MARITIME SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES IN ARCTIC OCEAN REGION

By

Maaz Ahmed Khan

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Submitted by: Maaz Ahmed Khan Registration #: 18563 MPhil/IR/S20

Masters of Philosophy

Name in Full

International Relations

Discipline

Dr. Maliha Zeba Khan _____

Research Supervisor Signature of Research Supervisor

Dr. Muhammad Riaz Shad _____

HOD (IR) Signature of HOD (IR)

Prof. Dr. Khalid Sultan _____

Dean (FSS) Signature of Dean (FSS)

Brig. Syed Nadir Ali _____

Director General, NUML Signature of DG NUML

CANDIDATE DECLARATION FORM

I Maaz Ahmed Khan

Son of Abid Atiq

Registration # 18563 MPhil/IR/S20

Discipline International Relations

Candidate of **Masters of Philosophy** at the National University of Modern Languages do hereby declare that the thesis: **MARITIME SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES IN ARCTIC OCEAN REGION** submitted by me in partial fulfillment of MPhil degree, is my original work, andhas not been submitted or published earlier. I also solemnly declare that it shall not, in future, be submitted by me for obtaining any other degree from this or any other universityor institution.

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DEDICATION

With utmost devotions, I dedicated my whole work to my beloved and affectionate, Parents, Abid Atiq and Noushaba Abid.

LIST OF ABBREVIATION

AC	The Arctic Council
AEPS	Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy
AKI	Arctic Knowledge Institute
AMBI	Arctic Migratory Birds Initiative
ANPF	Arctic and Northern Policy Framework
ARCS	Arctic Challenge for Sustainability
ASW	Anti-Submarine warfare
AWI	Alfred Wegener Institute
BRI	Belt and Road
CAFF	Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna
CLCS	Commission on the Boundaries of the Continental Shelf
CLCS	Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
DEW	Distant Early Warning System
DoD	Department of Defense
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
FCAS	Future Combat Air Systems
GFZ	German Research Centre for Geosciences
HCDC	House of Commons Defence Committee
IASC	International Arctic Science Committee
IASS	International Arctic Science Symposium
ICC	Inuit Circumpolar Council

ITK	Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami
JMSDF	Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
LOSC	Law of the Sea Convention
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIPR	National Institute of Polar Research
NSR	Northern Sea Route
NWP	North Western Passage
PAME	Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment
PIK	Potsdam Research organization for Climate Impact Research
PSR	Polar Silk Road
R&D	Research and Development
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SLOCs	Sea Lanes of Communication
TSR	Transpolar Sea Route
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

Maps

Map 01: Lomonosov Ridge



Source: The Mountains Magazine

Map 02: Northwest Passage

Source: International Institute for Law of the Sea Studies

Map 03: Polar Silk Road



Source: Research Gate

Abstract

Due to its enormous natural resource reserves and strategic importance Arctic Ocean region is a vast and dynamic area that is receiving more and more attention from both state and non-state entities. The region's long-term sustainability and stability are threatened by substantial marine security and governance issues nevertheless. This research provides a thorough analysis of the major maritime security and governance issues that Arctic Ocean region is currently facing including the need for effectivegovernance and cooperation between Arctic states and the international community as well as territorial disputes, resource conflicts, and environmental risks. One of the primary challenges facing the Arctic Ocean region is territorial disputes. The Arctic Ocean is a complex region with overlapping maritime claims by the Arctic coastal states of Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States. The melting of the Arctic ice has increased access to the region's resources, including oil and gas, leading to a growing competition for maritime boundaries and exclusive economic zones. This competition has the potential to escalate into conflict and destabilize the region. Another challenge is resource conflicts. The melting of Arctic ice is creating new opportunities for commercialshipping, tourism and resource extraction. However the region's vast and fragile ecosystemis under threat from increased human activity including pollution and overfishing. Additionally the competition for resources has the potential to create tensions among Arctic states and non-Arctic actors. The need for effective governance and cooperation among Arctic states and the international community is critical to addressing these challenges. The Arctic Council an intergovernmental forum consisting of the Arctic coastalstates and other observer countries plays a crucial role in facilitating cooperation and addressing common challenges. However the Arctic Council's ability to manage governance challenges is limited by its lack of binding decision-making power. Matters inthe region can be seen becoming ever more tortuous with the ever growing interests and presence of non-regional states, particularly china.

Introduction

Arctic Ocean is located on the North Pole and distinguished by extremely cold climate, vegetation and wild life. The area includes Arctic Ocean and eight regional states: Canada, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, Denmark and the United States. Each of these defines Arctic for their own objectives therefore the anarchic structure provides structuralpressure to these governments as they believe their Arctic territories to begin at distinct inclinations. Arctic encircled by landmasses and countries it is accordingly administered by the laws of the oceans or the regional arrangements of Arctic countries. The way that Arctic has eight regional countries within the anarchic system with various needs, influence, and interests scattered across three landmasses settles on collaboration for sharedarrangements unavoidably troublesome, especially without a solid association to uphold rules and guidelines other than the UNCLOS.

Climate change creates opportunities and causes challenges as well as threats in Arctic which lacks a solid institutional framework that necessitates cooperation and governance. In Arctic, climate change and rising temperatures have been attributed to have the greatest impact. Rising global sea levels as a result of melting glaciers changes in biodiversity such as a decline in Arctic species and cross-border migration, and melting permafrost have repercussions for more than just the way of life of Arctic communities. As much as climate change poses a threat to the fragile Arctic region it also presents opportunities for development on par with the threat. During the summer months when Arctic Ocean coastal ice partially recedes shipping lanes, passages and other sea and land areas become accessible for maritime activities and resource extraction. Viable industries, the oil and gas industry, shipping, tourism, mining, and fisheries to name a few are expanding in Arctic.[1]

As environmental change in Arctic has become something of a decree for worldwide discussion and concern it ought to shock no one that the locale is drawing in significant level of political and scholastic interest. Since environmental change and its related issues are transnational in nature and generally impacted by emanations from the south they

[1] Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, "Impacts of a Warming Arctic-Arctic Climate Impact Assessment", (England: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 23.

require activity through global systems and multilateral discussions. With the establishment of boundaries and the focus of international attention previously nonexistentsovereignty issues have also become more pressing. Albeit every Arctic country is answerable for the improvement of its own region the Native northern networks are obviously affected and now and again dependent on unfamiliar ventures. Research endeavors and exchange collaboration with non-Arctic countries like the UK, Netherlands, and China. While the international community does not hinder the administration of Arcticnations' sovereign domains. Non-Arctic countries have continuously settled their financial abilities and conciliatory ties in Arctic.[2]

Non-Arctic states for example Germany and the UK have a long history with investigation and scientific expeditions in Arctic and base their characters on these. China and Japan have developed their Arctic personalities in the previous 10 years or so by underscoring transporting, fisheries, mining, and different assets. Since Arctic boom began in the 21st century non-Arctic countries have raised questions regarding whether Arctic is an international or regional space. Every one of the eight Arctic countries have their own domains in the locale and the limits of these regions are examined and settled upon by the eight countries none the less there are parts of Arctic Sea that are not yet legitimately characterized as having a place with any country and are in this way represented by the laws of the ocean.

Countries like Canada and Russia are resolute that Arctic ought to stay a public or local space following one-sided or multilateral choices by the littoral states who are seen as the district's essential partners and sovereign entertainers. The rising worldwide participation in exchange, improvement and sea business has led to the idea of Arctic as a worldwide region. Since Arctic is assuming a bigger part in worldwide environmental change conversations and its fiscal role is turning out to be more evident to a global crowd. Inquiries of territorial administration should be posed to decide if it is fit for adjusting the locale's developing advantages and transnational difficulties. For example environmental change with public and provincial strategies. Despite the fact that Arctic nations coordinate

[2] James Morrison, et al. *Recent Environmental Changes in the Arctic: A Review.* 2000

intently on issues of shared interest territorial administration isn't fundamentally important particularly for the more remarkable states like Russia, Canada, and the US.[3]

Arctic Ocean faces a range of governance challenges and territorial disputes as well that pose significant risks to regional stability, economic development, and environmental sustainability. One of the primary challenges is the ongoing territorial disputes between Arctic states over the delimitation of maritime boundaries and their overlapping claims to the continental shelf. These disputes have the potential to escalate into conflicts and threaten the peace and stability of the region.

Another significant challenge is the exploitation of natural resources, such as oil, gas, and minerals, which are becoming more accessible as Arctic sea ice melts. The exploitation of these resources poses significant environmental risks and raises concerns about the sustainability of the region's ecosystem. The impact of climate change is also a major governance challenge in Arctic Ocean. The melting of sea ice is leading to rising sea levels, changing ocean currents and altering Arctic environment with implications for the region's biodiversity, the livelihoods of indigenous communities and the global climate system. The governance challenges in Arctic Ocean are complex and require a multi-dimensional approach that balances the competing interests of the Arctic states, promotes environmental sustainability and ensures the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The Arctic Council a cooperative forum of the eight Arctic states has been instrumental in addressing some of these challenges but more needs to be done to promote effective governance and sustainable development in the region. The resolution of territorial disputes and the management of natural resources will be key issues in ensuring the long-term stability and prosperity of Arctic Ocean region.

Arctic Council is the major venue for political contact between Arctic governments. It is an elevated administration with a chair that rotates every two years based on common agreements and Assertions amongst the eight Arctic governments. The Arctic Council lacks the authority to enact or follow the rules it creates, and security considerations are

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[3] Oran Young. *Arctic Governance - Pathways to the Future*. 2010.

not on its agenda. Nonetheless, it is a platform for diplomatic exchange. As Observers, twelve non-Arctic nations and government and non-government organisations comprise the Council. Since the end of the Cold War the Arctic Council has been maintaining the region's peace and stability despite rapid environmental, political, and socioeconomic changes. It has thus far been able to navigate both traditional geopolitical concerns exacerbated by Russian rhetoric and recent threats to the worldwide liberal order posed by Trump's American isolationism. Several institutional characteristics have contributed to its dependability

There are constraints although it appears to be sufficiently funded the Arctic Council Secretariat has very little discretionary funding. Likewise the functioning groups depend on a couple of states to support their secretariats. Unfortunately they have restricted assets for continuous undertakings. Practically all initiatives are operationally supported by the governments that lobbied for them and by individual specialists who get their own money through national channels.. This makes key preparation and putting together new exercises past a couple of year window troublesome.[4]

Apart from Arctic Council, there are certain other regional governing bodies such as the Nordic Council, Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Northern Forum. However such organizations have not been able to garner much momentum on the region. Though it can be argued that other than Russia, Canada would be the second strongest contender in the region in terms of stakes and territorial claims. Hence for such a purpose Canada has invested millions of dollars in its own Arctic organizations and local governing bodies such the Yukon, Nunavut and NWT to further its own policies in the region.

Although the Arctic Council has made significant strides in recent years to become more transparent through its open-access archive it continues to struggle to be responsive to stakeholders, northerners, and taxpayers. This is not due to a lack of effort, but to the structure of the work. It is voluntary, thereby preventing binding obligations. Ministerial Declarations contain numerous subjective assertions that are difficult to defend, and no

[4] Paula Kankaanpää,, and Oran Young. *The Effectiveness of the Arctic Council*. 2012.

formal attempts are made to evaluate them[5]

Problem Statement

The Arctic Ocean Region has become a focal point of complex geopolitics among regional, extra regional and non-state actors. The dominant factor of emerging geopolitics is intensifying competition among actors to maximize their gains resulting in governance challenges and security concerns. Therefore, in the 21st century, Arctic Ocean has become an arena of contention with the evolving geopolitical

dynamics of the region making up of the interplay of power politics between great regional state actors (US and Russia),middle power (Canada) and small regional states (Norway, Finland, Greenland) as well asextra-regional actors such as China. Even extra regional actors are increasing their stakes in Arctic by investing heavily along with regional competitors. The power play being established in Arctic with Russia's 53 percent territorial claim motivating it to reflect a dominant presence, challenging the supremacy of the US in the world order.

Research Objectives

The study aims to:

- Understand various security and economic dynamics being faced by regional state actors in Arctic
- Analyze the impacts of changing dynamics over the regional geopolitics
- Evaluate the competitive environment due to interests of regional and extra-regional states as well as non-state actors in more accessible Arctic

Research Questions

The core question of the undertaken research is following:

- How is power politics being shaped up in Arctic in 21st century?

Whereas sub questions addressing the related issues are as follows:

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[5] Evan Bloom. *Establishment of the Arctic Council*. 2017.

- What are the security, economic and political dynamics of Arctic Ocean Region
- What are the current governance challenges in Arctic Ocean Region
- Which are the territorial disputes associated with UNCLOS (Beaufort Ridge, LomonosovRidge) that are shaping the regional politics of Arctic?
- Why China's increased role influencing the geopolitics of Arctic?

Literature Review

The objective of a literature review is to get an awareness of the existing research and arguments pertinent to a specific topic or area of study, as well as to identify research gaps on which to base a future study. The literature of thesis is divided into three parts. The first part of the literature review discusses and asses the works of authors on the historical background of Arctic. The second part of the review undertakes the literature on the theoretical framework of this thesis. Lastly the third part of the thesis evaluates the literary works on the contemporary dynamics of Arctic Ocean Region.

Historical Background: Taking in to account the historical background of Arctic Ocean, Oran R. Young establishes the importance of Arctic from historic to present day aspects, a place of growing political, geopolitical, and economic significance. For Oran Arctic is one of the world's biggest and smallest areas, comprising 15% of the earth's geographical mass yet being home to less than 1% of the global population. Its physical grandeur is accompanied by a richness of natural resources; in oil alone, Arctic produces most of Russia's output with a quarter of the United States'. In addition a number of indigenous people and civilizations reside in the Circumpolar North, laying the scene for international disputes. In this collection of writings, Oran Young lays the groundwork for understanding the international politics of Arctic as a unique territory.

Expanding the conventional approach to area studies, he investigates Arctic not just for its distinctive characteristics, but also as a testing ground for novel responses to a variety of challenges of global significance. Young tackles longstanding assumptions that marginalise the area, reaching beyond the romanticism of many onlookers to comprehend the intricate social and biological processes of Arctic. Young defines Arctic as a territory of worldwide significance, both in its own right and in comparison to other geopolitical

zones.[6]

Andy Bruno examines the historical implications of Soviet development amid climate change. The Soviet Union transformed the Kola Peninsula in the northwest corner of the country into one of the most inhabited, industrialized, militaristic and polluted regions of Arctic during the twentieth century. This transition shows that environmental relations affected the Soviet experience most significantly. Interactions with the natural world promoted industrial livelihoods and thwarted socialist ideals. Even nature participated in the communist project. The Nature of Soviet Power examines Soviet environmental historyfrom a comparative, long-term vantage point and concludes that it is entwined with the global goal of perpetual economic expansion among modern powers. This in-depth investigation of railroad construction, the mining and processing of phosphorus-rich apatite, reindeer herding, nickel and copper smelting. As well as energy production in the region investigates Soviet cultural perceptions of nature, development plans, lived experiences and modifications to the physical world. While Soviet power transformed nature, nature so transformed Soviet power.[7]

Theoretical Framework: Evaluating the literature on the theoretical framework of the thesis the scholarly works of Kenneth Waltz were reviewed. Neo-realism, according to Waltz, is an approach to international affairs based on anarchy and capacity distribution. On the other hand, realism implies that political power is the primary element in all political problems. It is essential to note that, although both express politics and realpolitik, the use of power or principle by a state distinguishes the two facets since they are governed by competing self-interest.[8]

One of the most significant distinctions between classical realism and neorealism is their impact on international relations. Classical realism emphasises that states are power-seeking entities. Thucydides says that states are units with self-interest. Classical neo-realism, as opposed to realism, which is based on power that has the capacity to influence

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[6] Oran young. *Arctic Politics: Conflict and Cooperation in the Circumpolar North*. University Press of New England, 1992

[7] Andy Bruno. *The Nature of Soviet Power: An Arctic Environmental History (Studies in Environment and History)*. 2016.

[8] Kenneth Waltz, Neal. *Theory of International Politics*. 1979

other people, nations, or organisations, is based on immutable nature. Power is based on tangible or intangible features, such as the use of armed forces, the degree of revenue, and the size of the state, according to realism. In addition, it suggests that power can be founded on immaterial factors such as influence, which may be contingent on widespread support, diplomatic skills, and national will.[9]

In international relations, anarchy is viewed as a source of conflict by neoclassical realism. In the absence of a central authority, states may create self-help structures of power in addition to anarchy. In addition, realism theory is predicated on the notion that states are the primary actors in international politics and are, therefore, the highest levels of global authority. Consequently, they constitute the primary power centre that is exerted for survival on the world stage. Realism is viewed as a significant power struggle, primarily for raw materials and market concentration. This approach contrasts from the neo-realist perspective, which recognises the presence of top organisations or authorities that govern production methods on a local or international scale.

Contemporary Dynamics of Arctic: Over the course of recent years, rapid changes in Arctic and the opportunities that these evolving dynamics bring, contemporary literature on Arctic is crucial to understand such dynamics. The insightful research of John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, and Robert Jervis on the necessity of multilateralism demonstrates that governments have lived under constrained frameworks in which their values and desires were rigidly imposed by norms and conservative beliefs. Arguably, these systems have been created directly or indirectly by political leaderships that have dictated their scope and method of application.

However, the necessity of international multilateral curtails the required autonomy, whereby the expression of communities and the contributions of people become limitless. Global cooperation will ensure that decisions will gradually transfer from a key concern to a community's extended borders. Modern systems according to Mearsheimer provides the ideal platforms for the formation of communities with diverse interests including industrial

[9] Mareike Oldemeinen,. *The Political Realism of Thucydides and Thomas Hobbes*. Feb. 2010.

prosperity, recreation demands, authority and activism, among others. The old mechanistic structure of power and domination must be altered, since it does not just diminish their comprehensive participation through creative contribution. Additionally it hinders their general growth and development. By achieving a free trade zone, economic interdependence is a crucial factor in the strengthening of a region and its future growth.[10]

In Energy Security and Geopolitics in the Arctic Hooman Peimani discusses the likely opportunities and difficulties that the arctic region may face as a result of climate change and global warming. In the coming decades it looks that the Arctic Ocean will transition from an icy landscape to a periodically ice-free and open state. Even though it is anticipated that there will be thick multiyear sea ice along the Canadian Arctic Archipelagos, the northern coast of Greenland and the winter Arctic Sea ice through the Arctic basin, they may not prevent a shorter and fruitful Arctic summer season in which trade routes are safe and manageable. Large icebergs on these routes mean that their viability and reliability remain in question. When these icebergs are present anywhere in the "shoulder season" for Peimani it might be problematic for ships because hurricanes and wind shifts can bring them into the trade routes. While examining the potential and difficulties of the Arctic's energy worth, another important factor that must be taken into account is the persistence of multiyear sea ice conditions in some locations.[11]

In his book, Robert Murray contends that the increased global interest in Arctic poses challenges for contemporary international relations, and that numerous concerns surround why and how Arctic countries are exercising their influence and claims over their northern territories, as well as why non-Arctic states are focusing on the region. In spite of the indisputable fact that interest in Arctic is increasing, relatively little research has been performed on the international relations aspects of this interest. No attempt has been made to characterise the region as a whole in the field of international relations, which has historically focused on special Arctic links. Development, the environment and climate

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[10] John Mearsheimer,. *Restricted Access A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe*. 1988.

[11] Hooman Peimani, Energy *Security and Geopolitics in the Arctic: Challenges and Opportunities in the21st Century* (World *Scientific Publishing*, 2013), 1-20

change, and indigenous populations dominate the majority of the literature on Arctic politics. The field of international relations which has traditionally focused on national and international security, has been virtually silent on Arctic challenges. It is vital to explain key concepts such as security, sovereignty, institutions and norms to comprehend why Arctic is so attractive. Due to the large number of states and organisations involved in Arctic international relations, the region is a perfect case study for scholars, politicians, and interested onlookers. In this systematic investigation of Arctic international relations, Murray and Nuttall have together a group of the world's leading scholars on Arctic problems to highlight the complexity and importance of circumpolar politics[12]

China is not an Arctic state, but its first Arctic white paper, published in January 2018, describes it as a "near-Arctic state." The Chinese government justifies its Arctic ambitions by describing its research history in Arctic, as well as the challenges and opportunities presented by climate change in Arctic. Due to the fact that China is not an Arctic state, it faces a challenge in terms of how to best legitimise its Arctic presence. China's Arctic white paper is an attempt to legitimise Chinese presence in Arctic.[13]

China's Arctic presence is driven by four factors, according to Srensen and Klimenko: 1) the willingness to develop polar exploration capabilities; 2) the achieving personal access to resources; 3) the desire to develop Arctic sea routes; and 4) the goal of establishing China a voice in the emerging Arctic governance regime. The fourth and last factor securing voice in Arctic governance is intriguing because it reflects China's unconventionalforeign policy approach[14]. Intellectuals such as Elisabeth Wishnick and Jianchao Peng&Njord Wegge note that this approach differs significantly from China's typical behaviour in other regions of the world, such as Africa and Latin America, wherebilateralism is the primary foreign policy instrument. Peng and Wegge explain that Chinafears "big power dominance" in Arctic from countries such as Russia and the United States.In the meantime time, China has failed to convince the lesser Arctic states that they rely onChina to prevent such Arctic

[12] Robert Murray. *International Relations and the Arctic: Understanding Policy and Governance*. 2014.
[13] *China's Arctic Policy*. The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, Jan. 2018.
[14] Ekaterina Klimenko,, and Camilla Sørensen. *Emerging Chinese–Russian Cooperation in the Arctic*. June 2017.

dominance.[15]

As a result of China's growing interest in Arctic affairs and Russia's extensive activities in the region, numerous experts contend that the geopolitical setting in Arctic is undergoing rapid transformation. In addition, whilst timing may be favourable for China, the United States' perception of its role in the region is in flux. Numerous scholars concur that the US must determine its role in Arctic, especially in a region that is undergoing rapid change.

According to a 2018 report by the Walsh School of Foreign Service, the current changes in Arctic have extensive environmental, economic, and strategic implications for the United States. Consequently, the United States must emphasise the significance of Arctic region and invest proportionally. If the U.S. fails to do so, it may be forced to invest asignificant amount of funds to keep pace with other nations such as Russia and China. The United States already lags behind Russia in icebreaker capabilities, whereas China plans to invest in more advanced icebreakers.[16] Granholm and Carlsson argue that the United States has adopted a "wait-and-see" approach to Arctic. Based on their perspective, the United States took concrete steps to further develop and implement its Arctic policies in response to the emergence of a new Arctic.[17]

Literature Gap: Though there is ample literature available on climate change in Arctic but literature on maritime security and emerging challenges that may arise as a result of evolving geopolitics in Arctic is limited. Furthermore there is little to no research or policies in Pakistan on Arctic Ocean Region

Core Argument

The structural dynamics behind evolving power politics amongst states is transforming the maritime security profile of Arctic Ocean Region by enhanced number of stake holders giving way to newer opportunities as well as competition in the region. This competition is giving to numerous governance challenges in Arctic as well in the form of territorial disputes and a bid to secure the natural resources in the region.

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[15] Jingchao Peng, and Wegge Njord. *China's Bilateral Diplomacy in the Arctic*. 2015.
[16] *Walsh School of Foreign Service Annual Report 2018*. Georgetown University, 2018.
[17] Niklas Granholm,, and Märta Carlsson. *The Big Three in the Arctic China's, Russia's and the United States' Strategies for the New Arctic*. 2016, p. 88.

Theoretical Underpinning

This thesis uses neoclassical realism as its theoretical foundation to investigate the factors that shape Arctic policies of regional and extra-regional nation-states, and what these policies portend for the prospective geopolitical circumstances in Arctic. Neoclassical realism has been selected as the theory due to its multi - dimensional approach which includes a greater number of analytical dimensions than other similar theoretical approaches. The most prominent writers of the theory being Gideon Rose, William Wohlforth, Jack Snyder and Thomas J. Christensen. Neo-classical realism contends that a country's foreign policy is primarily determined by its place in the global system, but that such institutional pressure must be sifted by intervening variables at the unit level. Therefore neoclassical realism involves two levels of analysis; systemic and domestic. This demonstrates the multifaceted approach of neoclassical realism to the analysis of foreign policy making it particularly pertinent for the research carried out in this thesis.

The theoretical approach of neoclassical realism permits the researcher to investigate the interaction between the systemic and domestic levels of analysis. In order to analyse as thoroughly as possible the variables that influence the foreign policy of regional and extra-regional state actors toward Arctic it is essential to examine both levels. For instance it would be insufficient to evaluate Russia's Arctic foreign policy approach without considering the impression of its standing in the international system by decision-makers or Russian economic indicators. Similarly the assessment would be somewhat deficient if systemic variables were excluded from an examination of Russia's Arctic policy. This is ever more prevalent given Russia’s unique form of governance structure where policies are centered to the Kremlin under Vladmir Putin’s leadership, it becomes even more vague when considering how much of Russia’s polices are the voices of the Nation and how much of them are the will Putin.

Furthermore these domestic variables allows us to assess Arctic Regions international security dynamics as well. When taking UK, which is a non-regional state, in to consideration, it mostly views Russia’s assertion in the region from a Cold War lens hence UK’s domestic policies targeted towards Arctic rely heavily on traditional security framework. When analyzing UK’s multilateral strategic ties with fellow NATO members

i.e. Denmark, Ice land and Canada in Arctic Ocean Region at its domestic roots under the framework of Neo Classical Realism, the research allows us to gain a better understanding of the international security and governance challenges in Arctic Region.

Subsequently the central debate for employing neoclassical realism in this thesis is the confirmation that the approach of state actors to Arctic can be best evaluated by employing a diverse theoretical approach that encompasses both the domestic and systemic dimensions. This also applies to the second part of the problem formulation which seeks to explain what Arctic policy of regional and extra regional powers means for the geopolitics in the region.

