical strikes, pointing to the adequacy of stability-instability paradox. For instance, there are two core assumptions of stability-instability: First, the acquisition of nuclear weapons will increase the tensions between the two rival states.⁵⁷⁰ The existence of nuclear weapons has arguably deterred India and Pakistan from engaging in a large-scale war, however, both nuclear-armed states experienced numerous crises including a limited war and surgical strikes under a nuclear overhang. Nevertheless, one of the key factors that remained at the center of all crises is the role of non-state actors. Both countries accuse each other of involvement or supporting

⁵⁷⁰ Krepon, "The Stability-Instability Paradox," 263.

terrorism. India accuses Pakistan of supporting terrorist groups that have carried out violent attacks in Indian Administered Kashmir and India. While, Pakistan blames India for its support of terrorist groups in the troubled province of Baluchistan, Pakistan. The presence of nuclear weapons has not deterred non-state actors from engaging in terrorism or other forms of violence. Interestingly, the phenomenon of terrorism has coincided with the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Since the nuclearization of India and Pakistan, the region has witnessed an increased role of non-state actors pointing towards LIC and much in line with the stability-instability paradox.

The second core assumption of the stability-instability paradox is that despite the increased level of tensions and numerous crises, the nuclear-armed rivals will evade a large-scale war or use of nuclear weapons.⁵⁷¹ One of the primary ways in which nuclear weapons have contributed to stability in the India-Pakistan conflict is by serving as a powerful deterrent against all-out war between the two rival countries. India and Pakistan experienced numerous crises in the post-nuclear era, however, no single crisis escalated to large-scale war or use of nuclear weapons. Thus, the stability-instability paradox is a suitable lens for studying India-Pakistan conflict dynamics. On the one hand, the possession of nuclear weapons has contributed to a degree of stability in the region by deterring an all-out war between India and Pakistan. On the other hand, the presence of nuclear weapons has also contributed to ongoing instability by encouraging smaller-scale conflicts and by failing to deter non-state actors from engaging in violence. The study finds that the stability-instability paradox is suitable for understanding India-Pakistan conflict dynamics, however the how and why the low-intensity conflict is fought demands further deliberation and assistance from the coercive spectrum.

⁵⁷¹ Krepon, "The Stability-Instability Paradox," 263.

Table 26: Adequacy of Stability-Instability Paradox and Coercive Spectrum

S No	Year	Crises	India's Strategy		Pakistan's Strategy		Stability- Instability Paradox
			Coercion		Coercion		
			Compellence	Deterrence	Compellence	Deterrence	
1	1986	Brasstacks Crisis	Compellence	-	-	Deterrence	Instability: Low Intensity of Violence
2	1990	Compound Crisis	Compellence	-	-	Deterrence	Instability: Low Intensity of Violence
3	1999	Kargil Crisis	-	Deterrence	Compellence	-	Instability: Low Intensity of Violence
4	2001- 2002	Twin Peaks Crisis	Compellence	-	-	Deterrence	Instability: Low Intensity of Violence
5	2008	Mumbai Crisis	Compellence	-	-	Deterrence	Instability: Low Intensity of Violence
6	2016	Uri Crisis	Compellence	-	-	Deterrence	Instability: Low Intensity of Violence
7	2019	Pulwama- Balakot Crisis	Compellence	-	-	Deterrence	Instability: Low Intensity of Violence

Source: Developed by Author

In total, seven crises erupted in the post nuclear era from 1974 to 2020, whereas two of them occurred from 1986 to 1998 (covert nuclearization) and the remaining five crises occurred from 1998 to 2020 (overt nuclearization era). India employed deterrence by denial in the Kargil Crisis while India six-times employed a compellence strategy (threat of use of force, limited use of force, and coercive diplomacy) such as the Brasstacks Crisis, the Compound Crisis, the Twin Peaks Crisis, the Mumbai Crisis, the Uri Crisis and lastly, the Pulwama Crisis. On the other hand, Pakistan one-time employed a compellence strategy involving limited use of force in the Kargil Crisis. While, six-times employed deterrence strategy such as the Brasstacks Crisis, the Compound Crisis, the Twin Peaks Crisis, the Mumbai Crisis, the Uri Crisis and the Pulwama Crisis. Nevertheless, the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis is distinct in a manner that Pakistan based on deterrence strategy employed limited use of force to keep deterrence intact. To sum up, deterrence in the backdrop of Pulwama-Balakot aerial surgical strikes eroded, which was restored but its spirit was challenged.

Is India on a Road to Shift Nuclear Posture?

Both India and Pakistan introduced military doctrines and war-fighting strategies to fight and win wars under the nuclear domain. Significantly, India based on compellence strategy carried out surgical strikes in the Uri Crisis (2016) and Pulwama-Balakot Crisis (2019). This generates an interesting theoretical and doctrinal question, Is India's compellence strategy an indication of change in its nuclear posture? To be clear, a compellence strategy is difficult to implement in comparison to deterrence, particularly in a nuclearized environment. The compellence strategy contradicts the minimum deterrence policy.⁵⁷² Broadly speaking, the credible minimum deterrence is associated with NFU posture. Traditionally, it is assumed that India unwillingly acquired the nuclear weapons and further, pursued the NFU posture majorly to

⁵⁷² Basrur, *Minimum Deterrence*, 100.

avoid large-scale wars. However, India's continuous nuclear restraint is likely to be ambiguous now. India is maximizing its capabilities and disseminating policy statements regarding preemptive and counterforce measures that contradict the minimum deterrence or assured retaliation. Thereby, the evolving doctrines and competing strategies in South Asia have created problems for strategic stability.

In South Asia, the strategic environment has been changing due to dramatic military developments and doctrinal upgradations. It is one of the most complicated regions where India bolsters its security to offset the balance with China (at a time when the latter's political and economic influence is rising in Asia) which in turn undermines Pakistan's deterrent effects in the region. Thus, Pakistan perceives India's force modernization to be detrimental to its security. Dr. Khan while commenting on India's evolving doctrinal posture stated,⁵⁷³

India's evolving doctrinal force posturing and force modernization surely undermine deterrence and broader South Asia strategic stability. As India modifies its doctrinal force posture for offensive designs against Pakistan and increases and modernizes its conventional and nuclear forces, it certainly increases its security while decreasing the security of Pakistan. This creates a classic security dilemma which if not reduced timely and effectively could increase the chances of serious military conflicts between the South Asian nuclear rivals.

India-Pakistan hostility has intensified in the backdrop of leading security patterns such as cross-border terrorism, the February episode, and New Delhi's revocation of articles 370 and 35A on Kashmir.⁵⁷⁴ Further, the doctrinal changes, continuous deterrent force modernization, inclusion of nuclear weapons in states' inventories, and evolving force postures incline to refresh the imperatives of the classic security dilemma when the Asian rivals' states fell into the trap of unresolvable arms racing problems. For example, India's nuclear strategy

⁵⁷³ Author's interview with Professor Dr. Zafar Khan.

⁵⁷⁴ The Kashmir dispute started after the partition of India in 1947 as a dispute over the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir and escalated into three wars between India and Pakistan and several other armed skirmishes. For more details, see Cohen, *Shooting for a Century*.

for the advancement of Ballistic Missiles Development (BMD), Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Multiple independently targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), Submarines equipped with nuclear technology, Aircraft Carriers, and Hi-Tech cutting-edge new technologies⁵⁷⁵ and deployment of new surveillance means continue to create fear and uncertainty for Pakistan, thereby making it less secure against India.

India's coercive strategies based on offensive doctrinal evolution and further, growing nuclear efficiency and sufficiency puts it on an advantageous pedestal that triggers a new debate in India on modifying their IND and NFU posture. One of the senior Pakistani retired military officials while responding to a question on Indian nuclear policy stated,⁵⁷⁶

India has just constructed the narrative of the No First Use policy; it is pursuing the First Use policy in practical terms. Indian officials time and again expressed the use of preemptive strikes against Pakistan. What does it mean? It is the indication of its First Use policy. India has long abandoned the First Use policy.

However, Dr. Basrur is of the view that occasional doubts have been raised, but nothing serious is going to happen. He opines that India will keep pursuing the NFU posture.⁵⁷⁷ Conversely, Dr. Clary opines that "Indian nuclear policy may change in the future but I suspect they are comfortable with ambiguous nuclear posture. India may continue with NFU or switch to FU but to be clear it has the option to go for FU in specific circumstances."⁵⁷⁸ India brought drastic changes in its conventional doctrines. The question arises, Are Indian doctrinal changes on the conventional levels are in compatibility with its nuclear doctrines? Dr. Khan when asked to comment on the compatibility between India's conventional offensive doctrines and nuclear doctrine/ posture stated, "Conventional forces always remain complementary to nuclear forces.

⁵⁷⁵ For more details see Abbasi and Khan, *Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia*.

⁵⁷⁶ Author's Interview with Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Naeem Khalid Lodhi.

⁵⁷⁷ Author's Interview with Professor Dr. Rajesh Basrur.

⁵⁷⁸ Author's Interview with Assistant Professor Dr. Christopher Clary.

India surely could be thinking of strategizing its conventional forces complement to its modernized conventional forces along those lines conceived here.”⁵⁷⁹

Traditionally, it is perceived that India has pursued NFU postures since 1999. However, India’s high-profile elites now conceptualize the attainment of an FU posture and preemptive counter-force strike options against Pakistan. Arguably, nuclear efficiency and nuclear learning have changed the Indian military strategist’s mindset which has triggered a new debate on the adoption of preemptive strikes as a force posture against Pakistan. Ostensibly, it appears that India is moving away from the commitment of minimum deterrence and NFU and further, transforming the nuclear strategy to the massive retaliation for war fighting against the adversary. Dr. Khan while commenting on Indian possible shift in nuclear policy asserted,⁵⁸⁰

Although India still officially maintains that it follows NFU, there is strong evidence in the existing literature that India is likely to depart away from its so-called NFU to FU where it could be able to use its nuclear forces in the event of serious military crises. Such offensive modification could further undermine strategic stability in South Asia.

Clary and Vipin Narang argue that the new development in nuclear doctrine is the correct assessment of this fact in a way, India is exploring and developing the options to efficiently target Pakistan’s strategic nuclear systems.⁵⁸¹ Narang argued that “serious revision of Indian nuclear doctrine may be in the offing – even to the extent of entertaining pre-emptive strikes against Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent.”⁵⁸² Dr. Zeb while responding to the question on possible change in Indian nuclear posture argued that, “the general view, at least in Pakistan is

⁵⁷⁹ Author’s Interview with Professor Dr. Zafar Khan.

⁵⁸⁰ Author’s Interview with Professor Dr. Zafar Khan.

⁵⁸¹ Clary and Narang, “India’s Counterforce Temptations,” 08.

⁵⁸² Michael Krepon, “The Counterforce Compulsion in South Asia,” *Stimson Centre*, April 27, 2017, <https://www.stimson.org/2017/counterforce-compulsion-south-asia/>; and for further details see, discussion on “Plenary – Beyond the Nuclear Threshold: Causes and Consequences of First Use,” *Carnegie Endowment for Peace*, March 20, 2017, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/20/plenary-beyond-nuclear-threshold-causes-and-consequences-of-first-use-pub-64779>.

that it is. Another view is that the revised nuclear doctrine of India already had this element. Also, note that such policies are mostly for peacetime and diplomatic purposes. How exactly it materializes in the fog of war is a different thing.”⁵⁸³

Former National Security Advisor of India, Shiv Shankar Menon, also pointed to a change in Indian posture when he stated “India will not allow Pakistan to go first.”⁵⁸⁴ This indicates that India intends to disarm Pakistan from its nuclear weapons. He further stated, “If Pakistan were to use tactical nuclear weapons against India, even against Indian forces in Pakistan, it would effectively be opening the door to a massive Indian first strike, having crossed India's declared red lines.”⁵⁸⁵ Additionally, Menon has warned that the strategic shift in the Indian doctrine to a nuclear war-fighting posture may lead to an arms racing problem instead of enhancing the effectiveness of deterrence stability. While Krepon asserts that “India and Pakistan have fulfilled the requirements of counter-value targeting and are moving down the path of counterforce targeting requirements,”⁵⁸⁶ which is a highly destabilizing development for deterrence stability. The author further asserts that nuclear learning has directed the two states towards the adoption of war-fighting and counterforce strategies which will certainly undermine the regional strategic stability in the South Asian region.

Ostensibly, keeping in view the massive force modernization, India might transform its strategy from countervalue to counterforce. India is exploring and developing options to efficiently target Pakistan’s strategic nuclear systems. India’s serious revision in its nuclear doctrine may be in the offing even to the extent of carrying out pre-emptive strikes against

⁵⁸³ Author’s Interview with Associate Professor Dr. Rizwan Zeb.

⁵⁸⁴ See Shivshankar Menon, *Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy* (Washington D.C.: Institution Press, 2016).

⁵⁸⁵ Menon, *Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy*.

⁵⁸⁶ Krepon, “The Counterforce Compulsion in South Asia,”.

Pakistan's nuclear deterrent. Indian officials think that India will not allow Pakistan to go first. Further, if Pakistan were to use TNWs against it, even against Indian forces in Pakistan, it would effectively be opening the door to a massive Indian first strike, having crossed India's declared red lines. This strategic shift in the Indian doctrine to a nuclear war-fighting posture may lead to an arms-racing problem instead of enhancing the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. To sum up, both India and Pakistan have fulfilled the requirements of countervalue targeting and are moving down the path of counterforce targeting requirements, which generates severe challenges to strategic stability in the region.

Conclusion

India introduced offensive doctrinal changes such as JDIAF-2017 and LWD-2018 to launch small military operations and surgical strikes as a punitive measure across the international border to counter terrorism. Apparently, it seems that India might have assumed the US drone strikes and smart military operations such as Operation Neptune Spear as a precedent to target alleged terrorist outfits in Pakistan. The study finds that both India and Pakistan did carry out small military operations such as raids or hot pursuits involving ground troops in the post-nuclear era but that remained confined to LoC, termed as old normal in this thesis. The two governments did not publicize the old normal until the Uri Crisis. India employed compellence strategy involving limited use of force to compel Pakistan while Pakistan invalidated any military operation on its side of LoC, thus absorbing the strike to avoid conflict escalation. In Pulwama-Balakot Crisis, India based on a compellence strategy carried out an aerial strike to target terrorist outfit deep inside Pakistan, crossing the new frontiers, first of its kind since 1971 while Pakistan based on a deterrence strategy, responded by striking back on the next day. This cyclical action-reaction military engagement is pointing towards the establishment of a surgical strike as new normal between India and Pakistan. Hence, the doctrinal changes led to conflict transformation, where large-scale wars are converted into small military operation and surgical

strikes, thereby pointing towards reduction in the intensity of violence and introducing renewed patterns of likely engagement. Amidst offensive doctrinal changes and the presence of nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan have luckily avoided escalation during the February episode, nevertheless, the dangers of unintentional escalation can never be out of the question. Lastly, it appears that India is moving away from the commitment to minimum deterrence and NFU and wholly transforming the nuclear strategy to the massive retaliation for warfighting, thereby generating risks for strategic stability in South Asia.

Chapter Seven

New Mechanism for Strategic Stability Amidst Offensive Doctrinal Changes

India and Pakistan are engulfed in a stability-instability paradox where large-scale wars might not be possible due to MAD but the offensive military doctrines and war-fighting strategies have the potential to provoke an advertent or accidental escalation of the conflict. The introduction of offensive doctrinal changes and risky military engagements such as the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis has led to creating a deterrence stability crisis, thereby making war more likely. The current South Asian environment generates mistrust and uncertainty between India and Pakistan. While uncertainty creates fear, fear leads to mistrust, and mistrust increases the arms-racing problem. Amidst competing doctrinal changes and war-fighting strategies, the conventional force modernization and increasing the number of nuclear warheads and delivery systems has triggered a severe trust deficit between India and Pakistan. In turn, these circumstances could produce crises between two states risking the escalation of armed conflicts to a strategic level in the absence of a mechanism to mitigate the threats endangering the strategic stability in the region. Thus, numerous plausible essentials and their permanency are mandatory to ensure strategic stability in South Asia. This chapter comprehensively and holistically provides a way forward involving bilateral and multilateral mechanisms to promote strategic stability in the South Asian region.

Minimizing Reliance on Offensive Military Doctrines and War Fighting Strategies

Since the acquisition of nuclear weapons, both India and Pakistan introduced competing offensive doctrinal changes that ultimately had a significant impact on the strategic environment of the South Asian region. For instance, India devised new war-fighting strategies and military doctrines such as CSD, JDIAF-2017, and LWD-2018 with an objectives to wage a limited war or launch a small military operation to take punitive measures against Pakistan

under the nuclear overhang, while Pakistan responded offensively by introducing FSD and developing TNW bringing the nuclear threshold to low level. The corresponding doctrinal changes are still in the evolution phase and apparently, the two states are responding to each other in a tit-for-tat manner under the nuclear domain. The doctrinal changes have seriously undermined the strategic stability of South Asia. Ms. Saadia, when asked about the impact of evolving doctrines on strategic stability, stated,⁵⁸⁷

India's military doctrine is increasingly focused on launching swift action and achieving its battle objectives in a short time without triggering Pakistan's nuclear threshold. This implies that India is building a force posture that relies on battle-ready armed units that can be deployed in a short period. India's arms acquisition in the last decade is geared towards fulfilling this doctrinal role. These trends in India's military doctrine and force modernization negate the principles of strategic stability. To maintain strategic stability, the concerned parties need to avoid triggers that can lead to armed conflict and maintain force postures that stabilize deterrence. Both these considerations are negatively affected by India's evolving war-fighting doctrines. This makes the initiation of armed hostilities more likely in South Asia.

