

**The Growing Rapprochement between Israel and Arab States:
Causative Factors and Prospects**

By

YUMNA RASHID

**A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

Department of International Relations

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES



NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF MODERN LANGUAGES, ISLAMABAD

September, 2023

© Yumna Rashid (2023)



THESIS/DISSERTATION AND DEFENCE APPROVAL FORM

The undersigned certify that they have read the following thesis, examined the defense, are satisfied with the overall exam performance, and recommend the thesis to the Faculty of Social Sciences for acceptance.

Thesis/ Dissertation Title: **The Growing Rapprochement between Israel and Arab states: Causative Factors and Prospects**

Submitted by: Yumna Rashid

Registration #: 18 MPhil/IR/21

Masters of Philosophy

In International Relations

International Relations

Discipline

Prof. Dr. Muhammad Riaz Shad

Research Supervisor

Signature of Research Supervisor

Prof. Dr. Muhammad Riaz Shad

HOD (IR)

Signature of HOD (IR)

Prof. Dr. Khalid Sultan

Dean (FSS)

Signature of Dean (FSS)

CANDIDATE DECLARATION FORM

I Yumna Rashid

Registration # 18 MPhil/IR/S21

Discipline of International Relations

Candidate of **Masters of Philosophy** at the National University of Modern Languages do hereby declare that the thesis: “**The Growing Rapprochement between Israel and Arab States: Causative Factors and Prospects**” submitted by me in partial fulfillment of MPhil degree, is my original work, and has not been submitted or published earlier. I also solemnly declare that it shall not, in future, be submitted by me for obtaining any other degree from this or any other university or institution.

I also understand that if evidence of plagiarism is found in my thesis dissertation at any stage, even after the award of degree, the work may be cancelled and the degree revoked.

Dated

Signature of Candidate

Yumna Rashid

Name of
Candidate

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my parents who have been my constant source of love and encouragement throughout my academic pursuits. Their unwavering support and belief in me have kept me motivated during the most challenging times.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am thankful to Allah Almighty who gave me wisdom and bestowed upon me the sense of judgment to finalize the research work. Special appreciations goes to my supervisor, Dr. Muhammad Riaz Shad for his supervision, patience, sound judgment and constant support. His invaluable knowledge, support and direction contributed to the success of this research. Last but not least, my deepest gratefulness goes to my siblings and friends for their endless love and supports, and best wishes to those who indirectly contributed in this research.

Yumna Rashid

Table of Contents

THESIS/DISSERTATION AND DEFENCE APPROVAL FORM	i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	v
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	1
ABSTRACT.....	2
INTRODUCTION.....	3
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM	4
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY	4
RESEARCH QUESTIONS	4
LITERATURE REVIEW.....	5
RESEARCH GAP	13
CORE ARGUMENT.....	13
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	13
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	16
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY.....	16
DELIMITATION.....	17
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE	17
CHAPTER 1.....	19
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF ARAB- ISRAEL’S RELATIONS	19
INTRODUCTION	19
1.1 THE EVOLUTION OF ZIONISM.....	19
1.2 SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT, 1916 AND THE BALFOUR DECLARATION,1917.....	20
1.3 UNITED NATION PARTITION PLAN, 1947.....	22
1.4 AL-NAKBA WAR, 1948.....	22
1.5 THE SINAI WAR, 1956	23
1.6 THE SIX DAY WAR, 1967	24
1.7 YOM KIPPUR WAR, 1973.....	25
1.8 CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, 1978.....	27
1.9 THE LEBANON WAR, 1982.....	28
1.10 THE FIRST INTIFADA.....	29
1.11 OSLO ACCORDS, 1993 AND 1995	30
1.12 AL-AQSA INTIFADA, 2000.....	32
1.13 THE ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE, 2002.....	33

1.14 THE LEBANON WAR, 2006.....	35
1.15 POST 9/11 ERA.....	36
1.16 ARAB UPRISINGS, 2011.....	37
1.17 CHANGING DYNAMICS OF ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS SINCE 2012.....	38
1.18 THE ARAB-ISRAELI RAPPROCHEMENT	40
CONCLUSION.....	41
2.1 THE ABRAHAM ACCORD DECLARATIONS	42
2.1.1 HISTORICAL CONTEXT	43
2.1.2 IMMEDIATE CONTEXT.....	44
2.2 ABRAHAM ACCORDS PEACE AGREEMENT: TREATY OF PEACE, DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND FULL NORMALIZATION BETWEEN THE UAE AND ISRAEL	46
2.2.1 HISTORICAL CONTEXT	47
2.2.2 IMMEDIATE CONTEXT.....	48
2.3 ABRAHAM ACCORDS: DECLARATION OF PEACE, COOPERATION AND CONSTRUCTIVE DIPLOMACY AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND BAHRAIN.....	50
2.3.1 HISTORICAL CONTEXT	51
2.3.2 IMMEDIATE CONTEXT.....	52
2.4 ISRAEL-MOROCCO NORMALIZATION AGREEMENT	53
2.4.1 HISTORICAL CONTEXT	54
2.4.2 IMMEDIATE CONTEXT.....	55
2.5 THE ABRAHAM ACCORDS AGREEMENT BETWEEN SUDAN AND ISRAEL.....	57
2.5.1 HISTORICAL CONTEXT	58
2.5.2 IMMEDIATE CONTEXT.....	58
2.6 FINDINGS OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS	59
2.6.1 SCOPE	60
CONCLUSION.....	62
CHAPTER 3.....	64
DOMESTIC CAUSATIVE FACTORS OF THE ARAB- ISRAELI RAPPROCHEMENT	64
INTRODUCTION	64
3.1 POLITICAL FACTOR	65
3.1.1 NEW LEADERSHIP IN THE MIDDLE EAST	65
3.1.2 REGIONAL INSTABILITY.....	66

3.1.3 ARABISM AND ISLAMISM.....	66
3.1.4 SHIFT IN THE NATIONAL INTERESTS.....	67
3.2 ECONOMIC FACTOR.....	68
3.2.1 ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION	68
3.2.2 ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION	69
3.3 SECURITY FACTOR.....	71
3.3.2 CYBER SECURITY.....	73
3.4 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION FACTOR.....	74
3.4.1 INNOVATIVE REFORMS.....	75
3.4.2 TECHNOLOGY DIVERSIFICATION.....	76
3.4.3 KNOWLEDGE ORIENTED ECONOMY.....	77
CONCLUSION.....	78
CHAPTER 4.....	80
REGIONAL CAUSATIVE FACTORS BEHIND ARAB ISRAELI RAPPROCHEMENT	80
INTRODUCTION	80
4.1 MUHAMMAD BIN SALMAN'S ROLE IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI RAPPROCHEMENT	80
4.2 REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION	83
4.2.1 FREE TRADE: REDUCING THE TRADE BARRIERS.....	83
4.2.2 ENERGY AND POWER SECTOR	85
4.2.3 TOURISM AND TRANSPORTATION AS DRIVERS OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION	86
4.3 PALESTINIAN CONFLICT	87
4.3.1 SHIFTS IN REGION'S INTERESTS.....	88
4.3.2 DISSATISFACTION WITH PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP	89
4.3.3 ISRAEL STRATEGY TO ISOLATE PALESTINE.....	90
4.4 REGIONAL SECURITY FACTOR BEHIND ARAB ISRAELI RAPPROCHEMENT.....	91
4.4.1 WEAK SECURITY FRAMEWORK.....	91
4.4.2 SHARED SECURITY CONCERNS.....	91
4.4.3 SECTARIANISM.....	92
4.4.4 GEOPOLITICAL AMBITIONS OF IRAN	93
4.4.5 IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM.....	95
4.5 REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL FACTOR.....	97

4.5.1 SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT	97
4.5.2 MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF WATER RESOURCES	98
4.5.3 CLIMATE CHANGE	100
CONCLUSION.....	101
CHAPTER 5	103
INTERNATIONAL CAUSATIVE FACTORS BEHIND ARAB ISRAELI RAPPROCHEMENT	103
INTRODUCTION.....	103
5.1 UNITED STATES AS AN EXTERNAL FACILITATOR IN ARAB -ISRAELI RAPPROCHEMENT..	103
5.1 DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT	104
5.1.2 CONTINUED U.S. SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL	105
5.1.3 SHARED STRATEGIC INTERESTS	105
5.2 ENHANCED ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES	106
5.2.1 GREATER ACCESS TO GLOBAL MARKETS	107
5.2.2 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS: FDI	108
5.2.3 INNOVATION AND COLLABORATION AT INTERNATIONAL LEVEL	109
5.3 STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR THE SECURITY	110
5.3.1 SHARED SECURITY THREATS	111
5.3.2 EXPANSION OF SECURITY TECHNOLOGY.....	112
5.4 INCREASING INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE: WIDENING DIPLOMATIC NETWORK.....	113
5.4.1 TOLERANCE AND COEXISTENCE.....	113
5.4.2 STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL CREDIBILITY	114
CONCLUSION.....	115
CHAPTER 6	116
FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR WIDER ARAB-ISRAELI RAPPROCHEMENT	116
INTRODUCTION.....	116
6.1 FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR ARAB -ISRAELI RAPPROCHEMENT AT DOMESTIC LEVEL	116
6.1.1 ECONOMIC PROSPECTS	116
6.1.2 SECURITY PROSPECTS.....	117
6.1.3 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION PROSPECTS	118
6.1.4 CHALLENGES AT DOMESTIC LEVEL	119

6.2 FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR ARAB -ISRAELI RAPPROCHEMENT AT REGIONAL LEVEL	120
6.2.1 REGIONAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS.....	120
6.2.2 REGIONAL SECURITY PROSPECTS.....	121
6.2.3 REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROSPECTS	122
6.2.4 SAUDI-IRAN RAPPROCHEMENT IMPACT ON THE PROGRESS OF ARAB-ISRAELI NORMALIZATION	123
6.2.5 CHALLENGES AT REGIONAL LEVEL	124
6.3 FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR ARAB -ISRAELI RAPPROCHEMENT AT INTERNATIONAL LEVEL	126
6.3.1 CHALLENGES AT INTERNATIONAL LEVEL.....	126
CONCLUSION, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	127
FINDINGS:.....	128
RECOMMENDATIONS.....	129
BIBLIOGRAPHY	131
ANNEX 1.....	150
ANNEX 1.....	150
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS.....	150

List of Abbreviations

DC.....	District of Columbia
EU.....	European Union
FDI.....	Foreign Direct Investment
GCC.....	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP.....	Gross Domestic Product
IRGC.....	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
ISIS.....	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
IT.....	Information Technology
JCPOA.....	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
PA.....	Palestinian Authority
PLO.....	Palestine Liberation Organization
R&D.....	Research and Development
UN.....	United Nations
UAE.....	United Arab Emirates
US.....	United States

Abstract

Despite historical tensions, recent developments have shown signs of change, indicating a potential shift towards peace and collaboration. The study primarily focuses on the factors driving this normalization with Israel, with a particular emphasis on the role of political and economic elites in Arab states. Economic considerations, such as trade and investment opportunities, have played a crucial role in motivating some Arab states to pursue closer ties with Israel. Additionally, the United States has played a significant role in fostering Arab-Israeli reconciliation, leveraging its global influence and close relationships with both parties. The research adopts a qualitative, explanatory, and descriptive research design. Primary data is collected through interviews and archives, while secondary sources, such as books, scholarly articles, publications, and web sources, are utilized for supplementary information. Discourse analysis is employed as a method to evaluate documents, such as accords and agreements between Arab states and Israel, to gain deeper insights into the narrative surrounding the normalization process. The findings shed light on the historical context and complexities of the Arab-Israeli conflict, examining the factors contributing to the recent trend of reconciliation. Understanding the causes and mechanisms behind this shift is essential for fostering more significant understanding and collaboration between the two sides, and may serve as a guiding post for future policy initiatives aimed at ensuring a more promising and cooperative regional environment in the Middle East.

Introduction

Significant developments in the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict occurred around the end of 2020. Yet there has been a noticeable trend in recent years towards peace between Israel and several Arab countries. Reconciliation between Arabs and Israelis is a relatively new development in the Middle East. The United Arab Emirates and Israel signed a peace agreement in September 2020 at the White House with the intention of generating prosperity by encouraging cooperation across number of key sectors, such as healthcare, agriculture, tourism, energy, and technology. After a few months, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco joined the Abraham Accords as well. While Israel is upfront about the link, Arab states have preferred to keep its rapprochement with Israel discreet for logical reasons relating to Palestinian conflict. However, increased political exposure media scrutiny has taken the connection into the light and academic as well as political debate. Arab- Israeli rapprochement did not emerge from thin air. The new era in Middle Eastern politics has begun with the signing peace treaty with Israel. The three major monotheistic faiths, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, all originated in the Middle East and have spiritual centers there. The treaties are named after Abraham, the Prophet of Islam and Judaism.¹ Normalization of the Arab states with Israel aspires to bring the nations closer together on the daily basis through business relations, tourism, direct flights, academic collaboration, and timely ambassadorial diplomatic links, as well as increased security cooperation in the face of regional challenges. Rapprochement with Israel also has significant economic repercussions. Naturally, agreements with the Gulf States permit the disclosure of previously hidden or indirect economic activity with Israel, as well as the development and intensification of commercial contacts in a variety of fields, including commerce, transportation, tourism, defense, information, technology, energy, finance, medical, and security apparatus. Normalization is the result of a long-standing convergence of interests between Israel and the Arab states. Arab-Israeli peace treaties go much further than security issues they are also linked to economic objectives. Normalization with Israel is frequently urged on the grounds that it will provide wealth, security, and shared prosperity to those who participate and will have a favorable spill-over effect on the region.

¹ Alison Tahmizian Meuse, "Israel Inks Twin Arab Treaties with UAE, Bahrain," *Asia Times*, September 16, 2020, <https://asiatimes.com/2020/09/israel-inks-twin-arab-treaties-with-uae-bahrain/>.

Statement of the problem

The Arab states had antagonistic ties with Israel for decades. Until late 1970's relations between Israel and Arab states were characterized by conflict. First major break-through in normalization of Arab Israel relations took place in 1978 when Egypt and Israel signed a treaty called Camp David Accord and later on in 1994 Jordan also normalized relations with Israel. There has been a persistent tendency in recent years towards peace between Israel and various Arab countries, even though this movement did not greatly advance in the years that followed. In reality, the Middle East has adopted normalizing relations with Israel as a new and dominant norm. Question arises why Arab Israeli why Arab-Israeli rapprochement is increasingly occurring in recent times.

The Arab-Israeli relationship has received the greatest attention due to the possible reciprocal economic and strategic advantages. The Arab states are preparing to move forward in areas where they perceive economic and technological value, such as health, cyber security, artificial intelligence, and other high-tech fields. Friendly relations with Israel also give Arab states a strategic advantage in terms of their rivalry with Iran. The purpose of this study is to clarify the factors of the increasing cooperation between Arab countries and Israel and the prospects for the Arab-Israeli rapprochement.

Objectives of the study

1. To highlight the Arab states interests behind the rapprochement with Israel at individual and state levels.
2. To examine regional factors for the Arab state's rapprochement with Israel.
3. To evaluate international factors of Arab states' rapprochement with Israel.
4. To assess the prospects for wider Arab-Israeli normalization keeping Arab states' interests in view.

Research Questions

1. How do individual and state level causative factors account for Arab states' normalization with Israel?
2. How do regional causative factors account for Arab states' rapprochement with Israel?

3. What are the international causative factors that account for Arab states' normalization with Israel?
4. What are the future prospects for wider Arab-Israeli rapprochement?

Literature Review

The literature on the subject under study is available but it lacks coherence. However, the necessary material has been gathered from reliable sources, and an overview of the relevant literature is given in the material that follows.

Socio-economic developments: In Raymond A. Hinnebusch's book "*The International Politics of the Middle East*," the author delves into a comprehensive analysis of the impact of state-building on the capabilities of political elites to manage both domestic and international arenas. The book places a particular emphasis on how the foreign affairs process influences individual states and their foreign policy decisions. Hinnebusch's work contributes significantly to our understanding of foreign policy formulation within major states, shedding light on how various systemic factors can limit the decision-making processes. Moreover, the book highlights the diverse ways in which states navigate these constraints, often contingent upon their unique domestic characteristics. The book extends its examination to the repercussions of state policies, delving into the dynamics of significant conflicts in the Middle East and exploring the regional alignment system. Additionally, it probes the influence of foreign integration within the region and provides historical context for the development of the regional state system. Furthermore, the book takes a closer look at the role played by foreign great powers in facilitating the region's integration into the global capitalist market. It offers insights into the processes through which the Middle East has become a globalized capitalist market, emphasizing the interplay of various actors and forces in shaping the region's trajectory in the global economy. "*The International Politics of the Middle East*" by Raymond A. Hinnebusch offers a comprehensive examination of the intricate relationship between state-building, foreign policy, regional dynamics, and global integration within the Middle East. It serves as a valuable resource for anyone seeking a deeper understanding of the complex political landscape of this pivotal region.²

² Raymond Hinnebusch, *The International Politics of the Middle East*, (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2003), 7-8, <https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/35008/341386.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

Barbara Stiles in her article “The Gulf’s Calculus on the UAE-Israel Deal” discussed that to see Abraham Accords through the eyes of Arab states vying for dominance, influence, and freedom of movement, as well as to preserve the power of each royal line. The United Arab Emirates' decision to formalize diplomatic ties with Israel signifies a pivotal shift in Middle Eastern geopolitics. This transformation has been influenced by several interconnected factors. Notably, both nations viewed Israel as a model of success amid regional security threats, fostering admiration for its leadership, technological prowess, and educated populace. Additionally, clandestine contacts, particularly in intelligence and security, have existed between the UAE and Israel for over two decades. The primary catalyst for this acceleration in UAE-Israel relations has been the shared apprehension regarding Iran. Both nations have perceived Iran's interventions across the region, support for proxies like Hezbollah, and extremist Sunni groups as destabilizing forces. This convergence became evident during the Obama administration's negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program, where Israel was vocally critical, and the UAE privately conveyed similar concerns. While the UAE-Israel partnership won't dramatically shift the regional power balance given Iran's size and military capabilities, it offers a formidable alliance for intelligence, cybersecurity, and defense cooperation. Israel can provide advanced defense systems and expertise in countering threats like Houthi drone attacks, which have heightened Gulf states' security concerns. Furthermore, the Gulf countries' approach to Iran has evolved in response to their confidence in U.S. support. The perceived waning commitment of the United States to Gulf security, particularly during the Trump administration, prompted Gulf states to explore alternative strategies and partnerships. The timing of this normalization agreement was influenced by various factors, including the U.S. electoral calendar and a desire to enhance the UAE's standing in both Republican and Democratic circles. Despite criticism from the Palestinian leadership, the UAE maintains that it has not abandoned the Palestinian cause but has chosen to prioritize its national security and regional stability. The UAE-Israel deal represents a significant recalibration of Middle Eastern strategic priorities amidst a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape.³

In Steve Holland's article, "Morocco joins other Arab nations agreeing to normalize Israel ties," the focus is on the agreements between various Arab nations and Israel, particularly

³ Barbara A. Leaf, “The Gulf’s Calculus on UAE-Israel Deal”, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 19, 2020, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/gulfs-calculus-uae-israel-deal>

highlighting the UAE-Israel accord due to its potential for reciprocal economic benefits and synergies. Observers emphasize the UAE's strategic position, suggesting that it can move ahead in sectors where it holds a competitive edge, such as health, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and other high-tech industries. These areas of cooperation receive significant attention. Another nation mentioned in the article is Morocco, which also signed an agreement with Israel. While Morocco may not be as ideally positioned for a technological concentration or economic breakthrough as the UAE, there is optimism that it will benefit from increased tourism as a result of this normalization. However, some analysts and officials argue that the primary objective of reaching a deal with Israel was to garner American support for Morocco's claims to the Western Sahara, with any economic gains seen as, at most, incidental to this geopolitical objective. Overall, the article underscores the diverse motivations and potential advantages that different Arab nations see in normalizing relations with Israel, ranging from economic opportunities to geopolitical considerations.⁴

Technology Advancements: Omar Rahman investigates the current pattern of amicable, public contacts between Israel and numerous Arab states in the twenty-first century in his paper titled "The emergence of GCC-Israel relations in a changing Middle East." While the UAE, Bahrain, and Israel established diplomatic ties in 2020, the Gulf nations' engagement and collaboration with Israel is not a new phenomenon. The UAE views Israel as a strong regional actor who shares its vision and is prepared to use force against mutual enemies, making the normalization of their alliance strategically advantageous. Gulf leaders have increased their investments in contemporary surveillance equipment to better keep an eye on their populace in response to the anticipated threat of public upheavals in the region. Israel has been an eager supplier of this technology, with minimal qualms regarding its possible effects on human rights. This has made it easier for them to work together and opened new business opportunities that support the UAE's ambition to establish itself as the region's center of innovation and technology. In addition, the two nations have formed various commercial alliances since their relations were normalized. Even if there hasn't been a steady or constant connection between most Arab

⁴ Steve Holland, "Morocco joins other Arab nations agreeing to normalize Israel ties," *Reuters*, December 10, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/israel-usa-morocco-int-idUSKBN28K2CW>.

countries and Israel, shifts in geopolitical factors have provided certain Gulf states a long-term strategic reason to close ranks with their old foes.⁵

Joshua Krasna is an expert in both international strategic issues and Middle Eastern political and regional dynamics. He is a Senior Fellow in the Middle East Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, where he provides analysis and forecasts on numerous problems relating to the Middle East. Provides a thorough examination of the current trend of normalization between Arab nations and Israel in the Middle East in his paper titled "Understanding the Wave of Normalization in the Middle East." The author contends that the normalization agreements between Israel and Arab nations, such as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Sudan, are the result of the convergence of several factors, including the shared concerns about Iran's regional activities and the recognition of Israel as a key player in Middle East. The article gives a broad overview of the Arab-Israeli conflict's historical background and its effects on the Middle Eastern region. It demonstrates how the Palestinian struggle and the larger geopolitical context have shaped the Arab countries' attitudes towards Israel. The author also analyses the U.S.'s role in fostering normalization and how the actions of the Trump administration have been crucial to this process. The present wave of normalization, he continues, is distinct from earlier attempts because it is motivated by common strategic goals rather than a sincere settlement of the Arab-Israeli issue. The advantages and difficulties of normalization for Israel and the concerned Arab nations are discussed in the essay, including the potential for economic growth, the need for security cooperation, and the possibility of popular reaction.⁶

Economic Opportunities and Regional Integration: Elham Fakhro in the article "Selling Normalization in the Gulf" explains that the Arab states hastened to build commercial links with Israel, hoping to advance statehood or at very least economic opportunities Elham Fakhro's article highlights the rapid development of commercial ties between Israel and Arab states, particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, following the normalization agreements. These agreements were motivated not only by geopolitical considerations but also by a strong emphasis on economic opportunities and prosperity. The UAE and Israel have

⁵ Omar Rahman, "The Emergence of GCC-Israel Relations in a Changing Middle East," Brookings, July 28, 2021, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-emergence-of-gcc-israel-relations-in-a-changing-middle-east/>.

⁶ Joshua Krasna, "Understanding the Wave of Normalization in the Middle East," Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 13, 2021, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/01/understanding-the-wave-of-normalization-in-the-middle-east/>

wasted no time in cementing their economic relations. A series of agreements, including a banking and finance memorandum, demonstrate the commitment to expanding financial cooperation. Additionally, the collaboration extends to cultural and creative industries, with Abu Dhabi planning to host an annual film festival in partnership with Israeli film companies. The involvement of Dubai's DP World in a joint bid with an Israeli shipping company for the management of Israel's Haifa port underscores the tangible economic benefits expected from these agreements. One significant indicator of the budding economic relationship is the visit of an Israeli business group to the UAE in November 2020, where they anticipated that the bilateral trade and investment between the two nations would eventually reach billions of dollars. Furthermore, nonstop flights between Tel Aviv and Dubai, established in December 2020, facilitated the movement of 70,000 Israeli tourists to the UAE amid the COVID-19 pandemic. To celebrate this newfound connectivity, an impressive illumination show took place at the base of the iconic Burj Khalifa on the first night of Hanukkah. In a major move, the UAE announced in March 2021 the establishment of a substantial \$10 billion investment fund aimed at supporting Israeli investments and fostering the growth of economic ties. This fund underscores the long-term commitment to building a robust economic partnership between Israel and the UAE, signaling the potential for significant collaboration in various sectors, including technology, finance, tourism, and trade. The normalization agreements between these nations have opened doors to a wide range of economic opportunities, emphasizing the shift towards cooperation and economic development in the region.⁷

Brandon Friedman's article "Israeli-Arab Normalizations: An Inflexion Point for the Middle Eastern Politics" provides insights into the dynamics of Israeli-Arab reconciliation and its far-reaching implications for the Middle East. These normalization agreements have not only strengthened informal affiliations between Arab nations and Israel but have also played a significant role in isolating Iran while sidelining the Palestinian issue. One of the notable aspects of these normalization deals is the immense economic potential they offer to both Arab states and Israel. The collaborative investment prospects span various sectors, including cybersecurity, food technology, water desalination, and renewable energy, among others. Israel, renowned for its innovation and technology prowess, is understandably excited about the

⁷ Elham Fakhro, "Selling Normalization in the Gulf," MERIP, June 23, 2021, <https://merip.org/2021/06/selling-normalization-in-the-gulf/>

opportunities presented by these agreements. These economic prospects have sparked enthusiasm and anticipation on both sides, promising mutual benefits and growth. Beyond economic cooperation, the normalization accords have strategic implications for Arab states, particularly in enhancing their deterrence against Iran. By aligning more visibly with Israel, these Arab nations aim to strengthen their anti-Iranian front and collectively deter Iranian aggression. This deterrence goes beyond rhetoric and extends to the potential for formalized channels of cooperation, including intelligence sharing, missile technology collaboration, and counter-insurgency support. These elements are critical in addressing Iran's expansionist ambitions and regional activities. These normalization agreements represent a multifaceted approach for Arab states to bolster their regional security and address common concerns related to Iran's influence and destabilizing actions. While economic opportunities are a driving force, the strategic alignment with Israel serves as a means to enhance their collective capabilities and resistance against Iranian regional influence. The agreements mark a significant inflection point in Middle Eastern politics, reshaping regional dynamics and alliances.⁸

Fawaz A. Gerges' study, "Morning in the Middle East," highlights the growing trend of diplomacy in the region, with significant regional powers like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, and Egypt adjusting their foreign policies and seeking to mend relations with neighboring countries. Within this evolving diplomatic landscape, Israel has long pursued measures to improve its integration with its neighbors, although the focus of former Prime Minister Netanyahu was primarily on thwarting a nuclear deal that posed a direct threat to his country. One of the key elements in this shifting diplomatic landscape was the Abraham Accords, which laid the foundation for greater strategic collaboration between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel. These agreements served as a catalyst for both nations to deepen their defense relations. This was particularly significant as the Biden administration worked toward re-entering the Iran nuclear deal, while Iranian hardliners pushed for the resumption of nuclear enrichment programs. The Abraham Accords enabled Israel to gather intelligence more efficiently regarding Iran's military training activities in the Persian Gulf. This valuable information-sharing benefited the UAE, allowing them to enhance their own security and preparedness.

⁸ Brandon Friedman, "Israeli-Arab Normalizations: An Inflexion Point for the Middle Eastern Politics," Institut Montaigne, January 20, 2021, <https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/israeli-arab-normalizations-inflexion-point-middle-eastern-politics>

Israel's intelligence agency, Mossad, played a pivotal role in swiftly detecting potential threats to the UAE. As a result, the UAE's foreign operations were able to preempt potential attacks, thanks to the intelligence provided by Mossad. The evolving diplomatic landscape in the Middle East, exemplified by the Abraham Accords, has not only fostered closer ties between Israel and the UAE but has also enhanced their collective security and intelligence-sharing capabilities, particularly in the context of regional challenges related to Iran's activities in the Persian Gulf. This demonstrates the evolving dynamics of diplomacy and cooperation in the region.⁹

In Omar Rahman's article, "What's behind the relationship between Israel and Arab Gulf states?" the author delves into the factors driving the normalization of relations between Israel and several Gulf Arab states. These developments have been brewing for some time, with discreet back-channel connections between Israel and Gulf Arab regimes growing in the shadows. While Israel has publicly acknowledged its connections with Arab states, these Arab countries have often tried to keep their rapprochement with Israel hidden, primarily due to concerns related to the Palestinian issue. The increasing diplomatic exposure of these relationships has brought them into the open, hinting at a potential move toward official connections. One of the key drivers behind this normalization is the growing regional insecurity and hostility, particularly in the face of common adversaries like Iran. With the region lacking any form of collective security organization, and the United States showing reduced interest in increasing its military commitment in the region after over two decades of conflict, a significant security vacuum has emerged. In this context, it becomes evident that Israel and the Saudi-UAE axis share common ground when it comes to their mutual antagonist, Iran. This common ground has provided the basis for greater security cooperation and closer ties. Arab nations are actively seeking strong connections with Israel to enhance their security and stability while also fostering economic growth. One of the primary reasons behind this normalization is the Arab regimes' increasing need for advanced security capabilities to manage their own populations in the aftermath of regional upheavals. Israel, with its extensive experience in security and technology, presents an attractive partner in this regard. As a result, some Arab nations have become enthusiastic purchasers of Israeli technologies, further solidifying their growing ties

⁹ Fawaz Gerges, "Morning in the Middle East," Project Syndicate, August 4, 2021, <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/middle-east-new-era-of-rapprochement-diplomacy-by-fawaz-a-gerges-2021-08>

with Israel. So, the normalization of relations between Israel and Arab Gulf states is driven by a complex interplay of factors, including shared security concerns, economic opportunities, and the evolving regional dynamics in the Middle East. These developments reflect a shifting landscape in which diplomacy and cooperation are being redefined in response to the challenges and opportunities facing the region.¹⁰

External factors: "*The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*," authored by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, is a book that delves into the intricate connection between Israel and the United States in the realm of foreign policy. This work has gained significant attention for its analysis of the influence of various organizations and interest groups that actively engage in shaping U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East. The authors of the book emphasize the unique and powerful bond between Israel and the U.S., arguing that certain interest groups, often referred to as "lobbies," wield considerable influence over U.S. foreign policy decisions. These lobbies, according to Mearsheimer and Walt, work systematically and effectively to promote policies that align with the interests of Israel, even when such policies may not be in the best interests of the United States. Central to their thesis is the notion that this lobby exerts significant pressure on decision-makers within the U.S. government and also on the media. They contend that this concerted effort ensures that the debate and discourse surrounding Middle East-related issues are largely dominated by the lobby's perspective. The authors go on to assert that the Israel lobby plays a defining role in shaping U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. They argue that the substantial material and diplomatic support extended by the United States to Israel is primarily a result of the influential political clout held by a loose coalition of individuals and groups working tirelessly to impact U.S. foreign policy decisions in the region. "*The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*" provides a thought-provoking examination of the intricate web of interests and influence that underpin the relationship between the United States and Israel in the realm of foreign policy, shedding light on the mechanisms through which policy decisions are made and implemented. This provocative analysis has sparked intense debate, with critics arguing that it oversimplifies the complex dynamics of U.S.-Israel relations,

¹⁰ Omar Rahman, "What's Behind the Relationship Between Israel and Arab Gulf States?", Brookings Institution Blog, January 28, 2019, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/28/whats-behind-the-relationship-between-israel-and-arab-gulf-states/>

while proponents see it as a courageous and well-researched critique of the role of lobbying in shaping American foreign policy.¹¹

Research Gap

The amount of information available on the Arab-Israeli conflict is vast. However, there is a limited literature on Israel's commercial, scientific, cultural, and economic links with Arab states. Much of the literature focuses on regional geopolitics and rivalries, rather on the factors behind the normalization because normalization with Israel is a new phenomenon. Although the recent accords mark a substantial change in the Middle East's geopolitical environment, it is yet unknown what the future holds for these alliances. Research might examine the possible difficulties and barriers that might affect the long-term viability of these accords, such as internal political resistance, changes in the balance of power in the region, or adjustments in the global geopolitical environment. The literature is built on earlier research on Arab-Israeli relations, although there is little written about potential outcomes. The potential for Arab-Israeli rapprochement depends on the durability and viability of cooperation between Arab states and Israel. It is essential to carefully examine the prospects. The prospects are what matters.

Core argument

Normalization with Israel opened new channels of economic, strategic, and political collaboration for Arab states, since Israel has evolved as a significant military, economic, and political force in the region. Building a strong security connection with Israel will serve Arab state's interest of countering threat posed by Iran. Through rapprochement with Israel, Arab states also seek to upgrade their political and diplomatic integration in the international community. The future of Arab-Israeli rapprochement depends on the sustainability and effectiveness of cooperation between Arab states and Israel.

Theoretical Framework

The research is viewed through the lens of Neoclassical Realism. Neo-classical realism is an international relations theory that aims to explain state behavior in terms of both external

¹¹ John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy*, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), <https://bamdadi.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/the-israel-lobby-and-us-foreign-policy-bamdadi-dot-com.pdf>

systemic influences and internal elements, such as state structure, leadership ideologies, and society interests. Insights from liberal institutionalism and constructivism, which emphasize the significance of rules, institutions, and ideas, are combined with parts of classical realism, which emphasizes the role of power and self-help in international relations. This theory demonstrates that while countries initiate foreign and security policies, they interact in large part to the regional and global system's possibilities, but their reactions are influenced by domestic and structural factors such as nation relations, domestic policies, strategic culture, and leader perspectives.¹² This theory examines the aspects at system and unit levels. It does this by functioning on three levels of analysis: systemic, domestic, and individual. The theory stresses anarchy, polarity, relative power capabilities, and the inherent unpredictability and hazard of international politics at the systemic level. Neoclassical realism asserts that state conduct is influenced by a mix of domestic and structural influences, such as the international system.

The Arab-Israeli conflict is a prolonged and complex rivalry between Israel and the Arab nations. There have been countless unsuccessful attempts to end the war throughout the years. Nonetheless, certain Arab states' attitudes towards Israel have changed recently, resulting in an unexpected reconciliation. Both systemic influences and domestic reasons leads Arab states towards normalization with Israel. Domestic factors including internal politics, leadership, and identity were also crucial in determining how Arab nations viewed Israel. According to neoclassical realism, systemic pressures and domestic factors combine to influence the results of foreign policy. The domestic politics of certain Arab nations have changed, which has had an impact on the reconciliation between Israel and the Arab world. Compared to their predecessors, the current generation of Gulf leaders, including Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed of the UAE, has been more open to dialogue with Israel. They have made effort to modernize their economies and widen their network of allies beyond conventional Arab allies. They now have the chance to interact with Israel, which they view as a possible partner in technical and economic progress. Identity politics is another internal aspect that has impacted the Arab-Israeli reconciliation. Since governments attempt to strike a balance between their national interests and their identity and ideologies, neoclassical realism contends that identity plays a crucial role

¹² "Neoclassical Realism," Wikipedia, October 1, 2009, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neoclassical_realism

in determining the results of foreign policy. Their shared identity as non-Arab, non-Muslim governments in a primarily Arab and Muslim region has been the driving force behind the normalization like The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain have tried to present themselves as countries that embrace variety and pluralism by exhibiting their tolerance and liberal principles. By cooperation with Israel and ascension to leadership roles, they want to create a new regional order that transcends the conventional Arab-Israeli split.

The altering power dynamics in the Middle East, which have led to number of Arab nations recognizing Israel as a viable partner against the regional danger presented by Iran, are having a significant influence on the Arab-Israeli rapprochement. The shifting balance of power in the region has been influenced by many factors, including the diminishing American influence, the destabilizing consequences of the Arab Spring, and the rising prominence of non-state entities like Hezbollah and ISIS. Since the conclusion of the Cold War, the United States has dominated the Middle East, supporting its allies militarily and economically and maintaining a sizable military presence there. The development of ISIS and the destabilizing effects of the Arab Spring are just two of the difficulties the US has encountered in the region recently. These difficulties have reduced American influence and left a power vacuum that other players have filled. Iran is one of the actors that has stepped in to fill the power void left by the US's decrease in influence. Iran has become a dominant force in the region, projecting dominance throughout Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Lebanon. Several Arab states, which see these organizations as a danger to their own stability, are enraged by Iran's backing for extremist organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah. Several Arab states are concerned that Tehran intends to rule the region as a result of Iran's emergence as a prominent force in the region. Several Arab countries are considering mending their relations with Israel in effort to counteract Iran's influence. Israel, which Iran, and Israel have long-standing animosities, is viewed as a possible ally in the face of Iranian aggression. With its powerful military and scientific capabilities, strong links to the United States, and desire to counterbalance Iran's dominance in the region, it is an appealing partner. Israel is a desirable partner for Arab states looking to balance Iran due to its military and scientific might as well as its strong links to the US.