Neoclassical realism is utilised in International Relations not because to its ability to explain various events, but due to its emphasis on several levels of assessment and evasion of the fundamentalist authoritarianism that plagues other theories. In actuality, neoclassical realism is a new perspective on classic realism and neorealism. . Foreign policy studies provide neoclassical realism by examining the structure of the international system as well as domestic elements and their intricate interactions. Neo-classical realism insists that when studying the foreign policy of states in the context of the international system, one should consider the analytical strengths of neo-realists such as Waltz, Gilpin, and others, as well as the analytical strengths of unit level studies classical realists such as Morgenthau, Kissinger, and Wolfers.[18]

Neoclassical realism bases its analysis of foreign policy on the understanding of decision-makers of the systemic pressures that force them to make choices. The second intervening variable in neoclassical realism is the capability or perceived strength of states in respect to other states. In other words, despite the fact that neoclassical realists want systemic analysis, they do so through analysing the relative power of each state and the attitudes of decision-makers toward the circumstance. In a nutshell, neoclassical realism is the theory that attempts to combine microcosm and overarching theories in order to provide a better understanding of the foreign policies of nations. In actuality, the reductionist approach of

[18] Korab Karpowicz,. *Political Realism in International Relations*. 2010.

both realism and neorealism causes challenges in foreign policy analysis. Realism considers the unit level of analysis and disregards systemic effects, whereas neo-realism investigates the requirements of the international system and disregards effects at the country level. Therefore, neoclassical realists refer to both as incomplete. Neoclassical realism is attempting to address this deficiency.[19]

Neo-classical realists as opposed to neo-realists view interpretive perspectives and national frameworks of states are equally as important as system-level issues. While neoclassical realists acknowledge anarchy as a significant issue, they also maintain classical realist principles. This is why they are referred to as "neoclassical." In actuality, neo-realism is the international politics theory that explains the international consequences of state acts and reactions. Neorealism views states as opaque containers in which internal elements including individual aswell as social responsibilities and their influence on international policy conduct are irrelevant. Neorealist theory defers to realism for the explanation and study of state behaviour. Neo-classical realism does not reject neo-realist assumptions, but seeks to incorporate them to provide a better explanation for the foreign policy ofindividual governments. It seeks to explain the nations' comprehensive responses tospecific patterns in the international environment by emphasising the relationships and activities of states within the international system. Similarly to neo realists, neoclassical realists give the most attention to power and define it in terms of capabilities.[20]

Neo-classical realists in contrary to neo-realists, place equal importance on various levels of investigation as well as the international system's anarchical structure. Neoclassical realists contend that internal and local variables serve as a link between the independent variable (relative power) and the dependent variable (foreign policy outcomes). Interests of domestic groups, governmental interests, and views of elites all contribute to the formation of a nation's foreign policy. In this context Gideon Rose observes that theories of foreign policy attempt to explain what and when states aspire to achieve through foreign policy. According to Rose realists have disregarded these elements, and the primary

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[19] Ali Omar. *Is There Anything 'New' in Neoclassical Realism?* 2013.
[20] Gustav Meibauer,. *Neorealism, Neoclassical Realism and the Problem(s) of History.* 2021.

objective of neoclassical realism is to address these deficiencies.[21]

As with other forms of realism, neoclassical realists think that politics is a constant battle between states for power and security in an environment of scarcity. Since they feel that structure is essential, they say that anarchy is the primary cause of conflict. They embrace the impact of anarchy on state behaviour and begin with the premise that the demands of an anarchical system constrain state choices in foreign policy, implying that the random prioritization of independent systemic variables are determining factors in state foreign policy. In other words, the relative power of governments determines the nature of their foreign policies. However, like traditional realists, qualities of states and unit variables are also significant. Thus the means and capabilities of states have an indirect effect on their behaviour because systemic constraints and pressures operate through unit-level intervening variables. Foreign policy is shaped by unit-level characteristics such as the views of decision-makers and the structure of the state. Consideration is required to comprehend the connection between relative power distribution and foreign policy of both the internal and external environments in which a state's foreign policy operates. Therefore, the primary objective of neoclassical realism is to determine how the distribution of power in the international system, state incentives, and states' subjective structures toward the international system influence their foreign policy.[22]

Neoclassical realism is classified as classic because it employs the fundamental concepts of classical reality. Neoclassical realism however, is distinguished from classical realism by its worldwide level of analysis and concept of anarchy. In other words, neoclassical theorists employ a systemic approach that transcends the micro level (state) of analysis. In addition to structural variables, neoclassical realists place focus on subjective and nonstructural factors such as the attitudes of leaders. They claim that although superpowers are significant, their capabilities should be evaluated in light of an anarchical society. If we view anarchy as a benign phenomenon, then security would not be a rare occurrence; conversely if we view anarchy as a malignant phenomenon then security would be a rare

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[21] Gideon Rose. *Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy*. 1998.

[22] Jeffrey Taliaferro, and Steven Lobell. *Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*. 2012.

occurrence, and expanding power would become the primary objective of every state.[23]

Neo-classical realists reject the notion of neo-realism, which asserts that systemic pressures will immediately affect the behaviour of units. However they believe that the extent to which systemic pressures affect the behaviour of states in an anarchical system depends on relative power and internal factors of states. Therefore it is states' views and misperceptions, not actual reality that lead them to engage in arms rivalry or conflict. Those responsible for the equipment of military forces create a clear difference between offensive and defensive military equipment. Consequently, perceptions of leaders are the driving force behind certain foreign policies.[24]

Neoclassical realism emphasises on the central role of the state and aims to explain how and under what circumstances the internal characteristics of a state influence the understanding of international risks and possibilities and its foreign policy by decision-makers. The primary goal of neo-classical realism is to strengthen the processing capability of neo-realism by incorporating internal variables that serve as intermediaries between incentives, systemic motivations, and foreign policy decisions, since its proponents consider that the nature of the international system as exemplified by the balance of power and the magnitude of external threats, cannot adequately explain foreign policy behaviour. Together, internal and exterior components provide a more persuasive explanation.[25]

Although neo-classical realism accepts the neo-realistic assumption of anarchy, it opposes the notion that the systemic level is the only level of analysis for foreign policy analysis. Systemic, internal, and individual levels of study are incorporated into neoclassical realist foreign policy analysis. Despite being based on neorealist assumptions, neoclassical realism clearly rejects the claim that systemic analysis is the only approach to analyse international politics and foreign policy. Individual, internal, and systemic levels ofanalysis should therefore all be utilised in the analysis process, as each level explains a portion of

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[23]Brian Rathbunn, *Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism.* Taylor & Francis Group, 2008.

[24] Norrin Ripsman. *Neoclassical Realist Theory and the Limits of Structural Realism*. 2016, pp. 16–

[25] Jalal Firoozabadi,. *Neo-Classical Realism in International Relations.* 2016.

the phenomenon. According to Rose, neoclassical realism employs both internal and exterior elements. Neoclassical philosophers contend that a state's foreign policy is determined by its location in the international system and its relative power or capabilities. However, its relative strength has a complex and indirect effect on foreign policy since systemic pressures are mediated by unit variables. As a theory of foreign policy, neoclassical realism focuses on power more than any other component and, like neo realists, defines power as the capacity of states. It is important to emphasise that neoclassical realism has greater explanatory power than neorealism due to its emphasis on systemic and unit levels of analysis, as well as its consideration of historical context.[26]

Research Methodology

The study is explanatory in nature based on descriptive, analytical research methods. Since it is qualitative research, secondary data in the form of research papers, reports, books and documents has been collected and analyzed through thematic literature review. The study has been established on deductive reasoning where "structural dynamics behind evolving power politics amongst states" are acting as independent variable; while "maritime security profile of Arctic Ocean Region" is dependent variable of the undertaken research. There are three intervening variables as "enhanced number of stake holders," "newer opportunities," and "competition in the region".

Significance of the Study

Arctic is surrounded by states and is thus controlled by the laws of the seas or the territorial policies of Arctic nations in issue. The reality that eight nations have a stake in Arctic, namely Canada, Finland, Iceland, the Kingdom of Denmark, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States, with various needs, influence and incentives makes collaboration for mutual accord unavoidably difficult, particularly in the absence of an effective coordination for application of rules.

The goal of this thesis is to examine the determinants of Arctic maritime policy.

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[26] Arash Pashakhanlou,. *Comparing and Contrasting Classical Realism and Neorealism.* E-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 2009.

Understanding the developing geopolitics of Arctic requires an appreciation of the internal and systemic concerns of both regional and extra-regional states. In addition to their foreign policy conduct towards one another in the region.

Arctic strategy of the countries will be evaluated based on three distinct aspects. First the systemic factors, which will include an appraisal of the country's foreign policy. Followed by their economic strength and ultimately military capabilities. This thesis examines the perspectives of regional and extra-regional nations towards Arctic as well as their commercial interests and resource demands, at the national level. In the course of the analysis it becomes clear that these three elements influence to varied degrees the behaviour of these governments toward one another. Which in turn influences their policies in the region and ultimately effects the geopolitical aspects of Arctic. For instance, in part due to the systemic China approaches Arctic with a degree of confidence, but prudence. Russia pursues a very aggressive Arctic policy in order to revitalise its economy and reestablish itself as a world force. Since 2013 the United States has pursued a cautious Arctic policy but it is boosting its presence in the region and is likely to continue doing so to counter Russia and China's growing influence. The analysis reveals that the United States views Arctic from a security perspective but China and Russia view the region as an opportunity. In addition, the analysis demonstrates that China's and Russia's Arctic policies are mostly driven by their commercial interests and resource requirements, whereas the United States Arctic policy is largely driven by national security concerns. Furthermore Reservations have been expressed on a global scale about the potential for Russia and the West to engage in conflicts in Arctic. As a result of ongoing political tensions stemming from the crisis in Ukraine since 2014 which might affect Arctic cooperation and diplomatic ties. Climate change brings possibilities and challenges in Arctic which lacks a solid institutional structure that requires collaboration and governance. Based on these factors Arctic will grow increasingly contentious in the next years.

Delimitation

The pace of environmental change has accelerated in Arctic during the last three decades. It is due to this environment change that a boom in Arctic’s geopolitics have been observed. The study is limited only to the geopolitics of regional and extra regional states. Along with

security and governance challenges resulting from these geo political dimensions. Climate Change will not be a focus of the study.

Organization of the Study

Introduction comprises of the proposal of the research, problem statement. Research questions and objectives, literature review, core argument, the theoretical framework of the research and methodology that the research employed.

Chapter One "Understanding Arctic Ocean Security Environment: Historical Preview of the Region" provides the historical back ground on Arctic Ocean by giving an overview of the historical expeditions in the region and its significance over the course of Second World War and the Cold War

Chapter Two "Emerging of Power Politics between the US, Russia and Canada in New Millennium and their Security Dynamics" discusses and analyzes security and economic motivations of the major powerstates in Arctic i.e. US, Russia and Canada

Chapter Three: "Small Regional States, Organisations and Territorial Disputes: Arising Governance Challenges" discusses how Iceland and Greenland shape regional power dynamics. The chapter discusses the role of international and local governing organisations in the Arctic and how they affect structural dynamics. It also analyses regional maritime claims and territorial disputes.

Chapter Four "Extra Regional Actors in Arctic" addresses the economic and security dynamics of extra regional states i.e. Japan, Britain, Germany and Singapore in Arctic Ocean Region

Chapter Five: "China's Enhanced Role in Arctic" discusses China's growing presence and cooperation with Russia in the Arctic. The chapter examines Russian and US concerns about China's increasing influence in the Arctic. The chapter also discusses Arctic militarization and its potential effects on structural regional dynamics.

Conclusion, Findings and Recommendations provides an overview of the research, along with a summary of the key arguments of the thesis. Finally, recommendations suggests the steps that can be taken to facilitate and improve the security and governance challenges in the region.

Chapter One

Understanding Arctic Ocean Security Environment: Historical Preview of the Region

Historically Arctic region has been a site of exploration and exploitation for centuries. The region's harsh environment and remote location made it a challenging and dangerous place to explore, but also rich in natural resources. During the 19th and early 20th centuries, several countries, including Russia, Norway and the United States, launched expeditions to Arctic to map the region and search for valuable resources such as whale oil and furs. However it was not until the discovery of oil and gas in Arctic in the mid-20th century that the region became a significant focus of international attention. In the late 1950s the Soviet Union began drilling for oil in Arctic which led to concerns among other Arctic states about Soviet expansionism and territorial claims. The Cold War heightened tensions in the region, with Arctic becoming a potential flashpoint for conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The end of the Cold War brought a new set of challenges for Arctic region. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's Arctic coastline was exposed leading to increased interests in exploring and exploiting the region's natural resources. At the same time new environmental concerns emerged as climate change began to affect Arctic ecosystem and wildlife. In recent years Arctic has become an increasingly important region in global politics, as the melting of sea ice opens up new shipping routes and resource extraction opportunities. The region's geopolitical significance has led to increased tensions among Arctic states, with territorial disputes and resource conflicts becoming more pronounced. At the same time there have been efforts to establish cooperative frameworks for governance of the region, such as the Arctic Council, which includes representatives from all eight Arctic states.

Overall the historical developments in Arctic region can be understood through the lens of neo-classical realism which highlights the interplay between domestic politics, international power dynamics and environmental concerns. As the region continues to

evolve, understanding these factors will be essential for effective governance and peaceful cooperation among Arctic states.

This chapter is divided into four parts. Discussing Russia's historical presence in Arctic in the first part. In the second part US-Arctic historical significance is discussed followed by Canada in the third part. In the final part of the chapter small regional states such as Norway. Greenland and Iceland's historical discourse in Arctic is highlighted.

1.1 Russia's Historic Presence in Arctic

In order to escape difficult ice conditions farther north, the Russians put in place a trade route across Arctic to the fur-trading hub of Mangazeya on the Taz River in western Siberia before the beginning of 17th century. However, usage of this route was formally terminated very soon after as a consequence of restrictions by Tsar Michael in 1616 and 1619, which were partially designed to fend against foreign interference and partly to strengthen trade control.

The Lena-Kolyma section of the Northeast Passage was already widely and regularly used farther east. 1645 marked the beginning of trade along Arctic coast between the Kolyma and the Lena. In 1648, seven ships led by the Cossack Semyon Dezhnyov sailed from the west to the east. As a consequence Dezhnyov was the first European to sail the Bering Strait. In 1733–1743 the Russian Admiralty undertook the unprecedented Great Northern Expedition, which has never been surpassed in the history of polar exploration. Each detachment was entrusted with exploring a particular section of Arctic or Pacific coastline. Since they had been repeatedly blocked by ice the affected boats were impelled to either spend the cold weather in Arctic or return to port to try once more in the following year.27

Despite the fact that the maps, soundings, and cruising instructions created during the expedition were extremely helpful to subsequent navigators the difficulties that all of the detachments encountered due to ice led Russian official circles to come to the conclusion that the idea of a passable NEP was completely impossible. In reality a merchant named Nikita Shalaurov made the first effort to cross any part of the canal in the 18th century,

[27]Dominic Lieven, "The Russian Empire (1453–1917)." *The Oxford World History of Empire*, Oxford University Press, 2021, pp. 964–88.

although with official permission. He sought to sail from the Kolyma to the Bering Strait in 1762 however was halted by glacials. He and his crew vanished in 1764. The Russian navy's Fyodor Petrovich Litke conducted four trips to Novaya Zemlya between 1821 and 1824 inspecting the island's western shore and enhancing maps of the White Sea coast and Matochkin Shar Strait. Pyotr Kuzmich Pakhtusov surveyed a sizable stretch of the island's east coast between 1832 and 1835. When he made the first of two trips to Franz Josef Land in 1880, the Englishman Leigh Smith He was the first individual to sail there on his own steam. His ship, the Eira was destroyed by ice on his second voyage. In order to investigate and collect data on the southern shore, Smith built a house along the coast and spent the winter there. In the spring, small boats transported the party to Novaya Zemlya.[28]

Baron Eduard von Toll, a Russian explorer worked on the New Siberian Islands in 1886, 1893, and 1900–02. From the different wintering locations of their ship, Zarya he and his crew significantly contributed to the surveying and charting of the northwest coast of the Taymyr Peninsula and the New Siberian Islands during the final of these journeys. Number of people who have died while trying to find Sannikov Land a supposedly existing island north of the New Siberian Islands that, like many other allegedly existing "lands" in Arctic, most certainly does not. Between 1898 and 1908, 1894 to 1904 and 1910 to 1915. The Russians carried out coordinated hydrographic work in the Barents Sea, the Kara Sea, and east of Cape Chelyuskin. The 1913 discovery of Severnaya Zemlya the main accomplishment of the Russian navy's icebreakers Taymyr and Vaygach, has previously been acknowledged. However they also made Zhokov Island (in the De Long Islands) known between 1910 and 1915 completed thousands of miles of sounding excursions and hundreds of kilometres of shoreline observations. Amundsen embarked on the Maud in 1918 with the purpose of reenacting Nansen's veer in the Fram but with the sight of reaching a more northerly latitude by setting off from a place nearer Bering Strait. He required three years to accomplish the voyage through the Northeast Passage to the east and it wasn't until 1922 that the Maud stray under the captainship of Harald Ulrik Sverdrup. It was hauled back to the New Siberian Islands in two years, emulating the Jeannette's

[28]Denis Brig. “Fedor Litke - Russian Arctic Explorer.” *Military Review,* 2017.

itinerary rather than the Fram's, while worthwhile scientific study was carried out on both portions of the journey.[29]

Arctic Ocean Hydrographic Expedition 1910–1915 was the first Russian expedition to successfully traverse the channel, although it was not until 1914–1915 that they were successful in doing so. In the fall of 1910, two miniature ice-breaking steamers named Taymyr and Vaygach undertook a reconnaissance expedition into the Chukchi Sea. These vessels had been built particularly for the mission in St. Petersburg in 1909 and they were designed to break through thick ice. They sailed westward across Arctic coast of Siberia over the course of the next three years, doing soundings and surveys as they went and making their way back to Vladivostok each winter. An archipelago that was discovered in 1913 and given the name Emperor Nicholas II Land was located to the north of the Taymyr Peninsula (now Severnaya Zemlya). In 1914 the two ships, led by Captain Boris A. Vilkitsky set sail at the direction of the west with the goal of arriving in Archangel. Nevertheless circumstances compelled them to spend the winter on the western shore of Taymyr, and they finally finished their voyage in the summer of 1915.

During that time period, there were two separate private expeditions that set out from the western end to search for the Northeast Passage. Both of these expeditions began in 1912. In one occasion, the ship Svyataya Anna captained by Georgy L. Brusilov and ensnared in the ice of the Kara Sea drifted almost directly north and then west, passing past the northern beaches of Franz Josef Land. In the spring of 1914 fourteen men set off on a journey to Franz Josef Land which is situated farther to the south. There is no way to know what happened to the ship or the 10 people who stayed on board; just two of those who abandoned ship made it out alive. In the advent of geologist Vladimir A. Rusanov the expedition vessel Gerkules arrived to the Kara Sea prior until the close of the 1912 season on the northern edge of Novaya Zemlya. Along the southern beaches of the Kara Sea the remains of none of the expedition's eleven participants have been found.[30]

[29]"The Russian Empire and Russian Monarchy:" *Russian Monarchy*, Academic Studies Press, pp. 221–32.
[30]W Barr. "The Fate of Rusanov's Gerkules Expedition in the Kara Sea, 1913; Some Further Details and Recent Developments." *Polar Reacord*, 2009.

1.1.2 Soviet Union and Arctic Ocean (1922-1991)

A component of the endeavour to establish the northern sea route, the scope and size of exploration expanded significantly after the Russian Revolution of 1917. The number of polar stations, of which there were already five in 1917 rose, offering meteorological, ice reconnaissance and radio services. By the 1970s, there seemed to be more than 100 stations compared to 24 in 1932, 80 in 1948 and 80 in 1948. The employment of icebreakers and subsequently airplanes as scientific work platforms was pioneered. In 1929 and 1930, the icebreaker Sedov sent parties of scientists to Franz Josef Land and Severnaya Zemlya, the last significant unmapped land in the Soviet Arctic; the island chain had been thoroughly cartographed under Georgy Alekseyevich Ushakov from 1930 to 1932. The one-year journey of the Sibiryakov through the strait in 1932 was the first to traverse the channel north of Severnaya Zemlya and achieved significant scientific work. It offered an additional push to constructing the sea route, and icebreaker operations to examine sea and ice became yearly.

In 1932, the Soviet Union made its initial attempt at passage. The ice-breaking steamship Sibiryakov attempted the west-to-east passage. After rounding the northern tip of Severnaya Zemlya and calling at Tiksi and the mouth of the Kolyma, the ship lost its propeller in ice just prior to entering the Bering Strait and eventually sailed through the strait using improvised sails. After nearly reaching the Bering Strait from the west the following season, the Chelyuskin became entombed in permafrost and was ultimately annihilated in the Chukchi Sea. In 1934, the icebreaker FedorLitke completed the first accident-free crossing of the Northeast Passage from west to east in a single season. The following year, it guided the first cargo ships in the opposite direction through the channel.[31]

Since then, scores of boats have through the channel in both directions but through passes constitute just a tiny portion of the overall traffic in Russian Arctic seas the majority of which goes between the two ends of the passage to the mouths of the main Siberian rivers. Traffic between the west and Dudinka the primary transshipment port at the mouth of the

[31]Olga K Bogolepova,., et al. “The Cambrian of the Severnaya Zemlya Archipelago, Russia.” *Newsletters on Stratigraphy*, no. 1, Schweizerbart, Dec. 2001, pp. 73–91.

Yenisey now has a 12-month season. The whole channel, known in Russia as the northern sea route is passable from late June until late November. It has been open to international shipping since 1991. During 1978, the nuclear-powered icebreaker Sibir transported a cargo from the Atlantic to the Pacific over a high-latitude form of the Northeast Passage, north of Novaya Zemlya, Severnaya Zemlya and the New Siberian Islands. This experiment has not been replicated since.[32]

The fast growing fleet of Soviet icebreakers also contributed to the opening of Arctic. In 1929 and 1930 O.Schmidt led two research missions aboard the icebreaking ship Sedov.[33]The first year, a polar station was created where Georgy Sedov had spent the winter on Franz Josef Land, making it the world's most northern colony. A second station was established the following year on Domashniy Island on the western shore of Severnaya Zemlya. From 1930 to 1932 a special expedition concluded that the Severnaya Zemlya archipelago comprised of four bigger and a number of lesser islands, thereby filling in the last "white dots" on the map of Arctic. In 1932, the Chief Administration of the Northern Sea Route and additional polar stations and observatories were built in order to connect the western and eastern legs of the Northern Sea Route and provide a regular transit route from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. The All-Union Arctic Institute planned the first transit along the Northern Sea Route by the icebreaking ship Sibiriakov during a single cruise (presently known as Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute). The Sibiriakov departed Archangelsk, traversed the Kara Sea, and followed an uncharted northern route around Severnaya Zemlya to the Laptev Sea. In September, the propeller shaft failed the icebreaker drifted for eleven days and in October using sails it completed the firstsuccessful passage of the Northern Sea Route in a single cruise without wintering.

The icebreaker Cheluskin made its second trip from Murmansk to the Pacific Ocean in 1933. She was swept northward through Bering Strait by the prevailing current where she became ensnared in the pack ice of the Chukchi Sea and eventually sunk. Members of the expedition made their way to the ice, set up camp, and eventually were airlifted to safety.

[32]Brill "The Soviet Union in 1990." *On Dissidents and Madness*, 2009, pp. 135–38.
[33]Alexander Saburov,. "Arctic as a New Strategic Region in the Soviet Union in the 1920s–1930s and Transformation of the Arctic Science." *Global Arctic*, Feb. 2022.

In 1934 the Litke an icebreaker successfully made the journey from Vladivostok to Murmansk through the NSR. New ports were established along the coast, and the number of polar stations grew due to the advancement of the Northern Sea Route and the introduction of more powerful icebreakers and dependable radio connection beginning in 1935.

In 1937 the icebreaking steamers Sedov, Sadko, and Malygin were frozen in while conducting oceanographic surveys in the Laptev Sea. In August of the following year the icebreaker Yermak broke through to the ships, escorted Sadko and Malygin out of the ice and onto the open sea. Due to severe damage to her steering Sedov was transformed into a drifting research platform since she could not escape the ice. Sedov was pinned by the ice for a total of 812 days during which time he travelled as far north as 86°39'N. The soundings showed that Arctic Ocean was far deeper than was previously believed. Year-round observations from the high Arctic demonstrated milder weather compared to its peripheries. Each ten days meticulous measurements were taken of the ice and snow levels. Similar findings were made at the time the drift started at the first "North Pole" drifting station. Soon after the drift began, in January 1940 Sedov reached the area where the Fram had drifted forty years before.[34]

1.1.3 The Soviet Scientific Drive

In 1937 the U.S.S.R. created the first floating research laboratory, employing a four-engine aero plane to land a four-person team led by Papanin near the North Pole in late May. Nine months after floating south on a melting ice floe in the Greenland Sea, the installation now known as North Pole 1 was recovered from the ice floe. Under the command of Konstantin Sergeyevich Bagin the icebreaker GeorgySedov (formerly the Newfoundland sealing vessel Beothic) became trapped in the ice in the Laptev Sea and began a 27-month drift from across Arctic basin that exactly matched that of the Fram and generated significant comparison data. In 1941 an aircraft carrying a team of scientists landed three times on ice between 80° N and 175° E.[35]

[34]T Armstrong,. *Early Soviet Exploration (1920s-1930s).* Accessed 10 Dec. 2022.
[35]BA Boczek "Soviet Union Expeditions, 1933." *Polar Record*, no. 6, Cambridge University Press (CUP), July 1933, pp. 82–83.

During World War II scientific research in Arctic Ocean rose substantially; afterwards, stations were regularly staffed, often with two persons on board. To examine Arctic Ocean on a massive scale the Russians undertook massive airborne flights with several landings on the ice to gather data as well as floating research stations. North of Wrangel Island Station North Pole 2 was constructed in 1950 for a single year of operation. After 1954 a chain of stations, sometimes twice at once were constantly used until they drifted into a region where they stopped believing or enlisted the Greenland Sea drift. Each station was occupied for at least one to two years. The North Pole 31 station operated from 1988 until 1991.[36]

US became an Arctic regional state in 1872 with the purchase of Alaska from Russia. For the US the importance of Arctic became apparent, as soon as the Second World War began, Arctic became a crucial area for the movement of armaments and supplies. The installation of meteorological stations and pockets of fighting as the Germans attempted to sabotage Allied operations. As a result of the development of bases, airstrips, and radio links, communications throughout the region were revolutionised, and Arctic settlements would never again be as isolated. As the 1950s advanced into the Cold War era, Arctic became a crucial battleground in the superpower rivalry. As radar sites were erected and dispersed across the country, military garrisons became a permanent fixture in a number of areas throughout the region. Aerial surveys led to the production of the most precise maps to date, which spurred territorial ownership disputes.

1.2 1860s to the Second World War

The Naval force Division directed the recently obtained Branch of The Frozen North from 1879 to 1884 when the domain was moved to common organization. The US Naval force positioned the conflict sloop USS Jamestown in Sitka, Alaska. In a period of growing Arctic investigation maritime officials were anxious to expand their Arctic information. Schwatka gave remarkable detail on the perils presented by ice-packs, ice-floes, ice sheets, tides, tempests and flows as well as guidelines for ships. Lieutenant John W. Danenhower USN gave an itemized record of Icy investigation in Procedures five years after the fact.

[36]"The Soviet Expedition to the Central Arctic, 1985-91." *ARCTIC*, no. 2, The Arctic Institute of North America, Jan. 1990.

The Naval force drove the US's earliest Cold endeavors. The files and narratives of the assistance detail both the risks of working in Arctic and how these obstructions could be survived. These were urgent points for maritime officials trying to guard and propel the public interests of the US in the district. On April 6, 1909 then-Officer Robert E. Peary Sr. of the US Naval force's Respectful Designer Corps turned into the main wayfarer to arrive at the North Pole.[37]

Despite the fact that many initially referred to the United States' 1867 acquisition of Alaska as "Seward's Folly" Arctic territory's economic potential became apparent during the 1896–99 gold rush and its strategic significance became apparent in the lead-up to World War II. General William L. "Billy" Mitchell USAAC proclaimed to Congress in 1935 that "he who controls Alaska controls the world" and that Alaska was the "most strategic location in the world." Mitchell whose views were influenced by his assignment as a junior officer to Alaska, advocated for the construction of military bases to enable a northern air defence. During the Cold War this argument became more pressing as the shortest and most likely route for Soviet bombers or ICBMs to attack the United States lay across Arctic.[38]

Meanwhile the Soviet government created Arctic route and flying capacities. The Soviets laid out the NSR as a way to resupply detached waterfront networks in the mid 1930s. In 1938 English writer H. P. Smolka stated "just lately has the world become mindful of Russia's vivacious endeavors to push open her frozen window in the North and lay out a Polar Domain." Putin's cutting edge desires to turn into a polar superpower mirror Russia's verifiable interest in the district yet they are worked with by a warming Icy. Smolka likewise underlined an apparent northern strength at the time which the ongoing Arctic defrost is decreasing. In light of his broad investigation of the district's topography and occupants he reasoned that Russia could be "suppressed" on three sides in case of a contention however that the northern shore was "free, ceaseless, and unassailable by anybody".[39]

[37] Lajeunesse, Adam. *Arctic Warfare*. 2014.
[38] Jones, Minnie. *William "Billy" Mitchell "The Father of the United States Air Force."* U.S. Army, 2019.
[39] Gosnell, Rachael. *Keep a Weather Eye on the Arctic*. U.S. Naval Institute , 2019.