The offensive doctrinal evolution signifies India's military's influence in creating options for limited war or launching small military operations which, in turn, put pressure on Pakistan to rely more on nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes, if not war-fighting. Ostensibly, it seems that India is shifting away from credible minimum deterrence and NFU and thinking to transform the nuclear posture to massive retaliation in line with war-fighting mode, thus it generates severe risks to the strategic stability of South Asia. The Indian political and military leadership should re-evaluate the efficacy of its offensive doctrines in the face of conventional and nuclear developments. India needs to take into account Pakistan's conventional and nuclear responses if and when these offensive doctrinal provisions. As Sood argues India needs to ponder whether course correction would suffice or it's time to go back to

⁵⁸⁷ Author's Interview with Ms. Haleema Saadia.

the drawing board.⁵⁸⁸ There is a need for both India and Pakistan to understand the threats associated with the development and implementation of offensive doctrines, particularly in the violence-prone region of South Asia.

Keeping in view the historical and geopolitical realities, India and Pakistan may find it challenging to minimize reliance on offensive doctrines and war-fighting strategies. Nevertheless, few initiatives at bilateral and multilateral levels can be beneficial to achieve this strategic imperative. One, great powers such as the US, China, and Russia are required to facilitate the two states to initiate dialogue and negotiations to minimize the trust deficit and support them in resolving their disputes. Two, India and Pakistan should initiate CBMs in the military domain such as communication between the two militaries regularly, joint military exercises to deal with terrorism, mechanisms to communicate during the crisis, and signing agreements to lessen the risks of accidental conflict. Three, the two countries should cooperate on an arms control regime and take tangible steps to participate actively in CTBT and FMCT to decrease the nuclear risks in South Asia. Lastly, India and Pakistan should be open about their doctrines, nuclear postures, and capabilities, to mitigate misperception and miscalculations. Thus, in this manner, minimizing reliance on offensive military doctrines and war-fighting strategies could assist in achieving strategic stability in the South Asian region.

Curbing Proxies to Constrain Adventurism

The lethal combination of the presence of nuclear weapons, the Kashmir dispute, and terrorism makes South Asia one of the riskiest regions of the world.⁵⁸⁹ India recently introduced offensive military doctrines to counter-terrorism across the international border under the nuclear domain, putting severe risks to the strategic stability of South Asia. Both India and Pakistan blame each other for involvement in proxies and insurgencies. For instance, India

⁵⁸⁸ Sood, "Pakistan's (Non-Nuclear) Plan,".

⁵⁸⁹ Gregory D. Koblentz, *Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age* (Council on Foreign Relations, 2014), 3.

blames Pakistan for supporting insurgency in Indian Administered Kashmir and elsewhere in India whereas Pakistan denies these charges. On the other hand, Pakistan blames India for its involvement in insurgency and terrorism in Balochistan, tribal areas including Karachi whereas India denies these allegations.

Ostensibly, cross-border terrorism is the primary cause of deadlock in the negotiations and moving towards normalization of relations including resolution of issues such as the Kashmir dispute.⁵⁹⁰ Any terrorist attack can provoke a limited or large-scale war between India and Pakistan that could further lead to the use of nuclear weapons, thereby generating severe risks to the strategic stability of South Asia. India and Pakistan should take tangible measures at domestic and bilateral levels to eliminate proxies and terrorism to ensure stability in the region, such as: One, the two countries should devise effective mechanisms to counter terrorism at the domestic levels. In this regard, a serious institutional-based effort backed by political will is required to eradicate terrorist outfits irrespective of any discrimination in their respective territories. Two, both India and Pakistan should take all-out measures to stop cross-border terrorism. Strengthening and cooperating on border security management can assist in preventing cross-border terrorism. Three, the two countries should cooperate and share intelligence information to eradicate terrorism. Sharing intelligence information about potential terrorist activities or groups can help in disrupting terrorist activities. Lastly, the two states are required to negotiate and address each other's concerns to mitigate the mistrust and uncertainty. Nevertheless, this could only become a reality when Islamabad and New Delhi collaborate to fight the menace of terrorism. Thus, India and Pakistan must eliminate proxies and insurgencies to maximize strategic gains.

⁵⁹⁰ Sanam Noor, "Pakistan-India Relations and Terrorism," *Pakistan Horizon* 60, no. 2 (2007): 65, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41500064>.

US Role as a Crisis Manager and Peacebuilder

The systemic forces influenced India-Pakistan conflictual relations in both pre and post-nuclear era. Dr. Khan while responding to a question about the role of great powers in the region stated, “The extra-regional link factor affects the South Asian nuclear states (i.e., India and Pakistan). In this case, whatever strategically happens between the United States and Russia and/or between the United States and China, this affects China—while China affects India. Arguably, India then affects Pakistan.”⁵⁹¹ Significantly, the changing US interests based on the US-China competition have influenced South Asian geopolitics. For instance, the Indo-US strategic partnership has altered the security parameters for Pakistan. Washington can play an effective role in the path of official dialogues between the rival states to manage their conflicts and avoid the risks of conventional or nuclear war. The US has the potential to mediate between India and Pakistan to solve the Kashmir dispute, while pushing both countries leadership to think out of the box. Dr. Khan while responding to a question about the role of the US in India-Pakistan crisis management stated,⁵⁹²

Although the US has withdrawn from Afghanistan and the relations between the US and Pakistan are on and off, the US interest has not diminished from South Asia. The US remains interested and would like to play a significant role in managing if not resolving the outstanding issues including that of the core issue of Kashmir between India and Pakistan. Unlike many other countries including China, the US has been a very active manager while managing the crises between the two South Asian rivals. Yet, the US has failed to resolve the issues between India and Pakistan. Moreover, the US role as a manager cannot be guaranteed.

The US diplomatic engagement in crises such as the Kargil War, the Twin Peaks Crisis, and the Mumbai Attacks has efficiently reduced the tensions between India and Pakistan. However, the US remained reluctant to play a crisis manager role in the last two crises such as the Uri Crisis and the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis. Subsequently, the risks of conflict escalation

⁵⁹¹ Author’s Interview with Professor Dr. Zafar Khan.

⁵⁹² Author’s Interview with Professor Dr. Zafar Khan.

went higher, particularly in the February 2019 episode which ended up in an aerial clash, traditional seen escalatory by the two states. Nevertheless, the changing US interests in the region majorly to counter China,⁵⁹³ pushed the US to adopt preferential support towards India ultimately boosting the latter's confidence to change its approach to dealing with militancy. For instance, India with the tacit approval of the US carried out an aerial surgical strike in February 2019 during the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis, the first of its kind since the 1971 war, crossing the new limits. Apparently, it seem that both the US and India miscalculated Pakistan's likely response. It was assumed that Pakistan would not retaliate as it chose to absorb the surgical strike in the Uri Crisis. Nevertheless, Pakistan's response surprised both the US and India, particularly the former which ultimately led to make efforts to de-escalate the conflict.

To sum up, the outcome of the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis may lead the US to return to clear prioritization of crisis de-escalation as it used to do in the previous crises. The US should engage both nuclear-armed states to avoid offensive military actions and instead, jointly work together to counter terrorism. Significantly, the US as a super power should develop a pool of diplomats particularly trained for nuclear crisis diplomacy to mediate and de-escalate crises across the nuclear flashpoints including the South Asian region. Moreover, the US should focus on improving the information available to the public and their governments during the crises to avoid the propagation of disinformation, thus this can assist in conflict de-escalation. However, keeping in view the US-China systemic competition and Indo-US strategic partnership, it is assumed that the US would prefer its strategic interests linked to containing China and would not play a traditional crisis manager role to resolve the conflict between India and Pakistan.

⁵⁹³ Michael S. Chase, "Chinese Suspicion and US Intentions," *Survival* 53, no. 3 (2011): 133-150.

Kashmir Dispute: Thinking Out of the Box

Indian government's unilateral abrogation of articles 370 and 35A of the Indian constitution to integrate Kashmir fully into the Union cannot terminate the conflict and will not yield lasting peace in the region. This decision has undermined the efficacy of the UN's resolution on Kashmir and the relevance of the global institutions. On January 20, 1948, Resolution number 39 was adopted by the UNSC for the peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute. According to it, a commission comprising three members was set up where one member each was to be chosen by India and Pakistan, and the third member was required to be selected by the commission. More so, the voice and participation of the eight million Kashmiri people are completely missing in the Indian recent move. Since August 05, 2019, Indian Administered Jammu and Kashmir have been under siege. The Indian government has done so many things to the people simultaneously: there is a blanket security lockdown and a communication blockade. Political leadership is under house arrest. Many Journalists are being harassed and arrested. The Kashmiri people who dared to conduct peaceful protest after Article 370, were arrested and detained in Srinagar's main jail.⁵⁹⁴ Later on, the protesters were let free conditionally. Thus, the voice of the Kashmiri people is suppressed and their right to self-determination is violated.

Critical analysis suggest that the international community particularly the US led western world is not interested in the Kashmir dispute anymore. Despite fighting two large-scale wars and a limited war including the February 2019 episode over Kashmir Dispute, both India and Pakistan, particularly the latter came to understanding that there is no military solution to resolve the dispute. Consequently, there is need to think out of the box and find some unconventional means. Significantly, there are few initiatives suggested in the past which

⁵⁹⁴ Riyaz Wani, "Life under Siege in Kashmir," *The Diplomat*, January 21, 2020, <https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/life-under-siege-in-kashmir/>.

seem pragmatic solution to the Kashmir dispute, for instance President Musharraf's four-point formula to resolve the Kashmir dispute in a step by step approach. In current circumstances particularly in the aftermath of the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis and revocation of article 370 and 35A of the Indian constitution, the two states should take few initiatives that could lead to the resumption of dialogue for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute as per President Musharraf's four-point formula.⁵⁹⁵

For instance, as a first step, the political and military leadership in the two countries should express the political will to initiate a dialogue over the Kashmir dispute. Two, the two countries should use back-channel negotiations for trust building and develop a foundation to resume official dialogue on Kashmir. Three, India and Pakistan need to resume the dialogue at all levels, where the leadership must sit down to settle the bilateral issues through any means, it could be good office or third-party medication. Fourth, the two states should maintain the ceasefire agreement at the LoC. A ceasefire is important to prevent conflict escalation and also help in negotiation. Five, the two states should pursue CBMs particularly related to Kashmir such as cross-LoC trade, and people-to-people exchanges. These steps can help in reducing tensions and creating an environment of dialogue and negotiations between the two nuclear-armed states. Six, the negotiated resolution of the Kashmir dispute with the participation of the people of Kashmir will only yield lasting peace between India and Pakistan. For this, the two countries must create an environment to discuss and develop a mechanism that is politically acceptable to the people of Kashmir on this disputed territory. This arrangement will lead to settling down the longstanding Kashmir dispute in South Asia.

⁵⁹⁵ Happymon Jacob, "Toward a Kashmir Endgame?: How India and Pakistan Could Negotiate a Lasting Solution," *United States Institute of Peace No. 474* (2020): 1-22.

Minimizing the Production of Offensive Technologies

The introduction of nuclear weapons has put off large-scale wars between India and Pakistan, however, the eruption of crises frequently in a nuclearized environment still points to the danger of nuclear use. The absence of comprehensive nuclear disarmament reflects that nuclear weapons states will continue to rely on offensive technologies. Interestingly, the reliance on nuclear weapons could differ from one state to another for the reason of a particular strategic environment each nuclear state is facing. For instance, the US was facing massive Soviet conventional forces at the start of the Cold War and this is why it had to rely on its nuclear arsenals. The US over time significantly increased its nuclear stockpiles and respective delivery systems to ensure nuclear deterrence and avert the Soviet Union from launching conventional attack/s against the US and its allies.⁵⁹⁶ Though the US reliance on nuclear forces has reduced in the aftermath of the Cold War, however, it continues to hold a huge size of nuclear forces together with respective sophisticated delivery mechanisms to deter the Soviets.

In South Asia, India and Pakistan's reliance on nuclear weapons has increased due to the security dilemma between China and Pakistan. India fears China, while Pakistan fears India, and in this manner the reliance on nuclear weapons has increased due to the ever-increasing conventional imbalance between them. Thus, till the time, the conventional imbalance prevails between India and Pakistan, the latter's reliance on nuclear deterrent forces will exist. Likewise, India's reliance on nuclear weapons; despite its growing conventional force advantageous position, would increase its deterrent forces. Significantly, India is starkly increasing its fissile materials that are used to boost its ability to maximize its nuclear deterrent forces.⁵⁹⁷ Moreover, India is developing sophisticated delivery systems for its nuclear arsenals

⁵⁹⁶ Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 37-42.

⁵⁹⁷ Mansoor Ahmed, "India's Nuclear Exceptionalism, Fissile Materials, Fuel Cycles, and Safeguards," *Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs* (2017): 1-60, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328463238_India's_Nuclear_Exceptionalism_Fissile_Materials_Fuel_Cycles_and_Safeguards.

to prepare for a two-front war against China and Pakistan. Thus, India and Pakistan are required to develop a framework to reduce reliance on nuclear deterrent forces. The South Asian rivals should take initiatives that become part of CBMs such as signing a treaty or agreement to mitigate conventional imbalances between the two by setting the limitations. These sorts of measures may reduce states' reliance on offensive technologies leading to inducing positive policy impact, for instance, it will discourage both India and Pakistan from deploying offensive technologies based on their offensive military doctrines. Thus, a reduction in reliance on nuclear deterrent forces will assist in mitigating the risk of nuclear use, subsequently encouraging strategic stability in the South Asian region.

Minimizing Risks of Accidental War

The US is the only nuclear power that has used nuclear weapons for the first and last time in World War II. Importantly, the MAD deterred both the US and Soviet Union from fighting any direct war,⁵⁹⁸ however, the risk of accidental nuclear use remained there between nuclear-possessing states mainly in the crisis, amidst offensive military doctrines and war-fighting strategies at conventional or nuclear levels. Nuclear learning based on the experiences of the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War era, sophisticated technological development, and comprehensive structural procedures have decreased the accidental use of nuclear weapons in peacetime. Nevertheless, a severe crisis between nuclear weapon states particularly when the nuclear deterrent forces are on high readiness alert increases the danger of escalation of the conflict to strategic levels.⁵⁹⁹

Some of the major reasons such as incomplete, improper, and false alarm messages increase the risk of accidental nuclear war. This increases the responsibility of the relevant nuclear security-related officials and organizations to thoroughly analyze these messages

⁵⁹⁸ Robert Jervis, "Mutual Assured Destruction," *Foreign Policy* 133 (2002): 40.

⁵⁹⁹ Len Scott, "Intelligence and the Risk of Nuclear War: Able Archer-83 Revisited," In *Intelligence in the Cold War: What Difference did it Make?*, pp. 5-23 (London: Routledge, 2013).

before making any decision. For instance, the accidental fire of a nuclear missile or detonation of a nuclear warhead could generate a false alarm to a rival state which could instantly prepare itself for retaliation. Interestingly, the retaliatory attack could subsequently be considered as an implementation of the first strike based on an offensive approach. This whole episode could cause serious miscalculation leading to unimaginable destruction. States' readiness alert activities and the prospects for ambitiously reacting to rival state action could lead to irrational behavior in a crisis.

There are instances when the US and Soviet Union were near accidental nuclear use during the first atomic age.⁶⁰⁰ India and Pakistan cannot be exceptions to these sorts of serious challenges. The case of Indian cruise missile misadventure is a case in point, which landed around 80 miles deep inside Pakistan's territory.⁶⁰¹ Misinterpretations and false alarms lacking proper analysis and procedures could lead to destruction in a crisis time between the two rivals. The political and military leadership's emotional statements by perceiving false alarms as reality could lead to nuclear alerts possibly higher between the neighboring nuclear rivals, particularly in South Asia lacks an effective early warning system.⁶⁰² During the Cold War era, despite suitable institutional practices, procedures and technological advancements concerning the safety and security of lethal nuclear deterrents forces experienced false alarm cases.⁶⁰³ The nuclear learning based on the security issues faced by the US and Soviet Union may give some valuable lessons for maintaining peace and stability in nuclearized South Asia. For instance,

⁶⁰⁰ Pavel Podwig, "Blurring the Line Between Nuclear and Nonnuclear Weapons: Increasing the Risk of Accidental Nuclear War?," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 72, no. 3 (2016): 145-9, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2016.1170363>.