The neoclassical realism paradigm also emphasizes how international institutions and norms influence state conduct. Normalization accords reached as part of the Arab-Israeli reconciliation

are thought to promote regional stability and collaboration. International actors supporting these accords include the United States, which was instrumental in brokering them. So neo-classical realism offers a helpful framework for comprehending the intricate dynamics driving the process of normalization between Arabs and Israelis. It emphasizes how crucial domestic and global issues are in influencing state conduct and acknowledges that governments are not monolithic actors but rather are impacted by a variety of circumstances. Both internal and external variables, including regional power dynamics and geopolitical concerns, have an impact on the normalization process. Internal elements include the desire for economic growth and security cooperation. We may develop a more extensive understanding of the elements that have influenced the normalization process by taking these aspects into account in combination.

Research Methodology

It is essential to grasp the research approach and its relevance in social science before doing research. It is vital to recognize that social scientific research is not like natural science research, as many researchers and professionals throughout the world believe. The research will be qualitative. The research will be carried out using an explanatory and descriptive research design. The study focuses on the Arab-Israeli rapprochement. The study will examine the factors behind the normalization with Israel. Inductive approach (bottom-up reasoning) is utilized. Inductive approach is a method of reasoning in which a set of data is utilized to generate a general premise. It moves from specific to general.

Data collection method will be primary and secondary. Primary data in the form of interviews and archives will be utilized. Discourse Analysis will be used like evaluating documents such as accords and agreements between Arab states and Israel. Secondary information, including books, scholarly articles, publications from international and research think-tanks, research journals, newspapers and web sources will be used to gather data.

Significance of the study

The research will be noteworthy because it will examine the interests and requirements of Arab states at four levels of analysis: individual, state, regional, and international. The study will help us understand how Arab states prioritize their national interests. The research will facilitate a better understanding of Arab states efforts to normalize relations with Israel and liberalize

policies in order to integrate into a global realm of social, economic, and political rapprochement. The decision to recognize Israel was since Israel has emerged as a formidable military, economic, and political force in the region after decades of antagonism with Arab states. The study will be useful to explain that the normalization with Israel opens new economic, geopolitical, and political opportunities at the various levels.

Delimitation

Historical background indicates that history is full of conflicts between Arab states and Israel. So, normalization with Israel is a new phenomenon. The research would primarily focus on the factors behind normalizing relations with Israel. Furthermore, the prospects for Arab-Israeli rapprochement will be examined. Arab-Israel normalization aims to bring the two countries closer together daily through commercial contacts, tourism, direct flights, academic collaboration, and timely ambassadorial diplomatic links, as well as improved security cooperation in the face of regional concerns. The research will be primarily concerned with the individual, state, regional and international factors of the rapprochement.

Organizational Structure

The study covers the following chapters:

Chapter 1: Historical Evolution of the Arab-Israel's relations

This chapter will examine the historical evolution of the Arab Israel's relations.

Chapter 2: Discourse Analysis of Arab-Israeli rapprochement

This chapter will cover the documentary analysis of the accords between Israel and Arab states.

Chapter 3: Domestic Causative Factors of Arab-Israeli Rapprochement

The motivations for Arab states wanting to normalize ties with Israel at both the individual and state levels will be examined in this chapter.

Chapter 4: Regional Causative factors of the Arab-Israeli rapprochement

This chapter will concentrate on the regional factors that have contributed to the normalization of ties between Arab countries and Israel.

Chapter 5: International Causative factors of the Arab-Israeli Rapprochement

Chapter 5 will focus on the factors behind normalization of the Arab states with Israel at international level.

Chapter 6: Future Prospects for the wider Arab- Israeli Rapprochement

This chapter will explain the prospects of the Arab Israeli rapprochement. The chapter will also cover the recommendations for the prospects of the normalization between Arab states and Israel

Chapter 1

Historical Evolution of Arab- Israel's Relations

Introduction

Middle East has seen greater competition in comparison to other regions of the world. The Arab and Israeli rivalry has been one of the longest and most intense in modern history. One of the barriers to normalization is that it usually comes after a lengthy period of strife and war. The conflict began in the late 19th century, when a campaign to create a homeland for Jews in the Middle East resulted in many Jews moving to Palestine. Palestinian Arabs opposed this immigration because they saw it as a threat to their own ambitions for self-determination. In Palestine, tensions between Jews and Arabs grew throughout the first part of the 20th century, reaching a boiling point in 1948 with the establishment Israel. Each side has significant religious, cultural, and historical links to the region, and the war has gone through various periods of escalation and de-escalation since 1948. Many significant wars as well as continuous low-level violence and terrorism, have been caused by the conflict. The status of Jerusalem, the boundaries between Israel and a future Palestinian state, the right of Palestinian refugees to return, and Israelis' and Palestinians' security concerns are the main points of contention. A key new trend of the twenty-first century is the rapprochement between Arab states and Israel. A new regional order and alignments based on geopolitical and economic concerns are produced as a result of growing Arab recognition of Israel, which is a substantial departure from Arab unity.

1.1 The evolution of Zionism

The Palestine conflict is the principal issue dividing Arab nations and Israel. Therefore, it is crucial to examine how this war began and how Israel evolved to become a part of the Middle East. Jews were dispersed around the world, including in North Africa, Germany, Poland, and Russia. In reaction to the prejudice and persecution that Jews endured throughout Europe, notably in Eastern Europe and Russia, Zionist movement was founded in 19th century. Zionism was established on the idea that creating a Jewish state on their historic homeland, which they identified as Palestine or the land of Israel, was the only way for Jews to be free from anti-Semitism and experience real equality. Jews would have a safe haven in a Jewish state, according to Zionist activists and intellectuals, but it would also serve to revive Jewish culture

and identity, which they regarded as being endangered by assimilation and cultural erasure.¹³ Herzl formed the International Zionist Organization and called the First Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland, in 1897. He also served as its first president. Despite his repeated attempts to get a charter from Ottoman officials, it was decided that Palestine, the ancestral homeland of the Jews, would be the best place to establish a Jewish state.¹⁴ Other political and social forces of the day, like as nationalism and colonialism, also had an impact on the emergence of Zionism. Jewish people realize their aspiration for national self-determination at a time when this concept was becoming more and more popular throughout the world. The Zionist movement became stronger as more Jews moved towards Palestine, founded kibbutzim, or communal agricultural communities. The displacement of Palestinian Arabs and the inflow of Jews into Palestine both contributed to the escalating tensions between Jews and Arabs in Palestine and set the groundwork for the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict.

1.2 Sykes-Picot Agreement, 1916 and The Balfour Declaration,1917

During World War I, on May 16, 1916, Great Britain and France secretly agreed to the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Should the Allies be successful in overthrowing the Ottoman Empire, the agreement planned to split the Arab territories of that empire into British and French spheres of influence. The deal was given the names of its two negotiators, François Georges-Picot of France and Sir Mark Sykes of Britain. According to the terms of the agreement, the British would have control over contemporary Iraq, Jordan, and Palestine, while the French would have control over contemporary Syria and Lebanon. The deal also established a global buffer zone around Jerusalem. The Sykes-Picot Agreement failed to take the wishes of the Arab people into consideration, who had been promised freedom in exchange for their assistance of the Allies throughout the war.¹⁵ Indirectly, the Sykes-Picot Agreement had an impact on Zionist hopes for a Jewish homeland. The terms of the agreement put Jerusalem and other sections of Palestine, which have historical significance to the Jewish people, under British rule. This paved the way

¹³ Liora Halperin, "Origins and Evolution of Zionism," Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 28, 2015, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/01/origins-and-evolution-of-zionism>.

¹⁴ Theodor Herzl, *The Jewish State: (Der Judenstaat)*, (Leipzig and Vienna: M. Breitenstein's Verlags-Buchhandlung, February 1896), 18, <http://www.mideastweb.org/jewishstate.pdf>.

¹⁵ Karin Loevy, "The Sykes-Picot Agreement's Regional Moment: Drawing Lines of Development in a New and Open Space," *AJIL Unbound* 110, (January 20, 2017): 7, https://www.academia.edu/33345902/The_Sykes_Picot_Agreements_Regional_Moment_Drawing_Lines_of_Development_in_a_New_and_Open_Space

for Jewish immigration in the future and the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, as stated in the Balfour Declaration. The Sykes-Picot Agreement, which created the groundwork for the region's current political, economic, and social frameworks, was a significant turning point in the Middle East's history. Its legacy still divides people in the Middle East and continues to influence the region's politics, conflicts, and sense of identity. The colonial, imperial, and artificial boundary legacies of the accord have exacerbated regional tensions, disputes, and problems. The British government said in 1917, during World War I, that it supported the creation of a national home for Jews in Palestine in the Balfour Declaration. The proclamation was prepared by Arthur James Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, and was sent to Lord Rothschild, a prominent member of the British Jewish community. The Zionist movement, which wanted to establish a Jewish state in Palestine, put its many years of work into the proclamation. Theodor Herzl, a Hungarian journalist had come to believe that Jews required their own country, created the movement in the late 19th century. While Palestine was still governed by the Ottoman Empire at the time of the Balfour Declaration, the British government hoped to seize control of the region as part of its attempts to defeat the Ottoman Empire in World War I. The proclamation was viewed as a means of securing British dominance in the Middle East as well as winning the Jewish community's support for the war effort. Arab leaders perceived it as a danger to their own ambitions for self-determination, while Zionist leaders saw it as an important step towards the establishment of a Jewish state. Many non-Jewish Palestinian locals opposed the proclamation as well, worried that the surge of Jewish immigration would result in their eviction and land loss. The League of Nations gave a mandate to the British government to rule Palestine after the war. In addition to upholding the rights of the non-Jewish populations in Palestine, this mandate contained a promise to put the Balfour Declaration's tenets into practice. The execution of this mandate was a point of contention and contention between the British government, the Zionist movement, and the Arab population of Palestine; as a result, violence eventually broke out in the region in the years before to the creation of the state of Israel in 1948.¹⁶

¹⁶ Ian S, Lustick, "The Balfour Declaration a Century Later: Accidentally Relevant," *Middle East Policy* 24, no. 4 (2017) :166-176, doi:10.1111/mepo.12314.

1.3 United Nation Partition Plan, 1947

Arab-Israeli relations and the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict were significantly impacted by the United Nations Partition Plan of 1947. The concept proposed for Jerusalem to be controlled as an international zone and for the British-mandated Palestine to be divided into separate Jewish and Arab nations. The Arab Higher Committee and Arab states rejected the proposal because they believed it violated their right to self-determination and interfered with their geographical claims, while the Jewish Agency for Palestine approved it.¹⁷ The proposal, according to Arab leaders and governments, would result in the eviction of Arab citizens and the formation of a Jewish state on Arab territory. As the plan was approved, violence broke out in several parts of Palestine and between Jewish and Arab populations. The 1948 Arab-Israeli War, which culminated in the eviction of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians and the founding of Israel as a sovereign state, was also sparked by the Arab side's rejection of the plan. Hence, the Partition Plan acted as a spark for the ongoing war between Israelis and Palestinians, with both parties continuing to fight over the political and territorial borders of their respective governments and making claims to the same area. The plan also had larger regional repercussions, increasing tensions between Arab countries and Israel, and influencing their long-term political and diplomatic ties.¹⁸

1.4 Al-Nakba war, 1948

The 1948 War is referred to as Al Nakba and it was a catastrophe for the Palestinian people. This conflict involved Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria and Israel. Due to military incompetence, the Arab nations suffered defeat in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. The Arab forces lacked cohesion, were ill-equipped, and were inadequately trained. Contrarily, the Israeli force possessed more advanced weaponry and superior training and coordination, which provided them a tactical edge. There was no single Arab policy for the conflict since the Arab states were fragmented. They disagreed on how to handle the crisis, and some were more vehemently opposed to the fighting than others. Several Arab countries were experiencing internal strife and instability, which

¹⁷ "Arab Committee Rejects U.N. Partition Plan," *CIE*. September 29, 2021, <https://israeled.org/arab-committee-rejects-u-n-partition-plan/>.

¹⁸ Dawn, C. Ernest, "The Arab-Israeli Confrontation: A Historian's Analysis," *Denver Journal of International Law & Policy* 5, no. 1, (1975): 373, <https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2241&context=djilp>.

made it harder for them to wage war successfully. The external powers like US supported Israel by giving it military assistance and other types of assistance.¹⁹ The Arab states participating in the Al-Nakba conflict saw severe economic, political, and military ramifications. Due to their compelled resource allocation to the war effort, the engaged Arab state's economy suffered greatly as a result of the conflict. Their economy suffered from the destruction of infrastructure and the loss of land. Economic repercussions resulted from the loss of Palestine as a potential market for Arab products. The Arab states political status in the region suffered greatly as a result of their defeat in the war. Inasmuch as it called into question the legitimacy of the existing Arab states, the loss of land and the founding of Israel also had political repercussions. As a result of the conflict, Palestinians were migrated and left their homes and seek asylum in neighboring Arab countries, igniting a long-standing refugee crisis. The conflict brought to light the Arab forces' shortcomings, including their lack of cooperation, poor training, and inadequate equipment. While the Arab states tried to upgrade and fortify their military, the conflict also signaled the start of a protracted arms competition in the region. All things considered, the Al-Nakba battle had a significant and enduring impact on the Arab world, reshaping its political and economic landscape for decades to come.²⁰

1.5 The Sinai War, 1956

The Sinai War, commonly referred to as the Suez Crisis, was a significant international conflict that occurred in 1956 and involving several important parties, including Egypt, Israel, France, and the United Kingdom. The Suez Canal had been under the jurisdiction of the British and French in the 19th century, but Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized it and assumed control, sparking a crisis. The decision was adverse to British and French interests in the region since the canal was a crucial route for the movement of oil from the Middle East to Europe. Britain, France, and Israel came up with a plan to invade Egypt and recover control of the canal in reaction to the nationalization of the canal. Israeli troops unexpectedly attacked

¹⁹ David Tal, *War in Palestine, 1948: Israeli and Arab Strategy and Diplomacy*, (London: Routledge, April 2014), 18

²⁰Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim, *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 81, https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfile.php/7572878/mod_resource/content/1/%5BCambridge%20Middle%20East%20Studies%5D%20Eugene%20L.%20Rogan%2C%20Avi%20Shlaim%20-%20The%20War%20for%20Palestine_%20Rewriting%20the%20History%20of%201948%20%282007%2C%20Cambridge%20University%20Press%29.pdf

Egyptian military installations in the Sinai Peninsula on October 29, 1956. Afterwards, Britain and France gave Egypt an ultimatum, requesting that they remove their soldiers from the canal so that British and French forces could take over. As Egypt resisted, airstrikes were started by Britain and France on Egyptian targets. To find a peaceful solution, the Soviet Union and the United States both intervened, but the situation quickly turned into a conflict. US threatened Britain, France, and Israel with economic that if they did not remove their troops from Egypt. In the meantime, the Soviet Union denounced the invasion and provided Egypt with military assistance. Britain, France, and Israel decided to withdraw their troops from Egypt after many weeks of fighting. ²¹ The Suez Crisis was a pivotal moment in world affairs because it represented the end of French and British hegemony in the Middle East and the rise of the United States and the Soviet Union as superpowers. The Suez Crisis raised calls for Arab unity against foreign forces and fueled nationalist sentiment throughout the region. Many Arabs saw that the battle represented a betrayal of their fight for independence and sovereignty, which encouraged calls for greater Arab solidarity and unity. The Suez Crisis led to the rise of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to prominence in the Arab world. Many Arabs, especially in Egypt and Syria, identified with his rejection of British and French imperialism and his "Nasserism" a vision of Arab unification and socialism. ²²

1.6 The Six Day War, 1967

In June 1967, there was intense military battle known as the Six-Day War between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. The Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank, all of which were then under Arab rule, were the main issues in the battle. There were several border conflicts and skirmishes between Israel and its neighboring Arab countries, notably Syria. Moreover, Israel began an offensive on Egypt's air force, destroying most of its aircraft on the ground. A ground attack in the Sinai Peninsula followed, swiftly defeating Egyptian soldiers. Israel also waged war on Syria and Jordan, taking the Golan Heights from Syria and the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan. Israel decisively won this war. ²³The Middle East was revolutionized by the 1967 war, which also had a big impact on both the national and

²¹ "Suez Crisis," HISTORY, September 14, 2022, <https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/suez-crisis>

²² Robert Eugene Danielson, "Nasser and Pan-Arabism: Explaining Egypt's Rise in Power", (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36697105.pdf>.

²³ Avner Cohen, *The 1967 Six-Day War*, (Washington, D.C.: Wilson Center, July 18, 2022), <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-1967-six-day-war>.

international political landscapes. This conflict strengthened the Jewish aspect of Israeli national identity and gave Israelis more self-confidence. After taking the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria, Israel established itself as the dominant military force in the region. This triumph also sparked an increase in Israeli settlement development in the occupied areas, which has persisted ever since and is still a major source of dispute. The Six-Day War saw Israel seize more than 26,000 square kilometers of Palestinian territory, according to an article by British military historian and novelist Edgar O'Ballance from 1972.²⁴The conflict caused havoc on the economies of the participating Arab nations, especially Egypt. Egypt's economy was significantly impacted by the annihilation of its air force and the closing of the Suez Canal, which resulted in a drop in GDP and an increase in inflation. The war caused economic losses in Jordan and Syria as well. The Six Day War revealed serious flaws in the military prowess of the Arab states Arab armies had a numerical advantage, but they fell short against Israel's military's technical prowess and tactical know-how. The conflict also caused the Arab states to spend much more on weaponry as they attempted to upgrade and rebuild their armed forces. This war, which altered the region's power dynamics and prepared the ground for future wars. The conflict between Israel and the Arab world is still shaped by long-standing political and geographical conflicts that were brought to light by the war.²⁵

1.7 Yom Kippur war, 1973

The Yom Kippur War was a military conflict between Israel and a coalition of Arab countries in October 1973, led by Egypt and Syria. The alliance's goal was to retake territory that had been lost during the 1967 Six-Day War. Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel on October 6, 1973, which was Yom Kippur and the first day of the battle. The US provided Israel with a lot of aid throughout this conflict. The American government gave Israel military hardware. U.S contributed to the fight diplomatically in addition as militarily. A ceasefire agreement, which was reached on October 25, 1973, was the immediate outcome of the conflict. Israel consented to remove its troops from the Sinai Peninsula territories it had occupied during

²⁴ Edgar O'balance, "WRITING OFF THE RESISTANCE (1973): Arab Guerrilla Power 1967-1972," *Taylor & Francis Online*, February 4, 2021, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.2307/2535608>.

²⁵ Rabinovich, Itamar, "The Strategic and Political Consequences of the June 1967 War," *Israel Affairs* 23, no. 2 (2017): 207-220, doi:10.1080/23311886.2017.1299555.

the conflict as part of the deal. During the Yom Kippur War, Arab powers enforced an oil embargo as a political tactic to compel Western governments to endorse their position on the war. The Arab states believed that the oil embargo was a means of using their oil exports as leverage to win over political support and influence since they were incensed by the U.S. choice to assist Israel during the conflict. The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries announced to put total ban on oil shipments to nations that supported Israel, like US, Canada, and the Netherlands, on October 17, 1973, which marked the start of the oil embargo.²⁶ Oil price went up as a result of the embargo, and many nations experienced shortages and disruptions in their energy supplies. This had a substantial influence on the world economy. The embargo was in place until March 1974, when it was lifted after pledges from the US and other Western governments that they would promote a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. By controlling oil market, Arab states wielded tremendous economic and political sway, and the embargo confirmed this. It also represented a fundamental shift in the global power structure. The Arab states that took part in the fight as well as the larger Arab world were significantly impacted politically by the Yom Kippur War. As a result of the crisis, which many Arab states regarded as an opportunity to band together against Israel and show their strength and commitment, there is now a renewed emphasis on Arab solidarity and togetherness. After the war, Arab states continued to place a strong focus on cooperation in order to assist the Palestinian cause and thwart Israeli expansion. The Yom Kippur War also caused political views in the Arab world to become more divisive, with some nations favoring a more combative strategy towards Israel and others favoring a more diplomatic and conciliatory. Regional dynamics are still shaped by this polarization today. As the Yom Kippur War made clear the limitations of armed combat with Israel, the Arab-Israeli issue was approached more diplomatically and politically. The succeeding years' greater focus on diplomacy and talks, such as the Camp David and Oslo Accords, mirrored this trend. Ultimately, the Yom Kippur War had a significant impact on the landscape of Middle East. The issue between Arabs and Israelis

26 Gregory L. Schneider, "The 1973 Oil Crisis and Its Economic Consequences," Bill of Rights Institute, March 4, 2023, <https://billofrightsinstitute.org/essays/the-1973-oil-crisis-and-its-economic-consequences>.

has been resolved via diplomatic and political means as a result of the war, which has revived Arab nationalism and solidarity.²⁷

1.8 Camp David Accords, 1978

The Camp David Accords were a set of accords that the presidents of Egypt and Israel reached in September 1978 at the Camp David presidential retreat in Maryland, with the assistance of then-US President Jimmy Carter. The Accords were a significant diplomatic success since they were the first peace accord between Israel and an Arab nation. After 12 days of difficult discussions, they were finally signed on September 17, 1978 the Framework for Peace in the Middle East and the Framework for the Completion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel were the two key accords that made up the Camp David Accords. These agreements addressed the following points:

1. The inauguration of full diplomatic ties between Egypt and Israel, which will include ambassadorial swaps and the establishing of missions in one another's nations.
2. The evacuation of Israeli troops from the Sinai Peninsula and Egypt's takeover of the region. Israel consented to a three-year army withdrawal from the Sinai.
3. Restrictions on the use of Egyptian military troops in the area and the demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula.
4. The two nations' normalization of their economic and cultural ties, including the opening of border crossings and the ease of commerce.²⁸

Egypt's Peace deal with Israel cost the Arabs significantly in terms of politics, the military, and strategy. As a result of this agreement, many Arabs felt duped by Egypt, thinking that Sadat was choosing Egypt above his Arab League allies. All Arab nations agreed to impose Egypt with both political and economic sanctions. The Arab League expelled Egypt. The Accords also had a wider effect on the Arab-Israeli conflict since they established a standard for future talks

27 David Sousa, "The 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars: Causes of Triumphs and Failures," E-International Relations, May 26, 2014, <https://www.e-ir.info/2014/05/26/the-1967-and-1973-arab-israeli-wars-causes-of-triumphs-and-failures/>.

28 UN Peacemaker, "Framework for Peace in the Middle East and Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel (Camp David Accords)," September 17, 1978, <https://peacemaker.un.org/egyptisrael-frameworkforpeace78>.

and peace accords. Free trade zone was established in the Sinai Peninsula and enhanced economic cooperation between Egypt and Israel were made possible by the Accords. Trade, investment, and tourism between the two nations all expanded as a result of this collaboration. An important military victory for Egypt was the departure of Israeli soldiers from the Sinai Peninsula because of the Accord. The Camp David Accords had both positive and bad effects, while being an important step towards peace between Israel and Egypt. Several Arab countries which perceived Egypt's deal with Israel as a break from the common Arab position on the Palestinian issue reduced their military support as a result of the accords.²⁹ Nevertheless, crucial Palestinian issues like Jerusalem's status and the right of Palestinian refugees to return home were not addressed by the agreements. The agreements strengthened Israel's hold on Palestinian territory instead, which made the regional issue even more problematic. The Camp David Accords had a huge political, economic, and military influence on Arab states, and Egypt's choice to make peace with Israel marked a fundamental change in the dynamics of the Middle East and ties amongst Arab nations.

1.9 The Lebanon War, 1982

In the Lebanon War of 1982, Israel fought against several Palestinian and Lebanese forces. The primary goals of the Israeli military were to drive out the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Lebanon and install a new, pro-Israeli administration in its place. Israeli forces entered Lebanon quickly and finally made it to Beirut, the country's capital. Many crimes occurred throughout the conflict, notably the slaughter of Palestinian refugee camps under Israeli military command. The act triggered demonstrations in Israel and received global criticism. The PLO decided to depart Lebanon under international supervision as the conflict came to an end with a ceasefire deal. Israel continued to have a presence in southern Lebanon until 2000, albeit the violence persisted. Arab nations stayed silent during this crisis. The fact that no Arab states responded to what happened in Lebanon has exposed the flaws of practically all Arab leadership, which has the potential to be more revolutionary than the 1948 war that brought down nearly all key Arab states. This exemplifies how divided the Arab states are. Arab nations remained mute. Arab nations were apprehensive to become involved because they did

29 Shibley Telhami, "The Camp David Accords: A Case of International Bargaining," University of Maryland, October 2, 2022, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/6847/doc_6849_290_en.pdf.

not want to be regarded as aiding the PLO, which was at the time seen as a terrorist group by many nations. Also, numerous Arab nations had established diplomatic ties with Israel and were hesitant to do anything that may jeopardize those ties. Many Palestinians and other Arab organizations viewed the fact that many Arab states kept silent during the crisis and the Arab League's alleged inaction as a betrayal. The battle also contributed to a growth in anti-Western feeling and the Arab world's Islamic fundamentalist movement. The political repercussions of this included the growth of extreme organizations like Al-Qaeda.

The conflict had a major effect on the economics of the Arab nations in the region, especially Lebanon. The infrastructure of the nation was severely destroyed, and the conflict significantly reduced tourism, which was a key source of income for the nation. The conflict also had wider economic repercussions since it made the region's overall mood more unstable and unpredictable. Many Arab countries were impacted negatively by this, which influenced commerce and investment. It had important military ramifications for Arab states because the Israeli force was able to invade Lebanon successfully and keep a presence there for almost two decades. It resulted in the idea that Israel was the dominating military force in the region, which made many Arab nations feel uneasy.³⁰ The conflict also had an impact on the Arab states' military prowess. It brought to light flaws in Arab military tactics and methods, especially when dealing with a technologically superior foe like Israel. In the years that followed, efforts were made to modernize and enhance Arab military capabilities.

1.10 The First intifada

This Palestinian uprising known as the First Intifada started in December 1987. The Arabic word for intifada, which means "shaking off," expressed the Palestinians' resolve to oust Israeli rule. The Palestinian populace had become weary and enraged because of Israel's military control, settlements and the theft of their resources and land. Four Palestinians were killed in a traffic collision involving an Israeli military vehicle in the Jabaliya refugee camp in Gaza, which served as the catalyst for the uprising. As a result of this incident, protests and demonstrations broke out throughout the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. The people in the First Intifada did boycotts, strikes, public gatherings, and acts of civil disobedience. The

³⁰ "The Israel-Lebanon War and Its Implications for Regional Security," Policy, January 2, 2007, <https://www.ips.org.pk/the-israel-lebanon-war-and-its-implications-for-regional-security/>

rebellion was heavily influenced by Palestinian youth, who attacked Israeli soldiers and settlers with Molotov cocktails and stones. Israel was also very aggressive towards people. There were thousands of Palestinian and Israeli casualties as a result of the bloodshed on both sides.³¹ On the one side, the revolt increased Arab nationalism and raised awareness of the Palestinian cause. Numerous Arab nations gave the Palestinian leadership financial and diplomatic backing, and some, like Jordan and Iraq, even permitted Palestinian terrorists to operate within their borders. The First Intifada, on the other side, also emphasized the shortcomings and divides among Arab states. When the revolt first began, certain Arab nations, like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, were hesitant to provide their assistance out of concern that it may destabilize the region and hurt their own interests. Several nations regarded the intifada as a chance to further their goals frequently at the expense of the Palestinians, including Syria and Libya. The First Intifada questioned the legitimacy of oppressive Arab regimes and sparked more populist protests, including the Arab Spring of 2011. Even in the face of governmental repression, the intifada showed that common people can oppose established power systems and demanding political and economic rights. First Intifada drew attention to the Palestinian cause on a global scale and compelled the international community to act to end the war. The Madrid Conference, the first direct negotiations for peace between Israel and Palestine took place in 1991. The Palestinian people were brought together by the First Intifada around the pursuit of independence and self-determination. This cohesion enabled the Palestinian leadership to bargain with Israel more successfully. The Oslo Accords was a result of circumstances that were greatly influenced by the First Intifada. Future discussions and agreements between Israel and the Palestinians were made easier to achieve because to the First Intifada.

1.11 Oslo Accords, 1993 and 1995

The Oslo Accords was signed at the beginning of the 1990s by the PLO and the Israeli government. The Oslo Accords aimed to put an end to the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine. The main objective was to establish a framework for peaceful negotiations between the two sides and to establish a procedure for resolving issues like borders, settlements, and the status of Jerusalem. The negotiations that led to the Oslo Accords were held in secret in Oslo,

31Alin, Erika G., Rex Brynen, Robert O. Freedman, Joost R. Hilterman, Michael C. Hudson, F. R. Hunter, Zachary Lockman, Joel Beinin, David McDowall, and Aryeh Shalev, "Dynamics of the Palestinian Uprising: An Assessment of Causes, Character, and Consequences," *Comparative Politics* 26, no. 1 (1993-1994): 1-22

Norway, hence the name "Oslo Accords." Many states, including as Norway, the US, and Russia, helped to facilitate the discussions. Oslo Accords was made up of two primary agreements: the Oslo I Accord, or Declaration of Principles on Temporary Self-Government Arrangements, and the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Oslo II Accord). ³²The main points of each agreement are as follows:

Oslo, I Accord (Declaration of Principles on Temporary Self-Government Arrangements), signed in Washington, D.C., in September 1993.

1. outlined a plan for talks between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
2. Proposed a five-year transitional phase during which the PLO would take limited self-government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip while Israel would maintain overall security authority.
3. Agreed to create the Palestinian Authority (PA) to rule the regions it controls.
4. Settled on the negotiating guiding principles for the ultimate status on matters including borders, settlements, Jerusalem, refugees, and security.

Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, known as the Oslo II Accord, was signed in Taba, Egypt, in September 1995.

1. Extended the scope of the PA's and Israel's military forces' duties and authority in the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the interim period.
2. Split the West Bank into Area A, Area B, and Area C, with the PA taking authority of Area A (which featured important Palestinian cities), Israel sharing control of Area B, and Israel maintaining control of Area C. (which included Israeli settlements and military installations)
3. Made provisions for the withdrawal of Israeli armed personnel from the West Bank's main Palestinian population centers.
4. Decided for Palestinian elections and for the gradual handover of authority from Israel to the PA.

³² "Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II)," UN Peacemaker, 28/09/1995, <https://peacemaker.un.org/israelopt-osloII95>.

The Oslo Accords was a major step in the right direction, but they did not result in an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that would have lasted for all time. The boundaries and the status of Jerusalem are just two of the crucial problems that haven't been settled since the final status discussions were meant to take place. The failure of the Oslo Accords is also attributed to the ongoing construction of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, the use of violence by both sides, and the inability to reach a consensus on crucial issues like the status of Jerusalem and the right of Palestinian refugees to return home. The struggle between Israelis and Palestinians has persisted notwithstanding the Oslo Accords, with recurrent outbursts of violence and unrest. As a result, there have been tremendous human and financial losses, which have added to the region's enduring instability.³³

1.12 Al-Aqsa Intifada, 2000

From September 2000 until May 2005, there was a Palestinian uprising against Israel known as the Second Intifada. The Intifada was marked by a wave of violence, which included Israeli military operations, settler brutality against Palestinians, suicide bombs, shootings, and other assaults by Palestinian militants against Israeli targets. The failure of peace talks between Israeli and Palestinian officials, as well as the attendance of prominent Israeli politician Ariel Sharon to a Jerusalem holy site venerated by both Jews and Muslims, served as catalysts for the Second Intifada. Both sides engaged in violent skirmishes as a result of the visit, which the Palestinians perceived as provocative. Thousands of Palestinians and Israelis, both fighters and civilians, perished as a result of the fighting. Infrastructure and property were severely damaged by the fighting in both Israel and the Palestinian territory.³⁴ The Israeli-Palestinian conflict was significantly impacted by the Second Intifada, which exacerbated divides and further weakened relations between the two sides.

Although Arab countries have always supported the Palestinian cause, their interest in and participation in the Second Intifada varies. There are several explanations as to why some Arab states may have had a more inconsistent involvement in the battle. Several Arab nation's leaders

33 Avi Shlaim, "Chapter 11: The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process," in Louise Fawcett, ed., *International Relations of the Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 241-261, <https://users.ox.ac.uk/~ssfc0005/The%20Rise%20and%20Fall%20of%20the%20Oslo%20Peace%20Process.htm>.

34 Hana Hussain, "Remembering the Second Intifada," *Middle East Monitor*, September 28, 2017, <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170928-remembering-the-second-intifada/>.

were more interested in keeping their positions of authority than they were in joining the fight. As an illustration, Egypt at the time was led by President Hosni Mubarak and was more concerned with preserving domestic peace and battling Islamic extremism than it was with aiding the Second Intifada. Several Arab regimes could have paid more attention to regional dangers than to the Israeli-Palestinian issue. For instance, Jordan was worried about the possibility of instability in Iraq, which was nearby and at the time faced the danger of an American invasion. It's possible that some Arab nations put their economic links to Israel and the West ahead of their support for the Palestinian cause. For instance, certain Gulf Arab nations, such as Saudi Arabia, developed economic relations with Israel and were reluctant of adopting any moves that may jeopardize these ties. Diverse geopolitical conflicts and alliances have split the Arab world, making it more difficult for Arab states to act jointly on problems like the Second Intifada. For instance, compared to some other Arab regimes who sided with the West, Syria, which is allied with Iran and Hezbollah, was more eager to help Palestinian terrorists. Overall, Arab state engagement in the Second Intifada demonstrates the complicated and sometimes conflicting interests that influence Middle Eastern regional politics.³⁵

1.13 The Arab Peace Initiative, 2002

On March 27, 2002, the Arab League proposed the Arab Peace Initiative during its summit in Beirut, Lebanon. It offered Israel complete recognition and normalization of ties with the Arab world in exchange for resolving the Palestinian question and establishing a Palestinian state. Arab-Israeli relations were significantly influenced by the Arab Peace Initiative. It marked a significant shift in the Arab world's position to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, moving from non-recognition and non-engagement with Israel to a proposal for a comprehensive peace deal. The Initiative also indicated Arab states readiness to work with Israel if the Israeli-Palestinian problem was settled. Arab states presented the Arab Peace Initiative as a means of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian issue and bringing permanent peace to the region. Several factors influenced the project, including The Arab states have long been concerned about the continuous conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, as well as its implications for the region.

³⁵ Kenneth W. Stein, "The Intifada and the Uprising of 1936-1939: A Comparison of the Palestinian Arab Communities," in Robert O. Freedman (ed.), *The Intifada: Its Impact on Israel, the Arab World, and the Superpowers*, (Florida International University Press, 1991), 3-36, <https://ismi.emory.edu/documents/stein-publications/intifada.pdf>

The effort was viewed as a means of bringing the conflict to a stop and bringing peace and stability to the region. The Arab states considered that a comprehensive peace deal, including resolving the Israeli-Palestinian issue, was required to solve the region's wider concerns, such as terrorism, extremism, and economic underdevelopment. Arab states anticipated that by acknowledging Israel's right to exist, they would be able to build a more stable and secure environment in the region, as well as strengthen ties with the international world. The Arab Peace Initiative's primary points were:

1. Israel's complete departure from the lands it captured in previous wars.
2. the creation of an independent, self-governing Palestinian state with complete sovereignty and East Jerusalem will be its capital
3. Achieving a fair resolution for solution refugee.
4. All Arab countries must recognize the Palestinian state as independent and sovereign.
5. A comprehensive and long-term peace accord that would end the conflict.³⁶

Nonetheless, Israel has raised objections about certain of the initiative's provisions and has not completely embraced the initiative's parameters. Israel has been hesitant to leave all the regions it captured during the 1967 war, including the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. The Arab Peace Initiative asks for Israel to leave these lands completely. Another cause of worry for Israel is the Palestinian refugees. The Arab Peace Initiative advocates for a "fair solution" to the issue of Palestinian refugees. Israel has rejected the concept of a right of return for Palestinian refugees and has advocated alternate solutions to the problem. An alternate idea is a "family reunion" scheme, which would enable a restricted number of Palestinian refugees to return to Israel to join family members who are Israeli citizens. This plan would not include a right of return for all Palestinian refugees and would not materially change Israel's demographic balance. The Palestinian leadership, however, has rejected any alternative plans and insists on the execution of the right of return for Palestinian refugees. The

36 The Arab Peace Initiative, 2002, *Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung*, september8,2023, https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=a5dab26d-a2fe-dc66-8910-a13730828279&groupId=268421.

Arab Peace Initiative, however, has yet to be completely implemented, and the Israeli-Palestinian issue remains unsolved.³⁷

1.14 The Lebanon War, 2006

The 2006 Lebanon War lasted a month and was fought between Israel and Hezbollah, a militant group headquartered in Lebanon. On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah staged a cross-border attack into Israel, murdering three soldiers and kidnapping two more. Israeli airstrikes and a ground invasion of southern Lebanon followed. For years, Hezbollah has been bolstering its military capabilities, collecting a massive arsenal of rockets and missiles, some of which could reach far into Israeli territory. Israel, which had already undertaken a massive military operation against Hezbollah in 1982, saw this development as a danger. Regional and international politics also had a role in the conflict. Iran, which backs Hezbollah, saw the crisis as an opportunity to confront Israel and exert its regional might. Throughout the battle, the United States, which supports Israel, supplied political and diplomatic support to Israel. The United Nations was also involved in the conflict, with a UN peacekeeping force stationed in southern Lebanon to supervise the truce that brought the fighting to a close. The violence ceased on August 14, when the UN Security Council passed the resolution and ordered foreign troops to monitor the ceasefire. Israeli soldiers withdraw from southern Lebanon. The violence ceased on August 14, when the UN Security Council passed the resolution and ordered foreign troops to monitor the ceasefire. Israeli soldiers withdraw from southern Lebanon.³⁸ This fight against Israel has been won by Hezbollah. It has hampered Israel's capacity to act as a deterrent in the region. Hezbollah develops as a prominent, effective, and important non-state actor.