Regardless of the way that The WWII was decimating to the Soviet Association the frozen north filled in as a secure boundary. Smolka had distinguished a critical part of Russia's ongoing technique in the High North. Russia's Arctic boundary the world's longest public shore, was once remembered to be invulnerable to attack. Anyway the launch of Arctic has uplifted Russia's neurosis in regards to likely attacks and prompted an expansion in militarization in the area. The Spitsbergen Settlement of 1920 exemplified the global collaboration that has described the contemporary Icy. However, not long after it was at first marked Germany and the Soviet Union developing carefulness incited the following round of Arctic strategy and military participation. In August of 1940 the US and Canada consented to the Ogdensburg Arrangement to reinforce their guard participation against polar airborne dangers. It laid out a Permanent Joint Board on Protection that was planned to outlast the blaze which later became critical as doubt of Soviet Socialism developed and the Cold War started.[40]

1.2.1 Arctic Expansion during the Second World War

In June 1942, the Japanese bombarded U.S. bases at Dutch Harbor and Stronghold Mears in The Frozen North and involved the Aleutian islands of Attu and Kiska making the Aleutians the main front line on U.S. soil where unfamiliar occupation happened during WWII. Throughout the span of WWII the Gold country Region assumed a significant part as an exchange site for Land Lease Act programs intended to convey frantically required food, oil and supplies to American partners. During WWII the Partners utilized Arctic courses to resupply the Soviet Association moving almost 4,000,000 tons of freight through the Barents Ocean and almost 500,000 tons through the Bering Waterway. Perceiving the essential significance of the Great North German powers laid out maritime and air bases in Norway following their effective attack in April 1940. The essential worth of Alaska provoked the development of The Alaska Canadian Expressway and other critical foundation projects. Large number of individuals moved to Alaska to help the conflict exertion and many stayed after the conflict finished.[41]

[40] *Ogdensburg Agreement,1940*. ehistory.

[41] *"The Worst Journey in the World": The Arctic Convoys of the Second World War*. E History Extra, Sept. 2021 pp. 27-33

By 1945 the tactical populace had soar from around 500 of every 1940 to almost 60,000. In 1950 Alaska's absolute populace almost multiplied from its 1940 degree of 129,000. The tactical development in Alaska during WWII which was reached out by the beginning of the Cold War, energized the state's monetary development. By 1955 almost a fourth of the populace was contained formally dressed military work force and however much 80% of Alaskan business was connected with the protection business. During the Cold War, Alaska assumed an essential part in the execution of a purported harm constraint methodology intended to deflect an expected Soviet atomic assault against the US. Hypothetically such techniques stop atomic assaults by giving the capacity to restrict the harm they could cause to a degree that renders them decisively superfluous. This would be achieved by conveying an air guard equipped for obliterating a critical piece of Soviet atomic planes and rockets before they arrived at the US's mainland region (CONUS). Alaska was (regardless is) obviously arranged to give early advance notice of Soviet Union assaults against the US on the grounds that the most limited air courses between the two countries cross Arctic Sea.[42]

Once it was resolved that Arctic was suscpetible against Soviet atomic planes, the SAC laid out the DEW Line, which comprises of in excess of fifty radar and correspondence stations spread across 3,000 miles to answer suitably to any danger. NORAD a joint U.S.-Canadian protection association took care of mainland air safeguard in 1957 focusing on Soviet dangers from the polar district. Advancements in innovation moved the accentuation of guard endeavors from plane assaults to ICBM dangers. Alaska was home to one of NORAD's most memorable long range rocket early-cautioning stations, which were intended to give a fifteen-minute admonition of a rocket assault against the mainland US. Arctic district of the US turned out to be decisively essential for distinguishing approaching Soviet aircraft, rockets and giving an open door to atomic safeguard inside and out. Nautilus turned into the main submarine to circumnavigate the globe under the polar ice cap reaffirming U.S. maritime authority in Arctic investigation as it finished its record-breaking journey.[43]

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[42] Joseph Micallef,. *The Critical Role of the Arctic Convoys in WWII*. Military.com, July 2019.
[43] John Rafferty,. *Distant Early Warning Line United States-Canadian Military*. Britannica . Accessed 18 Jan. 2023.

1.2.2 Cold War

During the Cold War there was a huge expansion in military tasks in Icy, essentially directed by submarines. Submarine movement between the Soviet Union and the US was hearty during the Cold War albeit many subtleties stay characterized. The mission of U.S. submarines was to follow Soviet rocket submarines from their northern bases on the Kola Promontory east of Finland into Arctic waters where the ice cover gave remarkable insurance from identification. All through the Cold War Arctic stayed a critical locale assuming a part in President Richard M. Nixon's "madman theory" of discouragement. This hypothesis started from President Eisenhower's atomic brinkmanship was expected to raise some questions about the level of mindlessness and instability that ought to be credited to the US. The objective was to hinder an expected Soviet incitement by improving the probability of a more grounded U.S. reaction than Soviet pioneers expected. SAC flew atomic equipped, airborne-ready trips over Cold Circle to show both ability and unconventionality.[44]

In fact cooperation and competition have coexisted in Arctic for a very long time. Nixon's efforts in the region shifted the national focus away from Arctic, but the region remained strategically vital for early warning of ICBM threats. The Reagan administration then redoubled its efforts in the 1980s to achieve a strategic advantage over the Soviet Union, particularly in the maritime domain.

Practice Ocean Venture united roughly 120,000 work force, 250 boats and 1,000 airplanes from fifteen countries from August to October 1981. The Naval force rehearsed hostile and ocean control tasks north of the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap through which Soviet armadas and long range rocket submarines situated in Icy would need to pass to compromise NATO powers in the North Atlantic. Supported tasks in these cold waters gave the maritime powers critical difficulties including decreased perceivability, freezing temperatures, risky icing conditions and hardware freezing. These deterrents convoluted fighting and made it more challenging for boats and airplane to finish their missions. The armada had the option to cruise inside striking distance of Murmansk the core of the Soviet strategic submarine

[44]Jen Evans,. *The History and Future of Arctic State Conflict: The Arctic Institute Conflict Series*. May 2021.

armada by utilizing creative techniques to beat both Arctic circumstances and the deterrents presented by the activity situation. Albeit the U.S. armada had recently worked in Arctic, the standards of the creating system called for unified surface boats to work all the more habitually in northern scopes to adjust the normal presence of Soviet maritime powers there. It was crucial for the expense burden technique that Soviet organizers reexamine their own power organizations to guarantee they had adequate resources for safeguard their essential strongholds.[45]

While the Naval force's surface powers worked on their capacity to work in the Arctic district, their lowered powers stayed predominant. The Russians conveyed their long range rocket submarines into safeguarded sendoff strongholds in the High North during the Cold War, changing Arctic into a jungle gym for submarines. To work in or close to Russia's Artic submarine fortresses, the US required assault submarines that could work really underneath the ice while avoiding location. This necessary huge foundation and preparing speculations. The Sturgeon-class submarines were intended for Arctic climate with frameworks fit for delayed activity in outrageous chilly, top and base sounders to empower route under the ice, and a "ice pick" sail to get through ice.

Although the Navy became adept at surface operations in the High North, the end of the Cold War left Arctic primarily to those operating in the subsea domain.

1.3 Canada

The retreat of Arctic sea ice is now widely recognised as a major factor in the region's growing maritime traffic. In fact, the history of commercial shipping in Arctic spans over 500 years. This blog will provide a concise summary of the historical events that led to Arctic shipping. John Cabot an Italian explorer and navigator was the first to propose the existence of the NWP as an interoceanic passage between Europe and Asia in the 1490s. Several centuries were spent by European explorers and navigators searching for Arctic waterways in response to this hypothesis.

[45] Drew Middleton, *U.S. AND ALLIED NAVIES STARTING MAJOR TEST TODAY; Military Analysis*. The New York Times, 1981.

From 1576 to 1578 Sir Martin Frobisher an English explorer successfully conducted three voyages, discovering Labrador and what is now Iqaluit (previously known as Frobisher's Bay), in Nunavut. These voyages had significant impacts on Arctic history as they have 1) made some (conflicting) contacts with Inuit; 2) triggered sporadic ore mining activities; and 3) helped European whalers making their way to the Baffin Island. In 1668 a British trading ship *Nonsuch* was sent to explore the Hudson Bay. This voyage led to the creation of the Hudson's Bay Company (HBC), which did the work of territorial exploration, government, knowledge exchange and became a critical enabler of Confederation and Canada as a country. Throughout the 18th century HBC established a vast network of trading posts throughout Arctic. Inuit began to travel seasonally hundreds of miles to nearby trading posts to exchange goods. HBC also offered annual maritime transports to trading posts. This is the earliest form of resupplying a community.[46]

The invention of steamships in the 19th century greatly increased whalers' ability to hunt farther north and encouraged a more systematic exploration of the NWP. Sir John Ross (1818) and William Edward Parry (1819) successfully traversed Baffin Bay and mapped the route to Lancaster Sound for whalers. From 1820 to 1840, industrial whaling accounted for the majority of marine traffic in the Canadian Arctic, and it reached its peak. The 1845 loss of Sir John Franklin's expedition is perhaps the most significant historical event. Franklin and his crew were last observed in Baffin Bay three months after their departure from England. This tragedy served as an excuse or impetus for the numerous search expeditions that led to the discovery and mapping of the Northwest Passage. Roald Amundsen, a Norwegian explorer, navigated the NWP for the first time afterward (1903-1906).[47]

The 20th century saw the greatest diversification of Arctic commercial shipping activities. Due to the depletion of Arctic whale populations, commercial whaling continued on a much smaller scale. The fur trade then took the lead in attracting marine traffic until WorldWar II broke out. From the 1950s to the 1970s, the mining industry expanded rapidly, resulting in massive inbound and outbound marine transportation. In 1984, the first voyage

[46] Peter Pigott, *From Far and Wide: A History of Canada's Arctic Sovereignty*. 2011.
[47] Anka Ryall and Johan Schimansk. *Arctic Discourses*. 2010.

of the M/S Lindblad Explorer to the Baffin Bay region marked the introduction of marine tourism to the Canadian Arctic. Commercial shipping has historically been a significant means of stimulating Arctic economy and transporting people and goods into and out of Arctic. Today due to the effects of climate change the NWP is more accessible, attracting more shipping interests and posing threats to Canada's national sovereignty and security. In the meantime, Inuit, whose voices have been marginalised in Arctic governance, continue to assert their inherent self-determination and self-governance rights in Arctic marine environments.[48]

Canada is in the process of developing a new governance framework for Arctic shipping within this sociopolitical context. This framework will support the sustainable development of Arctic shipping industry while meeting the federal government's reconciliation obligations with Indigenous Peoples.

1.4 Scandinavian States in the North

During the discord between the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church in the ninth and tenth centuries, the northern regions occasionally experienced turmoil between the east and west. The construction of fortifications, churches, and monasteries close to the border, such as in Valamo, Savonlinna, Solovki, Oulu, Gammelstad, and Boris Gleb became a crucial aspect of the area's colonisation.

This issue emerged on the grounds that the Settlement of Noteborg endorsed in 1323 by Novgorod and the Swedish Kingdom didn't unequivocally characterize the lines between the two countries. Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Novgorod guaranteed the option to demand charges on the occupants of this unclaimed domain at the time the North was a virgin domain financially and politically.Prior to the thirteenth hundred years there were essentially no country states in the district. This was exceptional without any trace of boundaries, tax assessment, enrollment and other country state qualities. Little gatherings of trackers and anglers from the Nordic nations and Novgorod were the main different occupants of the locale other than the native, generally migrant individuals. Native people groups, for example, the Sami and the Nenets were just step by step mistreated, bringing

[48] Greenwood, Nigel. *Canada's Pacific Gateway to the Arctic*. 2019.

about a deficiency of "Indian Conflicts" in the district. Ongoing exploration shows anyway that viciousness against ethnic gatherings and obstruction have happened.[49]

With an end goal to rule the locale between the fourteenth and sixteenth hundreds of years military undertakings were sent from Karelia to Norway as well as the other way around. It was well realized that the region was wealthy in fur, silver and fish. The tactical units of the time coming up short on labor, hardware and supplies to wage an extended conflict, so these and ensuing military tasks up until 1918 were basically little undertakings. Enormous scope ground battle in Arctic was not yet imaginable because of mechanical impediments. Near the end in the sixteenth century Sweden sent off numerous assaults against northern Karelia and the Kola Landmass. These areas were not completely integrated into the Russian effective reach and their safeguards were deficient. Sweden endeavored to control all exchange among Russia and Western Europe by involving them. This forceful strategy was impeded to a limited extent by the foundation of the Russian port and city of Lead celestial host for example cutting edge Arkhangelsk on the estuary of the Dvina Waterway in 1584. In 1854 and 1855 the English Naval force struck the northern bank of the Kola Promontory and decimated the undefended city of Kola. These activities originated from the far off Crimean War.[50]

In Mamontovaya Kurya in the Ural Heaps of the Republic of Komi the earliest history of the Barents Area traces all the way back to the Stone Age, around 36,000 B.C. In the Finnmark area the earliest signs of human residence in Scandinavia date back to 8,000 BCE and the Komsa culture. In 98 CE Cornelius Tacitus expounded on the Fenni, a northern group who were logical the predecessors of the cutting edge Sami. The occupants of the locale have kept up with expanded connections for a really long time. As per the Adventures; Viking families in Northern Norway had standard collaborations with the occupants of the White Ocean locale. The district was known as Bjarmeland. One of the earliest travel accounts specifies the northern Norwegian clan leader Ottar who went from the court of Lord Alfred in London to Bjarmeland around the year 890 to exchange with and gather charges from local people. Ottar depicts the excursion from his home district of

[49]J Braat. *Dutch Activities in the North and the Arctic during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*. 1984.
[50]Alexander Leslie. *The Arctic Voyages of Adolf Erik Nordenskiöld: 1858-1879*. Accessed 18 Jan. 2023.

Hlogaland to the place that is known for the Bjarmer, where Finns (Saami) paid charges on regular items.[51]

In the sixteenth century the Torne market turned into a center for broad exchange between the occupants of the district. The Swedish side's essential item was calfskin. Lord Gustav Vasa requested his portion of the exchange through the inconvenience of calfskin charges. At the end of the day the workers settled a Russian duty. The light Russian vessels showed up in Torne through inland streams, for example from the White Ocean by means of Uletrask or the Kemi River. At the point when Europeans were looking for ocean courses to China and America interest in the Barents Ocean and its expenses expanded. Willem Barentz was a Dutch guide who made three journeys looking for an Upper east Entry to Asia Ivan the Terrible established the city and port of Arkhangelsk in 1584 and Peter I started the foundation of the principal shipyard on Salombola Island in 1693. The Pomors advanced into vendors, sailors, pioneers, maritime sailors, and officials. For the financial and social improvement of northern Norway and Arkhangelsk the Pomor exchange was significant. The Pomor exchange between Northern Norway and Murmansk-Arkhangelsk can be followed back to the furthest limit of the seventeenth century yet it really thrived in the eighteenth. Northern Norway was in dire need of grain and flour, canvas and linen, hemp and rope, iron goods and tar, which were brought to the region by Russian merchant ships from the White Sea region. They exchanged them for fish, a resource that the Russians lacked.[52]

In the 19th century, bartering evolved into standard commerce. Close cultural Russian-Norwegian ties developed as a result of the regular presence of 250-400 Pomor sailing ships in Northern Norway. It was common for example, for the children northern Norwegian dealers to make a trip to Arkhangelsk to concentrate on Russian business, culture, and language. Also developed was "Russian Norwegian" an extraordinary Norwegian-Russian-English exchange language. The Russian Upheaval shut down lawful exchange and individual contacts between Northern Norway and Russia, and from 1920

[51]Spring Ulrike, and Johan Henrik. *The Useless Arctic: Exploiting Nature in the Arctic in the 1870s*. 2015.
[52] Jonas Nordin,, and Carl Ojala. *Copper Worlds: A Historical Archaeology of Abraham and Jakob Momma-Reenstierna and Their Industrial Enterprise in the Torne River Valley, c. 1650–1680*. 2017.

on, they were precluded. In any case exchange proceeded, though on a somewhat limited scale, until 1926.[53]

Conclusion

The historical dynamics of Arctic region can be analyzed through the lens of neo-classical realism such that it emphasizes the role of domestic politics and societal factors in shaping a state's foreign policy, in addition to the distribution of power in the international system. Over the centuries Arctic has been a site of exploration and exploitation with its harsh environment and remote location posing challenges and opportunities for the countries involved.

The region's geopolitical significance has grown in recent years due to the melting of sea ice, opening up new shipping routes and resource extraction opportunities. As a result Arctic states including the United States, Russia and Canada have increasingly been engaged in power politics in the region, driven by their respective geopolitical interests, domestic politics, and strategic considerations. These power politics have given rise to territorial disputes and resource conflicts but also to cooperative frameworks such as Arctic Council, which have sought to promote governance and peaceful cooperation in the region.

Overall the emerging power dynamics in Arctic region will continue to be shaped by a complex interplay of factors, including domestic politics, international power dynamics and environmental concerns. Understanding these dynamics through the neo-classical realism paradigm can provide useful insights for managing potential conflicts and promoting cooperation among Arctic states in the years to come.

[53]Tatjana Schrader. *Pomor Trade with Norway*. 2008.

Chapter Two

Emerging Power Politics between the US, Canada and Russia in New Millennium

Arctic region is becoming increasingly important due to the melting of sea ice, which is opening up new shipping routes and resource extraction opportunities. The region is believed to contain significant reserves of oil, natural gas and minerals making it a potential source of economic and strategic value for the Arctic states.

The United States, Russia, and Canada are the three largest Arctic states and are thus key players in the region's emerging power dynamics. These states have different geopolitical interests and domestic politics, which influence their behavior in Arctic. The United States for example has historically seen Arctic as a peripheral region with limited strategic importance. However as Arctic becomes more accessible the United States is increasingly concerned about Russian expansionism in the region and the potential for a Chinese presence. The United States has also expressed interest in maintaining freedom of navigation in the Arctic, which is seen as a critical part of its global power projection.

Russia, on the other hand, has long viewed the Arctic as a vital part of its national identity and security. Russia's Arctic coastline is a key strategic asset, and the country has invested heavily in developing its Arctic capabilities, including building new military bases and investing in icebreakers. Russia's actions in Arctic have raised concerns among other Arctic states about its territorial claims and expansionism. Canada meanwhile sees Arctic as an integral part of its national identity and has been working to assert its sovereignty in the region. Canada's domestic politics, including its relationship with indigenous communities, have also played a role in shaping its Arctic policy.

Overall the emerging power politics between the United States, Russia and Canada in Arctic region can be understood through the lens of neo-classical realism, which highlights the interplay between domestic politics, international power dynamics and strategic interests. As Arctic continues to become more accessible understanding these factors will be crucial for managing potential conflicts and promoting cooperation among Arctic states.

The chapter discusses the economic and security dynamics of the three major powers in Arctic Ocean. Being divided in to three parts, Russia is discussed in the first part of the chapter, followed by Canada in the second and finally the US in the final part of the chapter

2.1 Russia

The abundance of oil and gas in Arctic makes it a critical territory for the Russian economy as well as the business interests of important Kremlin figures who are close allies and members of Putin's inner circle. The State's and the ruling classes' economic interests in Arctic are interwoven. When Russia started a naval operation in 2007 to put a real Russian flag inside a titanium capsule 4,200 metres below the North Pole, the stakes were significantly elevated. In order to seize the enormous mineral and energy riches that many believe lay under Arctic ice, Russia's game plan was to expand its territory almost all the way to the Pole. The International Seabed Authority is in charge of managing the North Pole which is regarded as a global site. However a nation may assert an economic zone based on its undersea shelf if it can demonstrate that it is an extension of its continental boundary. Russia is doing this by methodically mapping the extent of its Lomonosov undersea shelf. It's like planting a flag on the moon, as its Arctic and Antarctic Institute spokesperson described it."[54]

2.1.1 Economic Dynamics

Despite Russia's government and businesses' ambitious intentions to entice international investors to help them fulfil their dreams of Arctic riches, the possibilities for success are far from guaranteed. The two resources oil and gas which are the focus of such programmes are also abundant in other friendlier places where they can be mined and transported to consumers more cheaply. Even when Putin personally sponsors ambitious schemes Russia's track record of success is far from promising. Rosatom and Rosneft are two large companies with strong links to the Kremlin that can get major subsidies from the government, but many initiatives without such high-level political favour go underfunded and unfulfilled. Major initiatives continue to be underfunded or unfunded, including in

[54]Martin Breum. *Russia Considers Extended Claim to the Arctic Seabed.* High Noth News, Feb. 2021.

Arctic, which is given a lot of high-level attention and should be given priority in budget allocation.

The future for the government's Arctic aspirations is further clouded by a number of external variables. The COVID-19 pandemic's effects on the world economy have reduced demand for oil and gas. Europe a key market for Russian gas, has experienced a severe economic hit and has set aggressive goals to decrease greenhouse gas emissions and lower its carbon footprint. And even without these elements, significant EU energy sector changes have made the European energy market far more competitive for Russian producers.[55]

Uncertain possibilities also exist for Russia's plan to increase LNG shipments to Asian markets particularly China. To make this goal a reality there are several obstacles to overcome including the high price of LNG gas, the NSR's length and difficult terms, the possibility of more U.S. sanctions, and the tough and uncompromising stance of Chinese negotiators. The objective of creating infrastructure, new communities, and economic activity in Russia's Arctic regions is a formidable barrier due to their sheer size, emptiness, and circumstances. Towns there suffer from extreme poverty and unemployment since they were built mostly with slave labour during the Stalin period. The brightest and greatest are departing. It will probably take more to keep them there than merely paying them little more than they could elsewhere. Additionally the ability to live and work in the area is being negatively impacted by climate change and permafrost thawing. Both have caused a rash of industrial and transportation accidents as well as the destruction or deterioration of already-existing infrastructure, including roads, buildings, and infrastructure. The NSR's future as a crucial transit route between Europe and Asia, as envisioned by Russian Arctic enthusiasts is now in doubt. Both insurance and ice-breaking assistance are pricey for nautical activities in arctic regions. Only 62 ships completed the whole journey along the NSR in 2020 carrying about 26 million tonnes, significantly less than Moscow's declared

[55]Indre Butkiene,"Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic to the Sustainability of the Energy Sector." *Sustainability*, Kaunas University of Applied Sciences, Nov. 2021.

aim of shipping 80 million tonnes by 2024. In 2020, 331 ships went along a part of the NSR.[56]

2.1.2 Security Dynamics

The principal military tool used by Russia in Arctic is the Northern Fleet. It serves to guard the SSBN strength and Arctic coastlines to show that Russia is a great power to endorse jurisdictional and resource claims, economic interests, and infrastructure and to stop NATO members, partners and neutral countries from developing military forces that the Kremlin regards as a threat to Russian interests in the area. Organizational reforms that have enhanced the stature of the Northern Fleet are a reflection of the significance ascribed to it. In order to better safeguard present and future military stations along the NSR, Russia established a combined strategic command for Arctic in 2014. An important part of this restructuring was the establishment of a new Arctic brigade. The Northern Fleet was officially established as Russia's fifth Military District in January, making it the first time a fleet has been accorded the same status as one of the land Military Districts.

These significant adjustments are the result of the Kremlin's statement in 2017 that the Northern Fleet's capabilities will be improved in order to "phase NATO out of Arctic." A motorised infantry brigade, four new brigade combat teams, more potent naval surface combatants, missile and artillery units, advanced air defence systems, anti-ship cruise missiles, command & control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems are just a few of the new brigade combat teams being added to the fleet. A fleet of more than fifty icebreakers is also planned and facilities are being built or modernised to offer enhanced logistical support for these resources. Russian naval dominance or a real blue-water navy do not seem to be in the works, based on the speed and breadth of this force upgrade effort at this time. The majority of its capabilities are intended for close-range perimeter defence and border security rather than for the projection of offensive force. A large portion of the expansion of infrastructure is meant to

[56]Eugene Rumer, et al. *Prospects for Russian Success*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2021, p. 11.

carry out non-military tasks like search and rescue operations or to safeguard energy, economic and marine interests.[57]

Even the future of Russia's military presence in Arctic is questionable. In a potential battle with NATO the job of safeguarding the SSBNs' safe haven as well as the region's military and economic infrastructure cannot be taken for granted. The plans for upgrading the military and building new infrastructure are expected to face the same resource limitations and challenging operational circumstances as the rest of Russia's Arctic aspirations. In the best case scenario this will result in delays in their completion; in the worst case scenario, they could prove to be too expensive for the military budget to support, particularly if the oil and gas bonanza does not materialise. In order to enhance coastal defence Russia had to abandon its proposal to establish a second Arctic Brigade. The Northern Fleet also has significant gaps in personnel transport, aerial refuelling, ice-capable ships, and ASW patrol aircraft. If significant efforts are not made to address these deficiencies the fleet's capacity to carry out a wider variety of tasks and activities than bastion defence of its SSBNs would be seriously hindered.

Uncertainty surrounds Russia's chances of winning an Arctic confrontation with NATO. Since the Baltic States are shut off from the rest of the alliance it would be very difficult to reinforce them or send soldiers there in a crisis without carrying out a sizable operation that would be especially susceptible to Russian interception. Additionally their miniscule size and closeness to significant Russian military sites and garrisons, as well as Russia's supremacy over NATO in icebreakers, ice-capable ships, local infrastructure, and cold-weather technology and training would give Russia an undeniable edge.[58]

On the other hand Russia has significant vulnerabilities due to the terrain of the Baltic area. The Baltic States would be susceptible to NATO's longer-range precision missiles delivered from airborne and maritime platforms due to the proximity of significant Russian military sites to those countries. In the case of war it would be uncertain if the Russian

[57]Alexander Sergunin,, and Valery Konyshev. “Russian Military Strategies in the Arctic: Change or Continuity?” *European Security*, Apr. 2017.
[58]Yu Koizumi. “Russia’s Military Build-Up in the Arctic: Russia’s Threat Perception and Its Military Strategy in the Arctic Region.” *The Influence of Sub-State Actors on National Security*, Springer Polar Sciences, 2019, p. 70.

Navy could leave the boundaries of the Gulf of Finland. Additionally susceptible to NATO attacks would be the strongly fortified Kaliningrad region, which is isolated off from the rest of Russian land. Due to Russia's aggressive behaviour in Arctic and Baltic areas NATO has taken actions that in a crisis may work against Russia and pose a serious danger to its security and interests. The United States temporarily sent a 200-person expeditionary B1-Lancer squadron to Norway in February. Exercises simulating a "high-intensity combat scenario" were carried out in northern Norway by Norwegian, British, United States and several other NATO units in March of 2017 along with units from Sweden and Finland. In September of 2017, the United States, British and Norwegian navies carried out joint exercises just over 100 miles from the Russian coastline.[59]

Last but not least one of the major players in Arctic is the military and security industry, along with its leaders. A personal friend of Vladimir Putin and the current secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev is a vocal supporter of strengthening Russia's ties to Arctic and publicising its achievements there. A special committee was created by the Security Council in 2020 to further Russian interests in the area. The committee is presided over by former president Dmitri Medvedev and is made up of the military and foreign affairs ministers, prominent members of the executive and legislative departments, and local leaders. Sergei Shoigu Russia's defence minister has long been a vocal supporter of increasing Russia's military presence in Arctic to protect its interests from threats from unfriendly neighbours.[60]

2.2 Canada

The Russian initiatives in Arctic are comparable to flashing a red flag in front of a bull for Canadians. The furthest northern regions of their nation have always been seen as an essential albeit remote component of Canada. Even the national song of the nation makes reference to the huge and icy Arctic Archipelago: "The genuine north, powerful and free." They are Canadian waters according to the Canadian government thus the jurisdiction is apparent. However the United States and certain other nations, including presently Russia,

[59]*Russia in the Arctic— A Critical Examination*. This publication was funded by the Russia Strategic Initiative U.S. European Command, Stuttgart Germany, Mar. 2021.
[60]Alexander Sergunin,, and Gunhild Gjørv. *The Politics of Russian Arctic Shipping: Evolving Security and Geopolitical Factors*. Sept. 2020.

disagree. They consider the Northwest Passage to be a global waterway that should be open to all ships. They are increasingly considering Arctic bottom as a resource that should be divided among several northern states. As they hurry to map Canada's Arctic claims before a treaty deadline, Canadian scientists are now joining the military fighting on the front lines of this conflict. During the short window of time when former US President Barack Obama's term in office coincided with that of Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau from late 2015 to early 2017, there was a rush of Arctic policy development. A bold embargo on new offshore oil and gas drilling was one of the bold initiatives that the like- minded leaders used to pursue a North American agenda for action on climate change, energy development, and Arctic leadership.[61]

Following Donald Trump's victory this common goal was immediately abandoned. In addition to suddenly having to protect its other fundamental interests against an unpredictable president after losing its American partner, Canada also had to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement. Arctic vanished from view overshadowed by scandals and indignation in Washington. The day before calling the 2019 federal election, the Trudeau administration finally unveiled the much awaited ANPF Framework but the new approach was unsatisfactory. Despite being founded on consultation with Northern, Indigenous, and other stakeholders, the ANPF failed to establish a national Arctic agenda, designate clear objectives, or provide more resources to solving Arctic issues. The ANPF sets forth admirable aims, but "the rest of the text is weak on real policy action," two colleagues remarked at the time budgets and deadlines are absent. It is challenging to identify a distinct government strategy. Arctic has mostly been out of the news and out of consciousness for the last five years.