⁶⁰¹ Rizwana, Abbasi, and Muhammad Saeed Uzzaman, "Indian Cruise Missile Misadventure: Malfunction or Malafide Intentions?," *Journal of Security & Strategic Analyses* 8, no. 1 (2022): 122-150.

⁶⁰² P. R Chari, 2003, "Nuclear Crisis, Escalation Control, and Deterrence in South Asia," *Stimson Centre Working Paper no 1.0* (August 2003): 23-7, https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/escalation_chari_1_1.pdf.

⁶⁰³ See Scot D. Sagan, *The Limits of Safety, Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons* (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1993).

two major false alarm problems in the US could have led to an accidental war involving nuclear weapons between the two Cold War rivals. The first is reckoned as the Goldsboro incident when the US B-52 bomber loaded with two hydrogen bombs crashed in Goldsboro. None of these bombs detonated due to the safety devices installed on these two bombs.⁶⁰⁴ Nevertheless, even if one of the two hydrogen bombs could have detonated, this could have been misperceived by the Soviet Union as an offensive US strike subsequently could have become the reason for cause crisis leading to an accidental use of nuclear weapons. The second is famous as the NORAND incident which caused a grave false alarm situation when a technical error in one of the computer chips created a false alarm generating a message to the US Strategic Air Command (SAC) indicating that the Soviets launched numerous SLBMs targeting the US.⁶⁰⁵ Likewise, the most recent incident is a ballistic missile false alarm that occurred in Hawaii, creating a serious panic that could have escalated the crisis between the US and its adversaries.⁶⁰⁶ Even though these crises occurred in peacetime, they could have escalated to a serious crisis. The contention is what would have happened if these kinds of nuclear accidents had occurred in a real crisis. Scott Sagan is correct to argue that no system to prevent accidents is perfect; incidents of some sort are bound to happen. What if some of the rare accidents that have occurred in peacetime, had instead happened in the middle of a serious crisis?⁶⁰⁷

That being noted, the political and military leadership in India and Pakistan is required to deliberate on these kinds of serious nuclear accidents in peacetime and further analyze the security implications for strategic stability in South Asia. Even though there is no single safety and security mechanism that could entirely prevent the possibility of accidents during peace

⁶⁰⁴ Scot D. Sagan, *Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 174.

⁶⁰⁵ Sagan, *Moving Targets*, 173-174.

⁶⁰⁶ See "Hawaii Worker who Sent Missile Alert was 100% Sure Attack was Real," *The Guardian*, February 3, 2018.

⁶⁰⁷ Sagan, *Moving Targets*, 144.

and crisis time, nevertheless both nuclear states can take rigorous measures to decrease the possibility of nuclear-related accidents from escalating to a large-scale military confrontation.

Reviving Comprehensive Confidence Building Measures

India and Pakistan initiated numerous CBMs since the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The main objective of these measures was to reduce tensions, and crisis management, and further to avert conflict escalation to strategic levels. Dr. Basrur on the usefulness of CBMs commented,⁶⁰⁸

In my view, nuclear powers cannot fight, so the question of asymmetry, conventional or nuclear, does not apply. No two nuclear rivals have ever fought – and this applies to highly ‘asymmetric’ relationships, e.g., between the US and North Korea. Stability can only be managed by refraining from conflict emanating at the sub-conventional level. CBMs are useful, but ultimately, it is political decisions that shape stability.

Despite severe tensions in the recent times, various CBMs still exist between India and Pakistan. These measures remained beneficial to achieve the goal of strategic stability in the South Asian region. In the last few years, these CBMs have been futile particularly due to the eruption of numerous crises such as the Mumbai Attacks, the Uri Crisis, and the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis. These crises had all the potential to endanger military escalation. There is a need to revive previous CBMs and take new initiatives to overcome the risks to strategic stability in the region.

It is imperative to mention that the CBMs remained successful between the two rivals, however, they failed to achieve any tangible outcome. Within South Asia’s security landscape, a strategic partnership between the US and India, doctrinal changes fast-growing military modernization, and attempts to achieve military superiority are key factors that are disturbing the prospects of coexistence. However, various other factors such as terrorism create hurdles in establishing effective nuclear CBMs in South Asia. Most significantly, the trust deficit

⁶⁰⁸ Author’s Interview with Professor Dr. Rajesh Basrur.

between India and Pakistan is the greatest obstacle to these formal communication links. In light of their past experiences, both states always remained dubious of each other's intentions and shaped their policies accordingly.⁶⁰⁹ Although CBMs provide an atmosphere for improving inter-state relations and establishing mutual trust, some degree of trust is still necessary even before CBMs can be negotiated. Hence, the existence of a limited or minimum level of confidence is an essential prerequisite for effectively pursuing the CBMs. Both India and Pakistan are required to devise a comprehensive and integrated approach for CBMs in political, military, economic, environmental, and social domains to foster an environment of mutual trust and peaceful coexistence.

Risk Reductions Measures

Risk reduction is a long-term process that requires a consistent commitment of both New Delhi and Islamabad. The adherence to improved communications reduces the risk of conflict escalation to strategic levels. Efficient communication is considered significant to avoid the failure of nuclear deterrence. Speedy, safe, and reliable means of communication are vital amidst offensive doctrinal changes and frequent crises occurring at regular intervals. Effective channels of communication might be enhanced between the nuclear rivals to avert the risk of accidental nuclear war. In the wake of the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis, this is high time for both countries to develop communication channels and close interaction to promote military predictability. There is a need to create Direct Communication Links (DCLs), especially between the top political and military leadership to manage the crisis. If the DCLs between the two leaderships are reliable, safe, and speedy what is reckoned as the Hotline then it may play an efficient role in averting nuclear states from the risk of accidental war. Even though it is assumed that the communication links are secure between India and Pakistan involving several

⁶⁰⁹ Asma Khalid, "Confidence Building Measures between India-Pakistan: Hope for Bilateral Peace," *Centre for Strategic and Contemporary Research*, May 14, 2021.

procedures, this may further be made swift, consistent, improved, and reliable by making certain that these hotline communication links are not obstructed and/or unintentionally wrecked in numerous crises escalation. Also, in addition to the Director General Military Operations (DGMOs) level, these communication links can be consistently used and further made effective at the political leadership levels such as Foreign Minister and even Prime Minister, in both peace and crisis times. Following effective, reliable, and swift DCLs could have security implications that can produce positive outcomes benefiting both India and Pakistan to ensure strategic stability in the region.

Reducing Regional Asymmetries

India and Pakistan are facing an ever-increasing conventional asymmetry, creating mistrust and uncertainty in the region.⁶¹⁰ India underwent massive force modernization to counter the Chinese threat, which ultimately led to altering the security parameters for Pakistan. In turn, this mounting conventional and nuclear asymmetry pushed Pakistan to rely more on nuclear weapons to deter the Indian threat that subsequently, led to arms racing between India and Pakistan. It is imperative for the regional peace that China and India reduce the severe trust deficit which is the cause of China-India-Pakistan security trilemma. Particularly, India and Pakistan must follow the roadmap of strategic talks between civil and military leadership. The dialogue should aim to devise policies focused on reducing threat perception by mitigating asymmetries. Shared identities can mitigate negative threat perceptions by promoting a culture of harmony at a regional level.⁶¹¹ A fresh convention is the need of the time to restrain the threats and to control the growing arms build-up. Instead of getting into an arms race centered on counterforce technologies in line with offensive doctrinal changes, both India and Pakistan

⁶¹⁰ Zulfqar Khan, "The Changing Dynamics of India-Pakistan Deterrence," *Pakistan Horizon* (2013): 1-19, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24711512>.

⁶¹¹ Rashid Ahmad Khan, "Friendly Exchanges and People-to-People Contact Between Pakistan and India," *Strategic Studies* 34, no. 2/3 (2014): 133-146.

should negotiate and avoid such dangerous moves which would increase risks of war and strategic instability.

Reviving a Strategic Restraint Regime

The offensive doctrinal changes amidst ever-increasing nuclear weapons stockpiles led to severe challenges to crisis stability and strategic stability in South Asia. The doctrinal changes are focused on waging a limited war or launching small military operations and surgical strikes under the nuclear domain. Alarmingly, there is no structural body to manage the crisis between India and Pakistan. The establishment of a regime between the two states is mandatory to ensure regional stability. Few initiatives have been taken in the past such as the proposal of establishing Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR) in 1998. However, no further steps have been taken in this regard as India and Pakistan, particularly the former are not interested in the regime based on its security concerns such as growing China. Dr Khan opined,⁶¹²

Along with the international community role, the two South Asian nuclear powers can follow up the nuclear confidence-building measures, expand the level of talks, trust each other, help resolve their issues amicably where possible, improving early warning systems to prevent accidental nuclear war, improving the notification procedures between the two more stringently, and more importantly develop Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR) once Pakistan proposed while India rejected.

The suggested SRR to manage potential arms racing in South Asia envisages three interconnecting aspects such as: One, a commonly arranged mechanism for restraint on nuclear weapons and missile technology; Two, restraint on conventional capabilities; and lastly, creating a framework to settle all unresolved problems particularly the Kashmir dispute for ensuring stability.⁶¹³ In broader terms, the SRR covers multiple aspects such as political, military, and nuclear patterns that have led to destabilization in the region.

⁶¹² Author's Interview with Professor Dr. Zafar Khan.

⁶¹³ Feroz Khan, *Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb* (Stanford University Press, 2020), 296.

Nevertheless, the establishment of SRR in South Asia may face a few challenges that could include: One, both India and Pakistan are introducing offensive military doctrines which necessitates the acquisition of deterrent forces. The two countries have plans to advance delivery systems for the nuclear warheads. Two, may be, the most significant factor amidst the lack of an arms control regime is an extra-regional link, for instance, the development of deterrent force development between the US and Russia impacts Chinese deterrence forces, and then Chinese deterrent force is perceived as a threat for Indian deterrence force credibility, and in turn, India deterrent force development majorly impact on Pakistan deterrent force posture. Ultimately, the prevailing force posture of great powers impacts the nuclear policies of smaller nuclear states. To overcome, global challenges such as the impact of systemic competition on India-Pakistan bilateral relations, and regional challenges such as offensive doctrinal changes, weapons asymmetries, Kashmir dispute, and terrorism, the two states are required to establish SRR to overcome the threats to strategic stability in South Asia.

Role of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

Almost four decades back, the SAARC was established to increase regional cooperation aimed at bringing betterment in the lives of approximately one-fourth of the world population.⁶¹⁴ Sadly, it did not happen and the SAARC remained an ineffective regional body. The major reason for its failure is the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry. In the wake of the Uri Crisis, India refused to participate in the SAARC summit planned to hold in Pakistan in 2016.⁶¹⁵ India pointed to recurring patterns of violence in Indian Administered Kashmir and declined to attend the summit. India employed diplomatic compellence against Pakistan and engaged other regional countries to pull out of the summit. Later on, Afghanistan and Bangladesh also

⁶¹⁴ Muhammad Jamshed Iqbal, "SAARC: Origin, Growth, Potential and Achievements," *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture* 27, no. 2 (2006): 127-140.

⁶¹⁵ Gul Bibi, Muhammad Adnan, and Muhammad Asif, "Strategic Stability in the Anvil: India-Pakistan-China Triangle," *PalArch's Journal of Archaeology of Egypt/Egyptology* 18, no. 10 (2021): 940.

declined to participate in the SAARC summit bring the regional cooperation to halt in practical terms. As per the Charter of the regional body, the decisions in the organization are taken on a consensus basis only, and further, it is not in the mandate of SAARC to discuss territorial disputes. Therefore, until India agrees to participate in a SAARC Summit, diplomatic activity is not going to be held. Thus, it is important for the peace and prosperity in the region that India expresses somewhat flexibility in joining the Summit to mitigate the looming threats of war in the region.

Alarming, the SAARC includes a region where rival states such as India and Pakistan are introducing offensive military doctrines to fight a limited war or carry out surgical strikes under a nuclear overhang. Like nuclear weapons, the presence of SAARC has not averted direct military confrontation and terrorism, nevertheless, resolving a conflict is out of options as far now. Regional cooperation is at the basic stages in South Asia. The conflict management of even a simple level is not present in the current times. Nevertheless, the leadership in South Asia particularly India and Pakistan should understand that confrontation is harmful and cooperation is beneficial for individual and collective betterment. The two nuclear-armed states should rethink their bilateral relations and are required to be focused on economic cooperation. Thus, the South Asian giants should make efforts to revive SAARC for regional stability.

Conclusion

Both India and Pakistan have managed to avert large-scale war amidst numerous episodes of crises including a limited war and surgical strikes in the post-nuclear era. The offensive doctrinal changes have added to the challenges faced by the two states to ensure strategic stability between them. The two countries should rely on dialogue instead of developing offensive doctrines and employment of military force. Rather than emphasizing the narrow degree of arm lessening, both India and Pakistan should ease the bilateral security environment to mitigate mistrust and promote nuclear arms control and strategic stability. The two states

should minimize their reliance on offensive weapons. The leadership of two countries should collaborate to counter the menace of terrorism in the region. India and Pakistan should not be part of extra-regional powers' nefarious designs that could ultimately hamper the security environment of South Asia. Also, the US should revert to its role as a peace broker to avoid any misadventure between the two states. India and Pakistan must open a bilateral constructive dialogue to strike a comprehensive bilateral mechanism to establish SRR, reduce mistrust, prevent prospects for an accidental war, and promote an arms control mechanism thereby accommodating each other to avoid miscalculation and confrontation. The two states need to initiate dialogue on managing states' bilateral conflicts, fostering pace for CBMs, mitigating growing asymmetries, and managing their threat perceptions that in turn would mitigate crisis instability, and preserve arms control culture leading to stabilize the region. The implementation of the above-shared mechanism may lead to ensuring strategic stability in the South Asian region.

Conclusion

The study concluded that there is a significant transformation in the conflict where large-scale wars might not be possible due to MAD but offensive military doctrines have made the surgical strikes a renewed pattern of bilateral likely engagement. The nuclear weapons instead of getting states into defensive military doctrines have guided them to introduce offensive military doctrines thereby making limited military operations more likely and peace exploited.

Both India and Pakistan have a long history of conflicts, particularly over the Kashmir dispute and cross-border terrorism. Interestingly, the two countries did not declare any military doctrines in the pre-nuclear era. Nevertheless, India followed a defense-in-depth strategy based on the doctrine inherited from the British while Pakistan followed a defensive offensive strategy in their first war in 1948. After the Indo-Sino 1962 war, India took the road of realistic orientation and shifted to an offensive defensive strategy majorly to counter the Chinese threat. Meanwhile, amidst the uprising in Kashmir, India and Pakistan fought their second war in 1965, which ended up in stalemate. Due to the US aloofness in the 1965 war, Pakistan started to look up to China to balance India. While India signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. India successfully implemented an offensive lightning campaign in the 1971 war while dissecting Pakistan into two halves, leading to the creation of Bangladesh. To conclude the conflict dynamics between India and Pakistan in the pre-nuclear era, the two rival states fought three large-scale wars, two over the Kashmir dispute. Both countries employed brute force strategies such as India adopting offence strategy while Pakistan adopted a defense strategy, thereby, the intensity of violence remained high.

India's demonstration of nuclear power in 1974 and successful military expedition in 1971 led it to introduce the offensive Sundarji doctrine, developed to carry out deep and swift offensive military operations. Pakistan offensively responded with strategies of Preemptive Operations and Reposte. Nevertheless, India launched Operation Meghdoot and captured the

Pakistani-controlled Siachen Glacier in 1984, to add another success to its offensive military posture. In two years, India organized a massive military exercise that ultimately resulted in the Brasstacks Crisis. Pakistan by then, which covertly acquired the nuclear weapon, threatened to use it, if India launched an offensive military operation. Thus, the assumption of MAD worked and the crisis de-escalated. In 1991, the two countries experienced another crisis reckoned as the Compound Crisis, amidst a rebellious uprising in Indian Administered Kashmir. India blamed Pakistan for supporting insurgency in the Indian-administered Kashmir while the latter denied the charges, thereby creating a new pattern of accusation-denial cycle that continued to happen throughout the post-nuclear era. Nevertheless, the US based on the fear of nuclear use actively engaged both sides to de-escalate the crisis, taking the role of crisis manager. India employed a compellence strategy while Pakistan relied on nuclear deterrence. Nuclear weapons did influence the nature and character of conflict and both crises did not convert into large-scale war in the covert-nuclear era, thereby, the intensity of violence remained low.

The India-Pakistan conflict dynamics became more complex with the overt nuclearization in 1998. It seems that the South Asia has hit the road of a stability-instability paradox with the acquisition of nuclear weapons. For instance, both India and Pakistan experienced high tensions due to an increase in the number of crises in the post-nuclear era, though no single event escalated to large-scale war based on the phenomenon of MAD. For instance, the Kargil War limited in its scale and objectives was fought in 1999. Pakistan's hastily crafted compellence strategy led to the most dangerous confrontation, which erupted in the nuclearized environment. Again, it was the US intervention as a crisis manager that helped ease the tempers between the two states by pulling the forces back to barracks. The crisis did not convert into a large-scale war, thus the intensity of violence remained low. Pakistan

employed compellence strategy during the Kargil Crisis while India responded with a deterrence strategy.

