CULTURAL SENSITIZATION IN LINGUISTICS OF DECEPTION DETECTION: A PRAGMATIC ANALYSIS

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ISLAMABAD

December, 2022

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MPhil, The University of Lahore, Lahore, 2015

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT
OF   THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

In **English**

To

FACULTY OF ARTS AND HUMANITIES

NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF MODERN LANGUAGES, ISLAMABAD

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NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF MODERN LANGUAGES   FACULTY OF ENGLISH STUDIES

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ABSTRACT

Thesis Title: Cultural Sensitization in Linguistics of Deception Detection: A Pragmatic Analysis

Deception is a ubiquitous phenomenon and deception scholarship is an exponentially large field. One prime focus of this field is to study the linguistic correlates of deception to detect a liar successfully. Nevertheless, there is an ever-growing realization that there is no universal way of lying that enjoys pan-cultural vitality. Lying as a mendacious statement depends on the corresponding language system and cultural norms and values. However, until very recently, the lingo-cultural nature of deception has remained underplayed in mainstream deception scholarship. The situation calls for the need of sensitizing linguistics of deception detection to cross-cultural variance introduced by language and culture. Working within the paradigm of Ethnopragmatics, a relatively recent off-shoot of the linguistic pragmatics, the study developed an integrated approach to generate meta-pragmatic awareness about the meaning, perception and production of deceptive speech acts in Pakistani culture and compare it with analogous findings located in the North American context. The study integrated the theoretical and methodological guidelines of the Cultural Scripts approach proposed by Anna Wierzbicka and Cliff Goddard (Goddard & Wierzbicka, 2002, 2004,2016; Wierzbicka, 1997, 2002,2021) with the Information Manipulation Theory propounded by Steve McCornack (McCornack, 1992; McCornack et al., 2014). The study was conducted in two phases. As cultural knowledge sediments in the form of emic labels and culturally salient key terms, Phase I investigated the Urdu lexical and phrasal items used to denote lying and deception and other cultural keywords to generate a semantic understanding of deception in Pakistani culture. The results were explicated in the form of cultural scripts formulated in the culturally neutral mini-language called Natural Semantic Metalanguage. These earlier semantic explications were further tested in Phase II study using the experimental design proposed by Information Manipulation theory to explore the production, perceived honesty and moral turpitude associated with various forms of deception in Pakistani culture. The results of both phases cumulatively revealed that the Pakistani concept of truth and lying is very categorical, dichotomous and black and white as compared with the scalar and kaleidoscopic view of truth and lying found in the Anglo-American culture. It was also found that avoidance of lying is an absolute, non-negotiable moral imperative in Pakistani culture, while the Anglo-American attitude towards lying is more pragmatic in nature. Though lying is considered invariably wrong in Pakistani culture,

Pakistani data demonstrated a greater acceptance threshold than the US counterparts for other subtle forms of deception that did not involve any blatant disregard for reality. It can be concluded that in Pakistani culture, speech acts are assigned very parsimoniously to the category of lying and locus of sincerity is primarily placed on the literal level. These nuanced differences in the cultural understanding of deception have clear implications for deception scholarship to make its theorization and methods free from ethnolinguistic bias.

Keywords: Deception, Lying, Deception Detection, Ethnopragmatics, Natural Semantic Metalanguage

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation	Meaning
NSM	Natural Semantic Metalanguage
IMT	Information Manipulation Theory
IMT2	Information Manipulation Theory 2
TDT	Truth-Default Theory
Lit.	Literal Translation
CS	Cultural Script

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

All praises and glory be to Allah Almighty who taught man which he knew not, endued his humble servant with the pursuit of truth and vouchsafed me with the spirit of faith and knowledge to accomplish this task. May the peace and blessings of Allah be upon Holy Prophet Muhammad who distinguished himself as the greatest patron of learning in human history and constructed the foundations on which the edifice of our knowledge stands.

I would also like to extend my profound and sincere gratitude to my respected supervisor, **Dr Ghazala Kausar,** Assistant Professor of English, National University of Modern Languages (NUML), Islamabad, Pakistan, for providing me with the opportunity to complete my research under her able guidance and generous support. I am profoundly inspired by her professional dynamism, unimpeachable integrity and deep compassion. She not only offered me the guidance I needed to achieve my research goals but also went the extra mile to help me in other official matters. She always offered me good counsel to navigate my path in moments of anxiety and self-doubt. I would always look up to her as a great mentor and a person of exemplary values. I would also like to pay my regards to her husband and kids for bearing with me during our long discussions and helping me in small meaningful ways.

I gratefully acknowledge the funding received towards my PhD from **Higher Education Commission**, Pakistan, under the indigenous PhD fellowship programme. This work could not have been accomplished without their funding and support. I also feel indebted to the **Higher Education Department, Punjab,** for granting me study leave for three years to complete my research unimpededly.

I would like to acknowledge the invaluable assistance I received from notable deception researchers across the globe. I wish to express my deep gratitude to **Dr Steve McCornack** from The University of Alabama at Birmingham, who generously offered to become my unofficial foreign supervisor, spared his precious time to help me refine my research design and provided me valuable feedback to ameliorate the quality of my work. I am also indebted to **Dr Tim Levine** from the University of Alabama, **Dr Robert Stainton** from the Western University Canada, and above all **Dr Judee Burgoon** from the University of Arizona for resting some faith in my work and providing me invitation letters to visit their respective universities for a six-month fellowship offered under IRSIP programme. I also thank the team of leading deception scholars working at the Center for the Management

DEDICATION

I dedicate my research to my loving husband. I am because he is.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Four years after the 9/11 attacks on the United States, a Californian jury voted to convict Hamid Hayat, a willow-wild, deferential young American citizen of Pakistani descent. He was convicted on one count of providing material support to terrorist outfits and three counts of lying to FBI agents about matters related to terrorist activities. Almost a year later, Hamid Hayat was sentenced to 24 years imprisonment. It took Hayat 14 years to vindicate himself of the accusations laid against him and prove his innocence. A series of deliberation which instantly began after Hayat moved an appeal against his conviction eventually culminated in the vacation of all convictions against him. In 2019 a judge ruled to overturn his convictions and after a ruling by the court citing ineffective legal defence, he was eventually exonerated in 2020.

Though the case best exemplifies the burgeoning trend of initiating preemptive prosecution that the US agencies strategically pursued in the post-9/11 scenario, this story has a strong cultural and linguistic side. Given the fact that Hayat hailed from an entirely different cultural context, the story involved a great deal of intercultural struggle like so many other post- 9/11 stories (Cutler, 2006). The points of cultural clash abound in Hayat's story. A *taweez* (a piece of paper with a short Qur'anic verse written on it, kept in a bid to protect the individual) in his purse was translated and interpreted as probative evidence to substantiate the allegation of Jihadist intent against him (Waldman, 2006). His random Anti-American rants, which were common in Pakistani conversations during tumultuous times, were taken as a serious intent to assault (Arax, 2006). His speech and religious beliefs were taken to indicate sympathy and support for terrorism (Cutler, 2006), just to name a few. Nonetheless, one crucial yet straightforward difference lay in how both parties construed the term *cooperation*.

When asked by the FBI agent to be cooperative during the interrogation process, he tried to follow his cultural model of being cooperative, parroted the responses suggested by the agents and said what they wanted to hear (Waldman, 2006).

On the other hand, the FBI agent wanted him to be truthful, informative, perspicuous and relevant. He was open to suggestions (Arax, 2006) and his demeanour was unmistakably submissive, reflecting a cultural practice of demonstrating deference to authority (Waldman, 2006). However, for the FBI investigators, his speech did not align well with their idea of cooperative or honest and truthful communication. Worn down by five long hours of interrogation, his broken sentences and delayed response aroused suspicions of mendacity and deception. His behaviour compelled the chief investigator to tell him, "If you tell the truth, your mind is not working because you're struggling to come up with answers. And you're struggling and struggling" (Otterbourg, 2021, para.14). From the perspective of their (Anglo-American) tacit logic, response latency signified deception. For them, honest speech was always spontaneous, stemming directly from the heart (Blum, 2005). They interpreted his disfluency and delayed responses as a sign of falsehood and deceit. The charges of lying against him rested on the inconsistent and contradictory statements he produced to answer the suggestive questions eliciting the desired response. Though (as James Weddick Jr., a former FBI agent notes) it was the sorriest confession coaxed out of him with intimidation and leading questions (Arax, 2006), the difference in the cultural norms of interaction created allowance for the task.

To complicate things further, FBI agents did not rely solely on their tacit cultural knowledge to dub his evasive remarks a solemn declaration of his crime. Their interpretations also hinged on the systematic, evidence-based, explicit training on deception cues scientifically believed to be unremittingly associated with deceptive speech. They were on the lookout for specific tell-tale body signals and linguistic signs that could betray the cognitive dissonance a liar faces when struggling to come up with a fabricated story (DePaulo et al., 2003).

Notwithstanding that a meticulous procedure was in place to establish the veracity of the statements, what went wrong in the case of Hamid Hayat is the simple, long ignored fact in the deception detection research. The non-verbal behaviours like lack of composure, fidgeting and nervousness, and verbal cues such as curtailed, disfluent and delayed responses that are routinely associated with deception are equally attributable to the anxiety a second-language speaker might experience in intercultural settings (Snellings, 2013). Furthermore, the linguistic correlates of deception in one culture may be a normative response in another culture (Taylor et al., 2014). Taking

mainstream Anglo-American norms of interaction as the default mode of human communication creates misattributed suspicions of deception in cross-cultural interactional contexts where a different communication model is operative.

The 14 years' struggle of Hamid Hayat sufficiently proves that if the interlocutors' cultural values and belief systems do not coincide, a person with the best intentions can be misunderstood or even branded as a liar. The story provides solid impetus to engage in systematic linguistic inquiry to detangle facts from the skewed stereotype about national character and fight back facile generalizations about linguistic correlates of deception. The story also provides a convincing account to illustrate the concerns highlighted in the topic of the current study, i.e., Cultural sensitization in linguistics of deception detection.

The term deception detection here refers to both formal research methods used by various law enforcement agencies across the globe and the informal deduction of interlocutor's honesty by using widespread beliefs about how to spot a (foreign) liar. Cultural sensitization means generating meta-pragmatic awareness about deception and lying, which makes deception scholarship alert and alive to cultural differences. The study operationalizes meta-pragmatic awareness as the process of unearthing or denaturalizing the tacit knowledge of the social meaning of lying and deception and awareness of how this meaning marks different aspects of social contexts. The social meaning of deception includes the knowledge about meaning, perception and production of deception and lying. This knowledge is "a crucial force behind the meaning-generating capacity of language in use" (Verschueren, 2000, p.439).

The phrase *Pragmatic analysis* in the title refers explicitly to grounding the discussion of deception in pragmatic inquiry using Ethnopragmatic techniques. As pragmatics is believed to link the adequacy of a linguistic act with its effects, it is best suited to study lying and mendacity (Vincent Marrelli and Castelfranchi, 1981). Nevertheless, there are no culture- external, universal pragmatic rules which are common to all cultures (Wierzbicka, 2003). The Ethnopragmatic approach elucidates that each known culture corresponds to a specific communication style that regulates the way people talk to each other. Cultures exhibit a great deal of variance in folk beliefs about the nature and role of language (Silverstein, 1979), in the ways information is cascaded (Brown, 2002; Vincent Marrelli, 2003), in the assessment of the linguistic strategies used to mediate the brusqueness of truth (Yeung et al., 1999)

and in classifying various forms of socially sanctioned lies (Peeters, 2018). Discrediting these cultural differences in the meaning-making process results in a myopic view of culture and creates a prejudiced assessment of interlocutors as vile and deceitful.

The following three sections briefly outline the existing state of deception research and address three key motives of the study to address the problem of deception across cultures. These sections correspond to three fundamental issues highlighted in the topic of the study. Section 1.1 presents an overview of the field of deception detection and discusses some of its facile generalizations. By introducing some recent developments in the deception scholarship, this section sets the ground for a cultural-sensitive approach. Section 1.2 introduces another impetus to engage in the cross-cultural enquiry of deception by highlighting the importance of pragmatic norms of interaction in cross-cultural interactions. Section 1.3 invites attention to the linguistic nature of deception and calls for the need to synchronize pragmatic and experimental approaches to study deception across cultures.

1.1. Deception Research and Culture

The first and foremost motivation to explore the cross-cultural differences in production and perception of deception lies in the scientific paradigm of deception detection. Deception is an omnipresent and ubiquitous phenomenon (Dulek & Campbell, 2015; Lapinski & Levine, 2000; Peeters, 2018). It has provoked a flurry of research on various aspects of deception within diversified disciplinary traditions, including psychology, anthropology, sociology, communication studies and, most importantly, semantics and pragmatics (Dynel & Meibauer, 2016). Nevertheless, the most prolific literature on deception is published within the cue-based deception detection approach, which works on the assumption that specific non-verbal and verbal behaviours betray deception (Ekman, 1992; DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008). This approach is now a mature field being spun into practical applications. There is now a booming industry that teaches people and law enforcement professionals to become expert lie detectors (Levine, 2018). A challenging problem in this field is that these studies have downplayed the role of culture as a critical variable until very recently. These studies have taken the findings located predominantly in North American settings (Lewis et al., 2009) as possessing universal diagnostic appeal (Enos, 2012; Kim, 1994; Leal et al., 2018; Taylor et al., 2014). With growing sensitivity about the

role of culture in modelling deceptive behaviour, the cross-cultural data has generated a consensus among researchers that there is no supra-cultural Pinocchio effect (Vrij, 2008) and there is no universal way of lying that is consistent across contexts and cultures (Meibauer, 2017). These culturally inconsistent findings have triggered resentment against the cue-based paradigm and researchers and theorists are now looking for alternate means to study deception.

One natural development of this increasing dissatisfaction against the premise and results of the cue-based approach is the shifted focus from deception cues to deceptive message design. Communication theories like Information Manipulation Theory (McCornack, 1992; McCornack et al., 2014) and Truth Default Theory (Levine, 2014) are more attuned to studying deceptive discourse production and perception than its detection. This field is also maturing with the wealth of sophisticated theories, well-crafted research methods and the potential to replicate the human module of deceptive speech production for computational purposes (Levine & McCornack, 2014b). Though it is a welcoming change compared to the pedantic tradition of listing deception cues, the research on deceptive message design is also stationed predominantly in North America. The findings of this stream of research are based on the Anglo-American communication model (The expression *Anglo-American* is used in this research to signify white, English-speaking North American culture as distinct from Latin-American or other English-speaking cultures). One (witting or unwitting) result of ignoring the non-Western norms of interaction is once again the mainstreaming of the Anglo-American communication model as a natural, neutral and default mode of human interaction (Lapinski and Levine 2000; Yeung et al. 1999). There is no one-size-fits-all explanation of deception that enjoys pan-cultural vitality. There is a need to find how these findings move across cultures.

Set within this backdrop, the current research acknowledges the role of culture as a set of all regularities found in a given group (Spencer-Oatey, 2008). The primary contention of this research is that there is no facet of human life that is not stamped or influenced by culture (Hall, 1976). Even cognitive factors which underline the way people think also possess strong cultural imprints (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Culture and social norms are intertwined in an inextricable manner. Social norms set the range of culturally acceptable (verbal and non-verbal) behaviours. The research has proven that cultural norms, when activated, influence the way people behave (Arcimowicz et

al., 2015). The diversity of deception cues across cultures is only one demonstration of the effects of culture. There are several other ways in which cultural values interact with deception to produce variegated results. Cultural moderators have also invited researchers to the broader interaction between cultural dimensions and the way deception is perceived or practised (Kim et al., 2008).

The Anglo-American idea of message honesty is couched in semantico-referential language ideology, which erects the expectation about the direct and unembellished exchange of information (Blum, 2005). When viewed as an uncooperative counterpart of Grice's cooperative principle, deception is likely to be construed as not only an untruthful assertion but also an indirect, long-winded, overly brief, inconspicuous or irrelevant statement (McCornack 1992; McCornack et al. 2014). While this can be true for Anglo cultures, some other cultural models of social interaction do not equate indirectness with manipulation, directness with sincerity or veracity with an optimal amount of information (Blum, 2005; Vincent Marrelli, 1997).

In the light of the preceding discussion, it is not difficult to discern why a one-size-fits- all model of deception design runs the risk of confirming erroneous stereotypes rather than countering them. It is imperative to cross-validate the existing models of deceptive discourse for other cultural contexts and build a culture-sensitive baseline profile that might affect how deception is construed, perceived, and produced in the culture under investigation.

1.2. Norm Violation Model

The stories of communication failure in cross-cultural settings bring us to the second major impetus to undertake this study. Apart from the need to sensitize formal research methods, studying the interaction of deception and culture is also crucial for interpersonal reasons. The study adopts the Norm Violation Model (Levine et al., 2000) to explain how the norms of interaction intersect with the perception of deception across cultures. According to this model, any departure from normative behaviour invites suspicions of deceit among interactants. The model explains that normative behaviour is considered a sufficient condition for veracity judgment and people evaluate any weird or inappropriate behaviour as dishonest and deceptive. The model is genealogically related to Bond et al.'s (1992) Expectancy Violation Model; however, it offers more sophistication by maintaining a conceptual distinction between norms and expectations. Although the expectations are mainly driven by norms, there can be

other bases of expectation, including popular stereotypes, hearsays and idiosyncratic behaviours of others with whom we have prior interactions. Since we expect people to behave normatively, the norms and expectations are likely to be confounded. The evaluation of a behaviour is the collective function of how far the behaviour is normative and expected (Levine et al., 2000).

The study maintains that there is a growing need to sensitize deception scholarship to certain facts about cross-cultural communication. Cross-cultural communicators enter in cross-cultural situations with a set of beliefs and assumptions about the rules of the game (Pierce, 2011) or display rules (Ekman & Friesen, 1969). They bring their own cultural values and norms to the interaction to set expectations about the desired behaviours. If their expectations are not met during an interaction, they seek a plausible account for any such violation. In the absence of any other relevant information, the interactants tend to infer duplicity on the speaker's part. For example, the Arab style of interaction is characterised by a lot of tactile physical proximity and loud conversations. For someone accustomed to American conversational conventions, such loudness can be misinterpreted as confrontational in nature and can create mistrust (Taylor et al., 2014).

As the theoretical understanding of the study is grounded in a culture-sensitive approach, it views communication as a rule-governed activity driven by cultural norms and expectations (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). Each culture has its own culturally determined norms of interaction (Taylor et al., 2014) shared by all cultural insiders that are not only considered neutral among cultural insiders (Goddard, 2009b; Goddard & Wierzbicka, 2002) but also facilitate the task of within-culture interaction. In cross-cultural interactions, since this common heuristic program is not available to infer correct meaning (Taylor et al., 2014), the difference in norms and expectations reduces the accuracy of judgement of speaker honesty (Bond Jr. & Atoum, 2000; Leal et al., 2018) and arouses the suspicions of duplicity. In cross-cultural settings, owing to the cultural difference in the etiquettes of interaction in general (Levine et al., 2000) and norms, motives and evaluation of lying and deceit in particular (Kwiatkowska, 2015), the people of one culture may find communication styles of others deceptive or dishonest (Spencer-Oatey & Franklin, 2012).

As a pragmatic study of deception, the current research foregrounds the role of pragmatic failure in cross-cultural settings in creating mistrust between interlocutors.

Since verbal behaviour is greatly reliant on the modes of representation, any difference in the linguistic form of presentation (Taylor et al., 2017) is also seen as a violation of norms. For example, second-language speakers are approached more with lie-bias than truth-bias (Da Silva & Leach, 2013). One possible explanation for this bias can be that speaking in a second language is a cognitively demanding job and may result in verbal and non-verbal behaviours that are generally listed as deception cues. This bias may arouse inaccurate suspicions of deception (Snellings, 2013). Similarly, if perceptions of one community do not match that of another community and pragmatic failure occurs (Leech, 2014), it raises suspicions that deception has occurred (Kim, 2008). Grammatical errors reflect poorly on the speaker in terms of proficiency but pragmatic failures are taken as reflecting bad intentions on the speaker's part (Jeremie, 2011; Kim, 1994).

The current study maintains that one very effective way of countering this suspicion of duplicity in cross-cultural settings is to explicate the latent "rules of the game" (Pierce, 2011, p. 1) through systematic semantic and pragmatic inquiry of key terms used to denote deception and truth (Dynel & Meibauer, 2016) and other cultural keywords (Wierzbicka, 2002) and making the findings available for the cultural insiders and outsiders alike in cultural-neutral terms (Goddard & Wierzbicka, 2004).

The justification for highlighting the importance of norms in studying deception lies in the far-reaching consequences that the erroneous judgement about others' deception can entail. If the receiver's normative expectations are violated at any stage, the further exchange is either negatively affected or may stop altogether (Pierce, 2011). It is why colonial administrators and travellers find people of other cultures more deceptive and dishonest than themselves (Vincent Marrelli, 2004a). Apart from the misunderstanding in the interpersonal domain, norm or expectation violation can result in severe outcomes in high-impact contexts. The Persian Gulf war resulted from an Iraqi official's flawed conclusion about the deceptive nature of American negotiators (Triandis, 1994).

The study builds its rationale on the premise that existing findings in cue-based approaches to deception are grounded in Anglo-American norms of interaction. As the research in cross- cultural moderators is sparse, the investigators also face this challenge in cross-cultural investigation contexts. The norms like the degree of deference for people higher in the hierarchy, the difference in expression of emotions

and above all, the difference in what counts as lying or crime translate into different verbal behaviour. It makes it difficult for investigators to assign behaviours to deception with some degree of authenticity (Taylor et al., 2014). Leal et al. (2018) note that the research in deception detection and interviewing techniques is rooted in the USA and Western Europe and there is a need to increase the meta-pragmatic awareness of practitioners about the cultural differences in the norms of interaction (Leal et al. 2018).

Addressing this research gap, this study ventures to relativise the notion of deception as a function of cultural norms and expectations and creates metapragmatic awareness about the concept of deception and lying using Ethnopragmatic and empirical apparatus.

1.3. Deception as a Linguistic Phenomenon

The third and the most crucial pivot point which anchors the current study is the desire to establish deception as a function of respective language and advance the fundamental understanding of deception by adopting an integrated linguistic approach. Such an approach has the potential to graft the various strands of deception scholarship together and invites intention to the centrality of culture in the entire debate.

The study endorses an important but long-ignored fact about the correlation between language, culture and deception. Culture has a deterministic effect on all the facets of human life (Hall & Peters, 1987), including cognitive factors which underline the way people think (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) and the way people behave (Arcimowicz et al., 2015). Above all, culture shapes the way people use language and interact with each other. Language and culture enjoy a dialectical relationship: Language is transmitted as an integral part of culture and culture is transmitted mainly through language. All cultural knowledge solidifies in the corresponding languages and the words and phrases become the repository of cultural norms, expectations and beliefs (Petrova, 2019; Vincent Marrelli, 2004c; Wierzbicka, 2003).

Modern linguistic approaches challenge the modular and innate nature of language and emphasize a close relationship between cultural knowledge and speech practices prevalent in society (Peeters, 2016). One natural consequence of this profound interest in studying language as a function of cultural values is the emergence of cultural approaches within the broader field of linguistics. Approaches such as cultural linguistics, intercultural pragmatics and cross-linguistic semantics and

Ethnopragmatics have successfully challenged the mainstream Universalist paradigm for being ethnocentric and culturally blind (Goddard,2006). These parallel trends have successfully kept the trend of registering cultural variations alive (Goddard, 2006). As a culturally-aware study, the current research finds these approaches very relevant for studying deception as a linguistic phenomenon.

The potential of lying is grounded in the language system (Meibauer,2018). Language and deception co-evolved to facilitate the task of group living (Meibauer, 2017) and both exert a deterministic effect on how communication proceeds. The lack of linguistic approaches in deception scholarship mainly has to do with the oversight concerning the linguistic nature of deception and the dialectic relationship between deception and language. Affirming the linguistic nature of lying, Meibauer (2018) contends:

> There are good reasons to assume a linguistics of lying. On the one hand, lying has to do with truth and falsehood, and because these are semantic notions, there is a semantic side to lying. On the other hand, lying has to do with the speech act of assertion, which is a genuine pragmatic notion. (p.358)

Deception scholarship acknowledges the role of language in detecting lies by considering it a vehicle or a medium to carry out specific communicative tasks. The cognitive load associated with lying and deceiving is widely believed to be reflected through the subtle changes in language use (Newman et al., 2003; Pennebaker et al., 2003). However, the fact that causality can run the other way i.e., a particular language can set the limits of how deception is produced and perceived, remains largely ignored. Viewing deception as an object of linguistic inquiry should go far beyond this container view of language and identify how lying as a mendacious statement is dependent on the respective language system and vice versa. Deception literature has rarely benefited from linguistic analyses and pragmatic theories as their primary explanation to connect certain linguistic acts with the goal of deception (Vincent Marrelli & Castelfranchi, 1981).

One major assumption that forms the impetus of the linguistic investigation of deception is the fact that the Anglo-American understanding of deception and lying is grounded in the English vocabulary (Wierzbicka, 2014) and Anglo-American norms and practices (Goddard, 2006). For instance, the very nature of lying as a "speech act of assertion" (Meibauer, 2018, p.358) is problematic because even the names of speech

acts such as request, apology, compliment and assertion are culture-specific words rooted in the English language system (Goddard, 2006; Wierzbicka, 2011). Deception in any other culture requires familiarity with the corresponding language system. Furthermore, studies in cross-cultural pragmatics have proven that different cultures appear different not because of the inherent differences in the physiognomy of their people but in the pragmatic values assigned to the language use in any given setting (Wierzbicka, 2003). An example of such a difference is quoted in Wierzbicka (2003), who narrates how Western colonizers saw the mitigation strategies used by Asian villagers in telling the time duration or distance as a sign of deceit. Any cross-cultural account of deception that does not take into consideration the connexion between language and culture can suffer the flaws of over-extrapolation and facile generalization.

The motivation to undertake this type of inquiry stems from a gap in the existing research. For a significant period, the researchers in deception have worked within confined disciplinary pods, discounting the parallel findings in other fields. Since the time Vincent Marrelli lamented the lack of interdisciplinarity for the first time in 2004, the situation has not improved much for deception research. The communication theorists working within the deceptive discourse design paradigm and the pragmatics scholars working on the specific meaning of the lying terms seem to be unaware of one another's research methods and related findings. The result is a lack of "mutual comfort" that would enhance the correctness of the results (Vincent Marrelli, 2004a, p. 247). In the same vein, the landmark semantic and pragmatic studies of lying (Chen et al., 2013; Coleman & Kay, 1981; Hardin, 2010), despite sharing the experimental design and focus with parallel studies of deception in the field of communication studies (Lapinski & Levine, 2000; Yeung et al., 1999, for example), have never mentioned each other. To wit, both the fields have hardly been synchronized.

On the other side, adopting an integrated approach can also fix a limitation found in the linguistic studies of deception. These studies have overindulged in circuitous theoretical discussions and hardly make practical problem solving their research goal. Meibauer (2011) advises linguists working on lying to profit from established psychological insights to improve their findings. Being an interdisciplinary field of inquiry, pragmatics has the potential to bridge the existing cross-disciplinary gaps that exist so far. Pragmatics can set lying in the broader

disciplinary debate (Meibauer, 2011). The clearest enunciation of using theoretical and empirical pragmatic methods to study deception is found in Dynel and Meibauer (2106). They locate deception exactly at the crossroads of multidisciplinary interaction and explain the putative nature of linguistic indicia by invoking differences in people's understanding of what lying or deception is. They advise linguists to capitalize upon the findings of deception research and make their definitions of lying more functional and less formal (Dynel &Meibauer, 2016). Vincent Marrelli (2004b) also makes a similar suggestion. This suggestion is exactly where the current study locates its interest, albeit reciprocally. The study proposes to start a reciprocally cooperative move for the benefit of both disciplines.

To summarize the preceding discussion, it would be apt to conclude that despite being seemingly universal signifiers (Meibauer, 2014b), lying and deception are cultural concepts. They run the risk of being wrongly interpreted if corresponding cultural systems, values and practices are ignored in the meaning-making process. It is vital to denaturalize the local sedimented practices and create meta-pragmatic awareness, which can inform deception research about valid cross-cultural practices (Vincent Marrelli, 2003). So far, two sets of evidence are available that feed into meta-pragmatic awareness about deception in the Anglo-American culture: The lexical accounts of deception based on the semantics of the emic labels and culturally salient English keywords (Coleman & Kay, 1981; Vincent Marrelli, 2004b; Wierzbicka, 2006, for example) and studies of deceptive message design which focus on the pragmatics of deception strategies (see McCornack, 1992, 1997; McCornack et al., 2014; Morrison et al., 2020 for instance). Both types of evidence bring indispensable insights for the comprehensive view of deception in Anglo-American settings. The current study adopts an Ehnopragmatic approach to generate equivalent findings for Pakistani culture by incorporating the theoretical and methodological guidelines of both lines of inquiry. It also compares these findings with what is already known about deception in the Anglo-American culture. Such triangulation of theory and method helps harvest the best of both fields and helps to attain the methodological rigour necessary to secure confidence in results (Vincent Marrelli, 2004b).

1.4. Statement of the Problem

Language and deception co-evolved as a natural response to the dynamics of group living and added a new layer of complexity to how communication operates in human society. The conspicuous part of the social interactions involves an active and on-the-fly assessment of the speaker's truthfulness based on one's idea of what honest and cooperative communicative behaviour constitutes. Nevertheless, honest communication is contingent upon social and cultural practices and there is no universal way of lying that uniformly applies to all cultures and languages. In cross-cultural interactions governed by different pragmatic norms, the communicative behaviour of others can appear dishonest or duplicitous to the uninitiated. Such unsubstantiated wariness about others' integrity can negatively impact communication, may result in less-than-optimal outcomes and cause prejudice and discrimination against the sincerity of a person or an entire ethnic group. The fact has direct implications for the mainstream deception research that has rarely benefitted from the theory of language in use. The situation calls for an informed approach that views deception at the crossroads of language and culture and tests the generalizability of the deception studies conducted in the United States for other cultural contexts. To address this issue, the study uses pragmatics as an interface for theoretical and empirical investigation of deception to explain the cross-cultural differences in meaning, perception and production of deceit and lies. By synchronizing the methods of Ethnopragmatics with empirical explorations of deceptive message design, the study generates findings that share the mutual comfort of both fields. Such an approach has the potential to explain the cross-cultural inconsistencies found in the linguistic correlates of deception. The approach also helps address the skewed stereotypes about people's honesty in a systematic and scientific manner and serves as a stepping stone to more reliable, informed and culturally sensitive deception research.

1.5. Focus of the Study

The current study has three converging foci: The first and the foremost is to identify and explore the semantic and pragmatic nuances of deception in an underrepresented culture i.e. Pakistani culture; second, to study those aspects as a function of cultural values, beliefs and assumptions and third, to establish their correspondence with broad generalizations found in the deception research located in the North American context. Put differently, sitting at the crossroad of three distinct yet interrelated fields of inquiry, the study makes an attempt to study the much-needed but often overlooked interaction

of deception, language and culture.

For comparative purposes, the study uses linguistic and empirical data from one pair of cultures i.e., Pakistani culture and Anglo-American culture and tries to establish the cultural nuances of these two cultures with respect to deception by performing a series of analyses. The semantic and pragmatic explorations of deception involve lexical analyses to identify key concepts and cultural key terms and explore what it means to deceive or lie in the given culture. Additionally, the study also tries to explicate the cultural perception and moral opprobrium attached to various forms of linguistic manipulations by adapting a meticulous experimental design proposed in McCornack (1992) and McCornack et al. (2014). A small portion of the study is also dedicated to exploring how various linguistic strategies are deployed to produce deceptive discourses in Pakistani cultures.

For setting the focus of the study, it is important to delimit the scope of the research and clearly state what the study does not set out to achieve. First, this thesis is cross-cultural in approach, which compares the specific cultural norms and practices of Anglo-American culture with that of Pakistani culture. Though expected to improve intercultural communication, the study does not involve direct exploration of situations in which interactants engage in intercultural exchange in real-time. Second, the study does not conduct any direct investigation of deception in the American context. It benefits from the wealth of already existing literature on deception in North American culture and compares it with the parallel findings generated from the current study. Third, the study does not intend to propose any deception detection method per se and does not test any of the tenets of deception detection research directly except the plea of universality in the deceptive behaviour. It only sets the grounds that challenge or invalidate the presumption of universality prevalent in the traditional deception detection paradigm. Simply put, the study is a pragmatic study of production and perception of deception, only obliquely related to deception detection research.

1.6. Rationale of Studying Pakistani and American culture

The rationale for making comparison between Pakistani culture and Anglo-American culture is twofold. First and foremost, most theoretical predictions about human communication that have achieved the status of universal maxims are based on Anglo-American norms of interactions (Wierzbicka, 2003). In the same vein, until the turn of the century, the deception scholarship also remained marked by facile generalizations based on American subjects referred to as people in general (Vincent Marrelli, 2004a).