That has changed as of late as Arctic is once again at the forefront of world politics amid the persisting difficulties of the COVID-19 epidemic, new estimations of the rate and extent of global climate change and a turbulent new chapter in international relations. The seven other Arctic governments - Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden

[61]James Manicom, *Identity Politics and the Russia-Canada Continental Shelf Dispute: An Impediment to Cooperation?* Sept. 2012.

and the United States have suspended their membership in the Arctic Council in response to Russia's resumed, full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The activities of Russia run the danger of undoing 25 years of pan-Arctic collaboration and accelerating the division of the area into diverse and antagonistic sub-regions.

Canada must respond to this situation and should further up its involvement in Arctic problems while securing the cooperation of its other circumpolar neighbours. By doing so it is possible to resolve long-standing diplomatic issues with the Western Arctic nations support the international reaction to Russian aggression, restore Canadian leadership, and advance Canada's national interests in the circumpolar area.[62]

2.2.1 Security Dynamics

Operation Noble Defender has been a yearly occurrence but in the weeks after Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine, the exercises have acquired new significance. Although the possibility of a Russian invasion into Canada's Arctic is now minimal the country's top military said he would not rule it out in the future. The head of the military staff, Gen. Wayne Eyre said that Canada should carefully monitor Russian activity abroad since it was "not unimaginable that our sovereignty may be challenged" from Arctic.

Russia has boosted its military presence in Arctic land bases recently and conducted a number of provocative flying sorties. A pair of Russian long-range aircraft approached Canadian airspace two years ago before turning around. The nuclear missile-carrying TU-160 Blackjack bombers flew over the North Pole and toward Canada from western Russia. According to experts any overt military intervention in Arctic would likely take the shape of air and sea strikes rather than land ones. With much of the technology already in use in Arctic, Russia has launched hypersonic missiles in the past that are challenging, if not hard, to locate.[63]

Following Moscow's blatant assault on Ukraine concerns about Vladimir Putin's rising unpredictability have returned escalating tensions in other areas where Russia has shown aggressiveness. According to former Canadian colonel Pierre Leblanc who spent years

[62]*Canada and the Circumpolar Regions*. Government of Canada, 2022.
[63]Valery Konyshev, and Alexander Sergunin. *Is Russia a Revisionist Military Power in the Arctic?* Sept. 2014.

managing soldiers in the Country's far north, "If Putin were logical, it'd be a different situation." But he's making us wreck his nation's economy. He still bombs innocent targets and commits war crimes in spite of all the warnings and punishments.

Leblanc said that in spite of the region's vulnerabilities previous Canadian administrations had neglected to establish military bases and deep water ports as well as to update early warning systems. The two forward operating bases for Canada's F-18 aircraft, Inuvik and Iqaluit are separated by a distance of 2,800 kilometres leaving enormous tracts of land and water exposed and challenging to patrol. In addition the short-range radar equipment used to protect the area is "essentially outdated" and maintenance parts are no longer produced. "There would be space to spare if you put all of mainland Europe in the Canadian Arctic. So if we sent out two ships to monitor all of Europe, it would be the same as sending out one ship. You would be laughed out of the room if you said that".

Leblanc has recently taken a strong stance in favour of building a base and deep water port in Resolute Bay and thinks that more investment in the area will provide employment for Inuit villages. It was revealed that the Inuit-owned Nasittuq Corporation has been awarded a C$592 million (US$464 million) contract to administer the North Warning System, a 37-year-old network of several remotely controlled radar stations spanning more than 5,000 kilometres along Arctic Ocean's edge. The radar system which serves as an essential pair of eyes over the area's airspace, requires major modifications. Even while the likelihood of military assaults remained low Leblanc said the recent events in Ukraine had underscored the need of preparedness for future occurrences.[64]

2.2.2 Economic Anarchy and Opportunities

The Canadian Arctic is often seen as little more than a part of the Federal Government's social responsibility rather than a big economic potential. Consequently the high cost of the food that does make it to Northern Canadian stores is directly related to the poor infrastructure in the region. Some Arctic Canadian households are so poor that they can't afford to eat. There is a severe lack of availability to healthy meals for seven out of ten preschool-aged Inuit children in Nunavut. Similarly many people in the North have to make

[64]Wallace R, Ron. *Canada and Russia in an Evolving Circumpolar Arctic*. Nov. 2019.

do with inadequate pre-university and post-secondary education, health care, housing, Internet connectivity, energy (diesel rationing) and water. Similarly, air travel is sometimes the only way in and out of many remote areas due to the severe lack of roads. The runways at many of the existing airports are however merely gravel. The North of Canada like Arctic as a whole, is severely lacking in significant deep-water ports especially those that are accessible all year round.

The shift to a global renewable resource economy relies heavily on the North Canadian region's abundant natural resources including its abundant fisheries, gas reserves and mineral resources like cobalt, nickel, copper, and others. But the lack of infrastructure, dependency on fuel and limited internet access adds 30% to the cost of mineral extraction in the North making most of this potential uncompetitive in global markets and unavailable to help create successful and self-sufficient Northern economies. There are no underlying barriers to developing Canada's North instead the lack of appreciation for the North's potential economic benefits is the biggest barrier to the region's growth and success.

Limits have been placed on the North, which has had repercussions in many areas, including the health, well-being, human rights and economic opportunities of the people who live there as well as the undervaluing of the contributions that the North can make to Canada's economic success and global geopolitical impact. From former Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson's 1946 vision of the North as a 'land of the future' to former Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources Arthur Laing's 1966 'Road to Resources' concept there were many 20th century visions of the potential of Canada's North. However, no comprehensive plan or funding was ever put in place to make those visions a reality. Former Canadian Minister of International Trade David Emerson said in a 2016 study that "northern infrastructure projects have been implemented on an ad hoc basis without a long-term coherent strategy or connections to trade and transport routes."[65]

[65]Brennan Vogel, and Ryan C. L. Bullock. “Institutions, Indigenous Peoples, and Climate Change Adaptation in the Canadian Arctic.” *GeoJournal Volume*, May 2022.

2.3 United States

The United States has been one of the eight Arctic nations and one of the five nations with coastlines along Arctic Ocean since March 30 1867 when it bought Alaska from the Russian Empire. Nixon released National Security Decision Memorandum 144 in December 1971 to discuss American policy toward Arctic. The letter recommended that the evolution of American Arctic policy concentrate on three crucial areas: reducing environmental risks that may be harmful, fostering international collaboration in Arctic, and ensuring the preservation of security interests in the area. The "Arctic and Policy Act of 1984" was approved by the US Congress in 1984 in order to finance environmental and climatic research, ensure the region's national security and improve commercial fishing operations. The United States' foreign policy toward Arctic area is known as its "Arctic policy." Additionally Arctic policy of the United States includes its domestic policy toward Alaska.[66]

Since the Arctic Council's founding in 1996 the United States has been a member. In April 2015 it took up the chairmanship (from Canada). In Alaska there are delegates from 4 of the 6 indigenous groups that make up the Arctic Council. The Conference of Parliamentarians of Arctic Region counts the United States among its observers. The world's temperature has increased by 0.8°C since 1880 but Arctic has warmed by twice that amount resulting in significantly reduced sea ice cover and improved access to natural resources, shipping lanes and fisheries. The increase in

Arctic temperature between 1971 and 2019 was three times more than the rise in the world average for the same time period. The following objectives are included in the United States Arctic Policy, which was published in NSPD-66 on January 9, 2009: Protect Arctic ecosystem and preserve its physiochemical components; verify that natural assets are managed and institutional growth in the area are ecologically viable; Meet national security and homeland security concerns pertinent to Arctic region; Involve the indigenous populations of Arctic in choices that impact them; Strengthen structures for collaboration among the eight Arctic states (the United States, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland,

[66]A. L Washburn, and Gunter Weller. *Arctic Research in the National Interest.* Aug. 1986.

Norway, the Russian Federation and Sweden); Boost scientific investigation and monitoring of regional, national, and international environmental concerns.[67]

The National Strategy for Arctic Region was unveiled by the Obama White House on May 10, 2013. With a focus on three areas: promoting U.S. seeking security concerns and being accountable for the stewardship of Arctic region, and enhancing international collaboration. Because of its closeness to the United States and shared Arctic policy stances, Canada is the United States' closest ally in Arctic matters. The nations collaborate on scientific research projects such as charting Arctic seafloor. The Beaufort Sea boundary issue and the legal classification of the NWP (as international or domestic waters) are two major points of contention.[68]

2.3.1 Economic Dynamics

In many respects the connection between Arctic and the U.S. began with a desire to grow the country's presence and interest in the area via research and policy development, with the hope that there would be future economic advantages. There is a lot of evidence now to support the consequences of global warming in Arctic. As a consequence the information that Congress used to design the Act is quite different from what Congress is aware of today. The continuing effectiveness of the Act hinges on two elements due to predicted changes in ice density in Arctic and the impact it would have on economic activities in the area. Initially Congress has to make sure that the three icebreakers that are scheduled to be constructed are completed on time and start the procurement process for more icebreakers. Second, to accommodate the projected commercial activity in Arctic, Congress should collaborate with administrative agencies, the States of Alaska and Maine, and others to build new and better infrastructure.

Without more ships and better infrastructure U.S. involvement in Arctic would be significantly hampered, as will whatever interest the U.S. hoped to garner in Arctic economy. The United States' interest in Arctic economy is already in direct rivalry with

[67]Crook and John R. "Comprehensive New Statement of U.S. Arctic Policy." *The American Journal of International Law*, Apr. 2009.
[68]Barack Obama. *National Strategy for the Arctic Region United States. White House*. United States. White House, May 2013.

that of other superpowers; as a result, Congress and the Executive must focus their emphasis on progress. While research and policy played a large role in the United States' interest in Arctic between the middle of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s it is obvious that these activities will not lead to economic progress. New icebreaking ships and enhanced Arctic infrastructure are the next phase in U.S. economic development in the region. Although a pricey technique was used to acquire and start this development.[69]

2.3.2 Arctic Gains

In addition to a wealth of natural resources, Arctic economy also benefits from the economic advantages and savings afforded by Arctic marine trade.

- **Natural Resources**

  Arctic is home to 30% of the world's unseen petroleum gas and 20% of the world's unseen flammable gas fluids, as indicated by the US Land Overview. Around 90 billion barrels of oil and 47 trillion cubic meters of gas. Large numbers of the world's most prominent assets of nickel, coal and zinc are situated under Arctic Sea. Normal assets aren't the main thing Arctic brings to the table; as the ice softens, the fishing business will thrive also. Arctic normal assets are significant.[70]

- **Commercial Shipping**

  The NWP, NSR, and Transpolar Passage provide shorter and deeper water shipping routes, which are important for commercial shipping, and are the driving forces behind Arctic economy. These factors may also be ascribed to the region's topography. Ninety percent of all commodities are transported by water. That is because shipping is now the most affordable mode of transportation, and there are no signs that this will change soon. Additionally, Arctic region is well-positioned to advance the global supply and demand chain because the large percentage of the

[69]Stephen Haycox. "Arctic Policy of the United States: An Historical Survey." *The Palgrave Handbook of Arctic Policy and Politics*, Nov. 2019.
[70]Eeva Turunen,. "Resources in the Arctic 2019." *Nordeigo*, Jan. 2019. ibid

globe's active industrial production is concentrated north of the thirtieth parallel and approximately 70% of urban metropolitan areas are situated north of the twenty-third parallel in the northern hemisphere. The Nordic Orion the first commercial bulk carrier to go through the Northwest Passage in 2013, serves as an example of the economics of shipping in Arctic. The Nordic Orion was able to go via the Northwest Passage instead the Panama Canal, which resulted in fuel savings of $80,000 a reduction in journey distance of 1,000 nautical miles, and an increase in coal capacity of around 25%. The Northwest Passage turned out to be both profitable and useful.[71]

2.3.3 Security Dynamics

The United States Navy maintains a sizeable existence in Arctic and was historically pivotal in developing a strategy to protect American interests there. When it comes to goals, the Navy's sights are set squarely on ensuring the safety of the seas. The Navy has included a long-term impact assessment of environmental concerns, rising economic and human activities and the geopolitical geography of Arctic in its strategic plan.

Even while the Navy has different goals for Arctic than the Commission does both might use improvements to port facilities and ice-breaking technology to support marine operations in the region. To "protect the sovereignty of the United States in Arctic and provide for the defence of the nation; maintain freedom of the seas; guarantee that naval forces are adequately equipped to react to emergencies and unforeseen circumstances; and encourage the formation of collaborative relationships within the United States Government as well as with overseas friends and allies" is among the Navy's mandated objectives in Arctic. New obstacles, such as enhanced navigability and utilisation by both Arctic and non-Arctic countries due to the "rich resources and trade routes," make it harder for the Navy to achieve its goals as an outcome of "melting ice sheets"[72]

[71]Frédéric Lasserre. "Case Studies of Shipping along Arctic Routes. Analysis and Profitability Perspectives for the Container Sector." *Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice*, Aug. 2014.
[72]Titley W., David. "ARCTIC SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS AND THE U.S. NAVY'S ROADMAP FOR THE ARCTIC." *Naval War College Review*, U.S. Naval War College Press, 2010.

The Navy's goals include a duty to safeguard the nation's maritime boundaries and EEZ as well as important sea routes and operational regions. The Bering Strait will become more strategically significant as resource extraction, shipping, fishing, and tourism grow. As Arctic Sea lanes start to open, the Navy will be deployed ahead of schedule and ready to defend American maritime interests.

The Navy claims that the use of shorter shipping channels by more organisations whether governmental or private, to exploit or extract resources has an impact on Arctic Ocean's general navigability. As a consequence the Navy is under increased strain. Additionally when Arctic and non-Arctic governments make investments, the extraction and exploitation of "oil and gas advancement, fishing, the travel industry and mineral mining could change the locale's essential importance." International relations may become strained as a result of this struggle.

The Navy will need to step up operations to safeguard and preserve American land because it has a duty to promote this engagement peacefully on a global scale particularly when it involves American territory. The sheer expanse of Arctic, which "covers an area of nearly 5.4 million square miles, about 1.5 times the size of the United States," is another obstacle to the Navy's goals. Increased enforcement, preparedness, and monitoring are needed for this regional difficulty. Additionally, "a severe environment and insufficient infrastructure" provide difficulties that limit the Navy's capacity to commence effective ventures in Arctic.

Although the Navy isn't mentioned by name in the Act it is clearly connected to Arctic and the Interagency Plan expressly took into account the Navy's research and policy. Despite not functioning in accordance with the Act the Navy has a significant impact on Arctic research and policy. Additionally, the actions taken by the Navy in Arctic "via continuous ice practises, scholarly ice excursions, and transits through the hemisphere" are consistent with those taken by other U.S. government entities working in a manner that is compliant with the Act. The rising commercial activity has an impact on international relations and challenges the Navy's capacity to accomplish its goals.

Similar to the Commission's findings the Navy's research and policy shows that in order for the Navy to fulfil its continuing goals and safeguard American interests in Arctic, enhanced arctic infrastructure and icebreaking warships are essential.[73]

The decision to hold the first-of-its-kind exercise this month, which involved approximately 8,000 troops and took place outside of Fairbanks, was driven in part by Russia's bold moves in recent times to militarise Arctic. This was one of the confounders that contributed in the decision to conduct the exercise. Even though the drill had been in the works for a considerable amount of time before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the latter event was a major motivating factor. Tensions in the region have been progressively growing for decades as a direct result of nations claiming claims to trade routes and energy supplies that are becoming accessible as an immediate result of climate change. A consequence of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the preexisting geopolitical order has been thrown into disarray. This suggests that the conflict for sovereignty and resources in Arctic may become much more contentious in the coming years.

The expansion of the port at Nome, which is situated on the western coast of Alaska is receiving an exponential funding from the federal government. The port might become a deep water centre that supports the boats of the Coast Guard and the Navy that are travelling into Arctic Circle if the expansion is successful. These vessels are travelling into Arctic Circle. Regardless of assertion that Russia presently operates more than 50 icebreakers, the Russian Coast Guard has plans to launch three more icebreakers in the not too distant future.

Irrespective of the reality that the United States has voiced its disapproval of Russia's aggressive military buildup in Arctic, the Department of Defense is moving forward with plans to expand its own capabilities and presence in the area. During the two decades that they spent fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan they let their abilities in cold weather deteriorate and are now attempting to repair them. The United States Air Force has just made the announcement that it will be moving dozens of its F-35 fighter planes to the stateof Alaska where it will host "more modern fighters than any other site in the world." This

[73]David Larson. *United States Interests in the Arctic Region*. Nov. 2009.

announcement comes on the heels of the Air Force's recent relocation of these planes to Alaska. Within the last twelve months the Army has presented the general public with its very first comprehensive strategic plan.[74]

Conclusion

The policies of the United States, Russia, and Canada in Arctic region can be analyzed through the neo-classical realism paradigm which emphasizes the role of domestic politics, international power dynamics and strategic interests. Each country has unique geopolitical interests and domestic politics that shape their policies in the region.

The United States has prioritized maintaining freedom of navigation in Arctic and countering Russian expansionism. Its policy focuses on supporting Arctic Council and promoting cooperation among the Arctic states while also expanding its own military capabilities in the region. Russia views Arctic as a vital part of its national identity and security and has been investing heavily in the region. Its policy is centered on maintaining and expanding its presence in Arctic including military and infrastructure development.

Canada sees Arctic as integral to its national identity and sovereignty with a focus on protecting its northern borders and asserting its claims over the Northwest Passage. Its policy emphasizes cooperation with other Arctic states while also increasing its own military presence in the region. The emerging power dynamics and strategic interests of Arctic states have given rise to territorial disputes and resource conflicts but also to cooperative frameworks such as Arctic Council. Understanding the domestic politics and strategic interests of each state through the neo-classical realism paradigm is crucial for managing potential conflicts and promoting cooperative efforts among the Arctic states.

Overall, the policies of the United States, Russia, and Canada in the Arctic region will continue to be shaped by a complex interplay of factors, including domestic politics, international power dynamics, and environmental concerns. The neo-classical realism paradigm provides valuable insights into these policies and will be essential for managing the emerging power politics in Arctic region

[74]Melody Schreiber. *A Key Arctic Alaska Port Expansion Gets $250 Million in Federal Funding*. ARCTIC TODAY, Jan. 2022.

Chapter Three

Small Regional States, Organizations and Territorial Disputes: Arising Governance Challenges

Arctic Circle is the northernmost boundary of our planet and one of the two polar circles. Arctic is the geographic area above Arctic Circle which includes the Scandinavian Peninsula, North Asia, North America and Greenland. As much as 80% of the World's freshwater is seated in Arctic, and other estimates put that number as high as 20%. Much of the frozen water in Arctic is contained in the ice caps. These ice tops are notably affect global climate because of their ability to emit light into space and dissipate solar heat. The dark surface of Arctic Ocean under 90% of the sun's heat is absorbed by these ice caps which has a detrimental impact on the ocean's temperature and hence on global warming. Significant ice melting is occurring in Arctic, and the annual pace of global warming is increasing. As ice caps melt, more of the ocean's dark surface is exposed, allowing it to absorb more solar heat.

As more of Arctic Ocean emerges from behind these ice sheets, prospects for resource exploitation in the region have grown. Early in the 21st century towards the end of the 20th, nations in Arctic have intensified their competition as per anarchic behaviour for territorial control due to structural pressures of the area in order to exploit its oil and natural gas reserves. This precise structural pressure is what drives states to embark on power maximization to strengthen their standing in the anarchic international realm. Experts estimate that Arctic has 13 percent of the world's undiscovered oil and 30 percent of its undiscovered natural gas. Having access to the region's resources Arctic republics have promising economic futures. According to international law however, neither Arctic Ocean nor the North Pole may be claimed by any one country. A number of trade possibilities through the Northern route have also been created by the warming of Arctic Ocean. Ice caps have previously blocked the Northern Passage, prohibiting commercial shipping. But because to global warming, it is now possible to go via the Northern Passage.

This chapter is divided in to three parts. The first part discusses the key regional actors in Arctic Ocean and the International as well as local governing bodies. The second part of the chapter highlights both the resolved and on-going territorial disputes in the region.

Third part discusses the maritime security implication of the territorial disputes and the actions being taken to address the governing challenges in Arctic Ocean Region

3.1 The Key Actors

The eight Arctic countries are the United States, Canada, Russia, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden. Arctic Circle is bordered by land in each of the eight states, including continental shelves. Thus every nation is permitted to assert territorial claims over a region of Arctic. However a significant proportion of these territorial rights assertions have been at odds with one another for more than a century, sparking territorial disputes between the countries and sharply rising disagreements in the region. Due to increasing unease between Arctic states many scholars today consider that Arctic may be the front for the Cold War of the twenty-first century.

3.2 The Law of the Sea and Arctic Ocean Region

LOSC from 1982 lays the groundwork for the legal framework that is universally recognised as guiding claims of marine jurisdiction and the creation of maritime borders between sovereign maritime zones. The fact that 167 countries and the European Union were already privy to the LOSC at the time this article was written is evidence of the convention's extensive acceptance in every region of the world.

One of the most important things that the LOSC was able to accomplish was reaching a consensus on the geographical boundaries of national claims to maritime jurisdiction. These limits are typically described as extending to a certain distance from baselines along the coast and they were one of the primary achievements of the LOSC. Because of this the regional waters, the Contiguous Zone and EEZ cannot be separated from the baselines along the coast by more than 12, 24 and 200 metres, respectively (LOSC Articles 3 and 4, 33 and 57). The knowledge of baseline locations along the coast is required to identify the radii of the individual maritime jurisdiction zones. As will be shown in the next section with respect to the centre of Arctic Ocean, determining the outer boundaries of the continental shelf requires not only measurements of distance but also a variety of geophysical criteria.

Participants in the Convention are provided with a legally enforceable framework for resolving disputes pertaining to maritime jurisdiction and defining maritime borders between sovereign sea zones as a result of the Convention. Articles 74 and 83 of the LOSC state that states are required to reach agreements about the EEZ and continental shelf in accordance of international law "in order to provide an equitable solution," but they do not specify how the boundaries should be drawn. This is because international law does not define what constitutes an equitable solution. In addition, states that are still in the process of negotiating "shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature" which encourage but not necessitate the implementation of collaborating processes such as seafaring joint research zones, putting final agreements on delimitation into jeopardy. These articles require that states that are still in the process of negotiating "will henceforth make all efforts to access into practical provisional arrangements." Canada, Denmark, Norway and the United States are the four countries, out of the five that border Arctic Ocean, that have ratified the LOSC. Russia is the fifth country to do so. The United States of America, despite the fact that it is not a member to the LOSC views the basic concepts of the UNCLOS as constituting customary international law and as being obligatory for all states.[75]

3.3 International and Domestic Governing Organizations

Arctic is plethora to numerous governing organizations which are both at an international level as well as the domestic. The following section discusses the most prominent governing bodies in the region.

3.3.1 Arctic Council

Arctic Council's mission is to promote sustainable development and environmental conservation in Arctic region. It has fostered effective cooperation between the eight Arctic governments, resulting in various quantitative outcomes. The Council is not founded on a legal obligation or a treaty. A declaration agreed by the foreign ministers of Arctic states designated it as a conference of the highest international level. Arctic Council's cooperation

[75]"UN Conventin On the Law of the Sea." *Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Nuclear Energy and Conumer Protection.* Accessed 5 Dec. 2022.

is centred on consensus-building. The Council cannot make decisions unless all Arctic states reach unanimity. This may qualify as a vulnerability. Despite this the structure of Arctic Council has made this a considerable strength.[76]

Arctic Council operates on three distinct levels. Ministerial, senior Arctic official, and working group are the three levels. At each of these levels the consensus principle prevails. Every two years, the Council meets at the Ministerial level. Typically the foreign ministers of Arctic states attend these events. One Chairmanship concludes and another begins at each Ministerial meeting. Council subsidiaries provide proposals and reports to Ministers. They establish new goals and maintain communication with Arctic states. The Ministers approve a detailed work plan for the upcoming time of the Chairmanship and reflect on past and ongoing activities.

At least twice a year, Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) assemble to oversee and direct the Council's operations, including its scientific and fact-finding endeavours. SAOs are frequently ambassadors or other high-ranking Foreign Ministry employees. The Ministers provide their mandate. The interaction between SAOs and third-level scientists is of the utmost importance and fundamental to the building of a Council consensus for informed decision making.

The council is comprised of six permanent working groups and a variable number of expert working groups. Occasionally special Task Forces are constituted between ministerial meetings to complete vital tasks. The working groups are responsible for the technical and scientific work performed by Arctic scientists and indigenous representatives. Observers from Arctic Council also give their expertise. The monitoring and evaluation of Arctic trends is central to the operations of the working and expert groups. Typically the effort culminates in recommendations to the Ministers for reducing the negative effects of the findings or, if more appropriate, for conducting additional research on the subject. However before such proposals reach the Ministers, they are reviewed by scientists from the working groups and senior officials who represent the Ministers at the level of the SAO. The

[76] Rottem, Svein Vigeland. "The Arctic Council in Arctic Governance." *The Arctic Council*, Springer Singapore, 2019.

majority of the time, ministers endorse suggestions made by consensus of scientists or technical experts with participation from indigenous groups and adopted by SAOs.[77]

Even though the LOSC lays the groundwork for Arctic administration, there are still several areas where Arctic States need to work together to establish new rules. Arctic statesmust function in tandem due to the region's extreme conditions, the scarcity of state resources, and the vulnerability of the ecosystem. Arctic States (the five Arctic coastline states plus Sweden, Finland, and Iceland) formed the Arctic Council for this purpose. Arctic Council provides a platform for collaboration and dialogue among Arctic governments. Considering that the United States, the biggest Arctic Council member, has about a thousand times as many people as Iceland, the smallest member, this is very extraordinary. Common wisdom in the field of International Relations is that larger states are in a better position to exert their will on the international stage. Larger states are oftenconnected with the term "great powers," whereas smaller states are seen as being less powerful. However the Arctic Council demonstrates that regional organisations may be successful when guided by the values of agreement and unanimity. Thus, the smaller member states might have an impact on political decisions.[78]

3.3.2 Indigenous Organizations

Since long before any nation-state claimed Arctic territory or an international body became engaged in Arctic politics and governance, Inuit have flourished in Arctic. The sustainable lifestyles that have enabled Inuit to survive in a place that most people would consider uninhabitable have given them a special awareness of their native territory. Inuit have, however, only lately begun to participate in Arctic administration at the national and international levels because to the impacts of colonialism. What roles have Inuit played in Arctic policy at some of these stages, and how has this impacted Arctic governance? This essay will examine three alternative forms of government that the Inuit have established to answer this issue. First, as a Permanent stakeholder in the Arctic Council, ICC has allowed Inuit to participate in international policymaking. Second, Inuit in Canada have participated

[77] "The Structure and Operation of the Arctic Council." *The Arctic Council*, Routledge, 2015 pp 46
[78]"Arctic Council." *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 4 Sept. 2013.

at the state level via Inuit TapiriitKanatami and ITK. Third, through overseeing four Inuit land claims agreements, Inuit organisations have a voice in regional governance choices made in Canada.