Both India and Pakistan experienced yet another crisis reckoned as the Twin Peaks Crisis that erupted after two successive terrorist attacks in Indian Administered and India in 2001-2002. India blamed Pakistan for supporting militant groups such as LeT and JeM for perpetrating terrorism in India while the latter denied India's accusations. The crisis created a high probability of war between the two nuclear states. India launched Operation Parakram to punish Pakistan for its alleged support of terrorism while Pakistan responded with counter-mobilization and also threatened India with nuclear use. The high tensions between India and Pakistan compelled the US who appeared to be seriously involved as a crisis manager to intervene. The US diplomatic efforts successfully restored peace and avoided war in a nuclearized environment. Twin Peaks Crisis did not convert into a large-scale war, thus the intensity of violence remained low. India employed a compellence strategy while Pakistan responded with a deterrence strategy.

The Kargil Crisis and the Twin Peaks Crisis not only led to conflict transformation but also acted as an impetus to undergo doctrinal changes. These crises indicated that the space exists for sub-conventional warfare including proxy wars, and limited war under the nuclear overhang, thereby making the scale of violence limited and peace volatile. Correspondingly, India and Pakistan introduced offensive doctrines to fight and win wars under the nuclear overhang. For instance, India introduced offensive CSD, with a major objective of waging a limited war as a punitive measure against Pakistan for its alleged involvement in terrorism, without crossing the latter's nuclear redlines. Importantly, India's intentions to introduce doctrinal changes to fight under a nuclear overhang in itself point to the adequacy of the stability-instability paradox. In response, Pakistan introduced offensive FSD and also developed TNWs to counter the Indian threat bringing down the nuclear threshold.

Meanwhile, terrorism continued to occur at regular intervals, generating crises in a nuclearized environment. Both states blamed each other for fighting proxies and sub-conventional warfare. Mumbai terrorist attacks sparked a crisis in 2008. India accused Pakistan of backing the LeT to launch the terror attack while Pakistan denied the charges. India mobilized its troops and threatened to launch aerial surgical strikes to destroy terrorist camps based on Pakistani soil. Pakistan put armed forces on red alert, particularly mobilizing its PAF to counter the Indian threat. India could not implement the CSD in the aftermath of the Mumbai Attacks. Ostensibly, the offensive force employment strategy remained merely a concept majorly due to structural and doctrinal weaknesses. Significantly, the US was heavily dependent on Pakistan, any divergence could have hampered the success of the war on terror campaign in Afghanistan. Consequently, the US initiated an intensive diplomatic intervention to avoid conflict escalation. The Mumbai Crisis did not convert into a large-scale war, thus the intensity of violence remained low. India employed a compellence strategy while Pakistan responded with a deterrence strategy.

Indian armed forces required intensive force modernization not only to deal with terrorism and insurgencies but also to counter growing Chinese influence in the region. India views China as a principal security threat and perceives Chinese assertive policies as a threat to India's national interest. China's strategic relations with Pakistan mainly defense cooperation and assistance in missile and nuclear programs are a matter of concern for India. India sees the China-Pakistan strategic partnership as a two-front threat. The US desired India to act as an offshore balancer to contain China whereas India needed the US to modernize its armed forces to ensure its security vis-à-vis China and Pakistan. The convergence of interest between the US and India led them to build closer ties to counterbalance China, nevertheless, the Indo-US ties significantly altered the security parameters for Pakistan. Thus, the massive modernization of conventional capabilities together with ever-increasing stockpiles and

relevance of deterrent forces in the wake of Indo-US strategic partnership provided the necessary foundation to introduce offensive war-fighting military doctrines to counter the two-front threat, particularly to counter-insurgency.

India introduced offensive doctrines such as JDIAF-2017 and LWD-2018 to meet its national security objectives. India long searched for a space to fight under the nuclear overhang, while the doctrinal changes provided the guidelines to carry out small military operations such as a surgical strike based on enhanced punitive response options to greater depth, effect, sophistication, and precision to counter-insurgency inside and across the borders. Ostensibly, India intended to follow in the footsteps of the US and Israel in counter-terrorism where both powers used offensive strategies against alleged terrorist outfits and blatantly violated targeted states' sovereignty. Particularly, the US carried out drone strikes and smart military operations such as Operation Neptune Spear to target Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. India might have assumed the US drone strikes and smart military operations as a precedent to launch counter-terrorism operations across the LoC and international borders against Pakistan.

Significantly, India and Pakistan carried out raids or hot pursuits across the LoC. Nevertheless, both governments did not publicize these kinds of military operations until India for the first time publicized it in the Uri Crisis, termed as old normal in this thesis. The Uri terror attack proved to be the higher point of confrontation between India and Pakistan since 2008. India carried out a surgical strike employing ground troops to target alleged terrorist outfits, across the LoC. India showed off the strike as of preemptive nature and asked the US to support it. The US blamed Pakistan for the terror attacks without discouraging Indian strikes, however, it initiated efforts to de-escalate the tensions between the two rival countries. The US ensured Pakistan that India would not carry out any further surgical strikes. Interestingly, Pakistan denied happening of any such strikes. It can be concluded that Pakistan's passive rationality to absorb the surgical strike was part of its strategy to de-escalate the tensions. The

Uri Crisis did not convert into a large-scale war, thus the intensity of violence remained low. India employed a compellence strategy while Pakistan responded with a deterrence strategy.

The militants continued to target the Indian troops in the Indian Administered Kashmir. For Instance, three Indian army installations came under attack located in Uri, Sunjuwan, and Nagrota from 2016 to 2018. India officially announced doctrines such as JDIAF-2017 and LWD-2018. The two doctrines provided the requisite guidelines to the Indian Armed Forces to launch offensive targeted small military operations against the terrorists within the country and even across international borders. In the aftermath of the Pulwama terrorist attack, India in line with offensive doctrinal changes based on a compellence strategy carried out an aerial surgical strike to target the alleged training camp of JeM, a terrorist outfit, across the international border deep inside Pakistan, crossing the new frontiers, first of its kind since 1971. Pakistan in contrast to the Uri Crisis, responded this time in a compulsive mode by locking and hitting targets in Indian Administered Kashmir. This study concluded that the cyclical action-reaction military engagement based on coercive strategies established surgical strikes as a new normal between India and Pakistan, pointing to the renewed pattern of bilateral likely military engagement.

Theoretically speaking, one of the principal ways in which nuclear weapons have contributed to India-Pakistan conflict dynamics is by serving as a powerful deterrent against conflict escalation to strategic levels. India and Pakistan experienced high tensions with an increase in the number of crises in the post-nuclear era, nevertheless, no single crisis escalated to large-scale war or use of nuclear weapons. Thus, the MAD ensured a degree of stability and despite increased tensions and crises, India and Pakistan evaded a large-scale war or use of nuclear weapons which points to the adequacy of stability-instability paradox.

Interestingly, the theories related to nuclear proliferation and deterrence are generally apprehended as comprehensive and well-ordered in International Relations. Nevertheless, crises or conflicts in the nuclear domain can come up with unexpected outcomes. To be clear, academicians and practitioners must understand the certainty of uncertainty in the nuclearized environment, as any crisis even involving a low intensity of violence can intentionally or unintentionally convert into large-scale wars or reach strategic levels. The stability-instability paradox logic is not at all an unquestionable phenomenon particularly if rival parties are involved in employing coercive strategies. It is imperative to understand that just like deterrence, the stability-instability paradox logic is appropriate till the time it collapses. Consequently, the collapse of the stability-instability paradox logic can be detrimental for centuries. To add further to the theoretical debate, India's compellence contradicts the principle of minimum deterrence. India is moving away from the commitment to minimum deterrence and NFU and wholly transforming the nuclear strategy to the massive retaliation for warfighting creating challenges to strategic stability in South Asia.

India and Pakistan should develop bilateral and multilateral mechanisms to promote strategic stability in the South Asian region. Both countries need to understand the risks linked to offensive doctrines and nuclear weapons in the violence-prone region. The foremost step should be to minimize reliance on offensive doctrines and new technologies to avoid intentional or accidental war. The two countries should understand each other concerns regarding terrorism and work jointly to eliminate proxies from the region. It is imperative for the stability in South Asia that the US despite its commitments and strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific should prioritize crisis management in South Asia to avert dangers of nuclear use. Nevertheless, total reliance on great powers or global institutions such as the UN might not be the pragmatic enough, the two states are required to devise a comprehensive CBMs framework to mitigate mistrust and uncertainties. Risk reduction via improved communication links and reducing

regional asymmetry might avert the risks of conflict escalation. Lastly, reviving SRR and SAARC particularly the former, might help both countries to mitigate the threats to strategic stability by addressing issues such as terrorism and finding some common grounds to resolve Kashmir dispute, the ultimate cause of conflict between India and Pakistan.

Lastly, the key findings of the thesis are: One, the introduction of nuclear weapons could not guarantee peace between India and Pakistan. Both countries experienced high tensions due to an increased number of crises with the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, based on the assumption of MAD, not a single crisis converted into large-scale war or use of nuclear weapons, thereby pointing to the efficacy of stability-instability paradox logic. Two, India and Pakistan fought large-scale wars employing brute force in the pre-nuclear era while both states employed coercive strategies such as compellence and deterrence to fight under the nuclear domain to gain their respective objectives. Three, terrorism remained the prominent cause of crises in the post-nuclear era. And it continues to be a menace to the regional stability of South Asia. Four, the nuclear weapons and terrorism guided the states to introduce offensive military doctrines by increasing military interaction while decreasing the level of violence. Five, the US based on changing interests in the region such as the Indo-US partnership to contain China, led to force modernization of India which boosted its capability and confidence to introduce offensive doctrinal changes. Further, the US interest in the region led it to adopt a reluctant approach to play a crisis manager role in the last two crises as Uri Crisis and the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis, ultimately leading to conflict escalation to an extent of use of limited force across the LoC and international borders, under the nuclear domain. Six, the doctrinal changes created a necessary foundation to engage in small military operations and surgical strikes without crossing the nuclear threshold. The conflict dynamics have shifted from large-scale wars to targeted small military operations and surgical strikes with decreased intensity of violence, pointing to conflict transformation between India and Pakistan. Seven,

the action-reaction surgical strike during the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis indicates the establishment of a new normal between India and Pakistan, thereby introducing renewed patterns of bilateral likely engagements. Eight, the compellence contradicts the principle of credible minimum deterrence. It seems that India is moving away from the commitment to minimum deterrence and NFU and wholly transforming the nuclear strategy to the massive retaliation for warfighting creating challenges to strategic stability in South Asia.

Bibliography

Abbas, Syed Sammer. "Army Rubbishes Indian 'Surgical Strikes' Claim as Two Pakistani

Soldiers Killed at LOC." *Dawn News*, September 29, 2016.

<https://www.dawn.com/news/1286881>.

Abbas, Syed Sammer. "Pakistan Rejects India's Allegations of Involvement in Terrorist

Attack in Held Kashmir." *Dawn News*, September 18, 2016.

<https://www.dawn.com/news/1284555>.

Abbasi, Rizwana, and Muhammad Saeed Uzzaman. "Indian Cruise Missile Misadventure:

Malfuction or Malafide Intensions?." *Journal of Security & Strategic Analyses* 8, no.

1 (2022): 122-150.

Abbasi, Rizwana. "Why the NPT needs a Makeover." *Dawn Sunday Magazine*, June 14,

2015. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1187551>.

Abdullah, Saania. "Cold Start in Strategic Calculus." *IPRI Journal* XII, no. 1, (2012): 1-27.

<https://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/art1asanw12.pdf>.

Abdullah, Sannia. "Pakistan's Evolving Doctrine and Emerging Force Posture: Conceptual

Nuances and Implied Ramifications." *Pakistan Horizon* 71, no. 1/2 (2018): 79-93.

Abdullah, Sannia. "Pakistan's Full-Spectrum Deterrence: Trends and Trajectories." *South*

Asian Voices, December 13, 2018. [https://southasianvoices.org/pakistan-full-](https://southasianvoices.org/pakistan-full-spectrum-deterrence-trends-trajectories/)

[spectrum-deterrence-trends-trajectories/](https://southasianvoices.org/pakistan-full-spectrum-deterrence-trends-trajectories/).

Abraham, Itty. *The Making of Indian Atomic Bomb, Science Secrecy and Post-Colonial State*.

London: Zed Books, 1998.

Abrar, Mian. "JIT Report Pokes Holes in India's Pathankot Theories." *Pakistan Today*, April 4, 2016. <https://archive.pakistantoday.com.pk/2016/04/04/jit-report-pokes-holes-in-indias-pathankot-theories/>.

Sultan, Adil. "South Asian Stability-Instability Paradox: Another Perspective." *IPRI Journal* XIV, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 21-37.

Ahmed, Ali. "Indian Strategic Culture: The Pakistan Dimension." in *India's Grand Strategy*, edited by Kanti Bajpai, Saira Basit and V. Krishnappa, 301-320. New Delhi: Routledge, 2014.

Ahmed, Ali. *India's Doctrine Puzzle: Limiting War in South Asia*. New Delhi: Routledge, 2014.

Ahmed, Ashfaq, Muhammad Jawad Hashmi, and Saima Kausar. "Pakistan Nuclear Doctrine from Minimum Deterrence to Full Spectrum Credible Minimum Deterrence (FSCMD)." *Pakistan Social Sciences Review* 2 (2019): 86-101.
<https://pssr.org.pk/issues/v3/2/pakistan-nuclear-doctrine-from-minimum-deterrence-to-full-spectrum-credible-minimum-deterrence-fscmd.pdf>.

Ahmed, Firdaus. "The Day after Cold Start." *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Military-Article*, no. 2424 (2007): 7-40.

Ahmed, Mansoor. "India's Nuclear Exceptionalism, Fissile Materials, Fuel Cycles, and Safeguards." *Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs* (2017): 1-60.

Ali, Muhammad Zeeshan. *Strategic Delusions – The Cold Start Doctrine: Proactive Strategy*. School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2016.
<https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1021787>.

Ali, Shafqat. "No Evidence of Pak Hand in Pathankot Attack: India." *The Nation*, June 3, 2016.

Aljazeera News. "Punjab attack threatens India-Pakistan peace progress." January 2, 2016, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/1/2/punjab-attack-threatens-india-pakistan-peace-progress>.

Aljazeera News. "'Fabricated': India Denies Pakistan 'Terror' Funding Allegations." November 16, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/16/india-denies-pakistans-allegations-over-funding-of-militant-grou>.

Almeida, Cyril. "Kiyani Spells Out Threat Posed by India." *World Press*, February 4, 2010.

Al-Saba, Kokab and Dr. Noor Fatima. "Doctrinal Shift in the Indian Army after 2018: Implications for Pakistan." *NDU Journal* (2023): zzzz.

Amin, Tahir. "Kargil Crisis in Kashmir." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 13, no. 2 (2007): 320-327. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557570008400318>.

Anand, Geeta. and Hari Kuma, "Militants Attack Indian Army Base in Nagrota, Inflaming Tensions with Pakistan." *The New York Times*, November 29, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/29/world/asia/kashmir-jammu-attack.html>.

Art, Robert J. and Waltz, Kenneth Neal, ed. *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009.

Asal, Victor and Kyle Beardsley. "Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (2007): 139-155, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343307075118f>.

- Ashraf, Fahmida. "Jammu and Kashmir Dispute: Examining Various Proposals for its Resolution." *Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad*, Series Paper 20 (2000): 1-51.
- Ashraf, Tariq M. "Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces." 84, no. 6 (2004): 53-62.
- Bahera, Navnita Chadha. *Demystifying Kashmir*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2006.
- Baig, Muhammad Ali, and Hamid Iqbal. "A Comparative Study of Blitzkrieg and Cold Start Doctrine: Lessons and Countermeasures for Pakistan." *Islamabad Policy Research Institute XVIII*, no. 1 (2018):1-31. <http://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/art1jw2018.pdf>.
- Bajwa, Farooq. *From Kutch to Tashkent: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965*. London: Hurst & Company, 2013.
- Bandyopadhyaya, Jayantanuja. *The Making of India's Foreign Policy: Determinants, Institutions, Process and Personalities*. New Delhi, Allied Publishers, 2003.
- Barua, Pradeep. "Strategies and doctrines of imperial defence: Britain and India, 1919–45." *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 25, no. 2 (1997): 240-266. <https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/03086539708583000>.
- Bashir, Salman. "The China–India–Pakistan Nuclear Triangle: Consequential Choices for Asian Security." *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament* 5, no. 2 (2022): 336-349. <https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/25751654.2022.2141053m>.