With a growing realization about the role of culture in shaping speech practices, deception researchers are becoming increasingly interested in knowing how the findings predominantly located in North American settings (Lewis et al., 2009) travel over diverse cultural contexts (Vrij et al., 2018). As the mainstream literature in deception research is based on American culture, it is almost intuitive to use it as a reference point for cross-cultural comparisons. It helps to ascertain how far the findings in deception research are generalizable to other cultural contexts. Most of the existing cross-cultural studies of deception have also made American culture their point of departure (Jacobs et al., 1996; Kim, 2008; Lapinski & Levine, 2000; Taylor et al., 2017; Vrij, Leal, & Fisher, 2018; Yeung et al., 1999, for instance). Since so much information is readily available about the meaning, value and perception of deception in the Anglo-American context, the current study does not perform any primary investigation of deception in Anglo- American culture and benefits from insights found in existing literature.

The second motivation to include Anglo-American culture comes from the fact that the US has emerged as a key player in world politics. The interaction of each culture with that of the US is rapidly becoming a part of the international experience (Abel, 2008). It is crucial to empirically explore the cultural nuances of local cultures compared to American culture to help individuals from both sides prepare for intercultural encounters that are becoming a norm rather than an exception.

The selection of Pakistani culture as the main object of study is chiefly motivated by a few methodological and pragmatic concerns. First, as a pragmatic study of emic labels for deception and other cultural key terms, the study requires the researcher to have an emic view of their meaning and connotation to generate authentic meta-pragmatic knowledge (Dynel & Meibauer, 2016). It is only possible for the native speaker of a language to decipher the correct prototypical meaning of a term and the concept it denotes. Furthermore, being a cultural insider, the researcher could use her native speaker intuition on several occasions, which influenced the study's design (The details can be found in the methodology section).

Second, since American and Pakistani cultures have weak phylogenetic and cultural diffusion relationship, the cross-cultural findings generated by their comparison can be free of Galton's problem. Galton's problem is an old but still relevant issue in cross-cultural research that challenges the reliability of the results of

comparative cross-national analyses by ascribing them to cultural diffusions rather than the processes operating within societies. The choice of American and Pakistani cultures is commensurate with the suggestions made by Levinson & Ember (1996) to not choose cultures within close geographical proximity to avoid Galton's problem. The culture can only be considered responsible for social differentiation if the comparison is between geographically distant cultures (Kwiatkowska, 2015).

The third reason to select Pakistani culture is the lack of existing evidence for the interaction of culture and language that may inform deception in Pakistani culture. After Pakistan participated in the war against terror, the international visibility of Pakistani culture has increased manifold, but so far, no detailed account of the deception (or baseline speech behaviours, for that matter) in Pakistani culture exists. Cultural nuances of Pakistani culture that may influence the pragmatics of deception in Pakistani culture remain undocumented so far. The perception of Pakistani culture is either confounded with that of Indian culture for their age-old historical ties and close geographical proximity or with the Islamic world at large for being a Muslim state. Since the study adopts the theoretical approach (Cultural Script approach propounded by Wierzbicka and Goddard) that challenges the delusion of the sameness of cultures, it is imperative to register the uniqueness of each culture and document the ways interactional norms operate in the respective society, which in turn impact the use and evaluation of various deception strategies. The study captures the people's raw perception of deception in Pakistani culture as reflected in its language and interactional norms and compares it with that of the US to document the similarities and contrasts between the two cultures.

1.7. Research Aims and Objectives

The current study sets the broader aim of denaturalizing locally sedimented speech practices by creating meta-pragmatic awareness about cultural differences in the meaning, perception and production of deception and lying and eventually sensitizing deception scholarship to the cultural variance that emerges thereof. The specific objectives set to achieve this broader aim are as follows:

- To explicate the semantic and pragmatic aspects of deception and lying in Pakistani culture.

- To explore different linguistic strategies deployed to manipulate the linguistic content of the speech in Pakistani culture.

- To explore the perceived honesty and moral opprobrium associated with various linguistic strategies used to convey information in Pakistani culture.
- To compare the meta-pragmatic knowledge about meaning, perception and production of lying and deception in Pakistani culture with that of the US.

1.8 Research Questions

1. What constitutes deception and lying in Pakistani culture?

2. What are different linguistic strategies used in deceptive discourse production in the Pakistani context?

3. How are various forms of linguistic manipulations perceived in terms of deceptiveness and moral opprobrium in Pakistani culture?

4. How do the linguistic nuances of lying and deception in Pakistani culture compare with that of Anglo-American settings?

1.9 Significance of the Study

Done at the crossroads of semantics, Ethnopragmatics and experimental studies of deceptive message design, this thesis documents several critical contributions to the relevant field of study. The study addresses several research gaps that exist in the existing literature. It is the first full-length study of deception in Pakistani culture. Building on the cross-disciplinary insights, the study develops a theoretical framework that has the potential to simultaneously explain deception in two different disciplinary jargon i.e., pragmatics and deception scholarship. The study increases cross-disciplinary interaction among various strands of deception research and integrates triangulation of evidence. The primary advantage of this approach is that it allows deception to be seen in a culture-relative way and accommodates both qualitative and quantitative analysis of linguistic and experimental data, respectively.

Though the findings carry considerable significance for cross-cultural communication and second language learning, the direct addressee of the study is a growing body of deception scholarship, which is trying to reap the harvest of technology to its fullest by using computational methods to automatize deception detection. With Pakistan's participation in the war against terror and professed bias of the West against Pakistan, more and more Pakistanis are facing trials in the international courts and receive discriminatory behaviour (Hamid Hayat case is one striking example). The findings of the study can be used at some level to highlight some of the cross-cultural differences, which can be dubbed as dubious or deceptive in

formal and informal settings. The study offers a systematic approach to deal with the typical stereotypes about the honesty of Pakistani people.

By uncovering the difference in local meaning, moral attitude and constitution of deceptive speech acts, the study creates sensitivity against pan-cultural generalizations and generates tenable conclusions, at least for one pair of cultures (Pakistan and the US). Such meta-pragmatic awareness about cultures has the potential to create tolerance and acceptance for the difference, maintain healthy communicative ecology and support peaceful intercultural relations (Vincent Marrelli, 2004). The study is one small step to increasing cultural awareness about Pakistani culture for the benefit of individuals and commonweal.

1.10 Organization of the Study

This dissertation is an academic endeavour to debunk the myth of uniformity and universality in the definition, perception and production of deceits and lies and tries to present an alternate account that is culturally sensitive. The organization of this thesis is as follows:

Chapter 2, titled Literature Review, presents a comprehensive overview of the current state of theory and practice in deception research. I begin by pinning down the exasperatingly challenging task of defining and classifying various deception types and elaborate upon the oft-cited correlation between lying and deceiving. The following sections briefly summarize the traditional deception paradigm and theoretical reasons to break away from it. Followed by a brief overview of the existing state of theory in deception, the foundation of the current research model is developed by locating deception at the semantic-pragmatic interface. Next, I list down various points of interaction that exist between language, culture and deception. In the end, a short statement about the deception research in the Pakistani context is presented, followed by the gap statement that lists the missing pieces in the existing literature and shows how the current work is distinguished from other works.

Chapter 3, titled as Theoretical Framework and Methodology, is divided into two sections. The first section sets forth theoretical model of the current research built out of two theories i.e., the theory of Cultural Scripts and Information Manipulation theory, which offer a complementary yet different view of deception. First, the major premises of both theories are outlined, followed by a detailed account of how both approaches are theoretically integrated. This section explains how integrating these

theories helps in eliminating ethnolinguistic bias, fixes the flaws of both approaches and presents the findings in cultural-neutral terms. The second section of chapter 3 outlines the methodology. It describes the research design, which comprises two phases and provides information about data collection, criteria to select the research participants, method and types of data analyses performed for two sets of studies.

Chapter 4 of this thesis, titled Cultural Scripts of Truth, Deception and Lying, summarizes the result of Phase I of this research which explores the cultural script of truth, deception and lying in Pakistani culture and compares it with that of the US. The results of the multiple lexical analyses of Urdu key terms are presented in the form of cultural scripts. Some of the key findings are rephrased as falsifiable hypotheses to be tested in the next round of studies.

In Chapter 5, titled Production and Perception of Deception, I extend the cultural script study from a point-to-point lexical analysis to a highly structured experimental design. This chapter provides information about phase II results of this research (based on deception production and perception tasks), which explore how various forms of deception are produced and perceived in Pakistani culture. These studies offer a sudden contrast with the lexical analyses performed in the previous chapter. Given the difference of research methods and explanatory apparatus, the transition can be jarring for the readers; however, the discussion section bridges the gap and links the findings of the study with that of Phase I to harmonize the results of both studies.

Chapter 6, titled Conclusion, summarizes the main findings of this study as well as discusses directions for future work. Last but not least, Appendix B provides the list of all situational prompts used in Phase II studies, followed by Appendix C, which provides the sample of each deception type for each given scenario.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter is designed to cover everything necessary to make sense of the existing state of knowledge in which the theoretical foundation of the study is situated i.e., deception at the crossroads of language and culture. The review is structured as follows: The chapter starts by examining the definition and basic concepts surrounding deception, along with a brief introduction to the prevalent taxonomies of lying. Though the current study does not locate its interest in the traditional cues-based approach to study deception, a brief outline of the approach is presented to provide the point of departure. Followed by the overview of the traditional approach, the existing state of theory in deception scholarship is appraised. The subsequent sections discuss the deception at the semantic-pragmatic interface, the interaction between the deception strategies and cultural dimensions, and finally, the intersection of semantic/pragmatics, culture and deception. The chapter concludes by identifying the research gap, which establishes the rationale for the current research.

Deception scholarship is an exponentially large field. Deception has sparked scholarly interest across numerous fields and disciplines, including psychology, sociology, anthropology, linguistics (Dynel & Meibauer, 2016), theology, philosophy (Arcimowicz et al., 2015), criminology, marketing, behavioural economics (Pierce, 2011), computational linguistics (Papantoniou, 2017), forensic linguistics (Harding & Ralarala, 2017) and communication studies (Vincent Marrelli, 2004a). Correspondingly, deception has been studied from a myriad of perspectives such as detection of lies and deceits (Vrij, 2008), verbal and non-verbal cues to deception detection (DePaulo et al. 2003), cognitive aspects of lying (Ekman, 1992), automated deception detection (Pérez-Rosas & Mihalcea, 2014), deceptive discourse production design (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Levine, 2014; McCornack, 1992), defining lies and

finding precise terminological categorization (Carson, 2012; Coleman & Kay, 1981; Fallis, 2012; Sweetser, 1987) linguistics of lying (Meibauer, 2018), Pragmatic consideration of lying (Vincent Marrelli, 2003) and cultural predictor and determinants of deception (Leal et al., 2018; Taylor et al., 2017; Vincent Marrelli, 2004a) to name a few. Applying the filter of the various contexts in which deception occurs, we can find an entire range of studies investigating deception in written statements (Picornell, 2001; Schafer, 2007), interview dialogues (Levitan et al., 2018), computer-mediated communication (Lewis, 2009; Rubin, 2010), suspect interviews (Deeb et al., 2018), online dating profiles (Toma & Hancock, 2012) and many more which are difficult to cover within the scope of one study.

Given the prolificacy and the expanse of deception research, an all-encompassing review is neither possible nor useful. For practical reasons, this review delimits the scope of the literature that can be covered in one study. The review does not deal with neurolinguistic approaches that use neuroimaging to study brain activity while lying, computational methods and economic theories of lying. Keeping in view the linguistic focus of the study, the deception detection paradigm is discussed briefly and the traditional interest in non-verbal deception cues is bypassed altogether. Only linguistic indicia of deception are discussed with their implications for cross-cultural research.

2.1. Defining Deception and Lying

Given the fact that deception has been a topic of inquiry in disparate fields of study, its definitions also vary in scope and terminological precision depending upon the goals and methodology of the discipline. The difficulty of arriving at a workable and unified definition has been repeatedly voiced in deception scholarship (Abel, 2008; Oswald et al., 2016). For defining deception, the study adopts the disciplinary view and discusses various definitions of deception with reference to the tradition they are coming from.

The most prolifically published research on deception comes from the empirical investigations of deception from the perspective of psychology. Within this paradigm, there is a tendency to define deception more workably without attending to complex paradigmatic caveats. Deception is most commonly defined as an "intentional attempt to create false beliefs in the minds of others" (Pierce, 2011, p. 6). Howard (2018) also considers the alteration of perception as a necessary condition for deception to occur. This definition of deception is widely cited in deception literature within the traditional

paradigm (DePaulo et al., 2003; DePaulo et al., 1996; Vrij, 2008). To explicate it further, it is important to note that in order to deceive, the sender must be convinced of the falsity of the belief they are trying to create in the target (Buller & Burgoon, 1994). False belief can be created either by forming an entirely new belief or altering an existing belief state (Zuckerman et al., 1981). It is interesting to note that the distinction between lying and deception does not hold clearly within this traditional paradigm of deception studies and the terms are used interchangeably. Many cue-based studies use the terms lying, deception and their derivatives interchangeably, either by clearly stating the fact from the very onset (Enos, 2012; Vrij, 2008; Zuckerman et al., 1981) or simply by relying on the commonsensical correlation between lying and deceiving (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Newman et al., 2003; Twitchell et al., 2004).

Vincent Marrelli and Castelfranchi's (1981) contribution is also admirable for distinguishing between lying and deception. According to them, lying is strictly communicative in nature. Lying is a subtype of deception characterized by explicitly conveying false information i.e., Deceiving through commission. If someone tries to conceal or withhold certain parts of information, this is an instance of deception but not lying (Vincent Marrelli & Castelfranchi, 1981). Carson (2010) also reiterates the same two points of difference between deception and lying: Deception can be achieved through other means but lying is strictly verbal in nature. To lie, the speaker has to make a false statement. For Carson (2010), another major point of difference lies in the fact that contrary to lying, deception connotes success. For deception to occur, the precondition is that the receiver was eventually deceived, which is clearly not the case with lying. The sender lied, regardless of the fact the lying was successful or not (Carson, 2012).

Although the philosophical debates about lying and deception span across centuries, the linguistic analyses are sparse and just a few decades old (Hardin, 2010). Linguistic analyses found in the semantic-pragmatic interface are more oriented towards lying than deception. Linguistically, lying is defined by appealing to the notion of semantic prototype theory (Coleman & Kay, 1981) or through pragmatic modelling of lying on speech act theory and implicature (Meibauer, 2017). Coleman and Kay (1981) believe that there is no definitive set of necessary conditions that can fully capture the concept of lying. They argue in favour of the prototype approach and list three prototypical elements necessary to define lying; the speaker's belief that the utterance is false, intent to deceive the hearer and the falsity of the statement itself. The

three prototype elements of a good lie are:

(a) P is false.

(b) S believes P to be false.

(c) In uttering P, S intends to deceive A.

where the speaker (S) asserts some proposition (P) to an addressee (A).

(Coleman & Kay, 1981, p. 26)

Working well within the prototype paradigm, Sweetser (1987) challenges Coleman and kay's definition and contends that the prototype elements are part of the context and not of the very definition of lying which is simply a false statement (Sweetser, 1987).

The standard semantic definition of lying attested by many researchers (Chen et al., 2013; Hardin, 2010; Marsili, 2016; Meibauer, 2014b, 2017) also includes two of Coleman and Kay's definitional elements except the third condition of utterance being actually false. Benton (2019) explicates this standard definition in traditional three-clause format:

You lie to S just in case you:

(i) You assert that p to S;

(ii) You believe that p is false; and

(iii) By asserting p, you intend to deceive S (in some specified way) (Benton, 2019, pp. 1–2)

The definition is close to Meibauer's (2018) definition of lying as an insincere assertion. However, Meibauer (2005) expands the boundary of lying from the cases in which a literally false statement is produced to the situations in which the speaker conversationally created false implicature (Meibauer, 2005). Meibauer's definition fixes a broken thread in Coleman and Kay's definition; the inability to account for intermediate cases in which the truth value of a statement is determined not only by what is said but also by what is implicated (Hardin, 2010).

Chen et al. (2013) try to venture out with the first-ever pragmatic definition of lying. This definition not only takes into account the semantic prototype notion and speech act theory but also the politeness principle. Following Coleman and Kay (1981), they also adopt the scaler view of lying. According to them, apart from the bivalent

notion of semantic falsity of the utterance, the lie-likeness of a statement is dependent on the degree of concealment of untruth involved, the extent to which the lie is self-serving and the extent to which the lie is other-oriented. The lie- likeness of a situation is not a yes-no question but a matter of degree, a judgement about more or less. (Chen et al., 2013).

Within the pragmatic definitions of lying, Li and Yuan (2020) made the most recent attempt under Relevance-Adaptation Model. All extant analyses of lying are performed from the perspective of speakers. Li and Yuan's (2020) model is the first to arrive at an operational definition of lying from the perspective of both the speaker and addressee. They define lying as follows:

> For the speaker, to lie is to choose a verbal stimulus through developing a misrepresentation of truth, with the non-prior-notified intention to make this representation manifest or more manifest to the addressee. For the addressee, the speaker is lying when what he states disagrees with the addressee's assumption of the speaker's cognitive environment. (Li & Yuan, 2020, p. 38)

This definition has the potential to address a caveat in common language, which allows the hearer to dub their spurious judgments of the interlocutor's honesty as lying.

2.1.1 Correlation between Lying and Deceiving

Defining lying as a "pretended speech act of information" (Hardin 2010; p.3199) brings us to another issue of vital importance; the correlation between lying and deceiving. The existing linguistic analyses deal with the question in two broad ways: exploring the intent to deceive and distinguishing between the two on the basis of the asserted content of the speech act produced.

Many scholars consider the presence of deceptive intent as central to the act of lying (Coleman & Kay, 1981; Sweetser, 1987; Vincent Marrelli & Castelfranchi, 1981), while for others, the intention to deceive is not strictly indispensable for lying (Fallis, 2009, Carson, 2010). Meibauer (2014, 2016) labels the two opposing groups as Deceptionists and Non-deceptionists, respectively. Non-Deceptionists rely on their paradigmatic examples of bald-faced lies which lack the intent to deceive but still are considered lies by lay English people (Arico & Fallis, 2013). In constructing bald-faced lies, the speakers go on record to depict themselves as believing the truth of their assertion even when it is known to everyone involved in the interaction that such belief

does not exist (Benton, 2019). For example, Carson (2010) presents the case of a cheating student who knows that the dean has conclusive evidence about his cheating but still lies to the dean because he knows the dean can punish students only if they confess. Meibauer (2011) challenges this non-deceptionists approach by invoking the central premise of speech act theory i.e.; Each speech act is produced with an intention and a major part of understanding a speech act is uncovering what it intends to achieve. If lying is a speech act, there has to be a certain intention associated with it and deceiving appears to be the most likely case in this regard (Meibauer, 2011). He proposes that defining lying as an insincere assertion should always follow the definition of assertion. One can assert content p of a statement only if p is presented as truth and the speaker intends that the hearer actively believes that p. Simply put, one cannot assert without intending; therefore, intention to deceive is an integral part of lying (Meibauer, 2005).

Coming towards the second point of contact between lying and deception, pure linguistic analyses mention the correlation in passing. For example, Hardin (2010) furnishes a definition of deception as "an action or omission aimed at misleading other people's knowledge" (Hardin 2010, p.3201) and establishes the pragmatic nature of deception but does not seem to comment upon how deception is correlated with lying. The communication theorists working within the Gricean paradigm offer the most nuanced discussion about the distinction between deception and lying. In theories of deception, including Information Manipulation Theory (IMT), Information Manipulation theory 2 (IMT2) and Truth-Default Theory (TDT), deception is used as a hypernym for many subordinate categories, lying being only one of them (Howard, 2018). For instance, original IMT (1992) and IMT2 (2014) define deception as a covert violation of the Gricean maxims across multiple dimensions. In TDT, deception is a deliberate act of misleading others, while lying is a sub-type of deception characterized by non-notified, deliberate falsehood on the speaker's part (Levine, 2014). Put differently, lying is the covert violation of the Quality maxim, while deception can involve manipulating information in any possible manner (McCornack, 1992). Communicating false information (lying) is only one way of altering the hearer's perception. One may deceive by transmitting true information leading to false conclusions. Communicators can create the false belief in the minds of the receivers through myriads of other verbal strategies, by sending a vague message, omitting a part of useful information, altering the amount of information and by adjusting

environmental cues to suit the goal of interaction (Buller & Burgoon, 1994; McCornack, 1992). Here, it is interesting to note that, unlike traditional approaches to deception, these communication theories do not insist on the deliberate nature of deception and lying. Despite not excluding the deliberate and orchestrated forms of deception, these theories do not restrict the scope of deception to the communicative outcome of conscious intent (Levine & McCornack, 2014b).

The complexity of an apparently prevalent phenomenon in our social life starts revealing itself from the very onset. So far, we have discussed the concept of deception from a cross-disciplinary perspective. The situation can be further complicated when the variable of cultures is introduced. It has been increasingly realized that the linguistic studies of lying revolve around the English verb *lie* (Peeters, 2018) and Grice's cooperative principle, both of which can be charged with a certain degree of Anglocentrism (Meibauer, 2014b). Different studies replicating Coleman and Kay's (1981) semantic analysis of the English verb *lie* confirmed the presence of prototype elements but to a varying degree and in different order of preference (see, for example, Hardin 2010 for Spanish culture). Similarly, the notion of intentionality central to many definitions of lying is completely absent in Maya Mopan Community (Danziger, 2010). A detailed discussion of these studies can be found in the subsequent sections. Here, it will suffice to say that arriving at a definition of deception (and lying) that accounts for all cross-cultural variations is not easy (Meibauer, 2017).

For the sake of theoretical economy, following the original IMT and IMT2, the current study adopts a functional definition of deception and maintains a methodological distinction between deception and lying. However, it is believed that in the theoretical discussion that follows, various senses of deception and lying are transposable and can be used interchangeably.

2.2 Lying and Truth as Philosophical Constructs

The earliest and terminologically the most intricate attempts to define lying and deception are found in the field of philosophy (Li & Yuan, 2020; Arico & Fallis, 2013). However, any discussion of lying hinges inevitably on the idea of truth. Lying and truth are part of the same package; mentioning one presupposes the presence of the other (Vincent Marrelli, 2004c). The following discussion treats truth and lying as two diametrically opposite but inextricably linked phenomena. The earlier part of this section briefly summarizes various theories of truth and tries to work out their relationship with lying. The latter part outlines philosophical attempts to define lying

in its own right.

The philosophy of language has long been concerned with the systematic relationship between meaning and truth, which makes the concept of truth a pivot point in the debate. Having said that, the concept of truth is notoriously tricky to pin down. Many philosophers doubt whether an all-embracing definition of truth can be given. The four main theories of truth: correspondence, coherence, pragmatics, and deflationary theories, define truth within their own scholarly traditions (Asghar, 2012) and deal with the question of truth from different perspectives with little common ground between them. The main tenets of these theories and their relationship with lying.

The Correspondence theory dating back to Plato, is the earliest known theory of truth. Plato defined truth as a statement corresponding to the fact or the way things are. (Glazenberg, 2006). According to correspondence theories, genuine assertions and beliefs reflect the actual state of affairs and human beings possess an intuitive ability to recognize the correspondence (Asghar,2012). Within the purview of the Correspondence theory, truth is the correspondence between language and mind-independent world. The theory offers a traditional model of truth which is based on realist beliefs that we can directly observe things as they are. Aristotle's definition of truth, "while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true" (as in Crivelli, 2004, p. 132), reflects the idea that our senses provide us a chance to have a direct awareness of reality. According to this theory, a statement becomes false only when a state of affairs related to the statement does not exist. Aristotle's assertion, "To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false" (as in Crivelli, 2004, p. 132), highlights the relationship between a truthful and false statement. Though philosophers have espoused the theory until recently, it has become unfollowable for the adherents of idealism who believe that there is no mind-independent reality. We only have a perception or awareness of real-world objects rather than their direct knowledge, which makes truth a correspondence between ideas of truth and ideas of the world. This philosophical position leads to the coherence theory of truth.

The coherence theory of truth states that "the truth of any (true) proposition consists in its coherence with some specified set of propositions" (Young, 2018, para.1). According to the proponents of coherence theory, "a set of beliefs is true if the beliefs are comprehensive, consistent, and do not contradict one another" (Asghar,

2012, p.296). Truth is not a close fit with reality, it is a close fit between an element and the whole system. Coherence theory acknowledges various systems of beliefs which can be invoked for the determination of truth. It also necessitates that the truth and its negation are determined based on a single system. Within this scholarly tradition, a statement is false if it fails to cohere with a system of other statements.

First propounded by Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, the Pragmatic theory of truth define truth as a statement that works. A proposition is true if it is useful or beneficial to believe (Chin, 2020). According to this theory, the ideas do not have any intrinsic significance and truth value (Asghr, 2012). The ideas must be evaluated as an end and not a means. According to pragmatists, facts are beliefs that result in the best "payoff," provide the best rationale for our actions and foster success. If a belief has no useful or pragmatic application in the world, it is not true.

The deflationary theory of truth is not a theory in the traditional sense. According to the theory, the search for truth is frustrating because it is looking for something that is not there. Truth is redundant and "there is no substantive property of truth to theorize about" (Asghar, 2012, pp.297-298). Truth and falsity are the properties of propositions and an explicitly stated proposition such as ''It is true that Caesar was murdered' means no more than that Caesar was murdered. Similarly, 'It is false that Caesar was murdered' means no more than Caesar was not murdered. These phrases are used only for emphasis or stylistic reasons (Armour-Garb et al., 1997).

Besides these theories, some other philosophers have tried to make lying their point of departure. A major part of these philosophical studies revolves around testing the theoretical soundness of various definitions of lying. The questions about the assertion of lies, warranting the truth, contextual relativity (Carson, 2012) and intentions and assumptions of the deceiver (Vincent Marrelli & Castelfranchi, 1981) make the task of arriving at an all-inclusive definition of lying exasperatingly challenging in the field of philosophy (Carson, 2012). Montaigne (1586) described the complexity of deception by calling it the opposite of the truth, having hundreds of faces and infinite fields (in Abel 2008). Many philosophers have attempted to surmount this complexity by appealing to paradigmatic instances of lying that are best described by definition (Arico & Fallis, 2013). Such philosophical debate about the examples and the counterexamples of lying falls outside the scope and space of the current review;

therefore, briefly summarizing some widely cited definitions would suffice. St. Augustine defines it as holding one opinion in mind and expressing another through verbal or any other form of manifestation (Augustine ca.A.D.395/1952). Fallis (2009) adopts a Gricean approach to lying and defines lying as an act of producing a believed-false statement only in the context in which the Gricean maxim of Quality "Try to make your contribution one that is true," is in effect (p.570). Vincent Marrelli and Castelfranchi (1981) arrive at a tentative definition of deception as a communicative act identified by the sender's goal to create a false assumption in the hearer. One implication of this goal-oriented definition is that even if what the sender believed to be false and intended to be false coincidentally ended up being consistent with the realities, the speaker still deceived the listener regarding his own convictions (Vincent Marrelli & Castelfranchi, 1981).

The definitions given above come from philosophical discussions of truth. As a pragmatic inquiry of culture, the study strictly eschews any circuitous discussion of these concepts found in the philosophy of language. It adopts a less formal and more functional approach towards truth, lying and deception. Furthermore, the study also concurs that there is no one-size-fits-all definition of these terms that applies to all cultures and contexts. The reliable definitions are not those that are pre-given but those that emerge after the pragmatic exploration of emic labels.

2.3 Taxonomy of Deception and Lying

Just like definitions, the taxonomies of deception and lying abound in deception literature. The researchers have proposed different classifications based on various criteria. The most commonly found classification is based on the potential beneficiary of the act of lying or deception (Arcimowicz et al., 2015). Lies can be categorized as self-serving lies or other-oriented lies, depending upon who is likely to benefit from the lies. The former is to shield or strengthen the liars psychologically, to protect the interests of the liars, or to evoke a specific emotional response desired by the liars, and the latter is to gain or protect the interests of others (DePaulo et al., 1996). Despite being widely cited, this typology is criticized for being too broad in nature. Moreover, in many situations, it is difficult to establish who the actual beneficiary of the lie is (Li & Yuan, 2020).

Researchers can also classify lies by using labels for the type of message. For example, Ekman (1982) notes two primary ways of lying: Concealing and Falsifying. McCornack (1992) also maintains a distinction between "falsification (asserting

information contradictory to the true information….) and omission (withholding all references to the relevant information)" (McCornack, 1992, p. 2). He further argues against dumping different types of information manipulation under the common label of distortion. Lapinski and Levine (2000), drawing on Turner, Edgley, and Olmstead (1975), also distinguishes between lies, exaggerations and diversionary responses. A deceptive message can be produced by adjusting information on two coordinates; truthfulness and degree of clarity. The message can range from true to false and from clear to equivocal depending upon the type of manipulation involved (Bavelas et al., 1990).

The psychological research on deception also distinguishes between high-stakes and low-stakes deception (DePaulo et al., 2003). High-stake lies occur in situations where the consequences of duplicity are very high for the liar. The liar can gain or lose important resources depending upon the success or failure to deceive (McCornack, 1992). Low-stake lies are easy lies in which the liar can easily get away with deception. Low-stake lying occurs when the degree of predictability is very high and planning time is sufficiently available. These everyday lies are sometimes based on socially acceptable normative responses (Harwood, 2014). Most of the empirical studies of lying study high-stake situations

The degree of social acceptability is another dimension in which deception can be categorized. Lies can range from socially consequential to socially acceptable lies (Pierce 2011), with a host of intermediate cases termed innocuous lies told to protect the hearer or speaker's face or for politeness concerns. Bryant (2008) differentiates between real lies (Socially unacceptable egoistic lies, motivated by malicious intent, showing complete disregard for reality), white lies (Socially acceptable, inconsequential lies lacking malicious motives), and grey lies (ambiguous in nature or similar to real lies, albeit justifiable) (Bryant, 2008). This classification is quite flexible and it is difficult to draw boundaries between socially acceptable and innocuous lies for all cultural contexts. For example, Meibauer (2014) considers prosocial lies to belong to three different categories: altruistic lies, lies told for self-defence and lies to protect privacy. From a cross-cultural perspective, it is a highly disputable contention because cultures differ in the premium placed on values like privacy and self-disclosure or guarding personal interest over the collective good.

Buller and Burgoon (1994) adopt the most inclusive approach to categorize

various types of lying. They base their classification on the liar's motive and divide lies into three broad categories: Instrumental motive, interpersonal motives and identity motives. Instrumental motives consist of lying motivated by personal needs like acquiring and maintaining resources and avoiding punishment and disapproval. Interpersonal motives include the lies told for initiating, maintaining or terminating social relationships. Identity lies are motivated by the need to protect the source's or target's face (Buller & Burgoon, 1994).

All these studies indicate that lying is not a homogenous construct in terms of the aspect of social appropriateness and degree of acceptability, with the central determinants being the stakes involved, the liar's motivation to deceive, the relationship between the deceiver and the target and who the benefitting person is (Dynel & Meibauer, 2016).

The current study registers this complexity and opts for a typology of deception which aligns across all these co-ordinates (benefit, manipulation type and deception motive). For empirical investigations of deception, the study maintains a distinction between self-benefitting instrumental, interpersonal or identity-based manipulations and other-benefitting instrumental, interpersonal or identity-based manipulation.

2.4 Traditional Deception Paradigm

Since this study advocates a non-traditional approach, it is important to briefly describe the theoretical assumptions and methodological techniques of the conventional paradigm that need to be addressed. The traditional research design, also called the cue-based approach, is built on three central presumptions about deception: Deception is ubiquitous and universal, humans are poor lie-detectors and when they lie, they often leak cues to make deception detection possible. In this section, all three aspects are discussed briefly one by one.

The ubiquity of deception is well documented. The prevalence of deception in everyday life is recognized in almost every study of naturally occurring deception (McCornack et al., 2014; Papantoniou, 2017; Yeung et al., 1999). Friedman and Weisel (2013) have quoted various studies that report the lying frequency of individuals statistically. For instance, an average person is found lying three times per day. Similarly, the results of self-report data reveal that an average American lies 1.65 times a day and an average British male would lie 42 times a week (Friedman & Weisel, 2013). Apart from the prevalence of deception, the universality of lying is also

acknowledged. All human beings intuitively understand what it means to lie and almost all documented languages have a term comparable to *lying* in definition (Peeters, 2018).

Despite the omnipresence of deception in everyday life, human beings are found to do poorly on deception detection tasks. The fact that the human ability to accurately detect lies is lower-bound or slightly better than the level of chance is one of the most consistent findings of deception research (Buller & Burgoon, 1994; Fitzpatrick et al., 2015; Papantoniou, 2017). The researchers have tried to seek multiple explanations for this notoriously bad performance in detecting lies successfully or accurately. The most commonly accepted explanation comes from the fact that people are truth-biased i.e., They are programmed to assume truthfulness and honesty as a default point of departure in the sense-making process (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Levine, 2014). Deception is a behaviour that is designed in a manner that escapes detection (Duran et al., 2010). There are only a few who cannot lie well and generally; most people are good at lying, which makes detecting lies exasperatingly challenging (Levine, 2010). It is evident from this discussion that to make up for this inaccuracy under normal conditions, there is a need for quick, efficient and reliable methods to detect deception in real-time.