The 2006 Lebanon War weakened the Arab-Israeli peace effort significantly. The United Nations peacekeeping force formed to oversee the truce between Israel and Hezbollah was viewed as a failure. The UN's inability to police the ceasefire and prevent violations by both sides harmed public trust in the peace process. The conflict underlined the lack of progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process up to that moment. It revealed that major barriers remained to be addressed before achieving long-term peace. The war aided the spread of extremism in the

37 Joshua. Teitelbaum, "The Arab Peace Initiative: A Primer and Future prospects," *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs*, August 27, 2009. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/141408/Arab-Peace-Initiative.pdf>.

38 Hany Nakhleh, "THE 2006 ISRAELI WAR ON LEBANON: ANALYSIS AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS" (U.S. Army War College, 2007), <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA468848.pdf>.

region, with some organizations using the conflict to justify violent activities. This made peaceful discussions more difficult and raised the possibility of more bloodshed. The conflict increased already-existing tensions in the region between Sunni and Shia groups, notably in Lebanon, where it prompted sectarian bloodshed. This friction also affected Arab states' ties, with some governments backing Hezbollah while others condemning the organization. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan, three Sunni Arab powers, denounced Hizballah for being little more than an Iranian tool and Syrian collaborator. The previous Arab regional order, which was dominated by Sunni nations like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, was disintegrating. Throughout the war, Iran was a key sponsor of Hezbollah, and the fighting served to expand Iran's influence in the region. This was especially true in Shia-majority nations such as Iraq and Bahrain, where Iran has pushed to increase its political and military might. The war contributed to a pervasive sense of insecurity in the region, with fears of future warfare and increasing tensions between regional powers.³⁹

1.15 Post 9/11 era

The conflict between Palestine and Israel has been significantly influenced by the War on Terror, which was started by the US because of September 11, 2001 attack. There are several methods to see this effect. The US strengthened its financial and military assistance for Israel after the War on Terror, enabling the Israeli military to conduct extensive operations against the Palestinians. For instance, in order to quell Palestinian resistance, the Israeli military carried out Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 and Operation Cast Lead in 2008–2009.⁴⁰ Israel's activities against the Palestinians gained more international legitimacy because of War on Terror since the war was considered as a component of the larger fight against terrorism. The international community found it more challenging to hold Israel responsible for its conduct and to exert pressure on it to respect Palestinian rights as a result. The region has become even more unstable as a result of the War on Terror, which has hurt the Palestinian economy. Due to the conflict, the Palestinians are having a harder time achieving their economic objectives. Extremist organizations like Hamas have been able to grow in strength due to the security

³⁹ Salem, Paul., "The after-effects of the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah war," *Contemporary Arab Affairs* 1, no. 1 (January 8, 2008) :15-24, doi:10.1080/17550910701812255.

⁴⁰ Naysan Rafati, "Operation Defensive Shield: Lessons and Aftermath." The Washington Institute, June 18, 2002, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/operation-defensive-shield-lessons-and-aftermath>.

vacuum that the War on Terror has produced. It has become more challenging for the Palestinians to achieve their political and social objectives as a result of these groups' use of violence and terrorism to promote their political objectives. The peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians have been affected due to War on Terror. It has become increasingly challenging for the two parties to negotiate a permanent peace accord since the fighting has increased the hostility and unpredictability of the environment.

Regarding the War on Terror, Arab opinion was mixed and complex. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, some Arab nations backed the US-led effort to battle terrorism, while others were more critical of the US strategy. Many Arab states regarded the War on Terror as a chance to improve their security and relations with the US. For instance, several nations, like Saudi Arabia and Jordan, worked with the US to fight terrorism and let the US to utilize their territory as military staging areas.⁴¹ Israel's and Arab states' ties have been significantly and widely impacted by the War on Terror. On the one hand, the War on Terror has improved relations between the two sides since Israel and several Arab nations shared a concern about the threat of terrorism. On the other side, because of Palestine, the War on Terror has also heightened tensions and confrontations between Israel and several Arab states. Israel and several Arab countries have forged tighter connections since both they see the danger of terrorism as a shared problem. Like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the UAE have engaged with Israel to combat terrorism while also attempting to strengthen their ties with Israel.

1.16 Arab Uprisings, 2011

Pro-democracy demonstrations swept through several largely Arab countries in 2011 which is called Arab spring. The countries included Tunisia, Morocco, Syria, Libya, Egypt, and Bahrain. These protests and civil confrontations, demonstrators were able to dethrone long term authoritarian governments in Tunis, Libya, and Egypt, while people of Oman, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Bahrain were awarded certain fundamental freedoms.⁴² The Arab upheavals are affected not only the political structures of Arab states and communities. The region's geopolitics is likewise changing dramatically. As major shifts continue to shape Arab

41 Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid, Bahman Baktiari, and Michael Barnett, "The Impact of 9/11 on the Middle East," *Middle East Policy* 9, no. 4 (December 2002): 75-101, doi:10.1111/1475-4967.00084.

42Liz Sly, "Lost Decade: The Unfinished Business of the Arab Spring," *The Washington Post*, January 24, 2021, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2021/arab-spring-10-year-anniversary-lost-decade/>.

geopolitics and highlight the absence of regional order, the post-Arab Spring period has seen fluctuating and multidimensional alliance formation. The Arab Spring had a conflicting effect on Arab-Israeli ties. While it resulted in some beneficial improvements, such as increasing collaboration between Israel and several Arab countries, it also brought to light the region's underlying issues and tensions, notably the Palestinian question. The Arab Spring produced a power vacuum in the region, causing traditional regional powers such as Egypt, Syria, and Libya to falter. Israel saw this as a chance to increase its regional influence and present itself as a more stable and trusted partner for some Arab countries. The Arab Spring produced a complicated and volatile climate in which Israel's connections with Arab countries were reassessed. When certain Arab nations witnessed considerable political change, Israel's connections with its neighbors confronted new difficulties and opportunities. The common worry about the regional danger presented by Iran was one of the primary elements driving the trend towards tighter ties between Israel and several Arab countries. Furthermore, the Arab Spring generated an atmosphere of uncertainty and insecurity, prompting several Arab countries to reassess their previous enmity against Israel. When popular upheavals overturned governments and unleashed unrest across the region, several Arab leaders came to see Israel as a steady and trusted partner in the face of these problems. Additionally, while several Arab countries tried to solve economic and political issues, they also realized the potential benefits of tighter ties with Israel. For example, Israeli experience in sectors such as technology, agriculture, and water management might be significant resources for nations suffering economic and environmental difficulties. Israel's connections with Arab countries were evaluated and new chances for collaboration developed. While the process of normalization has been hard and protracted, the Arab Spring was critical in establishing the framework for these reforms.

1.17 Changing dynamics of Arab-Israeli Relations since 2012

Arab-Israeli relations have been characterized by a combination of collaboration, friction, and conflict since 2012. On the one hand, there were some good events, such as the beginning of peace talks between Israel and Palestine in 2013, which was encouraged by the US. Furthermore, in 2014, Israel and Jordan negotiated a large water-sharing deal, which was viewed as a positive step towards regional cooperation. Nonetheless, hostilities remained high. Overall, the time

since 2012 has been marked by a complicated mix of positive and bad developments, with tensions and violence simmering under the surface. Israel launched this operation in November 2012 against the Gaza Strip. The operation was directed at attacks from Gaza in as well as targeting Hamas and other terrorist groups in Gaza. Israeli troops carried out airstrikes and naval assaults on Gaza targets, while Palestinian militants retaliated with rocket attacks on Israeli towns and cities. The fighting lasted eight days and resulted in the deaths of many Palestinians. Arab countries including as Egypt and Jordan criticize the Israeli military action and demanded a halt to the bloodshed immediately. The Arab League also condemned Israel and backed the Palestinian cause.⁴³The Arab states during this period were more concerned regional stability and security than on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Israel began another attack on Gaza in July 2014, dubbed Operation Protective Edge. The fighting lasted 50 days and resulted in the deaths of nearly 2,100 Palestinians. A ceasefire was established between Israel and Hamas in August 2014, although it accomplished nothing to address the conflict's core concerns. The Gaza embargo, which severely restricts activities, remained a key source of disagreement between the two sides. Tensions between Israel and Palestine began in 2012, and they have had a considerable influence on other Arab states in the region. The violence exacerbated sectarian and political differences and led to the Middle East's overall instability. One significant result was the widening of the gap between Sunni and Shia Muslims. As Iran, a Shia-led country, continued to back Hamas, a Sunni-led organization, Sunni Arab powers like Saudi Arabia and Egypt were increasingly concerned about Tehran's influence in the Middle East. This heightened sectarian tensions. The battle had an influence on regional politics as well. Countries such as Egypt and Jordan, who had previously participated in peace talks between Israel and Palestine, became increasingly unwilling to cooperate with Israel as anti-Israel sentiment grew. The turmoil exacerbated the Middle East's sense of insecurity and growth of extremist organizations such as ISIS.

One significant repercussion was worsening of Israeli relations with Egypt, which had previously served as a vital mediator in peace talks between Israel and Palestine. Egypt's Islamist president, Mohamed Morsi, openly denounced Israel's conduct in Gaza in 2012, and the two nations severed diplomatic ties. While Egypt and Israel's relationship was finally

⁴³ "Remembering Israel's 'Operation Pillar of Defense,'" *Middle East Monitor*, November 14, 2017, <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20171114-remembering-israels-operation-pillar-of-defence/>.

restored in 2014, the experience underscored the fragility of the two nations' peace. The conflict also had a greater influence on regional politics. Arab nations, particularly those with authoritarian regimes, utilized the war as a tactic to divert from their own domestic concerns and to present themselves as champions of the Palestinian cause. This contributed to a greater sense of anti-Israel sentiment in the region. Overall, Israel-Palestine tensions since 2012 have had a substantial influence on Arab-Israeli ties, adding to a climate of distrust and antagonism between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The crisis made building diplomatic connections in the region more difficult for Israel.

1.18 The Arab-Israeli rapprochement

Politics in the Arab world might appear to be a series of phases of shifting manipulation, coercion, and alliances of individuals in an ongoing endeavor strengthen one's own skills at the expense of other actors and the group. Furthermore, a historical view reveals that inter-Arab ties evolved in keeping with regional order alongside socioeconomic development and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Arab regimes' promotion of supra state ideals was frequently a sign that they were in a serious attempt to boost their stature or defend their control and national sovereignty from local and regional threats. The Middle East's fast-changing regional politics, aggravated by Arab Spring demonstrations and regional tensions, drove the Arab Gulf States, particularly the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Bahrain, closer to Israel. The Arab Gulf states are seeking partnership with Israel due to similar security concerns with Iran, shifting US foreign policy goals, and rising outsider participation in regional events. They are no longer afraid to openly engage Israel, as seen by the UAE and Bahrain's determination to restore relations with Israel, setting the groundwork for a reconciliation and establishment of open, cordial ties between Israel and several Gulf Arab states has emerged as an important new trend in the Middle East of the twenty-first century. Normalization flourishes in the setting of an overall Arab instability, disputes among Arab nations and Iran, and shared interests between Arab nations and Israel. The goal is to cooperate in the areas of water, technology, agriculture, and medical. Arab states are compelled to work with Israel due to external pressure, intra-Arab conflict, domestic politics, and the structure of the regional economy. In addition to the escalation of the Arab state conflicts, it was also part of a plan to counter the Iranian threat in the region with popular upheavals that caused strife among Arabs and sped up the process of

rapprochement. In an interview with Clive Jones, Professor of Regional Security at Durham University, he explains that the Arab-Israeli rapprochement is the outcome of a historical process. There is substantial evidence to support the notion that a state of continuous conflict existed between the Arab and Israeli nations. However, over time, their relationship has undergone significant evolution and has now reached a point of normalization.⁴⁴

Conclusion

The conflict between Israel and the Arab world has been one of the oldest and most bitter in contemporary times. By outlining the conflicts and negotiations for peace, such as those at Camp David and Oslo, between Arabs and Israel, the development of their ties is traced. Early in the 20th century, when Zionism and Arab nationalism fought, the Arab-Israeli conflict may be traced to its origins. However, the idea of Arabism waned as Arab states began prioritizing their own interests and there was a lack of military cooperation among Arab states. Arab countries lost political, military, and strategic clout after every conflict. Arab national security now faces more difficult conditions throughout the Arab world. The security dynamics of Arab states are changing and becoming more complex due to several factors, including political reform, domestic issues, a change in leadership, and the Arab Spring, which is by far the most significant event. Most of these security challenges were centered on territorial, political, and military rivalry and conflicts inside and between regional actors as well as between overseas actors prior to the Arab uprisings of 2011. The Israel-Palestine conflict is no longer of relevance to the Arab states. Israeli and Arab relations are strained by the volatility in the region. The two previously adversarial Arab states and Israel are becoming more friendly as a result of Iran. Iran is a bigger threat to Israel's survival because of its wealth and powerful hold over the local population. Arab nations desire to defend themselves from Iran as a result of Israel's development as a technological and military superpower. As a result of the national interests of the Arab states and the instability in the region, there is a shift away from pan-Arabism. A new regional order and alignments based on geopolitical and economic concerns are produced as a result of growing Arab recognition of Israel, which is a substantial departure from Arab unity.

⁴⁴ Clive Jones, Interviewed by Yumna Rashid, Online Interview, July 4,2023

Chapter 2

Discourse Analysis of the Arab-Israeli Rapprochement

The discourse analysis will concentrate on looking at the accords for normalization between Israel and four Arab countries UAE, Bahrain, Morocco Sudan. The goal of this analysis is to examine how these four states' and Israel's historical relationships have varied and to what extent. Gaining knowledge of the underlying narratives, motives, and implications of these diplomatic developments is the goal of this discourse analysis of these accords. A thorough examination of the historical interactions between Israel and the four Arab countries (Sudan, Bahrain, Morocco, and the UAE) is included in the discourse analysis's coverage. In order to contextualize the normalization accords, this analysis will look at previous conflicts, tensions, and interaction and immediate context of the normalization The differences in the four Arab state's relationships with Israel will be examined through speech analysis. It will evaluate the various degrees of participation, collaboration, and conflict that each state has personally experienced. To determine the underlying causes for the variances in their interactions with Israel, this analysis will consider elements including geographic closeness, cultural linkages, economic interests, political alignments, and regional dynamics.

2.1 The Abraham Accord Declarations

The Abraham Accords Declaration, a landmark agreement, was signed by the State of Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the Kingdom of Bahrain on September 15, 2020. This was a historic event. The accord marks a significant change in the Middle East's political landscape by normalizing diplomatic ties among three states. US mediated this agreement. The prophet Abraham, who is regarded as a forefather of both Jews and Arabs, inspired the name of the treaties. The Abraham Accords signaled a significant change in the Middle East since they were the first agreements for normalizing ties between Israel and Arab states in well than 25 years and the first time that Arab states had ever done so without the Israeli-Palestinian dispute being resolved. The declaration consists of the following themes:

1. Diplomatic relations: The agreement creates full diplomatic ties between the three nations, allowing for the creation of embassies and consulates, ambassadorial exchanges, and collaboration in a variety of areas, including trade, investment, tourism, and culture.

2. Regional peace and stability: The declaration places emphasis on the signatories' dedication to fostering regional peace, stability, and security. Additionally, it recognizes the significance of a solution for the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

3. Economic cooperation and trade: The agreement creates new possibilities for the three nations' economies to interact and trade products and services. Additionally, it calls for the formation of a Joint Cooperation Committee to encourage and enable cooperation across a variety of sectors.

4. People to people exchanges: The proclamation supports the exchange of visits by citizens, artists, and intellectuals while promoting cultural understanding and interchange between the three nations.

5. Cooperation in security and defense: The agreement calls for collaboration in the spheres of security and defense, including the sharing of knowledge and experience in subjects like cybersecurity and counterterrorism.⁴⁵

2.1.1 Historical context

The dispute between Israel and the Arab countries began in the late 19th century with the rise of Zionism, a movement that aimed to create a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Israel proclaimed its independence in 1948, which was quickly followed by conflict with its Arab neighbors because they opposed the creation of a Jewish state in the region. Israel and the Arab nations have engaged in several wars and conflicts throughout the years, notably the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and the Six-Day War in 1967. With the Palestinian-Israeli conflict at its center, the conflict has also expanded in depth. Many Arab nations have backed the Palestinians in their quest for statehood and independence, but they have insisted that any rapprochement should wait until the Palestinians' conflict with Israel is resolved. Despite several attempts at discussion and peace talks, little has been accomplished, and tensions have remained high. Several nations have taken sides in the conflict, which has wider regional and international repercussions. The Middle East's political and strategic environment has started to change in recent years, nevertheless. In order to offset Iranian dominance in the region, several Arab states now

⁴⁵ The Abraham Accords, 2020, U.S. Department of State, accessed March 2, 2023, <https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/>, <https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/>

perceive Iran as a larger danger than Israel. As a result, they are actively pursuing alliances and partnerships. The Abraham Accords was viewed as a means of bolstering the anti-Iranian alliance in the region while also fostering peace and stability in this situation.⁴⁶ The Abraham Accords was notable because they represented the first official recognition of Israel by Arab states in more than 25 years. The accords were hailed as a significant diplomatic achievement and warmly received by many nations. They were disputed, though, as some argued that they undermined Palestinian aspirations for self-government and statehood. Therefore, a protracted conflict between Israel and the Arab states, with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict at its center, shaped the historical context of the Abraham Accords. The accords were noteworthy because they signaled a change in regional dynamics and represented a break from conventional Arab sentiments towards Israel. The chances for a long-lasting peace in the region were also questioned, as well as the viability of the Palestinian cause.

2.1.2 Immediate Context

The Arab states have historically refused to recognize Israel, saying that a settlement to the Palestinian-Israeli problem should come before any normalization of ties, but in recent years, the Middle East's political and strategic landscape has started to shift, opening fresh chances for cooperation and diplomacy.

Shifting Geopolitical Dynamics: The Abraham Accords, which restored diplomatic ties between the UAE, Bahrain, and Israel, took place when Middle Eastern geopolitics changed. The participating nations understood that their foreign policies needed to change to face new regional issues. Iran's perceived danger to the region's stability was a major element. Concerns regarding Iran's nuclear program and destabilizing operations were echoed by the UAE, Bahrain, and Israel. They attempted to join as one and strengthen their collective security against these shared threats by forging diplomatic relations. The participating nations also saw the chance to rearrange their geopolitical positions and redefine their regional ties. The UAE and Bahrain adopted a practical stance, putting their own national interests first and working to strengthen

⁴⁶ Omar, Rahman, "What's behind the relationship between Israel and Arab Gulf states?," Brookings Institution, January 28, 2019, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/28/whats-behind-the-relationship-between-israel-and-arab-gulf-states/>

their connections with Israel in order to improve their security, intelligence-sharing, and defense capacities.

Economic opportunities: The UAE, Bahrain, and Israel's efforts to normalize their ties were heavily influenced by economic factors. The Abraham Accords' signing created new opportunities for collaboration and economic co-operation. The nations understood the potential for shared advantages by utilizing one another's assets and strengths. For the UAE and Bahrain, prospects to promote technical collaboration, R&D, and entrepreneurship were attractively provided by Israel, which is renowned for its scientific breakthroughs and innovation-driven sectors. The UAE wants to take use of Israel's expertise in fields including cybersecurity, water management, agriculture, and renewable energy due to its strategic position and efforts at economic diversification. Bahrain investigated collaborating with Israel's booming start-up ecosystem in order to enhance its finance and technological industries. The normalization accords also made it easier to grow commerce, investment, and tourism. The establishment of direct flights made it simpler to convey people and products across the nations. Various industries, including tourism, hospitality, transportation, and logistics, benefited from the possibility for major economic expansion and the creation of jobs.

Diplomatic engagement: The Abraham Accords and the mediation between the UAE, Bahrain, and Israel were both made possible in large part by the United States. A regional diplomacy program to promote normalization between Arabs and Israelis was extensively pushed by the Trump administration, led by the late President Donald Trump. Leveraging its clout and connections with all sides, the U.S. government created a forum for talks and diplomatic engagement. In order to further its own strategic objectives in the Middle East, the United States worked to increase regional stability, resist Iranian influence, and fortify ties with its most important allies. The accords were mediated by the Trump administration, which also helped to highlight their importance to the international community. The Abraham Accords signaled a fundamental shift in regional relations in the Middle East by normalizing ties between Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain. The accords marked a change from the traditional stance taken by Arab states which avoided establishing formal diplomatic connections with Israel until the Israeli-Palestinian problem was resolved. A possible realignment of regional alliances was also hinted at by the normalization of ties. Other Arab nations may reevaluate their relations with Israel

considering the advantages and opportunities that come with formal diplomatic ties. The Abraham Accords established a precedent for more openness and interaction between Arab states and Israel

2.2 Abraham Accords Peace Agreement: Treaty of Peace, Diplomatic Relations and Full Normalization Between the UAE and Israel

A historic peace accord known as the Abraham Accords Peace Agreement connected Israel and the United Arab Emirates diplomatically and restored long-simmering tensions. At the White House in Washington, D.C., on September 15, 2020, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and the Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, signed the agreement alongside Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and American President Donald Trump. The accord is seen as a pivotal moment in Middle Eastern history and has the power to change the region's geopolitical landscape. The key themes of this agreement are:

- 1. *Establishment of Diplomatic ties:*** According to the agreement, Israel and the United Arab Emirates will have full diplomatic ties, which will include ambassadorial exchanges and the establishment of embassies.
- 2. *Economic and Trade Cooperation:*** With an emphasis on industries including technology, healthcare, agriculture, and energy, the agreement seeks to strengthen UAE-Israel relations on the economic and trade fronts.
- 3. *Security Partnership:*** With an emphasis on cybersecurity and counterterrorism, the pact aims to improve security cooperation between Israel and the United Arab Emirates.
- 4. *People-to-People Ties:*** The agreement intends to promote tourism and cultural contact between the UAE and Israel, as well as make it easier for nationals of both countries to travel without a visa.
- 5. *Regional Peace and Stability:*** Through communication and collaboration between nations, the pact seeks to advance regional peace and stability.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ "Treaty of Peace, Diplomatic Relations, and Full Normalization Between the United Arab Emirates and the State of Israel," U.S. Department of State, *Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs*, September 15, 2020, <https://www.state.gov/treaty-of-peace-diplomatic-relations-and-full-normalization-between-the-united-arab-emirates-and-the-state-of-israel/>.

2.2.1 Historical context

The Arab nations, including the UAE, continued to have a non-engagement or hostile stance towards Israel after the State of Israel was established in 1948. This viewpoint was born out of the larger Arab hostility to the Zionist dream of a Jewish country in Palestine. The UAE took part in the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1948, 1967, and 1973, backing the Palestinian cause both diplomatically and materially together with other Arab countries. The UAE took a stance that was in line with the Arab consensus, emphasizing its opposition to Israeli policies and support for Palestinian self-determination. UAE, like other Arab nations, adopted a boycott of Israel policy. The diplomatic, economic, and cultural sectors were all affected by this boycott. Along with other Arab countries, the UAE avoided establishing diplomatic ties with Israel and prohibited any official contact. They also banned trade and exchanges with Israel.⁴⁸ Some Arab nations, particularly the UAE, started looking at possible interactions with Israel during the process of Oslo accords. As part of the Middle East peace process, the UAE took part in multilateral negotiations to advance communication and a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian issue. However, the UAE maintained its official stance of not recognizing Israel, and there was little progress made towards normalizing the relationship. The geopolitical environment in the Middle East has changed significantly in more recent years, which has affected how the UAE and Israel relate to one another. A convergence of interests between the UAE and Israel resulted from shared worries about Iran's regional influence, its nuclear program, and its involvement in crises throughout the region. Both nations revised their strategies as a result of seeing Iran as a shared danger. In line with the general Arab attitude towards the Israeli-Palestinian issue, the UAE first adopted a non-recognition and hostile approach in their ties with Israel. The Abraham Accords marked the formal creation of diplomatic ties and several cooperative accords, but more recent geopolitical realities, shared worries about Iran, and shifting priorities have led to a gradual transition.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ George Sadek, "United Arab Emirates: New Decree-Law Abolishes Law on Boycott of Israel," Global Legal Monitor, September 9, 2020, <https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2020-09-09/united-arab-emirates-new-decree-law-abolishes-law-on-boycott-of-israel/>.

⁴⁹ Jason Slotkin, "On Path To Normalize Relations, UAE Formally Ends Boycott Of Israel," NPR, August 29, 2020, <https://www.npr.org/2020/08/29/907457538/on-path-to-normalize-relations-uae-formally-ends-boycott-of-israel>.

2.2.2 Immediate context

The immediate background for the normalization of ties between the UAE and Israel may be examined in connection to the circumstances that drove the UAE to pursue normalization with Israel as well as the larger regional and international situation of the time. Several factors, including political, strategic, and diplomatic concerns, led the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to decide to normalize ties with Israel. While security and economic considerations were important.

Geopolitical Convergence: In order to improve its geopolitical position, broaden its regional influence, and position itself as a significant player in the Middle East, the UAE decided to normalize ties with Israel. The UAE wants to strengthen its position as a regional actor and capitalize on Israel's geopolitical prominence by allying with Israel. This alignment also enables the UAE to form alliances with countries that share its values, limit Iran's influence, and deal with shared problems. The UAE also gets access to resources, knowledge, and opportunity to further its economic, technical, and security objectives by taking use of Israel's already established international connections. Because of its support for Israel, the UAE can actively influence regional dynamics, take part in diplomatic initiatives, and aid in crisis resolution. In general, the UAE's geopolitical allying with Israel denotes a calculated move to strengthen its position and influence in the region.⁵⁰

Regional Stability: UAE's efforts to normalize relations with Israel are intended to advance Middle East peace. By establishing diplomatic connections with Israel, the UAE hopes to promote communication, settle differences, and lessen hostilities between the parties. For the UAE's own security, economic expansion, and long-term development, sustaining regional stability is essential. In order to tackle shared problems and advance regional stability, the UAE also works with like-minded states. The UAE works with other nations that value stability in order to further regional stability, in addition to its bilateral relationship with Israel. The UAE seeks to entice foreign investment, advance economic development, and combat regional dangers like terrorism by promoting a stable environment. The UAE contributes to the security

⁵⁰ Dr. Sanam Vakil and Dr. Neil Quilliam, "The Abraham Accords and Israel-UAE normalization: Shaping a new Middle East," Chatham House, March 28, 2023, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/03/abraham-accords-and-israel-uae-normalization>.

and prosperity of the whole Middle East through coordinating with Israel and other regional partners.⁵¹

Security factor: Iran is considered a rival by the UAE in the region, notably in terms of geopolitical sway and the balance of power in the region. The UAE sees Iran's involvement in conflicts, funding for proxies, and suspected meddling in the domestic affairs of Arab states as destabilizing acts and policies in the Middle East. The UAE seeks to increase its position and group influence in opposition to Iran's regional aspirations by siding with Israel, which has similar worries about Iran's actions. The UAE is aware that a unified front against Iran's alleged influence might result in a more equitable power structure in the region. The UAE's strategic position is strengthened by its alliance with Israel, which also makes it possible to work more closely with other nations who have similar worries about Iran. This alignment offers a foundation for collaborative efforts to solve shared issues, advance stability, and lessen possible threats coming from Iran. Additionally, the UAE's strategy for restraining or balancing Iran's operations entails cooperation with nations and regional players. Establishing diplomatic channels, intelligence exchange, and security collaboration are all part of this effort to properly track and mitigate any Iranian threats. The UAE's support for Israel is a component of a larger plan to forge stronger alliances and partnerships that can work together to counter and lessen Iran's influence.⁵²In order to discourage future Iranian aggression or destabilizing measures, the UAE wants to improve regional security arrangements through strategic alignment, establish collective defense mechanisms, and advance a stable environment.

Economic diversification: The UAE's resolve to improve ties with Israel is driven by the need to further its attempts at economic diversification. The UAE hopes to leverage Israel's experience to promote growth in non-oil industries by forging relationships with this country, a pioneer in technology and innovation on a worldwide scale. The UAE's competitiveness in a variety of industries may be increased by collaborating and exchanging expertise with Israel's

⁵¹ Sanam Vakil, Neil Quilliam, "The Abraham Accords and Israel–UAE Normalization: Shaping a New Middle East," Middle East and North Africa Programme, March 2023, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/2023-03-28-abraham-accords-israel-uae-normalization-vakil-quilliam-1.pdf>.

⁵² Danny Citrinowicz, "Israel and the UAE on Iran: Shared Foe, Different Perspectives," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 1, 2020, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/israel-and-uae-iran-shared-foe-different-perspectives>.

thriving technological industry. The normalization also makes it possible for the UAE to attract money and diversify its economic relationships by opening doors for expanded trade, investment, and market access. The UAE wants to lessen its dependency on oil and establish itself as a regional powerhouse for innovation and entrepreneurship by utilizing Israel's technical breakthroughs and entrepreneurial ecosystem.⁵³

2.3 Abraham Accords: Declaration of Peace, Cooperation and Constructive Diplomacy and Friendly Relations between Israel and Bahrain

On September 15, 2020, the normalization agreement between Israel and Bahrain was signed. The two nations also decided to work together on several subjects, including as security, commerce, and tourism. In the Middle East, where Arab nations had historically maintained a position of non-recognition of Israel, the restoration of ties between Israel and Bahrain signified a significant change in the geopolitical landscape. Israel and Bahrain have taken actions to strengthen their relations after the agreement was struck, including the establishment of embassies in each other's major cities. In addition, the two nations have signed several agreements in the areas of technology, investment, and tourism. The key points of the accord are:

- 1. *Recognition of Sovereignty:*** Israel and Bahrain acknowledge that the other is a sovereign nation with the right to exist and to be safe inside its boundaries.
- 2. *Commitment to Non-Violence:*** Both nations pledge to settle their differences amicably and forego using or threatening to use force against one another.
- 3. *Cooperation in Shared Interests:*** Both nations concur to work together in areas of shared interest, including as trade, technology, culture, and security.
- 4. *Peaceful Dispute Resolution:*** Both nations pledge to use peaceful ways, such as discussions, mediation, or other predetermined techniques, to settle any disagreements.

53 Yoel Guzansky and Ari Heistein, "The benefits and challenges of UAE-Israel normalization," Middle East Institute, September 16, 2020, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/benefits-and-challenges-uae-israel-normalization>.

5. *Promotion of Tolerance and Human Rights:* Both nations pledge to uphold and advance tolerance, understanding, and respect for diversity. They also pledge to uphold and advance human rights and basic freedoms.⁵⁴

2.3.1 Historical Context

Bahrain, like most Arab nations, refused to acknowledge Israel after it was founded in 1948. Bahrain formally endorsed the Arab League's positions during this time, which supported Palestinian self-determination and the rejection of Israel. There were not many indirect encounters between Bahrain and Israel in the 1990s. Bahrain took part in the Madrid Conference, a multilateral peace conference that brought together Israeli and Arab representatives in 1991 to explore Middle East peace. However, during this time, no formal diplomatic ties were established. Bahrain continued its non-engagement with Israel policy throughout the 2000s. However, there have been sporadic claims of covert communications and unofficial talks between Bahraini and Israeli officials using track II diplomacy. These unofficial routes offered chances for covert communications, frequently occurring during conferences, workshops, or seminars held abroad. Even while the specifics of these contacts were not always made public, they showed a genuine openness to conversation and engagement. In 2005, Bahrain served as the venue for the Middle East-North Africa Economic Summit, which brought together Arab, Israeli, and other foreign officials to talk about the region's economic growth. Despite the presence of Israeli representatives at the conference, formal diplomatic ties between Bahrain and Israel were not established. Bahrain took part in the 2008 Annapolis Conference, which was held with the goal of advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Although the summit signaled a significant international peace effort, it did not result in Bahrain and Israel establishing formal diplomatic ties. Bahrain kept up its non-engagement policy with Israel after the Annapolis Conference in 2008, and no direct diplomatic ties were established between the two nations during this time. There were, however, sporadic allegations of conversations and encounters between Bahraini and Israeli officials behind closed doors, particularly regarding mutual interests and worries about regional security.⁵⁵ The unveiling of

54 "Joint Statement of the United States, the Kingdom of Bahrain, and the State of Israel," United States Department of State, September 15, 2020, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Bahrain-Israel-Agreement-signed-FINAL-15-Sept-2020-508.pdf>.

55 Suzan Quitaz, "From covert to overt: Warming relations between Bahrain and Israel no longer a secret," *The New Arab*, December 17, 2019, <https://www.newarab.com/analysis/kingdom-bahrain-reaching-out-israel>.

the Abraham Accords in 2020 signaled a change in the situation. As the United Arab Emirates had done a month earlier, Bahrain declared on September 11, 2020, that it intended to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel. The United States facilitated the agreements, which aimed to improve regional economic cohesion, peace, and stability.

2.3.2 Immediate context

Re- evaluation of Arab solidarity: The normalization of relations between Bahrain and Israel reflected greater Middle Eastern diplomatic changes. It indicated a break from the conventional Arab consensus on the Israeli-Arab issue and showed a rising interest on the part of some Arab countries in direct negotiations with Israel. Within the region, there were different responses to this change; some nations praised it as a step towards collaboration and stability, while others denounced it as a betrayal of the Palestinian cause. As the first member of the Gulf to establish full diplomatic ties with Israel, the UAE. This ground-breaking initiative established a standard and provided a framework for Bahrain and other Arab nations to follow suit.

Security concerns: Bahrain, like many other Arab nations, is concerned about potential threats to regional security. Arab countries are seeking stronger ties with Israel due in large part to Iran's growing regional influence, as well as its nuclear aspirations and funding for proxy organizations. Countries like Bahrain are looking for ways to work with Israel to strengthen their security capabilities because they perceive Iran as a common danger.

Shifts in national interest: The choice to normalize ties was heavily influenced by economic cooperation. The potential advantages of expanded commerce, investment, and technology interchange were acknowledged by both Bahrain and Israel. Industries including banking, technology, agriculture, and healthcare saw an increase in potential for bilateral commerce, tourism, and investment after the normalization agreement was signed. Bahrain, a major financial center in the region, aimed to capitalize on Israel's cutting-edge technological industry and forge profitable business alliances.⁵⁶

U.S. Mediation and Diplomatic Pressure: The normalization of relations between Bahrain and Israel was made possible in large part by the United States. The Trump administration actively

⁵⁶ Hussein Ibish, "Why Bahrain is Embracing Normalization with Israel," Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, September 14, 2020, <https://agsiw.org/why-bahrain-is-embracing-normalization-with-israel/>.

urged other Arab countries to adopt the UAE-Israel pact. In order to allay Bahrain's worries and hesitations, the U.S. administration used diplomatic pressure and gave promises, such as military and security cooperation. Bahrain's decision to move through with normalization was probably influenced by American mediation and the prospect of improved relations with the U.S.⁵⁷

2.4 Israel-Morocco normalization agreement

The United States assisted in the signing of the Israel-Morocco normalization agreement between Israel and Morocco in December 2020. With the opening of embassies, direct flights, and economic cooperation, the two nations now have full diplomatic ties. With Middle Eastern and North African nations, including Morocco, Israel inked four significant accords in 2020. Like the previous accords, this normalization arrangement was seen as a crucial step towards boosting regional cooperation and stability. In facilitating the accord, the United States was crucial. The agreement's primary themes are as follows:

- 1. *Sovereignty over Western Sahara:*** The normalization pact between Israel and Morocco was signed on the side of diplomacy. As a condition of the deal, the US acknowledged Morocco's sovereignty over the disputed Western Sahara region.
- 2. *Diplomatic Relations:*** According to the agreement, Israel and Morocco must establish full diplomatic ties, including by building embassies and consulates in each other's nations.
- 3. *Economic Collaboration:*** The pact promotes commerce, investment, and tourism between the two nations as well as economic collaboration.
- 4. *Cultural Interaction:*** The agreement encourages cultural interactions, especially those in the areas of art, music, and sports, between Israel and Morocco.
- 5. *Interfaith Conversation:*** The agreement promotes interfaith conversation between the two nations and reiterates the value of religious freedom and tolerance.
- 6. *Peace and Stability:*** The agreement between Israel and Morocco recognizes the need of maintaining regional security while fostering cooperation to improve regional peace and

⁵⁷ Hesham Youssef, "Can the 'New Normalizers' Advance Israeli-Palestinian Peace?," United States Institute of Peace (USIP), June 16, 2021, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/06/can-new-normalizers-advance-israeli-palestinian-peace>.

stability. The accord, which emphasizes the necessity of collaboration towards accomplishing these aims, acknowledges the relevance of sustaining peace and security in the region.⁵⁸

2.4.1 Historical context

Jewish communities had lived in Morocco for millennia prior to the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. Jews have lived in the region since antiquity, and the Middle Ages saw a considerable increase in the number of Sephardic Jews who had been banished from Spain and Portugal.⁵⁹ While there were occasionally conflicts where Moroccan Jews and Muslim or Berber groups coexisted, they generally got along. Zionist activities developed globally as a result of post-World War II support for the Jewish people and the creation of a Jewish homeland. Morocco did not participate in the 1948 UN General Assembly vote on the partition plan, which advocated for the establishment of separate Arab and Jewish states in Palestine. This was regarded as a modest show of sympathy for the cause of the Jews. Conflict and Relationship Breakdown Morocco joined the larger Arab consensus and backed Arab state's stance against Israel throughout the Arab-Israeli conflict and the process of decolonization in North Africa. In response to the Six-Day War between Israel and Arab countries, Morocco terminated diplomatic ties with Israel in 1965. In the years that followed, Morocco actively supported the Palestinian cause and helped Palestinian refugees. Morocco carefully held a small-scale, informal conversation with Israeli officials in the 1980s that was mostly focused on the plight of Moroccan Jews. Morocco began allowing direct phone calls between Moroccan Jews and their family members in Israel in 1993, following the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Morocco and Israel effectively established low-level diplomatic communication in 1994 when they each opened liaison offices. There were informal diplomatic exchanges between Morocco and Israel throughout this time, despite the absence of formal ties.