- Basrur, Rajesh M. "The Lessons of Kargil as Learned by India." In Peter R. Lavoy, ed. *Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict*. Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Basrur, Rajesh. "India's Pakistan Problem: Operation Parakram Revisited." *India Review* 18, no. 5 (2019): 503-519.
- Basrur, Rajesh. *Minimum Deterrence, and India's Nuclear Security*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006.
- Basu, Nayanima. "Open to Probe, but will retaliate if India attacks: Pakistan PM Imran Khan on Pulwama." *The Print*, February 19, 2019. <https://theprint.in/diplomacy/open-to-probe-but-will-retaliate-if-india-attacks-pakistan-pm-imran-khan-on-pulwama/194982/>.
- BBC NEWS, "Kashmir Attack: Tracing the Path that led to Pulwama." May 1, 2019. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-47302467>.
- BBC NEWS. "Balakot: Indian Air Strikes Target Militants in Pakistan." February 26, 2019. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47366718>.
- BBC NEWS. "Dozens Dead in India Train Blast." February 19, 2007.
- BBC NEWS. "Kashmir Attack: Pakistan Hits Back at India Accusations." September 19, 2016. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37405719>.
- BBC NEWS. "Militants Attack Indian Army Base in Kashmir 'Killing 17'." September 18, 2016. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-37399969>.
- BBC NEWS. "Mumbai Train Blasts: Death for Five for 2006 Bombings." September 30, 2015. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-34398810>.

BBC NEWS. "Police Raids Seek Mumbai Bombers." July 12, 2006.

BBC NEWS. "World South Asia: India Loses Two Jets." May 27, 1999.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/354120.stm.

Bedi, Rahul. "Indian Army Announces New Land Warfare Doctrine." *Jane's Defense Weekly*. December 21, 2018.

Bell, Mark S. and Julia Macdonald. "How Dangerous Was Kargil? Nuclear Crises in Comparative Perspective." *The Washington Quarterly* 42, no. 2 (2019): 135-148, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1626691>.

Bell, Mark S. and Julia Macdonald. "How to Think about Nuclear Crises." *Texas National Security Review* 2, no. 2 (February 2019): 41-64, <http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/1944>.

Bell, Mark S. and Nicholas L. Miller. "Questioning the Effect of Nuclear Weapons on Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59, no. 1 (2015): 74-92, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713499718>.

Bergman, Mats. "Positivism," in *The International Encyclopedia of Communication Theory and Philosophy* (2016): 1-5 <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118766804.wbiect248>.

Bhaskar, C Uday. "The Forgotten India-Pakistan Nuclear Crisis: 25 Years Later." *The Diplomat*. 2015. <https://thediplomat.com/2015/05/the-forgotten-india-pakistan-nuclear-crisis-25-years-later/>.

Bhattacharjee, Anol. *Social Science Research: Principles, Methods and Practices*. Florida: Text Collection, 2012.

Bibi, Gul, Muhammad Adnan, and Muhammad Asif. "Strategic Stability in the Anvil: India-Pakistan-China Triangle." *PalArch's Journal of Archaeology of Egypt/Egyptology* 18, no. 10 (2021): 928-943.

Biswas, Arka. "Surgical Strikes and Deterrence Stability in South Asia." *ORF Occasional Paper*, no. 115 (June, 2017). https://orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/ORF_OccasionalPaper_115_SurgicalStrikes_NEWFINAL.pdf.

Bonne, Jon "Bin Laden Killing: Official Report Criticizes Pakistan and US." *The Guardian*, July 9, 2013. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/08/osama-bin-laden-pakistan-criticised>.

Bratton, Patrick and David Smith. "India's Joint Doctrine: Hopeless Muddle, or the Start of Strategic Articulation?." *War Room*, June 6, 2017. <https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/indias-joint-doctrine-hopeless-muddle-start-strategic-articulation/>.

Brines, Russell. *The Indo-Pakistani Conflict*. London: Pall Mall, 1968.

Brodie, Barnard. *The Absolute Weapon*. New York: Harcourt, 1946.

Bruce, Riedel. *Avoiding Armageddon America, India and Pakistan To The Brink and Back*. Washington D.C: Brooking Institution Press, 2013.

Burke, S. M. "The Post-War Diplomacy of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971." *Asian Survey* 13, no. 11 (November, 1973): 1036-1049. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2642858>.

Business Standard. “Attack Underlines Need to Fast-Track Peace, Says Pak.” June 14, 2013.

https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/attack-underlines-need-to-fast-track-peace-says-pak-107022001117_1.html.

Carnegie Endowment for Peace. “Plenary – Beyond the Nuclear Threshold: Causes and Consequences of First Use.” March 20, 2017.

<https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/20/plenary-beyond-nuclear-threshold-causes-and-consequences-of-first-use-pub-64779>.

Carr, Edward Hallett. *The Twenty Years' Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. New York: Palgrave, 2001.

Central Investigation Agency. “Indian Army Modernization Efforts: Progress and Problems.”

Document No CIA-RDP06T00412R000504820001-1 (October 1, 1985), 1

Chadha, Vivek. *Even if it ain't Broke Yet, Do Fix it: Enhancing Effectiveness Through Military Change*. New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2016.

Chakma, Bhumitra. *Strategic Dynamics and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in South Asia: A Historical Analysis*. Bern: Peter Lang, 2004.

Chari, P. R. “India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Confused Ambitions.” *The Nonproliferation Review*, (Fall-Winter, 2000): 123-135.

<https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/10736700008436829>.

Chari, P.R. “Nuclear Crisis, Escalation Control, and Deterrence in South Asia.” *Stimson*

Centre Working Paper no. 1.0 (August, 2003): 1-27. https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/escalation_chari_1_1.pdf.

- Chari, P.R. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Stephen P. Cohen. *Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia*. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2007.
- Chari, P.R., Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Stephen Philip Cohen. *Perception, Politics and Security in South Asia, The Compound Crisis of 1990*. London: Routledge, 2003.
- Chaudhury, Rahul Roy. "Nuclear Doctrine, Declaratory Policy, and Escalation Control." *Stimson Center* (2004): 101-116. <https://www.stimson.org/2004/nuclear-doctrinedeclaratory-policy-and-escalation-control/>.
- Cheema, Musarat Javed. "Pakistan-India Conflict with Special Reference to Kashmir." *Social Asian Studies* 30, no. 1 (January-June, 2015): 45-69.
- Cheema, Zafar Iqbal. "Pakistan's Nuclear Use Doctrine and Command and Control." in *Planning the Unthinkable*, edited by Peter Lavoy, Scott. D Sagan and Jim Wirtz, 158-181 (New York: Cornell University Press): 169.
- Chitkara, M. G. *Benazir, A Profile*. New Delhi: APH Publication Corporation, 2014.
- Clark, Alexander M. "The Qualitative-Quantitative Debate: Moving from Positivism and Confrontation to Post-Positivism and Reconciliation." *Journal of advanced nursing* 27, no. 6 (1998): 1242-1249, <https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1365-2648.1998.00651.x>.
- Clary, Christopher and Vipin Narang. "India's Counterforce Temptations: Strategic Dilemma, Doctrine, and Capabilities." *International Security* 43, no 3 (2019):7-52. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00340.
- Clary, Christopher. "Deterrence Stability and the Conventional Balance of Forces in South Asia." in *Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia*, edited by

Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson, 136-160. Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2013.

Clary, Christopher. "Personalities, Organizations, and Doctrine in Indian Military." *India Review* 17, no. 1 (2018). <https://doi.org/10.1080/14736489.2018.1415283>.

Cloughley, Brian. *A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999.

CNN Wire Staff. "World Leaders React to News of Bin Laden's Death." *CNN*, May 3, 2011. <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/05/02/bin.laden.world.react/index.html>

±

Cohen, Stephen P. *Shooting for the Century: The India-Pakistan Conundrum*. Washington D.C: Brooking Institution Press, 2013.

Cohen, Stephen P. *Shooting for the Century: The India-Pakistan Conundrum*. Washington D.C: Brooking Institution Press, 2013.

Cohen, Stephen Philip. "India, Pakistan and Kashmir." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 25, no. 4 (2002): 32-60. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390412331302865>.

Cohen, Stephen Philip. and Sunil Dasgupta. *Arming without Aiming: India's Military Modernization*. Washington: Brooking Institutions Press, 2010.

Cohen, Stephen Philip. *The Indian Army its Contribution to the Development of a Nation*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Coletta, Damon. *The Power of Security Doctrine over the Use of Force in International Crises*. Duke University, 1999.

Cool, Steve. "The Stand-Off: How Jihad Group Helped Provoke the Twenty-First Century's First Nuclear Crisis." *The New Yorker*, February 5, 2006,

<https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/02/13/the-stand-off>.

Cotta-Ramusino, Paolo and Maurizio Martellini. *Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan: A Concise Report of a Visit by Landau Network-Centro-Volta*. Como Italy: Landua Network, January 2001.

Crail, Peter. "Pakistan Test Short Range Missile." *Arms Control Today*, May 2011.

<https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011-05/pakistan-tests-short-range-missile>.

Crawford, Timothy W. *Pivotal Deterrence, Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace*. London: Cornell University Press, 2003.

Cropley, Arthur. *Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods*. Hamburg: University of Hamburg, 2015.

Daily Pakistan. "Journalists Debunk India's Claim of Surgical Strikes." October 2, 2016.

<https://dailytimes.com.pk/54228/journalists-debunk-indias-claim-of-surgical-strikes/>.

Dalton, Toby and George Perkovich. *India's Nuclear Options and Escalation Dominance*. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Dalton, Toby. "Signaling and Catalysis in Future Nuclear Crises in South Asia: Two Questions after the Balakot Episode." *Carnegie Endowment for Endowment*, June 25, 2019. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/06/25/signaling-and-catalysis-in-future-nuclear-crises-in-south-asia-two-questions-after-balakot-episode-pub-79373>.

Dasgupta, Sunil and Stephen Philip Cohen. "Is India Ending its Strategic Restraint Doctrine?." *The Washington Quarterly* 34, no. 2 (2011): 163-177.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2011.562442>.

Dawn News. "12 Die as Gunmen Storm Indian Parliament." December 14, 2001.

<https://www.dawn.com/news/404644/12-die-as-gunmen-storm-indian-parliament>.

Dawn News. "62PC Cut on War on Terror Losses." April 27, 2018.

<https://www.dawn.com/news/1404161>.

Dawn News. "7 Tourists Killed in Kashmir." July 12, 2006.

<https://www.dawn.com/news/201081/7-tourists-killed-in-kashmirm>.

Dawn News. "For Indians, Bin Laden Still a Non-no." May 13, 2011.

<https://www.dawn.com/news/628392/for-indians-bin-laden-still-a-no-no>.

Dawn News. "India Spurns PM Khan's Olive Branch, Says Offer to Investigate is 'Lame Excuse'." February 19, 2019. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1464803>.

Dawn News. "Pakistan will not allow Use of its Soil for Terrorism, Says PM." 5 May, 2011.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20110505061304/http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/02/zardari-gilani-security-chiefs-in-emergency-talks.html>.

Dawn. "2 Indian Aircraft Violating Pakistani Airspace Shot Down; Pilot Arrested." February 27, 2019. <https://dikhawa.pk/blogs/dawn-news/2-indian-aircraft-violating-pakistani-airspace-shot-down-pilot-arrested>.

Dawn. "Indian Defense Minister Blames Pakistan for Attack in India-held Kashmir." June 26, 2016. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1267374>.

- DAWN. "Samjhota Express Bombing: India's Special Anti-Terror Court Acquits 4 Accused." March 20, 2019. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1470809>.
- DAWN. "Transcript of RAW Agent Kulbhushan's Confessional Statement." March 30, 2016. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1248786>.
- Defence PK. "Army, PAF Start Azm-e-Nau War Games." July 14, 2009.
- Department of Defense Report. "Lead Inspector General for Operation Freedom's Sentinel I Quarterly Report to the United States Congress I January 1, 2019 – March 31, 2019." *Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoDIG)*, May 17, 2019, OCO. <https://www.dodig.mil/Reports/Lead-Inspector-General-Reports/Article/1853337/lead-inspector-general-for-operation-freedoms-sentinel-i-quarterly-report-to-th/>.
- Dixit, J. N. *India-Pakistan in War and Peace*. London: Routledge, 2002.
- Downes, Alexander. "Step Aside or Face the Consequences: Explaining the Success and Failure of Compellent Threats to Remove Foreign Leaders," in *Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics*, edited by Greenhill and Krause, 93-114. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Erdag, Ramazan. "Security Studies and International Terrorism." *European Scientific Journal* 9, no. 23 (2013): 62-73.
- Farid, Rifat "Indian Soldiers Killed in Kashmir Gun Battle." *Aljazeera News*, February 12, 2018, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/2/12/indian-soldiers-killed-in-kashmir-gun-battle>.

- Farooq, Umar. "Afghanistan-Pakistan: The Covert War." *The Diplomat*, January 1, 2014, <https://thediplomat.com/2014/01/afghanistan-pakistan-the-covert-war/>.
- Faisal, Muhammad. "Pakistan-China Relations." *Strategic Studies* 40, no. 2 (2020): 23-40, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48732331>.
- Feld, M. D. "Middle-Class Society and the Rise of Military Professionalism: The Dutch Army 1589-1609." *Armed Forces & Society* 1, no. 4 (1975), 419-442. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X7500100404>.
- Feroz, Hassan Khan. "Minimum Deterrence: Pakistan's Dilemma." *RUSI Journal* 156, no.5 (2011): 44-51. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2011.626274>.
- Folker, Jennifer Sterling. "Making Sense of International Relations Theory." in *Making Sense of International Relations Theory*, ed. Jennifer Sterling-Folker. Londres: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2013.
- Freedman, Lawrence. "I Exist, Therefore I Deter." *International Security* 13 (Summer 1988): 177-195. <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/446771>.
- Freedman, Lawrence. *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
- French, Ryan. "Deterrence Adrift? Mapping Conflict and Escalation in South Asia." *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 10, no. 1 (2016): 106-137, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26271089>.
- Ganguly, Rajat. "India's Military: Evolution, Modernization and Transformation." *India Quarterly* 71, no. 3 (2015): 187-205. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928415584021>.
- Ganguly, Rajat. *India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute*. Asian Studies Institute, 1998.

Ganguly, Rajat. *Kin State Intervention in Ethnic State: Lessons from South Asia*. New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 1998.

Ganguly, Sumit and Kanti Bajpai. "India and the Crisis in Kashmir." *Asian Survey*, 34 No. 5 (1994): 401-416. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2645054>.

Ganguly, Sumit and Kapur, S. Paul. *Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behavior and the Bomb*. New York: Routledge, 2009.

Ganguly, Sumit and Manjeet S. Pardesi. "Explaining Sixty Years of India's Foreign Policy." *India Review* 8, no. 1 (2009): 4-19. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14736480802665162>.

Ganguly, Sumit. "Deterrence Failure Revisited: The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 13, no. 4 (1990): 77-93. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402399008437432>.

Ganguly, Sumit. "Nuclear Stability in South Asia." *International Security* 33, no. 2 (Fall, 2008): 45-70. <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2008.33.2.45>.

Ganguly, Sumit. *Conflict Unending, India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.

Ganguly, Sumit. *Deadly Impasse: Indo-Pakistani Relations at the Dawn of a New Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Ganguly, Sumit. *Deadly Impasse: Indo-Pakistani Relations at the Dawn of a New Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Gill, John H. "India and Pakistan: A Shift in the Military Calculus?." in *Strategic Asia, 2005–06: Military Modernization in an era of Uncertainty*, edited by Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, 237-268. Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research 2005.

- Gill, John H. *An Atlas of the 1971 India-Pakistan War: The Creation of Bangladesh, Near East-South Asia Center Occasional Paper*. Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2003.
- Gilpin, Robert. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- Grare, Frederic. "Looking Back at Three Decades of India-U.S. Relationship." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, July 27, 2019. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/07/27/looking-back-at-three-decades-of-india-u.s.-relationship-pub-79779>.
- Grix, Jonathan. "Introducing Students to the Generic Terminology of Social Research." *Politics* 22, no. 3 (2002): 175-186. <https://doi.org/10.1111%2F1467-9256.00173>.
- Gul, Ayaz. "Pakistan Claims 'Irrefutable Evidence' of Indian Links to Terrorism on Pakistani Soil." *Voice of America*, November 14, 2020. https://www.voanews.com/a/south-central-asia_pakistan-claims-irrefutable-evidence-indian-links-terrorism-pakistani-soil/6198372.html.
- Gul, Ayaz. "US Drone Kills Afghan-Based Pakistani Taliban Commander." *Voice of America*, July 4, 2018. <https://www.voanews.com/a/us-drone-kills-afghan-based-pakistani-taliban-commander/4467419.html>.
- Gulf News. "Violation of Water Treaty Risks War, Senior Pakistan Official Warns, PM's Adviser Aziz Says Country will not Accept any Form of Aggression." September 27, 2016. <https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/pakistan/violation-of-water-treaty-risks-war-senior-pakistan-official-warns-1.1903026>.