3.3.3 Inuit Circumpolar Council

The ICC is a global organisation that advocates Inuit interests. The ICC was established in 1977 and serves as a representative body representing Inuit in Canada, Russia, Greenland and the United States. The purpose of establishing the ICC was to create a new vision for Arctic that emphasised "Inuit sovereignty, Arctic economic growth, and environmental conservation". This initial vision has evolved over the years, with climate change, rising maritime activities and tourism now ranking among the top issues. However, the basic purpose of the ICC has not changed: to provide an Inuit viewpoint on Arctic governance and policy.[79]

3.3.4 Inuit TapiriitKanatami

ITK is the Inuit national organisation in Canada. It was founded in 1971 and seeks to safeguard and enhance the interests and rights of Inuit in Inuit Nunangat, the Inuithomeland in Canada (ITK 2020). The ITK collaborates closely with the Canadian government to develop policies that recognise both the inequities between Inuit and non- Inuit in Canada and the significance of Inuit-led initiatives to tackling many of these problems. This is described in Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (2019) which emphasises the significance of partnership and engagement with Indigenous populations in Arctic. This policy also covers the ITK's Arctic and Northern Policy Framework: Inuit Nunangat chapter. This chapter focuses on an Inuit-centered viewpoint and approach to Arctic policy. It describes the most significant facets of wealth and statusdisparity in Inuit Nunangat. This paper not only acknowledges significant aspects of socialand economic inequality, but also presents policy ideas and studies that currently address many of these problems and how they might be resolved.[80]

[79]Roberto Zepeda,, and Jorge Virchez. "THE ARCTIC COUNCIL AND THE INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL. GOVERNANCE IN THE ARCTIC REGION." *KACS*, June 2022.
[80] "Inuit in Southern Canada." *Inuit Outside the Arctic*, Barkhuis, pp. 173–206.

The 2007 Inuit Action Plan, Building Inuit Nunaat, is a key report by the ITK. This study was drafted by the Inuit and the Canadian government in reaction to the 2005 Partnership Accord, which demanded a new and more constructive relationship between the Inuit and the Canadian government (ITK 2007). It lists ways in which the Canadian government may assist the Inuit in addressing the most urgent challenges at the moment. The ITK constantly provides reports and participates in community actions aimed at safeguarding and advancing Inuit rights in Canada.

Additionally, the ITK has been heavily active in research programmes in Northern communities. This is shown by the Ulukhaktok research which sought to determine how people in this Northern Inuvialuit community were affected by changing environmental circumstances. Effective communication and cooperation with national and regional Inuit organisations particularly the ITK made this research feasible. This is only one example of how the ITK can foster productive interactions between Inuit in Canada and research colleagues to perform climate change research in the Canadian Arctic.

Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami has made significant contributions to the protection and advancement of Inuit rights and interests in Canada. Community-driven collaborative projects sponsored by the ITK have the potential to be outstanding grassroots solutions to a number of the issues impacting these Northern towns. The ITK's capacity to use the experiences and expertise of Inuit who are most impacted by social and economic inequality has been beneficial in resolving a number of these challenges.[81]

A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in Arctic is another notable paper issued by the ICC. Soon after the 2007 adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples by the United Nations General Assembly. It describes Inuit rights to Arctic and recognises Inuit knowledge and self-determination as essential components of any Arctic policy strategy. This is an important subject particularly in relation to climate change. Inuit have unparalleled knowledge of Arctic habitat and surroundings. This is information that the Inuit have collected during thousands of years of living in Arctic in a sustainable manner. While the rest of the world scrambles to adapt to the consequences of

[81] Mary Simon. *Inuit and the Canadian Arctic: Sovereignty Begins at Home*. 2009, p. 257.

climate change and comprehend how it may be avoided, the Inuit and many other Indigenous peoples throughout the globe continue to engage in traditions that have existed sustainably for millennia. This is why an Inuit viewpoint on Arctic governance is essential, particularly with regard to attempts to mitigate the consequences of climate change in the area.[82]

The ICC has made substantial contributions to Inuit autonomy and sovereignty in Arctic. As a Permanent Participant in Arctic Council, their contributions were able to be heard by the world community. As Arctic continues to gain prominence on the world arena, the ICC works to guarantee that Inuit viewpoints are heard and that Inuit expertise is considered when Arctic-related policy choices are made.

3.4 The Small Coastal States and the Arctic Council

It was a well-thought-out move on the part of the small coastal governments to join the Arctic Council given the political landscape and diplomatic climate. They may focus their policies and shape Arctic developments via targeted agreements and measures thanks to their Arctic strategy.

3.4.1 Iceland and the Arctic Council

Iceland is a country where such sort of conduct is clearly shown. Despite its limited ability to influence events on a global scale Iceland is well aware of its location in Arctic and actively promotes itself as a coastline state in the region. Being an island nation in the North Atlantic, Iceland naturally has a vested interest in marine issues and the fishing industry. The Icelandic government should participate in international decision-making onpressing issues such as marine safety or the control of fishing in Arctic seas. In reference to Young's "honest broker" idea for a tiny state. Iceland which has been exploring Arctic for over a hundred years is now trying to establish itself as a supplier of knowledge-basedservices and a gateway to the region. Location, history and national pride should paint an image of an honest and dependable negotiator in Arctic negotiations. To this end Iceland

[82] Fiammetta Borgia,, and Paolo Vargiu. "The Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic: Between the Right to Self-Determination and a New Concept of Sovereignty?" *The Yearbook of Polar Law Online*, no. 1, Brill, 2012, pp. 189

takes the "entrepreneur leadership" tack by offering "salient assistance" and "new ideas" to its external partners. According to this idea Iceland's transition "from tiny state to smart state" is a clear example of the aforementioned formula in action. The institutional and legal structure was previously recognised as an essential indication for the potential strength of tiny governments. Using the example of Iceland and the Arctic Council, we can see this plainly. Unanimity and sovereign equality ("one state, one vote") are the cornerstones of Arctic Council decision-making, and the presidency of the organisation rotates among member states on a regular basis. Every two years, a different member state takes the helm as chair giving it the probability to further its own vital sovereignty and those of the Council as a whole. Until 2019 Finland served as chairman; in 2019, Iceland will assume the role. Even if individual nations are free to prioritise their own concerns they are nevertheless responsible for considering how their actions may affect the rest of the area. Keep in mind that Arctic Council is an important forum for Arctic's minor governments because of their lack of military and economic might. Baldur maintains that even the smallest of nations need a reliable ally. The state is increasing the prospect of gaining action capability even if these allies take the shape of an institution (or are the institution itself). Smaller coastal governments may be outnumbered, outgunned and outgunned militarily, but they may nevertheless have significant influence over Arctic policy with the right approach.[83]

3.4.2 Greenland and the Arctic Council

Given its physical position and the political dynamics within the Kingdom of Denmark, Greenland's significance in Arctic concerns cannot be overstated. Geographically, racially, linguistically and culturally speaking Greenland belongs to the North American continent since it is a part of the Danish monarchy and is politically and economically linked to Copenhagen as a result of its colonial history. Furthermore Nuuk has been puttingincreased pressure on the government to exercise more political and decision-making authority in matters that directly affect Greenland's interests in Arctic. Even though Denmark's territory is relatively far from the circumpolar North, it is because of the

[83]Valery Zhuravel,. "The Chairmanship in the Arctic Council: From Finland to Iceland." *Contemporary Europe*, no. 90, The Russian Academy of Sciences, Aug. 2019, pp. 97–107.

character of the Danish realm that it is an official member of Arctic Council. In light of this fact Greenland has consistently taken an engaging role in Arctic Council, participatingin both the talks that led to the forum's founding in 1996 as well as its predecessor which institutionalised collaboration under the AEPS in 1991.

The Home Rule and current Self-Rule administrations consider it essential for Greenland to participate in and contribute to debates of regional policy in a political body like the Arctic Council particularly when such choices have an impact on Greenland and its people. The Danish government has often acknowledged Greenland's crucial role in the Arctic Council up to the present. Additionally Greenland has constantly participated in numerous task forces serving as the foremost cohort and as head of several working parties. In working groups on sustainable development and the preservation of Arctic maritime environment, Greenland now represents the Kingdom of Denmark. Notably Denmark, the Faroe Islands and Greenland made up the Danish representation to the Arctic Council during the 2000s. Participants from all political parties were treated equally. However, Arctic Council is really beginning to resemble an international organisation for Greenland Additionally, it is just one among a growing number of venues for Greenland to participate in Arctic and international affairs.[84]

3.4.3 Norway Arctic Policy

Since 2005 the development of the High North, including Arctic, has been the top foreign policy goal for Norway. The primary purpose is to enhance knowledge, activity and presence in the north, as well as to provide the groundwork for long-term sustainable economic and social growth. The Norwegian government created the High North plan in 2006. 2009's "New Building Blocks in the North" study lists seven focus areas: 1) climate and the environment; 2) monitoring-emergency response-maritime safety in northern waters; 3) sustainable development of offshore petroleum and renewable marine resources; 4) onshore business development; 5) infrastructure; 6) sovereignty and cross-border cooperation; and 7) indigenous peoples' culture and way of life. A major chunk of the NOK 1.2 billion allocated for High North activities in the 2011 central government budget was

[84]"Greenland and the Arctic Council." *Greenland and the International Politics of a Changing Arctic*, Routledge, 2017, pp. 125–38, http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315162645-10.

designated for research. Cooperation with Russia has a significant role in Arctic policy of Norway. Norway is also advocating for more Arctic engagement by NATO and the Nordic Council of Ministers.[85]

3.4.4 Sweden Arctic Policy

Sweden's position as an Arctic nation in the Nordic region is comparable to Finland's. Both countries are EU members and have indigenous Sámi populations. Neither country borders Arctic Ocean. The Finnish Arctic strategy, which was developed in 2010, outlines the country's Arctic policy objectives and promotion methods. The focus is on foreign ties, namely Finland's international engagement with Arctic. The strategy addresses the region's security, environment, economy, infrastructure, indigenous populations, international institutions, and the European Union's Arctic Policy. Among the proposed actions are the enhancement of transport communications, the promotion of exports, research, and the strengthening of Arctic Council. In addition to proposing that regular Arctic Council summits be held, the strategy also outlines how the EU's Arctic Policy might be. The Finnish Government has formed a delegation for Arctic issues, which will play a key role in the strategy's future development.[86]

3.4.5 Denmark Arctic Policy

Danish government released a new foreign and security policy framework in which Arctic and North Atlantic region plays an ever-increasing importance. Arctic strategy of the Kingdom of Denmark is low-tension for the benefit of Arctic states and their populations. This strategy is pursued by greater cooperation between Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands in the areas of foreign, security, and defence policy, as well as through strong cooperation and coordination with allies and partners in Arctic, particularly the United States.

The Danish Joint Arctic Command (JACO) has enhanced its capabilities in Arctic region over the previous five years. JACO will continue to enhance its situational awareness and

[85] Andreas Østhagen,. "Norway's Arctic Policy: Still High North, Low Tension?" *The Polar Journal*, Apr. 2021.

[86]Niklas Eklund,. "Security Perspectives from Sweden." *Routledge Handbook of Arctic Security*, 2020.

surveillance capabilities in order to maintain the region's sovereignty and presence. Denmark's rising interest in Arctic is a result of shifting power structures and a dynamic security environment. The Danish government aspires to preserve Arctic as a place of mutual cooperation where international law and a rules-based international order are essential. Denmark believes that a balanced approach to the security environment will contribute to the stability of Arctic. In addition, it continues to monitor developments in the security environment and geopolitics of Arctic, particularly in light of Russia's recent invasion of Ukraine and its potential long-term consequences on the region.[87]

3.5 Ongoing Disputes

Given the many territorial claims in Arctic, it is only inevitable that there are a few territorial conflicts there. While some of these issues have been peacefully settled, others are ongoing still. The United States, Russia, and Canada are the principal parties to each of these issues.

3.5.1 The Northern Sea Route

The Russian Arctic domain traverses 24,140 kilometers of Arctic coastline from the Barents Ocean close to the Norwegian line in the west to the Bering Ocean and the Ocean of Okhotsk in the Far East. The NSR, legally perceived as the streams between Kara Entryway and the Bering Waterway runs along parts of this coast. This course is vital for various variables including its essential area, fish stocks and the presence of oil assets in its sea zone.

This route is considerably less frigid than the Northwest Passage due to climatic variations in this region of Arctic. Thus, commercial and economic development opportunities may be more likely here than in the NWP at this time. Legal Standing of NSR Concerning rights over the route, it is important to highlight the multiple roles held by various actors regarding the status of NSR's jurisdiction. Russia's stance on the status of the waterway is that the straits are internal waters and that the waterways north of Russia are part of the national

[87]Jon Clemmensen,, and Line Nielsen. *The Middleman—The Driving Forces Behind Denmark's Arctic Policy*. 2020.

transport infrastructure that holds the nation together. This indicates that Russian legislation requires vessels having entered or intending to gain entry the NSR to notify Russian authorities in advance and pay a fee for the utilization of the route. Others, including the United States of America, argue that the NSR is an international waterway.[88]

According to the 2009 U.S. Presidential Directive on Arctic Region, the Northern Sea Route contains straits in use for maritime trade transit through these straits is governed by the transshipment passage regime. With respect to maritime rights UNCLOS stipulates unrestricted navigation within the 200 nm exclusive economic zone. The purported glacier areas clause of Article 234 contains an important exception which is the reason for Russia's declaration for directing and controlling traffic on the course. This provision gives beach front expresses the power to authorize guidelines to forestall, diminish, and control marine contamination. With diminishing ocean ice in any case, Article 234 may turn out to be less significant provoking Russia to stress the course's long term authentic development. Russia has more than once forewarned that endeavors by different legislatures to adjust the lawful notoriety of the NSR and integrate it into a worldwide travel course would be incongruent with its public advantages. As its importance is expected to develop the authorization of the NSR might actually turn out to be considerably more hostile.[89]

3.5.2 North West Passage

The control and legitimate acknowledgment of the NWP (Map02) is one of the most pivotal issues for the US in Arctic which might turn out to be much more significant as the ice sheet keeps on softening. The US and Canada differ concerning the legitimate status of the NWP. While the US sees the NWP as a waterway utilized for global route and insists that it is a worldwide stream Canada declares sway. NWP is a worldwide strait as per the US Coast Guard which contested Canada's case in 1985 by sending the US Coast Guard Cutter MS Polar Sea through the Entry without Canadian authorization.

[88] Vylegzhanin, and Nazarov. *The Northern Sea Route: Solving Political and Legal Problems.* Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2020.
[89] Didenko, and Cherenkov. *Economic and Geopolitical Aspects of Developing the Northern Sea Route*. 2018 pp. 140-147

In 1969 the unannounced visit of the US tanker SS Manhattan to the NWP caused discretionary difficulty between the nations. The connection between U.S. interests in navigational opportunity and the issue of the NWP is close. The US puts together its situation with respect to the NWP on the guideline of opportunity of route. Nonetheless Canada's assertion perplexes the situation as there are concerns. Whereby acknowledging Canada's case that the NWP is Canadian internal waters could lay out a point of reference pertinent somewhere else on the planet.[90]

As ice keeps on dissolving the NWP could act as a shipping lane between the east and west shorelines of the US. Permitting ships to avoid the more extended course through the Panama Canal by going north. There might be a few possible financial and business benefits for the US from the Northwest Section. Nonetheless the US comes up short on required framework. Principally icebreakers and ports to help any worthwhile business utilization of the Northwest Section and its unpleasant circumstances make it less practical than elective courses. Along these lines the NWP is probably not going to contend with different waterways for example the Suez Canal in the near future. Furthermore Canadian pioneers recognize the ongoing ecological state of the course's business use. The course's ongoing reasonability may likewise legitimize why the matter has not turned into a notable one.[91]

3.5.3 Hans Islands December 1973 Onwards

Between Ellesmere Island in Canada and Greenland in the Nares Strait's Kennedy Channel sits Hans Island a 1.3-kilometer-long island (A Danish territory). The deserted island is situated in international waters between Denmark and Canada, but a treaty signed in 1973 failed to resolve the dispute over who should own the island. Even as recently as April 11th, 2012 both nations discussed dividing the island in half, but no deal has been made. A number of commentators have labelled this exchange a "pseudo-confrontation," while others have seen it as an afterthought from the diplomatic community. The so-called "whisky war" which never really existed, has officially ended with the formal division of

[90]Ted McDorman,. *The Northwest Passage: International Law, Politics and Cooperation*. 2010.
[91]Alicia Zorzetto. “Canadian Sovereignty at the Northwest Passage.” *MandalaProjects*, May 2006.

a small, lifeless Arctic island between Canada and Denmark. Hans Island is a desolate half-mile square in the Nares Strait between the northwest coast of the semi-autonomous Danish state of Greenland and Canada's Ellesmere Island and it has no natural resources or anything else of interest unless you're a passing seabird. Because of its muffin-like form and cliffy environs it served as an Inuit hunting ground for millennia. However under Greenland's self-rule government it has been in the forefront of a long-running border dispute between Canada and Denmark. Despite Ottawa's denial Copenhagen continues to insist that Hans Island is part of Greenland on the basis of geological evidence.[92]

Halfway between Greenland and Canada lies the Nares Strait where Canada and Denmark set up a border in 1973. However an agreement could not be reached upon which country would control Hans Island, which is situated around 680 miles (1,100 km) south of the North Pole. Ultimately they decided to settle the ownership question at a later time. As a result both camps engaged in some friendly lobbying complete with flag-waving topromoting their own causes. It was in 1984 that the Danish minister for Greenland affairs raised the Danish flag over the island, buried a bottle of Danish schnapps and left a note reading "Welcome to the Danish island" which is where the name "whisky war" comes from. Canadians sent a bottle of whisky and a flag. Since then, each country has raised its flag in turn and left behind empty bottles of liquor. While atop the cliff in 2002 Nana Flensburg stood with a Danish military contingent for a flag-raising ceremony. According to an article in Tuesday's Politiken newspaper she noted that "among the stones in the cairns were hundreds of bottles, cups, etc. with documentation that talked of prior journeys to the island." In 2005, when tensions were at their worst after Denmark said it would submit a letter of protest in response to a visit by Canada's defence minister Bill Graham.[93]

Denmark responded to Graham's assertion that Canada had perpetual possession of the island by saying "Hans Island is our island." Some Canadians have called for a boycott of Danish pastries just as some Americans have rejected "french fries" in response to France's decision not to join the coalition troops in Iraq. The two countries have agreed to split the little island in half and a peace treaty will be signed later on Tuesday. Denmark's Foreign

[92] Jan Rudnicki. *The Hans Island Dispute and the Doctrine of Occupation*. 2016.
[93] Adam Lajeunesse, and Heather Pirot. “HANS ISLAND A HOUSEWARMING GIFT?” *2018.*

Minister Jeppe Kofod said it "sends an explicit indication of it is feasibility to handle border problems in a rational and civilised manner where the all parties emerge winners."He called it "a crucial signal" in light of the current global instability. The agreement will take effect after both countries' internal procedures are finalised. A parliamentary vote is needed in Denmark to finalise the agreement.[94]

3.5.4 Beaufort Dispute 2004 Onward

The foundation of the issue can be traced back to the French-drafted Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1825 between Russia and the United Kingdom. The United States and Canada inherited these treaty rights from Russia and Great Britain in 1867 and 1880 respectively. Canada asserts that the treaty demarcates the boundary at the 141st-degree meridian line on both land and sea while the United States asserts that it is merely a land boundary and that conventional maritime boundary demarcation extends beyond the coast. In 1976 when the United States took issue with the boundary line that Canada was using to grant oil and gas concessions in the Beaufort Sea, these divergent perspectives reached a head.

Despite the resource potential of the contested region, it seems unlikely that any resources if discovered will be exploited in the medium to long term. Given the technological obstacles high costs, stringent restrictions, lack of infrastructure, and ramifications of the recent Paris Agreement the odds are stacked against continued development in Arctic of North America. This reduces the political costs of compromise for both parties and prepares the road for a settlement. The United States and Canada have disputed about whohas legal control over the Beaufort Sea since 2004, when the United States leased eight parcels of undersea land for resource development. In July 2011, the two nations started talks in Ottawa, but the issue has not been resolved.[95]

3.5.5 Lomonosov Ridge Dispute 2004 Onward

Since its discovery the UN Convention on the High Seas, the Continental Shelf Convention and the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Convention have determined the ridge's legal

[94]Hornackova Nikoleta, "HANS ISLAND CASE A Territorial Dispute in the Arctic." *Aalborg University*, May 2018.
[95]Lewis-Koskinen, Simone. "U.S. - Canada Dispute Over Offshore Territory." *ICE Case Studies*, Dec. 2010.

status. These legal instruments did not overcome every difficulty in contended territory. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea specifies that the continental shelf of a coastal state encompasses the seabed and mineral resources beyond territorial waters and is defined as the natural extension of the land territory to the outer boundary of the undersea continental margin. Thus paragraphs 4-7 of the treaty permit any state to expand its maritime territory if it can demonstrate that the shelf is an integral part of its continental plate. Obviously the polar states have struggled for a section of Arctic that is so precious. However study on underwater ridges and elevations was limited.[96]

The Russian Federation a significant competitor in this race has made substantial Arctic research investments. Seven missions devoted considerable time to collecting geological data on Arctic Ocean bottom. Their primary target was the underwater Lomonosov Ridge (map 01). The regions are part of the Russian continental shelf from a legal standpoint. In December 2001 Russia first demanded a boundary enlargement. The UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf determined a year later that the data was insufficient to validate Russia's claims. In 2007 Russia continued its research on the seafloor and the Siberian continental plate to locate additional evidence. On August 2, 2007 for the first time in the history of polar exploration the Mir-1 and Mir-2 deep-sea submersibles descended to the seafloor of Arctic Ocean under the supervision of renowned Russian polar explorer Arthur Chilingarov and planted the Russian flag there, sparking international outrage. In 2015, Russia submitted another bid to the UN.[97]

This energy-rich region is attractive to other countries. Canada and Russia are defending the territory in dispute. In 2008-2009 the United States and Canada conducted joint shelf studies to confirm that the ridge is part of the North American continental plate. The expedition operated north of Alaska east of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, and in the direction of the Mendeleyev Ridge. Using photographs and films, American and Canadian scientists acquired data on the seafloor and continental shelf.

[96] Basaran. "The Lomonosov Ridge and the Overlapping Outer Continental Shelf Claim to North Pole." *Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce*, 2016.
[97] Michael Byers,. "The Law and Politics of the Lomonosov Ridge." *Challenges of the Changing Arctic*, 2016.

Using this information Canada made a UN border expansion request. Researchers have demonstrated according to the Canadian government that the Lomonosov Ridge is a natural extension of the North American continent. Due to its size and interest in Arctic, Canada is an important participant in Arctic development issues. Position and cutting-edge technology are benefits for the development of certain territories in Canada. The Danish government asserts that scientific evidence relates Greenland's continental shelf to the geology of the ocean floor. The Danes can lay claim to a 900,000-square-kilometer area located north of Greenland a component country of Denmark. The United States which is drafting a similar petition, lacks a compelling argument for legalising the disputed territory and submitting the necessary documentation to the United Nations.[98]

3.6 Baseline and Maritime Claims in Arctic

All eight regional Arctic states have laid claims to the baselines of Arctic Coast. Some of these Claims have been resolved with ease while others are still on going. The following section discusses the structural power dynamics and the rising geopolitical challenges as a result of these Base line and maritime claims in Arctic.

3.6.1 Arctic Baselines

Traditionally baselines along the coast or crucial base points situated along such baselines are used to assess claims to maritime jurisdiction. These baselines are often extremely significant to the delineation of maritime borders. This is due to the long-standing acceptance of equal spacing or average paths drawn between competing tiers of benchmarks as a means of defining maritime boundaries. Baselines along the coast are often defined by "the low-water line along the coast as depicted on large-scale charts legally recognised by the coastal State," as stated in LOSC Article 5. All of Arctic coastalnations with the exception of the USA, have also asserted straight baselines along portionsof their coastlines that face Arctic Ocean, even though they all already have such "normal"baselines by default. According to LOSC Article 7, "when "straight baselines" must be specified if "the coastline is significantly indented and trimmed into, or if there is a partingof islands along the coast in its direct proximity.".

[98]"Denmark Challenges Russia and Canada over North Pole." *BBC*, BBC NEWS, Dec. 2014.

Although it is obvious that Article 7 is meant to cope with particularly complicated coastal situations, it lacks objective criteria. This has given rise to a number of straight baseline assertions that may be considered liberal, perhaps including some of the straight baselines specified in Arctic. In instance, substantial systems of straight baselines have been developed by Canada, Denmark (on behalf of Greenland), Russia and Norway (in regard to Svalbard). There have been worldwide objections about the claims made by both Canada and Russia that encompass portions of straits that other nations deem to be utilised for international navigation. Straight baselines must be linked to places on the low-water line along the coast in order to make each system of baselines "closed," therefore their position still depends in part on where normal baselines are. It used to be difficult to pinpoint the position of normal baselines along ice-covered shores. This issue may have diminished due to the dramatic environmental changes Arctic area has seen lately. Normal baselines, on the other hand, correspond with the low-water line along the coast. When a consequence, they may 'ambulate,' and the boundaries of maritime jurisdiction that rely on them, as the coast moves due to deposition or erosion.

This is troublesome because extensive stretches of Arctic coastline which were formerly mostly permafrost encased for the entire year but are presently vulnerable to refraction and torrential rain activity contain a high ice content. Thus normal baselines and Arctic coastlines are susceptible to slumping, subsidence, and erosion. As a consequence, baselines and the coast may move inland, thereby affecting the scope of Arctic maritime claims.[99]

3.6.2 Arctic Maritime Claims

Majority of actors that sit along Arctic coast have staked substantial marine rights that are consistent with international law and that serve to safeguard their own strategic interests. These marine claims include a total area equivalent to twelve M-wide territorial waters (except in respect of Greenland, where a 3 M territorial sea is claimed). Despite the fact that Norway's claim in this case does not extend to Jan Mayen Island or Svalbard, the

[99]"The Law on Straight Baselines for Coastal Archipelagos." *Canada's Arctic Waters in International Law*, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 133–46.

United States of America, Canada, Norway and Russia all allege continuous zone rights out to 24 miles. Despite the fact that other Arctic coastline governments claim EEZs that extend out to 200 miles, Norway has only temporarily established a non-discriminatory Fisheries Protection Zone that surrounds Svalbard. This zone is based on the Act on Norway's Economic Zone and was established in accordance with the Act on Norway's Economic Zone.

3.7 Arctic Maritime Boundary Agreements

There are five reciprocal sea line debates in Arctic including those among Russia and the US, Canada and the US, Denmark and Greenland, Denmark and Norway (Svalbard), Norway and Russia. Somewhere around 200 meters from the shore, huge headway has been made in settling covering oceanic cases between adjoining States. From the terminal of the two countries' property verge on the coast for 24.35 M into the Varangerfjord, Norway and the then-USSR laid out the primary marine limit in Arctic in 1957.

A very nearly 1,500 M long mainland rack limit was settled upon in 1973 by Canada and Denmark for Greenland. The boundary stumbles into Baffin Narrows, Nares Waterway and Robeson Channel prior to arriving at the Lincoln Ocean at the gathering of their 200- meter limits at the Davis Waterway's mouth. The contested Hans Island is situated insidea little hole in the Nares Waterway that is essential for the boundary, to begin. This islet, which is somewhat more than 1 km2 in size, is the main challenged land region in the Icy.A shrewd strategy to get around this sway conflict was to overlook this challenged includetotally. While the limit depends on equivalent distance between contradicting shores, therewas vulnerability in regards to the area of a few base places in the high Arctic at the hour of its exchange, so the settlement accommodated a later change of the line considering new reviews in light of similar standards. Subsequently the fringe had a minor correction in 2004.[100]

[100]"DENMARK and CANADA Agreement Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Greenland and Canada (with Annexes). Signed at Ottawa on 17 December 1973." *United Nations-Treaty Series*, 1974.

In 1990 a new extended sea line was laid out between the USA and the previous USSR. Arctic Ocean toward the north and the Bering Ocean toward the south are totally remembered for this understanding which crosses the Bering Waterway among Gold country and Russia. The limit of the district covered by the 1867 show under which the US procured Alaska from the USSR fills in as the establishment for the arrangement. The Bering Waterways are the beginning stage for the limit line that applies to Arctic Sea. From that point, it reaches out "similar to allowed by global regulation" to their 200 M cutoff points and, contingent upon how the external mainland rack limits past their EEZ limits are characterized, may expand further offshore in the focal.