The major contention that forms the spine of the traditional paradigm of deception research is called the Leakage Hypothesis. The Leakage Hypothesis postulates that certain channels of behaviour defy strategic control and tend to leak out during the act of deception (Ekman & Friesen, 1969). The idea dates back to Darwin, who believed that specific actions denoting emotional state evade our will to suppress them and get expressed involuntarily (Darwin, 1872). Freud also acknowledged how actions like fidgeting reveal betrayal, which is concealed through words (Freud, 1953).

Historically, there has been a common presumption about the deception that lies and truth involve two characteristically different production mechanisms and result in distinct verbal and non-verbal behaviour (McCornack et al., 2014). Ekman (1992) has demonstrated that liars experience myriads of negative emotions like fear, excitement, and guilt which truth-tellers do not. The moral qualms associated with the act of deceiving make it difficult for the liars to embrace their own deception. The guilt the liars may experience is translated in the ways in which they distance themselves from their statements (Picornell, 2001). Fear and anxiety associated with moral reprehension about lying and fear of getting detected make liars behave differently

from truth-tellers (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Ekman, 1992; Picornell, 2001; Vrij et al., 2010). The long and short of the argument is that the deceivers tend to leak cues making them available for an astute eye to observe and detect deception (DePaulo et al. 2003; Zuckerman et al. 1981).

Within this research strain, there is a pervasive assumption that lying causes an added cognitive load. The effort required to manufacture false information or make the lie believable makes lying cognitively more demanding than truth-telling (DePaulo et al., 2003; Picornell, 2001; Vrij et al., 2010). Psychological studies suggest that our mind is programmed for truth; our first unplanned, natural response that comes to mind is based on truth. As an evolutionary process, humans have acquired the ability to manipulate information but it comes with an added cost (Verschuere & Shalvi, 2014). Strongly correlated with the Leakage Hypothesis, the Cognitive Load Hypothesis also states the conditions which result in physiological or emotional arousal causing a characteristic bodily response or distinctive verbal and non-verbal behaviour which differs qualitatively and quantitatively from the baseline state when no deception is happening (Ekman, 1992; DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008). Owing to cognitive load, liars leak non-strategic cues that can be mapped to detect deception.

The fairly limited human capacity to detect lies, coupled with the fact that deception is rife in everyday life makes a strong case for devising methods to detect lies more systematically (Papantoniou, 2017). The traditional deception paradigm is built on designing cue-based deception detection methods and improving their accuracy in order to compensate for poor human performance on lie detection tasks (Kim, 2008). This line of inquiry is primarily concerned with high-stake situations in which deception can have serious social, economic or material repercussions. Globally, law enforcement agencies and intelligence services are becoming increasingly interested in adopting failsafe methods to detect deception (Gupta, 2007).

Under the umbrella of the deception detection model, two parallel lines of inquiry exist. On one side, a substantive body of literature tries to index the reliable cues to detect deception (Newman et al., 2003; Twitchell et al., 2004). The deception scholarship has focussed on finding non-verbal (e.g. Body posture, the degree of eye contact), paralinguistic (e.g., pauses, stress) and verbal (e.g., fewer self-references, negative emotion words) accompaniments of deceptive behaviour (Preston, 2016).

On the other side of deception detection research, there are expert-based

intensive analytic procedures like Statement Validity Assessment (SVA), Content-Based Criteria Analysis (CBCA), Reality Monitoring (Schafer, 2007) and Model Statement Lie Detection Technique (Vrij et al., 2018). The courts and law enforcement agencies are increasingly accepting these procedures as evidence to establish the veracity of the statements. For instance, the West German and other European courts have mandated using SVA to determine the credibility of the victim statements (Schafer, 2007). A significant part of this evidence is drawn from the linguistic profiling of the mendacious statements as indexed in deception studies. For instance, CBCA relies on 19 different criteria, out of which three are based on the quality and amount of the details revealed by the suspect (Abel, 2008), a phenomenon repeatedly addressed in deception detection studies.

With the advancement of Natural Language Processing and Computational Linguistics, there is a relatively recent trend to develop algorithms to automatize deception detection techniques. Based on linguistic markers of deceptive language, word-based stylometric analyses are performed to establish the veracity of the statements (Pérez-Rosas & Mihalcea, 2014). Pennebaker et al. (2001) have developed an empirical method called Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) to detect deception using 70 different semantic categories. The tool has gained the reputation of a tried and tested method and has been used in many seminal works in the field of deception (see Newman et al., 2003; Pérez-Rosas and Mihalcea, 2014; Zhou et al., 2004, for example). Apart from LIWC, other natural processing tools like Coh-Metrix (Duran et al., 2010) and grammar parsing trees (Pérez-Rosas & Mihalcea, 2014) have also been found useful in detecting deception.

The principal motivation to take the traditional paradigm in the loop of argument comes from the fact that the practitioners and law enforcement agencies rely mostly on this paradigm to draw forensic evidence in high-stake situations. The epithet *traditional* does not and shouldn't mean *obsolete* or *fallen out of use*. The approach has a far bigger practical, in- field presence than any other theoretical field of deception. The methodological soundness and scientific nature of inquiry make deception detection tools a good fit for situations that call for the active detection of deception. Various text analysis programmes based on the professed correlation between deception and language use are being heavily employed to automatize deception (Pennebaker et al., 2003). In the wake of increasing utility, it is important to sensitize these methods to the linguistic and cultural effects on lying and adopt a more culture-

relative way of studying deception.

2.4.1 Linguistic Indicia of Deception

Traditional deception scholarship has identified a strong correlation between deception and language use. Prolifically published literature in clinical and empirical studies of deception supports the evidence that the inner states and beliefs are reflected in the subtle changes in language use (Newman et al., 2003; Pennebaker et al., 2003). Social and psychological factors affect how language is used while deceiving others (Duran et al., 2010; Howard, 2018; Markowitz & Hancock, 2018). The effect goes well beyond the literal usage of the words and pays attention to how discourses are structured and organized (Duran et al., 2010). The way liars fit fabricated information into reality makes their language different from truth-teller (Howard, 2018).

A substantial body of deception literature is dedicated to making a comprehensive list of linguistic cues that can be used to detect deception. The linguistic features of deceptive statements are reported to be a more reliable measure of mendacious and deceitful statements than non-verbal cues (Dynel and Meibauer 2016; Lapinski and Levine 2000; Vrij 2008). A meta-analysis of 134 studies has confirmed that key linguistic features such as fewer self- references, increased negative emotions, more third-person pronouns, hedges and fewer exclusive words are characteristic of deceptive speech (DePaulo et al., 2003). While some of these cues unwittingly emerge as a consequence of emotional arousal, others are found to be paradoxically resulting from the deceiver's strategic choices to mitigate culpability.

Newman et al. (2003) describe three linguistic dimensions of deceptive speech. First, owing to the lack of immediacy and commitment to the deceptive statement, liars make fewer self-references (e.g., I, me, my). Using fewer self-references helps deceivers distance themselves from their statements and shifts the responsibility and agency away from the deceiver to someone else (Burgoon et al., 1996). Second, since liars experience myriads of negative emotions like fear, guilt or anxiety, their state of mind is reflected through patterns of language use. Liars use more negative emotion words (e.g., hate, angry, etc.) and more negations in their speech (DePaulo et al., 2003; Picornell, 2001). Finally, creating a fabricated account requires additional cognitive resources that modify how liars tell their stories. Liars tell less complex stories; their stories lack motion verbs and personal evaluation of the events and objects (Newman et al., 2003).

Liars are also reported to produce less detailed responses and avoid incriminating details (Vrij et al., 2018; Vrij & Vrij, 2020). Since manufacturing more detailed stories invite greater responsibility to prove them and increases the risk of being detected, liars prefer to keep their responses short (Burgoon et al., 1996). Researchers predict that computing words per conversation can be a reliable measure to distinguish between truthful and deceitful accounts. Various empirical studies have proven that liars use fewer words and offer fewer details than truth-tellers (DePaulo et al., 2003; Hancock et al., 2008). Stories derived from the actually experienced event also include more sensory and contextual details than stories based on an imagined or manufactured event. (Hancock et al., 2008; Picornell, 2001).

These linguistic cues have been tested in various contexts and collectively, they are found to be moderate predictors of deception. However, the findings concerning each of these cues are quite inconclusive and contradictory (Dynel & Meibauer, 2016; Toma et al., 2008). The linguistic correlates of deception in one setting do not necessarily hold for deception in another setting (Duran et al., 2010; Zhou et al., 2004). For example, the pattern of self-reference varies across contexts. Liars use fewer self-references in expressing their opinions (Newman et al., 2003), while in situations like writing fake reviews, liars tend to use more self-reference than truth-tellers. The effect is moderated by several factors, including event type, type of interaction, motivation to lie, mode of interaction and valence of deception. (Markowitz & Hancock, 2018).

Another variable that probably has the most definitive effect on any communicative behaviour, including deception, is the culture that has remained underplayed in deception detection research for a long time. Consequently, deception researchers have recently focussed on the long-due acknowledgement of the role of culture in perceiving and detecting deception.

2.5 Current State of Theory in Deception Research

Until recently, researchers have lamented the lack of viable theory that can explain the observable characteristics of deception. For a very long time, the deception scholarship has remained beholden to what Levine and McCornack (2014) call the variable-analytic approach to answering narrow empirical questions. The earliest theories of deception started emerging at the turn of the century when researchers shifted their gaze from the uncontrollable and low-awareness cognitive processes that triggered non-strategic cues to the planned and strategic management of communication during

deception (see Buller and Burgoon 1994).

2.5.1 Interpersonal Deception Theory

Propounded by Buller and Burgoon (1996), interpersonal deception theory (IDT henceforth) is based on a copious set of empirically testifiable propositions about the nature of interpersonal communication and deception (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). Rather than embracing the extant understanding of deception uncritically, the theory builds on it from the perspective of interpersonal communication. IDT views interpersonal communication as a complex and cognitively demanding process requiring interactants to concurrently attend to several perceptual, behavioural and cognitive tasks. It is also a dynamic activity that evolves over time as the communication proceeds and communicators receive feedback, understand context and change topics.

Each interaction is affected by several proximal factors or contextual antecedents that can possibly modify the judgement about deception. There are many factors, including but not limited to: the degree of familiarity between the interactants, the goal of communication, pre- deception behaviour familiarity, the affective relationship between the interlocutors, personality traits of the communicators, pre-deception honesty expectations and evaluation of communicative norms. The entire process of interpersonal communication is organized under certain foundational principles comprising social norms and expectations. The communicators enter into an interaction with preconceived ideas about how the others will act and why. One of the most widely held presumptions about others is that people are routinely honest and truthful (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). People base their judgment about deception on schemata constituted by general normative expectations about being truthful and any other specific information about the individual conduct of the sender.

According to IDT, a single deceptive message can have multiple goals depending upon the degree of harm or benefit the act of deception brings to the sender, receiver or a third party. For example, a sycophantic white lie may be told to protect one's face, gain social approval or personal favour and maintain the relationship between communicators. People may opt for deception to accomplish the goals like protecting self, acquiring instrumental benefits, preserving relationships or lubricating conversations. Atop the usual communication goals, during deception, the deceiver has to be alert and alive to multiple channels and guard against the danger of raising suspicions, which adds additional complexity to the routinely performed interactions.

Deception is cognitively more effortful than honest communication because the sender has to make additional efforts to bolster the verisimilitude of their main message (Buller and Burgoon 1996). This effort can result in some inadvertent behavioural clues that promulgate deceptive intent. However, here caution is in order; IDT does not consider deception always more cognitively demanding than truth and acknowledges that the truth can demand more cognitive resources than deception under certain contextual conditions.

Based on this assumption about the cognitive complexity of deception translating into inadvertent behaviour, which IDT foregrounds, Levine and McCornack (2014b) call IDT a cue-based theory. They believe that the theory heralded the shifted focus mediated forms of communication to face-to-face communication and the difference between the two (Levine & McCornack, 2014b). Other studies working within the IDT paradigm also found that as lie involves at least two people, each communicative situation in which lying occurs invites a unique style of communication, based on the contextual factors and the relationship dynamics of the communicators (Markowitz & Hancock, 2018).

2.5.2 Truth Default Theory

Levin's (2014) Truth Default Theory (TDT henceforth) is the theory of accuracy in veracity judgment. Instead of making deception its focal point, it centres its discussion around the robust existence of truth and truth-bias (Van Swol, 2014). Very much like IDT, it takes the truth-bias as the default assumption about human communication; people tend to assume that what people say is true by default. The idea is similar to Harwood's (2014) proposition that we are designed to tell the truth most of the time and truth comes to us more naturally than deception (Harwood, 2014). Levine (2014) acknowledges that the presumption about truth- bias is not unique to IDT and the phenomenon is repeatedly attested by other researchers (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Zuckerman et al., 1981). What is new to IDT is the speculations on the nature of truth-bias and its role in human communication.

Truth default position aids communication by enhancing efficiency and mutual cooperation. However, such presumption of honesty increases human susceptibility to occasional deceit and makes people more prone to judgement error. Previous theories of truth- bias consider truth-bias as an impediment to developing correct belief states. The truth-bias results in flawed judgment and compromised accuracy in detecting on-line deception. IDT eschews this position and states conditions in which truth-bias can

actually enhance accuracy in credibility assessment. Since, in real-life situations, the percentage of occurrence of honest communication has been much higher than deceptive communication, the judgments based on truth-bias are correct most of the time. The attention to demeanour cues divulging deception pushes the level of accuracy down towards the level of chance. Deception detection is not the primary goal of interpersonal communication. Communicators are oriented towards successful and efficient communication; misplaced suspicions can interfere with interaction goals. Truth-bias is functionally adaptive because it enables the communicators to achieve this goal of efficient and successful communication. Deception detection accuracy can be increased by comparing what is said with what is known about the facts thus far. There are occasions in which people suspend the truth-default position and create suspicions of lie triggered by a number of contextual events; "when others have an obvious motive for deception, when they lack an honest demeanour, when they are primed to expect deception by third parties, or when the communication content appears either self-contradictory or inconsistent with known facts" (Levine, 2014, p. 390). In order to improve the accuracy of judgment, contextual clues about the content can be sought.

TDT is developed abductively and can be categorized as one of the only two known non-cues theories, the other being Information Manipulation Theory. Since IDT does not eschew the systematic differences between honest and deceptive non-verbal behaviour, its empirical focus lies in increasing detection accuracy by looking for contextual evidence (Levine & McCornack, 2014b). TDT is designed from the receiver's perspective and studies what can be done on the receiver's part to improve the judgment accuracy (Levine & McCornack, 2014a). The receiver should focus on content in the context which shapes our view about what is possible, normal or plausible in a given situation (Markowitz & Hancock, 2018).

Recent studies have found evidence for TDT. Van Swol (2014) links TDT with the research on the early socialization of children. Since children receive repeated instructions about deception being a socially inappropriate response, they are likely to shun deception as a less efficient, problematic option. As humans develop their interactional repertoire, they start viewing deception as incongruent with their interactional goals (Van Swol, 2014). TDT can also be applied in the field of Politics and Finance to derive idiosyncratic information about the content in context (Markowitz & Hancock, 2018).

2.5.3 Information Manipulation Theory

A detailed discussion of Original Information Manipulation Theory (IMT henceforth) and Information Manipulation Theory 2 (IMT2) can be found in the theoretical framework section; however, a brief overview would be pertinent to the ongoing discussion. The most noteworthy discussion of linguistic and pragmatic features of deception (Oswald et al., 2016) comes from the theory of deceptive message design. IMT (McCornack et al., 1992) and IMT2 (McCornack et al., 2014) take into account the communicative nature of lying and make a theoretical move towards viewing deception and lying as a tool towards efficient communication (McCornack et al., 2014). IMT is concerned with deceitful discourse produced by manipulating Gricean Maxims at various levels and views deception as an uncooperative counterpart of the Gricean Cooperative Principle. According to IMT, deception is generated through covert violation of one or more Gricean Maxims that guide the interlocutor's expectation about cooperative behaviour. IMT views deception as arising not only from falsification of information (quality violation) but also from varying the amount of information to be revealed (quantity violation), choosing to be evasive (relevance violation) or using equivocal or ambiguous statements (manner violation) (McCornack et al., 1992).

2.5.4 Contextual Organization of Language and Deception Framework

The contextual Organization of Language and Deception (COLD) framework, proposed by Markowitz and Hancock (2018), is the recent framework of deception detection, which takes into account a full-blown concept of context. This approach is appreciable for integrating linguistic, communication studies and psychology to recognise how context affects the language of a deceptive message. The COLD framework identifies at least three contextual factors germane to any deception; the psychological dimensions of lying, including cognitive and emotive content, the pragmatic dimensions that define what the speaker is set out to achieve, and the communication norms within which deception takes place.

The pragmatic goals of the speaker include an immediate reason to modify the hearer's belief and the motivation to sustain the primary reason. The speaker chooses a linguistic form that matches with their primary reason and as the goals or reasons for lying diversify, so do the various linguistic manifestations of such goals. The framework explains the inconsistency found between the linguistic cues of deception

by linking the liar's motivation and goals with the diversity of linguistic representation.

The influence of deception on the language is mediated by the genre or the discourse community of the speaker. Each genre sets certain limitations on how the conversation rolls. Then these "genre-normative language features" are further altered by any intention to deceive (Markowitz & Hancock, 2018, p. 202). For example, the community conventions about using the first-person pronoun in political speech and a scientific report are entirely different. Therefore, the effect of deception on the language in these two domains will also lack supra- genre robustness.

Modern theories are now more contextual, more communication-oriented and more language-focussed. One feature common to all these theories is the growing reliance on the linguistic or more particularly, the pragmatic features of deception. Since the linguistic nature of deception has finally been acknowledged, it would be apt to see what linguistic proper has to offer about the nature of lying.

2.6 Cultural Moderators of Linguistic Correlates of Deceit

The putative nature of linguistic correlates of deception has been acknowledged elsewhere; however, there are few considerations about the role of cultural moderators. Deception, norms and expectations are found closely related. Since truth-telling is considered unrehearsed, automated (Spence et al., 2004) and a default mode of behaviour (Levine et al., 2014), it is expected to be constructed within the limits of a normative set of responses. Notwithstanding, normative behaviours are culturally and socially determined and are by no means set in stone. The difference in baseline behaviour directly influences the way deceptive behaviour is perceived and detected. Despite being located in North American settings, the findings are taken as possessing universal diagnostic (Enos, 2012; Kim, 1994; Leal et al., 2018; Taylor et al., 2014). For example, findings that deceptive speech has fewer self-references and an increased affect quotient (Zhou et al., 2004) presuppose that all cultures consider self-enhancement and emotion regulation a desirable speech behaviour. It is not difficult to establish that self-enhancement is an Anglo concept and many Asian/collectivist cultures operate on the principle of self-effacement (Wierzbicka, 1996), which is likely to affect the use of personal pronouns in quantitative as well as qualitative ways. Similarly, considering the emotions as antagonistic to the goal of rational thinking is another Anglo concern that emphasizes strict control by downplaying the emotional experience (Wierzbicka, 1994). Other cultures may pose different expectations about up/down-regulation of emotions (Miyamoto and Ma, 2011) in their baseline speech

and, consequently, in deceptive speech. Moreover, the weight a culture puts on experiencing emotion and on deception can modify how one experiences emotions while deceiving (Abel, 2008). However, these facts remain largely ignored and traditional deception studies work on the implicit assumption that variance introduced by culture is irrelevant and deception cues are consistent across cultures (Taylor et al., 2014)

The research on cross-cultural cues of deception is very sparse, with the noteworthy exception of the works of Taylor and Leal (Leal et al., 2018; Taylor et al., 2014, 2017). The evidence that has been accumulated through this sparse line of inquiry studies deception cues as a function of cultural dimensions. Taylor et al. (2014, 2017) have demonstrated that the linguistic correlates of deception show considerable variability across cultures. By examining several cultural groups, including Pakistani, Arab, White British and White European participants, they discover that the linguistic cues are culturally contingent. For example, increased use of negation is correlated with deceit in Pakistani and Arab culture but not for North African and white British participants. Similarly, the detailed spatial description is indicative of deception in Pakistani and African culture while indicative of honesty in Arab and white British participants (Taylor et al., 2014). People's recall patterns are influenced by the kind of information that is stored in semantic memory. For anyone from an individualistic culture, the perceptual details experienced by an individual are a more salient part of their memory than a person from a collectivist culture who views things from the perspective of social interconnectedness and mutual relationships. This cultural preference can affect the recall pattern of people from different cultures (Taylor et al., 2014). The cultural effects also moderate self-reference. It is observed that the white British participants used the least possible self-references during deception. At the same time, the North African population increased the use of self-reference to a great extent, with other cultural groups falling in the middle (Taylor et al., 2017).

2.7 The Departure from the Traditional Approach: Moving Forward

Several meta-analyses have proven that the field is rife with inconsistent findings and contradictory results. As the counterevidence has accumulated, the initial findings of cue-based deception studies are getting weaker and weaker. The situation calls for a systematic and theoretical explanation of the gap existing between theoretical predictions and empirical findings. Levine and McCornack (2014b) invite attention to at least three factors of the traditional paradigm. First, the heterogeneity and

inconsistency of results merit some serious consideration. The research has failed to find a reliable set of deception indicators. The portended differences between honest and deceptive communication are not only small but also heterogeneous across studies. Second, the paradigm fails to suggest techniques or methods improve deception detection accuracy. Regardless of the extensive training backed by years of research, the deception detection accuracy still hovers slightly above the level of chance. Third, there should be some plausible explanation for the robust nature of truth-bias (Levine & McCornack, 2014b).

McCornack (1997) has pointed out a few other caveats in the traditional paradigm. For a considerable period, prior cue-based theories of deception have relied on intuitive but empirically questionable assumptions. The first and foremost is that the deceivers build the lie from scratch and, in doing so, feel the additional cognitive load and emotional arousal, which leaks in the form of behavioural cues (McCornack, 1997). The fact does not fit comfortably with the observed ubiquity of deceptive communication: How can something cognitively so complex be so frequently present in everyday discourse? Levine and McCornack (2014) debunk this myth of lying being more complex than truth-telling by a simple anecdotal example. If someone is asked to describe a day from the distant past, it is far easier for them to fabricate the lie than to sift their long-term memory to come up with a coherent narrative. If lying was always more effortful than truth-telling, we could expect lies to be always characterised by disfluency and response latency but DePaulo et al.'s (2003) metanalysis shows that this is not the case. It is the context of communication that determines if lying is cognitively more demanding or not and it is not difficult to imagine situations where truth-telling is more challenging than readily available lies derived from working memory (Levine & McCornack, 2014b).

Another shift that the deception scholarship observed was the focus on everyday lying. Instead of viewing lying as a high-stake, conflict-ridden, cognitively complex phenomenon, recent studies focus on lying as a ubiquitous, successful, casual and low-stakes affair (McCornack, 1997). Lying and deception are inextricably intertwined with our social interactions and it is difficult to imagine our communication without a dash of harmless lies and polite courtesies (Abel, 2008). Everyday lies are small, insignificant and unplanned (Kim, 2008), involving low to no stake situations that do not induce any distress or discomfort among deceivers (Harwood, 2014). Cue-

based research applies only to high-stake situations and fails to attend to every day lying, which is successful to the extent of going undetected (Park et al., 2002). Levine et al. (2006) have studied the effect of rigorous training in detecting lies and found negligible differences between extensive, bogus and no training settings. The findings prove that detection accuracy is independent of training content based on behavioural correlates of deception (Levine et al., 2006).

The growing dissatisfaction with the traditional paradigm evoked the need to part ways with old theoretical assumptions and focus on observable characteristics of deception (Levine and McCornack 2014; McCornack 1997). Deception research is now more attuned to studying deceptive message design than behavioural cues to deception detection (Kim, 2008).

2.8 Deception at Semantic/Pragmatic Interface

Though some forms of deception rely on non-verbal manifestations, lying is inexorably linked to language. In a recent article, Dor (2017) argues that lying and language co-evolved over the course of human history. The human capacity to deceive improved significantly with the emergence of language. On the other side, lying as a communicative phenomenon has far-reaching effects on how language operates in society. Without lying, communication would have been much simpler, cognitively less challenging and potentially less useful or relevant in shaping our relationships within social communities (Dor, 2017). The most vociferous projection of the linguistic nature of lying is found in the works of German Linguist Jörg Meibauer. Meibauer (2018) has established that lying has distinctive features at all linguistic levels. There are certain prosodic features associated with lying. For example, deception research has identified certain suprasegmental features like speech rate, high-pitched voice and frequency and length of pause related to lying. The nature of lying also begs the vexed question of the syntax of lying i.e., What sentence types can be used to construct a lie. Meibauer (2018) challenges the traditional assumption that lying being an insincere assertion, is syntactically bound to a declarative sentence. He empirically shows that certain other sentence types like non-restrictive relative clauses, exclamations and conditional can also be used for lying (Meibauer 2018).

Apart from the general propositions about the linguistic explorations of the phenomenon of lying, what counts as the central premise of Meibauer's theoretical position is locating lying at the semantic and pragmatic interface. Meibauer (2011) proposes that "lying as an object of linguistic study should be firmly settled in linguistic

pragmatics, or, more precisely, in the semantics/pragmatics interface" (Meibauer, 2011, p. 278). Lying as a false statement is linked with truth and truth-condition, which are direct subjects of truth-conditional semantics. Nevertheless, lying is also a speech act that is reliant on a host of contextual antecedents, which clearly has to do with the pragmatic domain (Meibauer, 2011, 2014b). There are at least two ways in which lying can be modelled from the pragmatic perspective; speech act theory and implicature theory. Both theories have the potential to act as complementary approaches to complete the pragmatic picture of lying (Meibauer, 2017). Lying as a speech act of assertion involves the notion of honesty and commitment, both of which involve taking responsibility for what one has asserted (Meibauer, 2014b). On the other side, implicature theory is based on Grice's Quality maxim which requires one only to say what is truthful and avoid saying something which lacks sufficient evidence (Meibauer, 2014b, 2017). By using implicature theory, it can be explained that literal falsehood is not an essential condition to lie; one can also lie by creating false implicature (Meibauer, 2005).

Prior to Meibauer, some other scholars have explicitly submitted the case of lying as a linguistic phenomenon. Bolinger (1973) observed that truth is the most fundamental question in human communication and the non-concealment of information is a prerequisite for successful human interaction. The "Non-concealment" principle not only rules out the permissibility of propositional lies but also all other forms of deceptions. (Bolinger, 1973, p.539). Such broad conceptualization of lying makes it an object of linguistic inquiry. Vincent Marrelli and Castelfranchi (1981) have also noted the pragmatic nature of lying. They establish that deceptiveness and mendacity are not part of sentence meaning but of utterance meaning. Lying as a deceptive act can only be explained by analyzing it with reference to the speaker's goal. As pragmatics is believed to link the adequacy of a linguistic act with its effects, it is best suited to study lying and mendacity (Vincent Marrelli & Castelfranchi, 1981). Vincent Marrelli (2004a) lists various studies that mainly rely on essential pragmatic toolkits (Speech act theory, Gricean CP, Implicature and Conversation analysis) to study deception. The centrality of the notions of sincerity and truthfulness in all such approaches makes them relevant for the study of lying and deception (Vincent Marrelli, 2004a).

Dynel and Meibauer (2016) also submit that lying is appropriate for pragmatic inquiry almost on similar grounds. However, they also base their recommendations on

appealing to the eclectic nature of linguistic pragmatics, which naturally draws on various other disciplines and fields of study. Pragmatics, as a heterogeneous field of study, has the potential to fit the discussion of lying in the broader debate.

The recommendations of the linguists mentioned earlier have certain implications for future linguistic studies of deception. So far, the linguistic analyses of deception have principally relied on equating lying with deception and defining lying as untruth. Lying is deceptive does not entail that all deceptions are essentially lies (Meibauer, 2005). The pragmatic view suggests that lying can also be carried out by telling the truth (Vincent Marrelli & Castelfranchi, 1981). The goal of misleading can be accomplished by adopting various linguistic forms which can be true at the statement level but deceptive at the utterance level. Some communication approaches have tried to resolve this complexity by situating deception in the Gricean Paradigm.

2.8.1 Semantic and Pragmatic Studies of Lying

Even though the ubiquity of lying in daily life has been firmly established, social sciences in general (Barnes, 2009) and linguistics (Meibauer, 2018) in particular have shown a long-standing reluctance to embrace lying as an object of inquiry. More specifically, despite being a semantic and a pragmatic notion (Meibauer, 2016; Vincent Marrelli & Castelfranchi, 1981), Semantics and Pragmatics have shown a disinclination to embrace lying and deception as a primary object of inquiry (Meibauer, 2018). With a notable exception of the body of literature that exists in Philosophy of Language dealing with the concept of lying (Carson, 2009; Fallis, 2013 & Dynel &Meibauer, 2016, for example) and a few linguistic analyses of lying in the late twentieth (Hardin,2010), the subject of lying is mentioned in passing in studies focussing on other issues (Vincent Marrelli, 2004a). Only a few analyses deal with lying from the linguistic point of view (Meibauer, 2018), and even fewer have been empirically tested (Galasiński, 2000). The linguistic profile of lying is still not complete (Meibauer, 2011). Furthermore, everyday conversations can either be cooperative or uncooperative and the researchers have agreed on the prevalence of non-cooperative communication in our daily lives (Oswald et al., 2016). However, lying as the most prototypical form of uncooperative communication remains an under-studied area. It is only recently that we have started seeing the flurry of publications that investigate lying at the semantics/pragmatics interface (Peeters, 2018)

This section covers what is known so far about the semantics and pragmatics of lying and deception. However, it is difficult to disentangle the concept of

truthfulness from any such discussion. Lying and truth are part of the same package; mentioning one presupposes the presence of the other (Vincent Marrelli, 2004c). The ensuing discussion inevitably swings back and forth between truthfulness and deception as two diametrically opposite but inextricably linked phenomena.

The scholarly interest in lying within the field of philosophy of language dates back to ancient times. A major part of the philosophical studies of lying revolve around testing the theoretical soundness of the definitions of lying. A theoretical corollary of this tradition is found in the field of semantics which tries to capture language users' appraisal of what lying means. This strand tries to explicate the metapragmatic understanding of emic labels used to denote lying (Dynel and Meibauer, 2016).

 In their classical study, Coleman and Kay (1981) try to elucidate the meaning associated with the English verb *lie* in American English. They adopt a prototype approach that emphasizes the blurred boundaries between semantic categories. According to them, the applicability of a certain word to a category is a matter of degree and not a yes or no question. There is no definitive set of necessary conditions that define lying. Instead, there are prototype elements or lying parameters that lying consists of. A good or prototypical lie comprises of three basic features: The prototypical lie is characterized by" (a) falsehood, which is (b) deliberate and (c) intends to deceive" (Coleman & Kay, 1981, p. 28). These elements are scalar in nature and can be more or less present in different instances. The satisfaction of each element does not contribute equally towards the degree of membership. Utterances lacking any of the prototype elements will still be categorized as lies, however, of a lesser degree. To test this definition, they designed a questionnaire based on eight different hypothetical stories, each containing one, two or all of the prototypical elements in various compositions. They asked the participants to rate the lies in each scenario on a numerical scale. The findings revealed the presence of prototype elements in hierarchical order: the falsity of the belief being the most prominent one followed by the deceptive intent. The factual falsity of the utterance was found to be the least important element of prototype lying. The findings also confirmed the hypothesis that the scenario containing all prototypical elements would receive the highest lying score.

The presence of deceptive intent as a sufficient condition for lying is challenged by some compelling counterevidence from situations where the speaker goes on record and opts for bald-faced lies (Arico & Fallis, 2013; Carson, 2012; Marsili, 2016). Marsili (2016) tried to address this caveat by removing Condition 'c' from Cole and Kay's

classical definition and extended lying to illocutionary acts of assertion. Only a genuinely asserted proposition that the speaker believes to be false can constitute a lie proper (Marsili, 2016). Marsili's definition can be extended to other speech acts executed by explicit performatives. He formally and successfully calculates the possibility of the speech act of promising as lying by entailing assertion.

Wierzbicka (1990, 2006) presents an explicated account of English lie by using accredited Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM), a collection of semantic primes free from linguistic bias. Apart from the intention to deceive, she includes an evaluation of lying to the meaning of the verb in an earlier version (1990) but later drops it in the improved version (2006). Her final explication of the lie is as follows:

> When X said it X was lying
>
> X said something like this: "I want you to know that Z" to
>
> someone X knew that Z was not true
>
> X wanted this someone to think that Z was true. (Wierzbicka, 2006, p. 45)

Pragmatics as a discipline is reliant on interdisciplinary insights about the meaning-making process. The question of truthfulness is salient to both theoretical and experimental pragmatics (Vincent Marrelli, 2004c). Theoretically, Grice's cooperative principle seeks to explain communication as a vehicle for exchanging information. Cooperative communication is the one that is truthful, relevant and perspicuous and adheres to the principle of quantity. While describing cooperativeness, Grice (1975) mentions that any furtive violation of the maxims is directly interpretable in terms of deception. Researchers in the field of communication describe deception in Gricean terms (McCornack, 1992; McCornack et al., 2014). Any message that fails to observe Gricean maxims without making it manifest to the audience is characterized by deception. The fact has stirred scholarly interest in the pragmatic aspects of deception.