- Gupta, Amit. *Building an Arsenal, The Evolution of Regional Power Force Structure*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997.
- Gupta, Amit. "Determining India's Force Structure and Military Doctrine: I Want My MiG." *Asian Survey* 35, no. 5 (1995): 443, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2645747>.
- Hagerty, Devin T. *South Asia in World Politics*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005.
- Hagerty, Devin T. *The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia*. MIT Press, 1998.
- Haider, Irfan. "Nawaz-Modi Call: India Urges Pakistan to Act after Pathankot Airbase Attack." *Dawn*, January 5, 2016. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1230945>.
- Hali, S. M. "PAFs Exercise High Mark 2010." *The Nation*, March 17, 2010.
- Hart, Basil Henry Liddell. *The Revolution in Warfare*. London: Faber and Faber, 1947.
- Hart, Basil Henry Liddle. *Deterrent or Defence A Fresh Look at West's Military Position*. London: Stevens and Sons, 1960.
- Hersh, Seymour M. *The Price of Power Kissinger in the Nixon White House*. University of Michigan: Summit Books, 1983.
- High Commission of India, Islamabad, Pakistan. "Bilateral Brief: India-Pakistan Relations." <https://india.org.pk/pages.php?id=16>.
- Hindustan Times. "Diplomatic Disaster: Modi Govt under Fire over Pak Report on Pathankot.", April 6, 2016. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/modi-govt-under-fire-after-pak-media-claims-pathankot-attack-was-staged/story-IzUQdnhV5VdBoOAicJzIuI.html>.

Hindustan Times. "India propagating a 'hostile narrative' about Uri attack: Pak Army Chief."

September 19, 2016. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/india-propagating-hostile-narrative-about-uri-attack-pak-army-chief/story-LFHNi2z8BFDPow4xtjMGSM.html>.

Hindustan Times. "Samjhauta Express Blast Verdict Held Up Over Pakistani National's Last-

Minute Plea." March 11, 2019. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/samjhauta-express-blast-verdict-held-up-over-pakistani-national-s-last-minute-plea/story-3JU1XExtGftHcwNMj0Bk9I.html>.

Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan*. Penguin Books, Baltimore, MD, 1968.

Hoffman, Steven A. *India and the China Crisis*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.

Høiback, Harald. *Understanding Military Doctrine*. New York: Routledge, 2013.

Hooda, Deependra Singh. "Three Years after Balakot: Reckoning with Two Claims of Victory." *STIMSON*, February 28, 2022. <https://www.stimson.org/2022/three-years-after-balakot-reckoning-with-two-claims-of-victory/>.

House, Jonathan M. *Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2001.

Hussain, Rifaat. "Nuclear Doctrines in South Asia." *South Asia Strategic Stability Unit University of Bradford, Research Report no. 4* (2005): 1-30. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/99918/RR%20No%2004.pdf>.

India Today. "Jammu Army Camp Attack: 4 Militants Killed, 5 Soldiers Martyred as Operation Continues." February 11, 2018.

<https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/sunjuwan-terror-attack-3-terrorists-killed-1-still-holed-up-inside-army-camp-1166976-2018-02-11>.

Indian Express. "From US to UK, Major World Powers Urge India, Pakistan to Avoid Further Military Action." February 27, 2019.

Iqbal, Aamir and Pamela Constable. "In Kashmir, Doubts that Indian Soldiers Actually Infiltrated Across the Border." *The Washington Post*, October 2, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-kashmir-doubts-that-indian-soldiers-actually-infiltrated-across-the-border/2016/10/02/cbf46cec-88ac-11e6-8cdc-4fbb1973b506_story.html.

Iqbal, Anwar. "TTP has Foothold in Afghanistan, Says Abdullah." *Dawn News*, November 17, 2017. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1371039>.

Iqbal, Imran. "India's New-Normal." *The News*. March 7, 2019. <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/442019-india-s-new-normal>.

Iqbal, Muhammad Jamshed. "SAARC: Origin, Growth, Potential and Achievements." *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture* 27, no. 2 (2006): 127-140.

Jabeen, Mussarat, and Muhammad Saleem Mazhar. "Security game: SEATO and CENTO as instrument of economic and military assistance to encircle Pakistan." *Pakistan Economic and Social Review* (2011): 109-132.

Jackson, Aaron P. "The Nature of Military Doctrine: A Decade of Study in 1500 Words." *The Strategy Bridge*, November 15, 2017. <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/11/15/the-nature-of-military-doctrine-a-decade-of-study-in-1500-words>.

- Jackson, Aaron P. *The Roots of Military Doctrine: Change and Continuity in Understanding the Practice of Warfare*. Combat Studies Institute Press.
- Jalil, Ghazala Yasmin. "Missile Race in South Asia: Security Challenges for Pakistan in the 21st Century." *Strategic Studies* 40, no. 1 (Spring, 2020): 39-57, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48732326>.
- Jamal, Sana. "Once Terror-Hit Region Now Ready to Welcome Students." *Gulf News*, March 21, 2019. <https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/pakistan/once-terror-hit-region-now-ready-to-welcome-students-1.62810352>.
- Jaspal, Zafar Nawaz. "Comparative Analysis of India-Pakistan Proliferation Contours," *Journal of Security and Strategic Analyses* IV, no. 1 (2018): 07-26. <https://ojs.thesvi.org/index.php/ojs/article/view/82>.
- Jaspal, Zafar Nawaz. "Paradox of Deterrence: India Pakistan Strategic Relations." *Strategic Studies* 29, no. 4 (2009): 23-36.
- Jaspal, Zafar Nawaz. "Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Stability in South Asia." *Weekly Pulse*, September 23, 2011.
- Jaspal, Zafar Nawaz. *India's Surgical Strike Stratagem: Brinkmanship and Response*. Khursheed Printers (Pvt) Ltd – 2019.
- Jervis, Robert. *The Illogic of Nuclear Strategy*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1984.
- Johnston, Patrick B. "The Impact of US Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan." *International Studies Quarterly* 60, no. 2 (2016): 203–219, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqv004>.
- Joint Doctrine: Indian Armed Forces*. New Delhi 53 Printing Press, E-in-C's Branch, 2017.

- Jones, Rodney W. "Nuclear Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia: Structural Factors." in *Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia*, edited by Michael Krepon, Rodney W. Jones, and Ziad Haider, 25-55. California: Stanford University Press, 2004.
- Joshi, Shashank. "Everything that We Know about India's Cross-LoC Strikes before Uri." *Scroll.in*, October 5, 2016, <https://scroll.in/article/818324/everything-that-we-know-about-indias-cross-loc-strikes-before-uri>.
- Joshi, Shashank. "India's Military Instrument: A Doctrine Stillborn." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, no. 4 (2013): 512-540, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2013.766598>.
- Joshi, Yogesh, and Frank O'Donnell. *India and Nuclear Asia: Forces, Doctrine, and Dangers*. Georgetown University Press, 2018.
- K. Betts, Richard. "Conventional Deterrence: Predictive Uncertainty and Policy Confidence." *World politics* 37, no. 2 (1985): 153-179, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010141>.
- Kampani, Gaurav. "Stakeholders in the Indian Strategic Missile Program." *Non-proliferation Review* 10, no. 3 (2003): 48-70, <https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/10736700308436943>.
- Kanwal, Gurmeet. *Indian Army Vision 2020*. New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2008.
- Kapila, Subhash. "Pakistan's Army Politico-Military Signals to India through Azm-e-Nau." *South Asian Analysis* (2010): 577-594.

- Kapur, Ashok. *Pokhran and Beyond Indian Nuclear Behaviour*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Kapur, Harish. *India's Foreign Policy, 1947-92, Shadows and Substance*. Sage Publications: New Delhi, 1994.
- Kapur, S. Paul and Ganguly, Sumit. "The Jihad Paradox, Pakistan and Islamist Militancy in South Asia." *International Security* 37, no. 1 (Summer, 2012):111-141.
https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00090.
- Kapur, S. Paul. "Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia." *International Security* 33, no. 2 (Fall, 2008): 71-94. <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2008.33.2.71>.
- Kapur, S. Paul. *Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007.
- Karnad, Bharat. *India's Nuclear Policy*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008.
- Karnad, Bharat. *Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy*. New Delhi: Macmillan Publishers, 2002.
- Kavic, Lorne J. *India's Quest for Security: Defence Policies, 1947-1965*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.
- Keith B. Payne. "Deterring the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction." *Comparative Strategy* 14, no. 4 (1995): 347-359. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495939508403042>.
- Khalid, Asma. "Confidence Building Measures between India-Pakistan: Hope for Bilateral Peace." *Centre for Strategic and Contemporary Research*, May 14, 2021.
<https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/defense-security/confidence-building-measures-between-india-pakistan-hope-for-bilateral-peace/>.

- Khalid, Hanif. "How Shaheen was Developed." *Jang Newspapers*, April 19, 1999.
- Khalid, Iram. "Brasstacks Crisis 1986-87." *South Asian Studies A Research Journal of South Asian Studies* 27, no. 1 (January-June, 2012): 35-36.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/344298012_Brasstacks_Crisis_1986-87.
- Khan, Aarish U. "Siachen Glacier: Getting Past the Deadlock." *Regional Studies* XXX, no. 3 (2012): 3-22.
- Khan, Feroz. *Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb*. Stanford University Press, 2020.
- Khan, Feroz Hassan. "Pakistan's Perspective on the Global Elimination of the Nuclear Weapons." in *Pakistan and Israel*, edited by Barry Blechman, 3-36. Washington DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2009.
- Khan, Feroz Hassan. "Russia-Pakistan Strategic Relations: An Emerging Entente Cordiale." *Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs*, January 15, 2021.
<https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2473361/russiapakistan-strategic-relations-an-emerging-entente-cordiale/>.
- Khan, Feroz Hassan. *Subcontinent Adrift: Strategic Futures of South Asia*. Cambria Press, 2022.
- Khan, Hafeez Ullah and Khalid, Ijaz. "Indian Cold Start Doctrine: Pakistan's Policy Response." *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan* 55, no. 1 (2018): 325-341.
- Khan, Iftikhar A. "Army Plans Largest Exercise since 98 Zarb-i-Momin." *Dawn*, April 6, 2010. <https://www.dawn.com/news/529108/army-plans-largest-exercise-since-ae98-zarb-i-momin>.

- Khan, Jamshed Ayaz. "India's Nuclear Doctrine." *The Nation*, January 31, 2003.
- Khan, M Ilyas. "India's 'Surgical Strikes' in Kashmir: Truth or Illusion?." *BBC NEWS*, October 23, 2016. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-37702790>.
- Khan, Muhammad Ilyas. "India Kashmir Strike: The View from Pakistan." *BBC News*, September 30, 2016. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37518200>.
- Khan, Muhammad Ilyas. "Operation Gibraltar: The Pakistani Troops who Infiltrated Kashmir to Start a Rebellion." *BBC NEWS*, September 5, 2015, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34136689>.
- Khan, Rashid Ahmad. "Friendly Exchanges and People-to-People Contact between Pakistan and India." *Strategic Studies* 34, no. 2/3 (2014): 133-146.
- Khan, Saira. *Nuclear Weapons and Conflict Transformation: The Case of India-Pakistan*. London: Routledge, 2009.
- Khan, Sajad Padder. "Siachen Stalemate." *International Journal of Peace and Development Studies* 4, no. 3 (2013): 35-42. DOI: 10.5897/IJPDS12.010.
- Khan, Zafar, "The Arrival of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in South Asia: Deterrent Stability or Instability?." *Comparative Strategy* 32, no. 5 (2013): 402, DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2013.840205.
- Khan, Zafar. "Cold Start Doctrine: The Conventional Challenge to South Asian Stability." *Contemporary Security Policy* 33, no. 3, (2012): 577-594. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2012.727685>.

- Khan, Zafar. "Conceptualizing China and India's Transforming Strategic Forces Postures under the Essentials of Minimum Deterrence." *Journal of Contemporary China* 26, no. 105 (2017): 403-418. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2016.1245898>.
- Khan, Zafar. "Crisis Management in Nuclear South Asia A Pakistani Perspective." in *Investigating Crises: South Asia's Lessons, Evolving Dynamics, and Trajectories* edited by Hannah Haegeland, Michael Krepon and Sameer Lalwani, 143-164 Washington: Stimson Centre, 2018.
- Khan, Zafar. "Pakistan's Nuclear First-Use Doctrine Obsessions and Obstacles." *Contemporary Security Policy* 36, no. 1 (2015): 149-170. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2015.1012349>.
- Khattak, Masood Ur Rehman, Muhammad and Qumber, Ghulam. "Evolution of New Indian Military Strategy: Implications for Pakistan." *Margalla Papers*, Issue – I (2019): 29-39.
- Khattak, Masood ur Rehman. "The Indian Army's Land Warfare Doctrine 2018: A Critical Analysis." *Islamabad Policy Research Institute* XX, no. 1 (2020): 105-134.
- Khokhar, Amna Yousaf. "Operation Neptune Spear." *Strategic Studies* 31, no. 3 (2011): 109-123, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48527651>.
- Koithara, Verghese. *Crafting Peace in Kashmir: Through A Realist Lens*. SAGE Publications, 2004.
- Kraig, Michael Ryan. "The Political and Strategic Imperatives of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia." *India Review* 2, no. 1, (January 2003): 1-48. <https://doi.org/10.1080/714002322>.

Krepon, Michael and Nate Cohn. *Crises in South Asia: Trends and Potential Consequences*. Henry L. Stimson Center, 2011.

Krepon, Michael, and Alex Stolar. "Outlook for Regional Security in South Asia." *Pakistan Horizon* 60, no. 3 (2007): 73-82.

Krepon, Michael. "The Counterforce Compulsion in South Asia." *Stimson Centre*, April 27, 2017. <https://www.stimson.org/2017/counterforce-compulsion-south-asia/>.

Krepon, Michael. "The Meaning of the Mumbai Blasts." *Stimson Centre*, August 7, 2006. <https://www.stimson.org/2006/meaning-mumbai-blasts/>.

Krepon, Michael. "The Stability-instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia." *Prospects for Peace in South Asia* 1 (2003): 261-279.

Krishna, Ashok. *India's Armed Forces: Fifty Years of War and Peace*. London: Lancer Publishers, 1998.

Kugler, Jacek. "Terror without Deterrence: Reassessing the Role of Nuclear Weapons." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28, no. 3 (1984): 470-506. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002784028003005>.

Kumar, Sundaram and M. V. Ramana. "India and the Policy of No First Use of Nuclear Weapons." *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2018): 152-168, <https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2018.1438737>.

Kunsman, David M. and Douglas B. Lawson. *A Primer on US Strategic Nuclear Policy*, *Sandia Report 2001-2003*. Sandia National Laboratory, 2001.

Ladwig III, Walter C. "Indian Military Modernization and Conventional Deterrence in South Asia." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 38, no. 5 (2015): 729-772.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1014473>.

Ladwig III, Walter. "A Cold Start for Hot Wars? Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine." *International Security* 32, no. 2 (2007): 158-190.

<https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2008.32.3.158>.

Lalwani, Sameer and Hannah Haegeland. *Investigating Crises: South Asia's Lessons, Evolving Dynamics, and Trajectories*. Washington: Stimson Centre, 2018.

Lamb, Alastair. *Incomplete Partition: The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute 1947-1948*. Oxford: Roxford Books, 1997.

Lamb, Alastair. *Kashmir A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990*. Hertfordshire: Roxford Books, 1991.

Latif, Amir. "A Comparative Study of Nuclear Doctrines of India and Pakistan." *Journal of Global Peace and Conflict* 2, no. 1 (June, 2014): 129-146.

http://jgpcnet.com/journals/jgpc/Vol_2_No_1_June_2014/7.pdf.

Lawrence Freedman, "War in Iraq: Selling the Threat." *Survival* 46, no. 2 (2004): 07-49.

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2004.9688597>.

Lederach, John Paul. *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation across Cultures*. Syracuse University Press, 1996.

Lederach, John Paul. *Reconcile: Conflict Transformation for Ordinary Christians*. MennoMedia, Inc., 2014.

- Lee, Dong Sun. "When are Power Shifts Dangerous?: Military Strategy and Preventive War." *Journal of International and Area Studies* 13, no. 2 (2006): 53-71, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43111457>.
- Leng, Russel J. "Realpolitik and Learning in the India-Pakistan Rivalry." in *The India-Pakistan Conflict, An Enduring Rivalry*, edited by T. V. Paul, 103-130. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Leonard, Thomas M. *Encyclopedia of the Developing World Vol 2 F-N Index*. London: Routledge, 2006.
- Lodhi, S. F. S. "Pakistan Missile Technology." *Defence Journal*, May 31, 1998.
- Luthi, Lorenz. "Sino-India Relations 1954-1962." *Eurasia Border Review* 3, no. Special Issue. (2012): 93-119. https://eprints.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2115/50965/1/EBR3-S_009.pdf.
- M. Hart, Douglas. "Soviet Approaches to Crisis Management: The Military Dimension." *Survival* 26, no. 5 (1984): 214-223. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338408442196>.
- MacDonald, Myra. *Defeat is an Orphan: How Pakistan Lost the Great South Asian War*. London: Hurst & Company, 2017.
- Machado, Gary, Alexander Alaphilippe, Roman Adamczyk, and Antoine Gregoire. "Indian Chronicles: Subsequent Investigation: Deep Dive into a 15-year Operation Targeting the EU and UN to Serve Indian Interests." *EU DISINFO LAB*, December 9, 2020, <https://www.disinfo.eu/publications/indian-chronicles-deep-dive-into-a-15-year-operation-targeting-the-eu-and-un-to-serve-indian-interests/>.