One of the four "vital aspects" designated by the agreement is Arctic Ocean (the other three are in the Bering Sea). These Special Areas are areas on the US side of the border that are within 200 metres of the USSR's baselines but outside of 200 metres of the USA's baselines. All ocean spaces within 200 metres of one or both of their coastlines are secured to be divided between these two nations thanks to these unique regions. Despite the fact that Russia has not officially accepted this border treaty, both parties have abided by its provisions according to notes they have exchanged. At the point when Denmark and Norway settled on a roughly 430 M-long equidistance-based mainland rack and fisheries zone line between the shores of Greenland and Svalbard, more advancement in sea delimitation in Arctic Sea was accomplished in February 2006. Denmark concluded that convention with the understanding that Svalbard creates both continental shelf rights and fishing rights. This was a crucial factor to Norway since it supports their argument that Svalbard may produce offshore zones which makes it relevant for defining maritime boundaries in Arctic. Other nations occasionally disagree with this statement on the Svalbard Treaty's language.[101]

The 2010 historic maritime border agreement between Norway and Russia represents the most important recent accomplishment in addressing maritime conflicts in Arctic Ocean. The demarcation limit was extended to 39.41 M by the two nations in a 2007 agreement

[101]Oude Elferink, Alex G. *Maritime Delimitation Between Denmark/Greenland and Norway, Ocean Development & International Law.* 2007, pp. 375–80.

that largely replaced the Varanger Fjord Treaty from 1957. In contrast from the 1970s forward, overlapping claims to the continental shelf covering an area of around 175,000 km2 persisted further north in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean. The main points of contention were Russia's proposal for a sector line and Norway's support for a median line solution. Availability to fishing industry particularly cod and haddock stocks that are commercially valuable and supported by the Barents Sea's highly productive and diverse ecosystem also caused conflict though this resulted in the adoption of efficient collaborative management efforts stretching back 35 years before the border pact. The two nations reached an agreement in 2010 to draw an all-purpose border "... keeping with international law in a bid to reach a fair resolution," taking into account " crucial variables, such as the impact of significant differences in the lengths of the two coastlines" and distributing "the general demilitarized zone into roughly equivalent halves." This marked the first significant progress on the remaining boundary disputes. The agreement included clauses for co-management of any hydrocarbons that cross the border as well as clauses for continuous collaboration in the area of fishing.

One of the additional fascinating parts of the game plan is the way that, like the Extraordinary Regions that were laid out among the US of America and the Soviet Association, a piece of the EEZ on the Russian side of the line is really found farther than 200 meters from Russian baselines however is nearer to the Norwegian shore than 200 meters. This is one of the additional captivating parts of the arrangement. Under the details of this arranged arrangement the two states had the option to isolate the whole EEZ region inside 200 meters of their individual shores. Nonetheless, this division didn't have to happen inside 200 meters of the baselines of the state on whose side of the line a specific region of the EEZ is arranged. In lieu of a definitive motivation behind coming to an understanding, this was seen by the two players to be a sensible trade off that could be acknowledged. Canada and Denmark (Greenland) guaranteed in 2012 that they will force a sea limit out to 200 nautical miles in the Lincoln Ocean equidistance. This would be finished related to impressive specialized revisions to the 1973 Arrangement.[102]

[102]*Canada and Kingdom of Denmark Reach Tentative Agreement on Lincoln Sea Boundary*. Government of Canada, Nov. 2012.

Therefore it could be construed that numerous maritime borders in Arctic Ocean have been agreed upon and that long-standing boundary conflicts that at one point seemed unsolvable have been amicably settled. This reality stands in stark contrast to alarmist portrayals of Arctic as a zone of geopolitical rivalry and border conflicts. Additionally it should be emphasised that consistent with marine delimitation elsewhere, most sea border pacts in Arctic are premised on collinear lines, although equal spacing lines amended as a result of the negotiating process.

3.8 Arctic Disputes and Overlaps

The essential disputed matter over the sea zones in Arctic is the manner by which Canada and the USA ought to separate the Beaufort Ocean. The issue is the means by which a settlement endorsed by Russia and Extraordinary England in 1825 was phrased (the USA consumed Russia's Deal privileges when it purchased Gold country in 1867; Canada got England's freedoms in 1880)." As indicated by Canada, both the land line and the marine limit were characterized by this settlement statement and both should run stringently north. The USA then again, keeps up with that the delimitation just applies to land and that it closes at the shore where the land line ends. The USA accepts an equidistance line to be the legitimately and geologically appropriate methodology for delimitation in the Beaufort Ocean.[103]

In the late 1970s Canada and the USA attempted to settle the Beaufort Sea issue but without success. By demonstrating that the continental shelf in the Beaufort Sea may extend 350 M or more offshore joint cartography beyond 200 M with a Canadian and a US icebreaker (2008–2011) possibly opened the door to settlement of this issue. The Beaufort Sea border dispute takes on a new twist as a result of the enlarged continental shelf. Seawards of 200 M an equidistance line is shifted to the northwest due to the effect of Canadian Arctic islands. Therefore adopting the other's perspective would be beneficial for both Canada and the USA in terms of space. The Canadian government expressed a wish to "engage with other northern nations to resolve border disputes" in March 2010. Be that as it may in2011 when the two countries decided they would need extra logical information on the

[103]Baker S, James, and Michael Byers. "Crossed Lines: The Curious Case of the Beaufort Sea Maritime Boundary Dispute." *Ocean Development and International Law*, Jan. 2012.

presence and area of hydrocarbon stores prior to arranging a line conversations were required to be postponed.

The debate among Canada and Denmark is the other unsettled sea zone struggle. Denmark changed its baselines in 2004 supplanting the 40.9 M pattern east of Beaumont Island with a progression of more limited baselines. Including one connecting Beaumont Island to John Murray Island the following island in the chain. This decreased the size of the issue. The 2012 declaration that negotiators "had achieved a provisional agreement on where to create the maritime border in the Lincoln Sea" was made by the foreign ministers of Canada and Denmark was likely influenced by these Danish changes, which nearly eliminated the northeast contested territory by reducing its size. An agreement on a shared management system for any overlapping hydrocarbon reserves was the only thing still up for discussion. The Danish and Canadian negotiators were unable to resolve this issue alone since, regardless of Denmark's proceeded with impact over Greenland's international strategy. The Greenland government has starting around 2008 practiced power over normal assets, remembering those found for the mainland rack. In order to resolve the unresolved concerns surrounding this maritime border, Canada and Denmark organised a "Joint Response Team on Demarcation matters" in 2018.

3.9 Outer Continental Shelf Areas and the Central Arctic Ocean

A Russian group conveyed a sub on August 2, 2007 at a profundity of around 4,200 meters under the North Pole to drop a rust-evidence titanium coffin with a Russian banner on Arctic seabed. This occasion got a ton of media consideration, its vast majority being scaremonger in tone. This demeanor continued to worldwide relations when Peter MacKay Canada's unfamiliar pastor appeared to discount the banner dropping occasion as an exposure ploy and said, "This isn't the fifteenth 100 years." You can't just place signals all around the globe and pronounce "We're guaranteeing this locale." Nobody is throwing banners about Sergei Lavrov the unfamiliar priest of Russia said. Examinations were taken between Russia's action and Hillary and Tenzing establishing the Association Jack on the pinnacle of Everest in 1953. Lavrov tried expressing determinedly that Russia was not acting autonomously and that its activities were "in finished line with worldwide regulation."

The Commission on the Restrictions of the Mainland Rack, a logical and specialized body laid out by the Show can help with deciding the external furthest reaches of the mainland rack concerning toward the ocean of 200 M mainland rack regions. LOSC Article 76 spreads out complex models for this reason (CLCS). This entanglement results from the way that the depiction of mainland rack privileges seawards of 200 M limits doesn't just rely upon a distance equation. In spite of the fact that there is just a single mainland rack truly these offshore of 200 M limits parts of the mainland rack are once in a while alluded to as the "external" or "broadened" mainland rack. Then two greatest requirements or cut-off lines are applied: a limitation of 100 M from the profundity isobath (profundity shape) of 2500-meters or, at the beach front state's decision a limitation of 350 M from its baselines (Article 76(5)). It has been said that the "intricacies and ambiguities" connected with Article 76 as well as issues with the manner in which the Commission's work makes it challenging to characterize the external limits of the mainland rack offshore of 200 M cutoff points. A seaside state should gather information on the geography and morphologyof its mainland shoreline as well as bathymetric information on sea profundity, to set up an accommodation for the CLCS. The state should likewise recognize distance measures for example the areas of the 200 M and 350 M limit lines. Albeit this technique should be exorbitant and tedious it has the significant advantage of characterizing the external limit of the mainland rack, which Mc Dorman has alluded to as "the real achievement" of Article 76 of the LOSC.[104]

The data needed to create submissions has been actively collected by all Arctic coastal nations. Some nations, such as the USA and Canada, have worked together, for instance to conduct joint surveys. With the exception of the USA (as a non-LOSC party) every Arctic littoral state has submitted information to the CLCS. These comments suggest that should the Commission agree the great bulk of Arctic Ocean's seabed will be a part of the coastal states' outer or extended continental shelf. The main area of ambiguity in this situation is how the CLCS intends to handle the main Arctic Ocean ridge systems. These include the Lomonosov and Gakkel Ridges which are where Canada, Denmark (Greenland) and

[104]Bjørn Kunoy,. *The Delimitation of an Indicative Area of Overlapping Entitlement to the Outer Continental Shelf*. 1st ed., British Yearbook of International Law, 2013, p. 66.

Russia's contributions overlap and the Alpha Rise, which is where Canada, Russia, and the United States' submissions connect. It is important to note here that the delineation of continental shelf borders is not affected by the requirements of Article 76 of the LOSC. Unless all the states involved agree that the CLCS may continue the Commission does not have the authority to examine a submission involving a portion of the continental shelf where there are overlapping claims.

These restricting cases to the mainland rack will at last must be tended to by the signatory parties separately through dealings and conversations because of this present circumstance. Article 76 gives states the position to pick the methodology that will be best in this regard and permits them to do so uninhibitedly. In mark of reality, the three Arctic littoral states — Canada, Denmark (Greenland) and Russia — that are probably going to have to take part in two-sided or three sided exchanges over the delimitation of their lengthy mainland racks have all expressed their expectation to coordinate inside the structure of LOSC and worldwide strategy. These discussions are probably going to occur over the delimitation of their drawn out mainland racks. These exchanges could happen over the delimitation of the states' separate expanded mainland racks. The catch here is that it isn't yet clear assuming sea delimitation for regions on the external mainland rack will follow similar course as delimitation for places inside the 200-mile limit. This is an important caution to keep in mind. The current state practise is restricted, and it often adheres to the same procedures that are utilised within 200 metres of the coast, or it only slightly deviates from those limits. In spite of the fact that it has been suggested that geophysical characteristics could play only a "minimal role" in the delimitation of sections of the outer continental shelf outliers do occur. As a result, it is maybe still too early to come to any definitive conclusions in this respect.[105]

[105]Bernard, Leonardo, and Clive Schofield. *Disputes Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles.* p. 158.

Conclusion

Small regional states such as Iceland, Norway and Denmark as well as organizations like Arctic Council, play a significant role in shaping the governance and power dynamics of Arctic region. These small regional states have unique geopolitical interests and domestic politics that shape their policies and behavior in the region. Norway for example is heavily invested in the Arctic region and has prioritized environmental protection and sustainable development. Iceland has focused on expanding its own capabilities in the region, such as increasing its search and rescue capabilities. Denmark as the colonial power in Greenland has a strategic interest in asserting its sovereignty over the island. Territorial disputes, such as the one between Canada and Denmark over Hans Island, are also shaped by domestic politics, international power dynamics, and strategic interests. These disputes can be managed through cooperative frameworks such as the Arctic Council, but also have the potential to escalate into conflicts.

Arctic region is warming up in more than just the climactic dimension given the numerous expeditions and the ever growing claims in this anarchic region, where some are resolved amicably under the guise of negotiations and dialogue, other matters ascertaining to Russia, US and Canada are not so simple due to structural pressures and can be seen as taking more of a confrontational application. But based on neo classical paradigm even where states resort to cooperation on matters, it is only to work together in order to strengthen their own positions on the matter hand, this can be seen as ever more apparent in the cases of small regional powers as Greenland, Denmark, Iceland, Finland and Sweden. Since for them as they lack the necessary power individually to take on a more assertive stance to safe guard and further their own regional interests, they find it feasible to work together for mutual gain. In the case of Russia which in itself is a powerful entity can be seen as employing a unilateral approach stance in to assert itself further in Arctic region.

Chapter Four

Extra Regional Actors in Arctic

Arctic and its resources became more accessible in 21st century, due to anarchic International presence and other extra regional governments has become significantly interested in the area. While physical models help in the construction of models for increased ship traffic and link to ocean resources and coastal resources as well as scenarios for Arctic sea ice retreat forecasting the influence of structural pressures more over external economic forces on Arctic development is still difficult. Due to the significant estimated oil and gas reserves north of Arctic Circle new advances in the oil and gas industry are of special interest in Arctic. The factors investigated here include state policy patterns that influence future Arctic investment, consistency in policy incentives to encourage development, and the variety of states engaged in oil and gas exploration. Considering that the United States and other key players have important interests. As a result, it also drew the attention of more regional players that saw an arctic presence as crucial to their interests.[106]

The chapter is divided in to four parts, each part highlights and discusses arctic policies and interests of the extra regional states in arctic. The first part highlights Japan's arctic aspirations and policies. Second part discusses Britain's Arctic stance followed by Germany in third. The fourth part sheds light on Singapore's arctic ambitions.

Extra Regional States in Arctic

As Arctic is becoming more accessible, the potential of new SLOCs that provide a perspective of better transit routes and the prospect of access to greater untapped natural resources, the region has caught the attention of some extra-regional states as well.

[106]Kenneth Bird,, et al. *Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle*. USGS Publicantions Warehouse, 2008.

4.1 Japan

For Japan, its public advantages are dealt with by current issues and tended to by means of its Arctic commitment strategy. To start with Japan's inclinations in the space incorporate those that go under the bigger meaning of' safety.' There are little stresses over traditional military security since all key gatherings concur that Arctic ought to stay a helpful and serene zone. Tonami Aki sees that Japanese review performed under the sponsorship of the Service of Safeguard "reasoned that adjustments of Arctic don't present prompt worries to Japan's public safety." Notwithstanding, there are stresses over Arctic security corresponding to regular calamities brought about by quick environmental change. To address these worries Japan should carefully concentrate on possible risks and assemble trustworthy response frameworks. Another sketchy Japanese need connects with energy security. A country that imports 90% of its energy assets is needing both sort and provider variety. Japan is currently reliant upon Center Eastern hydrocarbons.

Investing in Arctic oil and gas extraction projects is just one solution to this problem. This may partially explain Tokyo's rather autonomous attitude to its dealings with Russia since it does not adhere to the sanctions policy of the United States and the European Union in response to the Ukraine issue. Participation with Russia on the improvement of mineral assets is by all accounts an advancement towards energy security for Japan. The last concept in the "security" part is the often neglected food certainty. The northward migration of some marine species and the accompanying dangers must be handled in order to supply the country with a nutritious diet. This is a significant concern for a small-sized island nation. Once more, this aspect depends largely on study and risk evaluation. Arctic exploration is also motivated by clear economic considerations. The growth of energy resources is one part of this. From an economic standpoint, its cost-effectiveness is still up for question, therefore Japan is rather cautious.[107]

Beginning in the 1990s Arctic Routes became an increasingly important transportation corridor for Japanese cargo. The NSR which linked Japan with Europe was the most important. Since it was 40% faster than the traditional route via the Suez Canal, the Route

[107]Marina Lomaeva,, and Juha Saunavaara. “Japan Facing the Arctic and North: Interplay Between the National and Regional Interests.” *Arctic Fever*, Aug. 2020.

was employed for more regular commercial movements. The NSR shipping is of special importance to Japan now that the Japan and European Union Fiscal Partnership Agreement has been in effect for a year. This would be good for Japan-EU commerce and assist greatly to expand barter quantities. Japan is thinking of establishing itself as a key Asian port at the start of Arctic Sea Route. The government of Hokkaido sees the seaport of Tomakomai as a possible hub for Arctic transport and commerce. Japanese fiscal stakes are highly dependent on Russian officials' dedication to ensuring the NSR is a secure and sustainable path for Arctic sea ways. The Russian government's plans such as the "Arctic 2035" strategy, are expected to bring about significant improvements in Arctic region's infrastructure and standard of living.[108]

Shipbuilding, engineering and facility construction are additional sectors of the Japanese economy that draw enterprises from Arctic states. Nevertheless Japan faces intense competition from Korean and particularly Chinese corporations in these fields. Japan wants a bigger role and more sway on the global stage which brings us to our third point. It seeks the privilege that is presently almost exclusively held by Arctic governments to engage actively in setting the rules for Arctic affairs rather than just observing them. Due of the significance of regional events for the rest of the globe this hope appears reasonable. Another facet of this curiosity is rivalry amongst CJK nations. Japan will not accept being just "China's neighbour" during the moments when the whole world is witnessing China's ascent to power. South Korea's aspirational goals likewise prevent Japan from going with the trend. Competing with one another is really beneficial for the CJK nations since they keep pushing each other ahead. To enhance its reputation among East Asian governments Japan must advocate for good global change, such as addressing the difficulties in Arctic made more difficult by global warming. Japanese public diplomacy to Southeast Asia is well-suited to the goal of countering negative impressions of the country's military by doing good. Finally Japan is committed to solving Arctic environmental issues. Not only are these problems framed as security risks but they also align with the growing agreement on the necessity for immediate environmental action to save the planet. Japan's dedication to the

[108]Stepanova, et al. "The Potential of Digital Platforms for Sustainable Development Using the Example of the Arctic Digital Platform 2035." *IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science,* 2020.

SDGs and the Paris Agreement's tenets is impressive. Japan has been doing sophisticated study and observation in Arctic for over 60 years and it uses this knowledge to help populations who have been severely impacted by climate change, especially indigenous peoples of Arctic.[109]

4.1.1 Japan's Arctic policy

Japan's attitude to Arctic has become increasingly formalised and sophisticated in recent years. In 2013 Second Ocean Policy Blueprint was created. It encompassed the following three major axes of Japan's Arctic strategy:

- Observing and studying Arctic;
- Increasing international cooperation in Arctic
- Using the Northern Sea Route

Japan's Bureau endorsed "Japan's Arctic Strategy" in October of 2015. Issues of overall ecological concern, native people groups, Arctic Ocean Course, regular asset improvement, public safety and the advancement of law and order are just not many of the strategy regions covered here. Right away it might appear to be that some of them are just the Japanese government's acknowledgment of existing difficulties (what to some extent meets with Arctic Council's plan), as opposed to substantial arrangement responsibilities. For example while the problems of Arctic indigenous peoples are often cited as one of the major obstacles in Arctic affairs Japan which is not an Arctic state, is naturally less invested in this area of policy. To rephrase "it is not seen as a major domestic problem that requires immediate action by the government" in Japan.

Japan is aware of this yet persists in trying to demonstrate dedication to its own policy goals despite the challenges. At the 2019 Arctic Circle Assembly in Reykjavik, Japan's Arctic Affairs Ambassador Miyoshi Mari spoke mostly about Japan's work with Arctic indigenous peoples highlighting initiatives in Greenland, East Siberia and Alaska. As a result it may deduce that Japan's new Arctic strategy is more issue-oriented than previously thought. Examining such efforts can help us obtain a better grasp on Japan's Arctic strategy.

[109] Hiromitsu Kitagawa. "East Asia (Japan, South Korea and China) and the Arctic." *WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs*, 2008.

In May of 2018 the Cabinet green lit the Third initiative on Ocean Policy which for the inaugural moment includes Arctic policies among the primary ocean policy directions. Using Japanese cutting-edge science and technology to better study and observe, Arctic nurturing multilateral collaboration to establish legislation in Arctic governance and interacting in feasible seafaring commercial development are all highlighted in the document to help provide a clearer picture of Japan's objectives in its Arctic policy.[110]

The three pillars of Japan's Arctic strategy are sustainability, collaboration, research & development (R&D). Taking into account both national interests and strategic goals as well as capabilities and prospective contributions. In order to emphasise Japanese accomplishments and to show how the issues mentioned above are contextualised within this framework, further examination of each of these areas in greater detail. One area in which the Japanese excel is R&D, and they are willing to share their knowledge in order to build a reputation among Arctic governments. Japan has a lengthy history of Arctic studyand observation that stretches back to the 1950s as noted earlier. NIPR founded Arctic Environment Research Center in 1990.

A new organisation began doing cutting-edge research on Arctic sea ice, marine ecosystems, the ocean and upper atmosphere. It now runs two research stations on the Svalbard Islands. Arctic Data Archive System run by Japan has been an open repository for Arctic observational research and pertinent datasets since 2012. ARCS the largest modern research initiative in Japan was started in 2015. It is jointly supervised by the NIPR the Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology, Hokkaido University and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports and Science and Technology. The ARCS is crucial because it not only focuses on climate and environmental research but also examines how changes in Arctic affect cultures, most notably indigenous populations. Once again this initiative intends to transparently provide accurate evaluations of the existing status and potential threats in the future to all stakeholders, both locally and internationally.[111]

[110]Almazova-Ilyina, A. B., et al. *National Interests of Japan and Its Emerging Arctic Policy*. 2020.
[111] Tetsuo Sueyoshi, et al. "Background and Activities of the Arctic Challenge for Sustainability (ArCS) Project." *Polar Science*, Feb. 2021.

Even with all their progress the Japanese Arctic research still has its limits. The shortage of research boats particularly those with icebreaker capabilities, is a well-known problem. The Japan Shore Guard operates two of the country's three icebreakers, however they are restricted to the seas off the northern coast of Hokkaido. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force has another icebreaker called Shirase and there are legal restrictions on when and when it may be used. This ship is now serving in Antarctica as a support vessel for the National Ice and Snow Science Program.

The Basic Plan on Ocean Policy declares the Japanese government's intent to create an icebreaking research vessel and an independent submersible automative for Arctic exploration. Therefore progress in research and development must precede any participation in Arctic. To maintain stable governance and a sustainable, ecologically benign nature of expanding economic activity in Arctic, international collaboration is essential. Events in this area may have far-reaching consequences. Because of this international discussion procedures that involve people from beyond the area are crucial. Arctic Council and its regular observers are particularly affected (thirteen non-Arctic states as of 2019).

Their participation in the Council's Working Groups and the submission of written suggestions are indicative of their advisory rather than decision-making function. The position of observers as permanent members of the Council is still up for debate. In an interview, Shiraishi Kazuko, Japan's former ambassador in charge of Arctic affairs, said, "Arctic Council need to think about allowing for a more active participation of Arctic observers in the council via the use of some mechanism that gives observers the opportunity to voice their ideas, make presentations, and devise a structure for legally binding contracts." The future of Arctic is something that various observer nations perceive in different ways. For example, East Asian observer states view Arctic in a more global context, placing special emphasis on everyone's shared duty to safeguard the region's delicate ecosystem and everyone's entitlement to a say in Arctic's resource development, regardless of whether or not it violates the sovereignty of Arctic states themselves.[112]

[112] S Haruki. *Japan's 2018 Observer Review Report*. 2019.

While Chinese authorities formerly saw Arctic as a "shared heritage of humanity," Korean officials now advocate the concept of "user states" when discussing visitors from the area. Japan prioritises preserving the sovereignty and national interests of Arctic nations in this situation. Even though one of Arctic governments, the US is not a signatory to the Convention UNCLOS continues to be the primary international accord that governs Arctic matters. Contrary to Antarctica, Arctic lacks a separate treaty framework that would handle its particular problems. This starts a conversation on whether, Arctic needs an own legal system. There have been many attempts to establish such a strict worldwide system, and some of these suggestions such as the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (the Polar Code), which was accepted by the International Maritime Organization, have actually been put into action.

However as Arctic governments differ on a number of important issues particularly those pertaining to maritime boundaries in Arctic Ocean such efforts often concentrate on certain subject areas. Universally recognised regulations that are adhered to by significant players reduce the risks and expenses associated with Japan's activities in Arctic. They also take care of environmental and security issues that may prevent future Arctic research. One of the top concerns in Japanese Arctic stance is securing the right to alter the decision-making objectives contractually enforceable documents particularly those practiced by Arctic Council (i.e. solely by Arctic border states). Particularly as it relates to contracts in disciplines that are vital for Japan such as fishery and transporting. This is one of the primary concerns in Japanese Arctic stance.[113]

According to Robert Keohane's liberal institutionalism theory of international relations the rule of law and robust institutions will in general promote mutually beneficial cooperation between stakeholders and reduce some transaction costs in Arctic affairs. When discussing sustainability as a top policy priority we should consider the financial incentives for increased Japanese Arctic involvement. Further Arctic exploration offers new economic opportunities but these opportunities are still fraught with many unknowns. Discussions

[113] Julie Babin, and Frederic Lasserre. “Asian States at the Arctic Council: Perceptions in Western States.” *Polar Geography*, Feb. 2019.

about potential economic activity in the area raise concerns about the viability cost-effectiveness and potential environmental harm of such operations. Because of security worries dissatisfaction with the current infrastructure and stringent sailing restrictions imposed by the Russian government Japan continues to view NSR shipping with skepticism.

Japanese businesses participate in a number of initiatives involving mineral resources such as offshore drilling in Greenland and the development of liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities in Russia (Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2). Despite the fact that these projects are significant components of Japan's efforts to diversify its energy sources. Some analysts believe that the country's nuclear industry's revival is the outcome of a political alliance between Japan and Russia's authorities. To guarantee the maintainability of fisheries in the waters of the area more exhaustive examination on biodiversity and marine environments in Arctic is as yet required. The short season for such activities in this location is another restriction on the fishing. Overall, until it gathers sufficient data to perform a thorough review of the sustainability and cost-effectiveness of economic activity in the area, Japan will not increase its participation in Arctic.[114]

4.2 Great Britain

The United Kingdom, like Japan, has been open about connecting its new security interests to developments in Arctic. The post-Brexit process, future British strategic collaboration with the EU, and growing fears over increased Russian military involvement in the North Atlantic, which might endanger the maritime security of the UK (and NATO) are some of the elements at play in this situation. There is still a significant impact of the Cold War on British thinking on the security of its northern maritime region. Britain continues to keep a careful eye on Russia's heightened naval activities, including submarine intrusions, in the "GIUK (Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom) Gap," which is a major passageway from Arctic to the Atlantic Ocean and is thus of crucial interest to Russia's Northern Fleet. A July 2018 UK House of Commons Defence Committee (HCDC) document outlining the

[114] Schach Schach, and Reinhard Madlener. "Impacts of an Ice-Free Northeast Passage on LNG Markets and Geopolitics." *Energy Policy*, Nov. 2018.

difficulties the nation's military is encountering in Arctic clarified these worries. The report cited a number of factors as evidence of shifting political and strategic winds in Arctic, including the opening of Arctic to increased economic activity, the growing interest of Asian non-Arctic states in the region, and pressures, primarily from Russia, being placed on the legal system in Svalbard. The HCDC report came to the conclusion that more action was needed to better coordinate British defence interests with those of Arctic governments, to recognise Moscow as a threat to the region's peace and order, and to persuade the British military to place more emphasis on preparing personnel and equipment for operations related to Arctic. Although Britain published a government White Paper on Arctic in 2013, making it the first non-Arctic government to do so, the country is nonetheless concerned that it may be left out of Arctic's globalisation. The many foreign policy uncertainties brought on by Brexit significantly complicate UK diplomacy and strategy in Arctic. Thus, articulating the nation's security concerns in the far north will probably reflect a desire to re-establish its reputation as both an Arctic stakeholder and a global participant. This will help Britain stand out from its previous allies in the European Union.

4.2.1 The UK’s Engagement in Arctic

The British government published its strategic review paper, in which it outlines its goals and objectives for the next years. The fundamental premise is that the liberal international order is undergoing rapid change, and there is greater competition over the material and normative dimensions of international affairs. As a result the future of open societies and the liberal international order may be significantly affected by this conflict. Although Arctic is only briefly discussed, changes there will probably have a significant impact on the British government's capacity to carry out its Global Britain programme.