Chen et al. (2013) take this notion forward and propose the pragmatic definition of lying by bringing in the context along three different dimensions: The concealment continuum, the self-benefit continuum and the other-benefit continuum. They try to reconcile two extreme positions about morally irreprehensible forms of lying by taking recourse to the gradient or scalar nature of lying. A socially sanctioned lie is a *lie* but to a lesser degree. Their findings confirm the scalar nature of lying and reveal that the lie-likeness of a statement is affected by the fact if the lie is well-meaning or self-serving (Chen et al., 2013). Chen et al.'s (2013) study is so far, the most comprehensive

account of lying from the perspective of experimental pragmatics. However, the study only focuses on prototypical bald-faced lying and does not take into account other types of information management.

2.9 Deception, Language and Culture

The etymology of the modern concept of 'culture' dates back to classical antiquity. The ancient Roman orator Cicero used the term "cultura animi" to refer to the development of the philosophical soul which is considered the highest possible form of natural human development (Wahr, 2000, para.2). Since the Roman Age, the original meaning of the word has been abstracted towards the social context of human societies. Despite the prevalent use of the word in humanities and social sciences, defining culture and deciding on its constituent components is not an easy task. Acknowledging the inadequacy of all definitions in one way or the other, Spencer-Oatey (2008) defines culture as

> A fuzzy set of basic assumptions and values, orientations to life, beliefs, policies, procedures and behavioural conventions that are shared by a group of people, and that influence (but do not determine) each member's behaviour and his/her interpretations of the 'meaning' of other people's behaviour. (p. 3)

In the 20th century, culture emerged as a key concept in humanities and social sciences. There has been a well-documented cultural turn in linguistics that calls attention to the centrality of culture in encoding human experience. Culture has a decisive effect on all the facets of human life (Hall & Peters, 1987), including cognitive factors that underline how people think (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Culture and deception are intertwined inextricably. It has been empirically established that cultural norms, when activated, influence the way people behave (Arcimowicz et al., 2015).

Nevertheless, until the turn of the century, the deception scholarship remained marked by facile generalizations based on American and British subjects referred to as people in general (Vincent Marrelli, 2004a). With the growing sensitivity towards cross-cultural variation, the observations about the correlations between deception cues and cultural moderators invited researchers to the broader interaction between cultural dimensions and the way deception is perceived or practised. The diversity of cues across cultures is only one demonstration of the effects of culture and there are several other ways in which cultural values interact with deception to produce variegated results. Just like deception detection research, the research on deceptive message

design ensued in the West, predominantly in North America and took the Anglo-American model of communication as a natural, neutral and default mode of human interaction and appeared to disregard non-Western understanding of deceptive communication (Lapinski & Levine, 2000; Yeung et al., 1999). Cultural norms and social values cast their deterministic influence on how speech patterns are evaluated and used in social interaction. Any discussion of lying as an instance of interpersonal (uncooperative) communication should be couched in the discussion of culture.

It is challenging to tease apart or detangle various aspects of cultures that affect the moral perception and beliefs about deception and lying. Nevertheless, the study tries to isolate a few prominent stimuli and treats them as distinct yet mutually related predictors of cultural variation found in the perception and production of deceptive messages.

2.9.1 Cultural Dimensions and Deception

The most widely studied causes of cross-cultural differences in perception and production of deception are based on various cultural dimensions. The resultant influence of these cultural dimensions creates an expectation about the norms of interaction, which drives our judgment about social (un)acceptability of the act of lying and deceiving and informs how social actors construct deception.

The most common way of distinguishing between cultures is Hall's (1980) individualism and collectivism dimension (Yeung et al., 1999). The differences observed in deception research mainly arise from the fact that individualist and collectivist cultures have different expectations about self-construal (Kim, 2008; Lapinski & Levine, 2000). An independent self-construal that prevails in individualistic cultures considers an individual an autonomous social actor whose actions are guided by their internal thoughts and feelings. In an individualistic culture, self-maintenance is motivated by protecting and defending the individual identity and being consistent in one's beliefs and expressions. To express one's identity, there should be a close correspondence between the spoken words and one's internal feelings, regardless of the social consequences it can involve (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

On the contrary, collectivist cultures pose a different set of expectations which are based on maintaining socially harmonious relationships and attending to the group needs. Such expectations result in interdependent self-construal, which does not set any

strict requirement to maintain consistency in one's thoughts and actions, specifically when one's social goal comes in competition with honest expression (Lapinski & Levine, 2000). This expectation about consistency can cause more distress and less motivation associated with deceptive behaviour for the individualistic cultural dimension.

In comparison, when an individual with interdependent self-construal is faced with competing goals, there is an increased motivation to use deception as a strategy to maintain social order. Moreover, the absence of a strict requirement for consistency coupled with the cultural preference to maintain a trouble-free relationship makes deception less condemnable for an individual with a collectivist orientation. The guilt associated with deception is expected to remain remarkably low if deception is viewed as a socially operative strategy than a self-motivated activity (Kim, 2008).

The high-context/low-context dimension is based on the context in which communication occurs. Hall (1976) finds a correlation between communication style and the degree of social dependence. People in low-context cultures view themselves as self-governing, autonomous and independent individuals (Hall, 1976). One corollary of such conceptualization is a more explicit and direct style of communicating information. In low-context Western cultures, the message's conciseness, accuracy and clarity are greatly appreciated. The content of the message is exclusively dependent on the words used to convey that message. The verbal message is considered superior to the non-verbal code (Kwiatkowska, 2015).

In contrast, in high-context cultures, like far Eastern countries, the individuals are more community-oriented. Social harmony and group relations take precedence over individual feelings and opinions. (Beune et al., 2010). Such group-based orientation results in communication being more indirect and evasive. A significant part of the message is derived from non-verbal means like facial expressions, silence and tone calibrations. Words are not considered necessary for communication and sometimes interfere with the meaning (Kwiatkowska, 2015)

The third distinction between cultures mentioned in deception literature is the femininity vs. masculinity divide. Hall (1980) defines masculinity as a social construct that encodes a social disposition to protect personal goals and gain social recognition by making more wealth and acquiring social status. In contrast, femininity is characterized by nurturing relationships, even at personal expense. As a cultural

dimension, the competitive and self-assertive nature of masculinity predisposes individuals to indulge in deception to ensure personal gains (Pierce, 2011). Lewis and Sarni's (1993) portrayal of non-Western, non-industrialized societies does not mention the masculinity and femininity distinction; however, the key features of these societies are clearly indicative of the masculinity dimension. People in these cultures use deception as a means to maintain aggressive dominance and gain and protect resources like food, goods and desirable mates. Deception in these cultures serves as a social strategy to make oneself appear less fortunate in the eyes of others so that their good fortunes are protected from the envy of others (Lewis & Saarni, 1993). The effect of this cultural allowance is reduced guilt and anxiety associated with deceptive behaviour. In the absence of guilt, the linguistic cues that are considered a non-strategic outcome of self-arousal are not likely to emerge (Kim, 2008).

2.9.2 Morality of Lying and Cultures

The degree of acceptance or condemnation that the act of lying receives is greatly reliant on the moral system followed in the society. Some cultures use the stricter criterion to judge the phenomena of deception, while others find it less abominable (Abel, 2008). Apart from the overall judgment about lying as a monolithic phenomenon, there is a universal acknowledgement that there are certain types of lies that are socially sanctioned and some others that are abhorred. All cultures seem to differentiate between ethically wrong and adaptive forms of deception, which determine the degree of approval and condemnation a deceptive act would meet in a given context (Lewis & Saarni, 1993). All societies also appear to recognize the danger associated with promiscuous lying and pose certain expectations about the degree to which such loose use of language should be checked or made permissible (Blum, 2005).

Since most of the studies that explore the phenomena of lying are conducted in Western cultures, it is important to explore various schools of thought that shape Western moral philosophy. The concept of truth has been central to Western philosophy. A philosophical exploration of truth has a very ancient pedigree in Western thought, dating back to Aristotle (Vincent Marrelli, 2003). Explaining the meaning-making process always begs the question of how it relates to the truth. However, the influences on Western Philosophy are diverse and thinkers and philosophers are divided between absolutist or relativist positions about lying (Friedman & Weisel, 2013).

The Absolutist view proscribes lying under all conditions. Aristotle, St. Augustine and Kant are three leading exponents of the Absolutist camp. Aristotle, in his *Ethics* appears to hold an absolutist position about lying and prevarication and associates equal condemnation for all kinds of lies. For him, lying is prohibited in all forms, under all conditions. In his essay On Lying, St Augustine goes to the extent of banishing lies to save someone's life. He poses a rhetorical question: How can a lie be praiseworthy when Lord abhors lying and punishes those who prevaricate. A lie remains abominable even if the consequences it draws are good or positive (Augustine ca.A.D.395/1952). Among modern Western Philosophers, Kant is the most well-known torch-bearer of Aristotle's Absolutist tradition (Carson, 2012; Pölzl, 2016). In Kantian terms, lying is a crime against a man's own honour (Friedman & Weisel, 2013). Lying would be deemed a sin even in the bottleneck situation where a murderer awaits outside his victim's room.

The second camp that believes in the moral permissibility of lying under certain conditions is led by Plato. He, in his Republic, acknowledges that there are certain situations in which it is permissible to lie. A physician can lie to a patient for their well-being and statesman to the masses to protect the welfare of the state. In Christian tradition, Aquinas maintains a distinction between malicious lies that are unpardonable and lies that are wrong but are defensible to a certain degree (Hardin, 2010; Vincent Marrelli, 1997). Martin Luther King is also of the view that a lie told to protect the church is not a mortal sin. Nietzsche holds the most relativistic views about the necessity of lying in everyday life (Friedman & Weisel, 2013). According to him, deception is rife and we should avoid assigning any categorical position to it. Nietzsche is invoked as the spiritual progenitor of postmodern post-truth philosophy which has far-reaching effects on modern Western thought. Nietzsche does not believe in black and white moral laws and refutes the presence of any moral principle by embracing the fact there are only moral interpretations available for moral individuals. In the wake of current political practices, it is plausible to assume that modern Western societies are post-truth societies where the distinction between fact and value no longer holds (Higgins, 2016).

Cultural configurations also affect the way moral systems are built and perceived. In cultures where individuals are held responsible for their behaviours, the moral system is more dualistic based on clear-cut judgments about good and bad. In

comparison, in cultures that prioritize group needs over individuals, the morality system is more social in nature. The decisions about lying and truth are made after careful appraisal of the situation and the consequences of the act for the group's safety and well-being (Kim, 2008).

Different non-Western societies derive their moral indictment about lying from their collective religious, cultural and legal traditions. Friedman and Weisel (2013) have studied the influences of religious texts on Jewish moral perception about lying. They quote various excerpts from Talmud and other religious texts to unearth the Jewish ethics and legal system. According to these texts, lying is permissible in a variety of situations, including a tractate, in bed and hospitality. One is also allowed to make a (false) vow to the killers, looters and even to crooked tax collectors who usurp others' belongings and edibles, particularly those that are only permitted to be eaten by priests (Friedman and Weisel, 2013).

When seen cross-culturally, the relationship of truth with positive moral evaluation and lying with negative judgment is not always unidirectional and neat. Certain cultural norms impose restrictions on the permissibility of truth under certain specific conditions and if someone violates such expectations by speaking truth, they are likely to face social criticism. Travis (2011) notes that in Columbian culture, there is some cultural agreement that there will be times when truth becomes dysfunctional and should be avoided. A popular Columbian graffiti, "Children and crazy people tell the truth, that's why we educate the former and lock up the latter" (Travis, 2011, p. 208) reflects this cultural attitude. The Columbian culture associates a higher moral value with saying something that makes people feel good than saying something factual or closely anchored with reality. The concept encoded in the phrase "pious white lie" is widespread in Columbian society, which goes to the extent of registering certain lies as virtuous (Travis, 2011, p.208).

The review of relevant literature reveals that the range of influences on Western thought makes it very difficult to pin down their moral system to a single, consistent and internally coherent account. One can find a number of publications that deal with lying from moral perspectives and reveal contradictory findings. For instance, Wierzbicka (2002) refers to the moral value of truth in Anglo-American culture as a negotiable moral imperative while Levison (2016) notes that lying from the perspective of the English language is a morally reprehensible act. In comparison, traditional, non-

Western societies are more anchored to a single or at least internally consistent moral philosophy and reflect a stable attitude towards the morality of lying.

2.9.3 Language Ideologies and Deception

The folklore beliefs about the nature of language and how it works are found to be very relevant by the researchers who are engaged in cross-cultural investigations of discursive practices (Vincent Marrelli, 2003). These folklore beliefs, often called *language ideologies*, reflect socially, historically and culturally conditioned ideas about the nature and role of language and communication (Eades. 2012). The presumptions about the nature of language use and interaction can offer a potential contrast between societies when the judgment about deception is involved. Deception is prevalent even in those cultures that strongly believe in the ideology of truthfulness; however, the cultures that do not erect such expectations are considered more honest in their conceptualization (Vincent Marrelli, 2004a)

The American obsession with the truth stems from what Silverstein (1979) calls semantico-referential ideology. This view of looking at language presumes that the primary function of language is to convey information. Any other use of language is either lateral or secondary to this primary function (Silverstein, 1979). Considering the informational purpose of language as basic or normative entails certain theoretical inferences and precludes certain others. Sweetser (1985) makes some illuminating remarks about the folk theory of information. Taking informational purpose as a default use of language does not mean that such informative discourses are statistically more prevalent in society than other indirect discourse modes. It amounts to saying that any discourse exchange necessarily involves an exchange of information of some sort, even if it is information about the speaker's belief states while other functions may or may not be present. Informativeness is the default, basic, direct and unmarked mode and indirect discourses scrounge upon this mode (Sweetser, 1987).

The other components of American ideology consider language a unique and discrete entity originating from the individual experience. Speech is expected to be the spontaneous expression of this individual experience in a direct and concise manner. This ideology is reflected in the "conduit metaphor" (Reddy, 1993, p.166) or the vehicle view of the language (Verschueren, 2011) which presents "language ("voicing") as a potentially straightforward ("mere") vehicle for the expression of ideational contents ("opinions") which may be identifiably separable ("contrasting")"

(Verschueren, 2011, p. 7). The meaning is believed to be springing from our thoughts and reaching the brain and ear of the hearer wrapped in linguistic forms (Reddy, 1993). Another component of the American language ideology, which Marrelli (2003) calls "no frill use of language" (Vincent Marrelli, 2003, p. 26), requires information to be conveyed in a simple and unembellished form. Any occasion that calls for adjusting the speech to some other function than its primary referential function is met with resentment (Blum, 2005). It is only from this perspective of language that one can assign greetings and their formulaic responses to the category of lies, as it can be found in Harvey Sack's oft-quoted article 'Everyone has to Lie' (Sacks, 1975). Blum (2005) summarizes the whole American ideology in the following manner:

> Though sincerity and directness are not necessarily identical to truthfulness, an American ideology of language connects them in its insistence that language is normatively sincere, direct, non-manipulative, referential, unembellished, and true. (Blum, 2005, p. 302)

Other cultures operate under the local theories of meaning, which prioritize the non- informational, non-interactional, interpersonal function of language (Marrelli, 1997). Blum (2005) investigates the prevalence of deception in Chinese society with special reference to the differences in American and Chinese language ideologies. He notes that the Chinese practice is based on the ideology of script selection. In Chinese culture, the idea of role supersedes the notion of individual identity. There are multiple functions of language and which function takes precedence over the other is determined by a careful appraisal of the context of language use. The moral valence associated with truth or deception in public life is determined by a number of other competing goals that the speech is believed to achieve. In certain contexts, like war, politics and business, it is acceptable to lie than having to fight or confront. Language is a pragmatic resource available for manipulation to achieve desirable outcomes and language users are skilled workers who know how to function linguistically for a variety of purposes. The skilled use of language involves anticipating others' reactions, manipulating language based on that reaction and avoiding future unpleasantness by careful answering (Blum, 2005).

Cultures also differ in the ways they regard information (Ochs, 1976). From the Western perspective, the Kantian categorical imperative links information with the principle of personal autonomy. In order to act freely and independently, people need

the best stock of facts to drive their future course of action. People owe information to others in order to ensure their freedom of action. Information should be made free and readily available for individuals in order to not impede their freedom of action. If you possess a certain piece of information relevant to anyone else's needs, it is their right and your obligation to make it available for them (Vincent Marrelli, 2004a). Grice's conversational postulate to be informative is derived from this ideology about the role of information. As conveying information in Western cultures is always considered helpful, the Gricean maxim is a manifestation of another general maxim operative in Western social interactions "Help, not harm" (Sweetser, 1987, p.45). However, when seen globally, this language ideology is not uniformly distributed across cultures. In Chinese culture, information is something to be protected, expressly against outsiders. The information about the world needs to be carefully guarded and only to be disclosed to those who have proven some extra behavioural credentials to win the legitimacy for possessing information (Blum, 2005). Malagasy society's version of being informative entails conveying less information than one actually holds. New information is a highly sought-after resource that is rare to find. Possessing new information brings power and prestige to the bearer and needs to be protected as long as possible. Apart from the prestige factor, giving less information than needed is a way to avoid commitment to the truth of the statement and it acts as a means to avert any unpleasant outcome in the future (Ochs, 1976).

Apart from these extensively discussed areas of correlation between language ideologies and deception in social life, one can find scattered remarks in various other studies that hint at the close connection between folk beliefs and the evaluation of deception. For example, Tomlinson (2008) tries to establish the correlation between efficacy and truth by invoking language ideologies. Fijian language ideologies prove that efficacy and truth are inseparable and denote the same characteristic. In order to be effective, one needs to be truthful and vice versa (Tomlinson, 2009). Eades (2012) enumerates various language ideologies that promote certain interactional practices in court settings and place people at a disadvantage who fail to satisfy common expectations. The ideology of consistency outlines that conflicting accounts of an event signal the lack of truthfulness. While the problem can lie within the recall patterns, any inconsistent story telling is considered indicative of deception in court settings. Similarly, the repeated questioning ideology rooted within the Western culture encourages the use of the repeated questioning technique to elicit the truth. However,

the technique fails to attend to the cultural differences found in the answer patterns of various communities. Australian Aboriginal people, for instance, are accustomed to what Eades (2012) call "gratuitous concurrence" i.e., Saying yes in answer to every positive question (Eades, 2012, p.478).

The discussion about language ideologies does not explain or suggest the correlation between the degree of prevalence and varying evaluation of deception. Neither the Chinese pragmatic approach towards deception hints that lying is more prevalent in Chinese culture, nor the Anglo-American ideological obsession with truth proves that Americans are very honest and truthful people. It is not the actual behaviour but the perception, beliefs and evaluation of that behaviour that vary across cultures (Blum, 2005).

2.10 Cultural Variance in the Semantics of Lying

Lying as a mendacious statement depends on the respective language system. Even when interlocutors speak a common language, the cultural and social background of the interlocutors still remains operative (Meibauer, 2017). Lexical items and phrasal labels for various speech acts perform as cultural nodes which have the potential to reveal implicit folk theories of language and beliefs (Vincent Marrelli, 2004c). Linguistic expressions used to code the phenomenon of honesty, truth and deception imitate cultural values in their meaning. The cross-cultural studies of lying bring evidence to this claim.

Although most European languages have a word comparable in meaning with the English verb *lie*, cultures exhibit a great deal of semantic variance in what ground is covered under the label (Peeters, 2018). Coleman and Kay's study has been replicated in different cultures to explore if the prototype elements hold for other cultures and/or possess the same semantic weightage. Cole (1996) replicated the prototype study for Makkan Arabic and found that cultural understanding of lying in Makkan Arabic bore a striking resemblance to English one. However, the Arab data on lie judgment revealed increased tolerability for lying in two situations; when someone lied to save one's life or to bring reconciliation between partners. This cultural acceptance of lying comes from the fact that Islamic Law creates the permissibility of lying under these two conditions. The observation made her conclude that pragmatic elucidation should accompany the semantic features because the context mitigates the judgment about lying (Cole, 1996). Hardin (2010) replicated the study in the Spanish

context to find out if the Spanish equivalent of 'lie' bears some resemblance to English prototype elements. His data partially supported the prototype notion and the lying continuum; however, the prototype approach demonstrated some theoretical inadequacy in explaining the Spanish evaluation of social lies in which the intent to deceive is missing. The Spanish data demonstrated some conflicting tendencies concerning the intent to deceive. The Spanish respondents assigned speech acts to lying the way English respondents did; however, the ranking of different prototypes differed from the English Data. In their judgement, the Spanish respondents rated the prototype element falsity of belief as the important one, followed by the actual falsity of the statement. The intent to deceive was found to be the least essential predictor of lie judgement. Yet some other cultures differ in the amount of responsibility they place on the individual about the truth of a statement (Brown, 2002). While the speaker's belief about the statement's falsity forms the strongest criterion in Western culture, it is arguably the weakest predictor of lying in the Tzeltal community (Brown, 2002). Wierzbicka (2002) challenges the entire sense of what includes in the definition of the English verb 'lie'. People in other cultures do not lie; they perform speech acts found in their own languages, which may or may not resemble their English counterparts (Peeters, 2018; Wierzbicka, 2002). She notes that the Russians have two words, "vrat" and "lgat", corresponding to the English word and both have almost the same degree of salience in everyday discourse. " Lgat" denotes intentional manipulation of facts and has a strong negative connotation. "Vrat" refers to the trivial or less serious misrepresentations which are done for the sake of playful amusement (Wierzbicka, 2002, p.418). At first blush, the distinction appears to be similar to the distinction that holds between *lie* and *fib* in English. However, Peeters (2018) identifies at least two senses in which the Russian terms are different from their English counterparts. First, English terms vary significantly in terms of their salience and degree of entrenchment and second, fib is not a speech genre in English while "Vrat" in Russian is an established verbal art. The absence of neat correspondence suggests that when Russians "vrane" (a verb form associated with the noun "vrat"), what they are producing is not fibbing but a distinct verbal art (Peeters, 2018, p.171).

Culture is so potently operative that even the genealogically related languages diverge in the meaning associated with the speech act of lying. Despite being an English-based dialect, Bislama, a Melanesian creole, has no word having stringent correspondence to the verb lie. The closest counterpart in Bislama is "giaman", which

refers to a practically useful and morally less reprehensible verbal act (Peeters, 2018, p.174). Levison (2016) has demonstrated the uniqueness of Bislama verb "giaman" which denotes something common, necessary and unavoidable (Levison, 2016, p.53). Describing *giaman* in terms of lying would be equivalent to destroying Bislama worldview

Intention-seeking is very central to the process of utterance interpretations in the Gricean tradition. In the Gricean paradigm, the success of deceptive goals is not the defining characteristic of deception; the source's deceptive intent is necessary for deception to happen (Vincent Marrelli & Castelfranchi, 1981). Intention-seeking is not always relevant for people of other cultures. Danziger (2010) has demonstrated how the notion of intent to lie is irrelevant for the Mopan Maya speakers of Southern Belize in Eastern Central America. They evaluate the act of lying for the social outcome it has generated or the damage it has caused and not for the intention of the speaker (Danziger,2010). Quality violations are always blameworthy regardless of the speaker's knowledge that any such violation occurred. She relativizes the entire Gricean paradigm, at least for the Mopan Maya community, by proposing an altered version of the Quality maxim. As intention-seeking corresponds to the "trying" component in the original Quality maxim and the "believe" component in the first submaxim (Danziger, 2010, p. 215), they need to be dropped to make the maxim generalizable for the cultures which do not necessitate the intention seeking process as the departure point of everyday conversations. The revised Quality maxim looks like this, "Make your contribution one that is true. Do not say what is false. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence" (Danziger, 2010, p. 211).

Aside from the semantic differences in the labels used to encode falsehood, other miscellaneous factors can influence the meaning-making process. One such example can be drawn from the law of contradiction which appears to be the logical way of resolving two contradictory statements. Two contradictory statements are considered indicative of deceit in Western cultures. Western thought is grounded in the Aristotelian law of logical contradiction which states that two contradictory statements cannot be true at the same time. So, of the two statements "It is night at the moment" and "It is day at the moment", only one can be true at a given point in time (Kwiatkowska, 2015, p.54). On the contrary, Chinese thought is shaped by Tao philosophy and the yin-yang principle, which allow accepting the truth of both statements simultaneously. According to the yin-yang principle, the opposites are

considered complementary in nature and the presence of one implies the presence of the other (Kwiatkowska, 2015). The reconciliation between contradictions is resolved by finding the Middle way. Both sides of the argument are considered valid to a certain extent and both parties in the dispute are assumed to be right (Peng & Nisbett, 1999).

2.11 Cross-cultural Pragmatics and Deception

According to Kecskes, "intercultural pragmatics is concerned with the way the language system is put to use in social encounters between human beings who have different first languages, communicate in a common language, and, usually, represent different cultures" (Kecskes, 2014, p. 14). The cross-cultural perspective in pragmatics has remained underplayed until the turn of the century (Vincent Marrelli, 2003). As the review of literature in the previous sections has demonstrated, there are several isolated specific studies of deception in single culture and some lexical studies of lying in a few different languages. Only very recently some empirical data emerged from controlled investigations, specifically comparing pairs of cultures and concentrating on deception and lying (Vincent Marrelli, 2004a).

A host of pragmatic factors come into play when it comes to cross-cultural deception. The greatest charge levied against Grice's cooperative principle is of ethnocentric bias (Wierzbicka, 1991). It favours Western models of truth and truthfulness by taking them as universally applicable (Meibauer, 2014). Grice's Pragmatics is anything but universal and simulates cultural practices reflective of Western standards for natural communication (Vincent Marrelli, 1997). Each known culture has a specific communication style that affects how people talk to each other. For instance, it is believed that the American style of interaction is based on the principle of camaraderie, while the Japanese style of communication is based on deference (Jeremie, 2011).

The points of contact between culture, pragmatics and deception can endlessly be multiplied. Nevertheless, this section addresses three pragmatic grounds which are central to the discussion of the pragmatics of cross-cultural deception. To wit, the cultural in/tolerance for indirectness and perception of social lies as a politeness strategy and perception about the role of silence in human interaction.

2.11.1 Indirectness and Deception

Couched in semantico-referential ideology, CP presupposes direct, unembellished and straight transmission of information as the default mode of human communication. It amounts to saying that CP mainstreams directness not only as conventional but also as

the preferred mode of human interaction. By applying the filter of CP, directness as a verbal phenomenon can be defined as a verbal adherence to the maxims of quantity, manner and relevance, while indirectness is characterized by omission, evasion and equivocation (violations of quantity, relevance and manner, respectively) (Yeung et al., 1999).

The relationship between indirectness and deception starts building up when Grice's CP is used to explain lying as fallacious or uncooperative communication, as is done in IMT and IMT2. The plea of directness found in Gricean maxims is interpreted as signalling honest and truthful communication. In contrast, any covert violation of the maxims is deemed to be less honest than fully disclosive baseline messages (McCornack, 1992). However, empirical studies in the field of communication have shown that this is not a universal matter. Brown (2002) notes that the relationship between lying and indirectness is the function of cultural expectations about how a message should be conveyed. For indirect cultures in which meaning is the product of statements and their implicature, lying is not disputed. In these cultures, verbal indirectness is not perceived as deceptive because being direct is not relevant to meet the communicative needs of others (Brown, 2002). It has repeatedly been established that some indirect cultures have a higher level of tolerance for violations based on relevance, quantity and manner than American culture (Byon, 2006; Kim, 2008; Lapinski & Levine, 2000). For many Asian cultures, indirectness is not deceptive but a regular feature of everyday conversations (Yeung et al., 1999).

A parameter like the Quality maxim can have multiple interpretations in different cultures (Ochs, 1976). In sharp contrast with "no more no less information" interpretation found in the Western world (Herawati, 2013, p.45), for black Americans, being informative means saying a lot (Kochman, 1981). Quantity violations are considered deceptive only if there are certain expectations about the optimal number of units of information to be revealed. In the presence of such expectation, any long-winded or too curt response would be indicative of deceit. The fact is verified in the studies conducted in the US. The US respondents rated quantity violations as more deceptive than the baseline messages (McCornack et al., 1992). Quite contrary to this, Yeung et al. (1999) found that the people from Hong Kong did not consider omissions as less dishonest than the fully disclosive message (Yeung et al., 1999). Ochs (1976) notes that for the Malagasy lies of omission, the judgement is affected by the particular specifications of domains in which the maxim is expected to hold and the degree to

which adherents are expected to follow his maxim (Ochs, 1976).

Maxims of manner and relevance specify the way in which information can be presented. Bavelas et al. (1990), examining equivocation, have argued that the message can vary across two distinct coordinates: truthfulness and equivocality. The coordinate of truthfulness applies to what is said and equivocality covers how it is said (Bavelas et al., 1990). Bavelas et al. (1990) define message equivocality in terms of manner and relevance maxim; a message is equivocal if it uses ambiguous language or digresses from the topic of ongoing discourse. Their distinction appears to be intuitive; however, in American culture, equivocality is inextricably linked with message truthfulness. Messages deficient in manner and relevance are considered deceptive and less honest (McCornack et al., 1992). For some other cultures like Hong Kong, the violation of the manner maxim is not considered deceptive (Yeung et al., 1999). Lapinski and Levine (2000) relate this trend with interdependent and independent self-construal. People with independent self-construal prefer verbal clarity and explicitness of the message content. For interdependent self-construal, indirectness serves as a face-maintaining strategy. They see it as a way to maintain social harmony (Lapinski & Levine, 2000).

The studies mentioned above only reflect cross-cultural variations in (in)directness when the filter of CP is on. Wierzbicka (2003) has empirically demonstrated that indirectness in all cultures is not measured by CP yardstick and some cultures define indirectness in culture- specific ways. For example, the Javanese proverb "Look north, hit south" perfectly summarizes the Javanese idea of indirectness (Wierzbicka, 2003, p. 100). Javanese culture defines indirectness as a dissimulation of truth as a means to avoid telling "gratuitous truth" (Wierzbicka, 2003, p. 100).

2.11.2 Politeness and Social Lies

Despite its default focus on being cooperative, Gricean CP acknowledges the situations in which social actors flagrantly flout a maxim. There are interactional contexts like ritual greetings and leave-taking in which being polite is more important than the veracity of the statements. Politeness is a widely recognized phenomenon. Li and Yuan (2020) acknowledge that Leech's politeness theory (though in a culturally variant form) has more cross-cultural currency than Grice CP which can be charged with a certain degree of ethnocentrism for portending Western models of talk and interaction as universal.

Despite possessing universal vitality as a phenomenon, the core definition of

politeness is contingent on the context of culture. What is considered polite in one culture can be considered downright rude in some other cultures. However, any such deliberation about the nature of politeness across cultures is beyond the scope of the current review. What is of prime interest for the topic at hand is the correlation between politeness and lying. Xie et al. (2005) capture this relationship by maintaining a distinction between sincere politeness and insincere politeness. When people lie to be polite or safeguard the sentiments of others against emotional harm, they observe sincere politeness. On the contrary, if people try to be polite to conceal their deception and lying, they are being insincerely polite (Xie et al., 2005). From an Anglo- American perspective, the phenomenon of sincere politeness is closely linked with the concept of lying: politeness in direct cultures often involves trimming or buffing one's speech to save others from the brusqueness of truth.

Sincere politeness is best exemplified by prosocial lying. Social lies (or white lies in Anglo terms) are a widely known category of lying that bridges the connection between politeness and lying. Social lies are distinct from the category of "justified lies" which are told in exceptional situations. They are more ubiquitous and socially more widespread (Hardin 2010, p.3201). A review of relevant literature (Dynel & Meibauer, 2016; Peeters, 2018; Seiter et al., 2002) suggests that in order to be characterized as a social lie i.e., A politeness motivated lie, it has to be harmless, blatant and socially sanctioned at the same time. Lies that are harmless but subtle cannot be characterized as social lies. Similarly, blatant lies aiming or inadvertently causing harm cannot be called social lies (Sweetser, 1987). Since all the parties involved in communication know that a flout has happened, from the perspective of CP and IMT, social lies are not lies-proper. However, some researchers have proven empirically that white lies are considered lies for conveying false information. In consonance with the direct ideology, English people classify white lies under the category of lying. (Fallis, 2009).

It is believed in the Anglo-American culture that there are situations in which Robin Lakoff's (1973) politeness principle (do not impose; give options; make the interlocutor feel good/be friendly) comes into play, takes precedence over the cooperative principle or precedes the need to be informative. The notion of white lies is very salient in Anglo cultures (Wierzbicka, 2002). White lies are called white lies because, in Western culture, white colour symbolizes transparency and innocence (Peeters, 2018). Notwithstanding the ever-increasing permissibility for white lies in

Anglo culture, the cultural attitude towards *White lies* in the English world has not been positive in all ages (Peeters, 2018). The changes in Anglo-American culture based on the values of freedom from imposition, personal autonomy and smooth interpersonal communication have caused a sea change in Anglo-American communication style. The decline of performative phrases, increasing use of whimperative (requests and commands put forth in the form of questions) and social acceptance of white lies is a corollary of such change in cultural thought (Wierzbicka, 2003).