- Machiavelli, Nicollo. *The prince (1513)*. Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 1993.
- Magan, Tapakshi, *Analysis of Indian Defense Approach in Last 70 Years*. New Delhi: KW Publishers New Delhi, 2018.
- Malik, Iftikhar H. "The Afghanistan Crisis and the Rediscovery of the Frontline State." *Asian Survey* 42, no. 1 (2002): 204-212. <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2002.42.1.204>.
- Malik, Qasim Mustafa. "CTBT: A Critical Evaluation from a Pakistani Perspective." *Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad* 33, no. 3/4 (Autumn/ Winter, 2013): 41-63.
- Malik, V. P. *India's Military Conflicts and Diplomacy: An Inside View of Decision-Making*. HarperCollins India Publishers Pvt Limited, 2019.
- Manan, Abdul. "Kerry Urges Pakistan, India to Continue Talks despite Pathankot Attack." *The Express Tribune*, January 9, 2016. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1024712/kerry-urges-pakistan-india-to-continue-talks-despite-pathankot-attack>.
- Mark P, Sullivan. *The Mechanism for Strategic Coercion Denial or Second Order Change?* Air University Press, 1995.
- Marsh, David and Paul Furlong, "A Skin, not a Sweater Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science," in *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, ed. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002.
- Masood, Salman. "Pakistan Arrests Jaish Militants Over Attack on Indian Air Base." *The New York Times*, January 13, 2016. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/14/world/asia/pakistan-india-pathankot-jaish-muhammad.html>.

- Matinuddin, Kamal. *The Nuclearization of South Asia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Mazari, Shireen M. *The Kargil Conflict, 1999: Separating Fact from Fiction*. Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies, 2003.
- Mearsheimer, John J. *Conventional Deterrence*. New York: Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, 1983.
- Menon, P. *The Strategy Trap: India and Pakistan under Nuclear Shadow*. New Delhi: Wisdom Tree, 2018.
- Menon, Shivshankar. *Choices: Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy*. Washington DC.: Brookings Institution Press, 2016.
- Michael, S. Gerson. "Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age." *Parameters*, 39, no. 3 (Autumn 2009): 32-48, doi:10.55540/0031-1723.2486.
- Miglani, Sanjeev, and Jorgic, Drazen. "India, Pakistan Threatened to Unleash Missiles at EachOther." *Reuters*, March 17, 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/india-kashmir-crisis-page-idINKCN1QZ0F1>.
- Mille, Katherine. *Communication Theories: Perspectives, Processes, and Contexts*. Beijing: Peking University Press, 2007.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Pakistan. "Indian External Affairs Minister's Confession of Politicizing FATF against Pakistan." no. 338/ 2021 (July 19, 2021). <https://mofa.gov.pk/indian-external-affairs-ministers-confession-of-politicizing-fatf-against-pakistan/>.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Pakistan. "Pakistan Hands over Dossier on Indian Interference and Terrorism in Pakistan to UN Secretary General." no. 008/ 2017, January 06, 2017. <https://mofa.gov.pk/pakistan-hands-over-dossier-on-indian-interference-and-terrorism-in-pakistan-to-un-secretary-general/>.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan. "Record of the Press Briefing by Spokesperson on 15 February 2018." February 15, 2018. <https://mofa.gov.pk/record-of-the-press-briefing-by-spokesperson-on-15-february-2018/>.

Misra, Ashutosh. *India-Pakistan Coming to Terms*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

Morgan, Patrick M. *Deterrence Now*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Morgenthau, Hans Joachim. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978 [1948].

Muhammad, Adil Sultan. "India-Pakistan Crises and the Evolving Dyadic Deterrence Model." *IPRI Journal* XX, no.1 (2020): 21-43.

Mukhtar, Misbah. "Issue Brief on "India-US Military Agreement: BECA and its Implications for the Region." *Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad* (November 17, 2020), <https://issi.org.pk/issue-brief-on-india-us-military-agreement-beca-and-its-implications-for-the-region/>.

Musharraf, Pervez. *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir*. London: Free Press, 2006.

Mustafa, Zubeida. "The USSR and The Indo-Pakistan War." *Pakistan Institute of International Affairs* 25, no. 1(1972): 45-52. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41393112>.

- Nagappa, Rajaram, Vishwanathan, Arun and Malhotra, Aditi. *HATF-IX/ NASR- Pakistan Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Implications for Indo-Pak Deterrence*. Bangalore, National Institute of Advanced Studies, 2013.
- Naqvi, Jawed. "India Soften Tone after Powell's Visit: Jaswant Want Action on Terrorists' List." *Dawn News* (January 19, 2002).
- Naqvi, Muneeza. "66 Die in India-Pakistan Train Attack." *The Washington Post*, February 19, 2007. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/18/AR2007021801136.html>.
- Narang, Vipin. "Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability." *International security* 34, no. 3 (2010): 38-78. <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2010.34.3.38>.
- Nasim, Zehra. *From Kargil to the Coup: Events that Shook Pakistan*. Lahore: Sang-e, Meel Publisher, 2018.
- Nayak, Polly and Michael Krepon. *The Unfinished Crisis: US Crisis Management after the 2008 Mumbai Attacks*. Stimson Center, 2012.
- Nayak, Polly and Michael Krepon. *US Crisis Management in South Asia's Twin Peaks Crisis*. Report 57, Second Edition 2014 (Washington D.C.: Stimson Center September 2014).
- Nayar, Kuldip. "We Have the A-Bomb, Says Pakistan's Strangelove." *The Observer* London, March 1, 1987.
- Newman, Lawrence. *Social Research Method: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. Edinburgh: Pearson Education Limited, 2014.

Nisser, John. "Implementing Military Doctrine: A Theoretical Model." *Comparative Strategy* 40, no. 3 (2021): 305-314. <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3995-0885>.

Nugroho, Ganjar. "Constructivism and International Relations Theories." *Global & Strategis* 2, no. 1 (2008): 85-98.

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. *Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Kashmir: Developments in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir from June 2016 to 2018, and General Human Rights Concerns in Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan*. Geneva, 2018.
<https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/IN/DevelopmentsInKashmirJune2016ToApril2018.pdf>.

Ogden, Chris. *Indian Foreign Policy: Ambition and Transition*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014.

Ohsishi, Kin. "Compellence and Coercive Diplomacy: Concepts and Characteristics." *Global Security Division, Policy Studies Department*, 2019.

Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood. "Constructivism." in *International Relations in a Constructed World*, ed. Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul Kowet, 35-65. London: Routledge, 2012.

Panda, Anik. "India, US Sign Logistics Exchange Agreement: What You Need to Know." *The Diplomat*, August 30, 2016. <https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/india-us-sign-logistics-exchange-agreement-what-you-need-to-know/>.

Pant, Harsh V., and Julie M. Super. "India's 'Non-Alignment' Conundrum: a Twentieth Century Policy in a Changing World." *International Affairs* 91, no. 4 (2015): 747-764. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12336>.

- Pari, Dinaker. "How did an Indian Airforce Mi-17 Helicopter get Shot Down by the IAF?." *The Hindu*, June 2, 2019.
- Payne, Keith B. *Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age*. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996.
- Perkovich, George and Toby Dalton. "Modi's Strategic Choice: How to Respond to Terrorism from Pakistan." *The Washington Quarterly*, no. 38:1 (2015): 41-42. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2015.1038172>.
- Perlez, Jane. "Pakistan Pushes Back Against the U.S. Criticism on Bin Laden." *The New York Times*, May 3, 2011. <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/04/world/asia/04pakistan.html>.
- Peters, John E. et al. *War and Escalation in South Asia*. RAND Corporation, 2006.
- Philips, Macon. "Osama Bin Laden Dead." *The White House, President Barrack Obama*, May 2, 2011. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-dead>.
- Podwig, Pavel. "Blurring the Line Between Nuclear and Nonnuclear Weapons: Increasing the Risk of Accidental Nuclear War?." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 72, no. 3 (2016): 145-9. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2016.1170363>.
- Posen, Barry. *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars*. Cornell University Press, 1984.
- Praval, K. C. *Indian Army after Independence*. New Delhi: Lancer International, 1987.

- Quackenbush, Stephen L. "General Deterrence and International Conflict: Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory." *International Interactions* 36, no. 1 (2010): 60-85.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620903554069>.
- Quester, George. *Deterrence Before Hiroshima: The Airpower Background of Modern Strategy*. New York: Wiley, 1966.
- Raghavan, Srinath. "Nawaz Sharif's Pleas and Bill Clinton's Intervention in the Kargil War." *The Print*, June 24, 2018. <https://theprint.in/pageturner/excerpt/nawaz-sharifs-pleas-and-bill-clintons-intervention-in-the-kargil-war/74007/>.
- Raghavan, Srinath. *War and Peace in Modern India: A Strategic History of the Nehru Years*. Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2010.
- Raghavan, V.R. "Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia." *The Non-proliferation Review* 8, no. 3 (Fall-Winter, 2001): 82-98.
<https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/10736700108436865>.
- Rais, Rasul Bakhsh. "Conceptualizing Nuclear Deterrence Pakistan's Posture." *India Review* 4, no. 2 (2005): 14-172.
- Rajagopalan, Rajesh. "India's Nuclear Doctrine Debate." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, June 30, 2016. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/india-s-nuclear-doctrine-debate-pub-63950>.
- Rajain, Arpit. *Nuclear Deterrence in Southern Asia: China, India and Pakistan*. New Delhi: Sage, 2005.

Ramana, M.V. and Zia Mian. "The Nuclear Confrontation in South Asia," in *SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, 195-212. SIPRI Yearbook, 2003.

Rao, Hamza. "No Proofs of Any 'Surgical Strikes' on LoC: UN Monitoring Group (UNMOGIP)." *Daily Pakistan*, October 1, 2016. <https://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/01-Oct-2016/no-proofs-of-any-surgical-strikes-on-loc-un-monitoring-group-unmogip>.

Rao, V. R. Krishna. *Prepare or Perish: A Study of National Security*. New Delhi: Lancer, 1991.

Rauchhaus, Robert. "Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 2 (2009): 258-277. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002708330387>.

Ray, Ayesha. *The Soldier and the State in India Nuclear Weapons Counter Insurgency and the Transformation of Indian Civil-Military Relations*. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2013.

Rehman, Zia ur. "Pakistani Taliban: Between Infighting, Government Crackdowns and Daesh." *TRT World*, 2019. <https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/pakistani-taliban-between-infighting-government-crackdowns-and-daesh-25976>.

Rej, Abhijnan. "India Is Not Changing Its Policy on No First Use of Nuclear Weapons." *War on the Rocks*, March 29, 2017. <https://warontherocks.com/2017/03/india-is-not-changing-its-policy-on-no-first-use-of-nuclear-weapons/>.

Reidel, Bruce. "The Mumbai Massacre and Its Implication for America and South Asia." *Journal of International Affairs* 63, no. 1 (2009): 111-126. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24384175>.

- Reiter, Dan. "Military Strategy and the Outbreak of International Conflict Quantitative Empirical Tests, 1903-1992." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43, no. 3 (June 1999): 366-387.
- Rej, Aghijnan. and Shashank Joshi, *India's Joint Doctrine: A Lost Opportunity*. Observer Research Foundation, 2018.
- Reuters Staff. "Pakistan Rejects Links to Attack in Indian Controlled Kashmir." *Reuters*, February 15, 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/india-kashmir-attacks-pakistan-idINKCN1Q32S4>.
- Robson, Colin. *Real World Research. A Resource for Social Scientists and Practitioner-Researchers*. Malden: Blackwell, 2002.
- Roger W. Barnett. *Asymmetrical Warfare: Today's Challenge to US Military Power*. Virginia: Brassey's Inc, 2003.
- Rosen, Stephen Peter. *Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996.
- Rosen, Stephen Peter. *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991.
- Rosenberg, Matthew. "U.S. Disrupts Afghans Tack on Militants." *New York Times*, October 28, 2013. <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/29/world/asia/us-disrupts-afghans-tack-on-militants.html>.
- Roy-Chaudhury, Rahul. "India's Nuclear Doctrine A Critical Analysis." *Strategic Analysis* 33, no. 3 (2009): 404-414. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160902790084>.

- Ryan, Mike. Facing the Failures of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime.” *Nuclear Age Peace Foundation*, April 23, 2003. <https://www.wagingpeace.org/facing-the-failures-of-the-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-regime/>.
- S. Levy, Jack, “Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy: The Contributions of Alexander George,” *Political Psychology* 29, no. 4, (Rutgers University: 2008): 537-552. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00648.x>.
- Sadiq, Muhammad. “International Non-Proliferation Regime: Pakistan and Indian Perspective.” *IPRI Journal XIII*, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 13-36.
- Sagan, Scot D. *Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- Sagan, Scot D. *The limits of Safety, Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons*. New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1993.
- Sahni, Varun. “Going Nuclear: Establishing an Overt Nuclear Weapons Capability.” in *India and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options*, edited by David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo, 96-97, New Delhi: D.K. Fine Art Press, 1996.
- Saifi, Sophia. “Kashmir: Pakistan Calls Emergency Meeting amid ‘Deteriorating Situation’.” *CNN News*, September 30, 2016. <https://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/29/homepage2/kashmir-pakistani-soliders-killed-india-surgical-strikes/index.html>.
- Salam, Hamza Azhar, and Murtaza Ali Shah. “Lt Gen (r) Kidwai Warns India not to take Pakistan’s Nuclear Capability as a ‘Bluff’.” *The News International*, February 7, 2020. <https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/610366-lt-gen-r-kidwai-warns-india-not-to-take-pakistans-nuclear-capability-as-a-bluff>.

- Sarkar, B. N. "Indian Military Leadership: Past Lessons Yet to Be Imbided." *The Times of India*, May 23, 1975.
- Sawhney, Pravin. "New Land Warfare Doctrine is not a Credible Deterrent to China or Pakistan." *The Wire*, December 30, 2018.
- Schelling, Thomas C. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.
- Schelling, Thomas C. "The Diplomacy of Violence." In *Theories of Peace and Security: A Reader in Contemporary Strategic Thought*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1970.
- Schofield, Victoria. *Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan, and the Unending War*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2003.
- Sechser, Todd S. and Matthew Fuhrmann. *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy*. Cambridge University Press, 2017.
- Sehgal, Rashmi. "Kashmir Conflict: Solution and Demand for Self-determination." *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 1, no.6 (June 2011): 188-195.
<https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.467.2544&rep=rep1&type=pdf>.
- Seligman, Lara. "Did India Shoot Down a Pakistani Jet? US Count Say No." *Foreign Policy*, April, 4, 2019. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/04/did-india-shoot-down-a-pakistani-jet-u-s-count-says-no/>.
- Sengupta, Prasun K. "Mountain Warfare: The Kargil Experience." *Asian Defense Journal* 10 (October, 1999): 42-46.

- Shah, Hemal. "US-India's Defense: Pivoting the Strategic Partnership Forward." *Foreign Policy*, January 23, 2015, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/23/in-u-s-indias-defense-pivoting-the-strategic-partnership-forward/>.
- Shahi, Agha. "Command And Control of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia." *Strategic Issues* 3 (March 2000): 53-62.
- Shahi, Agha. "Pakistan's Response to the Indian Nuclear Doctrine." *Strategic Issues* (March 2000).
- Shamsastry, R. *Kautilya's Arthashastra*. Mygore: Wesleyan Mission Press, 2016.
- Shidore, Sarang. "India's Strategic Culture and Deterrence Stability on the Subcontinent," in *Deterrence Instability and Nuclear Weapons in South Asia*, edited by Michael Krepon, Joshua T. White, Julia Thompson and Shane Mason, 119-148. Washington D.C: Stimson, 2015.
- Shinn, James. *Introduction to Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China*. New York: Council on the Foreign Relations Press, 1996.
- Siddiqui, Huma. "India-US Military Trade to touch \$25 billion! Know the Man behind Big Bilateral Deals." *Financial Express* (June 2, 2023), <https://www.financialexpress.com/business/defence-india-us-military-trade-to-touch-25-billion-know-the-man-behind-big-bilateral-deals-3109839/>.
- Siddiqui, Naveed. "Pakistan Navy Foils an Attempt by Indian Submarine to Enter Pakistani Waters." *Dawn*, March 5, 2019. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1467778>.
- Sigdi, Anil. "India & US sign COMCASA, Pompeo says no decision on S400." *The Economic Times*, September 06, 2018.

<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-and-us-sign-military-communication-pact/articleshow/65700604.cms>.