⁵⁸ "Joint Declaration on Full Normalization of Relations Between Israel, the Kingdom of Morocco, and the United States," United States Department of State, January 6, 2021, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Joint-Declaration-US-Morocco-Israel.pdf>.

⁵⁹ Karim Mezran , Alissa Pavia, "Morocco and Israel are friendlier than ever thanks to the Abraham Accords. But what does this mean for the rest of North Africa?" Atlantic Council, October 7, 2021, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/morocco-and-israel-are-friendlier-than-ever-thanks-to-the-abraham-accords-but-what-does-this-mean-for-the-rest-of-north-africa/>.

The pragmatist and diplomatic king Hassan II maintained covert channels of communication with Israeli officials. These interactions were mostly concerned with humanitarian problems, such as aiding Moroccan Jews' immigration to Israel. Morocco's attitude towards Israel gradually changed in the 1980s due to both domestic and external forces. Moroccan support for the Palestinian cause and the need to address Moroccan Jews' concerns needed to be balanced, according to King Hassan II. The king emphasized the value of religious tolerance and cohabitation while acknowledging the long history of Jewish presence in Morocco. King Hassan II became actively involved in efforts to bring about a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the 1990s. He participated in mediation attempts and held several diplomatic gatherings between the leaders of Israel and Palestine in Morocco. The diplomatic efforts of King Hassan II intended to promote communication and a peaceful settlement of the issue.⁶⁰ Periods of conflict, restricted contact, and covert encounters characterized Morocco and Israel's relationship throughout King Hassan II's reign. The king's strategy was characterized by a balance between the interests of the Moroccan Jewish minority, Morocco's Arab identity, and support for the Palestinian cause. Although cautious, his diplomatic efforts demonstrated a practical outlook and a desire for regional stability. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Arab nationalism, and Moroccan domestic concerns are only a few examples of the larger regional variables that have shaped Morocco's and Israel's historical connections. Their relationship has changed significantly as a result of the most recent normalization accord, which opens a new chapter in their diplomatic relation.⁶¹

2.4.2 Immediate context

Morocco are interested in strengthening its military ties with Israel and moving quickly the transfer of technology to increase its military edge over the Polisario and defend itself from a potential attack by Algeria, its neighbor with whom it has been in conflict for decades. Advanced weaponry and Israeli-made technologies worth several million dollars have already

60 "Israel-Morocco agreement follows a history of clandestine cooperation," *TRT World*, May 23, 2023, <https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/israel-morocco-agreement-follows-a-history-of-clandestine-cooperation-42268>.

61 Ana Salas Cuevas, "A New Era in Israel-Morocco Relations," *Global Affairs UNAV*, March 26, 2022, <https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/a-new-era-in-israel-morocco-relations>

been purchased by Morocco.⁶² The accords for Israel, Morocco, and Bahrain's normalization were mediated in a considerable way by the United States. The Abraham Accords were one of the diplomatic initiatives the Trump administration undertook to promote stronger ties between Israel and the Arab world. To persuade these nations to normalize ties with Israel, the U.S. government offered incentives and guarantees.

Economic benefits: The decision of Morocco and Bahrain to normalize ties was heavily influenced by economic and strategic factors. These nations wanted better access to modern technology, defense collaboration, and information sharing, as well as more trade, investment, and economic cooperation with Israel. The normalization deal may strengthen economic and commercial connections between the two nations and open new markets for investments and corporate ventures. Morocco and Israel both have strong economies that complement one another. Morocco is a significant exporter of industrial and agricultural goods, and Israel is a global innovator and leader in technology. Together, the two nations may take use of each other's advantages and accelerate economic progress.⁶³

Security threats: The Middle East's shifting alliances and changing regional dynamics both contributed to the normalization. Concerns over Iran's regional sway and its backing for non-state entities have grown among certain Arab countries. To counteract this influence and strengthen their own security, they have sought stronger relations with Israel, an Iranian competitor.

Environmental concerns: Environmental concerns were a contributing factor in the normalization of Moroccan-Israeli relations, they are now a significant area of cooperation between the two nations. The repercussions of climate change, such as droughts, desertification, and sea level rise, are extremely dangerous for Morocco. As a result, the nation has invested heavily in renewable energy and is one of the top solar energy producers in the world. Israel, on the other hand, is a pioneer in water conservation and has created cutting-edge water management technology including desalination and drip irrigation. The drought in both

⁶² Mohamed Siali, "Morocco and Israel, beyond mere diplomatic normalization," *Atalayar*, August 5, 2022. <https://atalayar.com/en/content/morocco-and-israel-beyond-mere-diplomatic-normalisation>.

⁶³ Intissar Fakir, "Morocco and Israel: Economic Opportunities, Military Incentives, and Moral Hazards," Middle East Institute, December 1, 2022, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/morocco-and-israel-economic-opportunities-military-incentives-and-moral-hazards>.

Morocco and Israel has prompted Israel to invent new terms of technology, boosting water desalination mechanisms with a concentrate on energy efficiency, sewage treatment, and smart irrigation to reduce water use. Morocco and Israel are strengthening their partnership to better manage the scarcity of water supplies.⁶⁴

2.5 The Abraham Accords Agreement between Sudan and Israel

The normalization agreement between Sudan and Israel was declared on October 23, 2020. Sudan consented to normalize its relationships with Israel, establish diplomatic links, and move towards greater collaboration and economic integration under the terms of the agreement. As the Abraham Accords deviate from the long-standing Arab consensus that Israel should be recognized, they are considered as a significant change in the dynamics of the Middle East. The Accords have been hailed as an important step towards regional peace and security. The Abraham Accords Agreement between Sudan and Israel focuses on following key points:

- 1. *Concrete steps towards normalization:*** The inauguration of direct flights between the two nations and the installation of embassies are examples of this.
- 2. *Removal of Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism:*** The U.S. consented to strike Sudan from its list of nations that support terrorism as part of the accord. This would lift certain economic restrictions and present chances for commerce and investment.
- 3. *Promoting peace and stability in the region:*** By providing a framework for collaboration and communication between Sudan and Israel, the agreement aims to foster peace and stability in the area.
- 4. *Collaboration in various industries:*** The agreement collaboration between Sudan and Israel in industries including technology, trade, health, and agriculture. This covers the sharing of knowledge and the marketing of investment possibilities.
- 5. *Humanitarian Assistance and Technical Support:*** Israel promised to help Sudan, notably in the fields of agriculture and water management, with both technical support and humanitarian relief.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ "Water Management: Morocco, Israel Called Upon to Strengthen Their Partnership (Israeli Minister)," *MapNews*, September 17, 2022, <https://www.mapnews.ma/en/actualites/economy/water-management-morocco-israel-called-upon-strengthen-their-partnership-israeli>.

⁶⁵ "Joint Statement on the Normalization of Relations Between Sudan and Israel.," United States Department of State, January 6, 2021, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Sudan-AA.pdf>.

2.5.1 Historical Context

The historical context of the normalization agreement between Sudan and Israel can be traced back to the Arab-Israeli conflict that began with the establishment of Israel in 1948. Like many other Arab nations, Sudan refused to accept Israel's right to exist and cut off all trade and economic ties with it. Sudan took part in the Khartoum Resolution in 1967, which proclaimed the "three no's": no discussions with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no peace treaty.⁶⁶ Sudan's position changed somewhat in the 1990s as the Middle East's geopolitical landscape began to change. Sudan wanted to connect with world powers and raise its international profile. Israel, on the other hand, participated in the Oslo Accords peace negotiations and signed peace treaties with Jordan in 1994 and Egypt in 1979. These events led Sudan to secretly review its strategy towards Israel. Sudan sought foreign support and assistance due to its numerous internal crises, particularly the Darfur civil war. Israel is said to have helped Sudan, particularly in counterterrorism activities and intelligence cooperation, and financial assistance. Furthermore, Omar al-Bashir led an Islamist government in Sudan during the 1980s and 1990s. Hamas and Hezbollah were two extremist Islamist organizations promoted by the state that were hostile to Israel's existence. The Sudanese government's position against Israel at this time was influenced by the Islamist ideology that predominated at the time. However, Sudan has experienced a lot of political change recently. 2019 saw a public revolt that resulted in the collapse of Omar al-Bashir's administration and the installation of a transitional government under Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. To strengthen ties with the international community and draw in foreign investment, the transitional administration has been working on political and economic reforms.

2.5.2 Immediate context

Economic incentives: The immediate context of the normalization agreement was shaped by several factors. First and foremost, the United States was a key player in negotiating the deal. The United States provided incentives to Sudan as part of the normalization deal, including the removal of Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and financial support. Given that Sudan had been listed as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1993, this was a significant milestone.

⁶⁶ "The 3 'No's of Khartoum," CAMERA, May 25, 2023, <https://www.sixdaywar.org/immediate-aftermath/the-3-nos-of-khartoum/>.

Certain economic constraints would be lifted, and there would be opportunities for trade and investment if Sudan was taken off the list. The normalization agreement was reached at a time when tensions in the region were rising and numerous nations, including Iran, were dealing with serious political and economic problems. It was anticipated that the agreement between Israel and Sudan would open the way for other nations in the region to follow suit since it was considered as a crucial step towards further normalizing ties between Israel and Arab nations.⁶⁷

Removal from terrorist list: Normalization with Israel offers concrete advantages for Sudan. A crucial component of this agreement was the removal of Sudan from the U.S. list of states supporting terrorism after years of isolation from the rest of the world. This choice repaired ties with the United States and allowed Sudan to receive more financial support from the international community.⁶⁸

Regional Dynamics and Geopolitics: Sudan's decision to normalize relations with Israel was influenced by shifting regional dynamics and geopolitical factors. Following the removal of former President Omar al-Bashir, Sudan's new government worked to reposition the country on the world arena and strengthen regional connections. The Sudanese administration was also eager to advance its diplomatic ties with the United States and win backing for its planned political change. Sudan's ambition for international participation and reintegration into the world community also had a role in its decision to normalize relations with Israel. Sudan sought to improve its reputation abroad, draw in investment, and broaden its diplomatic and economic links by establishing diplomatic ties with Israel.

2.6 Findings of Discourse Analysis

The normalization accords between Israel and the Arab countries have had a big impact on the dynamics of the region and the development of diplomatic ties. These themes highlight the shared objectives of the accords, including diplomatic relations, economic cooperation, security, cultural exchange, regional stability, and the promotion of tolerance and human rights, even

67 Col. (ret.) Dr. Jacques Neriah, "The Prospects of Normalization between Sudan and Israel," *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs*, January 4, 2023, <https://jcpa.org/the-prospects-of-normalization-between-sudan-and-israel/>.

68 Max Bearak and Naba Mohieddin, "U.S. lifts Sudan's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism," *The Washington Post*, December 14, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/sudan-remove-state-terror-list/2020/12/14/7f119482-3d10-11eb-aad9-8959227280c4_story.html.

though the specific agreements may vary in phrasing and specifics. some common themes that emerge are:

1. ***Establishment of Diplomatic Relations:*** The establishment of complete diplomatic links between the parties is emphasized in all four accords. The development of diplomatic ties, the changing of ambassadors, and the opening of embassies all fall under this category.
2. ***Economic cooperation and trade:*** Improving economic cooperation and commerce between the nations is another recurring issue. The deals are meant to fortify linkages between numerous sectors, including technology, healthcare, agriculture, and energy. They aim to foster economic cooperation while promoting trade, investment, and tourism.
3. ***Partnership for Counterterrorism and Security:*** The agreements acknowledge the value of counterterrorism and security cooperation. In order to increase regional security and stability, they seek to deepen cooperation in fields including cybersecurity and counterterrorism.
4. ***People-to-People Exchange:*** In all four agreements, links between people are emphasize. They want to encourage tourism, cross-border travel, and cultural exchange. The accords aim to promote tolerance, respect, and understanding of diversity.
5. ***Regional Peace and Stability:*** A constant theme throughout the agreements is the goal of regional peace and stability. They stress the importance of international cooperation, dialogue, and nonviolent conflict resolution. The accords emphasize the value of preserving regional stability and security while promoting collaboration.
6. ***Interfaith Dialogue and the Advancement of Human Rights:*** While not mentioned in all agreements, two of them make a special point of advancing interfaith dialogue and the importance of religious tolerance and freedom. One of the accords also refers to the commitment to maintaining and developing human rights and fundamental freedoms.

2.6.1 Scope

The historical development of the relationships between these four states and Israel reflects a variety of experiences, such as varied levels of confrontation, sporadic participation, covert cooperation, and changes in political dynamics. By signing agreements, Sudan, Bahrain, Morocco, and the UAE broke with their prior stances and entered a new phase of contact with Israel. The fact that none of these four Arab nations have a territorial dispute with Israel is, in fact, a significant component of the historical relationships between the UAE, Bahrain,

Morocco, and Sudan and Israel. Sudan, Bahrain, Morocco, and the UAE have not had direct territorial disputes with Israel, in contrast to several other Arab countries like Palestine, Lebanon, or Syria, which have had ongoing battles with Israel over their respective territories. The absence of territorial issues offers the normalization agreements a distinctive setting. These agreements have placed more of an emphasis on diplomatic, political, and economic reasons than they have on resolving disputed territorial disputes. This feature distinguishes these four states from other nations in the region and adds to the unique character of their relations with Israel. Sudan, Bahrain, Morocco, and the UAE have been able to pursue avenues of cooperation, commercial partnerships, technology exchange, and cultural links by forging diplomatic ties with Israel without the burden of territorial conflicts. These agreements mark a break from the conventional Arab view that normalization and the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict go hand in hand. The ability and development of interstate cooperation can be influenced by several variables. Political factors including leadership transitions, geographical context, and political stability can influence a state's attitude and capacity for cooperation. The degree of collaboration is significantly influenced by economic factors, including trade opportunities and reciprocal advantages. The way people feel about working with Israel at home and abroad can have an impact on how quickly collaboration moves forward. Furthermore, the setting and course of collaboration might be influenced by regional changes and the stances of other actors. Various elements work together to explain how various states' capacities and levels of cooperation vary.

Following the normalization agreement, the UAE has demonstrated a strong capacity for collaboration with Israel and significant advancement. The two nations swiftly began substantial partnerships, exchanged ambassadors, and full diplomatic relations. The UAE-Israel partnership spans a variety of fields, including banking, technology, healthcare, the military, tourism, and innovation. Direct flights between the two nations' cities have been built, and commercial alliances have been made easier. In particular, the UAE has been proactive in utilizing its cutting-edge infrastructure and worldwide connectivity to quicken cooperation with Israel. After the normalization deal, Bahrain showed that it could cooperate with Israel and was making progress in doing so. Both nations promptly opened embassies, engaged in high-level visits, and established full diplomatic ties. Bahrain and Israel have worked together in a variety of fields, including trade, investments, tourism, security, technology, and cross-cultural

interactions. ⁶⁹To foster cooperation and strengthen ties between the two nations, several bilateral agreements and initiatives have been established.

Morocco has also demonstrated a moderate level of collaboration with Israel. Both nations have signed various agreements, opened liaison offices, and established formal diplomatic ties. In contrast to some other Arab states, their cooperation has been less extensive and in-depth. Although there have been debates and measures to encourage cooperation in industries including tourism, trade, and technology, the progress has been quite modest. Sudan's interaction with Israel has been noticeably less than that of other nations. ⁷⁰Although both nations have taken initiatives to develop diplomatic ties, such as exchanging delegations and starting economic cooperation, the scope of their cooperation is less extensive. Sudan's domestic issues, such as political upheavals and economic limits, have slowed the development of collaboration with Israel relative to other states. Notably, there have been conversations and initiatives to increase collaboration in sectors like agriculture, technology, and investment.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the discourse analysis of the normalization pacts between Israel and the Arab states of Sudan, Bahrain, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has illuminated several important themes. While considering the variance in historical relations and the scope of relations among these states and Israel, the analysis explored the narratives, motivations, and implications surrounding these accords. The findings showed that the normalization agreements reflected a major shift from these Arab states' previous attitudes towards Israel. While some nations, like Sudan and Morocco, had traditionally maintained antagonistic attitudes, others, like Bahrain and the UAE, have engaged in covert cooperation behind the scenes. These four governments and Israel do not have any territorial issues, which gave the agreements a special setting and allowed them to concentrate more on political, economic, and diplomatic considerations. It was clear how differently various states were able to cooperate and how far forward they were. In many areas, Bahrain and the UAE showed a high degree of involvement

69 Petra Dachtler, "From New to Normal: Two Years after the Abraham Accords." *GIGA Focus Middle East*, no. 5,(2022),<https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/giga-focus/from-new-to-normal-two-years-after-the-abraham-accords>.

⁷⁰Elie Podeh, "The Many Faces of Normalization: Models of Arab-Israeli Relations," *Strategic Assessment - Research Forum* (INSS), vol. 25, no. 1 (March 2022), <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/the-many-faces-of-normalization-models-of-arab-israeli-relations/>

and quick success, building partnerships in trade, investment, technology, security, and cross-cultural exchange. As a result of internal difficulties and a slower rate of economic development, Sudan and Morocco, on the other hand, demonstrated more moderate levels of collaboration. The narratives, reasons, and results of the normalization agreements were significantly shaped by the altering political environments, economic interests, public perceptions, and larger regional dynamics. Overall, the discourse analysis has shed light on the ramifications of the normalization agreements' complexity. It has brought attention to the four Arab states various historical paths and levels of involvement with Israel. Gaining a greater understanding of these variances and the underlying causes can help us predict how these states' ties will develop in the future and how the Middle East's changing dynamics will affect it.

Chapter 3

Domestic Causative Factors of the Arab- Israeli Rapprochement

Introduction

The Arab-Israeli reconciliation is a relatively new phenomenon with the aim of boosting development and prosperity by cooperation in many sectors such as health, agriculture, tourism, energy and technology. After a few months, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco joined the Abraham Accords as well. In the current era of globalization, it is significant for states to interact with each other. The creation of foreign policies by the head of state aims to advance both local and global agendas. It entails a complex set of processes and is heavily influenced by domestic politics. Numerous internal and external elements are involved in foreign policy formation. In world politics, A state's ultimate goal is to maximize its interests, and as a result of this rule, each state attempts to influence the other's playground. In other words, the field of international politics plays a structural role in how governments interact with one another and decide what to do with each new move. Normalization of the Arab states with Israel aspires to bring the nations closer together on a daily basis through business relations, tourism, direct flights, academic collaboration, and timely ambassadorial diplomatic links, as well as increased security cooperation in the face of regional challenges. Rapprochement with Israel also has significant economic repercussions. Naturally, agreements with the Gulf States permit the disclosure of previously hidden or indirect economic activity with Israel, as well as the development and intensification of commercial contacts in a variety of fields, including commerce, transportation, tourism, defense, information, technology, energy, finance, medical, and security apparatus. Normalization is the result of a long-standing convergence of interests. The Arab leaders are highly interested in ensuring their family's consolidation of power in the nations. Arab rulers have traditionally prioritized their own interests. In reaction to Arab Spring, the Arab world's authoritarian rulers have decided to protect their power and privilege at whatever cost. Following the regional revolutions, Arab states have a greater need for improved defense and surveillance technologies. Several Arab countries have expressed an interest in purchasing Israeli technologies. In this chapter domestic factors account for Arab states' normalization with Israel are discussed.

3.1 Political factor

3.1.1 New leadership in the Middle East

Leaders or domestic unrest have an impact on how foreign policy is made in Middle East. In fact, it can only be fully understood by examining the many variables, such as state interests and constraints, to which policymakers respond when they formulate policies. Leaders have a motivation to pursue higher degrees of national integration that increase autonomously from such influences and to develop state-centric identities consistent with sovereignty. The decisions that state make in terms of their foreign policy are closely related to their internal social economic structure, especially the social makeup of the ruling coalition, the relationship that results between the state and business, and the logic of the development strategies that these coalitions suggest. In Arab states, the head of state frequently controls the formulation of foreign policy.⁷¹ The new Arab leaders are more concerned with domestic politics. Arabs have a great propensity to put local political and economic issues first before regional or global ones. History demonstrates how powerful and unquestioned the authoritarian leaders of the Middle East were. However, we have observed that leaders are motivated to start reforms now. They are no longer able to use their influence to respond to internal protest movements; instead, they are caving in to pressure from an increasingly disillusioned populace that has never been particularly receptive to the ideals of democracy, sound policy, respect for human rights, and political engagement.⁷² In an interview with Clive Jones, Professor of Regional Security at Durham University, he explains that the Arab-Israeli rapprochement primarily takes place among the political and economic elites, rather than establishing a deep connection between the general populations of the respective nations. Furthermore, Jones highlights that Arab leaders display a greater interest in implementing economic reforms within their own countries.⁷³

In order to improve their economy, Arab nations have begun to restructure their political structures and enact more democratic regimes. The leaders of the Arab world are likely to adopt good governance as an alternative. In particular, they are focusing on providing public services

⁷¹ Hinnebusch, Raymond. *The International Politics of the Middle East*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003, 102, <https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/35008/341386.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

⁷² Jeffrey Martini, Becca Wasser, "The Next Generation of Leaders in the Gulf," RAND, February 15, 2016, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/02/the-next-generation-of-leaders-in-the-persian-gulf.html>

⁷³ Clive Jones, Interviewed by Yumna Rashid, Online Interview, July 4, 2023

efficiently, enhancing the management of the public sector, and implementing economic reforms that would guarantee the state's long-term prosperity. In terms of defense, the new Arab leaders are also leaving their mark. The militaries of young Arab leaders are being developed through investments in the creation of special operations teams and the diversification of security partnerships.

3.1.2 Regional instability

The region has grown split during about ten years of unrest that began with the Arab Spring, characterized by persistent ethnicity and religious conflict, areas without functional government, and the regular occurrence of dissolved nations. Due to its impact in politics, the economy, and the media, the Gulf is starting to have a bigger voice in the region. Due to regional, global, and fast domestic events, the nature of Arab politics is swiftly changing. Arab nations are becoming more divided as a result of the upheaval and internal conflicts that the Arab states have been facing for the past ten years. The resurgence of tribal and identity politics, the rise of non-state actors, including the Islamic State at its height, the expansion of Arab media, the overthrow of previous regimes, and the escalating calls for political change and reform in the Arab world are just a few of the causes of the current tense atmosphere. Many people in the region have changed their way of thinking as a result of situation. Arab Spring caused a profound shock to the region as it had been accustomed to a traditional formula that prioritized stability over economic freedoms, cultural expression, and political liberties. Arab leaders have realized that they must employ containment and deterrence tactics that include a mix of repression, public spending, and conciliation measures if they want to prevent overthrow and keep their positions of authority. They discovered how to modify their practices in order to stay in power. In order to facilitate people Arab leaders are moving towards normalization with Israel in different fields to facilitates their citizens and to preserve their power and authority.

3.1.3 Arabism and Islamism

Arab states are confronting numerous challenges in the twenty-first century. Thus, Arabism undoubtedly continues to exist in both the cultural and political realms, but it is no longer the main framework through which decision-makers must express their views. Arab acceptance of the Israeli state is a concept that is growing, demonstrating the erosion of the concepts of Islamism and Arabism. The Arab states' top priorities are security and the economy, and

Arabism and Islamism appear to be declining. Even while the Israeli-Palestinian issue is portrayed in less fundamentalist terms and is less of a priority. According to Faisal al Yafai, concerns like the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, terrorism, and rising anxiety over the state of relations between Sunni and Shia populations could all undermine stability and economic prosperity.⁷⁴ In replacement of Islamism, Arab societies have shifted towards prioritizing language that emphasizes their interests, political responsibility, and reconsideration of concepts such as peace. The United Arab Emirates established a ministry of tolerance in 2016 and declared 2019 as the "year of tolerance." Bahrain has also increased its engagement in initiatives that promote tolerance, communication, and interfaith understanding, and has declared "tolerance as part of Bahrain's identity." Similarly, Saudi Arabia has recently moved away from Wahabism and political Islam and has adopted a more tolerant approach. The Arab states, which have historically been unified in their opposition to Israel, are now paying less attention to the Palestine dispute, and they have recently made significant progress in improving their relations. The fact that Arab nations have downplayed the importance of the Palestinian issue demonstrates how their priorities have changed.

3.1.4 Shift in the national interests

Gulf states' national priorities have expanded to encompass the enhancement of infrastructure, economic growth, cultural development, diversification strategies, and the establishment of distinctive national identities that enable seamless integration into the global landscape. These factors have contributed to an increase in the confidence of Gulf leaders, leading them to make decisive political choices. Domestic considerations play a role in promoting change in the region, and many Arab states have begun the process of putting such changes into practice and increasing their collaboration with Israel, which is highly established in technology education and nearly every field, on this path. Arab citizens have a significant propensity to place more importance on current local, socio-political, and economic issues than on global or regional issues. Arab states have developed a variety of dimensions and tried a variety of techniques in their fight for security against both internal and external threats. Arab officials are concerned about these new goals and worries as the Arab strategic focus moves to normalization with

⁷⁴ Nir Tuvia Boms, Hussein Aboubakr, "Pan Arabism 2.0? The Struggle for a New Paradigm in the Middle East," *Religions* 13, no. 1 (2021): 28, doi:10.3390/rel13010028.

strong nations like Israel as cultural trends strive to make the Arab state full members of the globalized world. Arab States frequently recognize the benefits Israel can offer to their nations in a number of areas, including high technology, cyber defense, military hardware, and intelligence. For example, UAE has had significant growth under Sheikh Khalifa's leadership, providing a fair quality of life for the citizens. In addition, he was a driving force behind the development of businesses and the regional, national, and international expansion of the healthcare, education, and technology sectors, which significantly increased the nation's economic variety. Under his direction, the UAE has developed into the GCC's most diversified economy and a major transportation and tourism hub.⁷⁵ Arab nations who advocate for Israel's normalization may have a lot to offer. Arab States and Israel are still thriving in a variety of fields, including business, technology, military and mutual defense and science.

3.2 Economic factor

3.2.1 Economic Diversification

The Middle East is characterized by a disproportionate reliance on exports of raw materials for foreign exchange profits as well as a reliance on foreign markets as a source of industrial and agricultural products. Challenges brought on by these dependencies include unstable growth and significant unemployment, particularly among young people. Recent crises have had an impact on the region's economy and social structure, highlighting the region's need to diversify away from its reliance on oil. Long-term economic progress and prosperity are hampered by a country's harmful dependence on a single commodity. This is because the Arab economies have changed to become "rentier" economies with a major imbalance between production and consumption due to an over reliance on oil earnings and the dollar value. Oil extraction and sales alone are insufficient proof of a prosperous economy. Arab nations are attempting to diversify their economies in order to boost productivity and open up new job opportunities. Global threats have historically been concentrated in the Arab world. The geopolitical risk nexus of high rates of young poverty and governments' incapacity to diversify economies has been a problem for Arab leaders for decades. The need for economic diversification is becoming

⁷⁵ Deepthi Nair, "The UAE Economy's Transformation Under Sheikh Khalifa's Leadership," *The National*, May 14, 2022, <https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/economy/2022/05/14/how-the-uae-economy-transformed-under-sheikh-khalifas-leadership/>.

more urgent in Arab nations. Due to their expectation that hydrocarbon reserves and revenues will dwindle; Arab states have long been encouraged to support the growth of other lucrative businesses. Arab leaders realized that their countries needed to diversify their economic interests beyond oil, which led to increased trade and commercial activity with Israel. Arab nations have understood the benefits of trade openness. Reduced government spending, a growth in non-oil exports, and an increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) are just a few of the crucial elements needed to successfully diversify the economy. Although the Gulf countries produce a wide range of products and services, including manufactured goods, agricultural goods, and business services, the majority are used domestically. Diversification calls for the creation of products and services that can be traded internationally in addition to hydrocarbons and their by-products.⁷⁶

One of the world's most advanced financial markets is Israel. Israeli able to take the lead in new industries because its highly trained workforce and concentration of venture capital. Regarding technical preparedness, access to venture capital, and the caliber of its research groups, Israel routinely ranks highly among the economies of the world. In terms of the number of start-up businesses per person, the availability of scientists and engineers, and innovative financial assets per person, the nation comes in first. Israel's economy has expanded significantly over the years despite the country's small domestic market. Israel has purposefully increased the size of its market for products and technologies to meet this challenge. Israel's strength has been luring international investors to purchase or support businesses. A closer relationship between Israel and Arab countries would increase commerce and foreign direct investment.

3.2.2 Economic Modernization

There is a widespread belief that despite the fact that the large oil reserves have facilitated economic growth and modernity, they have also produced fragile nations that are independent of social pressures, political responsibility, and transparency.⁷⁷ Arab nations are concentrating on advancing modernization's pillars. Arab nations aim to take full advantage of any new

⁷⁶ Nejla Ben Mimoune1, Nader Kabbani, "Economic Diversification in the Gulf: Time to Redouble Efforts," Brookings, January 14,2021, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Economic-diversification-in-the-Gulf.pdf>.

⁷⁷ Rolf Schwarz, "The Political Economy of State-Formation in the Arab Middle East: Rentier States, Economic Reform, and Democratization," *Review of International Political Economy*, 15, No. 4 (October 2008), 599.

political and economic prospects. Arab nations place a lot of emphasis on transferring knowledge and acquiring new technologies. They recognized the need to update their infrastructure for health care, education, and the environment, as well as for tourism, cultural exchanges, and other people-to-people initiatives. The pursuit of economic diversification, which aims to increase non-oil revenue and position the country as a major global and regional financial and tourism center with first-rate infrastructure and transport networks, is one of the main drivers of modernization in the Arab states. It is also essential to this endeavor to create an atmosphere that is business-friendly. Securing a steady income stream independent of shifting oil prices and limited reserves is essential for long-term economic modernization and growth. This may be done by putting money into and growing the production sector, which will cut down on dependency on imports of products and services, ensure a steady revenue stream, and lessen reliance on oil. There is a lot of room for cooperation in these important challenge areas given Israel's expertise in water, agriculture, and renewable energy technologies. Therefore, collaboration with Israel will benefit the economy and help to further economic modernization and successful long-term economic development.

Israel and Arab nations are working together to combine their electricity sectors and use the economic pillar to promote regional economic growth. The normalization accord will have long-term economic advantages that will be shared by Israel and the Gulf Arab countries. These advantages will result from greater investment in start-ups and new technologies as well as well-established industries like logistics or mineral extraction, where the Gulf region has the required knowledge, resources, and capabilities. The normalization agreement will also provide better access to markets outside of the local market. The normalization deal will also aid in economic stabilization by opening up access to bilateral assistance from a wider variety of nations and multilateral organizations and by unleashing a considerable potential for investment, notably from the Gulf, Sudan will be the most immediate benefactor. The easing of U.S. sanctions will free up certain restrictions, aid in currency stabilization, and pave the door for potential debt relief and international aid packages, while the shaky political environment may impede the development of such initiatives. Saudi Arabia will profit among the Gulf nations, aside from their established operations in the UAE and Bahrain, Israeli companies have been conducting business with specific sectors in the Gulf region through covert or indirect means. Nevertheless, since the recent normalization of relations, Gulf-based businesses and state

investment funds have had the chance to investigate potential business opportunities in Israel and other nearby markets. The UAE-Israel agreement provides room for collaboration in a variety of fields. Given Bahrain's considerably smaller economy, the Bahrain deal appears to be less significant, but it also gives Israeli businesses better access to the Saudi market and potential in sectors like fin tech where Bahrain excels. Israel has acquired a reputation for having a strong entrepreneurial and innovative culture and for the significance of high-technology exporting to its economy.⁷⁸ Israel has claimed that as a result of the countless transactions and commercial agreements established between them in their normalization of ties, its commerce with Arab nations has increased to record levels in only one year. His organization's June newsletter said that Tel Aviv's commerce with Abu Dhabi increased by 130% from May to \$201.4 million in June. This outcome follows the signing of a trade agreement between the two nations more than a month ago and the establishment of million dollars joint project in Ghana last month. Israel's commerce with Jordan reached \$55 million, up 54% from the previous year. Egypt came in second with \$23.6 million up 41%. Morocco surpassed \$3.1 million in trade agreements with Israel this year, an increase of 94%. Aside from the substantial geopolitical changes that process brought about, normalization also paved the way for a number of business transactions in commerce, tourism, investment, and education. Front and center in that was economic collaboration. Cooperation has now been seen to result in expanding commerce sector between Israel and Arab countries following the rapprochement.⁷⁹

3.3 Security factor

The Middle East has developed into a center for the creation of numerous, frequently converging security issues. The environment for Arab national security in the Arab World has grown more challenging. Issues including political reform, domestic difficulties, a change in leadership, and the most significant event, the Arab Spring, are all altering the security dynamics of Arab states and making them more complex. Prior to the Arab upheavals of 2011,

⁷⁸ Keren Uziyel, "The economic implications of the Israeli-Arab normalization agreements - Interview with EIU. FocusEconomics," November 26, 2020, <https://www.focus-economics.com/blog/the-economic-implications-of-the-israeli-arab-normalization-agreements-interview-with-eiu..>

⁷⁹ "Israel's Trade with Arab Nations Reaches Record Increases After Normalization," *Middle East Monitor*, July 4, 2022, <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220704-israels-trade-with-arab-nations-reaches-record-increases-after-normalisation/>.

the majority of these security issues were based on territorial, political, and military rivalries and disputes within and between regional actors as well as external actors. Human security concerns and challenges were prevalent, but they were frequently dominated by threats to territorial sovereignty that were more immediate and real, as well as by other forms of political and military rivalry among state actors.

3.3.1 Military diversification/ Considerations

There is a huge demand for weapons in the region as a result of numerous more considerations. Several nations are concerned about domestic insurgencies and transnational terrorist threats. Given the important role that well-equipped armies play in a nation's domestic and foreign affairs, their presence can have an impact on decisions about national weapons sales. Technology advancements have rendered certain military systems outdated, forcing the purchase of new hardware. It has been suggested that Middle Eastern governments place a high value on large military acquisitions because they see them as a way to strengthen their sense of national identity, pride, and credibility abroad. The Arab states placed a greater focus on military education and weaponry due to the continued instability in the region. Arab states' focus is being diverted toward building their national defense due to security issues in the Middle East. These adjustments necessitate new connections with defense suppliers like Israel. Formerly-customer Arab states are now becoming independent arms producers, signaling a shift in the Middle East's strategic balance. The Arab nations are eager to turn themselves into arms producers by using their domestic industries to produce the massive weapons they purchase for strategic, financial, and symbolic reasons. Arab nations are attempting to distance themselves from the nations from which they usually import weapons. They are forming long-term alliances in an effort to fortify their autarky. Arab countries are working to improve their military capabilities.⁸⁰

Arab nations are aware that unless they take more fundamental measures to educate and retain highly qualified employees, they will not be able to sustain their armaments manufacturing. Israel's highly developed technological and military capabilities can be advantageous to the

80 Bilal Y. Saab, "The Gulf Rising: Defense Industrialization in Saudi Arabia and the UAE," Atlantic Council, May 7, 2014, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-gulf-rising-defense-industrialization-in-saudi-arabia-and-the-uae/>

Arab countries. Israel has grown its domestic armaments business into a significant supplier to the world market. The Abraham Peace pact has given Israel the opportunity to investigate the prospects of building military-industrial alliances with Arab countries, who are increasing their military prowess by importing weapons and setting up local military factories to achieve self-reliance. With the ongoing security issues, Arab nations are becoming more and more interested in obtaining cutting-edge weaponry from Israel. The need for technical improvement in the defense sector encourages the Arab states to strengthen their connections with Israel. Their common security issues and military-security defense links will also continue to shape their interactions. Strong strategic interest overlap makes military-security cooperation appear potential, and Israel's weapons agreement with Arab nations is likely to gradually gain momentum.⁸¹ Israel is exploring a defense pact with Gulf Arab nations, according to Israel's Minister of Défense Benny Gantz “We are also in the process of building up specific security arrangements and developing defense ties with all of the nations with which we have diplomatic relations.”⁸²

3.3.2 Cyber Security

With a concentration on digital services, trade, and e-government, many Arab states are continuing to modernize and diversify their economies which brings both the Internet's benefits and risks. The economy, society, and important information infrastructure are all becoming more and more dependent on the Internet, therefore keeping it connected is crucial. Arab nations are concentrating on developing and maintaining cyber security as a result of their realization that it is crucial in the contemporary cyber-defense scenario. The GCC's population is primarily younger and more technologically competent yet due to a lack of cyber-education, internet users and their networks are vulnerable to dangerous cyber -attacks in the region.⁸³ Israel is emerging in the Middle East as a cyber security guarantor. Long before the most recent normalization, Israel began offering cyber security solutions to the Arab countries. A "smart" surveillance

81 Alvitte Ningthoujam, "The military–security dimension of the 2020 Abraham Accords: An Israeli perspective," ORF, July 28, 2022, <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-military-security-dimension-of-the-2020-abraham-accords/>.