There is a famous quote in Goethe's Faust "In German one lies when one is polite" (Xie & House, 2009, p.432). The quote captures the German attitude towards lying for politeness concerns: One is lying when one is trying to be polite. However, cultures exhibit considerable variance in treating social lies and assign different degrees of tolerability if such lying occurs. Wierzbicka (2002) has empirically demonstrated that there is no lexical item to encode the concept of white lies in the Russian language. The Russian culture is characterized by treating truth-telling as a moral imperative under all conditions. Russian culture's fixation with expressing unedited thoughts transpires through the bipolar understanding of truth in the Russian language (Wierzbicka, 2002). Lapinski and Levine (2000) discuss how certain linguistic strategies that mediate the bluntness of the message are considered deceptive in the US but normative behaviour in an East Asian culture. Collectivist cultures may allow their concern for politeness to take over their concern for accurate representations of reality, while for individualist cultures concealing direct communication of facts is considered a morally reprehensible act (Lapinski & Levine, 2000).

2.11.3 Silence and Deception

Grice's quantity maxim is binding upon revealing information and not withholding any information that is relevant to the topic of discourse. As it has been repeatedly emphasized that such conceptualization is modelled on Western folk ideologies, the view has certain implications for the role of silence in social interaction. In Anglo-American convention, the use and meaning of silence are linked with negative assumptions. Anglo-American culture operates on the superordinate maxim that one must say what one knows. Silence is believed to be signalling concealment and is always interpreted to the detriment of the person being silent (Eades, 2012). The semantic contrast of the English word truth with concealment reflects this cultural attitude. Ekachai (2004) connects this attitude with the context of communication. In low-context cultures, the meaning is derived primarily from the verbal message and the

precision and explicitness of the verbal message is much needed; therefore, silence is seen as negative. This perception of silence being devious is not shared by high-context cultures. High-context cultures prefer silence as a strategy to avoid social confrontation (Vincent Marrelli, 2004a). Aboriginal cultures do not find silence as marked or suspicious (Eades, 2012). Rather, eastern societies value silence more than Western societies (Gundlach, 2013). For instance, Japanese communication is characterized by long stretches of silence which allow the speaker to reflect and plan their speech ahead of time. In Japanese culture, being silent is not equated with opting out of the conversation but is a means to avoid saying things that are confrontational in nature (Jeremie, 2011).

Apart from these general remarks about the nature and social evaluation of silence, a detailed discussion of the correlation between deception and silence is absent. However, keeping in mind the norm violation model, it can be predicted that such correlation would raise suspicions of duplicity in cross-cultural settings.

2.12 Pakistani Vs American Culture

National cultures are the expression of norms, beliefs and attitudes, customs, and values shared by the population of a sovereign nation. In the modern civilizational context, national cultures possess a key explanatory force in describing various social and political phenomena. This section briefly outlines key differences between Pakistani and American cultural dimensions, values and social norms which may result in a different view of deception and lying.

Before embarking on the exasperatingly difficult task of pinning down the specificity of American and Pakistani culture, it is important to defend the common labels 'Pakistani culture' and 'American culture' for two heterogeneously diverse cultural contexts. Pakistani society is a heterogeneous mix of around 212 million people (Worldometer.info, 2020) who come from diverse cultural, linguistic and religious backgrounds. Because of such cultural heterogeneity, it can be debated if putting a common label on Pakistani culture would be counterproductive or not. The study defends the label by invoking the fact that the practice is common in cross-cultural studies. The same caveat is in order in labelling cultures as Anglo-American or Western; they are far too diverse to be internally homogenous but relevant literature finds them useful to discuss overarching social structures. The use of superordinate epithets like *Anglo-American* or *Pakistani* to describe national culture can be disputed

for the sense of reification and homogeneity these terms invoke. However, despite all fluidity, these terms refer to a stable core that resists transience in a given period of time (Fancy, 2004). Moreover, the terms are difficult to dispense with as no alternative concept in cross-cultural communication is as anchoring as these terms are (Wierzbicka, 2002).

One reliable discussion about Pakistani and American cultures can be found in Hofstede's cultural dimension programme to describe national culture. Hofstede Insights (2020) use their patent 6-D model to determine the cultural drivers of various national cultures. As per their report, Pakistan has a very low score of 14 on the individualism index which means Pakistani society is highly collectivist in nature. The report describes that social life for a culture with such a low score is characterized by seeking and protecting loyalty and group members. All members take the responsibility to protect inmates and offence brings shame and face loss to all the members of the group. Contrarily, America scores as high as 91 on the individualism score and is one of the most individualistic cultures on the globe. This is evidenced by the American preference for equality, personal autonomy and free will (Wierzbicka, 2003). The individuals are seen as autonomous and independent persons whose actions stem from their internal thoughts, feelings and actions (Lapinski and Levine, 2000). Combined with a fairly low score of 40 on the Power Distance scale, American culture is characterized by liberty, justice and social equality. In comparison, Pakistan scores 55 on a Power Distance dimension which speaks for a hierarchical and stratified society. Pakistan's social and organisational structure is characterized by uncritical acceptance of authority, deference and group living (Khilji, 2003).

Another potentially most significant determinant of Pakistani culture is Pakistan's score on the Uncertainty Avoidance dimension. Pakistan scores 70 on this dimension and displays a high preference for a rigid code of conduct and orthodox behaviour and ideas. Contrarily, The US scores below average, with a low score of 46, on this dimension. Consequently, this cultural pattern reflects itself in a fair degree of acceptance of new ideas and a willingness to try something new or different, whether it pertains to practices or behavious. Unlike Pakistani people, Americans do not require a lot of rules to guide their social conduct (Hofstede Insights,2021).

As far as the masculinity index and the long-term orientation index are concerned, Pakistani culture has an indeterminate score of 50, making it difficult to

predict the cultural preference of Pakistani culture along these dimensions. Contrarily, Americans show a high preference for masculinity, with a score of 62. Coupled with individualistic inclination, Americans assert their masculinity individually. On the other hand, the United States scores normative on the long-term orientation dimension with a low score of 26. This dimension is reflected by the fact that the Americans are very practical and pragmatic in their approach with a focus on quick results (Hofstede Insights, 2021).

The most striking result of this report is Pakistan's rating on the Indulgence scale. Pakistan scores as low as zero on this scale. It means Pakistani society is characterized by extreme restraint on seeking personal pleasure or comfort. As a highly restrained society, Pakistani people believe that their actions should be guided by social norms and any kind of self-indulgence is extremely wrong (What about Pakistan?, 2017). The United States scores as an Indulgent (68) society on this dimension. This dimension is reflected by contradictory attitudes, acceptance of ambivalent behaviours, and non-normative social conduct (Hofstede Insights, 2021).

Another way to understand the cultural differences between Pakistani and US culture is through the high and low context framework proposed by Edward T. Hall. Cultures also differ in the way people communicate with each other. The USA falls into the low context communication category, meaning that communication is expected to be direct and explicitly stated in the US culture (Hall, 1976). Being a low-context culture, the normative use of language in American culture is expected to be free of confusion and ambiguities. The clarity or directness of the message takes precedence over other concerns to guide communication. Thus, when a communicator is not being clear or direct, this person is often seen as deceptive (Lapinski and Levine, 2000). On the other hand, collectivist cultures prefer an indirect style of communication and fall under the category of high-context cultures (Yeung et al.,1999). Being a collectivist culture, the Pakistani communication style is highly contextualized and implicit. People use various linguistic strategies to avoid hurting other's feelings or to fulfill their social obligations and expectations. People use their shared experience to decipher the underlying message implicit in these message manipulation strategies; therefore, such violations of conversational maxims do not remain covert. Conversely, "to the U.S. Americans, such violations of the conversational maxims would be seen as covert and thus would constitute an act of dishonesty" (Yeung et al,.1999, p.9).

All these cultural dimensions affect how deception is perceived in the corresponding culture. For instance, as high masculinity corresponds to more aggressive and competitive traits, individuals may feel predisposed to practice deception for personal gains (Pierce, 2011). Similarly, a high-context, collectivist orientation results in view of deception that is different from that of an individualistic culture. In collectivist cultures, the individuals act according to what is expected of them and sometimes the role expectations take precedence over the concern for candour and honesty (Yeung et al., 1999).

Apart from cultural dimensions, the role of religion is another strong predictor of cultural differences between America and Pakistan. Religion still matters a great deal for Americans; however, modern America is witnessing the lasting effects of deepening secularization (Petrova, 2014). America has surpassed the old Puritan preoccupation with essentially sinful human nature and has adopted a more practical, pragmatic and optimistic approach towards human life (Petrova, 2014). In comparison, religious assumptions are still very prevalent in Pakistan. The idea of religion as a key determinant of the Muslim identity and cultural heritage is a part of the ideology of Pakistan. As a result of several political interventions, Islamic principles permeate all domains of life and determine cultural thought (Khilji, 2003). This does not mean that all people in Pakistan lead their lives according to the teaching of Islam, but their cultural schemata are strongly influenced by the rule of thought and actions laid out in the Qur'an (Khilji, 2003).

The foregoing discussion outlines the key differences and similarities between American and Pakistani cultures. There are a host of other historical, geographical, political and economic determinants of cultural behaviour that are difficult to list within the scope of this section. The study makes recurrent connections to these points of difference throughout the entire thesis, specifically in the discussion section.

2.13 Deception and Pakistani Culture

There is very little known about deception in Pakistani culture. In the absence of any direct evidence, the scores on Hofstede's cultural dimensions (discussed in the previous section) can help predict how lying would be perceived in Pakistani culture. The findings located in collectivist, highly-restrained, uncertainty-avoiding cultures can be deemed relevant for Pakistani cultures. It is expected that lying as a breach of social conduct would be subject to strict moral scrutiny. However, keeping in mind the uniqueness of each cultural context, any naive import of the findings located in other

cultures would be extremely gross. Only studies based on the Pakistani population can be expected to possess a certain degree of reliability.

Even though Pakistan has emerged as a key player in international politics and intercultural encounters of Pakistan with the world at large and the US, in particular, are now the norm rather than the exception, the research on deception in the Pakistani context is almost non-existent. So far, only two studies in deception scholarship have been reported to include Pakistani samples. Taylor et al. (2014)'s study on cross-cultural moderators of deception includes Pakistani respondents. They observed that the use of negation and the use of spatial details were indicative of deceit in Pakistani culture. Levine et al. (2016) have included 51 Pakistani respondents in their research on pan-cultural deception motives. Their findings demonstrate the validity of pan-cultural typology for Pakistani data; however, they made some interesting observations concerning Pakistani culture. Lies told for economic advantage were reported the highest number of times in Pakistani data. Pakistani data also reported the highest number of malicious lies among all other nationalities. Levine et al. (2016) conclude that Pakistani lies are more harmful than any other cultural group. They believe that the prevalence of harmful lies in Pakistani society has to do with loose commerce regularities and a lack of corruption regulation (Levine et al., 2016). Though their data demonstrate methodological rigour, the interpretations they have made based on that data need further exploration. The type of lies being reported may have other explanations than the actual prevalence of malicious lies. Another interesting finding in their data, which they have not discussed, is the absence of humour jokes in the reported lies. Given the fact that Pakistani society does not lack humour, the finding can be interpreted towards the relationship between lying and humour. Pakistani respondents do not see humour as a form of lying and do not report it when asked to report lies.

2.14 Research Gap Statement

The study identifies and addresses multiple gaps in existing deception literature.The first gap comes from the fact that deception has rarely been the subject of pragmatic inquiry. If we see the bibliography section of various semantic and pragmatic studies of lying, we would find almost the same names and count. Moreover, these studies focus only on quintessential cases of lying characterized by falsification. There is no pragmatic study of lying that deals with the manipulation of information on all four coordinates (maxims).

The second gap exists in the lack of mutual coordination between various approaches studying deception. As the review of existing literature demonstrates, deception has sparked scholarly interest in a number of fields. However, various traditions work in closed disciplinary boundaries and limited interaction and cross-referencing exist among them. Deception scholarship treats deception as a language-independent and cultural-neutral psychological phenomenon that is amenable to scientific inquiry. The field has rarely benefited from rich pragmatic insights about cultural norms of interaction.

Since the time the importance of culture as a key variable is registered, only a few non-Western cultures are systematically investigated (mainly Confucian cultures from East Asia). Cross-cultural investigations of deception are still very sparse (Leal et al., 2018). In the wake of cultural diversity, such a limited number alludes to the limited inclusion of various cultures and languages in deception scholarship. Linguistic profiling of deception will only be complete if the insights are available for the majority of languages. With this, we come to the third gap that the current study tries to address i.e., Exploring and explicating semantics and pragmatics of lying in Pakistani culture. Pakistani culture remains undocumented with respect to meaning, perception and design of deception and mendacity. No empirical study of deception has been conducted for Pakistani culture so far. Similarly, no full-length study of semantic and pragmatic exploration of truthfulness/deception in the Urdu language exists so far.

To address these multiple gaps, the study combines Ethnopragmatic and empirical investigations to study not only lying but also other subtle forms of deception for at least one under-documented culture i.e., Pakistan and compare the results with existing findings. The theoretical and methodological integration of various approaches is expected to enhance the soundness of interpretations and stimulate cross-disciplinary interaction between various strands of deception research.

CHAPTER III

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

This chapter outlines the theoretical framework and methodology of this research. The first section of the chapter deals with the theoretical framework of the study that is grounded in two theories i.e., the Cultural script approach and Information Manipulation Theory. This section highlights the fundamental concepts and ideas of these theories and shows how these theories are adapted to the contexts of the current research.

The second section of this chapter outlines the research methods adopted by the researcher along with academic justification of the chosen methods. The part identifies and defines the key variables selected for the study, followed by a brief explanation for this choice. The criterion for the inclusion of research participants is also discussed in detail. Lastly, the method section thoroughly describes the data collection process, measurements and procedures to carry out each stage of this multi-phased study.

3.1 Theoretical Framework

The study adopts theoretical triangulation and embraces a host of theoretical insights about deception, culture and their mutual connexion. For instance, the sporadic references to the theoretical suggestions offered by Meibauer (2005,2011,2017,2018) and Vincent Marrelli (1981, 1997,2004 a,b,2006) about the linguistic, albeit culturally contingent nature of deception can be seen across all sections of the study. Likewise, various theories of deception, including Truth Default theory (Levine 2014), Interpersonal Deception Theory (Buller and Burgoon 1996) and Levine's Norm Violation Model (Levine et al. 2000), are also invoked for any theoretical explanation of deception across cultures. Nevertheless, the theoretical model of the study is formed out of two apparently disparate theories: The Cultural Scripts approach proposed by Wierzbicka and Goddard (Goddard & Wierzbicka, 2002, 2004,2016; Wierzbicka,

1997, 2002,2021) and the original Information Manipulation Theory and its revision in the form of Information Manipulation Theory 2 (McCornack, 1992; McCornack et al., 2014). The Cultural Scripts approach is the key technique used in Ethnopragmatics, while as a leading theory of deception production, Information Manipulation Theory enjoys significant currency in deception scholarship. In consonance with the research objectives, integrating these theories helps explicate the latent cultural knowledge deployed by cultural insiders to make judgments about the meaning and perceived honesty of various forms of information management. It also helps to bridge the gap that exists between deception scholarship and linguistic studies of deception.

The ensuing discussion outlines the central premises of the theories mentioned above and introduces the theoretical model formed by integrating these theories.

3.2 Ethnopragmatics

For in-depth linguistic analysis, the study uses the theoretical and methodological guidelines offered in Ethnopragmatics. Ethnopragmatics is an emerging field in linguistic pragmatics that refuses to embrace a pan-human universal model of communication (Levison, 2016), best represented in the works of Paul Grice (1975), Brown and Levinson (1978) and Sperber and Wilson (1995). Elaborating upon the key premise of Ethnopragmatics, Goddard (2006) challenges universalist pragmatics for imposing an 'external perspective on the description of speech practices of any particular local culture' (p.1). These universal models are ethnocentric in the sense that they adopt Anglo norms and practices as a base, model, or template and then generalize or adjust the model to all cultural contexts (Goddard, 2006). Counterposing this trend, Ethnopragmatics encourages assigning respective cultures a key explanatory role in the study of language (Goddard & Ye, 2014). It urges to replace universal explanations with cultural logic (Goddard, 2009b).

As the name suggests, the field rests its foundation on the extension of ethnography of communication and pragmatics (Goddard, 2006). Nevertheless, unlike ethnography which accepts and generates non-linguistic evidence, Ethnopragmatics puts great emphasis on linguistic evidence found in the form of emic labels and culturally salient texts. The approach claims its distinctive position in the field of linguistic pragmatics on three broad grounds; setting linguistic objectives of studying speech practices from cultural insider perspectives, using cross-linguistic semantics as its key methodology and grounding in linguistic evidence to draw conclusions (Goddard, 2006).

The field now has a rich tradition of descriptive and analytical works that elucidate culture-specific pragmatic principles with a degree of formalism that matches that of calculus (Enfield,2007). Using cultural scripts and semantic explications, a wide range of phenomena have been studied so far, demonstrating the profound cultural shaping of speech practices. The techniques of semantically grounded Ethnopragmatics are now being spun into practical usage. A new field of Applied Ethnolinguistics is emerging with interest in studying the nexus of language and culture for applied purposes to improve foreign language teaching and other fields (Peeters,2017).

The ethnopragmatic approach holds great significance for a linguistic study set to challenge ethnocentric assumptions rampant in the field of deception scholarship. The theoretical and methodological considerations of Ethnopragmatics make it a good fit for the objectives of the current study and provide it with a rich linguistic ground to generate a culture-internal account of the speech acts of deception and lying.

At the theoretical level, it highlights how various levels and units of language such as speech acts, proverbs, idioms and metaphors instantiate significant aspects of cultural schema. The linguistic usage "functions as an index of routine ways of thinking" (Goddard, 2006, p.15). All cultural knowledge solidifies in the corresponding language system and the words and phrases become the repository of cultural norms, expectations and beliefs (Petrova, 2019; Vincent Marrelli, 2004c; Wierzbicka, 2003). Lexical items and phrasal labels for various speech acts act as cultural nodes that potentially reveal implicit folk theories of language and beliefs (Vincent Marrelli, 2004c). Semantic analysis of language-specific terms reveals linguistically codified ways of social interactions. For instance, a few Ethnopragmatic studies of lying show that lying as a mendacious statement depends on the respective language system. People in other cultures do not *lie*; they perform speech acts found in their own languages, which may or may not resemble their English counterpart (Peeters, 2018; Wierzbicka, 2002). That is why Ethnopragmatics encourages using semantic explications and cultural scripts to demonstrate profound cultural shaping of speech practices (Goddard, 2006).

At the methodological level, the approach offers clear guidelines on how to generate semantic explications based on the insights gained from the dictionary and thesaurus-based information, semantic differential analyses, reductive paraphrasing and componential analyses. Further elaboration of specific theoretical considerations

and methodological guidelines followed in the current study can be found in the subsequent sections.

3.3 Cultural Scripts Approach

Working within the paradigm of Ethnopragmatics, the study uses the theory of cultural scripts propagated by Wierzbicka and Goddard to elucidate culturally shaped meanings, perceptions and attitudes towards lying and deception. Seen historically as an off-shoot of the ethnography of communication and linguistic anthropology, the cultural script approach (CS approach henceforth) was deftly inaugurated by Wierzbicka's (1985) article 'Different cultures, different languages, different speech acts: English vs. Polish'. The earliest articulations of the approach started to emerge in the 90s as a result of landmark publications of Anna Wierzbicka and Cliff Goddard (Goddard, 1997; Wierzbicka, 1991, 1994, 1996, 1997). Since then, the technique of cultural scripts has been used as a vital tool in Ethnopragmatics.

Cultural scripts refer to the technique of explicating culturally salient shared norms and practices (Goddard & Wierzbicka, 2002, 2004; Wierzbicka, 1997, 2002). As an explicitly articulated code, the concept of cultural scripts is far more concrete than the indiscernible concept of culture (Wierzbicka, 2003). The theory encourages replacing elusive expressions like "American culture" or "Japanese culture" with more tangible labels like "American scripts" or "Japanese scripts" (Wierzbicka, 2003, p.xvi). The core premise of the theory is that cultural thoughts and behaviours are closely related to culture-specific ways of speaking and the explication of these speaking norms can only be achieved by the nuanced understanding of norms, values and expectations of any culture under study (Wierzbicka, 1996). Interpersonal interactions are evidently grounded in cultural norms, values and attitudes. This approach aims to replace absolute conversation logic with cultural logic and understand the speech practices from the perspective of cultural insiders (Goddard, 2009b).

In order to create such understanding, the researchers must invest in concurrent cross-cultural semantic analysis of culturally salient keywords. Culturally relevant words used to code local values, social categories and speech acts often qualify as cultural keywords (Wierzbicka, 1997). The cultural explication of semantically complex concepts should be expressed in simple and easy-to-understand words. The approach does not allow neologism, technical jargon, and abbreviated forms to be used in semantic paraphrasing. The reductive paraphrasing of semantic meaning results in

explications that are free from obscure, complex or circular definitions. As an explicitly articulated code, cultural scripts are available to cultural insiders and outsiders alike (Goddard & Wierzbicka, 2004).

Though cultural scripts explain a great deal about the norms that underlie the ways of speaking (Wierzbicka, 1996), they are not restricted to the prescription of speech practices. Cultural scripts equally decode the norms, models and templates for the ways of thinking, feeling and acting (Goddard & Wierzbicka, 2004). Based on the generality of the attitude or the specificity of the norm they address, cultural scripts can exist at a variety of levels. Some cultural scripts cover the general attitude ramifying across a number of cultural contexts and domains, while others can spell out a specific form of social interaction. Goddard and Wierzbicka (2004) call the former scripts the "master scripts", which state the norms of interpretation while other more specific scripts voice norms of interaction (Goddard & Wierzbicka, 2004, p.175).

CS approach endorses the linguistic nature of cultural scripts, albeit with a note of caution: Common language does not essentially mean common cultural scripts. People who speak a common language do not necessarily share all associated pragmatic behaviour. Different historical backgrounds and lived experiences of different speech communities can result in regional and social variations.

3.3.1 Linguistic Evidence for CS

The theory of cultural scripts is also appreciable for being evidence-based and preferring linguistic evidence over ethnographic or sociological data (Goddard & Wierzbicka, 2004). The fact that the articulation of cultural scripts is grounded in solid linguistic evidence makes this theory suitable for an inquiry that lies at the crossroads of language and culture-specific speech practices. From the perspective of CS, lexica, interactional routines, response particles, proverbs and sayings found in the language under study form the core of this linguistic evidence (Wierzbicka, 2002). The theory of CS recognizes a generous list of sources that can be used to glean linguistic evidence. The evidence can come from any number of resources including dictionary searches, the native speaker's generated word lists, scenario-based experiments, key informants (Dzokoto et al., 2016), elicitation techniques, natural observation method, native speaker intuitions, textual analysis, the use of literary materials and other cultural artefacts (Goddard & Wierzbicka, 2004) and soft data in the form of anecdotal accounts, journal writings and personal memoirs (Goddard & Ye, 2014).

3.3.2 Cultural Scripts and Deception

The current study is the first to explore the semantics and pragmatics of truth and lying in Pakistani culture using the CS approach. A few other studies have already used the technique of cultural scripts to offer a semantic explication of the cultural labels used to encode (semantic equivalents of) truth and lying in other cultures (Levison, 2016; Peeters, 2018; Wierzbicka, 1990, 2002, 2003, 2006). Lexical items have strong imprints of implicit folk theories of language, talk and truthfulness (Vincent Marrelli, 2004c). The semantic explication of lexical and phrasal labels has the potential to uncover the corresponding folk ideology about the nature and meaning of truth and lying. Furthermore, pragmatic meaning deeply rooted in the speakers' assumptions, intentions and thoughts cannot be detangled from these semantic explications. The meanings of the lexical items can only be understood in their entirety if these underlying assumptions and thoughts are studied as a function of cultural norms and values. Wierzbicka (2002, 2003, 2006) has empirically demonstrated how the tacit system of cultural rules is manifested through lexical categories used to denote truth and lying in English, Russian, Javanese and Polish culture.

Cultural scripts not only explicate what it means to lie but also spell out the cultural norms that govern when, how or what to say, truthfully or otherwise. Ways of speaking or norms of social interaction that occupy the prime focus in the CS approach possess a direct bearing on specific cultural values, including cultural attitudes towards truth. This focus brings us to another point of contact between cultural scripts and deception: the role of norms in shaping our honesty judgements. According to the Norm Violation Model of veracity judgment proposed by Levin et al. (2000), each culture has its own range of expectations about socially approved behaviours (Levine et al., 2000). Stemming primarily from social norms, these expectations form the basis of behaviour evaluation (Burgoon et al., 1995). Any aberrant behaviour that fails to meet the normative expectations and falls outside that expectancy range is met with suspicion or directly equated with deception and dishonesty (Levine et al., 2000). One common manifestation of the Norm Violation Model can be found in the form of common stereotypes about the national character. Stereotypes are an outcome of overgeneralized and tendentious assumptions about people who are different from what we expect. Stereotypes emerge when the difference is interpreted as wrongness (Vincent Marrelli, 2004c). Now when the correlation between social norms and their enunciation in the form of cultural scripts is sufficiently elaborated, it is not difficult to see how the CS

approach can help to combat these suspicions of duplicity and address national stereotypes about the honesty of people.

During within-culture interactions, our assumptions about lying remain operative without us being consciously aware of them. Nevertheless, in cross-cultural encounters, such assumptions come to the fore and we start using them actively either to question our understanding or to sustain our negative perception of others (Vincent Marrelli, 2004a). Wierzbicka (1998) suggests using the technique of cultural scripts to challenge or partly confirm such naïve stereotyping of others which stems from gross generalizations (Wierzbicka, 1998). While cultural insiders are implicitly aware of these norms, explicating metapragmatic awareness about what constitutes socially approved behaviours is a valuable strategy. The metapragmatic awareness thus created is easier to understand and readily available to be circulated and shared within or across cultures. Specifically, it is essential to create metapragmatic awareness of the under-documented cultures such as Pakistan, whose cultural nuances remain obscure so far. Just as data from diverse sources sensitizes a computer programme, cultural awareness from diverse cultural origins can help sensitize deception studies. Had it been the case, the fate of Hamid Hayat (discussed in detail in the Introduction chapter) would have been entirely different.

The CS approach offers an unbeatable advantage in documenting the cultural nuances of a culture for which the existing evidence is scarce. In sections 2.7, 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10 of the current study, it has been amply established that the points of contact between culture, language and deception are too numerous and too diverse to pin down in a single study. Cultural dimensions such as high/low context, individualism/collectivism, femininity/masculinity and types of self-construal make it very difficult to decide upon the point of departure to study a culture for which no such relevant information is already available. Furthermore, it is not easy to detangle the effects of all these dimensions within a cultural context that is a nexus of all these factors. To complicate things further, factors like religion and the moral system entwined with the social system make it challenging to figure out the actual cultural determinants of deception motives and cues (Levine et al., 2016). Finally, it is very difficult to operationalize these concepts without running the risk of using technical jargon or culturally laden words. CS approach does not require operationalizing intricate cultural concepts. It offers a failsafe technique to pass over all these

terminological complexities by looking for purely linguistic evidence.

3.3.3 Natural Semantic Metalanguage

CS approach considers the explication of cultural scripts in the English language as essentially flawed. Describing the experience of one culture by using the culturally coded language of another culture suffers from the flaw of essentialism and reification (Wierzbicka, 2003). Wierzbicka and Goddard's version of cultural scripts is based on a mini-language called Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM henceforth) comprising of non-artificial, universal semantic primes (Goddard & Wierzbicka, 2016). Labelled as Minimal English in recent writings (see Goddard, 2021; Goddard & Wierzbicka, 2021, for instance), this mini-language consists of a small set of radically simplified English words. These words are pan-cultural and every language of the world has an identifiable equivalent for each one of them (Goddard, 2021; Wierzbicka, 2003). These semantic primes are simple to the extent of being indefinable in any other term. Apart from the meaning, their combinatorial properties, valence and complementary distribution are equally transferable in other languages (Goddard & Wierzbicka, 2004).

NSM is not only used as a tool for semantic decomposition but also as a code for writing cultural scripts or cultural rules (Goddard, 1997). The use of NSM guards the cultural representation of an insider experience against ethnocentric bias. Furthermore, it offers a potential means to transport concepts from one language to another without any loss of meaning (Goddard, 2009a, 2009b). Goddard (2006) notes that "Unlike complex English-specific terms (such as 'politeness', 'directness', 'harmony', 'collectivism', etc.) the universal mini-language of semantic primes can be safely used as a common code for cross-linguistic semantics and for ethnopragmatics, free from the danger of terminological ethnocentrism" (p.4). The semantic primes comprising de-Anglicized English (Goddard, 2021) allow articulating bias-free analyses in clear, concise and precise language intelligible to ordinary people without specialized linguistic training.

Formulating certain kinds of cultural scripts requires not only the use of semantic primes but also specific semantic molecules: semantically denser items that form a unit in cultural analyses. While semantic primes are/need to be universal, semantic molecules can be universal or culture-specific. For example, the Korean social category "noin", which roughly denotes respected old people, is an example of culture-specific social categorization or semantic molecule (Goddard, 2009b, p.73).

Since its inception back in the 1970s, NSM has expanded from 14 semantic primitives to a total of 65. The updated list of 65 semantic primes that are purportedly translatable in all the languages of the world is given below:

Table 1

Table of Semantic Primes, English Exponents (After Wierzbicka 2014:247)

Substantives:	I, YOU, SOMEONE, PEOPLE, SOMETHING~THING, BODY
Relational substantives:	KIND, PART
Determiners:	THIS, THE SAME, OTHER~ELSE
Quantifiers:	ONE, TWO, SOME, ALL, MUCH~MANY, LITTLE~FEW
Evaluators:	GOOD, BAD
Descriptors:	BIG, SMALL
Mental predicates:	THINK, KNOW, WANT, FEEL, SEE, HEAR
Speech:	SAY, WORDS, TRUE
Actions, events, movement:	DO, HAPPEN, MOVE
Location, existence, specification:	BE (SOMEWHERE), THERE IS, BE (SOMEONE/SOMETHING)
Possession	(IS) MINE
Life and death:	LIVE, DIE
Time:	WHEN, TIME, NOW, BEFORE, AFTER, A LONG TIME, A SHORT TIME, FOR SOME TIME, MOMENT
Space:	WHERE, PLACE, HERE, ABOVE, BELOW, FAR, NEAR, SIDE, INSIDE, TOUCH
Logical concepts:	NOT, MAYBE, CAN, BECAUSE, IF
Intensifier, augmenter:	VERY, MORE
Similarity:	LIKE, AS, WAY

Note. Table in Wierzbicka, A. (2014). Imprisoned in English: The hazards of English as a default language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

3.3.4 Research Participants of Phase II

The exact number and detailed demographics of the participants involved in various phases of the research are provided in the relevant section; however, an introduction to

the general criterion for the selection of the participants is provided here. Considering that Pakistani culture is a heterogeneous mixture of various ethnicities and sub-cultures, participants were recruited from a diverse pool. Unlike other studies within the IMT paradigm, the study did not opt to draw its sample from a single university. Though it could have been a convenient arrangement to seek for the researcher working as an assistant professor in the higher education department, the study intentionally avoided recruiting an all-student sample for three main reasons. First, given that the enrolment in Pakistani universities is mainly bound to a geographic region, it was not expected to have enough cross-ethnic representation. Second, the student population is generally not as diverse as society's general make-up. Third, particular disciplinary exposure to Anglo thought and philosophy that university education presupposes could interfere with their own raw judgment. The fact was observably visible when the researcher contacted a few of her students to reflect on the cultural meaning of *safaid jhoot* a literal equivalent of the English term *white lie* with entirely different meanings. Many of them interpreted the term on the basis of their knowledge about the English concept of white lies and failed to produce local meaning. Though the study does not exclude university students from its population sample, it tries to diversify its sample by keeping the demographics as varied as possible. Respondents selected from rural as well as urban backgrounds belong to three gender groups (male, female and unspecified), three age groups (18-25, 26-40, 40 and above), three educational levels (Intermediate, Graduate and Post Graduate) and seven ethnic groups (Baloch, Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushtoon, Kashmiri, Balti and others). Notwithstanding the plea for diversity, the study does not claim to have a balanced sample.