To put it another way how successive British governments respond to developments in Arctic will reveal a lot about whether or not London is capable of operationalizing its strategic agenda, from diversifying its supply chain of essential goods to the conduct of what it labels as dispute/legal diplomacy. The United States will be London's partner of choice in Arctic, claiming to be its "nearest neighbour to Arctic." The US is singled out as the UK's most crucial partner because unlike previous European discourses the text does not question the US's capacity for and dedication to Euro-Atlantic defence and security. In

light of this London is likely to try to strengthen its position in the area by acting as Washington's enabler or facilitator.[115]

Given that Russia appears to be the greatest challenge to the stability and prosperity of the Euro-Atlantic region it is reasonable to anticipate that the UK's elected government will call for more significant NATO posturing toward the High North rather than simply repeating Washington's call for higher defence spending by NATO member states. The UK will also further up its military and security cooperation with Arctic nations of Finland and Sweden who are not members of NATO. For example as it looks to replace its Typhoon planes, the UK is adamant to pursue its collaboration with Stockholm on the development of Future Combat Air Systems (FCAS). Aside from their potential financial rewards such cooperative projects might be crucial in assuring the technical, tactical and even operational compatibility of military weapons. Enabling London to serve as a link between the two Scandinavian countries and their NATO counterparts.

The construction of a common Five Eye supply chain for rare earth metals focused on the dominance of British energy and mining companies in Greenland, is recommended in a paper by the Polar Research and Policy Initiative that was just released. Making this move is seen as crucial because it lessens the reliance of the UK and its Five Eyes partners on China as a source of rare earth metals. Furthermore, it would help the UK fulfil its aspirations of becoming into a significant worldwide centre for the manufacturing of high-tech and military products. More crucially as a member of Arctic Council the UK may work closely with Canada to indirectly influence the Council's agenda and policy goals. London professes to be eager to reenergize its worldwide presence in a responsible manner by "working with current (institutional) frameworks." However as an observer state it is not eligible to vote in Arctic Council. Because of the enormous power differences between the UK and Washington, UK is the junior partner and is more likely to be led than to lead.[116]

Finally from a normative standpoint, Arctic is important to the UK. This is because there is still disagreement over what constitutes responsible behaviour in Arctic shipping and

[115] Duncan Depledge, and Klaus Dodds. “The Uk and the Arctic The Strategic Gap.” *The RUSI Journal* , June 2011.
[116] *INTERVIEW WITH ARCTIC COUNCIL OBSERVER: UNITED KINGDOM*. Arctic Council, Mar. 2020.

extractive sectors, just as there is in the online where rivalry over the standards of behaviour is always rising. The British government may then use this as fertile ground to use its diplomatic as well as legal knowledge and wield its convening authority over marine security, commerce and development. It goes without saying that its capacity to effectively contribute to the creation of a unified international framework for energy/mineral extraction and/or shipping in Arctic, would immediately increase its soft power and expand its regional influence.

In the future it is inevitable that the UK will aggressively work to increase its influence over Arctic matters. However, some of the strategies it suggests using to accomplish this goal are incongruous, polarising and so problematic. The British vision of the area is constrained like that of other observers or non-arctic States, by a regrettable concern with resource security and hard power security. Arctic is framed as a resource zone that has to be exploited and or dominated for the benefit of London's resource security notwithstanding the city's claims to be serious about climate change.

More concerningly its measures seem to give priority to bilateral ties with nations or coalitions above the EU. Any action that may undermine the EU's unity on Arctic matters would be damaging to the purpose of preserving peace and stability in the area at a time when European members of Arctic Council are advocating for a bigger EU presence in the region. The superficial and naive suggestions such as the PRPI's Five Eye coalition in Greenland are of particular concern. London does not have the authority to establish the laws simply because British companies dominate the mining industry in Greenland. Its demand that the UK act as "the bridge" between an EU territory and the USA reveals an ill-intentioned effort to both weaken the European Raw Materials Alliance and deprive the EU-US relationship of a crucial strategic component. Therefore although the UK should be encouraged to participate in Arctic, British authorities would be wiser to coordinate their Arctic policy with the EU and pay more attention to the interests and concerns of the local population.[117]

[117]"The United Kingdom and the Arctic in the 21st Century." *Arctic Yearbook 2012*, 2012 pp. 75-80

By doing this they may make sure that the regional posture of the UK is more in line with that of Berlin, Copenhagen, Helsinki, Oslo, Paris and Stockholm. So preventing the needless escalation of disputes that third parties can later take advantage of. After all disputes between Western democracies won't help keep the free international system stable.

4.2.2 UK Arctic Policy Sharpens Military Focus on Arctic

In light of Moscow's increased military activity in Arctic, Britain is pressing the NATO alliance to take a more active role in the area. In a statement that accompanied the policy, British Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said that his department will increase its defensive operations in the area. The UK Armed Forces will work more closely with our close partners and allies in Arctic, both bilaterally and via other multilateral organisations including the Joint Expeditionary Force, NATO, and other regional alliances. The Army will increase its cold-weather training, the RAF will send P8A maritime patrol aircraft to the area, and the Royal Navy including our dedicated Littoral Response Group (North) will sometimes operate in the High North with Allies and partners. Wallace has previously issued warnings that Britain's security in the Artic was at risk due to the region's growing military rivalry.

The policy paper “UK’s Defense Contribution in the High North” counsils the Alliance to further up its efforts in the area if necessary. The statement said “The UK will press for NATO to adopt a more proactive posture to the High North.” The NATO strategy should be appropriate and adjusted to reflect low levels of tension. However, the region’s significance within a 360-degree strategy for collective deterrence and defence must be acknowledged, as must its critical role in facilitating reinforcement throughout the North Atlantic, according to the statement. Wallace said that while there had previously been little tension in Arctic, things were now changing and there was a need for enhanced capabilities in the area. Both possibilities and hazards are brought about due to the dissolution of ice sheets in Arctic: He cautioned that China is backing its projected Polar Silk Road with a variety of facilities and capabilities that have the potential for dual-use while Russia is approaching the area with an increasingly militaristic posture. Threats fromdifferent regions of the globe might enter Arctic as the area becomes more accessible. We

need to be prepared to adapt to the shifting regional dynamics brought on by the melting sea ice, Wallace added. A new plan will increase UK military attention to Arctic.[118]

4.3 Germany

German Arctic policy incorporates certain aspects of both the legacy and the all-around groupings due to the nation's long history of participation in polar missions. The late nineteenth-century North Polar Expeditions were driven by science, much as it is with German foreign policy today. Germany now participates in active regional scientific collaboration, most notably the multinational MOSAIC expedition in Arctic Ocean in 2019–20 which is supported by the Alfred Wegener Institute in Bremerhaven and housed aboard a German research vessel, the RV Polarstern (Polaris). Germany which is worried about Arctic's potential for militarization has also grown economic and geopolitical interests in the area while it monitors it from a distance. In that regard, Berlin's new security anxieties are comparable to Tokyo's: they centre on the danger that hard power techniques among Arctic governments. Particularly Russia and the United States, may prevent maritime commerce in Arctic Ocean from continuing.

In its "Arctic Policy Guidelines" from August 2019 Berlin demonstrated its practical response to regional concerns. The statement emphasises the necessity to resolve sovereignty conflicts in Arctic Ocean and enhance national and international laws relating to Arctic. It believes that regional security risks result from a worldwide decline in multilateral collaboration, which might result in "non-cooperative conduct" in Arctic over resources, shipping lanes and maritime boundary conflicts. Even worse, a race to the top among regional powers might result from rivalry for Arctic resources. According to the Guidelines, the Federal Government "rejects any effort to militarise Arctic." Germany's behaviour on Arctic Council where Berlin has also gone beyond the conventional policy boundaries of observers by calling for guarded locales in the district as well as bans on nuclear-powered vessels and the use of heavy fuel oil is another indication that Berlin considers itself an interested party in Arctic affairs. These actions equate to what one description described as "walking a tightrope" (Drahtseilakt) between Berlin's desire to

[118] Johannah Treeck. *NATO Must Boost Presence in Arctic, Stoltenberg Says*. Politico, Aug. 2022.

guarantee that its interests in the far north are recognised notwithstanding such constraints and the limitations on Germany as a non-Arctic state. Berlin's shift in stance toward Arctic is partly a result of economic considerations.[119]

The 2019 Guidelines document emphasises that Germany has a vested interest in the continued safe and open development of regional maritime routes including the NSR since these passages become useable for longer periods of time as a result of climate-aided local ice loss. Berlin officials have warned that a direct clash over these lines may cut off access to the area for other countries. UNCLOS was enacted in 1982 when Arctic was mostly unavailable to economic activity according to one 2019 German commentator. Making it the most notable legal framework addressing Arctic. Aside from Arctic's changing physical landscape there is no recourse for punishing people who break UNCLOS regulations. In order to keep Arctic a "konfliktarme Zone," a low-conflict region, the government policy statement emphasised the need of "gleicheRegeln fur alle," or the same rules for all. As security issues that might gravely damage Germany's economic and political life being played out in Arctic. Berlin has shown it is no longer ready to take a hands-off approach to these issues, despite its increasingly aggressive foreign policy inside Europe and throughout the world.[120]

4.3.1 German Arctic Foreign Policy

In September 2013 the German Federal Foreign Office disseminated a brochure with the title "Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines." The pamphlet's tagline was "Assume Responsibility Seize Opportunities." It features the rising meaning of Arctic for the worldwide local area considering environmental change which is adversely affecting the far north, as indicated by the German government. This features the rising meaning of Arctic for the worldwide local area considering the environmental change. It is a work to "make Arctic a critical focal point of German strategy" and "consider the interesting qualities of Arctic." It is difficult for Germany as it is for all the other players to strike a balance between its imperialistic tendencies which endorse continued resource extraction

[119] Cecile Pelaudeix, and Thierry Rodon. “The European Union Arctic Policy and National Interests of France and Germany: Internal and External Policy Coherence at Stake?” *The Northern Review*, May 2014.
[120] Margaret Blunden. “Geopolitics and the Northern Sea Route.” *International Affairs*, Jan. 2012.

in the area, and the need to take action to save an ecosystem that was already vulnerable. Germany's economic interests would favour further resource exploitation in the area.[121]

4.3.2 German Research and Research Networks in Arctic

As per a record named "Fast Environmental Change in Arctic: Polar Exploration as a Worldwide Obligation" that was distributed in 2011 by the Government Service of Schooling and Exploration (BMBF). Polar examination is given the position of a high need in the BMBF system program Exploration for Practical Turn of events. (FONA). This is one reason why increasingly more German examination organizations are focusing on Arctic worries. This remembers establishments for the sociologies and different areas that had recently shown little interest in the point. Beginning around 2009 the IASS has been getting financing from the Government Service of Instruction and Exploration's FONA program,which has permitted it to set its situation as a wellspring of expert information on Arctic issues like air contamination, administration, assets, and maintainability. Likewise there is the Alfred Wegener Organization for Polar and Marine Exploration (AWI) which has been doing explore on Arctic for north of thirty years and the GEOMAR Helmholtz Place for Marine Exploration in Kiel. Both of these foundations are situated in Kiel. The German Foundation for Global and Security Undertakings (SWP) is definitely liable for the improvement of specific patterns because of attributable to its association in the universally prestigious examination projects International affairs in the High North and the Exploration Place NORDEN (RENOR) among others.

Researchers in Germany who study Arctic are simultaneously embracing collaboration across other disciplines. For example during the summer of 2014 The "Arctic in the Anthropocene" summer program was co-hosted by the International Arctic Science Symposium (IASS), Arctic Knowledge Institute (AKI), the Potsdam Research organization for Climate Impact Research (PIK), the German Research Centre for Geosciences (GFZ), the University of Potsdam and the city of Potsdam for two weeks. In order to make the most of this chance for their first collaboration, AWI and IASS collaborated with Jade University of Applied Sciences on the "Governance of Resources for Arctic Sustainable

[121] Kathrin Stephen, *German Involvement in the Arctic: Policy Issues and Scientific Research*. The Arctic Institute, Sept. 2015.

Policy and Practice (GRASP)" research project. In addition, in 2014 and 2015 Arctic World Institute (AWI), the International Arctic Science Society (IASS), the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) which is based in Potsdam, the Ecologic Institute in Berlin, and the Canadian Embassy in Berlin hosted a number of events related to Arctic as part ofthe "Arctic Discussion Series" in Berlin and Potsdam. Participants come from Germany and other nations to take part in the "Arctic Summer College," which has been organised by the Ecologic Institute, the Canadian Embassy, and the WWF since 2013.[122]

Young German Arctic researchers in particular have benefited from informal networks and forums that have grown in popularity in addition to official partnerships on research initiatives. The "Polar forum" email listserv stands out among them since it is often used by scholars to organise joint conference papers and other tasks.

4.4 Singapore

Singapore among the 'all-round' observer governments in Arctic Council has taken perhaps the most distinctive approach to forging an identity as an Arctic stakeholder and providing its own opinions on which security issues in the area should be stressed. Despite its tropical position the island city-state of Singapore has argued that the changing circumstances in Arctic would very much effect different areas of the country's security. Singapore is located at 1°17'N, making it about as far from the Polar Regions as possible. In the first place climate change in the Polar Regions and the ensuing ice loss might have an effect on Singapore because of increasing sea levels; the island nation's highest point is just 165 metres above sea level. That's why protecting Singapore's fresh water supply and expanding the city's landmass are two of the city state's top security priorities. Because of its proximity to the storm patterns in Southeast Asia the island's weather would be affected by the melting Arctic ice and the influx of cooler water farther south. Thus the link between regional environmental concerns and state survival has had a significant impact on Singapore's understanding of Arctic security. Even though the country has not placed as much emphasis on questions of balance of power and military might, as well as resource security, as other multifaceted governments. Second, Singapore's port facilities serve as the

[122]Kerstin Schley. *Germany's Interests in the Arctic, as Exemplifeid by Its Arctic Council Engagement*. scholarworks.alaska, 2019.

major, worldwide centre for maritime commerce in the Indian and Pacific Oceans and the shipping sector is the backbone of the country's economy.

It is possible that Singapore's economic fortunes would decline if new northern maritime transport routes are developed. Thus the nation has been trying to learn more about the dynamics of the numerous Arctic maritime routes. The time it takes Moscow to completely develop oil and gas sectors in Siberia and the Russian Far East for export, particularly to Asia-Pacific markets is an additional factor to consider. Future increased usage of the NSR as a secondary transportation route is closely related to Russian fossil fuel exports in the area. It will take years if not decades, to create Arctic shipping channels, whether via the NSR or transpolar routes.[123]

4.4.1 Singapore Arctic Policy in Progress

Singapore has a unique perspective on the possible effects of the NSR and other new routes on the future of the city-constant state's shipping issues due to its policy in Arctic and its membership as an Arctic Council observer. Singapore's way to deal with creating Arctic methodologies sets it particular from its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific district, China, Japan and South Korea who have shown a more grounded interest in the security of asset access. Singapore has not only represented the periphery of what constitutes an Arctic stakeholder but it has also done the same in the discussion of how non-Arctic governments see Arctic security.[124]

4.4.2 Singapore legitimizing its Arctic presence

France released their official Arctic strategy in 2016—16 years after being admitted to Arctic Council. Japan highlighted its official Arctic objectives in a "Basic Plan on Ocean Policy" launched in 2013 and it published a more thorough official Arctic policy document in 2015. China released their stance as the newest Arctic Council observer in January 2018. However Singapore has failed to create an official policy despite joining Arctic Council in

[123]ZHANG YIRU,. *THE IMPACT OF OPENING OF THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE ON THE PORT OF SINGAPORE*. University of Singapore , 2017.
[124]CHEN, Gang. “Asian Economic Interests in the Arctic — Singapore’s Perspective.” *Asian Countries and the Arctic Future*, 2015.

2013, which has caused some other Arctic governments to wonder what its true objectives are in the area.[125]

While France and China have mentioned their self as "polar nations" and a "near-Arctic state," respectively, Singapore is fully is cognisant that it is a stranger and a recent arrival in Arctic. As a result it treads gingerly rather than outlining its long-term strategy and aims it has often attempted to explain why the keen in the Polar Regions and in what it can accomplish there in different public statements.

Prior to being accepted as an observer to Arctic Council in 2013, Singapore was engaged in the region. The majority of this activity took place in the country's marine sector with the Keppel Corporation—a largely state-owned firm—constructing its first two icebreakers for the Russian oil giant Lukoil Kaliningradmorneft in 2008. However Singapore's interest and commitment in the area have persisted with greater strength even after its admittance, in contrast to certain other Arctic Council member nations. Singapore has consistently emphasised a two-pronged strategy in the area since 2013: to provide support in Arctic Council and the region itself in any manner that is feasible, and to better understand how changes in Arctic may impact the island state.

At first via its Singapore Cooperation Programme Singapore has effectively partaken in working gatherings (for example, the Preservation of Arctic Vegetation bunch) as well similarly as with the Council's ordinary individuals (like contribution postgraduate grants for native people groups to concentrate on in Singapore). Additionally it has collaborated in the organisation of smaller regional forums that are offshoots of the region's premier conferences such as Arctic Circle and Arctic Frontiers. Singapore has shown a penchant for working directly with Arctic governments via both bilateral and multilateral interactions, in contrast to China, Japan and South Korea. It has made steps to strengthen its bilateral ties with Russia as well as the NATO members of the Council. The second is that Singapore is aggressively enhancing a number of its Arctic research initiatives spanning from climate science to marine law and engineering. Along with addressing

[125]Narayani Basu. *Singapore: Emerging in the Arctic?* Institute of Peace and conflict Studies, May 2013.

difficulties unique to Arctic, Singapore has also made an effort to connect Southeast Asia with the polar region's renewable energy sources.[126]

The island city state has considered developing an official Arctic strategy although it does not currently have such intentions. Singapore's influence in the area is still relatively new compared to other Asian nations like China and Japan. Although it is not strictly required, Captain Ashley Roach argues that the expectation has grown as a result of the number of observer governments that have released public documents detailing their Arctic plans. In 2017 Captain Ashley Roach produced a guidebook for Arctic observers tailored especially for the city-state of Singapore. However unlike China, India is the sole Asian Arctic Council observer that has not issued a formal declaration detailing its regional policy.

The policies of other observers have not been well received. China's official policy was intended to calm concerns about its ambitions in the area but it hasn't been well received and in some respects has increased concerns already there about China's incursion in Arctic. China's stance, according to Captain Roach seems to be a "self-aggrandizing endeavour" that fails to dispel China's imminent territorial goals by laying down a good foundation for itself as having more noteworthy privileges than different eyewitnesses and perhaps equivalent freedoms to the littoral states. Uncertainty surrounds whether such an endeavour represents China's policy or is more of a propaganda tactic but such a critique offers an illustration of the possible cascading effects that a policy document from an observing state may have.

Given that it is 140 times smaller than Iceland the smallest Arctic Council member and that it is 7000 kilometres from Arctic Circle, Singapore the only tiny island observer state in Arctic Council is undoubtedly a distinct entity within Arctic region. Singapore has established a reputation for supporting and promoting a rigorous international legal framework both inside and beyond the context of Arctic despite the oddity of its position in the Council. It has also been able to project a positive image of itself as a helpful member via its different forms of involvement in the area and by playing a crucial role in transferring solutions across regions. Singapore tends to want its actions and engagement

[126] Ian Storey. "Singapore and the Arctic: Tropical Country, Polar Interests." *Asia and the Arctic*, 2016.

efforts to take priority over official policy papers at least for the time being. Singapore seems to feel that declaring an official policy document is not the only option for a state to justify its stance in Arctic.[127]

Conclusion

With more non regional state actors pressing for a greater presence and voice in Arctic Region we can see the line between arctic and non-arctic to fade even further and the and matter of interests as well as governance within the in the anarchic region taking on a more varied and complex dimensions. This of course creates further complications in an already challenging structural atmosphere of Arctic as now a balance of between regional and non-regional actors hangs in the mix.

[127] Richard Bitzinger. "Singapore: A Tangential but Constructive Player in the Arctic." *Handbook on Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic*, 2020.

Chapter Five

China’s Enhanced Role in Arctic

China's emerging role in Arctic has become a topic of increasing interest and concern among Arctic states, non-Arctic states and international organizations. Arctic is experiencing significant changes due to climate change, which are opening up new opportunities for resource exploitation and shipping routes. China as a rising power with global economic and strategic ambitions, has shown a growing interest in the region, raising questions about its motivations and potential impacts.

From a neo-classical realist perspective China's engagement in Arctic can be seen as part of its larger strategy to expand its global influence and secure its energy and resource needs. China's Arctic policy seeks to enhance its presence in the region through scientific research, shipping, investment, and diplomacy. Additionally China's growing economic interests in Arctic, including the development of the Polar Silk Road have raised concerns among Arctic states about potential resource conflicts and environmental risks. The emerging role of China in Arctic raises complex governance and security challenges for Arctic states and the international community. It highlights the need for effective cooperation among Arctic states, as well as the importance of international law and norms in governing Arctic region. The neo-classical realist perspective provides a lens to understand China's motivations and interests in Arctic and to explore the implications of its engagement in the region.

The chapter is divided in to three parts. The first part highlights and elaborates China’s arctic presence in arctic, its economic drive and strategic drive. The second part discusses Chinese-Russian cooperation in Arctic. The third part of the chapter sheds lights on Russia’s and U.S’s reservations in response to the growing Chinese presence in Arctic aswell as the increasing militarization of the region.

5.1 China’s strategic interest in Arctic goes beyond economics

Arctic was included as a "blue economic corridor" to President Xi Jinping's signature Belt and Road Initiative in June of 2017. Furthermore, China has rechristened Arctic sea routes as the "Polar Silk Road". Lately China has declared itself a "near-Arctic state" in its Arctic strategy released in 2018. Arctic has always been seen as important by Beijing due to its

geopolitical, economic and environmental significance. China likewise asserts it has the option to lead logical review, free route and overfly, fish, lay links and take advantage of assets in Arctic high oceans as per global legitimate arrangements, remembering the Unified Countries Show for the Law of the Ocean and the Spitsbergen Deal.

Beijing's influence in Arctic has been growing even before the policy's announcement. The Chinese have made significant progress in Arctic since 1999 when they launched their first excursions there. In 2004 they established their first research post the Yellow River Station on Svalbard Island. China's present strategy in Arctic includes learning more about the area conserving and utilising the ocean and taking part in its management; defending the international community's shared interests; and advancing China's own sustainable development.[128]

Most of China's more well-known Arctic initiatives are purely commercial, particularly its energy collaboration with Russia. In December 2019 Beijing officially opened the 3,000-kilometer-long "Power of Siberia" natural gas pipeline connecting Russia's Siberian reserves to northeast China. This was done as part of Beijing's goal to reduce its reliance on coal for power production and to strengthen energy security. In Arctic LNG 2 the second significant natural gas project that is now being developed in the Russian Arctic Chinese enterprises also play significant roles. Putting energy aside China and Russia's cooperation in creating a worldwide transportation route through the NSR has recently attracted considerable interest. According to experts this method would be around 40% quicker than via the Suez Canal for the same trip thereby reducing fuel expenses. The likelihood of opening up international Arctic shipping through the NSR grows as a result of climate change and the expansion of ice-free seasons each year.

To make the NSR a guarantee and financially doable Russia imagined an organization of port offices and strategic centers along the course which would require huge consumptions past the method for Moscow. With the commitment of enormous financing for framework advancement, China's BRI is an engaging recommendation. Russian President Vladimir

[128]*China's First North Pole Station Begins Expedition.* People's Daily Online , May 2019.

Putin has communicated interest in having the NSR integrated into China's 21st century Sea Silk Street under the "Polar Silk Street" idea.[129]

5.2 China's Polar Silk Road: Implications for Arctic Region.

The Polar Silk Road (Map03) pertains to Arctic shipping lanes that connect North America, East Asia, and Western Europe via Arctic Circle. As Arctic sea ice dissolves the region becomes accessible and shipping lanes such as the NSR are significantly reduced in length. It has been noted that the establishment of Arctic route will contribute to the expansion of the economy in the circumpolar North and cause significant shifts in global trade and shipping patterns.

Discussions over China's goals and strategies in Arctic have taken centre stage as it has emerged as one of the major actors in the area. Within a decade's time China has gone from a passive to a prominent role in Arctic Council. Arctic has risen to prominence in the policy arenas of key powers like the United States and Russia during the last decade as a result of global warming and the development of new economic and geopolitical prospects. Furthermore Arctic has evolved as a laboratory that every country wants to examine from a scientific and environmental standpoint.[130]

China distributed a paper in 2018 named China's Arctic System framing its strategy. The review exhibited China's guaranteed and favorable to dynamic local strategy. The report made sense of Chinese stakes by framing Beijing's express targets there and associating them to the growing BRI exchange system by means of the PSR. It couldbe said Beijing will likely make a "Polar Silk Road"" in the area interfacing Asia and Europe through calculated and transportation courses that pass through this area. China's inclinations may likewise be isolated into two gatherings. The first is Beijing's broad commitment to quite a while of science, asset review (and the administration of this sort of study), transportation and marine security. Second China accurately referred to the expected effects of environmental change on the region as a justification for why key members in Arctic issues ought to be concerned. China

[129]"The Northern Sea Route: Smooth Sailing Ahead?" *Strategic Analysis 2014*, Nov. 2014.
[130]Alyson Bailes. "Understanding The Arctic Council: A 'Sub-Regional' Perspective." *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Jan. 2014.

perceives the likelihood that its contribution in the turn of events and development of Arctic's new regional order will bring about expanded opportunity for Beijing to shape Arctic for its potential benefit and its public advantages. This is shown by China's goals for consideration in Arctic Council. The following is a definite conversation of China's targets for Arctic and the improvement of its Arctic policy.[131]

5.2.1 Issues in Arctic Debate

Although Arctic is little inhabited, its harsh climate and rich natural riches make it an important air and sea route. Arctic Ocean is really a component of the Atlantic Ocean whose littorals comprise the landmasses of the Northern Hemisphere according to Joseph Roucek. Another name for it is the "polar Mediterranean." Due to the existence of oil, gas,and other noncombustible resources in this area compared to the Antarctic region, the current geopolitical landscape has given it enormous relevance. As a result Arctic has cometo be seen of as the perfect place where resource-related technology advancements would ultimately need "a fresh appraisal of locational elements of the area." The topic of governance has finally come to light and been associated with the distinct interests and objectives of different countries. While other countries see this territory as a part of the global commons Arctic states' top priority is to continue to dominate the region alone. Two issues have received a great deal of attention in the discussion of the legality of Arctic area. First consider if a new legal structure based on the International Treaty on Arctic is required for Arctic area. (In actuality the Antarctic Treaty is the model for this International Treaty of Arctic.) Second whether to approve agreements made in the past, such as turning Arctic Council into a recognised international body.[132]

The Ilulissat Declaration sought to convey to those countries seeking to annex Arctic that the original Arctic Five states continue to play a leading role in governance. The paper reinforced this stating that "the five coastal nations are in a unique position to meet these opportunities and problems due to their sovereign rights and control over substantial sections of Arctic Ocean. Then it was once again declared that Arctic Five had a natural right to lead Arctic politics: "Arctic Ocean is a unique environment, which the five

[131] Heather Conley,. “China’s Arctic Dream.” *A Report of the CSIS EUROPE PROGRAM*, CSIS , Feb. 2018.
[132]“The New Problem of Arctic Stability.” *Global Politics and Strategy 2009*, Sept. 2009.

coastline governments have a stewardship responsibility in safeguarding." This viewpoint prompted a discussion over the rights of Arctic and non-Arctic states to influence the destiny of the area. In the present situation this topic is still open and the answer relies on how Arctic Five will position themselves in the future. Additionally the proclamation was crucial in defining or emphasising universal collaboration in Arctic. The littoral governments have made an effort in this area to work together and independently to maintain environmental stability. Not only that, but the efforts of Arctic Council as well as collaboration in scientific research and information sharing, are also caused by the cooperation between littoral governments.[133]

Arctic is gaining the political attention of several countries that are located far from the area. These include the polar and tropical powers as well as the large and little powers of Europe and Asia. The physical location of Arctic area and its placement between the three continents are two geopolitical considerations that are connected to this interest on multiple levels (North America, Europe and Asia). As a result the trade distances between different points on these continents are shortened, cutting down on transit time. Mineral and industrial resources are also present, including oil and natural gas. One of the main causes of the region's growing strategic importance is its presence. The natural resources of Arctic have consequently increased the likelihood of economic and energy security for the countries engaged in regional resource extraction; SLOCs in this region and their relationship to man-made circumstances and operational conditions. Effects of global warming and climate change (which have improved conditions for the exploration and exploitation of resources) and regulatory similarity to the (UNCLOS III). In actuality these elements have shaped the key players' interests and given us a picture of the geopolitical environment in Arctic. Russia and China have made significant investments in Arctic as part of this geopolitical struggle which will ultimately have an impact on American involvement there. In addition to the region's growing political and geopolitical importance its economic side is important. Countries like China are now considering the economic

[133]Andreas Kuersten,. *The Arctic Five Versus the Arctic Council*. Arctic Yearbook 2016, 2016.

viability of Arctic area owing to its undiscovered oil and gas resources and its faster international transit routes as the likelihood of a more ice-free Arctic region looms large.[134]

Natural resources, marine routes and environmental concerns are the three main themes that have emerged as the centre of Arctic debate as a result of the discussion above. These three challenges in particular are at the centre of all the main actors' strategic calculations.