⁸²Dan Williams, "Israeli Defence Chief Sees 'Special Security Arrangement' with Gulf States," *Reuters*, March 2, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-gulf-idUSKCN2AU1PW>

⁸³ Anas AlQaed, "The New Battlefield: Cyber Security Across the GCC," *Gulf International Forum*, October 29, 2018, <https://gulffif.org/the-new-battlefront-cyber-security-across-the-gcc/>.

system was installed throughout Abu Dhabi in 2007, and the UAE enlisted the aid of the Israeli-owned, US-based company 4D Security Solutions to assist in boosting defense capacity around vital energy plants.⁸⁴ Israel and the Gulf have recently maintained a continuing intelligence and security partnership, partly in reaction to shared fears. Due to cyber technology and security concerns, certain Gulf governments are more likely to collaborate with Israel. The Arab states will be able to effectively transition to deep technology in fields like cloud computing, block chain, and artificial intelligence with Israeli assistance. Arab nations serve as entry points for Israeli technological products and provide funding for capital-intensive companies. Israel has developed unique competence in cyber security as a result of its ongoing vigilance and commitment to ensuring that its citizens are prepared to face dangers at all levels. This has become a key component of Israeli government policy as cyber security has become a global concern.⁸⁵

3.4 Technology and Innovation factor

Despite opportunities presented by the advancement of the technologies, several Arab nations have not fully utilized the information and communications technology industry. To make innovations and compete for the future of state, businesses and nations must invest in research and development. Through the creation of jobs, the generation of money, and long-term economic growth, innovation helps to build a robust economy. Due to the 2011 Arab Spring events, the Middle East is going through both political and economic changes. However, there is a chance for more rapid development as well as fresh chances for youngsters to undergo change. A variety of social entrepreneurial ventures, including those focused on culture, healthcare, agriculture, sanitation and water, and the progress of women, have been made possible by the Arab Spring's empowering of young people. The Arab Gulf governments, who currently rely significantly on the sale of oil and gas, have declared their aim to encourage economic diversification and have started to restructure their current institutions for higher learning, scientific research, and technological innovation. Access to a good education and job possibilities are needed in Arab countries. Due to problems with their innovation systems,

⁸⁴ Islam Alhalwany, "Israel is Becoming a Cybersecurity Guarantor in the Middle East. Here's How," Atlantic Council, November 18, 2021, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/israel-is-becoming-a-cybersecurity-guarantor-in-the-middle-east-heres-how/>.

⁸⁵ Eleonora Ardemagni, "Israel and the Gulf: A Security Partnership Around the Corner," ISPI, February 16, 2022. <https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/israel-and-gulf-security-partnership-around-corner-33179>.

insufficient policy measures, inappropriate economic frameworks, poor educational systems, and a rising unemployment rate among new graduates, many Arab nations are dealing with a significant degree of concern over their lack of innovation.

3.4.1 Innovative reforms

One of the greatest barriers to innovation in Arab states are the absence of institutional reform. Following the Arab Spring in 2011, political instability is extremely high in the majority of Arab states. Many Arab nations lack the necessary legislative protections for intellectual property rights and innovation, and the quality and efficacy of the regulatory environment are still insufficient. Numerous resource-rich Arab nations, like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Kuwait, nonetheless have issues with business sophistication, market sophistication, and the difficulties of resolving insolvency. A sustainable development plan must be integrated with the national innovation visions of many nations. Even in situations where such a vision is created with clear objectives, it is only for a brief time without careful planning by the pertinent ministries and agencies. Visions frequently lack a focus on relationships between universities, public research institutions, and businesses to foster innovation and the dissemination of information.⁸⁶

Technology may potentially change how Arab-Israeli relations develop in the future. Over time, artificial intelligence and nanotechnology will have an influence on geopolitics because they will have an impact on all dimensions of power of the state like diplomacy, internal politics, economics, the environment research, and productive capacity .As Israel's successful start-up socio cultural and future technologies segmentation are widely praised throughout the region, as well as by many across the Arab states, there also be a shared interest in promoting innovation and entrepreneurship as the engine of economic growth and diversification between Israel and the Gulf. The governing elite in the Arab states has placed a strong focus on innovation, entrepreneurship. Israel has advanced industries in science and technology. The largest percentage in the world, 4.3% of Israel's gross domestic product (GDP) was spent on

⁸⁶ Samir Aita, "The Innovation Landscape in Arab Countries," Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), May 19, 2017, file:///C:/Users/IA/Downloads/innovation-landscape-arab-countries-critical-analysis-english.pdf

civil research and development in 2015. According to the Bloomberg Innovation Index for 2019, Israel was recognized as the fifth most inventive nation in the world.⁸⁷

3.4.2 Technology diversification

The desire by Gulf countries to diversify their economies away from oil and gas has also made it urgent for developing technologies to be used as a catalyst for commercial innovation.⁸⁸ The Gulf regimes have also been avid buyers of advanced surveillance equipment. Israel, on the other hand, has been a ready supplier of this technology with minimal qualms regarding potential violations of human rights. This has strengthened their bond and opened up new business opportunities that are in line with the aspirations of the Arab states to establish themselves as a center for innovation and technology in the region. According to business IT experts in the Gulf states the normalization would spur creativity, accelerate the growth of start-ups, and open the door for the transfer of knowledge and technology. Cross-border agreements already have the necessary components. Israel's burgeoning digital industry has earned them the nickname "start-up country." Israel is one of the world's top powers in a global economic system that is increasingly dominated by technology. The technology sector presents Israel as a country that growing economic powers are eager to do business with, not only as a tech power. Israel stands out from the majority of other countries with developed global technology for this reason.⁸⁹ The industrial sector in Arab nations is being developed, notably in high-tech industries like aerospace, agricultural biotechnology, and the space industry. They continue to rely on relationships with top space technology companies and technology imports. The Fourth Industrial Revolution's potential has been identified as a policy priority. National AI strategies have been adopted by Saudi Arabia and the UAE and Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia aim to follow suit. AI research has been established in Morocco. The world's first commercial 5G networks were launched in Gulf countries. The Fourth Industrial Revolution Centre has been established

⁸⁷ Shoshanna Solomon, "Israel Surges to Take Fifth Place in New Bloomberg Innovation Index," *The Times of Israel*, January 22, 2019, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-surges-to-take-fifth-place-in-new-bloomberg-innovation-index/#:~:text=Israel%20is%20ranked%20fifth%20among,by%20Finland%2C%20Switzerland%20and%20Israel>.

⁸⁸ Benito, Andrea, Marc Ferranti, "UAE, Bahrain Tech Leaders Gauge Impact of Israel Accords on Business," CIO, October 20, 2020., <https://www.cio.com/article/190863/uae-bahrain-tech-leaders-gauge-impact-of-israel-accords-on-business.html>.

⁸⁹ David Rosenberg, "How Israel is Turning Its High-tech into Global Political Power," *Fathom Journal*, no 21, (November 28, 2018), <https://fathomjournal.org/how-israel-is-turning-its-high-tech-into-global-political-power/>.

in Saudi Arabia, and the UAE is working to incorporate block chain technology into government services and transactions.⁹⁰

3.4.3 Knowledge oriented Economy

The majority of Arab countries are lagging behind in R&D. This demonstrates how enterprises in these nations have a restricted ability to adopt new technology. In order to overcome this, the government must fund research, support innovation and technology, put in place legislation to safeguard innovation, develop support policies for innovation, and promote the use of cutting-edge technologies.⁹¹ There are poor linkages between the business, public, and academic sectors, as well as weak coordination and idea replication. The innovation process in Arab countries is significantly hampered by weak university-industry collaboration for innovation and few links between research, knowledge output, and enterprises. This knowledge gap stunts innovation and economic development, which in turn results in a lack of employment prospects, particularly for young people, and escalates crises in various Arab states. Low levels of research funding are another concern, with the Arab states receiving just 1% of global R&D spending in 2013. Therefore, to prepare the youth for the future, Arab nations are now investing in education, particularly higher education. To prevent the "brain-drain" of the educated, Arab countries are concentrating on providing young people with respectable, formal, and inventive employment possibilities. By enhancing science education, modernizing and reforming institutions, boosting research capacity, and promoting international cooperation, Arab states are implementing a variety of measures to harness science, technology, and innovation for growth. Arab nations support striking the ideal balance between the oil-based economy of today and a knowledge economy that is defined by entrepreneurship, innovation, and high standards in education, as well as the effective provision of public services. The Arab nations have also started providing tax exemptions and other incentives to investors in order to encourage entrepreneurship and small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs). So, number of businesses and academic organizations are already cooperating and implementing the new agreements on technical partnership and cooperation among Israel and Arab states. Grants of up to 70% of the approved

⁹⁰ "The Race Against Time for Smarter Development, Chapter 17: The Arab States," UNESCO, April 21, 2022. <https://www.unesco.org/reports/science/2021/en/arab-states>.

⁹¹ Rabeah Morrar, "Innovation in the MENA Region," Strategic Sectors | Economy & Territory, 2019, <https://www.iemed.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Innovation-in-the-MENA-Region.pdf>.

budget will be given by the Israel Innovation Authority and the Directorate General of Labor for novel and ground-breaking initiatives that support the growth of the Arab population's already-existing pool of highly qualified and skilled workers in the tech industry.⁹²

Conclusion

States must interact with one another in the contemporary era of globalization. The ultimate objective of a state is to maximize its interests, hence international politics plays a fundamental role in how governments interact with one another and decide what to do with each new development. Through trade, tourism, direct flights, academic cooperation, timely ambassadorial diplomatic ties, and increasing security cooperation in the face of regional threats, normalization of the Arab states with Israel aims to bring the countries closer together on a daily basis. History illustrates how strong and unchallenged the Middle Eastern autocrats were. But from what we can tell, decision-makers are eager to launch reforms right away. Security and economic development are the Arab state's major concerns, and Arabism and Islamism appear to be on the decline. Even if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not given as much attention and is presented in considerably less fanatical terms. Arab countries are working to diversify their economies in an effort to increase output and create new job possibilities. The normalization pact will benefit both Israel and the Gulf Arab states economically in the long run. The atmosphere in the Arab World has become more difficult for Arab national security. Political reform, domestic challenges, a change in leadership, and the Arab Spring, which was the most major event, are all transforming and complicating the security dynamics of Arab states. Due to security concerns in the Middle East, Arab states' attention is being turned toward bolstering their own national defense. These changes demand developing new relationships with defense suppliers like Israel. Several Arab countries have not fully tapped into the information and communications technology sector, despite the opportunity given by the development of technologies. Businesses and Arab nations are collaborating with Israel in research and development to create breakthroughs and compete for the future of the state. Technology has the ability to alter how Arab-Israeli relations grow in the future, just as Israel's successful start-up sociocultural and future technologies sectors are largely praised around the

⁹² "20 million NIS to entities that develop innovative training and placement in High-Tech for Arab sector," *Israel Innovation Authority*, August 11, 2022, <https://innovationisrael.org.il/en/news/20-million-nis-entities-develop-innovative-training-and-placement-high-tech-arab-sector>

region. The environment is one area where cooperation is ideal, particularly as the Arab states move away from an economy dependent on oil and the region struggles with water scarcity. As Israel has undergone a remarkable agricultural transformation to emerge as a global leader in the field, shifting from conventional farming methods to high-tech solutions of the modern era, Arab nations have realized the advantages of cooperating with Israel in agriculture to revamp and diversify their national economies. Extreme water shortage starts to affect development, act as a barrier to economic growth, and as a serious problem in people's lives. As a result, Arab nations have concentrated on partnering with Israel to improve their water management practices and technological breakthroughs. Arab-Israeli rapprochement aims for economic, security, technological, and environmental diversification with Israel and the growth and intensification of commercial ties in a variety of fields, including business, transportation, tourism, defense, information, technology, energy, finance, and security apparatus.

Chapter 4

Regional Causative Factors behind Arab Israeli Rapprochement

Introduction

The Middle East has experienced significant political unrest in recent years as the transformation processes brought on by the Arab Uprisings continue in the entire region and Iran is persistently pursuing a nuclear program that appears to be intended for developing weapons. Meanwhile, the past decade has witnessed socioeconomic and political collapse in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, indicating that the region had pre-existing risk factors and underlying problems. Competition among different regional powers has been fueled by the Middle East's quest for power and status, which emphasizes the need of considering the region's continuing geopolitical tensions while examining the most recent stage of Arab-Israeli reconciliation. There are only persistent interests in international politics, not long-lasting allies or rivalries. The upheavals of the last few years have also had an impact on regional integration efforts like free trade agreements. Along with advantages for the military and security, the normalization process opened up new opportunities for the region's economic links to grow significantly. The Arab Spring, the rise of non-state actors, and hegemonic powers like Iran have changed how the Arab regimes view the Palestinian conflict, which they now see as merely a diversion from more pressing immediate challenges. This is something that the Middle East has repeatedly shown: an enemy today may become a friend tomorrow. For the benefit of national interests and regional stability, shifting geopolitics and regional realities have forced governments to put aside ideological disagreements. This is the case with normalization between Israel and the Arab world.

4.1 Muhammad Bin Salman's Role in the Arab-Israeli Rapprochement

Muhammad Bin Salman (MBS), the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, played a significant but often discreet role in the Arab-Israeli rapprochement. His influence extended not only to Saudi Arabia but also to several Arab states that recognized Israel. MBS engaged in behind-the-scenes diplomacy to encourage Arab states to recognize Israel. While not always publicly acknowledged, his diplomatic efforts were instrumental in advancing the normalization process. These efforts were driven by a vision of regional stability and cooperation. Saudi Arabia's subtle support for the Abraham Accords set the tone for other Arab states to follow suit. By

demonstrating a willingness to work with Israel on shared interests, Saudi Arabia indirectly encouraged other nations to do the same. The influence of the largest and most powerful Gulf state was undeniable.⁹³ Reports indicated that Saudi Arabia, under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, was involved in secret meetings and diplomatic efforts aimed at encouraging other Arab nations to engage with Israel. While these diplomatic efforts were not officially confirmed by the Saudi government, there were strong indications of their involvement. This quiet cooperation was a significant departure from the traditional approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁹⁴

Saudi Vision 2030 is a long-term development blueprint for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that was announced in April 2016. It was introduced by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman with the aim of reducing the country's dependence on oil revenue and diversifying its economy. The vision outlines a series of economic, social, and cultural reforms to transform Saudi Arabia into a more diversified and dynamic society.⁹⁵ Israel's tech sector, in particular, is known for its innovation and startups. Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, sought to invest in Israeli technology companies and projects, hoping to benefit from their innovations and potential returns on investment. This included investments in areas like cybersecurity, renewable energy, and healthcare technology. Saudi Arabia, have been working on diversifying their economies away from oil dependency. Building economic relations with Israel was seen as a way to diversify their economic portfolios. By investing in and collaborating with Israel, they could reduce their reliance on oil and explore new sources of economic growth.⁹⁶

The Neom project in Saudi Arabia, a groundbreaking city under development in the northwestern part of the country, presents a unique opportunity for collaboration between Israel and Saudi Arabia in various key areas. Leveraging Israel's renowned innovation and technology sector, joint efforts could focus on implementing cutting-edge smart city technologies, advancing renewable energy solutions, fortifying cybersecurity measures, and harnessing

⁹³ Bruce Riedel, "How to Understand Israel and Saudi Arabia's Secretive Relationship," Brookings, July 11, 2022, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-to-understand-israel-and-saudi-arabias-secretive-relationship/>.

⁹⁴ Natasha Turak, "Saudi Arabia is the 'White Whale' of Israel's Middle East Peace Deals," *CNBC*, October 12, 2020, <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/12/saudi-arabia-is-the-white-whale-of-israels-middle-east-peace-deals-jerusalem-official-says.html>.

⁹⁵ Nader Habibi, "Implementing Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030: An Interim Balance Sheet," Crown Centre for Middle East Studies, April 2019, no. 127, 3, <https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/middle-east-briefs/pdfs/101-200/meb127.pdf>.

⁹⁶ Yoram Ettinger, "Saudi Arabia's 'Interest Driven' Israel Policy," Jewish Policy Centre, April 4, 2023, <https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2023/04/04/saudi-arabias-interest-driven-israel-policy/>.

artificial intelligence to optimize Neom's infrastructure and services.⁹⁷With the normalization of diplomatic ties, Israeli businesses may actively engage in Neom's economic landscape, exploring investment opportunities, forming joint ventures, and establishing Israeli companies within the project, thereby fostering economic development and job creation.⁹⁸Recognizing shared concerns about regional security, collaboration in security and defense technologies between Israel and Saudi Arabia could ensure the safety and stability of Neom and its surroundings. Both nations' strong capabilities in research and development provide a foundation for collaborative efforts in scientific research, academia, and technology innovation, thereby contributing to the overall advancement of Neom. Additionally, drawing upon Israel's well-developed tourism industry, collaboration in tourism infrastructure, hotels, and services could enhance Neom's appeal as a destination, further promoting the success and global recognition of this futuristic endeavor.⁹⁹

Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) of Saudi Arabia viewed Israel as a potential partner in countering Iran's influence in the region for several reasons. Both Saudi Arabia and Israel have shared concerns about Iran's nuclear ambitions, its activities in the region, and its support for proxy groups like Hezbollah. These common security concerns provided a foundation for cooperation and normalization between the two countries. At the time of the Abraham Accords, there was indeed hostility between Iran and Saudi Arabia. These two regional powerhouses were engaged in a series of proxy conflicts and had opposing interests, contributing to regional instability.¹⁰⁰

Since then, there have been efforts to ease tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, leading to a gradual rapprochement. These developments have the potential to reshape the dynamics in the Middle East significantly. The rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia can potentially impact Arab-Israeli relations. While the Abraham Accords represented a significant step toward normalization, the changing dynamics in the region, particularly a reduction in

⁹⁷ Erez Cohen and Alexander Bligh, "A Comparative Analysis of the Israeli and Saudi Economies and an Argument for Bilateral Cooperation," *Asian Affairs* 54, no. 1 (2023): 11, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03068374.2022.2134657>.

⁹⁸ Paul Salem, "The Oncoming Saudi-Israeli Normalization: Obstacles, Opportunities, and the US Role," Middle East Institute, September 5, 2023, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/oncoming-saudi-israeli-normalization>.

⁹⁹ Ali Dogan, "Saudi Arabia's Neom Diplomacy," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 3, 2021, <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/83975>.

¹⁰⁰ Tova Norlen, Tamir Sinai, "The Abraham Accords – Paradigm Shift or Realpolitik?" George C. Marshall European Center For Security Studies, October 2020, <https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/security-insights/abraham-accords-paradigm-shift-or-realpolitik>.

tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, could lead to a reevaluation of priorities and alliances.¹⁰¹

4.2 Regional economic integration

Major socioeconomic growth obstacles exist in the Arab states. Instead of focusing primarily on the domestic level, regional solutions to these problems can be more successfully delivered. For the Middle East, regional economics is crucial, particularly for strengthening and accelerating the region's economic growth and development. Conflict in the region is getting worse, weakening the already precarious economic framework, and increasing poverty and youth unemployment in the Middle East region. Regional economic integration has contributed to reconciliation between Israel and the Arab world and has brought them closer together. Both parties can profit from each other's markets and resources through boosting economic cooperation and trade, resulting in profits for both parties. In 2020, Israel and Bahrain, the UAE and other Arab nations signed normalization agreements with Israel, which included provisions for economic and commercial cooperation. This covers industries including travel, transportation, energy, and technology. Additionally, Arab nations looking to diversify their economies and create new businesses may find Israel's sophisticated technology sector and innovation economy to be of special interest. As a result, by strengthening their economic links, Israel and the Arab world may help the region become more stable and prosperous while also fostering stronger relations between them.¹⁰² The Arab states have realized the necessity reforms and regional integration to spur economic progress.

4.2.1 Free Trade: Reducing the trade barriers

Free trade has always included more than just economics, including comparative advantage, effectiveness, reduced pricing, and other factors. In those nations and region of the world that have opened up to the global economy gradually, free trade has contributed to the reduction of poverty. A more stable and affluent Middle East need free trade as a foundation. The Abraham Accords' free trade clauses certainly offer a significant foundation for fostering regional

¹⁰¹ Sarah Zaaimi, "Is Saudi-Iran Reconciliation Threatening the Future of Israeli Normalization?" Atlantic Council, April 21, 2023, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/is-saudi-iran-reconciliation-threatening-the-future-of-israeli-normalization/>.

¹⁰² Mona Massalha, "Economic Effects of Regional Economic Integration: The Case of the Abraham Accords," *Open Journal of Political Science*, 12, no. 04 (October 2022), 702-717. doi:10.4236/ojps.2022.124038.

integration and enhancing economic cooperation. Reducing trade and investment barriers will enable businesses in both Israel and the Arab states to gain easier access to new markets and capitalize on fresh opportunities. This may provide more stability and prosperity in the region while also promoting economic growth and employment creation. A region that is more peaceful and successful in the long run may be achieved through increasing trade and economic cooperation, which can also serve to foster more trust and understanding between nations.

The Arab countries have changed their emphasis to such discussions as they realize the potential benefits of creating free trade deals with willing partners in the Middle East, including Israel. A regional free trade agreement will be established as a result of the Middle East Free Trade Area Initiative, which the US unveiled in May 2003. This initiative outlines a number of incremental steps that Middle Eastern countries can take to increase their investment and trade relations with the US and other developed economies.¹⁰³ Despite admirable reform initiatives in recent years, trade and overall economic competitiveness remain firmly constrained in Arab countries. The region needs to consider a variety of reforms, including reform of trade policy. as a result, the focus of Arab states is now to open up to the rest of the globe. Arab nations are discussing lower tariffs and nontariff barriers with Israel for the advancement of the regional economy and for long-term prospects, the Arab states hope to take advantage of opportunity to engage in free trade with Israel. The most significant prospect for change in the region is the Arab-Israeli reconciliation.

According to RAND research, plurilateral free trade among all of the Abraham Accords' members would boost each nation's GDP by 2% to 3%.¹⁰⁴ Economic integration through comprehensive free trade agreements that eliminate or reduce visa requirements, lower investment and nontariff barriers can have far greater advantages. The accords' strong base of support from Israel and the UAE will help the region's economy thrive. Each country is a powerful development engine, embracing cutting-edge technology, start-up cultures, venture capital experience, a desire to create, and a wealth of knowledge regarding bilateral and regional free trade agreements. Through improved communication and collaboration, the Arab-Israeli

¹⁰³ "Middle East Free Trade Area Initiative (MEFTA)," United States Trade Representative, <https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/other-initiatives/middle-east-free-trade-area-initiative-mefta>.

¹⁰⁴ Daniel Egel, Shira Efron and Linda Robinson, "The Abraham Accords Could Have Wide-Reaching Economic Benefits," RAND, March 2021, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1149-1.html>.

normalization seeks to serve as a catalyst for intra-regional trade. The Middle East performs poorly when compared to Europe, where commerce between EU nations accounts for less than 13% of all trade and makes for nearly two thirds (66%) of all trade. The reconciliation may spur economic growth and provide a flood of new job possibilities, boosting the competitiveness of the private sector, especially in the fields of aviation, agricultural, and technology.¹⁰⁵ New logistical chains started to emerge with the expansion in commerce between Israel and the Arab states, with massive transport playing a vital part in this development. Arab nations are beginning to fly to Israel, which is a significant step toward increasing the regular flow of travelers and commodities between the nations. As a result, the Middle East is more connected.

4.2.2 Energy and power sector

Renewables, energy supplies, and the significance of long-term management have been recurrent topics for nations in the Middle East for many years. It has been demonstrated that more regional cooperation and trade or economic integration can result in major economic improvements in the Middle East. Energy and other resource shortages may be lessened as a result of the cooperation. The energy industry is undergoing a period of disruption in which traditional ways of obtaining, utilizing, and exchanging energy are fast changing and old norms no longer apply. The energy environment is changing, and the challenge for oil producers is to find a way to coexist with new technologies such as wind and solar that are encroaching on their region.¹⁰⁶

Arab-Israeli reconciliation may be facilitated in a number of ways by the energy and power industry. In terms of clean energy, Israel is a regional leader, and it has a wealth of experience in creating environmentally friendly technology. Working together and exchanging information in this area with Israel might be advantageous for the Arab nations, who are attempting to diversify their economies and create new sectors. In addition to fostering technical innovation and promoting mutual economic advantages, this may assist in addressing shared issues with sustainability and climate change. Better energy security may be encouraged in the region by

¹⁰⁵ Keith Boyfield. "Abraham Accords Generate Real and Tangible Benefits: What Remains to Be Done," The Euro-Gulf Information Centre, April 5, 2022, <https://www.egic.info/abraham-accords-generate-real-benefits>.

¹⁰⁶ Kate Dourian, "Challenges to the Energy Transition in the Gulf Countries," Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (ASGIW) , October 2, 2019, https://agsiw.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Dourian_Petro-Diplomacy-2019-Scene-Setter_ONLINE.pdf.

fostering greater collaboration in the energy industry. Israel and the Arab states may lessen their dependence on imports and prepare for disruptions in the energy supply by diversifying their energy sources and developing regional energy infrastructure. This may increase regional stability and prosperity as well as strengthen international relations. Energy cooperation can serve as a springboard for further political and diplomatic interaction. The Arab states may develop understanding for more extensive political collaboration by cooperating on energy projects and sharing resources.

Israel filters 95% of its water and works hard to keep leaks to a minimum. All of the water is metered and measured, providing monitors with information on where and when losses occur. Eco Wave in Israel generates power from the water and seawalls. Its 5-megawatt plant will meet 15% of the country's power requirements.¹⁰⁷ As a result of collaboration with Israel, the region may make headway in the water and energy sectors. Israel allowed gas supplies to Egypt via Jordan in February 2022, boosting regional energy connections. Additionally, UAE, Israel, and Jordan inked a water-for-energy agreement in November 2022, under which an Emirati company would build a solar power plant in Jordan to produce electricity for an Israeli water system, which will then provide water to Jordan.¹⁰⁸

4.2.3 Tourism and Transportation as drivers of regional economic integration

By improving relations between Israel and Arab states, transportation and tourism might promote economic integration. Travelers may visit Israel and Arab nations more easily and conveniently with improved transportation services and infrastructure, which will both increase the number of travelers and strengthen the local tourism sector. Additionally, this may result in increased connectedness and mobility within the region, enabling the flow of people and products and lowering trade barriers. Jobs in Israel and Arab countries alike may become available as the tourist sector expands, especially in sectors like hospitality, transportation, and retail. This can promote more economic growth and development while assisting in lowering unemployment and poverty. Opportunities for investing in infrastructure, services, and

¹⁰⁷ Ken Silverstein, "The World Wants Israel's Energy and Environmental Innovations," *Forbes*, December 1, 2022, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2022/12/01/the-world-wants-israels-energy-and-environmental-innovations/?sh=3ca302182026>

¹⁰⁸ Riedel Bruce, Natan Sachs, "Israel, Jordan, and the UAE's energy deal is good news," Brookings, March 9, 2022, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/11/23/israel-jordan-and-the-uaes-energy-deal-is-good-news/>

attractions may arise as the tourist sector develops. By encouraging Israeli and Arab companies to invest in the area, more integrated and interdependent economies may result. Israelis and Arabs can learn more about one another's cultures and customs through the tourist sector, which can promote more respect and understanding between the two groups. Deeper economic and political links may result from this since it helps to remove obstacles and create bridges between different populations. The tourism sector may help local companies like restaurants, stores, and tour guides by bringing in additional tourists. This may contribute to the expansion of small and medium-sized businesses and the development of a more dynamic and varied economy. Overall, through generating jobs, stimulating investment, fostering cultural interaction, and bolstering local companies, transportation and tourism may be important forces for economic integration. Arab nations can unlock the enormous potential of the tourist sector and build an integrated and wealthy region by restoring their relations with Israel.

4.3 Palestinian conflict

Since 1948, ties between the Arab world and Israel have been tense due to the Palestinian problem. For years, the Palestinians have relied on the Arab Peace Initiative as the cornerstone of their struggle for independence from Israeli occupation, which is a pan-Arab initiative that demands the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and recognition of Palestinian sovereignty. The new regional constellation is not being addressed by a coherent Palestinian policy. The Palestinians have no choice but to use force, their political system is a mess, and the present administration has been in place since 2006 without the approval of the people. The great majority of Palestinians want new elections because they are tired of their corrupt and ineffectual leaders. The two main Palestinian factions, Fatah and Hamas, have tried to advance Israeli rule over the entirety of Palestine with their current political agendas, but these efforts have failed.¹⁰⁹ The main impediment to Middle East peace has been the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. There haven't been any formal Arab-Israeli connections outside of Egypt and Jordan since the 1917 Balfour Declaration between the British Empire and Zionists, which explicitly endorsed the establishment of a national homeland for the Jewish people, which came at the expense of Palestinian interests. However, the Middle East has been utterly upended by

¹⁰⁹ Massimiliano Fiore, "The Abraham Accords and the Palestinian Issue," *E-International Relations*, November 1, 2020, <https://www.e-ir.info/2020/11/01/the-abraham-accords-and-the-palestinian-issue/>.

geopolitical upheavals during the past ten years. The Arab Spring, the rise of non-state actors, and hegemonic powers like Iran have changed how the Arab regimes view the Palestinian conflict, which they now see as merely a diversion from more pressing immediate challenges.¹¹⁰

4.3.1 Shifts in region's interests

The Middle East's long-standing differences between the opposing factions were exacerbated by the upheavals and civil wars, which also gave rise to a more authentic regional geopolitical system characterized by violence and disorder. However, there has been a restoration of relations with Israel and certain Arab nations in recent years. Standing up for the Palestinians has lost importance for the Arab states due to the obvious and current dangers posed by Iran and non-state actors, as well as the formation of shared economic and security interests, in the absence of progress or any realistic hope of reaching it. Palestinians were unlikely to garner much attention from the Arab states given the disarray and fragmentation of the Arab Spring and its repercussions. Arab political leaders thus believe that now is the ideal time to approach Israel.¹¹¹ The Palestinian issue no longer takes priority over relations with Israel. Before the Arab-Israeli reconciliation, the Arab stance was that they would only recognize Israel if there was a fair deal with the Palestine. However, the wave of normalization that took an explicitly pro-Israel attitude left the Palestinians feeling alone. The rulers of the Gulf Arab states have little sympathy for the Palestinians and their predicament and get considerable advantage from their ties with Israel, which they believe have been unfairly and unprofitably side tracked for a long time by the Palestinian cause. And in the Israel-Palestine conflict, the Arab-Israeli reconciliation removed a barrier to Israel's continuous de facto annexation and provided a setback to the already dwindling hopes for a reasonable and durable solution.¹¹² There have been political conflicts and the Arab League's fragmentation, and it appears that the Arab League's unity and unanimity on Palestine have all but vanished. The Arab states, especially those who signed the accords, thought that since there were additional serious issues such

110 Aaron David Miller, "How Israel and the Arab World Are Making Peace Without a Peace Deal," *POLITICO*, May 27, 2020, <https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/05/27/israel-arab-peace-netanyahu-282727>.

111 Shadi Hamid, "A Separate Peace? What the Gaza Crisis Means for Arab Regimes," *Brookings*, May 16, 2022, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/05/16/a-separate-peace-what-the-gaza-crisis-means-for-arab-regimes/>.

112 Rowaq Arabi, "New Alliances, Increased Repression Characterise Post-Arab Uprisings Middle East," *Crisis Group*, November 8, 2022, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/new-alliances-increased-repression-characterise-post-arab-uprisings-middle>.

security concerns, resolving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute was not a top priority right now. It has been emphasized by a few Abraham Accords signatories that the moment has come to reap the rewards of peace.¹¹³ The normalization with the occupier of Palestine, according to the Arab states, will "ensure" their safety and protection. In other words, the Arab countries have delegated their security and intelligence systems to Israel while well aware that doing so means they have left Palestine.

4.3.2 Dissatisfaction with Palestinian leadership

Arab states have lost faith in the Palestinian Authority's (PA) capacity to successfully represent the Palestinian people and negotiate a peace accord with Israel. Certain Arab nations may feel disillusioned with the Palestinian leadership for a variety of reasons, including. Failing to negotiate a peace deal with Israel because the Palestinian leadership has been in peace talks with Israel for decades but has yet to strike a sustainable peace accord. Due to the failure of these discussions, certain Arab nations have become dissatisfied with the Palestinian leadership's capacity to represent Palestinian interests. Palestinian leadership has been condemned for corruption and political infighting, which has resulted in a lack of progress on critical topics such as governance reform and economic growth. Several Arab nations have lost faith in the Palestinian leadership as a result of this. Fatah, which dominates the West Bank, and Hamas, which controls Gaza, make up the Palestinian leadership. This schism has made it difficult for the Palestinian leadership to present a united front in discussions with Israel, resulting in a lack of progress towards Palestinian national unity.¹¹⁴ Conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen have diverted attention and resources away from the Palestinian cause, making it impossible for Arab countries to concentrate on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. As a result of this frustration, some Arab nations may regard normalization of ties with Israel as a chance to break the deadlock in the Israeli-Palestinian issue and focus on their own interests.

¹¹³ Koby Huberman, "Israeli-Palestinian Peace: The Abraham Accords have created space for a radical transformation in our thinking," *Fathom*, April 2022, <https://fathomjournal.org/israeli-palestinian-peace-the-abraham-accords-have-created-space-for-a-radical-transformation-in-our-thinking/>

¹¹⁴ Ghaith al-Omari, "Palestinian Politics Are More Divided Than Ever," The Washington Institute, May 27, 2021, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/palestinian-politics-are-more-divided-ever>

4.3.3 Israel strategy to isolate Palestine

When Israel was founded, battles broke out between Arab nations and Israel, each of which resulted in Arab defeat, rendering Arabs unable to free Palestine. Israel's pursuit of normalization accords with Arab nations is primarily driven by its desire to increase its legitimacy and acceptance in the region. A large portion of the Arab world has long seen Israel as an alien, refusing to either recognize its right to exist or establish diplomatic ties with the Jewish state. Israel seeks to reduce some of these impediments and increase its acceptance in the region by forging official relations with Arab nations. Israel's objective was to persuade the Arab states that realpolitik, or the art of putting interests first, is important. In 2016, Netanyahu grew more at ease bragging about Israel's strengthened strategic connections not only with Egypt but also with other states like Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, so security collaboration reached since 2011 as a result of the danger presented by Iran and its proxies as well as by militant Arab Islamists.¹¹⁵ The normalization plan is a component of a larger campaign to isolate Palestine and disprove its claims to independence and statehood. Normalization with Arab nations may undermine the Palestinian Authority's negotiating position and make it more challenging for the Palestinians to reach a fair and long-lasting peace with Israel. During an interview, while discussing Palestine conflict and Arab-Israeli rapprochement, Clive Jones emphasizes that Israel has achieved success in its relations with the Gulf states by employing an outside-inside strategy. By strengthening its ties with the Gulf countries, Israel can enhance its leverage in dealing with the Palestinians more effectively.¹¹⁶ Normalization accords might lessen pressure on the Israeli government to make concessions to the Palestinians and make it more challenging for the international community to advocate for a two-state solution by boosting Israel's position in the Middle East.¹¹⁷ As per Israel, there is still no chance, no reason to think the peace agreement for Palestine would advance, and there is no need to do so. Since Israel could today achieve peace with many more Arab states if it merely provided them technology, collaboration, and commercial possibilities, it is necessary

¹¹⁵ Yossi Alpher, "Israeli Regional Strategies: Balancing the Arab Core, the New Periphery, and Great Powers," IEMed, 2017, <https://www.iemed.org/publication/israeli-regional-strategies-balancing-the-arab-core-the-new-periphery-and-great-powers/>.

¹¹⁶ Clive Jones, Interviewed by Yumna Rashid, Online Interview, July 4, 2023.