3.4 Information Manipulation Theory

Original Information Manipulation Theory (IMT) (McCornack, 1992) and its wholesale theoretical up-gradation in the form of Information Manipulation Theory 2 (IMT2) (McCornack et al., 2014) adopt a functional approach towards deception and lying. Within the purview of IMT, deception is "at once cognitive, ubiquitous, casual and successful" (McCornack, 1997, p. 95). IMT/IMT2 define deception as a contextual problem-solving activity "involving the covert manipulation of information along multiple dimensions . . . driven by the desire for quick, efficient, and viable communicative solutions" (Levine & McCornack, 2014a, p. 345). Although IMT2 builds on IMT by fixing some of its flaws, the general purports of IMT are carried over into IMT 2. The subsequent theoretical discussion mainly refers to IMT2, albeit

concurrent references to IMT can be found sporadically.

IMT2 is a propositional theory of deception production rooted in diverse disciplinary input from artificial intelligence, cognitive neuroscience, speech production and linguistics. Synthesizing literature from these disciplines, IMT2 puts forth a central premise for deceptive discourse production along with three sets of empirically falsifiable propositions belonging to the categories of Intentional states (IS), cognitive load (CL) and information manipulation (IM). The central premise of IMT2 highlights certain truths about how deceptive discourse originates. According to IMT2, both truthful and misleading discourses are the product of the same production system and involve parallel-distributed-processing. Discourse production is a cognitive problem-solving activity constrained by an overall compulsion to maximize efficiency and the structure of working and long-term memory. Discourse production is constructed incrementally, allowing for mid-utterance modifications of discourse streams (McCornack et al., 2014; Morrison et al., 2020). As discourse production is guided by means-end reasoning or effort/reward ratio, lying can sometimes be cognitively more expedient than truth-telling, which amounts to saying that cognitive load is not intrinsic to deception (McCornack et al., 2014).

Various strengths and challenges of IMT2 have been identified in the relevant literature. The theory is recognized for its functional focus (Greene, 2014), for bringing in people's perception of truth for the study of lying (Van Swol, 2014), for challenging pre-act intention as a pre-requisite of lying (Cole, 2014) and for denaturalizing truth as a default response (Verschuere & Shalvi, 2014). One common objection against McCornack et al.'s (2014) model is that it applies only to unplanned, online message production constructed piecemeal. However, the situations in which we can plan our lies ahead of time are not hard to imagine or find (Greene, 2014; Harwood, 2014). Depending upon the perceived likelihood of having to lie and the stakes involved in lying, one can reasonably predict the situation call of having to tell a lie and rehearse and plan lies to make the response more slick and smooth and difficult to detect (Harwood, 2014). One possible defence against this objection is found within IMT2 itself: IMT2 does not preclude intentional or pre-planned deception from its focus; however, as a theory of interpersonal deception, it is mainly concerned with lies that arise spontaneously in daily conversations (McCornack et al., 2014). The theory acknowledges all kinds of possibilities about intentional awareness of deception: it may

not exist altogether, exist briefly or even occur post-facto (Cole, 2014).

3.4.1 Pragmatics of Information Manipulation

One of the chief strengths of IMT is that it offers a range of theoretical foci to select from. Depending upon one's disciplinary interest and expertise, one can formulate research questions that can be approached from several frameworks. Along with providing cognitive and neurological explanations, IMT significantly covers the linguistic and pragmatic grounds of deceptive message design (Jacobs et al., 1996). Prior to IMT, no theory provided a consistent framework to analyse the whole gamut of deception strategies from a pragmatic perspective (Kim, 2008). IMT in general and a set of six propositions made under the category of IM in IMT2 cover the connection between the principles of pragmatics and deceptive message design.

Couched in the Gricean approach, IMT views deception as a non-cooperative counterpart of Grice's cooperative principle (Oswald et al., 2016). According to Grice's Cooperative Principle (CP), the participants in the interaction are expected "to make their contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which they are engaged" (Grice, 1975, p. 45). Grice (1975) further specifies four categories or specific maxims that operate under CP. Quality maxim requires participants in talk to be truthful and avoid false information or for which there is a lack of evidence. Quantity maxim is binding upon providing the optimal amount of information. Manner maxim relates not to what is said but to how it is said. Interactants are expected to avoid obscurity and ambiguity and make their contribution as clear, orderly and brief as possible. Finally, the Relevance maxim calls for saying things that are pertinent to the foregoing discussion. Grice does not suggest that people necessarily adhere to these maxims all the time, but to make sense of each other, people tacitly assume that CP and its specific maxims are in effect at some level.

The study uses the consolidated taxonomy of information manipulation proposed by IMT. IMT consolidates various loose taxonomies of deception identified in previous research by grouping deception types on the basis of covert violation of four conversational maxims identified by Grice. The deceptive discourses do not exist in the form of these isolated or pure types but are found as discrete units nestled among otherwise truthful statements (McCornack, 1992, 1997; Morrison et al., 2020). IMT 2 challenges the prevalent fixation of deception research with bald-faced lies (BFL) and

bald-faced truth (BFT) dichotomy. Instead of adopting a dichotomous or categorical approach to message types as entirely harmonious with reality or explicitly contradictory to factual information, IMT2 emphasizes the continuous nature of deceptive message types. People do not produce bounded, discrete unitary message types (Morrison et al., 2020) but subtle and complex messages that vary on multiple dimensions (McCornack, 1992, 1997; McCornack et al., 2014). Breaking away from BFL and BFT dichotomy, IMT recognizes that deception is embedded in our daily exchanges not only in the forms of lies but also in the form of exaggerations, omissions and clever use of ostensibly truthful statements. Deception is not restricted to falsification only and comprises other verbal acts that are functionally deceptive (McCornack, 1992, 1997; Yeung, Levine, & Nishiyama, 1999). Below is a brief overview of different deception types and their rank order based on the frequency of occurrence and message honesty.

Falsification or BFL as a prototype of the deceptive message occurs by violating the Quality maxim. Maxim of Quality refers to presumptions about the truthfulness of messages. Participants in a conversation shouldn't bring up information they are aware is untrue (Grice, 1989). Falsifications involves fabricating the false information or contorting the truthful one. According to IM1 of IMT2, the impetus for falsification is basically functional in nature. If truthful information is unproblematic according to contextual constraints, people would not/do not produce falsifications. As the situational complexity rises, people deem unaltered truthful information retrieved directly from working memory less plausible or less efficient. In such situations, people would produce false information until the complexity of the situation remains within bound. Beyond a specific threshold level, interactants succumb to the mounting situational complexity and start telling the truth regardless of the outcome (Morrison et al., 2020). Since BFLs occur only if the relevant information is untenable to produce in a given communicative context, BFLs should be relatively rare (McCornack et al., 2014). By drawing evidence from their actual data, Morrison et al. (2020) show that out of a pool of thousands of messages, completely false messages were simply non-existent and only a small proportion of messages contained false information. A vast majority of verbal deception involves a more subtle and complex form of information manipulation (McCornack, 1992; McCornack et al., 2014).

Quantity maxim refers to interactants expectation concerning the amount of

information to be shared in interaction (Grice, 1989). Quantity violations result in lies by omissions. Deception by omission induces a false belief in the hearer, which lacks correspondence with the whole relevant reality (McCornack et al., 1996). Omissions occur in situations where small chunks of overall activated information are problematic to disclose. In situations like this, "people will simply edit out the "bad bits" as they construct their turns-at-talk" (McCornack et al., 2014, p. 366). According to IM2 (proposition number 2 of the set IM), editing information is cognitively less challenging than constructing utterly false information; therefore, Quantity violations are the most commonly occurring manipulation type.

Deception by equivocation results from the covert violation of Manner maxim. Manner maxim requires participants to present information in clear and orderly manner and avoid ambiguity and obscurity (Grice, 1989). Deception can arise out of the manner in which information is presented. IMT2 argues that it is difficult to violate Manner maxim covertly because relational demands constrain the nature of the response that can be produced. Nevertheless, they can frequently occur in situations with greater freedom in selecting a relevant response. McCornack (1992) notes that Manner violation rarely occurs in contexts when questions are asked and frequently occurs in non-constraining, open-ended situations. In the rank order of frequency, Manner violations occur less frequently than Quantity or Quality violations (McCornack et al., 2014).

Deception by evasion involves the covert violation of Relation maxim. This maxim require the assumption that participants will offer information pertinent to the conversation's theme as established by preceding discourse (Grice, 1989). Evasions are the least frequent form of information manipulation. In order to deceive successfully, the violation must operate covertly. In case of an abrupt change of topic, the breach is likely to transpire and cannot remain covert. Violations of Relation are only opted for in very limited circumstances where salient information is too problematic to reveal and any alternate information is not readily accessible.

Put differently, IMT2 proposes a rank-ordering of the frequency of the occurrence of various forms of information manipulation: "Quantity violations should be the most common; Quality violations second (although BFLs should be comparatively rare); Manner violations third; and Relation violations fourth" (McCornack et al., 2014, p. 367).

Along with the frequency rank order proposed in IMT2, McCornack (1992) offers a rank order of message honesty based on violation type. According to IMT, messages involving any violation would be perceived as more deceptive than baseline messages. The quality violations are perceived as the most deceptive of all manipulation types. However, Quantity, Manner and Relevance violations are rated more deceptive than a completely disclosive message (McCornack, 1992).

IMT also elucidates the deceptive power of deceitful messages by using CP apparatus. Deceptive messages successfully deceive because of the expectation about quality, quantity, relation and manner that hold in daily conversations. The target assumes that CP is being adhered to during the conversation. As McCornack (1992) wrote:

> It is the principal claim of Information Manipulation Theory that messages that are commonly thought of as deceptive derive from covert violations of the conversational maxims... Because the violation is not made apparent to the listener, the listener is misled by her/his assumption that the speaker is adhering to the CP and its maxims. (pp. 5-6)

People unostentatiously violate these expectations to deceive others and if these manipulations go unnoticed by the listener, the speaker's deceptive goal succeeds. Even when the covert violation becomes manifest for some reason, the listeners assume adherence to CP at some level and rarely see it as deceptive (McCornack, 1992). To put it briefly, deceptive discourse functions by violating the very belief in which our honest communication is grounded (Kim, 2008).

IMT was first tested by McCornack et al. (1992) who tested IMT with North American subjects and confirmed that most of the predictions made in IMT were consistent with the empirical evidence. The second test of IMT was performed by Jacob et al. (1996), who replicated McCornack's study again with North American participants but with entirely contrasting results: They find IMT inconsistent with Grice's cooperative principle. So far, various tests of IMT (Kim, 2008; Lapinski & Levine, 2000; Yeung et al., 1999) have been performed in a variety of cultures with mixed findings. Though the overall validity of IMT's claims has been attested unanimously, nuanced differences in honesty perception are observed consistently across cultures.

So far, no test of IMT has been conducted in Pakistan or any other South Asian

culture. Surprisingly, even after six years of publication, no empirical investigations of IMT2 can be found to date, except an unpublished work (Morrison et al., 2020) of the University of Alabama research team who propounded IMT2 in the first place. The study tries to bridge this gap by testing the rank order of message honesty proposed in IMT and the rank order of violation frequency put forth in IMT2, both in the Pakistani context. Here it would be apt to clarify that the study is not interested in testing IMT/IMT2 per se but in studying the perception and production of verbal deception for which the said theory offers the most suitable, field relevant and systematic guidelines.

3.5 Theoretical Integration of IMT/IMT2 and CS approach

The current study has some challenging research objectives to meet: It ventures out to study the semantics and pragmatics of deception (referred to as meta-pragmatic awareness elsewhere) from a cross-cultural perspective by still staying relevant to wider deception scholarship, which focuses on the detection and production of deception. The study needs to find some evidence that not only feeds into the pragmatics of lying but also contributes to the broader linguistics of deception one can find in deception literature outside the field of linguistics proper. Given the expanse of the current research objectives and questions, the study needs to combine theoretical and methodological insights from at least three fields: Pragmatic studies of lying and deception, cultural studies of deception and a theory of deceptive discourse design. IMT covers two grounds out of these research foci by presenting a pragmatic explanation of deception working well within the deception production paradigm. The evidence one can get from IMT replication is compelling because of its empirical nature. IMT's systematic empirical approach is very much similar to experimental pragmatics, which has the potential to bring different strands of deception research together (Meibauer, 2011). CS approach is not a theory of deception per se but as a study of interactional norms and emic labels, it has immense potential to cover cultural nuances of verbal deception. By combining IMT/IMT2 with the CS approach, most of the research objectives can be achieved and most of the research questions can be answered. The CS approach helps to generate preliminary insights about the meaning and perception of deception and lying, while the IMT apparatus helps to turn this precursory semantic activity into the empirical pragmatic inquiry of perception and production of deceptive discourse. The following discussion breaks down the theoretical model of the study into smaller nuggets.

Lying is a common feature of the social world and forms a significant part of everyday language use (Arico & Fallis, 2013). The legitimacy of lying as a speech phenomenon (Benton, 2019) makes it all the more amenable to cultural effects. Our ethical judgments and moral assumptions about right and wrong are mainly driven by our understanding of the truth and lying. Nevertheless, social actors take these notions for granted and truth and lying remain out-of-awareness things (Vincent Marrelli, 2004c). Our understanding of lying operates at an imperceptible level that lies beyond our consciousness and cognizance. However, the judgment about lying is potent and readily available for the perusal of the social actors if/when the need arises. Arico and Fallis (2003) demonstrate the socially determined nature of lying by drawing a metaphoric comparison between our judgment about the metallurgic properties of aluminium and our sense of what it means to lie. In case of wrong judgment about the properties of aluminium, there can be a tangible source of evidence to challenge our understanding. However, in the case of lying, there is no other court of appeal than a mutually shared sense of social reality. There is always a common-sense conception of lying at play that enables people to be systematically correct in their lie judgements (Arico & Fallis, 2013). The role of the CS approach to explicate such *out-of-awareness* understanding is pretty obvious; however, IMT is also doing the same, albeit indirectly.

By proposing the correlation between various types of information management (maxim violations) and honesty ratings, IMT is also trying to uncover the people's tacit appraisal of the various message types and their appropriateness in a given context. When people rate messages on honesty scales, they evaluate the messages not based on their personal whims but on the basis of systematic schemata they have in their mind about the correct (or truthful) way of coding information. By looking at the evidence yielded by IMT in this way, the compatibility between IMT and CS approach starts to transpire. The predictions made by IMT are a form of superscript about what happens when people's preferred way of speaking is violated.

IMT2 also posits a few propositions about what people would actually say if faced with a choice to lie on a particular occasion. Deception as a problem-solving activity involves means-end reasoning, which requires careful evaluation of contextual limitations. McCornack et al. (2014) acknowledge that the type of response produced in a given context is primarily determined by the pragmatic constraints of the situation. IMT2 specifies the conditions under which a speaker would choose falsification,

omission, evasion or equivocation as deception strategies. In doing so, what IMT2 seems to offer is specific scripts about the actual norms of interactions: Who will say what within a specific situation? What IMT2 fails to acknowledge is the lingo-cultural nature of these scripts. Here, the CS approach can rescue IMT2 by strengthening the researcher's predictive power about the nature of basic cultural assumptions.

Both theories consider linguistic evidence as to their critical explanatory force, albeit differently. Each culture has its own pragmatics defined by its salient keywords, which can be uncovered by the semantic analysis of emic labels. Such analysis is attestably a reliable method to capture people's raw understanding of what it means to lie (Dynel & Meibauer, 2016). The cultural keywords paradigm can offer additional support and advantage to unravel complex cultural thoughts and formulate tentative hypotheses that can be tested by IMT's experimental design. IMT's propositional nature is advantageous in formulating and testing the hypothesis in the controlled situation, which is difficult to achieve in semantic analyses, which always beg the question of (non) inclusion of examples and counterexamples. Furthermore, the CS approach is quite flexible in accepting data created from a range of sources. The elicitation techniques used in IMT to capture the language user's tacit understanding of verbal deception is one of the approved methods of data collection in the CS approach (Goddard & Wierzbicka, 2004). It can be concluded that the IMT paradigm can offer a powerful way of collecting reliable data for the semantic explications done in the CS approach.

3.5.1 Eliminating Ethno-Linguistic Bias

As elaborated in the previous sections, IMT/IMT2 is based on the Gricean Model of social interaction. On the other hand, Wierzbicka formulated the theory of cultural scripts in reaction to the Universalist approaches to pragmatics, particularly Grice's cooperative principle (1975). Grice's maxims portend interpersonal interactions of mainstream White American English as standard way of speaking likely to be found in every culture with minor adjustments. The theory of cultural script vehemently disavows this stance and questions all presumptions of universality (Wierzbicka, 2003). If CP is inadequate to describe various models of talks in other cultures, its adequacy to describe the deceptive discourse production across all cultures can be questioned on similar grounds. Wierzbicka, in her landmark publication *Cross-Cultural Pragmatics* (1991,2003), categorically mentions the cultural attitude towards truth as a central point of difference that might exist between cultures. What counts as

a "fundamental truth or basic truth" in one culture may not be something worth saying in another culture (Wierzbicka, 2003, p.446). People's perception of the role of language and information in social interactions and other cultural values is reflected in how they speak or evaluate various speech patterns (Wierzbicka, 2003). Appeal to the notion of universality found in IMT/IMT2 can be problematic on many grounds.

The fact is confirmed by various replications of IMT in other cultures which reported that certain alterations of truth are considered necessary to maintain social harmony (Lapinski & Levine, 2000). Indirect cultures have more tolerance for violations of maxims than the US (Yeung et al., 1999). Yeung et al. (1999) tested IMT in Hong Kong and found cultural differences in expectations about violations and their correlation with deceptiveness. They found that Quality and Relevance violations were also viewed as deceptive in Hong Kong; however, Quantity and Manner violations were not perceived as more dishonest than baseline messages. Nevertheless, they noted that violations of all types were positively correlated with the perception of deceptiveness (Yeung et al., 1999).

Lapinski and Levine (2000) studied the effect of construal types on honesty ratings of various maxim violations. Independent self-construal was more positively correlated with the ratings of deceptiveness in Quality violations, while interdependent self-construal was highly associated with honesty ratings in relevance violations (Lapinski & Levine, 2000). However, the overall effect of violations on honesty ratings was consistent with McCornack et al.'s (1992) findings. Simply put, how people deceive or perceive a message as deceptive or truthful varies systematically across cultures (Lapinski & Levine, 2000).

There are two ways to deal with this apparent discrepancy found between the two theories; First, to completely discredit the predictions made by IMT/IMT2 about the pragmatics of information manipulation altogether, and second, to find a ground of reconciliation between these two extreme positions. The current study adopts the course of reconciliation. There is no systematic approach other than IMT/IMT2 that gives a holistic framework to study pragmatic aspects of deception. Owing to its propositional nature and transparency of results, the theory is very suitable for cross-linguistic and cross-cultural replications (Vincent Marrelli, 2004a). Keeping in view the potential advantages IMT/IMT2 can offer, discrediting its predictions would be throwing the baby out with the bathwater. One needs to find a way that keeps the best

of both theories by exploring a ground that mitigates the theoretical contradiction.

Yeung et al. (1999) have already provided a way to reconcile the plea for universality with the plea for culturally contingent pragmatics. Their findings reveal that predictions made by IMT are generalizable; however, cultures demonstrate considerable variability in what counts as a (covert) violation. People associate covert violation with deceptiveness; however, their idea of violation may be derived from culture-specific ways of speaking. Kim's (2008) finding can bring exciting evidence for this proposition. Even though indirectness is highly tolerated in Korean culture, the correlation between honesty ratings and maxim violation was similar to the original findings of IMT. The effect of indirectness on message rating mainly depends on overt and covert violations; covert violations are always less tolerated regardless of the culture type (Kim, 2008). Despite specific variations in self-construal types and interaction styles, all experimental tests of IMT have found an overall effect of the violation type on the perception of honesty (Lapinski & Levine, 2000; Yeung et al., 1999). Vincent Marrelli (2004a) and Meibauer (2017) summarize the whole debate in the most befitting manner: "In experimental situations, the Gricean CP still also seems to be generally relevant" (Vincent Marrelli, 2004a, p. 347), even if not fully governing "since 'supportive' cultures are also 'cooperative' cultures" (Meibauer, 2017, p. 49).

However, to keep ethnolinguistic bias at bay, the descriptions must be kept as neutral as possible. The entire situation calls for an approach that has the potential to bypass the linguistic baggage of English terminology and present findings in a simple, neutral and comprehensible manner (Wierzbicka, 2003). The technique of cultural scripts can be used to explicate cultural norms about lying and truth by achieving a level of transparency that transcends the protean global labels such as image-management, self-construal, face, imposition and privacy. The theory gains this transparency by circumventing the arcane academic terminology and refuses to follow the Gricean tradition of using Anglocentric concepts and language to define and describe the cultures of the non-English speaking world. Without resorting to complex terminology, the theory uses culturally salient keywords to reach the core values and norms that form the crux of cultural thought (Wierzbicka, 1997).

Moreover, we do not need to establish the profile of the culture under study to trace back the antecedents of social behaviours in acknowledged cultural dimensions. The theory allows us to engage in an upfront linguistic analysis of key cultural concepts

and draw conclusions based on the evidence. Apart from being rooted in local languages, the theory has agreed on presenting the information in culturally neutral terms.

3.6 Methodology

The research objectives of the study mainly drive the choice of research methodology. The study had the broader aim of denaturalizing local sedimented practices by creating meta-pragmatic awareness about the concept of deception and eventually sensitizing deception scholarship to the cultural variance. As meta-pragmatic awareness was operationalized as the knowledge about how deception is defined, perceived and produced in a given culture, the aim translated into specific research objectives addressing various components. Each objective required to collect different units of information. The data was collected to explicate the exact constitution of the speech acts of lying and deception, the production and perceived honesty of various messages and the degree of moral turpitude associated with different deceptive strategies. Nevertheless, these units of information required more than one method to collect and analyze data. Furthermore, the imperceptible nature of this cultural knowledge necessitated using multiple methods to achieve reliable results.

Just like theoretical triangulation, the study used methodological triangulation to investigate the perception and production of deceptive discourses in Pakistani culture. First and foremost, it is important to justify using two different methodologies and types of data set to inform about the cultural attitude towards deception. As social phenomena are too complex to be pinned down to a single perfect measure, the triangulation strategy offers multiple measurements of the single construct to generate reliable results (Heath, 2015). Talking specifically about the cultural studies of truthfulness (or lying and deception, for that matter), Vincent Marrelli (2004) encourages using triangulation. According to him,

> Different types of data catch different aspects (ranging from what people do, to what they think they do, to what they think they should do). … data on these aspects, from all the available types of the investigation procedure, must be brought together and 'triangulated', and that it is the 'conspiracy' of data, if and when it occurs, which allows us to gain valid insights. (Vincent Marrelli, 2004a, p. 319)

Working within the IMT paradigm, there is a need to study deception from a

more culture-specific framework. Such an approach has the potential to yield more important insights which are not possible to achieve working alone within the IMT framework. Furthermore, data triangulation can help fix a flaw in the IMT paradigm. One common objection against IMT is the artificiality of the situational prompts used to elicit data. (Galasiński, 2000; Oswald et al., 2016). Only naturally occurring data can be thought of as reflecting true cultural talk in all its cultural essence (Vincent Marrelli, 2004a). However, in the case of lying and deception, it is very difficult to record actual lies spoken in real time. In order to compensate for naturally- occurring data, triangulation of data can be a good approach. IMT and CS approach can also complement each other in generating evidence. Complementing IMT's elicited data with naturally occurring keywords can partially help to remove this objection. Though both types of data are not comparable in nature, the evidence generated from each of them can enhance the validity of the results. Furthermore, each step in IMT methodology can generate at least some evidence to test, verify or refine cultural scripts derived from cultural keywords.

Based on the methodological assumptions stated earlier, the study integrated the methodological guidelines found within the CS approach with the empirical design of IMT to create a holistic account of deception across cultures. Within the CS paradigm, the pragmatics of a given culture is essentially rooted in the semantics of culturally salient keywords. Therefore, the study conducted a thorough semantic exploration of the relevant semantic fields followed by replication of IMT methodology to harvest the best of both worlds.

The methodology of the current study was built in a mosaic-like fashion in which small tiles of evidence were collected to form one big picture. The study used the evidence collected at each step not only to further IMT experimental design but also to draw certain conclusions about the cultural scripts of deception in Pakistani culture. In order to study the perception and production of verbal deception in Pakistani society, the research was conducted in two phases. The first phase (referred to as Phase I in the subsequent sections) involved using the standard Ethnopragmatic technique of using cultural scripts to study the emic labels used to code truth, lying, deception and other related speech phenomena to unearth cultural meanings, beliefs and attitudes towards lying and deception. The second phase (referred to as Phase II in the subsequent sections) was based on the replication of IMT's experimental design. The details of each round of studies are provided in the sections below, however, limitations

of each phase can be found at the end of relevant data analysis chapters. The findings of the second phase of studies not only revealed the rank-order of message honesty and frequency of occurrence of various maxim violations proposed in IMT but also tested hypotheses generated as a result of semantic explications created in Phase I.

3.7 Data Collection

There are two sets of data corresponding to each phase of the study.

3.7.1 Data for Phase I

The phase I of the study used linguistic evidence derived from the Urdu language. Being the official national language and lingua franca of Pakistan, the Urdu language is the richest source of the cultural heritage shared between the ethnically diverse regions of Pakistan. Initially, the study used two sources to collect linguistic evidence for the Urdu language i.e., Dictionary searches and culturally salient texts circulating in the form of religious writings, anecdotes and famous sayings. Lexical and phrasal items, idioms, proverbs, conversation particles, and interactional routines of Urdu language were culled from three Urdu dictionaries: Farhang-e- Asifia (Dehlvi, 1908), Jadeed Naseem-ul-Lughat Urdu (Lakhnoi et al., 1989) and Comprehensive Edition of Ilmi Urdu Lughat (Sarhindi, 1976). These dictionaries were selected after the recommendation by Urdu language experts who testified about the authenticity of these dictionaries. A content analysis of the lexical items, phrases and proverbs was performed to group them under different sub-themes. The lists under each section are not exhaustive; however, a special precaution was taken to include all culturally salient and socially familiar linguistic items (The final lists can be found in Appendix A). The lists were repeatedly updated over the course of three years to ensure that they comprehensively reflect what the study intended to investigate. Culturally salient texts were extracted from books, religious texts, oral narrations and popular social media content.

Keeping in view the fact that native speaker intuition is the most reliable source of semantic explications (Goddard & Wierzbicka, 2021) and dictionaries rarely speak about the salience, and entrenchment, as well as the affective and associative meanings of the words, counter- checks in the form of key informants, were regularly made. Key informants for the Urdu language (N=10) were native speakers of the Urdu language who had first-hand experience of Pakistani culture and language. Though physical mobility is not a precondition to get exposure to a foreign culture in the era of mass and social media, caution was made to select nonmobile key informants who had never

been abroad. The chief motivation behind the selection was to ensure that the chances of their direct exposure to another culture were minimal. Six of the solicited key informants were female and four were males, while all were above 30 years of age and held at least a bachelor's degree. The mode of interaction was flexible and informants were engaged in recurrent interactions in the form of formal/informal interviews, telephonic conversations and short text messages.

3.7.2 Data for Phase II

Phase II study followed the empirical design proposed by McCornack (1992) and McCornack et al. (2014). The data for this phase of research was collected in four steps. Combining all steps, a total of 1521 respondents participated in Phase II of the current study. The detailed demographics of the participants, situational prompts and semantic scales used to collect data can be found in sections 3.9 and 3.10. However, a brief discussion of each step is given below.

Table 2

Step-wise Detail of Number of Participants in Phase II Study

Task	N	%
Total	1521	100
Scenario Generation	147	9.66
Scenario Evaluation	193	12.68
Deception Production	428	28.14
Deception Perception	753	49.50

In the first step, respondents (N=147) participated in the scenario generation task. The respondents were students, colleagues and chance contacts of the researcher who were contacted through an online survey similar to Levine et al. (2016) and McCornack's (1992) surveys to elicit situations in which deception occurs. The participants were asked to report a recent situation in which they deceived someone or a situation in which someone else deceived them. The responders were urged to record all relevant situational information and specify the precise words the speaker used to deceive in that specific circumstance.

In the second step, in another online survey, the respondents (N=193) evaluated the locally created scenarios for the lie potential. The respondents were asked to read the scenario carefully and respond to two prompts 'I would likely deliver a message in this

situation that somehow twists or conceals information' and 'It would be difficult in this situation to be completely truthful' on three 7-point semantic differential scales. Scenarios with mid-range lie potential were selected for the next rounds.

In the third step, the respondents (N=428) participated in an online survey to complete the deception production task. The task was based on reading a scenario and responding to the lie-eliciting prompt requiring participants to produce a message that violated the expectation of honesty in some way or the other.

In the fourth step, the respondents (N=753) participated in an online survey and completed a deception perception task. They read two scenarios followed by six types of messages and rated each message on four honesty perception semantic scales. The detail of the instrument can be found in 3.11.3. The ratings on these scales were used to compute the honesty perception of each type of message.

3.8 Phase I: Cultural scripts of Truth, Lying and Deception in Pakistani Culture

Phase I of the study used the cultural script approach to explicate Pakistani scripts of truth and lying written in the NSM. No such attempt has been made to study the communicative nuances of lies and truth in Pakistani culture. This study brought forth the understanding of the Pakistani conceptualization of truth and lies reflected in and through the Urdu lexical items. The study was primarily focused on Pakistani culture; however, in order to highlight its nuanced differences, frequent references were made to parallel concepts/words/scripts found in North American culture. The selection was based on the premise that most of the research in deception is predominantly conducted in the North American context (Lewis et al., 2009). There is prolific literature available about North American culture to compare and contrast with Pakistani culture.

The study tried to uncover implicit perceptions of people about lying and deception by ransacking the meanings in four broad semantic domains: Truth, lying/deception, the directness/indirectness of speech and silence. The selection of these domains was both intuitive and research-backed. The semantic analysis of lexical items (emic labels) is the standard semantic methodology used in many studies of lying (Levison, 2016; Peeters, 2018; Wierzbicka, 2002). The study also endorsed the view that truth and lying are part of the same conceptual package and an exploration of lying cannot be teased apart from the exploration of truth (Vincent Marrelli, 2004c). Instead of studying single lexical items used in Urdu to code lying and truth, the study covered the entire

semantic field. Since the study was not focused on lying alone but on deception at large, it also explored the cultural attitude towards direct/indirect speech and the role of silence in social interactions. The selection of these two domains was motivated by the fact that these two facets of communication are attestably found relevant to the concept of deception. IMT's theoretical framework also treats violations of Quantity, Manner and Relevance both as a sign of indirectness or deceptiveness depending upon the culture and context

The evidence for the cultural scripts was derived from at least four different but simultaneously performed lexical analyses as proposed by Vincent Marrelli (2004b): Insights gained from the dictionary and thesaurus-based information, semantic differential analyses to uncover the positive or negative loading of the terms, the analysis of frequent idiomatic expressions, collocations and proverbs and componential analyses in the form of NSM to reveal folk attitudes and the incipient folk taxonomies. Furthermore, each cultural script was validated by providing support in the form of cultural and religious texts. The direction of the support remained bidirectional: For some sub-themes, the cultural and religious texts were put forth first to set the contours of a script. Then, the effects of cultural thought were traced back to the Urdu lexicon. For some others, the order was reversed i.e., Lexical analysis was performed prior to garnering any other textual evidence.

The study involved a lot of back-and-forth communication between the researcher and the key informants over the course of three years to reach a conclusion about the meaning, usage and connotation of a culturally salient emic label. Key informants were requested to authenticate the dictionary data to avoid including archaic, overly formal and unpopular terms. They were also requested to fill a form by adding their evaluation of the linguistic units where needed. Here, evaluation means the act of applying to a given language content (meaning) the binary opposition of positive or negative attitude (Petrova, 2019). An item was classed as a positive, negative or neutral lexical item only if it was marked so by the majority of the key informants (5 or more). Individual lexical entries in the given sub-themes marked as positive, negative or neutral were further grouped as negative, neutral and positive clusters to conclude the markedness, neutrality and (moral and social) appropriateness of verbal behaviour, respectively.

Each Urdu entry in the form of words, multiword expressions, proverbs,

sayings or quotes was transliterated, italicized and provided with the English translation. The study used ijunoon.com's web transliteration service to transliterate from Urdu to Roman Script (Ijunoon.com, 2020). In order to trace the etymological origin or the uniqueness of the cultural thought, the literal translation of the linguistic units is preferred over the idiomatic translation; however, idiomatic translations are also provided where necessary.

The regular references to the parallel English words and research findings of Anglo-American norms were made to get a comparative picture of both cultures. In order to clarify a certain meaning about an English term, phrase or proverb, the English key informants were not contacted directly but through English blogs like Quora, Wordreference and WordHippo that allow asking questions from a native speaker about the present meaning, connotation and salience of a particular word. Different Quora entries were also used to substantiate the findings concerning Urdu lexical items.

Based on this evidence, two tentative sets of cultural scripts were explicated in the NSM. Though the study was able to identify recognizable patterns in Pakistani cultural thought based on the evidence in hand, the conclusions made solely on semantic evidence can be insufficient or inconclusive. Further evidence to validate these preliminary cultural scripts is gleaned from the experimental data collected during the next phase.