5.2.2 Natural Resources

The development of natural resources as a major factor in the increased interest in Arctic. All of the world's superpowers including China are attracted by the easily accessible natural resources and their easy accessibility as a result of the melting of Arctic ice cover. The potential of the energy resources is enormous but due to adverse climatic factors and technical limitations this potential cannot be fully realised for the benefit of the parties concerned. The exact amount of undiscovered oil and gas deposits is unclear, although the American Geological Survey believes that Arctic Shelf's undiscovered oil and gas reserves might total 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,670 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids. Nearly 22% of all resources in the world that can be collected with current technologies are included in this group. Nearly 84 percent of these resources are expected to be found offshore. Therefore there may be significant obstacles to the growth of natural gas.[135]

Despite the region's abundant natural gas resources its development may be hindered by natural gas's inferior market value to that of oil. Furthermore compared to the transportation of oil and natural gas liquid users of natural gas who live distant from this location would have to pay higher transportation expenses. Undoubtedly Arctic region's challenging topography and environment—caused by the severe weather conditions as well as the strong, very cold winds—make the going challenging for the developing energy projects. As a consequence operational seasons are shortened which ultimately necessitates specialised equipment and raises prices. Contrarily the lack of infrastructural networks has

[134]John Grady,. *China, Russia Quietly Expanding Arctic Partnership, Says Panel*. USNI NEWS, 2020.
[135] Peter Johnston. "Arctic Energy Resources: Security and Environmental Implications." *Journal Os Strategic Security*, 2012.

its own difficulties making travel more challenging and expensive owing to greater travel distances and bad weather as well as having a significant and direct impact on the timeframes of transportation. Due to the exploratory efforts involved in oil and gas extraction the ecologies of Arctic are delicate and readily disturbed. Likewise the building of natural gas pipelines may encounter difficulties as a result of tundra melting. This may ultimately enhance the importance of marine transportation and LNG.[136]

5.2.3 NSR and TRT, Chinese-Russian Interests

The NSR runs along Russia's Arctic coast. This nautical route has the most economic potential since it is predicted to be the first to be free of Arctic ice. By using this new route the marine distance between East Asia and Western Europe would be reduced from 21,000 km through the Suez Canal to 12,800 km. additionally it will shorten transportation by 10 to 15 days. Previously during the Soviet period this route was utilised to support military and resource exploitation across the Soviet Arctic. However as the Soviet Union fell in the early 1990s, this traffic substantially decreased before increasing once again in the next decade. Two German ships Beluga Fraternity and Beluga Foresight made the first commercial crossing of the NSR in 2009 connecting Busan, South Korea to Rotterdam, the Netherlands following a number of layovers. They were escorted by a Russian icebreaker. Other shipping lines' attempts along this route haven't exactly been financially rewarding. During this period Russia used resources to improve the NSR on numerous levels including the passage of amendments to federal laws and regulations. The NSR was also opened for foreign transits. In parallel Russia has started a business promoting new shipping prospects and building offshore and onshore infrastructure. But this increased interest from the main stakeholders in the NSR as a potentially lucrative marine route has also brought attention to the challenges facing its steady growth and management. These difficulties pertain to potential dangers to the economy and the environment during the NSR as a result of uncertainty around the length of the navigable season and rapid variations in the oceanic and sea ice regimes in this area.

[136] Masoud Naseri, et al. "Availability Assessment of Oil and Gas Processing Plants Operating under Dynamic Arctic Weather Conditions." *Reliability Engineering & System Safety*, 2016.

TSR is an additional developing Arctic Sea route. This route would use the middle Arctic Sea to link the Bering Strait with the Atlantic Ocean at Murmansk which divides Russia and the United States just south of Arctic Circle (a port city in northwest Russia). The path is currently speculative, despite being the most practical. Arctic Bridge links Churchill to the ports of Murmansk in Russia and Narvik in Norway (Canadian port). This transportation line might make use of this bridge. Although this route does not inherently cross Arctic it seeks to connect the two hinterlands of North America's Midwest and Northwest through Arctic.[137]

Undoubtedly icebreakers and ice-class carriers are needed for freight transit in Arctic seas. Russia now has 46 icebreakers under its ownership (11 are being built and four are planned) followed by the United States with five (and three planned) and China with three (and one under construction). China has used an atomic-powered icebreaker that is comparable in size to Russia's biggest nuclear-powered icebreakers for the first time. It is important to note that Russia is the only country with nuclear icebreaker capacity in this context. China's capacity to travel across Arctic Ocean despite the harsh winter weather will improve with the addition of a nuclear icebreaker. The most recent endeavour to seek a more active role in Arctic diplomacy has been China's aspirations to create a nuclear icebreaker.[138]

5.3 Russian and American Arctic Activities

Russia and the United States have competed for Arctic dominance as the receding ice cover has allowed them to explore the resource-rich area. The Bering Strait and the circumpolar Arctic Ocean serve as a maritime boundary for both countries. A commitment to working together to protect Arctic seas is also important to both parties. The struggle for dominance has been sped up as a result. Since the geopolitical landscape has changed other important parties and stakeholders have had to lift their game.[139]

[137]M.Bennett, Mia, et al. "The Opening of the Transpolar Sea Route: Logistical, Geopolitical, Environmental, and Socioeconomic Impacts." *Marine Policy*, Nov. 2020.
[138]Trym Eiterjord. *Checking in on China's Nuclear Icebreaker*. The Diplomat, Sept. 2019.
[139] Yu Raikov,. *Russia and the United States in the Arctic: From Competition to Confrontation.* Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences , June 2022.

5.3.1 United States Retort

Alaska being the case the United States has often emphasised its presence in Arctic and its significant interests there. Operation preparation has taken up the majority of the attention of US armed forces particularly the Navy and the Coast Guard. In 2019 the US Department of Defense (DoD), US Navy and Coast Guard all published memos outlining their respective arctic strategies. The argument that has recently emerged, however, has centred on whether the DoD and the military services are providing enough funds and taking enough measures to protect American interests. Also gaining momentum with congressional oversight committees is this concern. The heavy polar icebreaker Polar Star and the medium polar icebreaker Healy are two active polar icebreakers owned by the US Coast Guard and the Coast Guard has money to purchase three more heavy icebreakers. Along with all of the concerns voiced in Congress the major exercise that was proposed to take place in Norway in March 2020 between the United States (with 7,500 troops likely to participate) and other NATO countries continues to be a major source of friction between the United States and Russia related to the NSR. This was done in an effort to comprehend American aspirations and wishes. Arctic Response 2020, the exercise's covert name called for a large simulated combat with a fictitious Russian invasion force. To avoid the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic and its exposure to the armed services Arctic Response 2020 was however cancelled in early March 2020.[140]

Heather A. Conley highlights three key characteristics that are affecting American policy in Arctic to help us better understand it. The main geopolitical aspect is the rivalry between the US and Russia the biggest Arctic coastline country as major powers. The self-declaration by China that it is a "near-Arctic state" adds to these worries. The second aspect is environmental which perplexes experts while also encouraging the creation of adaptable governance structures. Gradual changes in Arctic's marine and territorial environment. Third are the economic variables that are related to commodities prices globally and natural resource exploration. The evolving environment and national policies serve as the foundation of a new Arctic policy for the United States, as they do for many other Arctic

[140]Trebukh, A. D., et al. *Arctic Military Security: Geopolitical Interaction in "the United States-Russia-Norway" Triangle*. IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science, 2020.

states. Resources, national and homeland security, science and foreign policy are among the US's top issues. These strategies are intertwined in Arctic. In the past, the United States acquired Alaska from Russia in 1867, staking its claim to Arctic region. Following Alaska's admission to the Union individuals began to come there in search of natural riches particularly during the Gold Rush of 1889.[141]

Subsequently circumpolar political collaboration became a top priority for the US. Two crucial circumstances compelled the United States to take an urgent interest in Arctic issues. First was the campaign by former US president Barack Obama to make climate change a political priority (Spite of the fact that his state is now facing internal climate change setbacks). A legally binding contract's execution relating to collaboration in search and rescue operations gave the Arctic Council's intention to play a proactive role in Arctic governance more impetus. The Council seemed to be progressively becoming into "a body of practical consequence" as opposed to what had previously been referred to as a "high-level debate club." When former US president Obama established Arctic Executive Steering Committee in 2015 to assist the White House in coordinating Arctic strategy, American aspirations in this area were boosted.[142]

All of these aspects highlight how America's Arctic policies continue to be driven by economic growth competitiveness and the accessibility of abundant Arctic resources. International collaboration and cooperation however are still a work in progress in official political vocabulary. Conflict and strategy are still significant in the formulation of American policy. There are two topics that stand out in this discussion. First there is the connection to UNCLOS since concerns linked to maritime law and the ownership of marine resources have grown significantly in the political sphere as a result of the melting sea ice. Second, opinions about climate change have been linked to the change in American Arctic policy. President Obama's stance in this topic contrasts with that of his predecessor, George W. Bush. The emphasis has switched to denying climate change and advancing opportunities for the Alaskan oil and gas sector with the victory of President Donald

[141] David Houseknecht,, and Kenneth Bird. *Oil and Gas Resources of the Arctic Alaska Petroleum Province*. U.S. Geological Survey, 2006.
[142] Froukje Platjouw, et al. *From Arctic Science to International Law: The Road towards the Minamata Convention and the Role of the Arctic Council*. NOASP, Aug. 2018.

Trump. It is essential that these two opposing viewpoints be reconciled under the Joe Biden administration for the United States' Arctic strategy to continue in its current direction.[143]

5.3.2 Russia's Dilemma

The biggest Arctic country in terms of both people and geographical area is Russia, which sees itself as the region's dominant force. Additionally Russia has seen a large return on its military and economic expenditures in the area. Geographically 53 percent of Arctic Ocean's shoreline is located in Russia. It should come as no surprise that Russia seeks to increase its influence on opportunities in commerce, energy, and military. These are all components of Russia's Arctic policy. Working with national and international organisations helps Russia's diplomacy increase its influence. Russia's efforts to advance environmental protection and the welfare of the indigenous inhabitants of Arctic are validated by its support for Arctic Council and Arctic Economic Council. All of these facets of Russian Arctic policy are continually improved making Russia an Arctic country eager to collaborate with all parties involved. While attempting to claim large swaths of Arctic seabed Russian officials continue to place a high priority on cooperating with the other Arctic states.[144]

The importance of the region's future is acknowledged by official Russian policy which urges cooperation to protect it. Natural resources are listed as being essential to Russian growth and development in the Russian energy policies from 2003 and 2009 as well as the National Security Strategy from 2009. In this framework regional and multilateral cooperation are emphasised in the two Russian Arctic policy papers (2008 and 2013) to achieve national security objectives. In the NSR Russia has spent several billion dollars building or upgrading seven military sites since 2013 deploying its cutting-edge radar and missile defence systems—capable of hitting planes, missiles and ships—in regions where temperatures may drop below -50°C.

[143] Katherine Weingartner, and Robert Orttung. *US Arctic Policymaking under Trump and Obama.* ambridge University Press, Jan. 2020.
[144] Andrew Chater. "Explaining Russia's Relationship with the Arctic Council." *International Organizations Research Journal,* 2016.

The Russian military's presence in Arctic supports its global military operations in addition to strengthening its nuclear deterrent. Russia's 2015 military doctrine outlines its plan to protect its northern borders with a command structure that is all-inclusive (land, air, nuclear and sea). Russia's Northern Fleet which is stationed in Arctic has essential access to the Atlantic Ocean. The fleet's tactical nuclear weapons and strategic submarine capabilities increase Russian deterrence. Additionally the Kola Peninsula where Russian soldiers have been positioned to cover NATO's northern flank is connected to the Baltic Sea through Russia's western Arctic area. As a result, Moscow's whole shoreline and surrounding waterways are completely protected militarily. As a result Russian oversight will be applied to ships travelling through the area. Additionally it is considerably simpler to operate during the three months without ice due to the low number of traffic. As was to be anticipated in reaction to the growing amount of marine traffic and the flourishing shippingsector Russia has pushed for legislation to increase its control over Arctic routes. Rosatomhas been given complete responsibility for controlling access to the NSR and will do so byusing icebreakers that can shepherd ships including the first-of-its-kind nuclear-powered icebreaker. These developments show that Russia believes that conflict in Arctic is more probable than collaboration.[145]

There are two believable explanations that may be used to explain Russia's Arctic policy. First nationalism, expansionism and violence are the driving forces behind Russian behaviour in Arctic. Russian military aggression and unilateral actions are intended to advance and defend its national interests. According to the second storyline Russia's stance is determined by practical economic considerations and a desire to collaborate on Arctic problems in regional and global organisations. A third narrative however is emerging that describes Russia's Arctic approach as more nuanced and "neither benign nor confrontational." According to Carnegie Endowment researcher Pavel K. Baev, Russia views Arctic through a patriotic rather than an economic lens. Russia has been compelled to wait until after more consideration of the issue has been made due to shifting political and economic dynamics throughout the globe, ambiguity over the region's real oil and gas

[145] Brandon Boylan. “Increased Maritime Traffic in the Arctic: Implications for Governance of Arctic Sea Routes.” *Marine Policy*, Sept. 2021.

deposits, and other factors. Russia has been forced to overprotect its Arctic territory because of its drive to exploit the region's natural riches. However this may lead to Russia being politically isolated from its Arctic allies who are unaffected by its power struggles. Following Moscow's Arctic objectives in such a situation would be riskier than beneficial.

Concerning Russian-Chinese cooperation in this area it is rapidly becoming a topic of discussion after both nations vowed collaboration in the sphere of oil and gas development in Siberia—Far Russia's East. This indicates that despite China's desire to expand energy projects in Arctic and Russia's desire to form an alliance with China on this topic, there are several political, strategic and regional obstacles. Russia will need to demonstrate political generosity in order to attract Chinese investment for the development of Russian-Chinese energy cooperation. Nonetheless, international sanctions placed on Russia might function as an impediment and have a negative impact on China's readiness to engage in diverse investment and energy cooperation projects with Russia. In addition the current unstable political and economic climate may have made the Russian market less appealing to Chinese enterprises, who are under growing pressure to achieve profitable and lucrative partnerships.[146]

5.4 Arctic Supremacy Russian and Chinese Dilemma

One of the first organisations to fall victim to the conflict in Ukraine was Arctic Council. On March 3 all of Arctic governments, with the exception of Russia issued an unified statement declaring their decision to temporarily halt participation in all sessions of Arctic Council and its subsidiary organisations. Russia was the only state in Arctic to not participate in the declaration. Due to the current conflict, the preeminent forum for Arctic governance which had a history of being unaffected by geopolitical tensions is no longer able to operate in its traditional consensus-based framework.

China which is not a state located in Arctic region, has been an official observer on Arctic Council since 2013 and has plans to expand its presence in Arctic. What does the indefinite postponement of meetings of Arctic Council, at the very least for the foreseeable future

[146] Joachim Weber. "Limited Cooperation or Upcoming Alliance? Russia, China and the Arctic." *Handbook on Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic*, 2020.

imply for China? The ongoing crisis in Ukraine throws a shadow on China's hopes to establish a presence in Arctic. It is possible that Beijing still wants to have its cake and eat it too, i.e. to maintain its collaboration with Russia without damaging its relationships with other Arctic governments. However as a result of the war's effects expanding northward China may find itself in a position where it is more difficult to pursue its objectives in Arctic.[147]

Beijing is aware that it cannot put all its eggs in the Russian basket, and the West may look at this as a chance to place China farther away from Russia. However maintaining China's participation in the game calls for minimising its reliance on Russia to advance its Arctic goals.

5.5 Distancing China and Russia in the Context of Arctic

After the Trump administration awkwardly avoided the term "climate change" for years the loss of Arctic Council at least temporarily as a venue for collaboration and coordination will almost certainly stifle the various environmental and scientific exploration efforts that were finally underway. However this might also be a chance for the West to put space between themselves and Russia and China, while simultaneously reiterating the need of Arctic cooperation and sustainable investment.[148]

The idea of a reimagined "Arctic Council 2.0" that would address the problem of the biggest Arctic state being a pariah on the world stage is likely to find favour with non- Arctic governments that have a keen interest in Arctic governance. Decisions would be determined under this prospective new framework by a majority of interested nations ratherthan by consensus. It's feasible that non-Arctic nations like China, Japan, South Korea and Singapore who have rising interests in Arctic have made significant contributions to Arctic research would welcome the chance to play a more significant part in the affairs of this area. The dangers of this strategy are clear since it would fundamentally challenge the idea that Arctic governance is the exclusive province of Arctic governments. The "Arctic Council 2.0" however, is not seen as a serious plan to replace or change Arctic Council at

[147] *What Does Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Mean for China in the Arctic?* The Dilpomat, 2022.
[148] Nong Hong,. *Ukraine War May Freeze Both Russia and China out of Arctic Cooperation*. ICAS, Mar. 2022.

least not by the United States. One thing that hasn't changed according to James P. De Hart, U.S. Coordinator for Arctic Region at the State Department "is our commitment to the Council as the foremost platform for Arctic region, as a Circum-Polar forum."[149]

However this does not answer the issue of how the western Arctic nations would react to the new reality in Arctic or how they can use it to isolate China from Russia. It's not true that Russia is the only country the Polar Silk Road passes through. Beijing is making a concerted attempt to invest throughout Arctic with a primary focus on European countries as potential customers. This may provide western Arctic nations some sway over China's cost-benefit analysis of its Arctic ambitions.

Despite the need to maintain its connections with Russia and China, Norway, a founding member of NATO will defend the sanctions system and assure solidarity with NATO and E.U. allies. Norway is especially susceptible when ties with Russia worsen because of its position as a NATO "listening post" on the alliance's northern border. Due to the land and sea borders that it shares with Russia, communication with that country is crucial. However after a scuffle over the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010, relations between Oslo and Beijing deteriorated.

The two nations are attempting to reach an agreement on a bilateral free trade deal that may provide China more access to European markets and Norway's vast offshore hydrocarbon resources which can be explored to partially make up for the loss of access to the Russian Arctic. It seems doubtful that China will accept significant difficulties near the western terminal of the NSR which connects the route with the European market. Norway is actively wooing Chinese investment across its Arctic territory. Furthermore Norway's sovereignty over the crucial Arctic outpost in the Svalbard Islands affords it a unique bargaining chip with treaty signatories Russia and China by ensuring them access for business and research.[150]

[149]EDVARDSEN, ASTRI. *USA's Arctic Coordinator: "We Do Not Want to Change the Structure or Membership of the Arctic Council."* High North News, 2022.
[150] Hans Gåsemyr, and Bjørnar Thygeson. *Chinese Investments in Norway: A Typical Case Despite Special Circumstances*. ETNC Report, Dec. 2017.

In order to manage the new dynamics in Arctic Western allies may use Norway as a new form of listening post due to its unique location in relation to China and Russia. Finland and Sweden, two Arctic nations who are not now members of NATO, have started to change their minds. Should they join NATO the number of Arctic states would increase from five to seven. Sending a clear message to Moscow about the viability of future Arctic cooperation and to Beijing about the longevity of its all-encompassing Arctic diplomacy. It may also strengthen NATO as a new venue for Arctic cooperation and heighten interest in Arctic issues among NATO members who do not live in Arctic. Long-term this might result in a more military perception of Arctic cooperation which is bad news for efforts to cooperate on issues like the economy and the environment. An increased NATO presence in Arctic would not be in China's best interests since it has been labelled a strategic challenge for NATO.[151]

Canada has long supported pan-Arctic non-defense cooperation but has previously been hesitant about NATO playing a significant role in the North American Arctic. The likelihood that it will continue to follow Washington's and Europe's lead on Russian sanctions however will allow NATO to seek a more expansive role in the High North. Canada also harbours the hope that the Northwest Passage may eventually provide a practical alternative to Russia's control of the Northern Sea Route for trade between the Pacific and Europe. The NSR which also benefits from uneven ice melt that opens its sea lanes much more than the Canadian alternative, has received much more investment from Russia than the NWP whose near-term viability as a safe, affordable route for significant shipping activity is still in doubt. Canada's sea routes however continue to have a future potential for the maritime commerce of the PSR that China cannot ignore. Canada has the second-longest coastline in Arctic. China has made investments in Canadian industry particularly the mining sector although these investments have declined as a result of increased scrutiny brought on by U.S. concerns about so-called Chinese gray-zone operations including Arctic economic influence. The tensions surrounding the imprisonment of Canadian nationals Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig by China in

[151] Jana Robinson, *Arctic Space Challenge for NATO Emerging from China's Economic and Financial Assertiveness*. JAPCC, 2020.

retaliation for Canada's arrest of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou have also increased Canadian skepticism over Chinese intentions. However, Canada still has a strong desire for foreign investment in Arctic, and some aboriginal people still consider Chinese investment to be "too tremendous to pass up."[152]

Conclusion

China's growing role in Arctic has raised complex governance and security challenges for the Arctic states and the international community. From a neo-classical realist perspective China's engagement in the Arctic can be seen as part of its larger strategy to expand its global influence and secure its energy and resource needs. As a rising power China's interests in Arctic extend beyond economic, environmental considerations and may include strategic along with security considerations as well. China's Arctic policy seeks to enhance its presence in the region through scientific research, shipping, investment and diplomacy. The development of the Polar Silk Road and other economic interests in the region have raised concerns among Arctic states about potential resource conflicts and environmental risks. Additionally China's expanding presence in the region has also led to security concerns, particularly among the United States and its allies.

The emerging role of China in Arctic underscores the need for effective governance and cooperation among Arctic states and the international community. It highlights the importance of upholding international in governing Arctic region and the need for Arctic states to work together to manage the complex challenges and opportunities that arise from the region's changing geopolitical and environmental dynamics. Furthermore China's increasing presence in Arctic poses a challenge to the existing power dynamics in the region, particularly the longstanding dominance of the Arctic states. As China's engagement in the Arctic continues to grow Arctic states and the international community must carefully navigate these challenges to ensure the long-term stability, sustainability and prosperity of the region.

[152] Jackie Northam. *Canada-China Relationship Is Quickly Deteriorating After Huawei CFO's Arrest.* NPR news, Nov. 2020.

Overall the neo-classical realist perspective provides a useful framework for understanding China's motivations and interests in Arctic and for exploring the implications of its engagement in the region. As Arctic continues to experience rapid changes it is crucial for the Arctic states and the international community to work together to address the governance and security challenges that arise in order to ensure that the region remains peaceful, prosperous and sustainable for future generations.

Conclusion, Findings and Recommendations

Conclusion

Arctic Ocean remained a primary motive for regional actors over the course of many years, and global warming made a significant contribution to the environment shifting in this lawless zone. As a direct consequence of these occurrences, the countries of the region have widened the scope of their interests with regard to this region, and they have made significant investments, both financially and militarily, in order to meet the anarchic region's requirements in terms of structural pressures from regional and extra regional participants.

It is impossible to ignore the fact that the stability of Arctic Region is clearly in jeopardy. This is not only the case in terms of divisions within Arctic region itself, but also in terms of the ever-growing ambitions of regional state actors. Structural pressures as a result of an anarchic system are contributing to this instability. Waltz contends that as militarization increases, so does the complexity of the nature of conflict. This is because the situation in the region has the potential to either become a conduit for increased diplomacy and dialogue in order to avoid a direct conflict, or it has the potential to become a nexus of further friction, which can have ripple effects throughout the world itself.

Given the numerous expeditions and the ever growing claims in this anarchic region, Arctic region is warming up in more ways than just the climatic dimension. While some issues are resolved amicably under the guise of negotiations and dialogue, other matters ascertaining to Russia, the United States, and Canada are not so simple due to structural pressures and can be seen as taking on more of a confrontational application. This warming up of Arctic region is a sign that the world is becoming more unstable. But according to the neo-classical paradigm, even in situations where states resort to cooperation on matters, they do so only in order to work together in order to strengthen their own positions on the matter at hand. This can be seen as ever more apparent in the cases of small regional powers such as Greenland, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, and Sweden. As a result of the fact that each of them lacks the required capacity to adopt a more assertive attitude in order to protect and advance their own regional interests, they view it as reasonable to cooperate

with one another for the purpose of achieving mutual benefit. In the instance of Russia, which is already a powerful nation-state on its own, one might say that Russia is taking a unilateral strategy in order to further assert itself in Arctic region.

There is a visible fading line between Arctic and non-arctic region even further and the matter of interests as well as governance within the in the anarchic region taking on a more varied and complex dimensions as more non-regional state actors are pressing for a greater presence and voice in Arctic Region. This is because of the increasing number of non-regional state actors pressing for a greater presence and voice in Arctic Region. This, of course, adds further layers of complexity to an already difficult structural environment in Arctic, as there is now a precarious equilibrium between regional and non-regional entities in the mix. This causes extra issues.

The anarchic International System has brought China's interests in Arctic, and the greater alliance between Russia and China, can be seen as a very real threat to the US bloc with in the region. However, at the same time, the Chinese presence can also put structural pressures on Russia's own dominance within the region, since it can easily be pushed out of its own territorial domain under the 'ambitions' of the China's economic prowess. This is because Russia can easily be pushed out of its For the time being, however, we can only witness the Russian and Chinese links growing stronger in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. At the same time, Arctic can be seen becoming more and more militarised in an effort to better secure national interests inside the region..

Findings

- The melting of the ice caps has not only made Arctic more accessible in terms of maritime travel, but also paving the way for the regional states to extract the untapped natural resources in the region.
- Some territorial disputes though are resolved others such as the Lomonosov ridge and the Northern Sea Route dispute still remains ongoing. Though for the time being these two areas of territorial contention remains relatively amicable, as Arctic ice continuous to melt these zones in the region can be seen becoming more prone to conflict in the years to come
- Increasing Arctic Exploration is having an effect on the eco system and fisheries in

the region thus adversely affecting the Indigenous population.

- The presence of China in Arctic is indeed causing the existing political as well as power dynamic to change in the region. Previously it had only been Russia by itself in the region, yes there had been moments of cooperation between Russia and other regional states in Arctic matters but these regional states have shown more of an inclination towards the US rather than Russia. Increasing presence of China in Arctic provides Russia with a powerful ally which in turn gives way to power bloc in the region
- Arctic remains an area of relative peace for the time being but Russia continues to increase its military presence in the region. This coupled with Russia's assertive stance in Arctic and a lack of decisive US foreign policy in the region is giving way to level of uncertainty in the region

Recommendation:

- The US and Russia being the two major powers in the region should make greater efforts in cooperation to facilitate greater regional stability in Arctic.
- Currently, the United States lacks a strong and effective Arctic Policy hence it should rectify this and must assume a more active and prominent role in Arctic affairs**.**
- China should be given a more prominent role in the Arctic Council given its rising prominence in Arctic and economic power in the international system.

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