¹¹⁷ Mouin Rabbani, "The Palestinians and Arab Normalization of Greater Israel, " Arab Reform Initiative, December 21, 2021, <https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/the-palestinians-and-arab-normalization-of-greater-israel/>.

to take tactical measures to ameliorate the situation without attempting to find a final status solution. Since its independence, Israel has had greater diplomatic assistance than ever before. Israel demonstrates that it is possible to conduct business with important Arab nations without giving up on the Palestinian issue

4.4 Regional security factor behind Arab Israeli rapprochement

4.4.1 Weak security Framework

Despite the fact that the traditional definition of security places a heavy emphasis on the military, it is important to consider players and processes from the political, sociological, economic, and environmental fields as well. the concept of security is not limited to a single level or sector but is interconnected across different levels and sectors.¹¹⁸ The Middle East's ability to maintain its security framework will determine its stability over the medium and long terms. The Middle East's security situation is characterized by instability and insecurity, and state and non-state players in the region are always in a state of hostility and animosity. Arab nations are very securitized on a national and regional level because they perceive themselves as being vulnerable to outside attacks. Middle East security is currently weak as a result of a variety of issues. These have been structural, resulting from the region's larger geostrategic context as well as the political decisions made by states both inside and beyond the region. Due to a number of factors, including the ongoing civil wars in Syria and Yemen, ongoing extremist threats, massive displacement and humanitarian crises, sectarian tensions, and growing inequalities, the Middle East region faces significant risks of political, religious, and social instability. Arab states are also facing difficulties as a result of these regional and international dangers, which also include sectarianism, terrorism, state instability, and extreme religion. The region's security issue stems from a fundamental lack of trust between Arab states.

4.4.2 Shared Security concerns

There are several reasons why security concerns in Arab countries are moving toward normalization with Israel. The institutional weaknesses of the majority of the region's states, the connections between different regional conflicts, the existence of numerous autonomous

¹¹⁸ Pine Roehrs, "Weak States and Implications for Regional Security: A Case Study of Georgian Instability and Caspian Regional Insecurity," Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS), Research Paper No. 97, (2005), <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/31842/rieas097.pdf>

non-state actors, the relative wealth of the region, which makes it a generous buyer of modern weapons, as well as domestic instability and modernization difficulties in many Gulf countries, are the main contributing factors. In the Gulf, conventional security systems that call for a regional hegemonic power or an outside security provider are unlikely to be effective. There is no legitimate regional hegemon, and the traditional external security provider like the US is scaling back its presence there.¹¹⁹ The Gulf states also aim to use their connection with Israel to their advantage in order to assist them solve their own domestic security issues. The Gulf states' mutual animosity toward Iran and their belief that Iran is a threat is what drives them to turn to Israel for protection. The Gulf states want to increase defense cooperation and strengthen their defense against Iranian military aggression by taking advantage of Israel's advanced military technology, gear, and weaponry. The Gulf states can fill gaps in the region because of Israel's superiority in artificial intelligence, cyber operations, defenses against air and missile assaults, and military training and tactics.¹²⁰

4.4.3 Sectarianism

In the Middle East, sectarianism takes the form of both internal and exterior manifestations. Conflict or rhetoric between sects within a state is referred to as internal sectarianism. Interstate sectarianism occurs when a sectarian actor promotes sectarian strife in other nations in order to further its own political objectives.¹²¹ The Middle East is beset by sectarianism. Chaos, war, and fanaticism are attributed to it. It establishes Sunni vs Shiite as the primary fault line in the region. Undoubtedly, the dynamics of the region are influenced by conflicts between the two main schools of Islam. But the great bulk of recent bloodshed has left the Middle Eastern region mostly desolate and in ruins. Sunni and Shia regimes like Saudi Arabia and Iran frequently utilize it to enlist the support of their respective populations for regional hegemony. Sectarianism is exacerbated by various causes. Sectarian conflicts have been fueled by political

119 Jonathan H. Ferziger, Gawdat Bahgat, "Israel's Growing Ties with the Gulf Arab States," Atlantic Council, July 2020, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Israel%E2%80%99s-Growing-Ties-with-the-Gulf-Arab-States.pdf>.

120 Lora. Vonderhaar, "The Abraham Accords: A Peace Deal in Name Only," *Georgetown Security Studies Review*, October 23, 2020, <https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2020/10/23/the-abraham-accords-a-peace-deal-in-name-only/>

121 Heather M. Robinson, Ben Connable, David E. Thaler and Ali G. Scotten, "Sectarianism in the Middle East Implications for the United States," RAND Corporation Provides Objective Research Services and Public Policy Analysis | RAND, 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1681.html. 10

and economic competitiveness, regional power struggles, and historical grudges amongst sects. External factors, like as foreign meddling, have also contributed to sectarianism in the region. The goal of the sectarian conflict for Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other regional countries is not to militarily vanquish those opponents. In these domestic conflicts of weak states, it is to advance the interests of their own people and therefore increase regional power. Iran, for example, has developed a policy known as the "Shi'a Crescent," whereby it aims to form alliances with Shiite organizations around the region, such as in Lebanon, Iraq, and in Yemen.¹²² Given that the Shia axis includes backing for the major Sunni groups Islamic Jihad and Hamas, the struggle was never a matter of sectarian religion as it has sometimes been depicted. In reality, there are two camps in the Middle East: one led by Iran, which is attempting to unite everything along sectarian and non-sectarian lines by utilizing a more inclusive religious vocabulary when it sees the need to include Sunni groups like Hamas. The other fault line in the Middle East is neither sectarian or religious; rather, it is characterized by economic interests and security risks and concerns caused by Shia sects. The rapprochement between Arab states and Israel has alarmed Shia players, particularly Iran, which regards itself as the major foe of both Israel and the Sunni Arab states. Iran has accused these Arab states of acting as players for the US and Israel, compromising the Palestine for their personal gain. This has exacerbated the sectarian conflict between Iran and the Sunni Arab states, who are largely allied with the United States and Israel.

4.4.4 Geopolitical ambitions of Iran

Iran has targeted fragile states and has generally backed non-state actors who are establishing autonomous zones inside of them. Iranian involvement can be seen in practically every regional issue as Iran tries to sway its neighbors and expand its power. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and its Quds Force are two components of Iran's security apparatus that sponsor terrorism, and Iran's leaders are investing their limited resources in them. Additionally, Iran supports a number of terrorist organizations, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, with money, weapons or other resources.¹²³ For Iran, Iraq is of the utmost importance. Iran has concentrated a large portion of its coercive power on thwarting the US influence American military presence

¹²² F. Gregory Gause, "Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War," Brookings, July 2014, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/english-pdf-1.pdf>.

¹²³ "Iran destabilizing role in the Middle East," GovInfo | U.S. Government Publishing Office, July 16, 2014, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-113hrg88732/html/CHRG-113hrg88732.htm>.

in Iraq since the 2003 American invasion. Iran has snuck into the Iraqi government during the past 20 years by utilizing ties to the country's geography, culture, and religion. Kata'ib Hezbollah and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq are two examples of Iran-backed militias that have a growing presence in military and political institutions, with many of their members holding prominent posts in the Iraqi parliament. Iran's economic ties with Iraq, one of its main trading partners, are crucial to Iran's ability to fend off the crushing consequences of international sanctions.¹²⁴ In order to maintain its financial leverage in Iraq, Iran invests in a variety of infrastructure projects for the growth of non-oil industries, economic development, and religious tourism. Iran has coercively increased confidence and cooperation between the two nations by leveraging their shared Shi'a religious allegiance. To promote religious tourism, Shi'a religious foundations headed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have invested millions of dollars in infrastructure projects across the nation. These Shi'a sacred sites strengthen Tehran's leverage over the nation through soft power.

Hezbollah is Iran's most important non-state actor in the Middle East, and it is essential to Iran's disruptive actions because to its missile arsenal and overseas operating capabilities. The militant group fiercely backs Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's Supreme Leader, and calls for the installation of an Islamist government in Lebanon that is similar to that of Iran. Hezbollah's growth has depended heavily on Iranian assistance; it is claimed that Iran gives the organization \$700 million a year in funding and provides the majority of its military equipment. Hezbollah has joined a number of Iran's proxy wars as well, supporting and training militants in Yemen and Syria. For various reasons, including as entryways to the Mediterranean, an extension of its defense against Israel, and as a base from which to launch missiles and rockets into Israel, Iran wants to maintain control over both Syria and Lebanon. To ensure outlets to North Africa and Europe, Iran needs to have access to the Mediterranean.¹²⁵

Politically and economically, Yemen has historically sided with its Arabian Peninsula neighbors. The Gulf nations, mainly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Kuwait, took the lead in creating the 2011 GCC Initiative and Transition Mechanism, which set

¹²⁴ Claire Brenner, "Iran's Destabilizing Activities in the Middle East," American Security Project, March 5, 2021, <https://www.americansecurityproject.org/irans-destabilizing-activities-in-the-middle-east/>.

¹²⁵ Lüdtkke, Lisa, "The Socioeconomic Cost of Iran's Hegemony," GIS Reports, May 16, 2022, <https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/irans-influence-middle-east/>.

the terms of the political transition, in part because of this. The Arab states have also given Yemen essential economic help over the years. Since the Arab Spring movement had started, Iran has supported the Houthi rebel organization in Yemen to counter the Saudi-led Gulf State coalition that supports Yemen's internationally recognized government. It costs Iran relatively little money to prolong the Yemeni crisis, and it gives it the perfect chance to harm Saudi Arabia. Iran also wants to have a foothold in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, a vital shipping way for gas and oil imports. The Houthis have grown from a disorganized rebel group to a deadly armed force because of Iran's hundreds of millions of dollars in support. The Iranian-backed Lebanese Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard provide the Houthis with substantial financial aid as well as military support, manpower, and training. Iranian weapons have been utilized in lethal attacks, undermining peace attempts and intensifying the conflict in Yemen.¹²⁶

Iran has used a number of strategies to strengthen its footprint in the region since the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011. Instead of being motivated by a shared religion, the Iran-Syria relationship is based on a geopolitical partnership between authoritarian governments. Syria is an essential route for the movement of Hezbollah's weaponry, enabling a steady supply of arms to the militant organization backed by Iran. Investing in Syria's security also negates the influence of the United States and Russia while escalating the threat against Israel. Iranian assistance for President Bashar al-Assad has increased its military and security sway in Syria throughout the crisis. Numerous covert Iranian connections exist among Syrian private security firms, which have sway over key locations like the Baghdad-Damascus route in eastern Syria's desert.¹²⁷

4.4.5 Iran's nuclear program

Arab nations see Iran's nuclear program as a danger to the peace and security of the region. They fear that if Iran were to obtain nuclear weapons, the region would become unstable and there would be new security risks. The United States has worked to halt Iran's nuclear program's advancement until there is more certainty on Iran's goals because it is aware of the dangers it poses to the global and regional security order. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

¹²⁶ Gerald M. Feierstein, "Iran's Role in Yemen and Prospects for Peace," Middle East Institute, December 6, 2018, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/irans-role-yemen-and-prospects-peace>

¹²⁷ Navvar Saban, "Factbox: Iranian Influence and Presence in Syria," Atlantic Council, November 5, 2020, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/factbox-iranian-influence-and-presence-in-syria/>.

(JCPOA) between Iran and the P5+1 nations reached in July 2015 as a consequence of discussions aimed at stopping Iran from developing nuclear weapons and averting a regional nuclear arms race (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Arab nations, however, have severe concerns about the nuclear pact because they believe it would simply postpone Iran acquiring nuclear weapons.¹²⁸ If Iran obtains nuclear weapons, it may start a nuclear arms race in the region, leading other nations to feel the need to acquire nuclear weapons of their own for self-defense. Arab nations think that program is a part of the plan to increase its regional dominance and pose a danger to Arab nations.

Arab nations worry that Iran's nuclear weapons might encourage it to behave more aggressively, escalating tensions and destabilizing the region. Arab nations see Iran's nuclear program as an extension of its larger Shia agenda, which poses a danger to Sunni-dominated governments and may heighten regional sectarian tensions. Nuclear terrorism is more likely to occur in the region as a result of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which might directly threaten Arab countries. Therefore, the development of nuclear weapons by Iran might possibly undercut efforts made by other countries to stop the spread of these weapons and increase the possibility that other countries will choose a similar course.¹²⁹

Israel and Arab nations are concerned about the possible danger posed by Iran's nuclear program. These nations now have the chance to collaborate to find a solution to their shared problem. A nuclear arms race in the region is feared to start if Iran acquires nuclear weapons. Both Israel and Arab states would face increased security concerns as a result of this instability. Many of these nations are therefore driven to collaborate in order to avert such a situation. In response to the possible threat posed by Iran's nuclear program, Arab states and Israel have intensified their collaboration on security and intelligence issues. Sharing knowledge and experience has been done in order to better comprehend and keep track on Iran's nuclear programs. In an interview with Dr. Syed Qandil Abbas, he explained that the Arab states and Israel consider Iran as a threat against them and Arab Israeli rapprochement is the strategy to confront Iran.¹³⁰

¹²⁸ Einhorn, Robert, Richard Nephew, "The Iran Nuclear Deal: Prelude to Proliferation in the Middle East, " Brookings, March 8, 2022, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-iran-nuclear-deal-prelude-to-proliferation-in-the-middle-east/>.

¹²⁹ Arianna Scocchera, "Nuclear Iran and the Potential Threats to the Stability of the Middle East, " CGSRS | Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies, <https://cgsrs.org/publications/38>.

¹³⁰ Dr. Syed Qandil Abbas, interview by Yumna Rashid, QAU Islamabad, June 14, 2023

Therefore, the willingness for Arab states and Israel to cooperate on shared challenges has also been influenced by shifting geopolitical realities in the Middle East.

4.5 Regional Environmental Factor

Since there are few water resources in the Middle East, there has long been competition among the nations in the region for access to water. According to some analysts, the region's nations have begun to realize the importance of collaboration as a result of common water issues. Additionally, the Middle East is a region that is particularly susceptible to the effects of climate change, such as heat waves, droughts, and sea level rise. Countries in the region may see the need for increased cooperation to solve these concerns as climate change exacerbates already-existing resource scarcities and generates new problems. Natural catastrophes like earthquakes and floods, which may have catastrophic effects on populations and infrastructure, frequently occur in the Middle East. Countries in the region may decide that cooperating to prevent and respond to natural catastrophes is beneficial in light of these dangers. So environmental factors may have contributed to the development of a feeling of shared concern and an understanding of the necessity for collaboration among countries. The environment is one area that is ideal for collaboration, especially as the Arab states transition away from an economy dependent on oil and the region struggles with water scarcity. Exciting changes have occurred in environmental collaboration.

4.5.1 Sustainable agricultural development

In many Arab countries, agriculture is one of the key industries and pillars of economic and social development. Agricultural development is given priority in many development initiatives in the Arab world. But because the Arab world's agricultural production is insufficient to meet the demand brought on by population expansion, Arab nations have realized the benefits of investing in agriculture as a method to revamp and diversify their national economies. Political fragmentation in the Arab world, a lack of incorporated strategic development planning at the national level, the use of food subsidies by Western countries to exert economic dominance over other countries, the rapid increase in population, the scarcity and exploitation of natural agricultural resources, and low agricultural productivity are the factors made the food crisis in the Arab world worse, widening the food gap and the economic dependence of the Arab

states.¹³¹ This issue cannot be resolved by relying on others or outside assistance; rather, it must be addressed internally, with a focus on developing and implementing a precise plan to achieve sustainable agricultural growth and Arab food security.¹³²

By implementing cutting-edge agricultural machinery, fertilizers, and improved seeds, the Arab states need to adopt strategies for protecting the vitality of the land and abandoning farming practices that are bad for the environment and the soil. By employing modern irrigation techniques to preserve water, it is essential to use water resources in a way that ensures their protection from depletion. Israel has undergone a remarkable agricultural change to emerge as a global leader in the region, moving from traditional farming methods to high-tech solutions of the current day. Additionally, it has created prosperous export markets, changed global agriculture, and improved water management while strengthening national food security. Israel has made significant investments throughout the years in the state-run Volcani Centre for Agricultural Research. Its objective is to support farmers and the sector as a whole by creating cutting-edge solutions to address pressing problems. Israel is an innovator in the agriculture sector and will keep coming up with creative ways to improve global food security, one of the most important issues facing humanity's future. While some of the most lauded inventions include the firewall, the USB flash drive, and the PillCam (a capsule endoscopy), Israel's superior agricultural technology may hold the key to a brighter future. How we gather, prepare, package, and distribute food has been transformed by the "AgTech" or "agritech" industry, which is also a developing field.¹³³

4.5.2 Management and Development of water resources

Extreme water scarcity is a problem in the Arab world. Extreme water scarcity becomes a barrier to economic development, a major issue in people's lives, and starts to influence the development process. Water scarcity is the main issue the Arab World is facing. Due to the

¹³¹ Dr. Gamal Siam, "Food Supply Crisis and the Role of Agriculture in the Middle East & North Africa (MENA) Region," IEMed, 2009, <https://www.iemed.org/publication/food-supply-crisis-and-the-role-of-agriculture-in-the-middle-east-north-africa-mena-region/>.

¹³² Hala Hamza Aziz Al-Khuzai and Abduladheem Abdulwahid Al-Shurki, "Sustainable agricultural development and its impact on achieving food security: Saudi arabia as a model for the period 2004-2020," *PalArch's Journals*, April 15, 2022. <https://archives.palarch.nl/index.php/jae/article/view/10970>.

¹³³ Harry Stewart, "How Israeli Agriculture Technology is Changing the World," *Sar-El*, January 10, 2021, <https://sareltours.com/article/israeli-agriculture-technology-tour>.

unstable environments, deteriorating infrastructure, lack of information systems, unsteady institutions, and constrained human and financial resources, it is a difficult endeavor. Sustainable growth depends on managing water resources. It is pertinent in various complementing ways. For instance, wise water investments and policies would lay the groundwork for the overall development of the nation and the associated economic opportunities, as well as pave the way for reforming the power, irrigation, and water supply sectors, which would have a significant positive impact on all of the country's citizens. Water technology innovation has a significant potential to achieve water security, from water supply (such as desalination and solar pumping) to industrial efficiency (such as more effective water reuse) to agriculture technologies (such as crop protection and irrigation controls). The Arab world has to invest more in technology, such as automation, digital solutions, and artificial intelligence, which can help the water sector operate more efficiently. These technologies should be used more frequently in the Arab world.¹³⁴

Israel, one of the countries with the lowest water availability in the world, has managed to secure its water supply and completely recoup its costs through fees. This success can be credited to a number of audacious actions, such as the creation of a national water conveyance system to link all water infrastructure, the recycling of treated wastewater for irrigation, the implementation of large-scale desalination projects through public-private partnerships to provide independent potable water supply, the use of aquifers as reservoirs, the interception of surface water run-off, and the encouragement of crop selectivity. Water security fosters stability and is crucial in reducing risks to national security. Due to this, Arab countries have focused on bettering their water management methods and technological advancements. Given Israel's reputation as a "start-up nation," water cooperation between Israel and Arab countries will primarily focus on the start-up ecosystem. Examples include Blue Green Water Technologies, which works to transform algal bloom treatments into effective, eco-friendly solutions, and Water Gen, which works to produce clean drinking water from air.¹³⁵

¹³⁴ Jamal Saghir, "Innovation: A Game-Changing to Drive Water Security in the Arab Region," LinkedIn , September 8, 2020, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/innovation-game-changing-drive-water-security-arab-region-saghir?trk=public_profile_article_view.

¹³⁵ Rumaitha Al Busaidi, "The Quest for Water: Will the Abraham Accords Change the Water Landscape for the Region," Atlantic Council, December 23, 2020, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-quest-for-water-will-the-abraham-accords-change-the-water-landscape-for-the-region/>.

4.5.3 Climate change

Prior to the Middle East's current increase in climate action, climate change did not receive the same level of attention as it does now. The UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Israel, among other nations, have made commitments to cut carbon emissions in the region. Conflicts and ongoing socioeconomic problems, however, make it difficult to forge the kind of cooperation needed to lessen climate change's severe consequences and deal with its disproportionate repercussions on the region. The region should prioritize adopting climate-compatible crop choices, drought-tolerant landscaping, and technology to solve water shortages, improve food security, and increase resilience in the face of climate change. In order to avoid this worrying situation and ineffective regulatory frameworks, technological research and knowledge-sharing are required. Due to dry environment and scarcer water supplies, the Arab states have been forced to concentrate on agricultural innovation. Numerous nations are now significantly dependent on imported agricultural goods and thus extremely sensitive to changes in global commodity markets as a result of the region's limited availability of arable land and water. Due to the ongoing environmental deterioration brought on by climate change, the situation is becoming worse and is only expected to become worse. The water cycle, food security, and vulnerable people are all being impacted by climate change. It also has socioeconomic ramifications, which might jeopardize the Arab states' sustained growth. However, an emerging innovation that may hold the key to finding answers to the food shortage issue has developed in the region that has been at the forefront of recent technological advancements. In the past ten years, new technology has been created to solve the long-standing structural flaws in agriculture connected to water scarcity and underproductive farming soils. Such programs may significantly contribute to the promotion of resilient food systems throughout the region.¹³⁶

Israel has also modified the greenhouse for use in dry areas. Farmers can get over the limitations imposed by poor soil, arid weather, and scarce water supplies thanks to about 3,000 hectares of greenhouse farming. It is possible to build greenhouses in areas with poor soil. Water shortage

¹³⁶ Chloé Bernadaux, "Agricultural Technology in the Middle East: Sowing the Seeds of the Future," Middle East Institute, May 19, 2021, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/agricultural-technology-middle-east-sowing-seeds-future>.

is solved by irrigation systems, while temperature control and light control may be achieved by adjusting skylights and drapes. Plastic covering reduces weeds and insect growth, decreases evaporation, and avoids fertilizer evaporation by thermally sterilizing soil. In addition, soil covers are used in greenhouse technology to retain heat, and netting can be used to keep scales, mites, and other pests away from plants. Modern netting may also act as a thermal screen to keep plants cool during the day and warm at night. Fogging devices may be used to adjust the climate, and computer programs can control all of these systems to create a microenvironment, making greenhouse technology a cutting-edge agricultural method for the twenty-first century. Numerous Israeli businesses produce and sell high-tech woven plastic sheeting, as well as offer consultation, installation, and maintenance services for sophisticated greenhouse projects. Although they demand a substantial upfront investment, greenhouses are best used for high-value crops and intensive cultivation. Israeli agricultural technology has greatly raised regional yields and has the potential to significantly help feed the world's hungry population. This technology covers a wide range of topics, including livestock, efficient water management, fertilization techniques, and seeds with genetic modifications.¹³⁷ Israel's new diplomatic initiative, which is centered on climate change, may open up new commercial and political prospects in desert Arab states and may also pave the path for collaboration between those nations and Israel. Israel is developing a new "climate diplomacy" approach intended to boost adherence to global climate agreements while disseminating Israel's recognized green technological knowledge with friendly governments in exchange for new commerce and enhanced diplomatic relations.

Conclusion

The Arab Spring left the region with risk factors and pre-existing problems, which led to the subsequent economic and political collapse. Many regional geostrategic entities are vying for influence and status in the Middle East. The normalization process not only benefited the military and security but also created new chances for the region's commercial relations to expand dramatically. Regional economics is essential for the Middle East, especially for bolstering and accelerating the region's economic growth and development. The Arab-Israeli

¹³⁷ "Israeli Agro-Technology," Jewish Virtual Library, Accessed September 17, 2022. <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/israeli-agro-technology>.

reconciliation encourages economic growth in the region and supports in the building of regional economic integration by opening up new and better opportunities. Shifting geopolitics and regional realities have prompted states to set aside ideological differences for the benefit of national interests and regional stability. The apparent and present risks presented by Iran and non-state actors have made standing up for the Palestinians less important for the Arab states. Simply said, ties with Israel are now more important than the Palestinian issue. Israel is also seen as a potential partner by the Arab states should they chose to work together to employ military action to combat the Iranian threat given its current position.

Chapter 5

International Causative factors behind Arab Israeli Rapprochement

Introduction

Arab countries have recently started to normalize their relations with Israel, a step that was formerly frowned upon in the Arab world. This change in Arab states has sparked a great deal of interest and discussion in regional and international politics. There are various broad international and worldwide causes that are frequently credited to the Arab states' desire to normalize ties with Israel, even if the precise reasons for normalization may vary depending on the country. They encompass geopolitical factors, economic interests, and security worries. In terms of commerce and investment, normalization opens doors for more potential between Israel and Arab nations, which might be economically advantageous for both parties. Closer connections with Israel might make it easier for Arab nations to obtain cutting-edge technology and know-how in fields like agriculture, water management, and cyber security. Arab nations may want to present themselves as more dependable allies to Western nations, especially the United States, by siding with Israel. Here are some external factors behind Arab-Israeli rapprochement.

5.1 United States as an external facilitator in Arab -Israeli Rapprochement

The Abraham Accords is mediated by the United States, which has also been a vociferous proponent of the agreements. The Accords are a significant step forward for the Trump administration's foreign policy, which aimed to strengthen ties between Israel and the Arab states. The Accords reflect a substantial change in the Middle East's geopolitical environment and give fresh chances for cooperation and advancement. The Arab states' decision to join the Accords was influenced by the United States' commitment to fostering stability and security in the region, concerns about Iran's regional aspirations, a desire to strengthen economic ties with Israel, and the potential advantages of closer cooperation with Israel. This brings in a new era in the history of the region and has the power to alter long-standing geopolitical connections.¹³⁸

¹³⁸ Masami Nishino, "Progress in the Normalization of Relations between the Arab Countries and Israel," National Institute for Defense Studies, March 21, 2022, <http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/pdf/2022/e02.pdf>.

5.1.1 Diplomatic Engagement

The US has considerable influence in the Middle East, and Arab nations frequently depend on it for economic and military assistance. Arab leaders have regarded this as a chance to deepen their ties with the US as the US has used its influence to persuade Arab states to improve relations with Israel. The US has been heavily involved in diplomatic initiatives to encourage peace between Israel and the Arab world. This involves advocating normalization of ties, mediating negotiations, and facilitating communication between the two sides. Along with helping to broker accords, the US has fostered direct communication between the leaders of Israel and the Arab world. The Trump administration's Peace to Prosperity proposal, which offered a framework for settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and fostering regional economic cooperation, was launched in January 2020. The strategy underlined the significance of restoring harmony between Israel and the Arab world and called for communication and interaction between the two parties.¹³⁹ The US gave the Accords a lot of assistance, notably by arranging talks between the parties, giving financial incentives to Arab states, and endorsing the agreements diplomatically. Additionally, the Biden administration has persisted in its diplomatic initiatives to advance peace between Israel and the Arab world. This involves supporting the Abraham Accords diplomatically, giving financial incentives to Arab nations, and encouraging regional cooperation on matters like energy, trade, and security. On matters like energy, trade, and infrastructure, the US has promoted regional collaboration and communication between Arab states and Israel. The region's economic stability and collaboration have benefited from this. In summary, the US has been instrumental in promoting the current Arab-Israeli reconciliation through its diplomatic efforts. The Abraham Accords is supported, the Peace to Prosperity Plan is implemented, diplomatic engagement continues under the Biden administration, regional tours are organized, and regional involvement is supported. The US initiatives have contributed to lowering tensions and advancing peace and cooperation in the Middle East.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁹ U.S. Mission Israel. Peace to Prosperity - A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People," January 30, 2020, <https://il.usembassy.gov/peace-to-prosperity-a-vision-to-improve-the-lives-of-the-palestinian-and-israeli-people/>

¹⁴⁰ A Stronger and Wider Peace: A U.S. Strategy for Advancing the Abraham Accords," Jewish Institute for National Security of America, January 19, 2022, https://jinsa.org/jinsa_report/a-stronger-and-wider-peace-us-strategy-for-abraham-accords/.

5.1.2 Continued U.S. Support for Israel

Since Israel's creation in 1948, the US has been its strongest ally. Over time, this alliance has grown and strengthened. Israel is the country that receives the most military aid from the United States, making it the greatest beneficiary. The funding is largely used to assist Israel in defending itself against regional security challenges and maintaining its military advantage. The United States not only gives Israel military help but also economic support in the form of trade agreements, loan guarantees, and other financial aid. Additionally, the US has diplomatically backed Israel, particularly in light of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.¹⁴¹ The United States' support for Israel is based not just on common interests or ideals, but also on the strategic security that Israel offers to the country in the Middle East. Israel offers more than just military might when it comes to strategic certainty. The United States' trust in its ally is also influenced by Israel's intelligence proficiency, technical advancements, and economic benefits. Arab-Israeli reconciliation has been significantly influenced by US ongoing support of Israel. The Biden administration's ongoing support for Israel shows that the US is likely to back Israel as a strong ally in the future, which may inspire other Arab nations to follow suit and normalize ties with Israel. In an interview with Clive Jones, Professor of Regional Security at Durham University, he explains that Arab states perceive Israel as a means to amplify their influence in the United States. This perception stems from the significant presence of a powerful Jewish lobby within the US, which pursues various interests such as military cooperation and potentially economic considerations.¹⁴²

5.1.3 Shared Strategic interests

Arab countries and the US have a variety of strategic interests that span a wide range of topics, including regional security, counterterrorism, economic growth, energy security, and conflict resolution. Arab nations may take advantage of US assistance and knowledge by working with the US on these challenges, and they can collaborate to advance regional security and stability. Iran is a prominent regional player with a strong influence throughout the Middle East. It has participated in proxy battles in nations like Syria and Yemen and sponsored several armed

141 Ariel Ilan Roth, "Reassurance: A Strategic Basis of U.S. Support for Israel," *International Studies Perspectives* 10, no. 4, (November 2, 2009), 378-393, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1528-3585.2009.00384.x>

142 Clive Jones, interviewed by Yumna Rashid, Online Interview, July 4, 2023

organizations and militias in conflicts around the region. Concerned about Iran's growing influence in the region, the US and Arab nations want to rein it in while also fostering stability in the region.¹⁴³ Extremist organizations like ISIS and Al Qaeda have posed serious security issues to several Arab states, who have also been the targets of terrorist attacks. The US has played a significant role in regional counterterrorism initiatives, supporting Arab nations militarily and with intelligence, and seeking to thwart terrorist organizations' plans. Although oil exports have historically been a key source of income for Arab states, several nations in the region are currently implementing economic reforms to diversify their economies and lessen their reliance on oil. Many of these nations have the US as a significant trading partner, which can aid in their efforts to build their economies. The Middle East is a significant producer of oil and gas, therefore maintaining regional peace is crucial for the security of the world's energy supply. Maintaining stable energy markets and cooperating to handle supply interruptions or other risks to energy security are goals shared by the US and Arab countries.¹⁴⁴ The Syrian civil war, the conflict in Yemen, and Palestinian conflict are just a few of the recent wars that have afflicted the Middle East. Since instability and war may have detrimental effects on both the US and Arab nations' economies and national security, the US and Arab states have an interest in resolving these issues and fostering peace in the region. In addition, the US is a significant source of military assistance and support for several nations in the region. Arab nations should anticipate receiving more military training and assistance if they cooperate with the US, which will help them strengthen their security and defense capacities.

5.2 Enhanced economic opportunities

The dynamics of the Middle East have changed significantly over the past several years as many Arab states strive to improve their economic prospects on the global stage by normalizing their relations with Israel. This is a significant shift from previous theories of Arab-Israeli relations, which have been characterized by enmity and conflict for many years. Economic motives, geopolitical concerns, and a desire for better regional stability have all played a role in the

¹⁴³ Daniel Egel, Shira Efron and Linda Robinson, "Regional Security Cooperation Partnerships in the Middle East," The Washington Institute, September 21, 2021, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/regional-security-cooperation-partnerships-middle-east>

¹⁴⁴ Robert Barron, "What Do Normalized Israel-UAE Relations Mean for the Region?," United States Institute of Peace, August 14, 2020, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/08/what-do-normalized-israel-uae-relations-mean-region>.

decision to seek normalization. In this framework, the normalization of ties between Arab countries and Israel is considered as a potentially revolutionary move that might have profound effects on the Middle East's future.

5.2.1 Greater access to global markets

The restoration of ties between Arab nations and Israel may open up new chances for these nations to participate in global trade and business. Israel has an extensive network of free trade agreements with nations all over the world, including the US and the EU. Arab countries that work with Israel can use these trade accords, which may open up new chances for their companies to develop into global markets. Due to Israel's close economic relations to the US and EU, Arab countries may have easier access to these markets. By working with Israel, Arab nations may benefit from Israeli know-how in logistics and transportation, which can help them reach clients in many parts of the world.¹⁴⁵ Arab nations may create new trade channels that will link them to markets in Europe, Asia, and the Americas. For instance, Israel and the UAE are attempting for the creation of maritime route that links the them via the Red Sea. Arab nations may diversify their economic partners and lessen their reliance on a single market by working with Israel. This may strengthen their economies' resistance to external shocks and variations in demand throughout the world. Arab nations have the ability to develop new value chains in industries including agriculture, high tech, and renewable energy. These new value chains can aid Arab countries in economic diversification and lessen their reliance on a particular product or market.¹⁴⁶ In general, expanding global commerce through Israel may provide Arab countries with major advantages, such as access to new markets, value chains, and trade routes. It can aid in reducing their reliance on a particular commodity or market and encourage economic expansion.¹⁴⁷

145 Shmuel Even, Tomer Fadlon and Yoel Guzansky, "The Economic-Strategic Dimension of the Abraham Accords," Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), October 12, 2020, <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/abraham-accords-economic-dimension/>

¹⁴⁶ Keith Boyfield, "Abraham Accords Generate Real and Tangible Benefits: What Remains to Be Done," Euro-Gulf Information Centre, April 5, 2022, <https://www.egic.info/abraham-accords-generate-real-benefits>

¹⁴⁷ Robert Greenway, "Greater Than The Sum Of Its Parts: Abraham Accords Free Trade Area," Hoover Institution, March 7, 2023, <https://www.hoover.org/research/greater-sum-its-parts-abraham-accords-free-trade-area>.

5.2.2 Foreign direct investments: FDI

Foreign direct investment promotes economic growth. It leads to more employment options and the advancement of human resources. Foreign direct investment improves a country's financial and technological industries. Israel is renowned for having a robust environment for start-ups, which is supported by a large network of venture investors. Arab nations can collaborate with Israel to acquire access to Israeli venture funding, which can support the expansion of their own start-ups and small and medium-sized businesses. Arab-Israeli reconciliation might potentially be influenced by foreign direct investment (FDI) in a number of ways. FDI may serve to promote economic development and progress in both Israel and the Arab states, opening up new trade and investment opportunities. Greater cooperation and understanding may result from new prospects for corporate engagement and collaboration between Israeli, Arab companies and other states. Businesses may work together to handle shared difficulties and seek shared goals by exchanging information, experience, and resources. FDI can promote international cooperation and understanding. Businesses in Israel and the Arab states cooperating and establishing connections can help dispel preconceptions and encourage more cross-cultural interaction. By fostering more regional security and prosperity, this can aid in bridging gaps between states.

Israel's sophisticated sectors have contributed significantly to the rise of FDI in the Israeli economy, notably throughout the 2010s. Many Israeli high-tech enterprises were sold to overseas firms during those years, contributing to gains in FDI and GDP growth. At the moment, Israel remains a rich environment for foreign investment in general, and particularly in the local hi-tech industry.¹⁴⁸This increases both productivity and economic growth. Arab states have made significant efforts in recent years to promote and grow their local hi-tech industry by creating funds to entice investors to assist the development of technology initiatives in the region. In view of this, cooperation and normalization with Israel has significant advantages. Israel may benefit from such partnership as well, getting access to a big new market. The reconciliation between Arab states and Israel is directly related to efforts to attract new investments in Middle East. As a result, for the Middle Eastern countries, Israel provides a

148 Assaf Razin, "High Tech and Venture Capital Inflows: The Case of Israel," National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2018, https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w25351/w25351.pdf.

significant source of FDI.¹⁴⁹ Saudi Arabia and Israel, for example, are geographically separated by just a short sea voyage over the Gulf of Eilat or a short driving trip via Jordan. These routes have the potential to turn Israel into a link between Saudi Arabia and Europe, promoting exports to the European Union.¹⁵⁰ Israeli businesses that specialize in infrastructure development, such as transportation, logistics, and water management, can bring FDI to Arab nations. As Israeli businesses want to engage in new markets and seize new possibilities, the normalization of relations with Israel may also draw FDI in real estate development. As an illustration, Dubai has experienced a surge of Israeli investment since the normalization deal was signed. In general, Arab states may gain a lot from inviting FDI from Israel and other nations, including access to finance, technology, and knowledge. It can assist to fund the expansion of their own start-ups and small and medium-sized businesses as well as increase their technological prowess and marketability on a worldwide scale.