3.9 Phase II: Production and Perception of Deception in Pakistani Culture

Second phase of the study is based on an elaborate empirical design. It's a multi-step scenario-based study with deceptive discourse production and deceptive discourse perception tasks. The responses were collected through online surveys asking respondents to produce or rate deceptive/truthful statements on 7-point semantic differential scales. The scenario and messages were coded by trained coders according to a specifically designed coding scheme. The reliability of the coding scheme was also established. The details of the design, instruments and the participants of the study are provided in the following sections.

3.9.1 Key Variable

Apart from culture as the mega key variable, the study identified two other variables that would affect how verbal deception is produced or perceived in Pakistani culture. The idea was motivated by the empirical findings that both perception and production

of deception are the functions of context (McCornack and Levine, 2014b).

3.9.1.1 Deception Motives

The study adopts Buller and Burgoon's (1994, 1996) typology of deception motives to categorize various motivations to deceive. They propound that just like honest communication, deceptive discourses are also guided by some overarching motivation to influence the recipient's belief. According to their classificatory scheme, deception can be motivated by instrumental motives, interpersonal motives and identity motives.

Instrumental lies are told to avoid punishment or gain or protect self-interest, resources, power, services or needs. Interpersonal lies are told to maintain, maximize or terminate relationships, avoid tension and conflict in a relationship or protect the target from hurt. Identity lies are told to protect Face or to save the liar or the target from shame and embarrassment (Buller & Burgoon, 1994). Their typology was found to be consistent with Levine's (2016) deception motives. Their ten deception motives can be safely grouped in three broader categories proposed by Buller and Burgoon with the exception of pathological lies, which are told without any apparent purpose and exist in negligible proportion. Table 3 summarizes the relationship between the two typologies.

Table 3

Typology of Deception Motives

Buller and Burgoon's Deception Motives	Levine et al.'s Taxonomy of Deception Motives
Instrumental Motives	Personal Transgressions
	Economic advantage
	Non-monetary personal advantage
	Practical jokes
	Malicious lies
	Altruistic lies
Interpersonal Motives	Avoidance
	Social Polites
Identity Motives	Self-impression management

Working within IMT and CS paradigms, the study predicted that there might exist within-culture variations in perception and production of verbal deception produced for different deception motives. Apart from a master script consistent with the language ideology prevalent in a culture, there can be different cultural subscripts based on the objectives of verbal deception. Attending to the fact that different deception motives are perceived differently, the absence of cognitive dissonance about

a certain type of lying in a given culture can also be explained. The proposition is motivated by a host of observations made in various studies of deceptive communication.

So far, all tests of IMT are based on the relational context in which lies are told to protect the interpersonal relationship. Participants are asked to produce or rate information in a problematic relational situation. McCornack et al. (1992) acknowledge that some of their findings about message honesty and message competence are partly reliant on the relational context of the scenarios requiring a romantic partner to dump all sensitive information. It is acknowledged that different contextual factors would have caused different results (McCornack et al., 1992). The interpersonal domain is recognized as the trickiest site where the questions about truth-telling are continually evaluated in the light of relationship-maintaining factors (Levine & McCornack, 2014b). In individualist societies, the society is believed to function only if sufficient trust is reposed in the honesty of interpersonal communication (Homolka, 2017). For individualistic cultural orientation, any form of information manipulation contrary to the value of interpersonal honesty is deemed deceptive or negative.

Conversely, for a collectivist culture, deception can be a means to achieve certain interpersonal goals, resulting in greater tolerance for maxim violation (Kim, 2008; Lapinski & Levine, 2000). However, given the range of situations in which deception occurs, it cannot be concluded that collectivist cultures would always rate information manipulation as less deceptive or socially functional. Moreover, the characteristic nature of interpersonal motives of deception makes it difficult to conclude if the findings based on interpersonal deception motives can be transposed to other situations in which deception is motivated by some other social needs.

Cultural identity is another potent determinant of our perception and motivation to deceive (Kim, 2008). The concept of face upheld in culture would determine if identity lies are appreciated, abhorred or tolerated. If deception is in consonance with the cultural expectations about face needs, deception would be judged less harshly, rather approvingly (Buller and Burgoon 1994; Lapinski and Levine 2000). Similarly, if group identity is perceived to be preferred over individual identity, people would have greater motivation to use deception as a face maintenance tool (Kim, 2008; Lapinski & Levine, 2000).

Lying for instrumental reasons is the quintessential type of deception expected to garner an altogether different evaluation than lies motivated by relational or identity needs. Already existing experimental studies which encourage participants to deceive to acquire or maintain resources yield sufficient evidence to hypothesize that the motivation for lying may alter the perception or the selection of deceptive messages (Buller & Burgoon, 1994).

3.9.1.2 Self/Other-Benefit.

Apart from deception motives, cultural judgments are also divided on the basis of the potential beneficiary of deception. Individualist and collectivist orientations are reported to vary systematically in their motivation and perception about self-serving or altruistic lies. Working within IMT methodology, Lapinski and Levine (2000) have studied the effect of benefit type on message honesty and found an interaction between violation type and benefits condition. Each violation type was evaluated differently depending on the benefit condition. In their data, self-serving manipulations of Quantity were seen as significantly more devious than those for the other benefit. Conversely, Manner violations were considered more conniving when performed to benefit others. Keeping in line with their assumptions, the study also makes benefit type its key variable. Moreover, the study predicts that the deception motive will also moderate the main effect of benefit. The perception of deception for each deception motive will vary depending on the beneficiary of the deception. Therefore, the deception strategies would also correlate with benefit types in each deception motive.

3.10 Phase II-Part A: Deceptive Discourse Production in Pakistani Culture

Part A of Phase II comprised a study of deceptive discourse production, which built on IMT methodology and tried to find out how Pakistani people lie in various contexts. It tested the key claims made in IMT2 about the frequency of various violation types in deceptive discourse production. This study replicated the original IMT method; however, specific adjustments to suit the goals of the current study were made. The findings of the study were compared with the analogous findings in the North-American context.

3.10.1 Scenario Generation

Given the fact that dating scenarios used in the original IMT's preliminary test and its other replications may not be suitable for the specific context of Pakistani culture, a

survey was conducted to create local scenarios that are not only suitable and familiar for the Pakistani cultural context but also reflect social actor's sense of what counts as deception. Respondents (N=147) who were students, colleagues and chance contacts of the researcher were contacted through an online survey similar to Levine et al. (2016) and McCornack's (1992) surveys to elicit situations in which deception occurs. However, keeping in view the findings that emerged in the form of preliminary cultural scripts, it was speculated that Pakistani respondents would be unwilling to self-report any serious lie they have told recently. Therefore, the participants were given the freedom to report a recent situation in which they deceived someone or a situation in which someone else deceived them. The respondents were encouraged to write all situational details and report the exact words the speaker used to deceive in that particular situation. They were also asked to report the motive behind that particular instance of deception they have reported.

The participants who identified themselves as belonging to three gender groups (male, female and unspecified), three age groups (18-25, 26-40, 40 and above), three educational levels (Intermediate, Graduate and Post Graduate) and seven ethnic groups (Baloch, Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushtoon, Kashmiri, Balti and others) responded to the survey questions by writing a detailed account of a self or other- reported deception. The exact demographics of the participants are provided in Table 4.

Table 4

Participants' Demographics for Scenario Generation

Demographics	n	%
Total	147	100
Gender		
Male	40	27.21
Female	104	70.75
Unspecified	03	2.04
Age		
18-25	92	62.59
25-40	39	26.53
40 and above	16	10.88
Education		
Intermediate	21	14.29
Graduate	62	42.17
Post	64	43.54
Graduate		

Ethnic Groups		
Baloch	09	6.12
Punjabi	88	59.86
Sindhi	13	8.84
Pushtoon	19	12.92
Kashmiri	06	4.08
Balti	2	1.36
Others	10	6.80

The reported deception accounts that were sufficiently detailed (N= 89) were then reworded to remove any unique identifier of the respondent's identity. Furthermore, the accounts were then rephrased by changing past tense to present tense and third or first-person pronouns into second-person pronouns to turn them into accounts of hypothetical situations in which the respondents are the main character. The resultant scenarios eventually had all the situational details except the actual deceptive message that was produced.

3.10.2 Scenario Selection

Out of 89 scenarios, 18 scenarios were selected for the scenario evaluation. The scenarios were selected based on three sets of criteria: The frequency of occurrence in the reported data, the familiarity of the situation to the everyday cultural experience of the cultural insiders and the freedom from any other moral confound. For instance, scenario Replica Seller was selected on the criterion that deception during online shopping was the most commonly reported situation; in a sample of 147, five people reported a situation similar to this. In order to avoid any moral confound in people's sense of judgement, any scenario that would cause negative evaluation for some reasons other than lying was not included. For example, scenarios that reported flirtatious relationships could invite moral outrage in Pakistani culture, where an extramarital relationship between a man and a woman is strongly disapproved and could interfere with people's perception of deception. Given the fact that both the theory of cultural scripts and IMT are designed to explain interpersonal interactional norms, all of the scenarios selected for the evaluation involved dyadic, synchronous (Face-to-Face or Computer-mediated) exchange as a prototype of interpersonal, interactive communication.

3.10.3 Scenario Coding Scheme

The scenarios (N=18) shortlisted at the scenario selection phase were further categorized into various deception motives according to a coding scheme that

integrated Levine et al.'s (2016) and Buller and Burgoon's deception motive typology (Refer to Table 3).

In addition to this, the scenarios were also categorized for self-benefiting and other-benefiting conditions. There is a general trend in the existing research to associate instrumental motives with self-serving lies and interpersonal motives with the mutual benefit of relationship maintenance (see Buller and Burgoon 1994; Lapinski and Levine 2000; Levine et al. 2016). However, based on a cultural insider's intuition and the general observations about the collectivist cultures, it was expected to come across lies in Pakistani data that were told to gain and protect resources for others i.e., It was likely to come across both self and other benefitting instrumental deception. The scenario generation task confirmed the researcher's intuitive assumption and the respondents' reported lies that involved instrumental motives but centred on selfless, other-oriented benefit. In the same vein, it was anticipated that people's perception would be divided between lies of economic nature and the lies told for some other social/personal gain. The suggestion is similar to Levine et al.'s (2016) observations about Pakistani data that deception judgment and deception strategy may vary across monetary and non-monetary contexts. Consequently, to approximate people's raw judgment about deception in instrumental contexts, this specific motive type was further split into monetary and non-monetary advantages and the results in both domains were treated as a combined measure of deception in instrumental contexts. Similarly, apart from the macro benefit of protecting the relationship from potential damage, the researcher was able to identify a micro benefit of the interpersonal lies that served either the speaker's or the target's needs. Put simply, interpersonal deceptions were also subdivided into self/other-benefit. Correspondingly, as predicted by Buller and Burgoon (1994), identity lies were also split between self-impression management lies and lies told to protect the identity of the target or any third party. The coding scheme for scenario types is provided in Table 5 while the eight recruited scenarios are described in Appendix B.

Table 5

Scenario Coding Scheme and *Corresponding Scenarios

Benefit Type	Motive Type		
	Instrumental	Relational	Identity
Self- oriented	Lies told to avoid punishment Lies told to gain or protect self-interests, resources, power, services or needs.	Lies told to maintain, maximize or terminate relationships Lies told to avoid tension and conflict in a relationship	Lies told to save one's face Lies told to save the liar from shame and embarrassment.
	Replica Seller Plagiarized Project	Wedding Invitation	Fired
Other- Oriented	Lies told to protect others' interests or gain resources and service for others	Lies told to protect the target from hurt	Lies told to save addressees face Lies told to save the target from shame and embarrassment
	Hospital Card Lost Tablet	Commitment Crisis	Friendly Feast

Note. * The names of the scenarios fulfilling the respective motive and benefit conditions are placed in the corresponding cell.

To ensure that the participants' responses were chiefly motivated by the stated motive and benefit conditions, the selected scenarios were carefully rewritten in a fashion that the specific motive and benefit type get distinctly enunciated in the scenario description.

The coding was further evaluated by a trained coder other than the researcher. The reliability of the coding scheme was measured by Kohen's Kappa. The intercoder agreement was sufficiently high and kappa was found 0.78.

3.10.4 Scenario Evaluation

The scenarios were then further split into three sets of six each and a survey was designed to evaluate scenarios for the lie potential. Out of the total number of respondents (N=193), 76 respondents were randomly assigned to set 1, 53 to set 2 and 64 to set 3. Since the participants were assigned to various scenarios using simple randomization, there were an unequal number of participants allocated to each scenario. As the sample size was more than 120, an unequal sample size did not alter

the outcome of the study. The respondents were once again recruited from the researcher's social circle and were demographically diverse. The respondents were asked to read the scenario carefully and respond to the statements 'I would likely deliver a message in this situation that somehow twists or conceals information' and 'It would be difficult in this situation to be completely truthful' on three 7-point semantic differential scales.

3.10.5 Pilot Testing

For pilot testing, the scale was first administered in-person to a small group (N=07) from the researcher's immediate circle. The respondents were asked to reflect and give feedback on how they understood each question and response choices. The response time to solve each scenario was also noted. In light of the average time needed to read each scenario and respond to survey questions (varying between 7 to 8 minutes), it was decided to allocate only two scenarios to each participant. The choice was maintained throughout the research design and each participant was allocated to only one version of the survey, including two scenarios each.

Initially, the study adopted McCornack's (1992) 7-point semantic differential scales; likely/unlikely, probable/improbable, possible/impossible, and true/false. However, during pilot testing, it was realized that respondents who were non-native speakers of English found terms 'likely, possible and probable' extremely confusing and semantically repetitive. After careful deliberations, the scales were simplified by replacing the terms with less confusing alternatives and merging likely/unlikely and probable/improbable scales into a single expected/unexpected semantic differential scale. The simplified scales are shown in Figure 1.

Finally, the lie potential for each of the 18 scenarios was calculated by combining the score on all six scales (three scales for each question) and then dividing the number by the total number of items. The lie potential for each scenario could potentially range from 1(the lowest) to 6 (the highest). One scenario from each category with lie potential falling in the mid-range was selected for the deception production task. The selection of mid-range lie- provoking situations is motivated by the original IMT's design (McCornack, 1992) and suggestions made by Kim (2008) to use scenarios with a moderate level of lie potential.

Figure 1

Lie Potential Scales

Possible ·　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Impossible

```
 |____|____|____|____|____|____|
 1    2    3    4    5    6    7
```

Expected　　　　　　　　　　　　　Unexpected

```
 |____|____|____|____|____|____|
 1    2    3    4    5    6    7
```

True　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　False

```
 |____|____|____|____|____|____|
 1    2    3    4    5    6    7
```

The final pool of prompt scenarios consisted of eight scenarios balanced between deception motives and benefit types. The mean lie potential for all the selected scenarios ranged between 3.5 to 4.5. The entire practice ensured that all the situational prompts were based on familiar cultural contexts with a fair chance of success in generating deceptive discourse.

3.10.6 Design

Eight recruited scenarios were further subdivided into four sets with two scenarios each. The respondents (N=428) were given a survey in which they were asked to read two different hypothetical situations and write what they would have actually said in this situation. Scenarios were written in a manner that required respondents to imagine themselves as the main characters in the scenario or the producer of the deceptive discourse. The respondents were asked to answer an open-ended question about what they would say if faced with the given situation.

3.10.7 Pilot Study

The survey was first administered to a small but diverse group of participants (N=15) comprising of the researcher's friends and colleagues. The participants were requested to give feedback about the clarity of the prompts and the survey question. The survey completion time was within the accepted limit and the participants had no reservations about the clarity of the survey. Nevertheless, the results of the pilot testing revealed that the respondents were inclined to adopt a hypercorrect moral stance and appeared unwilling to lie. Almost 98% of the respondents produced truthful statements, many of which were accompanied by a short note about the immorality of lying and their personal preference for truth under all conditions. The outcome was problematic for a

study of deceptive discourse production. In the light of pilot testing, the researcher had to make some changes to the questionnaire. Instead of asking an open-ended question about what they would say, the question was changed to a precise lie-eliciting prompt: Respondents were asked to write what they would say if they had to lie or deceive about the situation.

3.10.8 Participants of Deceptive Discourse Production Task

The respondents (N=428) who participated in the deception production task were contacted online. They identified themselves as belonging to three gender groups (male, female and unspecified), three age groups (18-25, 26-40, 40 and above), three educational levels (Intermediate, Graduate and Post Graduate) and seven ethnic groups (Baloch, Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushtoon, Kashmiri, Balti and others). The detailed demographics of the participants are provided in Table 6.

Table 6
Participants' Demographics for Deception Production Task

Demographics	n	%
Total	428	100
Gender		
Male	106	24.77
Female	320	74.77
Unspecified	02	0.47
Age		
18-25	316	73.83
25-40	84	19.63
40 and above	28	6.54
Education		
Intermediate	111	25.94
Graduate	190	44.39
Post Graduate	127	29.67
Ethnic Groups		
Baloch	05	1.17
Punjabi	293	68.46
Sindhi	05	1.17
Pushtoon	56	13.08
Kashmiri	21	4.91
Balti	3	0.70
Others	45	10.51

The participants were allocated to different scenarios using a simple randomization technique. As respondents were given a choice to opt for any one of the four versions of the survey, the final pool assigned to each group had an unequal sample size. However, the loss of power associated with an unequal sample size with a large

number of participants is negligible (Vanhove, 2015). Replica Seller and Lost Tablet were randomly assigned to 112 respondents, Hospital Card and Plagiarized Project were assigned to 96, Wedding Invitation and Commitment Crisis were allocated to 112 respondents and finally, Fired and the Friendly Feast were given to 108 respondents.

3.10.9 Procedure

The lie-eliciting prompt required participants to produce a message that violated the expectation of honesty in some way or the other. The messages produced in response to each prompt were coded in six categories of information manipulation. The coding scheme was adopted from McCornack et al.'s (1992) original study; however, the current study also included silence as the sixth response type. Type combinations were also coded and counted; however, for the sake of the current study, only pure message types were retained for the analysis. The coding scheme for the message types is given in Table 7.

Table 7

Coding Scheme for Information Manipulation Types

Message Types	Code	Defining Criterion
Fully Disclosive	FD	A message that reveals all the relevant information or emotions in a clear and truthful manner
Falsifications	F	Covert Violation of Quality maxim A message that asserts information contradictory to the true information
Omissions	O	Covert violation of Quantity maxim A message that is true but withholds all/some references to the relevant and critical piece of information
Equivocation	Eq	Covert violation of Manner maxim A message that presents information in an ambiguous manner
Evasion	Ev	Covert Violation of Relevance A diversionary response A message that fails to answer the question that is being asked
Silence	S	Nothing is said at all.

Coded messages were first checked for their frequency of occurrence to test the rank order of message frequency proposed by IMT2. In the second phase, the motive-wise frequency of occurrence of all six types of messages was calculated and compared.

In the third phase, the moderator of the benefit type was also introduced to see if deception strategies systematically changed based on deception motive or locus of benefit. Finally, the correlation between deception motives and the nature of the benefit was further studied to explore what it means for people to lie and deceive in a particular context.

The findings were interpreted using the theoretical apparatus offered by IMT and CS approach. The results were not only presented or discussed in the statistical form but also in the form of cultural scripts written in the NSM. The discussion of results involved how the results in the Pakistani context compared with the findings located in Anglo-American culture.

3.11 Phase II-Part B: Perception of Deceptive Discourse in Pakistani Culture

Phase II-Part B explored the rank order of perceived honesty for different message types ranging from maxims-adhering messages to messages involving the violation of any of four maxims.

3.11.1 Design

In order to ensure that the findings are based on the same variables, the scenarios selected after careful deliberation in Part A were also retained in this study: The same number and composition of motives and benefit types were observed. All the scenarios were then reworded in a manner that they became a hypothetical third-person account of a present situation. This time, the respondents were assigned the role of objective observers instead of the producers of the message.

Out of the pool of 856 messages generated in Phase II-Part A, one message from each of six categories; Fully disclosive, falsification, omission, equivocation, evasion and silence was randomly selected for each of the eight scenarios. Though the study endorses the continuous approach for message categorization, for the sake of message evaluation, only pure message types were selected and messages involving a combination of violations were not retained. Following McCornack et al. (1992), McCornack et al. (2014) and Kim (2008), the message types were taken only as exemplars of various forms of the deceptive message and not as descriptors of how people actually deceive. In the case of the scenario The Wedding Invitation, the evasion message type was absent from the reported data. The researcher herself provided the missing message by exercising her native speaker intuition. Keeping in view the size

of the existing data, performing tests for manipulation checks was not feasible. However, in order to ensure the reliability of the coding scheme, the messages were coded by three trained coders and inter-coder reliability was measured using Kohen's Kappa. The agreement between coders was substantial, with a kappa value of 0.86. The resolution of conflicts was sought through discussions. The study results are based on the outcome of the post-resolution data.

With the exception of the scenario The Wedding Invitation, all scenarios accommodated a silent response. In consonance with the categories developed in Phase I, silence was included as a response type for all of the scenarios. In this way, the researcher was able to have a scenario accompanied by six possible responses that the main character would have produced in such a situation; one fully disclosive message, one silent response and one instance of falsification, omission, equivocation and evasion.

3.11.2 Participants of Deceptive Discourse Perception Task

The respondents (N=753) who participated in the deception perception task were contacted online. They identified themselves as belonging to three gender groups (male, female and unspecified), three age groups (18-25, 26-40, 40 and above), three educational levels (Intermediate, Graduate and Post Graduate) and seven ethnic groups (Baloch, Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushtoon, Kashmiri, Balti and others). The detailed demographics of the participants in this task are provided in Table 8.

Table 8

Participants' Demographics for Deception Perception Task

Demographics	n	%
Total	753	100
Gender		
Male	240	31.87
Female	511	67.86
Unspecified	02	0.27
Age		
18-25	397	52.72
25-40	275	36.52
40 and above	81	10.76
Education		
Intermediate	87	11.55
Graduate	337	44.75
Post Graduate	329	43.70

Ethnic		
Groups	12	1.17
Baloch	524	68.46
Punjabi	20	1.17
Sindhi	100	13.08
Pushtoon	35	4.91
Kashmiri	03	0.70
Balti	59	10.51
Others		

The allocation of the participants to different versions of the survey was once again based on simple randomization using the same procedure which was adopted in Phase A. Replica Seller and Hospital Card were assigned to 196 respondents, Plagiarized Project and Lost Tablet were assigned to 198, Wedding Invitation and Commitment Crisis were allocated to 182 respondents and finally, Fired and the Friendly Feast were given to 177 respondents.

3.11.3 Measurements

The honesty/deceptiveness ratings for each message type were measured using McCornack et al.'s (1992) honesty scale. The scale comprises four 7-point semantic differential scales; Dishonest/Honest, Deceitful/Truthful, Deceptive/Not Deceptive, Misleading/Not Misleading. The evidence for the reliability and validity of the scale is provided in McCornack et al. (1992). Apart from message honesty/deceptiveness, respondents were asked to rate each message for moral appropriateness/goodness on a 7-point semantic differential scale (Bad/good). Scales are illustrated below in figure 2.

Figure 2

Honesty and Moral Goodness Semantic Differential Scales

3.11. 4 Procedure

The honesty ratings for six message types (fully disclosive, falsification, omission, evasion, equivocation and silence) were first computed collectively for all eight scenarios and then separately for each deception motive. In the final stage, the ratings

were bifurcated for the locus of benefit within each motive type. The message honesty ratings were also correlated with the ratings of message effectiveness and the moral appropriateness of the message. The findings were then compared and contrasted with the statistical evidence found in American data.

As this study is the experimental counterpart of exploring people's perceptions expounded in the cultural scripts (Phase I), it grouped message types that matched with different domains studied under cultural scripts: Truth, lying, equivocation, evasion and silence. The ratings of message honesty for fully disclosive messages are expected to provide information about people's perception of truth. The ratings of the falsifications are equated with people's perception of lying. The cumulative ratings of omission, equivocation and evasion are also considered indicative of people's attitude towards the use of indirectness in everyday discourses. Finally, silence ratings would bring evidence for the cultural views about the role and meaning of silence in everyday interactions. The results are interpreted using the theoretical framework provided by IMT/IMT2 and the CS approach and the findings are reproduced in the form of cultural scripts written in the NSM.

3.12 Summary

The challenging research aim of sensitizing deception scholarship to cross-cultural differences by creating meta-communicative awareness about deception necessitates the triangulation of theory and methods. Therefore, the study combines theoretical insights and methodological guidelines of the IMT/IMT2 and CS approach and adopts a mosaic approach to collect small tiles of evidence to complete the big picture. The triangulated approach helps to overcome biases arising from using a single method and increases the credibility of the findings.

The next two chapters report the results of two phases of the study and generate a discussion about the logical explanation for these results. The limitations of each phase of the study are also discussed separately in the relevant sections.

CHAPTER IV

CULTURAL SCRIPTS OF TRUTH, LYING AND DECEPTION

4.1 Introduction

The current research aims to uncover the meta-pragmatic information about the meaning, perception and cultural attitudes towards lying and deception in Pakistani culture. Addressing this aim, the Phase I study used the technique of semantic explications or cultural scripts based on Ethnopragmatic perspective to denaturalize the implicit folk theories of language, talk and truthfulness and unearth local sedimented practices that form the crux of cultural thought.

This chapter elaborates the result of four different but simultaneously performed lexical analyses of the Urdu linguistic units used to code truth, deception, lying and other cultural keywords. The results are based on the insights gained from the dictionary and thesaurus-based information, semantic differential analyses to uncover the positive or negative loading of the terms, the analysis of frequent idiomatic expressions, collocations and proverbs and componential analyses in the form of NSM to reveal folk attitudes and the incipient folk taxonomies. Furthermore, cultural and religious texts supporting each cultural script are also provided to substantiate linguistic evidence.

The idea of describing the world by studying the words is not new: There is always a close correspondence between the life of a society and the lexicon of the language spoken in it (Vincent Marrelli, 2004b). The theory of cultural scripts encourages us to look at words as they naturally exist and reveal cultural meaning and attitude towards various social phenomena. One type of indisputably sound evidence that can be used to describe any social phenomenon comes by examining the forms and the vocabulary items used for that concept. The nature of a phenomenon X can be

explored by investigating how we use the word X (Hopper & Bell, 1984). Wierzbicka (2003), citing John Locke, points out that countries and cultures identify unique complex ideas that other cultures may not have put together in comparable ways and give them names that reflect cultural norms and attitudes. Semantic analysis of language-specific terms reveals linguistically codified ways of social interactions. All cultural knowledge solidifies in the corresponding languages and the words and phrases become the repository of cultural norms, expectations and beliefs (Petrova, 2019; Vincent Marrelli, 2004c; Wierzbicka, 2003).

The ensuing analysis uses this cultural knowledge to answer two broad questions concerning deception and lying in Pakistani and Anglo-American cultures: What does it mean to lie? and what is the degree of the moral turpitude associated with the acts of lying? The idea about what it is to lie is linguistically dumped primarily in the denotative meanings and the semantic relations between the terms in the relevant semantic field. At the same time, the degree of moral offence/approval can be traced by looking at the affective and associative meanings of the terms. The fact that "the semantics of a large part of the language units (words, phrases, proverbs, text fragments, texts, hypertexts, etc.) is, for the most part, expressive and/or evaluative" (Petrova, 2019, p. 292) lends further credence to looking for the evaluations of the linguistic items to explore cultural meaning.

The chapter is structured as follows. The first part of the chapter establishes the polysemous nature of lying and truth in Pakistani culture and sets the ground to differentiate between lying/truth as an abstract phenomena and lying/truth as a speech acts. Following that, the chapter extends these two senses to two sets of scripts. The semantic script addresses the way people think and feel towards lying and truth as abstract cultural phenomena. In this section, the semantic polarity of the concept of lying and truth is established by garnering evidence from the semantic field of lying and truth and invoking the affective and associative meaning of the relevant terms. Following that, the Islamic perspective on truth and lying is discussed in detail and its antecedence to the Urdu vocabulary is established. The next section delineates the pragmatic script that spells various norms of interaction. Under the heading of the pragmatic script, various components addressing one specific aspect of the script are discussed in detail. All findings are explicated in the form of cultural scripts. Next, the discussion section provides the explanation and interpretation of these findings. Following that, various limitations of the study are enumerated. The chapter ends with

some of the cultural scripts presented as falsifiable hypotheses to be tested in Phase II.

4.2 Polysemy of Lying and Truth in the Urdu Language

Before embarking upon the task of furnishing linguistic evidence for the cultural scripts of deception and lying in Pakistani culture and their concomitant differences with that of the US, it is imperative to illustrate two considerations that are pertinent to the analysis here. First, though the study focuses on deception at large, the discussion mainly revolves around lying as a primary lexical choice and the most general and prototypical element of all deception terms. The decision is motivated by the defining characteristics of a basic term: its etymology is opaque, it is monolexemic and it is the most frequent and the most salient of all deception terms (Vincent Marrelli, 2004b). Second, it is important to make a note of the fact that there does not exist any direct way of studying lying that works independently of the concept of truth. Truth and falsehood are a part of the same package deal and talking about one implies talking about the other (Vincent Marrelli, 2004c). IMT/IMT2 and Truth Default Theory also make truth their focal point. To understand deception, it is important to make people's presumptions about truth a point of departure (Van Swol, 2014.). It is the concept *True* that is the basic and undefinable semantic prime identifiably present in all the languages (Wierzbicka, 1996; Goddard & Wierzbicka, 2002). Lying is defined through or in opposition to truth.

To understand Pakistani Culture, it is indispensable to understand the semantics of these related concepts in the Urdu language. Urdu word *Sach* (truth) encodes a semantically dense concept. Urdu translation equivalent for two English words 'true' (an adjective) and 'truth' (a noun) is one monolexemic word *Sach*. Urdu word *Sach* is polysemous in nature: In one sense of the word, it is a predicative adjective meaning 'true' and in another sense, it is a noun also denoted by another Urdu word *succhaye,* meaning 'verity or truth'. It is important to note here that this distinction is made possible by borrowing categories from English grammar. No such distinction is possible in Urdu grammar that considers adjectives a sub-type of the larger category of nouns. The semantic pithiness of the word *Sach* in Pakistani culture is further revealed by the fact that in its noun form, it is used in two senses: As a nominal for an abstract quality and as a nominal for a communicated instance of that quality. Different Urdu proverbs and idioms use one sense over the other. For example, the proverb *saanch ko aanch nahi* (Truth has nothing to fear) takes the noun in the former sense, while the sentence '*us nay jo kaha wo sach hai*' (What he said is truth) uses *Sach* in the latter

sense. The distinction is somewhat similar to Vincent Marrelli's (2004b) distinction between truth and truthfulness, with a slight difference. In Vincent Marrelli's distinction, the former denotes 'Truth' as an absolute, universal and archetypal concept while the latter refers to the practice of telling the truth. The Urdu word holds the former sense i.e., truth as an abstract concept but differs in the second sense by denoting the product of truth-telling instead of the practice of telling the truth.

The same distinction stands true for the opposite of *Sach* i.e., *Jhoot* (lie), a monolexemic item that not only denotes 'falsehood' but also the asserted content of an untrue, unfactual, incorrect or false proposition. The dual sense of the word is completely translatable in the English language, in which the term 'lie' labels not only a phenomenon but also the propositional content of the speech act (Hardin, 2010). Therefore, it can be defensively concluded that the distinction also holds in the English language. The details of such semantic nuances are much needed to establish the rationale behind our scheme of analysis based on this distinction.

We think in signs or semantic categories available to us. Lying and truth as semantic notions are a part of a system of signs which contribute significantly to our meaning-making process. When seen as signifiers or category labels for abstract concepts, the raw judgement about *sach* and *jhoot* inadvertently rests on their association with other signs, concepts and entities. This semantic knowledge forms the foundation of cultural knowledge and thought. The dominant cultural attitude is mainly driven by this semantic understanding of a concept. At the same time, the second sense of *Sach* and *jhoot* as asserted content of (sincere/insincere) a proposition falls within the domain of pragmatics. Lying as a speech act is associated with the illocutionary act of assertion as well as a perlocutionary act of deceiving. When conceived as speech acts, *sach* and *jhoot* are interpreted in relation to many other events that constitute the context of the utterance and its intended force. This sense captures the pragmatic level of the folk categories of *sach* and *jhoot* and corresponds to the specific cultural attitudes.

The distinction between 'lie' and 'truth' as abstractions and 'lie' and 'truth' as communicative acts holds a lot of vitality for the current study. As illustrated earlier, people's judgment about a concept is always divided between context-independent and context-dependent i.e. semantic and pragmatic components of meaning. Based on this distinction, the study proposes a working hypothesis that roughly states that in

Pakistani culture, the judgment about lying splits between the two senses of lying, and two distinct components of cultural scripts emerge for 'Lie as an abstraction' and 'lie as a communicative act'. The same is true for the word truth, which also possesses two senses, truth as a speech phenomenon and truth as the propositional content of truthful assertion. We call the judgment about the former component the 'Semantic script' and the one about the latter the 'Pragmatic Script'. The explication of the terms and the evidence to support this argument can be found in the ensuing discussion. It is important to state that making this distinction is nowhere closer to suggesting that these two (components of) cultural scripts are strongly compartmentalized, mutually exclusive codes. As a matter of fact, they have a common blurred boundary and each one of these feeds into the other; however, the distinction is of some value here. Such a two-pronged approach towards lies is expected to explain the breach between cultural scripts and the prevalence of lies pointed out in deception scholarship.