Singh, Sukhwant, *India's Wars Since Independence, The Liberation of Bangladesh*. New Delhi: Vikas, 1981.

SIPRI Year Book 2003, *Disarmament, and International Security*. London: Oxford University Press, SPRI, 2003.

Slater, Joanna. "India Strikes Pakistan in Severe Escalation of Tensions between the Nuclear Rivals." *The Washington Post*, February 26, 2019.

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/pakistan-says-indian-fighter-jets-crossed-into...>

Smart, Ian. "The Great Engines: The Rise and Decline of a Nuclear Age." *International Affairs* 51, no. 4 (1975): 544-553. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2615835>.

Smith, Steve. "Positivism and Beyond." in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, edited by Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, 11-44. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Snyder, Glenn H. *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961.

Somini Sengupta. "Train Bombing Tests India-Pakistan Ties." *New York Times*, February 19, 2007. <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/19/world/asia/19cnd-india.html>.

Sood, Meenakshi. "Pakistan's (Non-Nuclear) Plan to Counter 'Cold Start'." *The Diplomat*, March 25, 2017. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/pakistans-non-nuclear-plan-to-counter-cold-start/>.

- Sood, V. K. and Pravin Sawhney. *Operation Parakram: The War Unfinished*. New Delhi: Sage, 2003.
- Steans, Jill, Pettiford, Lloyd, Diez, Thomas and El-Anis, Imad. *An Introduction to International Relations Theory Perspectives and Themes*. New York: Routledge, 2013.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database." [SIPRI Military Expenditure Database | SIPRI](#).
- Sultan, Adil. "India's Nuclear Doctrine: A Case of Strategic Dissonance or Deliberate Ambiguity." *Islamabad Policy Research Institute Journal* 18, no. 2 (2018): 26-52.
- Tarapore, Arzan. *The Army in Indian Military Strategy: Rethink Doctrine or Risk Irrelevance*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace., 2020.
- Taylor, Thomas R. and Bryan C. Lindlof. *Qualitative communication research methods*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE, 2011.
- Tellis, Ashley J. "Are India-Pakistan Peace Talks Worth a Damn?." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, September 20, 2017. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/09/20/are-india-pakistan-peace-talks-worth-damn-pub-73145>.
- Tellis, Ashley J. "Balancing without Containment: A US Strategy in Confronting China's Rise." *The Washington Quarterly* 36, no. 4 (Fall, 2013): 109-124.
- Tellis, Ashley J. "The Strategic Implications of Nuclear India." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* 46, no. 1 (2002): 13-45. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0030-4387\(01\)00104-1](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0030-4387(01)00104-1).

The Economic Times. “19 Minutes, 12 Jets, a Big Target: This is what the IAF did in Pakistan While You Were Asleep.” February 26, 2019.

<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/19-minutes-12-jets-3-targets-this-is-what-the-iaf-did-in-pakistan-while-you-were-asleep/articleshow/68164179.cms>.

The Economic Times. “Uri Attack Could be ‘Reaction’ to Situation in Kashmir: Nawaz Sharif.” July 14, 2018. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/uri-attack-could-be-reaction-to-situation-in-kashmir-nawaz-sharif/articleshow/54494539.cms>.

The Express Tribune. “Pakistan Presents ‘Irrefutable Evidence’ of India’s Sponsorship of Terror to Sabotage CPEC.” November 14, 2020. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2272201/pakistan-presents-irrefutable-evidence-of-indias-sponsorship-of-terror-to-sabotage-cpec>.

The Express Tribune. “Samjhauta Express Blast: Separating Fact from Fiction.” February 18, 2022. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2344153/samjhauta-express-blast-separating-fact-from-fiction>.

The Guardian. “Get Ready for our Surprise: Pakistan Warns India it will Respond to Airstrikes.” February 26, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/26/pakistan-india-jets-breached-ceasefire-line-kashmir-bomb>.

The Guardian. “Hawaii Worker who Sent Missile Alert was 100% Sure Attack was Real.” February 3, 2018.

The Guardian. "The Death Toll Climbs Past 150 as City Reels from Terror Attack."

November 29, 2008. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/nov/29/mumbai-terror-attacks-terrorism2>.

The Hindu. "Pakistan 'Must' Dismantle Terror Networks: Obama." January 24, 2016.

<https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/US-President-Barack-Obama-interview-with-PTI-at-Washington/article60540429.ece>.

The Indian Express. "Pathankot Attack JeM Role not Ruled Out, India will give Befitting

Reply." January 2, 2016. <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/pathankot-gun-battle-any-attack-will-be-given-befitting-reply-says-rajnath-singh/>.

The Indian Express. "Sushma Swaraj Rules Out Talks with Pakistan, John Kerry Says No Good or Bad Terrorist." August 31, 2016.

<https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/sushma-swaraj-pakistan-terrorism-john-kerry-india-visit-3004565/>.

The Newspaper's Staff Reporter. "Rare Light Shone on Full Spectrum Deterrence Policy."

Dawn, December 7, 2017. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1375079>.

The Print. "Indian Army Commanders left Brigade HQ 'minutes before' PAF Bomb fell in

the Compound 27 Feb." May 27, 2019. <https://theprint.in/defence/indian-army-commanders-left-brigade-hq-minutes-before-paf-bomb-fell-in-compound-27-feb/241324/>.

The Times of India. "Why can't India do a US to the likes of Dawood, Saeed?." May 3, 2011.

https://web.archive.org/web/20110830221935/http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-05-03/india/29499048_1_indian-intelligence-special-forces-anti-india.

The Times of India. "Why can't India do a US to the likes of Dawood, Saeed?." May 3, 2011.

https://web.archive.org/web/20110830221935/http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-05-03/india/29499048_1_indian-intelligence-special-forces-anti-india.

The Tribune, India. "350 Rounded Up in Maharashtra." July, 17, 2006.

The Wire. "Imran Khan's Offer to Prosecute Pulwama Perpetrators a 'Lame Excuse': India."

February 19, 2019. <https://thewire.in/diplomacy/imran-khan-india-pakistan-pulwama>.

The Wire. "Kulbhushan Jadhav Makes, Second 'Confession', Files Mercy Plea before

Pakistan Army Chief," (June 22, 2017), <https://thewire.in/diplomacy/kulbhushan-jadhav-files-mercy-petition-before-pakistani-army>.

Thucydides. *History of the Peloponnesian War*. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1989.

Tufail, Kaiser. "Changing Dynamics of Air Warfare in South Asia and Future Challenges for

PAF" in *Pulwama-Balakot Crisis & Operation Swift Retort 27 February 2020*, edited by Saima Aman Sial. CISS Special Issue, 2020.

Tufail, Kaiser. "Pulwama – From Bluster to Whimper." *Kaiser Tufail Blogspot*, June 1, 2019,

<http://kaiser-aeronaut.blogspot.com/2019/06/pulwama-from-bluster-to-whimper.html>.

Twomey, Christopher. *The Military Lens: Doctrinal Difference and Deterrence Failure in*

Sino-American Relations. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010.

Tzu, Sun. "The Art of War." In *Strategic Studies*, pp. 63-9. Routledge, 2008.

Umar, Lubna. "Azm-e-Nau and Renewed Security Trends." *Pakistan Observer*, April 9,

2010.

Van Evera, Stephen. "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War." *International Security* 22,

no. 4 (1998): 5-43.

- Van Evera, Stephen. "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War." *International security* (1984): 58-107, <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.9.1.58>.
- Viotti, Paul R. and Kauppi, Mark V. *International Relations Theory*. New York: Pearson, 2012.
- Voine, Emanuela. "Realism Today: Can the Pessimistic Perspective Account for Current Events in International Relations?." *E-International Relations* (2013). <https://www.e-ir.info/2013/03/01/realism-today/>.
- Walker, Samuel J. "Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation: The Controversy over Nuclear Exports, 1974–1980." *Diplomatic History* 25, no. 2 (March 2001), 215-249. <https://doi.org/10.1111/0145-2096.00260>.
- Walt, Stephen M. "International Relations: One World Many Theories." *Foreign Policy*, no. 110 (Spring, 1998): 29-46. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1149275>.
- Wani, Riya. "Life Under Siege in Kashmir." *The Diplomat*, January 21, 2020. <https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/life-under-siege-in-kashmir/>.
- Watterson, Christopher J. "Competing Interpretations of the Stability–Instability Paradox: The Case of the Kargil War." *The Nonproliferation Review* 24, no. 1-2 (2017): 83-99. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2017.1366623>.
- Weisman, Steven R. "On India's Border, A Huge Mock War." *The New York Times*, March 6, 1987. <https://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/06/world/on-india-s-border-a-huge-mock-war.html>.
- Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425.

- Werrell, Kenneth. *Sabres over MiG Alley: The F-86 and the Battle for Air Superiority in Korea*. Naval Institute Press, 2013.
- Wilcox, Wayne Ayres. *Pakistan The Consolidation of a Nation*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963.
- Winner, Andrew C., and Yoshihara, Toshi. *Nuclear Stability in South Asia*. Tufts University: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2002.
- Wirsing, Robert G. *India and Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflicts and its Resolutions*. New York: NY: St Martin's Press, 1998.
- Wirsing, Robert G. *Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in the Nuclear Age*. New York: M.E Sharpe, 2003.
- Wirsing, Robert. *War or Peace on the Line of Control? The India-Pakistan Dispute over Kashmir Turns Fifty*. University of Durham, International Boundaries Research Unit, 1998.
- Wright, Tom. "India Uses Osama Death to Pressure Pakistan." *The Wall Street Journal*, May 2, 2011. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704569404576298211101277924>.
- Yusuf, Moeed W. "The Pulwama Crisis: Flirting with War in a Nuclear Environment." *Arms Control Association*, May, 2019. <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-05/features/pulwama-crisis-flirting-war-nuclear-environment>.
- Yusuf, Moeed. *Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments: US Crisis Management in South Asia*. Stanford University Press, 2018.

Yusuf, Moeed. "The Indo-US Nuclear Deal: An Impact Analysis." *ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs* 3, no. 2 (2007): 47-56.

Annexure I: Respondents (In-depth Interviews)

S. No.	Name	Designation/ Expertise	Primary or Secondary Mode of Interview
Academicians			
1	Professor Dr. Bharat Karnad	Dr. Bharat Karnad is Emeritus Professor for National Security Studies, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi and Distinguished Fellow at the United Service Institution of India. His most recent book, <i>Staggering Forward: Modi and India's Global Ambition</i> was published by Penguin in September 2018. Previous books include <i>Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)</i> (Oxford University Press, October 2015), <i>Strategic Sellout: India-US Nuclear Deal</i> (2009), <i>India's Nuclear Policy</i> (Praeger, 2008), <i>Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy</i> , now in its second edition (Macmillan, 2005, 2002), and <i>Future Imperilled: India's Security in the 1990s and Beyond</i> (Viking-Penguin, 1994).	Primary/ Email
2	Professor Dr. Zafar Khan	Zafar Khan (Ph.D. Strategic Studies, University of Hull, UK) authored the book " <i>Pakistan Nuclear Policy: a minimum credible deterrence</i> " (Routledge: London, 2015) and also <i>Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia New Technologies and Challenges to Sustainable Peace</i> (Routledge: London, 2020). His areas of interest include proliferation/nonproliferation, nuclear policy, security strategy, cyber-studies, foreign policy, and international	Primary/ In writeup through WhatsApp

		relations theory. His papers have appeared in various national and international peer-reviewed journals. Currently, he is Executive Director, Balochistan Think Tank Network, and Professor of International Relations, Balochistan University of Information Technology, Engineering, and Management Sciences (BUIITEMS), Takatu Campus, Airport Road, Baleli, Quetta.	
3	Dr. Rajesh Basrur	Dr. Rajesh Basrur is Senior Fellow in the South Asia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He is also a research associate with the University of Oxford's Contemporary South Asian Studies Programme (CSASP). He has obtained MA and MPhil in History (Delhi) and MA and PhD in Political Science (Bombay). Prior to joining RSIS in 2006, he was Director, Centre for Global Studies, Mumbai (2000-2006), and taught History and Politics at the University of Mumbai (1978-2000). He has held visiting appointments at the University of Oxford, the University of Birmingham, the University of Hull, Stanford University, Sandia National Laboratories, the Brookings Institution, the Henry L. Stimson Center, Simon Fraser University, and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. His work focuses on South Asian security, global nuclear politics, and international relations theory. He has authored five books, including (with Kate Sullivan De Estrada) <i>Rising India: Status and</i>	Primary/ Email

		<p><i>Power</i> (Routledge, 2017), <i>South Asia's Cold War</i> (Routledge, 2008) and <i>Minimum Deterrence and India's Nuclear Security</i> (Stanford University Press, 2006). He has also edited ten books, including (with Sumitha Narayanan Kutty) <i>India and Japan: Assessing the Strategic Partnership</i> (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018) and (with Anit Mukherjee and T. V. Paul), <i>India-China Maritime Competition</i> (Routledge, 2019). He has published over 100 papers in various journals and edited volumes.</p>	
4	<p>Professor Dr. Tughral Yamin.</p>	<p>Professor Dr. Tughral Yamin is Associate Dean Centre for International Peace & Stability (CIPS) National University of Sciences & Technology (NUST). His papers have appeared in various national and international peer-reviewed journals.</p>	<p>Primary/ Email</p>
5	<p>Assistant Professor Dr. Christopher Clary</p>	<p>Dr. Christopher Clary is an Assistant Professor of Political Science. His research focuses on the sources of cooperation in interstate rivalries, the causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation, U.S. defense policy, and the politics of South Asia. Previously, he was a postdoctoral fellow at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University (2015-2016), a predoctoral fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University (2014-2015), a Stanton Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow at the RAND Corporation (2013-2014), and a Council on Foreign Relations International</p>	<p>Primary/ Email</p>

		Affairs Fellow in India (2009). Clary also served as country director for South Asian affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (2006–2009), a research associate at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California (2003–2005), and a research assistant at the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, D.C. (2001–2003). He received his PhD in Political Science from MIT, an MA in National Security Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a BA in History and International Studies from Wichita State University.	
6	Associate Professor Dr. Rizwan Zeb	Associate Professor Dr. Rizwan Zeb is DS (Research) Air War College Institute, Karachi. He is a former Benjamin Meaker Professor in Politics, University of Bristol. He is currently finalizing his book on strategic stability in South Asia. His papers have appeared in various national and international peer-reviewed journals.	Primary/ Email
7	Dr. Masood ur Rehman Khattak	Dr. Masood Ur Rehman Khattak, Lecturer, Department of International Relations, International Islamic University, Islamabad Pakistan. He has specialization in Strategic Studies. His papers have appeared in various national and international peer-reviewed journals.	Primary/ In writeup through WhatsApp
8	Haleema Saadia	Haleema Saadia. She is an academician and former Assistant Director Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs Branch at Strategic Planning Division.	Primary/ Email
Military Experts			

9	Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Naeem Khalid Lodhi	He is retired Pakistan Army General Officer and also served as a Defence Secretary.	Primary/ On Phone Call
10	Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Tariq Khan	Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Tariq Khan, HI (M) is a retired Pakistan Army General Officer who was the Commander of I Strike Corps at Mangla. A war hero, he has been the Inspector General of the Frontier Corps from September 2008 till October 2010.	Primary/ On Phone call
11	Brig (Retd.) Javed Hashmi	Authors Interview with Brig. (Retd.) Javed Hassan Hashmi SI (M) on June 05, 2022. He is a retired army officer. He is a graduate of Command and Staff College. He has served on various Command and Staff appointments in army. He also holds Master degree in Strategic Studies, International Relations and M. Phil. In International Relations. Currently, he is pursuing his PhD in International Relations.	Primary/ In writeup through WhatsApp

Annexure II: In-depth Interview Guidelines

- Q1.** How evolving doctrines impacted on the conflict dynamics between India and Pakistan?
- Q2.** How nuclear weapons impacted on India-Pakistan conflict?
- Q3.** How nuclear weapons led India and Pakistan to transform their strategic doctrines?
- Q4.** Why has India developed offensive doctrines such CSD, IAF Doctrine, JDIAF, LWD and surgical strike stratagem. What are India's compulsions behind this shift?
- Q5.** How India-Pakistan conflict dynamics are linked to compellence vs deterrence?
- Q6.** Why Indian reliance on offensive doctrinal strategies and surgical strike has increased?
- Q7.** Is Pakistan ready to respond to India's offensive Doctrines and its surgical strikes stratagem?
- Q8.** How have nuclear weapons influenced crisis between India and Pakistan?
- Q9.** How do you see the US role as a Crisis Manager in South Asia?
- Q10.** How does India's evolving doctrines and force modernization impact Regional strategic stability?
- Q11.** Is there any compatibility between India's conventional and nuclear doctrine?
- Q12.** Is India on a road to change its NFU policy?
- Q13.** How can strategic stability be achieved in the backdrop of changing nuclear postures and risks of preemptive disarming strikes?
- Q14.** How asymmetry can be mitigated and crisis managed? What are key policy steps to maintain peace and stability in the region?