5.2.3 Innovation and Collaboration at International level

The restoration of relations between Arab nations and Israel may open up new chances for international innovation and cooperation. In industries like high tech, renewable energy, and biotechnology, innovation and collaboration may serve to boost economic growth and generate new job possibilities. For Arab countries, developing a culture that encourages innovation and entrepreneurship may draw talent and funding from all over the world. Arab nations can get access to cutting-edge technology and knowledge that can help them increase their own technical skills and competitiveness in international markets by working with Israeli businesses and research organization for example UAE and Israel's Rafael Advanced Défense Systems have worked together to create a new air defense system that use artificial intelligence to identify and stop threats.¹⁵¹ Arab nations may create new infrastructure and services for their populations via innovation and cooperation. the development of new transportation technologies may increase connection and mobility, while the development of new healthcare

¹⁴⁹ Karen Young, "Diplomacy in the Gulf Follows the Money," *Al-Monitor*, January 13, 2021, <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/01/diplomacy-money-gulf-saudi-arabia-qatar-israel-sudan-fdi-gcc.html>

¹⁵⁰ Alexander Bligh, Erez Cohen, "A Comparative Analysis of the Israeli and Saudi Economies and an Argument for Bilateral Cooperation," *Taylor & Francis*, November 7, 2022, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03068374.2022.2134657>.

¹⁵¹ Alexander Cornwell , John Irish, "Exclusive: Israel to sell air defence system to United Arab Emirates," *Reuters*, September 23, 2022 <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/exclusive-israel-sell-air-defence-system-united-arab-emirates-sources-say-2022-09-22/>.

technology and treatments can enhance the quality of healthcare in the region. For Arab states, innovation and cooperation may help open up new trade and investment opportunities. They may increase their exports and entice new foreign investment by creating new goods and services. Arab nations may open up new markets and client bases throughout the world by working with Israel. Arab nations and Israel may cooperate across borders to address global issues including food security, climate change, and healthcare. They can create creative solutions to these problems that will help the entire region and the entire planet by combining their resources and talents.¹⁵² In general, innovation and cooperation at the international and global level through Israel may assist Arab states significantly, including access to new technology and knowledge, accelerated economic growth and job creation, enhanced infrastructure and services, and tackling global concerns.

5.3 Strengthening international cooperation for the Security

Another external factor influencing the Arab-Israeli reconciliation is the development of global security. Many causes have contributed to the restoration of ties with Israel. Arab states widespread anxiety about the escalating regional security risks is one of the key motivators. Several Arab states consider Israel as a critical partner in curbing Iran's power as the country and non-state players in the region have been increasing their military and political clout. It is believed that improving ties with Israel will help balance Iran's influence and fortify the regional security system. Access to Israeli technology and know-how in fields like military, cybersecurity, and water management is a factor that is also causing ties with Israel to improve. Several Arab states are eager in purchasing the superior military systems that Israel, a country well recognized for its technical inventiveness, has created. Normalizing relations with Israel allow Arab countries to use Israeli technologies to advance their own security and economic potential. Arab countries view Israel's restoration of relations as a way to boost global security cooperation and confront the shared security concerns that both faces. Arab states may strengthen their own security capacities and advance stability in the region by cooperating with Israel and other nations in the region.

¹⁵² Dr. Daniel Schatz, "The Abraham Accords: Politico-Economic Drivers and Opportunities," TRENDS Research and Advisory, November 15, 2020, <https://trendsresearch.org/insight/the-abraham-accords-politico-economic-drivers-and-opportunities/>.

5.3.1 Shared security threats

Terrorism, extremism, and regional instability are just a few of the main security issues that Arab countries must deal with. The Arab world faces a serious security danger from terrorism, with organizations like ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and Hezbollah committing atrocities there. These organizations are a menace to the whole world community as well as Arab states. Extremist ideologies seriously endanger the safety and stability of Arab countries, including religious and political extremism. High levels of regional instability, including continuing conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and Libya, are a hallmark of the Arab world. For Arab states, a key security worry is the spread of weapons, particularly nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons. It would be disastrous for the region and the entire globe if hostile actors, such as terrorist organizations or hostile regimes, were to acquire these weapons. Threats to cybersecurity, such as cyberattacks and cyberespionage, are of increasing concern to Arab nations. These dangers can jeopardize the safety of vital infrastructure, halt economic growth, and jeopardize national security.¹⁵³

A coordinated international response that encompasses cooperation between Arab states and their regional and international allies is necessary to confront common security issues in the Arab world. Effective plans and policies to combat security threats that have grown more complex and diversified can be developed with the aid of this kind of collaboration. One way to improve global collaboration and forge partnerships to combat these security risks is by normalizing relations with Israel. By encouraging greater collaboration between Arab states and Israel, normalizing relations with Israel can improve regional security. A variety of topics, including terrorism prevention, protecting against online threats, and exchanging intelligence data, might be the subject of this collaboration. These nations may share their resources and skills to create more powerful security measures by cooperating. Moreover, forming relationships with Israel may provide Arab countries access to cutting-edge equipment and weaponry that might help them improve their defense capabilities. They may be less dependent on established security allies like the US and other Western nations as a result. So, to address security risks in the Arab world, a coordinated global response is needed, involving cooperation between Arab states and their regional and global allies. It is possible to understand how

¹⁵³ Dr. Mohammad Salim Al-Rawashdeh, "Arab National Security (Dimensions, Perceptions, Challenges, Risks and Future Strategy)," *Saudi Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, February 14, 2019, <https://www.saudijournals.com/media/articles/SJHSS-4-2-69-82-c.pdf>.

improving ties with Israel can help the world work together more effectively and forge alliances to counter these challenges. This can help strengthen regional security and lead to the creation of more effective countermeasures to security threats.

5.3.2 Expansion of security technology

Israel is a worldwide leader in the creation and use of cutting-edge security technologies, such as cyber-defense systems, biometric scanners, and surveillance systems. Arab nations may obtain technology and so enhance their own security capabilities by forming closer connections with Israel. Arab states may have access to a shared digital platform that they may use to communicate and work together with other nations on security-related matters. For instance, if several nations employ the same encryption technology, it will be simpler for them to exchange information and coordinate their efforts to thwart security threats. Also, it might make it simpler and less expensive to create and maintain customized security systems for any nation. The exchange of information and communication between Arab nations and other nations can be facilitated by modern security technologies. The ability to communicate real-time information with neighboring nations about potential security concerns like terrorist attacks or cyber breaches, for instance, is made possible by modern communication infrastructure in Arab states. This may aid in halting the spread of such dangers and their detrimental effects.¹⁵⁴ Arab nations may be better able to comply with international security standards and best practice if they have access to cutting-edge security technologies. Arab states may verify that their security systems adhere to international standards by utilizing the same technology as other nations, making it simpler to share information and coordinate efforts to thwart security threats. Access to cutting-edge security technologies may help foster more cooperation and trust between Arab states and other nations. Arab nations may strengthen ties with other nations and their capacity to deal with shared security concerns by cooperating to develop and deploy cutting-edge security solutions. This might promote a safe and stable international environment, which would be advantageous to all participating nations.

¹⁵⁴ Alvite Ningthoujam, "The military–security dimension of the 2020 Abraham Accords: An Israeli perspective," Observer Research Foundation, July 28, 2022, <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-military-security-dimension-of-the-2020-abraham-accords/>.

5.4 Increasing International Presence: Widening Diplomatic Network

The expanding diplomatic network and growing international prominence of the Arab states are two external elements influencing this rapprochement. Due to its strategic position, abundance of natural resources, and economic potential, the Middle East has long been a key region for world powers. The Middle East has grown even more important because of world's growing interconnectedness and globalization, and the nations in the region have been attempting to increase their influence and worldwide presence. Developing diplomatic ties with other countries is one strategy for governments to expand their global influence. In order to further economic, political, and cultural cooperation as well as to resolve disputes and deal with regional challenges, diplomatic contacts are essential. The Arab-Israeli peace process has greatly benefited from expansion of the diplomatic community. The recent Arab-Israeli reconciliation has been largely influenced by outside forces, particularly the expanding diplomatic network and growing worldwide representation of Arab nations. Normalizing ties with Israel have grown to be a crucial instrument for attaining these goals as nations in the region want to increase their influence and foster stability in the region.

5.4.1 Tolerance and coexistence

The warming relations between Israel and the Arab world offers Arab nations a special chance to advocate for peace and tolerance throughout the globe. Arab states may provide a good example for other regions going through similar problems by committing to peaceful coexistence with Israel. Arab nations may improve regional stability by encouraging tolerance and harmony. A culture of tolerance and harmony can help lower these tensions and encourage peaceful cohabitation in region that has been plagued by wars and tensions for decades. The regional standing of Arab nations can also be enhanced by encouraging tolerance and harmony. Arab nations may dispel unfavorable impressions and preconceptions about the area that certain members of the international community may have by publicly committing to peaceful coexistence with Israel. Global peace may be advanced through encouraging tolerance and cohabitation across the world. Arab states might provide a positive example for other countries dealing with similar crises to end conflict with Israel, one of the oldest and most bitter conflicts in the world. This may result in a world where everyone lives in peace. In the context of the Arab-Israeli peace process, the promotion of tolerance and harmony around world is of utmost

importance to Arab states. By doing this, Arab states may improve regional stability, forge closer economic linkages, enhance their standing in the Middle East, and advance world peace. The roads to a common humanity and peace are tolerance and cooperation. The Abraham Accords constitutes as important strategic developments in my three decades of diplomacy in this region and have evident advantages for the globe as a whole in addition to the nations and people involved.¹⁵⁵

5.4.2 Strengthening international Credibility

In several ways, the normalization of ties between Israel and the Arab world can help those nations' standing in the world. It can show a readiness to communicate and cooperate with other countries, even ones they may have had a history of conflict or disagreement with. This might signify a dedication to amicably resolving conflicts and an understanding of the advantages of collaboration and respect for one another. The second benefit is that it may contribute to greater regional peace and security, which might benefit the entire world community. Arab nations and Israel may help create a more stable and peaceful Middle East by cooperating to combat shared risks and difficulties, such terrorism and extremism, which may have favorable effects on the world at large. All sides involved may profit if it helps to facilitate commercial and trade cooperation. Arab nations and Israel may foster trade, commerce, and investment possibilities that might have favorable economic effects on the region and beyond by establishing channels of communication and collaboration.

This change in strategy may improve the position of these Arab nations internationally and foster better cross-cultural understanding. A dedication to democracy is one of the shared values that may be highlighted via normalization. Arab nations should show their commitment to democratic ideals by mending relations with Israel, which is a democratic country with a long history of safeguarding individual rights and freedoms. This can assist to enhance their reputation internationally and dispel unfavorable perceptions about the Arab world. Another shared value that may be stressed via normalization is the support of human rights. Arab nations can cooperate with Israel on matters pertaining to human rights and the rule of law, such as

¹⁵⁵ "Joint Statement on the UAE-U.S.-Israel Religious Coexistence Working Group to Advance Interfaith and Intercultural Dialogue and Counter Religious Intolerance and Hatred," United States Department of State, March 29, 2022, <https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-uae-u-s-israel-religious-coexistence-working-group-to-advance-interfaith-and-intercultural-dialogue-and-counter-religious-intolerance-and-hatred/>.

advancing civil society and defending the rights of minorities. This may contribute to a more inclusive and tolerant society and an improvement in the region's human rights status. Arab states may enhance their international status and advance more intercultural understanding by highlighting common ideals like human rights. This might encourage a more accepting and tolerant society and assist create a more stable and peaceful planet.

Conclusion

While there is little doubt that internal factors contributed to the Arab-Israeli peace process, the above-mentioned international factors were essential in fostering the conditions that allowed for the normalization accords to be reached. The United States has been significantly involved in diplomatic efforts to promote peace between Israel and the Arab countries. The United States continued backing for Israel has had a substantial impact on the present Arab-Israeli rapprochement. Arab nations and the United States share a wide range of strategic objectives, including regional security, counterterrorism, economic growth, energy security, and conflict resolution. Economic considerations, geopolitical concerns, and a desire for greater regional stability all influenced the decision to pursue normalization. Normalization of relations between Arab countries and Israel is viewed as a potentially revolutionary act that might have far-reaching consequences for the Middle East's future. The advancement of global security is another external element promoting Arab-Israeli rapprochement. To address common security concerns in the Arab world, a coordinated international response that includes collaboration between Arab countries and their regional and international partners is required. If Arab countries have access to cutting-edge security technology, they may be better equipped to comply with international security standards and best practices. This might lead to a more secure and stable international environment, which would benefit all participating countries. Warming relations between Israel and the Arab world provide Arab nations with a unique opportunity to push for global peace and tolerance. By pledging to peaceful coexistence with Israel, Arab nations may provide a good example for other regions facing similar issues. Arab states can help to strengthen regional stability by promoting tolerance and peace.

Chapter 6

Future Prospects for wider Arab-Israeli Rapprochement

Introduction

For many years, there has been conflict and friction between Israel and the Arab world, which is partly due to the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Positive changes have, however, occurred recently. Arab-Israeli cooperation depends on a number of internal issues in both the Arab and Israeli communities, including developments in both countries' domestic politics and the status of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Even while many obstacles to overcome, the most recent normalization accords give hope that progress is feasible and that there may be chances for even more rapprochement in the years to come. Future possibilities for more Arab-Israeli harmony will be influenced by a number of variables, such as the progress made in settling the Israeli-Palestinian issue, internal political dynamics, and the degree to which common interests and economic opportunities can outweigh past grievances. If both parties are prepared to address the fundamental problems that have traditionally caused war and as long as diplomatic attempts are made, a more peaceful future in the Middle East is achievable.

6.1 Future prospects for Arab -Israeli rapprochement at domestic level

6.1.1 Economic prospects

The likelihood of a stronger state economy improving Arab-Israeli relations is encouraging. There may be new prospects for collaboration and economic growth in the Arab states as a result of the rapprochement. Increased commerce, investment, and tourism are all possible if nations start to interact more. There could also be chances for collaborative ventures and collaborations between Israeli and Arab companies, which might promote innovation and generate new employment. The Middle East may see new prospects for cooperation and economic growth if relations between Israel and Arab nations improve. It is important for regional stability and security, which are necessary for economic progress, to improve as a result of growing rapprochement between Israel and the Arab world. Increased foreign investment and commercial activity may result from the resolution of disputes and tensions. Between Israeli and Arab firms, there are possibilities for joint ventures and collaborations that

might foster innovation and generate new employment. With the restoration of relations between Israel and the UAE, several agreements and collaborations have already been inked in a variety of industries, including technology, healthcare, and renewable energy. Due to past tensions and hostilities, certain Arab nations may encounter opposition from their citizens while trying to improve relations with Israel. Before complete economic cooperation can be achieved, political and security challenges must be handled. For Arab and Israeli nations to cooperate and thrive economically in the long run, past tensions and disputes must be resolved. Economic collaboration may have major advantages for the whole Middle East, not just for Israel and Arab countries.¹⁵⁶ Increasing Investment inflows into the region may result from improved relations between Israel and the Arab states.

6.1.2 Security prospects

From a security viewpoint, there are varying degrees of hope for a wider Arab-Israeli rapprochement. On the one hand, there have been some encouraging developments, including the recent normalization accords between Israel and a number of Arab nations, such the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. By lessening tensions and fostering more communication and cooperation between these countries, these accords have the potential to improve security cooperation and stability in the region.¹⁵⁷ There are still enormous barriers standing in the way of a more comprehensive Arab-Israeli reconciliation, particularly when it comes to the Palestinian question. As long as there is no resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, many Arab states will continue to see Israel's attitude towards Palestinians as a significant barrier to better ties. State-level historical, political, and strategic concerns all have an impact on the likelihood that Arab states and Israel will cooperate in the area of security. The objectives of each state and its leadership have an impact on the likelihood of security cooperation. Several Arab states view security cooperation with Israel as a method to strengthen their own security against common dangers including terrorism, Iranian aggression, and regional instability. Yet, development will probably be slow and dependent on a variety of political and strategic factors, such as internal political issues and public pressure. The

156 "Abraham Accords: Warm Peace, Transforming Middle East," UAE Embassy in Washington, DC, March 13, 2023, <https://www.uae-embassy.org/discover-uae/foreign-policy/abraham-accords-warm-peace-transforming-middle-east>.

¹⁵⁷ Azriel Bermant, "The Abraham Accords: A Gamechanger for the Region and Europe's Role in It," Institute of International Relations (IIR), November 1, 2023, <https://www.iir.cz/en/azriel-bermant>.

modernization of the military is one area where Arab countries and Israel may possibly collaborate, with Israel offering Arab countries helpful aid in upgrading their own militaries and enhancing their defensive capabilities. The modernization of the military is one area where Arab countries and Israel may work together. Israel might help Arab countries modernize their militaries and strengthen their defensive capabilities.¹⁵⁸ Cybersecurity is another area where collaboration is possible. Here, Israel and Arab countries would be able to exchange knowledge on cyberthreats and vulnerabilities as well as best practice for defending against cyberattacks. By collaborative efforts to exchange intelligence, coordinate operations, and strengthen ability to better identify and prevent terrorist acts, Arab states and Israel might potentially collaborate in the domain of counterterrorism.

6.1.3 Technology and innovation prospects

The current improvement of ties between Israel and a number of Arab nations offers a singular possibility for expanded collaboration in technology and innovation. The region has historically been characterized by geopolitical tensions and wars, which have hampered collaboration in many fields, including technology and innovation. Although there is a chance for more cooperation in these sectors as a result of growing rapprochement between Israel and the Arab world, this possibility might be advantageous for both sides' economies and social systems. Youth populations are numerous and expanding across the Arab world, and they have a keen interest in technology and innovation. A robust start up environment and a workforce with a high level of education have helped Israel establish itself as a worldwide powerhouse for innovation and technology. The improved relations between Israel and the Arab world may result in more cooperation in scientific research and development, particularly in the fields of healthcare, renewable energy, and water management. Given that the Arab world is opening up and that the Israeli IT sector is recognized for its creative entrepreneurs, there may be potential for joint ventures and collaborations. The number of technological start-ups in the region could increase as a result.¹⁵⁹ Start-ups and business owners in the region may gain from enhanced access to funding and investment possibilities with more engagement and collaborations. The

158 Bilal Y. Saab, "The Military Dimension of the Abraham Accords," Middle East Institute, April 26, 2022, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/military-dimension-abraham-accords>.

159 Abigail Klein Leichman, "New innovation centers to encourage Arab entrepreneurship," *ISRAEL21C*, December 12, 2022, <https://www.israel21c.org/new-innovation-centers-to-encourage-arab-entrepreneurship/>.

Arab world is a sizable and developing market for e-commerce, and Israeli firms might contribute knowledge and technology to foster its development.

Increased tourism might result from the rehabilitation of relations between Israel and the Arab world, opening up prospects for tech-based travel solutions. The Arab world is making significant investments in the creation of smart cities, and Israeli businesses might contribute technology and knowledge in fields like IoT, AI, and big data to support the development of sustainable and cutting-edge urban centers. Increased cooperation may create chances for collaborative healthcare research and development, which might result in improvements in medical technology and therapies.

6.1.4 Challenges at domestic level

The collective memory and identity of Arab societies, particularly Palestinians, have been profoundly impacted by the Arab-Israeli conflict. A strong emotional commitment has been developed to the Palestinian cause as a result of the historical story of eviction and relocation. Many Arabs share Palestinians' plight and see Israel as an occupying force. Because it is perceived as a betrayal of their national aspirations and the suffering of their Palestinian brothers, any attempts at normalization with Israel may encounter considerable resistance as a result of this emotional link. In an interview with Dr. Syed Qandil Abbas, he highlighted the existence of a significant gap between the state level and societal level regarding the recognition and acceptance of Israel. While some states have officially recognized Israel, the broader society has not embraced this notion and remains resistant to normalizing relations with Israel, especially if it comes at the expense of Palestinian interests. This societal reluctance poses a considerable challenge to the prospects of Arab-Israeli rapprochement at the domestic level. Despite certain governments acknowledging Israel's existence, the sentiments of the general population remain largely unchanged. The prevailing view among many Arabs is that accepting or normalizing relations with Israel would entail compromising Palestinian rights and aspirations. This deep-rooted sentiment makes it difficult for Arab societies to accept or support initiatives aimed at strengthening ties with Israel, as they perceive such actions as prioritizing Israel's interests over their own.¹⁶⁰ Arab media and educational systems frequently present

¹⁶⁰ Dr. Syed Qandil Abbas, " Interviewed by Yumna Rashid, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, June 14,2023

Israel negatively, highlighting the Israeli occupation, violations of human rights, and plight of Palestinians.¹⁶¹ This exacerbates pre-existing biases and the public's poor opinion of Israel. These narratives influence public opinion and therefore make it may be difficult for Arab leaders to pursue reconciliation politically since they run the danger of appearing to be rejecting the needs and feelings of their own people. Organizations from the civil society, activists, and grassroots movements are essential in influencing public opinion and rallying support for causes like the Palestinian cause. These organizations frequently try to keep up the pressure on governments to take a strong position against Israel. They plan demonstrations, rallies, and social media initiatives to spread anti-Israel sentiment and put pressure on governments to avoid normalizing ties. Muslims, Christians, and Jews all place a great deal of cultural and religious value on Jerusalem. Arab societies may respond strongly to any perceived harm to Jerusalem's religious and cultural heritage. Changes to the status quo of sacred sites or policies that are seen as favoring Israel can lead to public unrest and hostility to measures for peace. A diverse strategy is needed to address issues with public opinion and popular feeling. Arab states must interact with their people, listen to their concerns, and explain the possible advantages of rapprochement, such as increased economic cooperation, regional stability, and enhanced diplomatic ties. Promoting intercultural conversation, grassroots activities that enhance communication and cross barriers, and people-to-people interactions can also help alter perceptions and increase support for rapprochement. Achieving a viable Palestinian state and addressing the fundamental causes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can allay public anxiety and foster a more favorable atmosphere for Arab-Israeli relations.

6.2 Future prospects for Arab -Israeli rapprochement at regional level

6.2.1 Regional economic prospects

Economic integration is one possible area of cooperation between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Arab nations looking to diversify their economies may be very interested in Israel's highly developed economy and booming tech industry. Certain Arab nations have recently demonstrated a desire to collaborate with Israel on economic matters, including trade and investment. The relationship between Israel and its Arab neighbors may be strengthened by

¹⁶¹ Irina Tsukerman, "Ongoing Challenges Threaten the Abraham Accords' Survival," *The Media Line*, January 2, 2023, <https://themedialine.org/news/opinion/ongoing-challenges-threaten-the-abraham-accords-survival/>.

further economic integration and collaboration, which would be profitable for all sides.¹⁶² Israel's economy is highly developed, with a thriving tech industry and top-notch innovation skills. By getting access to these cutting-edge technology and innovations, Arab nations may profit from expanded commerce with Israel. Israel would then have access to fresh markets and assets throughout the Arab world. More economic interconnectedness and stability in the region may result from increased commerce. Israel welcomes millions of visitors each year because to its rich cultural history. By positioning themselves as complementary travel destinations or by providing package tours that include Israel and their own country, Arab nations may profit from a rise in tourism to Israel. As a result, the region's economy may expand more quickly and Israelis and Arabs could engage in more cultural contact. With a significant concentration of start-ups and venture capital financing, Israel boasts a strong IT sector. Access to these inventions and expertise might help Arab nations benefits from expanded technological collaboration with Israel. Access to Arab markets and resources might be advantageous for Israel as well. Increased technological collaboration may also result in cooperative research and development projects that help both Israelis and Arabs.¹⁶³

6.2.2 Regional security prospects

The Middle East's security situation is complicated and complex, and a variety of internal and foreign challenges need to be tackled. These are some conceivable outcomes for regional security in the future: Counterterrorism is one possible area of cooperation between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Extremist organizations like ISIS and al-Qaeda pose challenges to both Israel and numerous Arab nations. Increased collaboration between these nations may result in more effective intelligence sharing and coordinated counterterrorism initiatives. It may also result in improved regional military capabilities if Israel and its Arab neighbors cooperate more on security issues.¹⁶⁴ For instance, Arab nations may benefit from sharing Israel's cutting-edge military know-how to better protect themselves from foreign attacks. Joint military exercises

¹⁶² Mona Massalha, "Economic Effects of Regional Economic Integration: The Case of the Abraham Accords," *Open Journal of Political Science*, 12, no. 04 (October 2022), 702-717. doi:10.4236/ojps.2022.124038.

¹⁶³ Keith Boyfield, "Abraham Accords Generate Real and Tangible Benefits: What Remains to Be Done," Egic, April 5, 2022, <https://www.egic.info/abraham-accords-generate-real-benefits>.

¹⁶⁴ Amr Yossef, "The Regional Impact of the Abraham Accords," Modern War Institute, March 1, 2021, <https://mwi.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/regional-impact-abraham-accords.pdf>.

and defense planning might result from such collaboration, further enhancing regional security. The future of regional security cooperation between Israel and its Arab neighbors looks bright overall. Threats that both countries face, such as terrorism and Iranian aggression, may spur more collaboration, enhancing regional defense capabilities and lowering the likelihood of confrontation. To achieve these gains, however, would need for ongoing efforts to increase Arab and Israeli confidence and collaboration, as well as political determination on both sides to place a high premium on security cooperation.

6.2.3 Regional environmental prospects

In the Middle East, where there are many environmental difficulties including water shortages, desertification, and air pollution, environmental concerns are growing more and more significant. Significant environmental opportunities for the region might result from the mending of relations between Israel and the Arab world. The Arab-Israeli rivalry has accelerated environmental deterioration over time, resulting in pollution, loss of biodiversity, and harm to water supplies. Particularly in this region, a major cause of stress and strife has been the lack of water. There is rising opportunity for cooperation amongst these nations as governments in the area acknowledge the significance of sustainable development and environmental conservation. There are now more opportunities for expanded environmental cooperation in the area thanks to the Abraham Accords, which were recently signed by Israel and a number of Arab nations, including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Sudan. In the context of improved relations between Israel and the Arab world, collaboration on environmental issues has the potential to increase. The states might cooperate to address environmental issues and advance sustainable development by exchanging information and resources. To address shared environmental issues including water shortages, climate change, and pollution, the area might launch collaborative research and development projects.¹⁶⁵ New techniques and technology may result from this, which would be advantageous to Israel and the Arab world. Initiatives in environmental education between Israel and Arab nations might include cooperative training sessions, conferences, and workshops. This might support public education about environmental challenges and the promotion of sustainable practices. With

¹⁶⁵ Rumaitha Al Busaidi, "The Quest for Water: Will the Abraham Accords Change the Water Landscape for the Region," Atlantic Council, December 23, 2020, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-quest-for-water-will-the-abraham-accords-change-the-water-landscape-for-the-region/>

technologies like waste-to-energy and recycling, the area might collaborate to create waste management strategies that are more effective and sustainable. This may lessen the quantity of garbage produced and lessen the environmental effect. On sustainable tourism projects like ecotourism and cultural tourism, Israel and Arab nations might cooperate. This might support eco-friendly tourist strategies and safeguard the region's rich natural and cultural heritage.¹⁶⁶ There is a need to safeguard and conserve the region's abundant biodiversity of plants and animals. Together, Israel and the Arab world might create collaborative conservation projects including protected areas, animal corridors, and habitat restoration programs. The region is extremely susceptible to climate change's effects like droughts. Cooperation between Israel and Arab nations might be used to generate renewable energy sources, store carbon, and implement energy efficiency measures.

6.2.4 Saudi-Iran Rapprochement impact on the progress of Arab-Israeli normalization

The conflict between Iran and Israel may become less prominent if relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia are improved and tensions are reduced. The process of redefining the enemy in the context of normalizing Arab-Israeli relations could be hampered by the prospective Iran-Saudi relationship. If relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia get better, it might draw focus away from the long-standing hostility between Israel and the Arab countries. It might be more difficult for Arab states who have already begun the normalization process to recast Israel as a friend while still juggling their relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia. The process of resolving old conflicts and forging new alliances may become more challenging due to the altering regional dynamics brought on by a prospective Iran-Saudi reconciliation.¹⁶⁷ The prospective Iran-Saudi rapprochement could result in the creation of new regional Middle Eastern alliances or blocs. The course of Arab-Israeli normalization could change if Arab states ally with Saudi Arabia in handling regional issues, notably those involving Iran. By concentrating on regional issues and alliances, Arab states may become less interested in cooperating with Israel under

¹⁶⁶ Dr. Daniel Schatz, "The Abraham Accords: Politico-Economic Drivers and Opportunities," Trends Research & Advisory, November 15, 2020, <https://trendsresearch.org/research/the-abraham-accords-politico-economic-drivers-and-opportunities/>.

¹⁶⁷ Sarah Zaaimi, "Is Saudi-Iran Reconciliation Threatening the Future of Israeli Normalization?," Atlantic Council, April 21, 2023, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/is-saudi-iran-reconciliation-threatening-the-future-of-israeli-normalization/>.

the Abraham Accords, which would delay the pace of new normalization pacts.¹⁶⁸ In an interview with Dr. Syed Qandil Abbas, he explained that If Iran and Saudi Arabia's relations improve, the diplomatic environment in the region may experience substantial changes.¹⁶⁹ Some Arab nations that have already established diplomatic ties with Israel might try to mediate the dispute between Saudi Arabia and Iran by drawing on their connections to both nations. Their stance on a number of regional problems, including their relationship with Israel under the Abraham Accords, may change as a result of this diplomatic interaction. The dynamics emerging from a prospective reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia may have an effect on the diplomatic initiatives and plans employed by Arab nations to normalize relations with Israel. During a discussion on the prospects of Arab-Israeli rapprochement in an interview with Clive Jones, he highlights that more states have the potential to normalize relations with Israel, but under certain conditions. For instance, he suggests that Saudi Arabia, as a representative in the Palestine conflict, may consider normalization with Israel contingent upon the achievement of a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Additionally, an important question arises regarding whether Israel will be willing to accept these conditions.¹⁷⁰ Overall, the process of normalizing Arab-Israeli relations is made more complex and unclear by the anticipated Iran-Saudi rapprochement. The developing geopolitical environment impacted by the Iran-Saudi connection makes it more difficult to redefine the enemy, invent a new ally, and navigate altering regional dynamics. The chances and results of Arab-Israeli normalization in the context of a prospective Iran-Saudi reconciliation will be significantly shaped by these elements.¹⁷¹

6.2.5 Challenges at regional level

Middle East is characterized by deep-rooted rivalries and competing interests among different regional powers. Countries such as Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia have their own agendas and geopolitical ambitions, which often intersect with the Arab-Israeli conflict. These regional rivalries can complicate efforts towards rapprochement, as some countries may actively oppose

¹⁶⁸ "Impact of the Saudi-Iranian Rapprochement on Middle East Conflicts," Crisis Group, a April 19, 2023, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iran-saudi-arabia/impact-saudi-iranian>.

¹⁶⁹ Dr. Syed Qandil Abbas, Interviewed by Yumna Rashid, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, June 14,2023

¹⁷⁰ Clive Jones, Interviewed by Yumna Rashid, Online Interview, July 4,2023

¹⁷¹ Dr. Syed Qandil Abbas, Interviewed by Yumna Rashid, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, June 14,2023

or undermine any steps taken towards normalizing relations with Israel to protect their own interests or gain leverage in the region. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a core issue in the region and has implications beyond the immediate parties involved. Arab countries have historically supported the Palestinian cause, advocating for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the rights of Palestinian refugees. As long as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains unresolved, it will continue to impact regional dynamics and complicate efforts towards broader Arab-Israeli rapprochement. In an interview, Dr Syed Qandil Abbas points out that security is a major concern for numerous Arab states, primarily due to the presence of non-state actors like Hamas, Hezbollah, and other militant groups. These groups have a history of engaging in armed conflict with Israel, posing a perceived threat to regional stability. Consequently, some Arab countries may display hesitancy in normalizing relations with Israel, as they fear potential security risks. These risks include retaliatory attacks and the potential for internal instability fueled by extremist elements who oppose any efforts towards rapprochement.¹⁷² External powers, including the United States, Russia, and various European countries, have vested interests and influence in the region. Their involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict and related regional issues can either facilitate or hinder rapprochement efforts. The alignment of regional actors with different external powers can create divisions and impede coordinated efforts towards Arab-Israeli reconciliation. Regional sentiment and public opinion also play a crucial role in shaping the dynamics of Arab-Israeli rapprochement. The collective memory, historical narratives, and cultural ties within the region have created a deep emotional connection to the Palestinian cause. Public opinion in many Arab countries strongly supports the Palestinian struggle and may view normalization with Israel as a betrayal. Arab states must navigate this sentiment and carefully manage public perceptions to gain support for rapprochement initiatives.¹⁷³ Overcoming these challenges at the regional level requires inclusive dialogue, mediation, and confidence-building measures. Engaging regional powers, addressing security concerns, promoting economic cooperation, and seeking mutually beneficial solutions can help build trust and foster an environment conducive to Arab-Israeli rapprochement. Additionally, international support, diplomatic efforts, and regional initiatives

¹⁷² Dr. Syed Qandil Abbas, Interviewed by Yumna Rashid, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, June 14, 2023

¹⁷³ Yoel Guzansky, Kobi Michael, "The Emerging Abraham Accords: The Challenges of Positive Change," The Washington Institute, September 25, 2020 , <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/emerging-abraham-accords-challenges-positive-change>.

that promote peace and stability can play a vital role in facilitating dialogue and reconciliation among regional actors.

6.3 Future prospects for Arab -Israeli rapprochement at international level

Increased Arab-Israeli reconciliation has the potential to have various positive effects on the international level. A deeper alliance between Arab nations and Israel would ease tensions and advance stability in the region, which might have wider effects on world security. Because the region is a crucial center for the energy supply in the world, any violence or unrest there might have serious economic and political repercussions elsewhere. The region's economy might benefit from more economic cooperation between Arab nations and Israel, which could have beneficial knock-on repercussions for the global economy. A closer relationship between Arab nations and Israel could aid in extending diplomatic networks and fortifying ties with other major world powers. The Middle East is home to some of the largest oil reserves in the world and has a sizable and expanding consumer market, which may present significant business opportunities for international companies. A tighter connection between Arab nations and Israel might serve to deepen relationships between these nations and the US, as previously indicated, since the US has been instrumental in mediating recent accords between Israel and Arab nations. Also, improved relations between Israel and the Arab world would promote greater regional integration and collaboration, which would be advantageous for world peace and security. But there are also possible dangers connected to closer ties between Israel and the Arab world on a global scale. For instance, any considerable increase in hostilities between Israel and its Arab neighbors might be detrimental to the security and stability of the whole world. Any apparent partiality or bias towards Israel may further encourage anti-Western sentiment in the region and elsewhere. Thus, any international and worldwide initiatives to encourage reconciliation between the Arab and Israeli populations will need to be properly handled and balanced.

6.3.1 Challenges at International level

The involvement of external powers in the Arab-Israeli conflict can pose challenges to normalization. External actors such as the United States, Russia, and European Union countries, often have their own strategic interests and may exert influence to shape the dynamics of the conflict. Their differing approaches and policies can complicate efforts towards normalization and impede consensus-building among Arab states. Global power dynamics: The global

balance of power and the relationships between major powers can impact Arab-Israeli normalization. Shifts in alliances, geopolitical realignments, and changes in the international order can create uncertainties and complexities in the pursuit of normalization. Arab states must carefully navigate these power dynamics to secure international support and ensure the sustainability of the normalization process. International perception and media narratives: The international perception of the Arab-Israeli conflict, shaped by media narratives and public opinion, can influence the support or opposition towards normalization. Negative portrayals of Israel or perceived injustices against Palestinians in the media can generate resistance to normalization efforts. Arab countries must proactively engage with international media, shape narratives, and highlight the potential benefits of normalization to garner international support. Addressing these challenges at the international level requires skillful diplomacy, strategic engagement, and sustained dialogue with key international actors. Building alliances, fostering regional cooperation, leveraging economic opportunities, and effectively communicating the rationale for normalization are essential to overcome these challenges and advance the prospects of Arab-Israeli rapprochement.

Conclusion, Findings and Recommendations

Despite historical tensions, recent developments have shown signs of change, indicating a potential shift towards peace and collaboration. This transformation is primarily driven by political and economic elites within Arab states, who are focused on implementing crucial economic reforms and improving stability. Economic considerations, such as increased trade and investment opportunities, have played a pivotal role in fostering this rapprochement. Israel has successfully cultivated closer ties with Gulf states through a strategic approach, strengthening its overall position. Shared concerns, especially regarding the containment of Iran's influence, have provided a foundation for collaboration between Arab states and Israel, aligning their interests with those of other international players. The United States, with its global influence and close ties to both Israel and Arab states, has acted as a significant catalyst for Arab-Israeli reconciliation. Arab states see Israel as a means to further their interests, including military cooperation and economic benefits in the U.S., influenced in part by the presence of a powerful Jewish lobby. Furthermore, global trends favoring normalization and regional integration, driven by economic interdependence and shared security concerns, have

promoted closer ties between Arab states and Israel. This international climate acknowledges the importance of collaboration and stability in advancing regional prosperity. Nevertheless, the sustainability and effectiveness of this rapprochement will hinge on the continued cooperation and commitment among Arab states and Israel. Challenges at domestic, regional, and international levels will undoubtedly test the resilience of these newfound relations. All parties involved in this, including the global community, civil society groups, and the governments of both Arab states and Israel, will need to work together and put out consistent effort in order to achieve this. The likelihood of a larger Arab-Israeli détente ultimately rests on each party's capacity to put aside differences, develop mutual confidence, and cooperate for regional peace, stability, and prosperity.

Findings:

The findings on the research “The Growing rapprochement between Israel and Arab states: Causative factors and prospects” are:

1. The historical pattern of conflict and tension in Arab-Israeli relations has shown signs of change, indicating a potential shift towards peace and collaboration. The Arab-Israeli rapprochement is the outcome of a historical process, with evidence indicating a long-standing state of conflict that has evolved over time to reach a point of normalization.
2. The Arab Israeli rapprochement primarily involves political and economic elites, rather than establishing a deep connection between the general populations of the respective nations. Arab leaders, recognizing the potential benefits of normalization, are particularly focused on implementing economic reforms within their countries. These reforms aim to improve economic conditions and promote stability, which in turn have influenced the willingness to explore closer ties with Israel.
3. Economic considerations, such as increasing trade and investment opportunities, have played a role in driving some Arab states to pursue normalization with Israel.
4. Israel has achieved success in its relations with the Gulf states by employing an outside-inside strategy. By strengthening its ties with the Gulf countries, Israel can enhance its leverage in dealing with the Palestinians more effectively.
5. The shared interest in containing Iran's influence has provided a basis for further collaboration between Arab states and Israel, as well as convergence with other international players. Arab

states and Israel have an interest in containing Iran's influence due to the country's growing international isolation and its escalating disruptive operations in the region.

6. The United States has played a significant role in fostering Arab-Israeli reconciliation, leveraging its global influence and close relationships with Israel and Arab states. Arab states perceive Israel as a means to pursue interests such as military cooperation and economic in the US as there is significant presence of a powerful Jewish lobby in the US. This perception motivates Arab states to seek closer ties with Israel to enhance their cooperation with the United States.
7. Global trends towards normalization and regional integration, driven by economic interdependence and shared security concerns, have fostered closer ties between Arab states and Israel. This favorable international climate recognizes the importance of collaboration and stability in advancing regional wealth and stability.
8. Despite facing challenges at the domestic, regional, and international levels, the potential for broader Arab-Israeli rapprochement depends on the durability and effective cooperation among Arab states and Israel.
9. If Arab states and Israel are prepared to address the fundamental problems that have traditionally caused war and as long as diplomatic attempts are made, a more peaceful future in the Middle East is achievable.

Recommendations

These suggestions might be considered for the wider Arab-Israeli rapprochement for the regional peace process.

1. To foster confidence and settle unresolved concerns, encourage direct talks between the heads of Arab states and Israel.
2. Address the conflict's underlying issues, such as the unresolved status of the Palestinian issue and the competing territorial and resource claims of Israelis and Palestinians.
3. Encourage joint ventures, trade agreements, and other types of economic integration between Israel and Arab nations.
4. Foster people-to-people relationships between Israelis and Arabs through organizing educational programs, cultural events, and other activities.

5. Encourage security cooperation between Arab nations and Israel to handle common security issues including terrorism.
6. To advance more freedom, accountability, and transparency, encourage political reform in Israel and the Arab states.
7. To support honest and fair reporting and to combat the spread of hate speech and incitement, promote media cooperation between Arab states and Israel.
8. Encourage religious tolerance between Arabs and Israelis by reducing religious tensions and by supporting projects that involve interfaith communication.
9. Encourage scientific collaboration between Israel and Arab nations to advance technological innovation and tackle common environmental and health issues.
10. Advocate for gender equality, women's access to education, and economic possibilities for women in Israel and the Arab world.
11. Support Educational Programs, Internships, and Other Efforts to Promote Leadership and Active Citizenship: Support educational program, internships, and other initiatives to promote young engagement in the peace process.
12. Foster regional integration and collaboration between Israel and Arab nations in sectors including energy, water management, and transportation.
13. Address human rights issues and encourage adherence to the law in both Arab countries and Israel.
14. Promote international backing for regional peace, stability, and cooperation by involving important international players including the UN, EU and other multilateral organizations.

Bibliography

List of Interviewees

Clive Jones, Professor of Regional Security in the School of Government and International Affairs, Member of the Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at Durham University, Online Interview, July 4, 2023

Dr. Syed Qandil Abbas, Assistant Professor, School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, In Person Interview, June 14, 2023

Government publications/Documents /Releases

"Abraham Accords: Warm Peace, Transforming Middle East." UAE Embassy in Washington, DC, accessed March 13, 2023. <https://www.uae-embassy.org/discover-uae/foreign-policy/abraham-accords-warm-peace-transforming-middle-east>.

"IRAN'S DESTABILIZING ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST." GovInfo | U.S. Government Publishing Office, July 16, 2014. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-113hrg88732/html/CHRG-113hrg88732.htm>.

"Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II)." UN Peacemaker, 28/09/1995. <https://peacemaker.un.org/israelopt-osloII95>.

"Joint Declaration on Full Normalization of Relations Between Israel, the Kingdom of Morocco, and the United States." United States Department of State, January 6, 2021. <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Joint-Declaration-US-Morocco-Israel.pdf>.

"Joint Statement of the United States, the Kingdom of Bahrain, and the State of Israel." United States Department of State, September 15, 2020. <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Bahrain-Israel-Agreement-signed-FINAL-15-Sept-2020-508.pdf>.

"Joint Statement on the UAE-U.S.-Israel Religious Coexistence Working Group to Advance Interfaith and Intercultural Dialogue and Counter Religious Intolerance and Hatred." United States Department of State, March 29, 2022. <https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-uae-u-s-israel-religious-coexistence-working-group-to-advance-interfaith-and-intercultural-dialogue-and-counter-religious-intolerance-and-hatred>.

"Joint Statement on the Normalization of Relations Between Sudan and Israel." United States Department of State, January 6, 2021. <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Sudan-AA.pdf>.

"Middle East Free Trade Area Initiative (MEFTA)." United States Trade Representative. <https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/other-initiatives/middle-east-free-trade-area-initiative-mefta>.

The Abraham Accords, 2020. U.S. Department of State. Accessed March 2, 2023. <https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/>.

The Arab Peace Initiative, 2002. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Accessed September 8, 2023. https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=a5dab26d-a2fe-dc66-8910-a13730828279&groupId=268421.

Treaty of Peace, Diplomatic Relations, and Full Normalization Between the United Arab Emirates and the State of Israel. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, September 15, 2020. <https://www.state.gov/treaty-of-peace-diplomatic-relations-and-full-normalization-between-the-united-arab-emirates-and-the-state-of-israel/>.

U.S. Mission Israel. "Peace to Prosperity - A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People." January 30, 2020. <https://il.usembassy.gov/peace-to-prosperity-a-vision-to-improve-the-lives-of-the-palestinian-and-israeli-people/>.

UN Peacemaker. "Framework for Peace in the Middle East and Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel (Camp David Accords)." September 17, 1978. <https://peacemaker.un.org/egyptisrael-frameworkforpeace78>.

"20 million NIS to entities that develop innovative training and placement in High-Tech for Arab sector." Israel Innovation Authority, August 11, 2022. <https://innovationisrael.org.il/en/news/20-million-nis-entities-develop-innovative-training-and-placement-high-tech-arab-sector>.

Books

Avner Cohen. *The 1967 Six-Day War.* Washington, D.C.: Wilson Center, July 18, 2022. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-1967-six-day-war>.

Herzl, Theodor. *The Jewish State: (Der Judenstaat).* Leipzig and Vienna: M. Breitenstein's Verlags-Buchhandlung, February 1896. <http://www.mideastweb.org/jewishstate.pdf>.

Hinnebusch, Raymond. *The International Politics of the Middle East.* Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2003, 7-8. <https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/35008/341386.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

Mearsheimer, John J., and Stephen M. Walt. *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy.* New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007. <https://bamdadi.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/the-israel-lobby-and-us-foreign-policy-bamdadi-dot-com.pdf>.

Rogan, Eugene L., and Avi Shlaim. *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 81. https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfile.php/7572878/mod_resource/content/1/%5BCambridge%20Middle%20East%20Studies%5D%20Eugene%20L.%20Rogan%2C%20Avi%20Shlaim%20-%20The%20War%20for%20Palestine%20Rewriting%20the%20History%20of%201948%20%282007%2C%20Cambridge%20University%20Press%29.pdf.

Shlaim, Avi. *Chapter 11: The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process.* In Louise Fawcett, ed., *International Relations of the Middle East.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 241-261. <https://users.ox.ac.uk/~ssfc0005/The%20Rise%20and%20Fall%20of%20the%20Oslo%20Peace%20Process.html>.

Stein, Kenneth W. "The Intifada and the Uprising of 1936-1939: A Comparison of the Palestinian Arab Communities." In Robert O. Freedman (ed.), *The Intifada: Its Impact on Israel, the Arab World, and the Superpowers*, Florida International University Press, 1991, 3-36. <https://ismi.emory.edu/documents/stein-publications/intifada.pdf>.

Tal, David. *War in Palestine, 1948: Israeli and Arab Strategy and Diplomacy*. London: Routledge, April 24, 2014, 18.

Journal articles

Al-Sayyid, Mustapha Kamel, Bahman Baktiari, and Michael Barnett. "The Impact of 9/11 on the Middle East." *Middle East Policy* 9, no. 4 (December 2002): 75-101. doi:10.1111/1475-4967.00084.

Alin, Erika G., Rex Brynen, Robert O. Freedman, Joost R. Hilterman, Michael C. Hudson, F. R. Hunter, Zachary Lockman, Joel Beinin, David McDowall, and Aryeh Shalev. "Dynamics of the Palestinian Uprising: An Assessment of Causes, Character, and Consequences." *Comparative Politics* 26, no. 1 (1993-1994): 1-22. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/422027>.

Bligh, Alexander, and Erez Cohen. "A Comparative Analysis of the Israeli and Saudi Economies and an Argument for Bilateral Cooperation." *Taylor & Francis*, November 7, 2022. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03068374.2022.2134657>.

Boms, Nir Tuvia, and Hussein Aboubakr. "Pan Arabism 2.0? The Struggle for a New Paradigm in the Middle East." *Religions* 13, no. 1 (2021): 28. doi:10.3390/rel13010028.

Certainly! Here's the updated citation with the link in Chicago Manual of Style 17th Edition format:

Cohen, Erez, and Alexander Bligh. "A Comparative Analysis of the Israeli and Saudi Economies and an Argument for Bilateral Cooperation." **Asian Affairs** 54, no. 1 (2023): 11. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03068374.2022.2134657>.

Dachtler, Petra. "From New to Normal: Two Years after the Abraham Accords." *GIGA Focus Middle East*, Number 5 (2022). <https://www.giga->

hamburg.de/en/publications/giga-focus/from-new-to-normal-two-years-after-the-abraham-accords.

Dawn, C. Ernest. "The Arab-Israeli Confrontation: A Historian's Analysis." *Denver Journal of International Law & Policy* 5, no. 1 (1975): 373. <https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2241&context=djilp>.

Dr. Mohammad Salim Al-Rawashdeh. "Arab National Security (Dimensions, Perceptions, Challenges, Risks and Future Strategy)." *Saudi Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, February 14, 2019, <https://www.saudijournals.com/media/articles/SJHSS-4-2-69-82-c.pdf>

Edgar O'balance. "WRITING OFF THE RESISTANCE (1973): Arab Guerrilla Power 1967-1972." *Taylor & Francis Online*. February 4, 2021. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.2307/2535608>.

Itamar Rabinovich. "The Strategic and Political Consequences of the June 1967 War." *Israel Affairs* 23, no. 2 (2017): 207-220. doi:10.1080/23311886.2017.1299555.

Loevy, Karin. "The Sykes-Picot Agreement's Regional Moment: Drawing Lines of Development in a New and Open Space." *AJIL Unbound* 110 (January 20, 2017): 7. https://www.academia.edu/33345902/The_Sykes_Picot_Agreements_Regional_Moment_Drawing_Lines_of_Development_in_a_New_and_Open_Space.

Lustick, Ian S. "The Balfour Declaration a Century Later: Accidentally Relevant." *Middle East Policy* 24, no. 4 (2017): 166-176. doi:10.1111/mepo.12314.

Massalha, Mona. "Economic Effects of Regional Economic Integration: The Case of the Abraham Accords." *Open Journal of Political Science* 12, no. 04, October 2022, pp. 702-717. DOI:10.4236/ojps.2022.124038.

Podeh, Elie. "The Many Faces of Normalization: Models of Arab-Israeli Relations." *Strategic Assessment - Research Forum (INSS)*, vol. 25, no. 1 (March 2022). <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/the-many-faces-of-normalization-models-of-arab-israeli-relations/>.

- Rosenberg, David. "How Israel is Turning Its High-tech into Global Political Power." *Fathom Journal*, no. 21 (November 28, 2018), <https://fathomjournal.org/how-israel-is-turning-its-high-tech-into-global-political-power/>.
- Roth, Ariel Ilan. "Reassurance: A Strategic Basis of U.S. Support for Israel." *International Studies Perspectives* 10, no. 4 (November 2, 2009): 378-393. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1528-3585.2009.00384.x>.
- Salem, Paul. "The after-effects of the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah war." *Contemporary Arab Affairs* 1, no. 1 (January 8, 2008): 15-24. doi:10.1080/17550910701812255.
- Schwarz, Rolf. "The Political Economy of State-Formation in the Arab Middle East: Rentier States, Economic Reform, and Democratization." *Review of International Political Economy*, 15, No. 4 (October 2008): 599.
- Sousa, David. "The 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars: Causes of Triumphs and Failures." *E-International Relations*, May 26, 2014. <https://www.e-ir.info/2014/05/26/the-1967-and-1973-arab-israeli-wars-causes-of-triumphs-and-failures>.
- Vonderhaar, Lora. "The Abraham Accords: A Peace Deal in Name Only." *Georgetown Security Studies Review*, October 23, 2020. <https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2020/10/23/the-abraham-accords-a-peace-deal-in-name-only>.

Reports

- Al Busaidi, Rumaiha. "The Quest for Water: Will the Abraham Accords Change the Water Landscape for the Region." Atlantic Council, December 23, 2020. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-quest-for-water-will-the-abraham-accords-change-the-water-landscape-for-the-region/>.
- Alvite Ningthoujam. "The military–security dimension of the 2020 Abraham Accords: An Israeli perspective." Observer Research Foundation, July 28, 2022. <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-military-security-dimension-of-the-2020-abraham-accords/>.

- Aita, Samir. "The Innovation Landscape in Arab Countries." Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), May 19, 2017.
- Bernadaux, Chloé. "Agricultural Technology in the Middle East: Sowing the Seeds of the Future." Middle East Institute, May 19, 2021. <https://www.mei.edu/publications/agricultural-technology-middle-east-sowing-seeds-future>.
- Ben Mimoune, Nejla, and Nader Kabbani. "Economic Diversification in the Gulf: Time to Redouble Efforts." Brookings, January 14, 2021. <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Economic-diversification-in-the-Gulf.pdf>.
- Boyfield, Keith. "Abraham Accords Generate Real and Tangible Benefits: What Remains to Be Done." The Euro-Gulf Information Centre, April 5, 2022. <https://www.egic.info/abraham-accords-generate-real-benefits>.
- Boyfield, Keith. "Abraham Accords Generate Real and Tangible Benefits: What Remains to Be Done." Egic, April 5, 2022. <https://www.egic.info/abraham-accords-generate-real-benefits>.
- Citrinowicz, Danny. "Israel and the UAE on Iran: Shared Foe, Different Perspectives." Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 1, 2020. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/israel-and-uae-iran-shared-foe-different-perspectives>.
- Dourian, Kate. "Challenges to the Energy Transition in the Gulf Countries." Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW), October 2, 2019. https://agsiw.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Dourian_Petro-Diplomacy-2019-Scene-Setter_ONLINE.pdf.
- Egel, Daniel, Shira Efron, and Linda Robinson. "The Abraham Accords Could Have Wide-Reaching Economic Benefits." RAND, March 2021. <https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1149-1.html>.
- Einhorn, Robert, Richard Nephew. "The Iran Nuclear Deal: Prelude to Proliferation in the Middle East." Brookings, March 8, 2022. <https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-iran-nuclear-deal-prelude-to-proliferation-in-the-middle-east/>.

- Fakir, Intissar. "Morocco and Israel: Economic Opportunities, Military Incentives, and Moral Hazards." Middle East Institute, December 1, 2022. <https://www.mei.edu/publications/morocco-and-israel-economic-opportunities-military-incentives-and-moral-hazards>.
- Ferziger, Jonathan H., and Gawdat Bahgat. "Israel's Growing Ties with the Gulf Arab States." Atlantic Council, July 2020. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Israel%E2%80%99s-Growing-Ties-with-the-Gulf-Arab-States.pdf>.
- Feierstein, Gerald M. "Iran's Role in Yemen and Prospects for Peace." Middle East Institute, December 6, 2018. <https://www.mei.edu/publications/irans-role-yemen-and-prospects-peace>.
- Friedman, Brandon. "Israeli-Arab Normalizations: An Inflexion Point for Middle Eastern Politics." Institut Montaigne, January 20, 2021. <https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/israeli-arab-normalizations-inflexion-point-middle-eastern-politics>.
- Gause, F. Gregory. "Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War." Brookings, July 2014. <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/english-pdf-1.pdf>.
- Guzansky, Yoel, and Ari Heistein. "The benefits and challenges of UAE-Israel normalization." Middle East Institute, September 16, 2020. <https://www.mei.edu/publications/benefits-and-challenges-uae-israel-normalization>.
- Guzansky, Yoel, and Kobi Michael. "The Emerging Abraham Accords: The Challenges of Positive Change." The Washington Institute, September 25, 2020. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/emerging-abraham-accords-challenges-positive-change>.
- Halperin, Liora. "Origins and Evolution of Zionism." Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 28, 2015. <https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/01/origins-and-evolution-of-zionism>.

Habibi, Nader. "Implementing Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030: An Interim Balance Sheet." Crown Centre for Middle East Studies, April 2019. No. 127. <https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/middle-east-briefs/pdfs/101-200/meb127.pdf>.

Ibish, Hussein. "Why Bahrain is Embracing Normalization with Israel." Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, September 14, 2020. <https://agsiw.org/why-bahrain-is-embracing-normalization-with-israel/>.

Keith Boyfield. "Abraham Accords Generate Real and Tangible Benefits: What Remains to Be Done." Euro-Gulf Information Centre, April 5, 2022. <https://www.egic.info/abraham-accords-generate-real-benefits>.

Krasna, Joshua. "Understanding the Wave of Normalization in the Middle East." Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 13, 2021. <https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/01/understanding-the-wave-of-normalization-in-the-middle-east/>.

Leaf, Barbara A. "The Gulf's Calculus on UAE-Israel Deal." The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 19, 2020. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/gulfs-calculus-uae-israel-deal>.

Lüdtke, Lisa. "The Socioeconomic Cost of Iran's Hegemony." GIS Reports, May 16, 2022. <https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/irans-influence-middle-east/>.

Martini, Jeffrey, and Becca Wasser. "The Next Generation of Leaders in the Gulf." RAND, February 15, 2016. <https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/02/the-next-generation-of-leaders-in-the-persian-gulf.html>.

Morror, Rabeh. "Innovation in the MENA Region." Strategic Sectors | Economy & Territory, 2019. <https://www.iemed.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Innovation-in-the-MENA-Region.pdf>.

Nakhleh, Hany. "THE 2006 ISRAELI WAR ON LEBANON: ANALYSIS AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS." U.S. Army War College, 2007. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA468848.pdf>.

- Neriah, Jacques. "The Prospects of Normalization between Sudan and Israel." Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, January 4, 2023. <https://jcpa.org/the-prospects-of-normalization-between-sudan-and-israel/>.
- Rafati, Naysan. "Operation Defensive Shield: Lessons and Aftermath." The Washington Institute, June 18, 2002. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/operation-defensive-shield-lessons-and-aftermath>.
- Robinson, Heather M., Ben Connable, David E. Thaler, and Ali G. Scotten. "Sectarianism in the Middle East: Implications for the United States." RAND Corporation Provides Objective Research Services and Public Policy Analysis | RAND, 2018. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1681.html.
- Robert Greenway. "Greater Than The Sum Of Its Parts: Abraham Accords Free Trade Area." Hoover Institution, March 7, 2023. <https://www.hoover.org/research/greater-sum-its-parts-abraham-accords-free-trade-area>.
- Saab, Bilal Y. "The Gulf Rising: Defense Industrialization in Saudi Arabia and the UAE." Atlantic Council, May 7, 2014. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-gulf-rising-defense-industrialization-in-saudi-arabia-and-the-uae/>.
- Saban, Navvar. "Factbox: Iranian Influence and Presence in Syria." Atlantic Council, November 5, 2020. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/factbox-iranian-influence-and-presence-in-syria/>.
- Schneider, Gregory L. "The 1973 Oil Crisis and Its Economic Consequences." Bill of Rights Institute, March 4, 2023. <https://billofrightsinstitute.org/essays/the-1973-oil-crisis-and-its-economic-consequences>.
- Shmuel Even, Tomer Fadlon, and Yoel Guzansky. "The Economic-Strategic Dimension of the Abraham Accords." Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), October 12, 2020. <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/abraham-accords-economic-dimension/>.

Teitelbaum, Joshua. "The Arab Peace Initiative: A Primer and Future Prospects." Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, August 27, 2009. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/141408/Arab-Peace-Initiative.pdf>.

Telhami, Shibley. "The Camp David Accords: A Case of International Bargaining." University of Maryland. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/6847/doc_6849_290_en.pdf.

"The Israel-Lebanon War and Its Implications for Regional Security." Policy, January 2, 2007. <https://www.ips.org.pk/the-israel-lebanon-war-and-its-implications-for-regional-security/>.

"The Race Against Time for Smarter Development, Chapter 17: The Arab States." UNESCO, April 21, 2022. <https://www.unesco.org/reports/science/2021/en/arab-states>.

Vakil, Sanam, and Neil Quilliam. "The Abraham Accords and Israel-UAE normalization: Shaping a new Middle East." Chatham House, March 28, 2023. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/03/abraham-accords-and-israel-uae-normalization>.

Vakil, Sanam, and Neil Quilliam. "The Abraham Accords and Israel-UAE Normalization: Shaping a New Middle East." Middle East and North Africa Programme, March 2023. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/2023-03-28-abraham-accords-israel-uae-normalization-vakil-quilliam-1.pdf>.

Zaami, Sarah. "Is Saudi-Iran Reconciliation Threatening the Future of Israeli Normalization?" Atlantic Council, April 21, 2023. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/is-saudi-iran-reconciliation-threatening-the-future-of-israeli-normalization/>.

News articles

Alexander Cornwell, John Irish. "Exclusive: Israel to sell air defence system to United Arab Emirates." *Reuters*, September 23, 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/exclusive-israel-sell-air-defence-system-united-arab-emirates-sources-say-2022-09-22/>.

Bearak, Max, and Naba Mohieddin. "U.S. lifts Sudan's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism." *The Washington Post*, December 14, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/sudan-remove-state-terror-list/2020/12/14/7f119482-3d10-11eb-aad9-8959227280c4_story.html

Bearak, Max, and Naba Mohieddin. "U.S. lifts Sudan's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism." *The Washington Post*, December 14, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/sudan-remove-state-terror-list/2020/12/14/7f119482-3d10-11eb-aad9-8959227280c4_story.html

Benito, Andrea, and Marc Ferranti. "UAE, Bahrain Tech Leaders Gauge Impact of Israel Accords on Business." *CIO*, October 20, 2020. <https://www.cio.com/article/190863/uae-bahrain-tech-leaders-gauge-impact-of-israel-accords-on-business.html>

Gerges, Fawaz. "Morning in the Middle East." *Project Syndicate*, August 4, 2021. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/middle-east-new-era-of-rapprochement-diplomacy-by-fawaz-a-gerges-2021-08>

Holland, Steve. "Morocco joins other Arab nations agreeing to normalize Israel ties." *Reuters*, December 10, 2020. <https://www.reuters.com/article/israel-usa-morocco-int-idUSKBN28K2CW>

Hussain, Hana. "Remembering the Second Intifada." *Middle East Monitor*, September 28, 2017. <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170928-remembering-the-second-intifada/>

"Israel's Trade with Arab Nations Reaches Record Increases After Normalization." *Middle East Monitor*, July 4, 2022. <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220704-israels-trade-with-arab-nations-reaches-record-increases-after-normalisation/>

"Israel-Morocco agreement follows a history of clandestine cooperation." *TRT World*, May 23, 2023. <https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/israel-morocco-agreement-follows-a-history-of-clandestine-cooperation-42268>

"Israel's Trade with Arab Nations Reaches Record Increases After Normalization." *Middle East Monitor*, July 4, 2022.

<https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220704-israels-trade-with-arab-nations-reaches-record-increases-after-normalisation>

Karen Young. "Diplomacy in the Gulf Follows the Money." *Al-Monitor*, January 13, 2021. <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/01/diplomacy-money-gulf-saudi-arabia-qatar-israel-sudan-fdi-gcc.html>

Klein Leichman, Abigail. "New innovation centers to encourage Arab entrepreneurship." *ISRAEL21C*, December 12, 2022. <https://www.israel21c.org/new-innovation-centers-to-encourage-arab-entrepreneurship>

Meuse, Alison Tahmizian. "Israel Inks Twin Arab Treaties with UAE, Bahrain." *Asia Times*, September 16, 2020. <https://asiatimes.com/2020/09/israel-inks-twin-arab-treaties-with-uae-bahrain/>

Miller, Aaron David. "How Israel and the Arab World Are Making Peace Without a Peace Deal." *POLITICO*, May 27, 2020. <https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/05/27/israel-arab-peace-netanyahu-282727>

Nair, Deepthi. "The UAE Economy's Transformation Under Sheikh Khalifa's Leadership." *The National*, May 14, 2022. <https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/economy/2022/05/14/how-the-uae-economy-transformed-under-sheikh-khalifas-leadership/>

Quitaz, Suzan. "From covert to overt: Warming relations between Bahrain and Israel no longer a secret." *The New Arab*, December 17, 2019. <https://www.newarab.com/analysis/kingdom-bahrain-reaching-out-israel>

"Remembering Israel's 'Operation Pillar of Defense.'" *Middle East Monitor*, November 14, 2017. <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20171114-remembering-israels-operation-pillar-of-defence/>

Sadek, George. "United Arab Emirates: New Decree-Law Abolishes Law on Boycott of Israel." *Global Legal Monitor*, September 9, 2020. <https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2020-09-09/united-arab-emirates-new-decree-law-abolishes-law-on-boycott-of-israel/>

- Slotkin, Jason. "On Path To Normalize Relations, UAE Formally Ends Boycott Of Israel." *NPR*, August 29, 2020. <https://www.npr.org/2020/08/29/907457538/on-path-to-normalize-relations-uae-formally-ends-boycott-of-israel>
- Sly, Liz. "Lost Decade: The Unfinished Business of the Arab Spring." *The Washington Post*, January 24, 2021. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2021/arab-spring-10-year-anniversary-lost-decade/>
- Solomon, Shoshanna. "Israel Surges to Take Fifth Place in New Bloomberg Innovation Index." *The Times of Israel*, January 22, 2019. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-surges-to-take-fifth-place-in-new-bloomberg-innovation-index>
- Stewart, Harry. "How Israeli Agriculture Technology is Changing the World." *Sare-El*, January 10, 2021. <https://sareltours.com/article/israeli-agriculture-technology-tour>
- Sadek, George. "United Arab Emirates: New Decree-Law Abolishes Law on Boycott of Israel." *Global Legal Monitor*, September 9, 2020. <https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2020-09-09/united-arab-emirates-new-decree-law-abolishes-law-on-boycott-of-israel/>
- Tsukerman, Irina. "Ongoing Challenges Threaten the Abraham Accords' Survival." *The Media Line*, January 2, 2023. <https://themedialine.org/news/opinion/ongoing-challenges-threaten-the-abraham-accords-survival>
- Turak, Natasha. "Saudi Arabia is the 'White Whale' of Israel's Middle East Peace Deals." *CNBC*, October 12, 2020. <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/12/saudi-arabia-is-the-white-whale-of-israels-middle-east-peace-deals-jerusalem-official-says.html>
- Silverstein, Ken. "The World Wants Israel's Energy and Environmental Innovations." *Forbes*, December 1, 2022. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2022/12/01/the-world-wants-israels-energy-and-environmental-innovations/?sh=3ca302182026>

"Water Management: Morocco, Israel Called Upon to Strengthen Their Partnership (Israeli Minister)." *MapNews*, September 17, 2022. <https://www.mapnews.ma/en/actualites/economy/water-management-morocco-israel-called-upon-strengthen-their-partnership-israeli>

Online Research Articles

Al Busaidi, Rumaita. "The Quest for Water: Will the Abraham Accords Change the Water Landscape for the Region." Atlantic Council, December 23, 2020. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-quest-for-water-will-the-abraham-accords-change-the-water-landscape-for-the-region/>.

Alhalwany, Islam. "Israel is Becoming a Cybersecurity Guarantor in the Middle East. Here's How." Atlantic Council, November 18, 2021. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/israel-is-becoming-a-cybersecurity-guarantor-in-the-middle-east-heres-how/>.

Al-Khuzai, Hala Hamza Aziz, and Abduladheem Abdulwahid Al-Shurki, "Sustainable Agricultural Development and Its Impact on Achieving Food Security: Saudi Arabia as a Model for the Period 2004-2020." *PalArch's Journals*, April 15, 2022. <https://archives.palarch.nl/index.php/jae/article/view/10970>.

Ardemagni, Eleonora. "Israel and the Gulf: A Security Partnership Around the Corner." ISPI, February 16, 2022. <https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/israel-and-gulf-security-partnership-around-corner-33179>.

Bermant, Azriel. "The Abraham Accords: A Gamechanger for the Region and Europe's Role in It?" Institute of International Relations (IIR), November 1, 2023. <https://www.iir.cz/en/azriel-bermant>.

Cuevas, Ana Salas. "A New Era in Israel-Morocco Relations." *Global Affairs UNAV*, March 26, 2022. <https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/a-new-era-in-israel-morocco-relations>.

Danielson, Robert Eugene. "Nasser and Pan-Arabism: Explaining Egypt's Rise in Power." Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007. <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36697105.pdf>.

- Dogan, Ali. "Saudi Arabia's Neom Diplomacy." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 3, 2021. <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/83975>.
- Ettinger, Yoram. "Saudi Arabia's 'Interest Driven' Israel Policy." Jewish Policy Centre, April 4, 2023. <https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2023/04/04/saudi-arabias-interest-driven-israel-policy>.
- Fakhro, Elham. "Selling Normalization in the Gulf." MERIP, June 23, 2021. <https://merip.org/2021/06/selling-normalization-in-the-gulf/>.
- Fiore, Massimiliano. "The Abraham Accords and the Palestinian Issue." E-International Relations, November 1, 2020. <https://www.e-ir.info/2020/11/01/the-abraham-accords-and-the-palestinian-issue/>.
- Hamid, Shadi. "A Separate Peace? What the Gaza Crisis Means for Arab Regimes." Brookings, May 16, 2022. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/05/16/a-separate-peace-what-the-gaza-crisis-means-for-arab-regimes/>.
- Huberman, Koby. "Israeli-Palestinian Peace: The Abraham Accords have created space for a radical transformation in our thinking." Fathom, April 2022. <https://fathomjournal.org/israeli-palestinian-peace-the-abraham-accords-have-created-space-for-a-radica-transformation-in-our-thinking/>.
- "Israeli Agro-Technology." Jewish Virtual Library, Accessed September 17, 2022. <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/israeli-agro-technology>.
- Mezran, Karim and Alissa Pavia. "Morocco and Israel are friendlier than ever thanks to the Abraham Accords. But what does this mean for the rest of North Africa?" Atlantic Council, October 7, 2021. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/morocco-and-israel-are-friendlier-than-ever-thanks-to-the-abraham-accords-but-what-does-this-mean-for-the-rest-of-north-africa/>.
- Nishino, Masami. "Progress in the Normalization of Relations between the Arab Countries and Israel." National Institute for Defense Studies, accessed March 21, 2022. <http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/pdf/2022/e02.pdf>.

- Ningthoujam, Alvite. "The military–security dimension of the 2020 Abraham Accords: An Israeli perspective." ORF, July 28, 2022. <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-military-security-dimension-of-the-2020-abraham-accords/>.
- Norlen, Tova, and Tamir Sinai. "The Abraham Accords – Paradigm Shift or Realpolitik?" George C. Marshall European Center For Security Studies, October 2020. <https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/security-insights/abraham-accords-paradigm-shift-or-realpolitik>.
- Rabbani, Mouin. "The Palestinians and Arab Normalization of Greater Israel." Arab Reform Initiative, December 21, 2021. <https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/the-palestinians-and-arab-normalization-of-greater-israel/>.
- Rahman, Omar. "The Emergence of GCC-Israel Relations in a Changing Middle East." Brookings, July 28, 2021. <https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-emergence-of-gcc-israel-relations-in-a-changing-middle-east/>.
- Rahman, Omar. "What's Behind the Relationship Between Israel and Arab Gulf States?" Brookings Institution Blog, January 28, 2019. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/28/whats-behind-the-relationship-between-israel-and-arab-gulf-states/>.
- Riedel, Bruce. "How to Understand Israel and Saudi Arabia's Secretive Relationship." Brookings, July 11, 2022. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-to-understand-israel-and-saudi-arabias-secretive-relationship>.
- Roehrs, Pine. "Weak States and Implications for Regional Security: A Case Study of Georgian Instability and Caspian Regional Insecurity." Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS), Research Paper No. 97, 2005. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/31842/rieas097.pdf>.
- Rowaq Arabi. "New Alliances, Increased Repression Characterise Post-Arab Uprisings Middle East." Crisis Group, November 8, 2022. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/new-alliances-increased-repression-characterise-post-arab-uprisings-middle>.

- Saghir, Jamal, "Innovation: A Game-Changing to Drive Water Security in the Arab Region." LinkedIn, September 8, 2020. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/innovation-game-changing-drive-water-security-arab-region-saghir?trk=public_profile_article_view.
- Siali, Mohamed. "Morocco and Israel, beyond mere diplomatic normalization." Atalayar, August 5, 2022. <https://atalayar.com/en/content/morocco-and-israel-beyond-mere-diplomatic-normalisation>.
- Siam, Dr. Gamal. "Food Supply Crisis and the Role of Agriculture in the Middle East & North Africa (MENA) Region." IEMed, 2009. <https://www.iemed.org/publication/food-supply-crisis-and-the-role-of-agriculture-in-the-middle-east-north-africa-mena-region/>.
- "Suez Crisis." HISTORY, September 14, 2022. <https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/suez-crisis>.
- Salem, Paul. "The Oncoming Saudi-Israeli Normalization: Obstacles, Opportunities, and the US Role." Middle East Institute, September 5, 2023. <https://www.mei.edu/publications/oncoming-saudi-israeli-normalization>.
- "The Abraham Accords and the Palestinian Issue." E-International Relations, November 1, 2020. <https://www.e-ir.info/2020/11/01/the-abraham-accords-and-the-palestinian-issue/>.
- "The military–security dimension of the 2020 Abraham Accords: An Israeli perspective." ORF, July 28, 2022. <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-military-security-dimension-of-the-2020-abraham-accords/>.
- "The 3 'No's of Khartoum." CAMERA, May 25, 2023. <https://www.sixdaywar.org/immediate-aftermath/the-3-nos-of-khartoum/>.
- Youssef, Hesham. "Can the 'New Normalizers' Advance Israeli-Palestinian Peace?" United States Institute of Peace (USIP), June 16, 2021. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/06/can-new-normalizers-advance-israeli-palestinian-peace/>.
- Encyclopedia/Wikipedia/ web source**
- "Neoclassical Realism." Wikipedia, October 1, 2009. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neoclassical_realism.

Interview articles

Uziyel, Keren. "The economic implications of the Israeli-Arab normalization agreements - Interview with EIU. FocusEconomics." November 26, 2020.
<https://www.focus-economics.com/blog/the-economic-implications-of-the-israeli-arab-normalization-agreements-interview-with-eiu>.

Annex 1

Name: Clive Jones

Designation: Professor of Regional Security in the School of Government and International Affairs, Member of the Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at Durham University, England

Email: c.a.jones@durham.ac.uk

Annex 2

Name: Dr. Syed Qandil Abbas

Designation: Assistant Professor, School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad

Email: syed572@hotmail.com

Interview Questions

Factors

Q1. Do you think Arab-Israeli rapprochement is the result of historical process or it is an outcome of specific current circumstances?

Q2. Which regional geopolitical and geoeconomics factors have played role in driving the rapprochement between Arab and Israel?

Q3. How do domestic factors such as public opinion, political leadership and domestic interests

influence the rapprochement between Arab states and Israel?

Q4. What role has the United States and other external factors played in facilitating or hindering

Prospects

Q5. What are the prospects for further deepening and expanding the rapprochement

between Arab states and Israel

Challenges

Q6. What are the main challenges and obstacles that Arab states and Israel face in maintaining and deepening their cooperation and rapprochement?

Q7. How does Arab-Israeli rapprochement effects regional stability and Israel-Palestine conflict?