4.3 Semantic Script

The script (or component) about 'lying and truth as abstractions' belongs to the semantic domain of cultural knowledge and for the sake of the current study, it can be called 'The Semantic Script'. By semantic script, we mean the script that fixes the definitions in and around the semantic field of lying/deception and truth and determines the evaluative and emotive character that those definitions evoke. In Goddard and Wierzbicka (2004)'s terms, this script is a "master script" which is mainly concerned with the predominant cultural attitude and the norms of interpretation in various domains (p.175). It tries to explicate people's raw judgement about what a truth, a lie or an act of verbal deception is by looking at the words that denote these concepts. It spells out the norms of interpretation and not necessarily the norms of interaction (Goddard and Wierzbicka, 2004). The semantic script covers what people think they should do or should be done rather than what they essentially do (Vincent Marrelli, 2004a). This knowledge is exclusively reserved for the meaning and the judgment about the abstract phenomenon of lying and deception as good/bad or socially inappropriate /appropriate or innocuous/damaging. It does not deal with the judgment about the actual instances of lying.

This script deals with the denotative and connotative meaning of truth, lying and deception, which form the core of the meaning-making process. Like other cultural scripts of social values, the semantic script takes an axiological form (see Wierzbicka, 2002 for a parallel discussion). Lastly, this script addresses the way of thinking and

feeling about the diametrically opposite phenomena of truths and lies and is only diagonally related to the ways of speaking.

4.4 Semantic Polarity of Lying and Truth in Pakistani Culture

Extolling the virtue of truth-telling and avoiding lies is a fundamental ethical principle valued in all cultures to varying degrees (Blum, 2005; Kwiatkowska, 2015). No culture seems to promote lying in its own accord. Folklores like '*The boy who cried wolf*' (Aesop trans. Santore, 2018) and the moral it draws, "For none believes the liar, forsooth, /Even when the liar speaks the truth." (Leonard, 1912, p. 106) have cross-cultural vitality in Anglophonic as well as Pakistani culture. Culture-specific legends like *The Cherry Tree Myth* associated with George Washington and the story of Abdul Qadir Jeelani (narrating the story of a saintly young figure who preferred truth over losing his money at the hands of dacoits) appear to promote the value of truthfulness in equal proportion. However, such broad generalization can obscure the nuanced understanding of lying and truth behind this delusion of sameness.

The concept of truth in Anglo-American culture is a multi-shaded concept that can be juxtaposed to a whole array of related concepts. Such a kaleidoscopic view of truth can primarily be an organic outcome of the fact that from the Anglo-American point of view, the discourses are not fashioned in the black and white manner and incorporate many colours and shades (Wierzbicka, 2002). Anand (2018), in her comparative study, notes that the English word truth can be written in multiple ways like TRUTH, Truth, truth and truths and each denotes a specific meaning. When written in the singular form and capital letters, it conveys the sense of absoluteness, while in other plural and lower-case forms, it denotes relativity and particularity (Satha-Anand, 2018). Various English dictionaries define 'truth' as honesty and sincerity, the state and the quality of being true, a transcendent reality, a judgment, proposition, idea or a body of statements that are (accepted as) true and conformity to an original and a standard. The range of senses in which the word truth is glossed in dictionaries shows the cluster of related yet diverse meanings that accumulated over centuries (Petrova, 2019).

Conversely, the ensuing semantic analysis of the relevant linguistic units reveals that Urdu concepts of truth and lying are highly polarized, dichotomous, binary and monochromatic. The evidence for the semantic polarity is provided below in section 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. This evidence is garnered by exploring a range of lexical or phrasal items used to denote the concept of truth, lying and deception, the denotative,

affective and associative evaluations which these concepts invoke, the way these related terms are separated or lumped together in semantic relations, collocations and a few syntactic properties of the words.

4.4.1 Semantic Fields of Truth, Lying and Deception

The first set of evidence for the polarity of the concepts under discussion is derived from the semantic field of truth and lies in Urdu. Anglo word 'truth' is defined in several senses, which can be summarized in two broad categories: the 'factuality' truth or the quality/state of being true to the fact or reality and the 'fidelity' truth or the quality/state of being true to some standard, ideal, person or a thing. For instance, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (n.d) glosses truth both as the property (as of a statement) of being in accord with fact or reality, as well as fidelity to an original or to a standard (being true to something). In a third sense, Merriam-Webster Dictionary mentions the meaning of truth as fidelity or constancy (being true to someone). Both meanings are a part of everyday discourses. The phrases 'being true to oneself' and 'the scientific truth' are the demonstration of the semantics of the 'fidelity' truth. In his famous lines of Christabel, "Alas! They had been friends in youth;/ But whispering tongues can poison truth;" Coleridge has used truth to represent a state of being faithful or sincere (Coleridge, 1816).

Now, if we look at the semantics of *Sach,* the Urdu counterpart of truth*,* it denotes something that is *darust* (correct)*, raast* (right)*, theek* (factual)*, sahih* (Accurate) and *bajaa* (Justifiable/correct) (Dehlvi, 1908; Sarhindi, 1976). In its nominal form, *Sach* is synonymous with *haqeeqat* which means reality. All the derivative forms of the word such as adjectives *Saccha/Sacchi* (truthful), noun *Sacchai/Sacchapan* (truthfulness), the adverb *sach much* (genuinely) and the verb *Sach bolna* (to speak the truth), reflect this monochromatic shade of meaning i.e., to be in accord with the fact or reality as stringently as possible. *Saccha* means *darust* (correct), *rast go* (veracious) and *theek* (factual). *Sacchai* (truthfulness) means *raast bazi* (uprightness), *Raast goi* (truth-telling) and *Sadaqat* (truthfulness). The adverb *sach much* literally means *hubahu*, *be kam o kaast* (in all its exactness and precision, nothing more, nothing less) (Dehlvi 1908 Vol 3:38). The entire semantic field consistently refers to what is called 'factuality' truth.

Interestingly, all the words such as *darust, raast, sahih* and *Baja* reported in Urdu dictionaries as synonymous to truth have an additional meaning associated with

them. Apart from denoting factual correctness, all these words also refer to something morally good, justified or acceptable; a *darust, raast and sahih* action/statement is not only consistent with the ideals of factuality but also with the agreed-upon social and ethical standards. When one says in Urdu '*ye baat sahi hai*' (This is right), one is referring not only to the veracity of the statement but also to the ethical appropriateness of the statement. If *sach* is inadvertently linked with the question of social and moral appropriacy, it can be concluded that the question of fidelity is latently grafted on the question of factuality. *Sach* is a factually correct and/or morally sound statement that is not only consistent with reality but also with the accepted standards of society. The fidelity component is semantically represented in an oblique manner. Instead of maintaining the terminological distinction between two senses of truth, the Urdu language assigns a common semantic label to a complex cultural thought represented by the word *sach*. Abdul Malik and Alvi (1994) define truth as "the harmony between what is said, what is in heart and what is being reported" (Abdul Malik & Alvi, 1994, p. 49). From the Anglo-American perspective, the truth can be one of these three things i.e., the real fact about something, the quality of being true to facts and sincerity or genuineness. From the perspective of Pakistani culture, truth is all these three things put together. If one says something true without believing in it or says something that he believes to be true but is not factually true, it is by definition not a truth.

In consonance with the semantics of factuality, *jhoot* is also defined by Urdu dictionaries as *na rast* and *ghalat* which mean factually and/or ethically incorrect or wrong. The other meanings glossed in dictionaries are *waqia kay khilaf* (opposite to the real event) (Lakhnoi et al., 1989, p. 361), *sach ka naqeez* (The opposite of truth) (Dehlvi 1908 Vol 2:75) *jo sach na ho* (something that is not true) and *haqeeqat kay bar aks* (contradictory to reality) (Sarhindi, 1976, p. 564). The infinitive *jhoot bolna* 'to lie' means to say something opposite to the truth. The nominal adjective *Jhoota* refers to someone who tells a lie, does not speak the truth and says something wrong or contrary to the actual event (Sarhindi, 1976, p. 564). As it has been elaborated earlier for the Urdu word *Sach*, there should be a close fit between reality, what is said and what is believed. For *jhoot* as an opposite of *sach*, missing out on anyone component of *sach* qualifies a verbal act to be labelled as a lie. Abdul Malik and Alvi (1994) define lying as "reporting something contrary to the facts, whether you do it knowingly or unknowingly" (Abdul Malik & Alvi, 1994, p. 50). Though one is not a sinner if one does so out of ignorance, lying occurs regardless of the speaker's knowledge.

Besides being the opposite of *sach, raast* and *theek*, *jhoot* is also defined by its synonymy with other deception terms. Farhang-e-Asifia glosses *jhoot* as *chal* (chicanery), *dhoka* (deception)*, makkar* (put ons)*, bahana* (pretence) *and khot* (fraud) (Dehlvi 1908 Vol 2:75). Jadeed Naseem-ul-Lughat Urdu defines *jhoot as dhoka* (deception)*, makkar* (put-ons)*, bahana* (pretence) and *faraib* (trickery) (Lakhnoi et al., 1989, p. 361). Likewise, *Ilmi Lughat* adds *dhoka* (deception)*, bahana* (pretence), *makar* (put-ons), *faraib* (trickery), *dagha* (perfidy) and *khot* (fraud) as the meaning of *jhoot* (Sarhindi, 1976, p. 564)*.* The synonymity of *jhoot* with a whole array of verbal and non-verbal deception types indicates that lying in Urdu is also considered a prototype deception term and is at par with the other forms of deception. Given the presumption that aberrant behaviours get more linguistic representation than the behaviours that are considered natural or default ways of doing or speaking (Vincent Marrelli, 2004b), the presence of a vast variety of deception terms also testify that truth and honesty are considered the default way of operating in the social world. It is lying as an anomalous behaviour that needs to be pinned down with all the terminological precision (Wierzbicka, 2002). While there is only one way to be truthful i.e., by saying something in close accordance with reality, there are myriads of ways in which one can depart from the truth. One can say something untrue (*jhoot*), say something untrue and hide its untruth (*dhoka*), pretend to be feeling something without being accompanied by the true feelings (*makkar*), to make something appear true that is not the case (*faraib*) or feign a state that is not real (*bahana*), just to name a few.

Moreover, the synonymy of lying and other deception terms indicates that the term 'lies' not only refers to the written or spoken untruth but also to the practical form of deceptions that involve manipulation of truth or reality. Though lying necessitates verbal production of untruth, there is a tendency to use lying as a generic label for all forms of deception. Various treatises on the subject of *Jhoot* in Pakistani culture list non-verbal deception under the taxonomies or forms of lying. While talking about the evil consequences of lying, a pamphlet published on lying notes that lying, "Whether it is committed through the tongue or action, it is judged either way." (Dawat-e-Islami, 2018, p.4). A person who claims by his actions to possess something that is not in him is also a liar. In the same vein, practically doing something that gives the wrong impression to another person is part of the definition of a lie (Abdul Malik & Alvi, 1994; Usmani, 2011).

If we look at the relations of antonymy, the Urdu word *Sach* has one clear-cut complimentary opposite *Jhoot* 'lie'. In contrast, the American concept of truth has a number of opposites apart from the customary 'lie': untruth, dishonesty, falsity, error and fiction being the most salient ones. Going further back in time, the opposite of truth used to be opinion and not lie. Brahms (2020) notes that the an opinion, not a lie, is the greatest enemy of factual truth, especially given the present trend of blurring the lines between fact and opinion. In the present age, when the idea of objective and rational truth has thinned down in Anglo-American culture, opinion is no longer seen in opposition to the truth but still, in philosophical debates, opinion contrasts with facts and, for that matter, with the truth (Satha-Anand, 2018). For each of these Anglo terms denoting the opposite of the truth, it is possible to find semantic equivalence in Urdu, but despite being relevant, those terms are not mutually transposable concepts. Moreover, they only relate diametrically to the concept of *Sach* and enjoy the position of a distinct phenomenon. For example, it is very likely to come across antonymous pairs like *haqeeqat* aor *fasana* (fact and fiction) and *sach aor jhoot* (Truth and Lie) but any crossover like *Sach aor Afsana*, though semantically possible, is culturally far less salient than almost instinctive and perfunctory pair '*jhoot aor sach*' (Lying and truth).

Jhoot and *Such* are polar opposites and do not form a continuum as truth and lie do. Though *Such* and *jhoot* are generally translated as 'truth' and 'lie' respectively, a close inspection of the semantic meaning reveals that these concepts can be more closely represented by the sense of 'true' and 'false'. The meaning of Urdu terms is closer to the traditional model of truth dating back to Aristotle. Aristotle's definition of truth as "To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true" (as in Crivelli, 2004, p. 132) presupposes a kind of structural isomorphism that exists between the statement and the state of affairs. Like the idea of truth in other Eastern cultures, Urdu vocabulary also makes state of affairs a primary home of truth (Smith, 1980). While Anglo-American cultural and philosophical thought has long surpassed such conceptualization of truth and lies thereof, the correspondence view of truth appears to be the dominant and most salient meaning of truth in the Urdu language. Semantically, the opposition of *Sach* and *Jhoot* is more like the opposition of true and false rather than that of the modern conceptualization of truth and lies. Though challenged by the language philosophers like Austin, true and false are still considered more mutually exclusive, more binary and ungraded complementary opposites than lying and truth are. The mutual

exclusivity of 'true' and 'false' gets reflected by the fact that though it is semantically possible to say 'a true lie', it is semantically implausible to say 'a true false'.

From the Anglo-American frame of reference, falsehood needs some other qualifications to be construed as an instance of lying or to be seen as the opposite of truth and to be considered morally bad. From the Anglo-American perspective, though all lies are characterized by falsehood, all falsehoods are not lies. The presence of deceptive intent is the supreme qualifier to distinguish between communicative instances of falsehood that are deceptive and to the effect, the ones that are not i.e., irony, jokes and teasing (Bok, 2011). The speech act of lying also depends on the degree of concealment involved in the communicative event. There are certain occasions when falsehood needs to be transparent to make a communicative event successful. For instance, the success of a joke or a figure of speech rests mainly on being seen through by the hearer (Chen et al., 2013).

Simply put, an opposite of truth may/may not be a lie depending upon the speaker's intention or the degree of concealment involved. Conversely, at least at the semantic level, from the perspective of the Urdu language, this does not seem to be the case of lying. All falsehoods are *jhoot* which is always the opposite of *such* and merits no further qualifications. As it has been elaborated before, Farhang-e-Asifia, Ilmi Lughat and Naseem-ul-Lughaat define *jhoot* as contradicting to the truth, untruth or the opposite of truth. *Jhoot* denotes strictly everything and anything that is the complete opposite of *Such*, just like the way 'false' is always the opposite of 'true'. There appears to be no continuous spectrum between *Sach and Jhoot*. The presence of one presupposes the absence of the other. Unlike lying, *jhoot* is characterized by factual falsity and/or falsity of belief and not by any secondary qualifier. Just as the phrase a' true false' would be semantically incorrect, it is not possible in Urdu to say a '*saccha jhoot*' (a true lie). *Sach* and *jhoot* cannot be put in any semantic unison that violates the properties of complementary opposites.

Regarding all types of falsehoods, *jhoot* can mean one of two things for the Urdu language: Either the Urdu conversations are devoid of the verbal functions played out by irony and joke or else they are labelled as *jhoot.* However, any native speaker would attest that this is not exactly the case. Urdu interactions are neither devoid of jeering and joking, nor these verbal acts are always considered lies. It only means that unlike Anglo-American culture which envisions the concept of truth and lying in the

form of a semantic cloud with various senses diffusing into each other, in Urdu, truth and lying are viewed as compartmentalized concepts which have definitive semantic boundaries, with little allowance for shared membership.

4.4.2 Associative and Affective Meaning

The semantics of language units is, for the most part, expressive or evaluative (Petrova, 2019). The connotation of a word characteristically invokes the shared emotional association with the word, which in turn reflects the moral attitude associated with the concept denoted by that word. Negative connotations roughly mean the negative judgment of the phenomenon and positive connotations reflect the positive evaluation of the concept (Wierzbicka, 1997). The range of connotational values associated with a single concept hint at the ambivalence of the cultural attitude related to the concept. For instance, the English language offers many euphemisms and dysphemisms for lying, deception and trickery to balance the aggressive nature of the word 'lying' and/or introduce the alternatives that vary in terms of the degree of culpability attached with the act (Vincent Marrelli, 2004b). The word 'liar' carries a more negative loading and attaches more culpability than the word 'fibber', which is neutral in its moral valence and moderate in assigning blameworthiness. On the other hand, the word 'storyteller' carries positive loading and removes the culpability altogether. Similarly, falsehood and untruth are euphemisms that denote the acts of lying sans deliberate deceptive intent, thus reducing the degree of improbity (Vincent Marrelli, 2004b). This information about the connotation of as provides further evidence for the semantic greyness of lying in Anglo-American culture.

Anglo-American culture is very pragmatic in its attitude towards truth. Though Anglo-American culture favours truth over lies, moral condemnation is not part of the meaning of lying. The fact is attested by the acceptability of utterances such as "John lied to Mary, and I think he did the right thing" (Peeters, 2018, p. 171). The grammaticality of the sentence shows that the meaning of lying does not essentialize the badness of lying. It is bad to lie but the judgment about telling the truth should be based on the careful estimation of time and place. Conversely, given the fact that *jhoot* is defined as the semantic opposite of *theek* (right) and *darust* (correct), the Urdu sentences *Us nay jhoot bol ker theek kia* roughly meaning 'He did the right thing by lying' would be semantically implausible, though not semantically incorrect. Similarly, a sentence like *jhoot bolna darust hai* is semantically an oxymoronic and self-contradictory statement in Urdu. At the same time, its English translation 'It is OK to

lie' is not semantically strange or uncommon.

The Anglo-American attitude towards lying is reflected in the existence of the concept of white lies, for which no semantic equivalent is available in many other languages of the word (Wierzbicka, 2003). White lies are lies that are deemed less offensive or socially acceptable (Peeters, 2018). These lies are told to protect people from harm, be polite, or save people from getting upset by the truth. Anglo-American culture adopts a non-absolutist and pragmatist approach towards lying (Wierzbicka, 2003) and recognizes the difficulty associated with the truth. From the Anglo perspective, there are plentiful occasions when the truth can be unneedful or hurtful (Wierzbicka, 2003). Friedman and Weisel (2003) cite many examples from English poetry that portray the truth as hurtful and avoidable.

> A truth that's told with bad intent/Beats all the lies you can invent [William Blake]. Tis not enough your counsel still be true;/Blunt truths more mischief than nice falsehoods do [Alexander Pope]. The truth is an awful weapon of aggression. /It is possible to lie, and even to murder, with the truth [Alfred Adler]. (Friedman & Weisel, 2013, p. 3).

Wierzbicka summarizes the Anglo attitude towards truth as follows:

> It is usually bad to say what is not true
>
> Sometimes it is good to say what is not true
>
> If nothing bad can happen to anyone because of this. (Wierzbicka, 2003,

p.104)

Martin Luther King's saying illustrates this cultural script in the following words:

> What harm would it do, if a man told a good strong lie for the sake of the good and for the Christian church… a lie out of necessity, a useful lie, a helpful lie, such lies would not be against God, he would accept them. (Williams et al., 2009, p. 3)

Martin Luther King's saying reflects the cultural thought that 'lie' is generally bad but can be paired with positive epithets like useful, helpful, strong, and even good if the outcome it generates vouchsafes larger interests. Similarly, the semantic pairing of truth with negative adjectives such as dark, odious and unpalatable in the English collocates of truth reflects the greyness associated with the concept of truth in Anglo-American culture. The entire cultural thought can be condensed in the common English

adage 'Truth is always grey'.

It is important to find out comparable information about Urdu words used for lying and truth. As Urdu dictionaries rarely provide evidence about the associative and affective meaning of the words, the study has to rely on the native speaker intuition of the key informants and the researcher to explore the connotative value of the truth, lying and deception. As the connotation of a word is determined by the way the given language content is evaluated as positive, negative or neutral by the native speakers (Petrova, 2019), key informants were requested to assign each entry to a positive, negative or neutral category. When asked to tag the lexical items for positive(P), negative (N) or neutral (Nt) evaluation, the key informants unequivocally marked all lying and deception terms as negative and all truth terms as positive. No term carried a neutral value. In Urdu, 'truth' as an abstraction in all its manifestations has more favoured connotations or positive loading than lying of any kind. Similarly, the negative loading of the Urdu word *Jhoot* reflects that lying as an abstraction is an object of strong disapproval in Pakistani society. Preservation of truth and the aversion of lies at all costs is highly valued in Pakistani culture. Adages like 'Truth needs no defence' and 'Lie has no legs to stand upon', which approve truth and depreciate lying are found in Urdu as well as in the English language. However, Urdu has no counterpart of English proverbs like 'Greater the truth, the greater the libel' and 'only children and fools speak truth', which reverse the order of approval.

At the lexicon level, the concept of positive, prosocial, small, innocuous or neutral lies is non-existent in the Urdu language. The Urdu language does not offer euphemistic expressions denoting lying that moderate the seriousness of the offence or act as jocular alternatives. There is only a single item available to replace lying, falsehood or untruth i.e., *jhoot* which is negatively loaded for all three senses. Apart from some personal coinage, there is not even a single canonized lexical category available that trivializes lying, makes light of it or portrays it in a good light. The concept of benign/harmless lies is not lexicalized in the Urdu language. In Urdu, no semantic equivalent to the English phrase 'white lies' exists. This is an interesting observation, given the fact that collective cultures are more likely to approve of prosocial lying (Leal et al., 2018). The literal equivalent of 'white lies' exists in the Urdu language; however, *Safaid jhoot* means a blatant lie. It can be translated as whopper or a big and gross lie and not as a benign or prosocial lie. Here it is important to note that *safaid jhoot* can be harmless in some situations, but we are only concerned

with the meaning of the phrase and not with the contextually varied content it can comprise. Furthermore, the term *safaid jhoot* which is notable for its negative loading, is viewed as blatant or shameless disregard for reality. The absence of a lexicon item does not suggest that white lies are absent in Pakistani society. There is some cultural understanding that on some occasions lying is more advantageous for social harmony than the truth, as reflected by the adage *Darogh e muslihat amez ba az rasti fitna agaiz* (A lie that does some good is better than the truth that stirs a trouble) (Lakhnoi et al., 1989, p. 455). However, in the presence of the empirically proven fact that ways of thinking are preserved in ways of speaking (Wierzbicka, 1996; Wierzbicka, 2000), the absence of the semantic equivalent of 'white lie' simply means that such phenomenon is not registered in the language as semantically plausible. Combining untruth and mildness or innoxiousness in a single semantic unit would be oxymoronic and would go against the cultural grain.

Likewise, the Urdu language has no neutral item to denote trivial lies or lies of little to no consequences. In short, there is no lexical item available that is equivalent to 'fibbing'. The Urdu language does not have any word registered as a member of the semantic field of lying and deception that softens the grade of moral turpitude. In contrast, some Urdu words indurate the degree of moral improbity or blameworthiness associated with lying. The alternate words for *jhoot* such as *darogh* and *kizb*, all denote grave, serious or consequential big lies. Though words can be creatively joined in any number of combinations in real life, it is very unlikely that one comes across canonized lexical expressions like 'little lies', trivial untruth, or 'little sweet lies' in Urdu dictionaries with the meaning of being minor or useful lies. Instead, many phrasal groups such as *jhoot kay daftar* (lit. a big volume of lies/made-up stories), *jhoot kee pot* (big liar), *jeeta jhoot* (a living lie) are used to code weightier and more frequent forms of lying. There are no lexical or phrasal constructions that denote lies of lesser nature. Even the most common collocates of *jhoot* such as *sarasar jhoot* (complete lie), *sareeh jhoot* (sheer lie) and *safaid jhoot* (blatant/gross lie) describe rather serious, grave and morally heavy kinds of lying.

The way lighter forms of lying are not linguistically registered in the Urdu language, the benevolent forms of deception or in the words of Goffman "benign fabrications" that are engineered to benefit the person contained in them (Goffman, 1974, p. 87) cannot be seen at the lexical level. The lighter uses of lying as are found in playful vexations and pranking do not get lexical representations in Urdu. There are

no one-word counterparts of prank or prankster in the Urdu language. This is not to hint that the Fiction and Playing category of deception terms as found in Hopper and Bell (1984) do not exist in the Urdu language or that phenomena such as joking or teasing are non-existent in associated cultures. However, banter, joking and jesting form entirely different verbal acts which cannot be clustered together with lying as they do in English.

The English word truth is a part of a number of phrases and idioms that refer to the truth in diverse situations and constructions. It is very likely to come across collocations such as partial truth, half-truth, near-truth, stretch the truth, bend the truth, naked truth and untruth which refer to complete or partial truth. Similarly, several idioms exemplify the greyness of the idea of truth and lying. For example, phrases 'gospel truth' and 'naked truth' refer to the undeniable/complete truth. It contrasts with the idioms 'stretch the truth' and 'bend the truth' that refer to the manipulation of truth yet preserving the status of the truth. Merriam-Webster Dictionary (n.d) defines the idiom bend the truth as 'to say something that is not true or that misleads people but is usually not regarded as a serious or harmful lie'.

In contrast, such expressions are rare to find in Urdu, and even when they occur, the judgment about assigning them to the respective category is actively sought i.e., nothing is left in the middle or undetermined. There are a few phrasal constructions in the Urdu language that denote doing something with the truth. In each such case, the meaning is assigned definitively to lies. For example, the noun phrase *jhoot such* (partly true and partly false) is glossed by Jadeed Naseem-ul-lughat as *bilkul jhoot* (sheer lie) (Lakhnoi et al., 1989, p. 361). Similarly, the idiom *jhooti succhi lagana* (to mix truth with falsity) and the noun phrase *adha such* (half- truth) denote telling a lie and a lie, respectively and carry more negative moral valence than a complete lie. Hence, one can manipulate the facts and thus become a liar but cannot manipulate the truth and stay partly or poorly truthful. In Urdu playing around with the truth is an act of lying, not a poor case of truth. An act of mixing lies with the truth is a form of lying. There is no middle ground between lying and truth. Allama Iqbal's poetic assertion " *Batil Doi Pasand hai Haq La Shareek hai/Shirkat-e-Miana-e-Haqq-o- Batil Na Ker Qabool*" (Untruth conceals in various masks but Truth and God both are unique/Do not accept the middle ground twixt Truth and Falsehood) (Iqbal, 1936, p. 71) explains the religiously motivated cultural attitude towards the mutual exclusivity of these two

concepts. Muslims are instructed to maintain a distinction between truth and falsehood. The Qur'an says, "And do not mix up the truth with the falsehood, nor knowingly conceal the truth." (The Qur'an 2:42).

The foregoing observations lead to a conclusion about the semantic understanding of lie and truth in both cultures. Pakistani cultural script for lying is black and white. The black and whiteness of Pakistani semantic script means that at the semantic level lying and truth are defined narrowly as bivalent, binary or dichotomous notions. It also means that labels are assigned more parsimoniously than the Anglo-American culture. The expanse of the semantic field is not limited; however, it does not mix and mingle related concepts to form a cline. Conversely, in the American semantic script, the concepts of truth and lies have a lot of greyness between black and white. The semantic greyness does not purport that Anglo-American culture condones or approves lying and deception more than Pakistani culture. It simply refers to the fact that the concept of lying aligns on a continuous spectrum and entertains a host of degrees and shades of meanings. Such greyness in the Anglo-American conceptualization of truth stems from chronological developments in western thought. Various philosophical traditions such as realism, rationalism, post-positivism and relativism have affected the notion of reality thus altering the perception of the notion of truth in the west and adding different shades of meaning to it (Smith, 1980). Conversely, Islamic epistemology has always upheld notion of truth as unchangeable and essential entity existing independent of our knowledge of it (Asghar, 2012).

The existing research provides some evidence for the horizontal semantic greyness. Native speakers of English classify anything untrue, including jokes, metaphors and white lies, as lies though characteristically varying in goodness or badness (Chen et al., 2013). Various English terms that are clustered inside the semantic field of deception attest to the cultural acknowledgement of the multiple forms and functions that deception can play in everyday communication (Hopper & Bell, 1984). Correspondingly, further evidence for the greyness of American truth comes from the fact that in the American sense, 'truthfulness' is a gradable quality that can possess a lesser or more degree. The existing literature affirms that the English concept of lying is a scalar or gradable rather than a bivalent notion with acceptable and non- acceptable degrees of lying (Hardin, 2010; Chen, 2013). This greyness is best exemplified by Austin's (1962) statement.

The truth or falsity of statements is affected by what they leave out or put in and by their being misleading and so on [...] It is essential to realise that 'true' and 'false' [...] do not stand for anything simple at all; but only for a general dimension of being a right or proper thing to say as opposed to a wrong thing, in these circumstances, to this audience, for these purposes and with these intentions. (Austin 1962, pp. 143-144).

Aforesaid understanding of 'true' and 'false' warrants the grammaticality of calling someone less or more truthful in English. Such gradability in Urdu equivalents is unidirectional. One cannot say in Urdu that a statement is less or more truthful/deceitful. Similarly, *Sach* has no degree of comparison while its English counterpart 'true' has forms expressing a greater or lesser degree, for example, truer, truest, less true or least true. The Urdu language has an elative form describing a very high degree of a particular property but no form for a lesser degree. One can be more truthful or *Saccha* than the other but referring to lesser truthfulness is grammatically and lexically absent. Similarly, a liar or *Jhoota* can be a liar to a greater extent but there is no concept of being a liar to a lesser degree. It can be argued that these differences emerge from the difference in grammatical categories and not from the difference in cultural preference. The argument is not defensible in the light of the empirically verified fact that grammatical categories and worldview are inextricably linked (Silverstein 1979).

4.5 The Islamic Perspective on Lying and Truth

The greatest challenge in describing a cultural phenomenon is to establish the link between the ways of speaking and their cultural antecedents (Goddard, 1997). The dictionary data and informal remarks made by key informants included repeated allusions to Islamic teachings about the prohibition of lying. Furthermore, although not all people practice Islam on a regular basis, the widely recognised and respected moral beliefs and tenets in Pakistani society are derived from the religion Islam (Evason et al., 2016). Inglehart (2020) affirms that Pakistan (as one of those 18 Muslim countries included in the World Value Survey) is a strongly religious country preserving traditional norms and religious values (Inglehart, 2020). In the light of these observations, it is very imperative to explore the concept of lying and deception from the perspective of Islamic teachings.

The moral attitude towards lying is mainly influenced by Islamic teachings and principles which sanction the spiritual elevation of truth and associate strict moral

opprobrium with lying. The concept of truth and lying are very central to the Islamic Faith. Truthfulness is not only a paramount quality of believers but also the formative principle on which the edifice of Islam is erected.

The Urdu word *Haq* (God or Truth) is derived from the Arabic language which is the language of the Quran. One of the attributive names of God in Islam is Al-Haq which precisely means the Truth. Because of its semantic density, the word and its derivatives are used in the Holy Quran on innumerable occasions. God declares himself as (absolute)Truth, his religion as truth and his promise to help believers as true: Some examples include "For that is Allah your Lord, the Truth." (The Qur'an 10:32), "And who is truer to His covenants than Allah. (The Qur'an 9:111), "And who is more truthful than Allah in the statement? (The Qur'an 4:87). The word of Allah is the supreme example of truth because it would most certainly occur. He says, "He it is Who created the heavens and the earth in truth; and on the day He says "Be!" and it is, His Word is the Truth" (The Qur'an 6:73). It is imperative for Muslims to follow the path of truth and believe in the absolute truth revealed by God. Truthfulness is an indispensable quality of a believer: "O you who have believed! Fear Allah and speak words of appropriate justice." (The Quran 33:70). The believers are the ones who are "The patient, the true, the obedient, those who spend [in the way of Allah], and those who seek forgiveness before dawn." (The Qur'an 3:17); "It is those who are truthful." (The Qur'an 49:15).

The Quranic injunctions about truthfulness as the defining characteristic of a believer are reflected in the life and teaching of the Prophet Muhammad. The prophetic tradition is deemed an epitome of the truth to be religiously followed by all Muslim believers. The prophet Muhammad was given the title of *Sadiq* (truthful) and *Ameen* (Trustworthy). The titles are not generic or arbitrary titles to celebrate his exalted character. These titles encode the attributes of someone 'who has not told a single lie in his entire lifetime' (*Sadiq*) and the one 'who has NEVER breached anyone's trust' (*Ameen*). The prophet's life is believed to be the testimony to the strict adherence to truth under all conditions and circumstances.

Islamic theology strongly reinforces the urgency of truth. Islam makes it obligatory to speak the truth regardless of the consequences it may invite; "Believers! Be upholders of justice, and bearers of witness to truth for the sake of Allah, even though it may either be against yourselves or against your parents and kinsmen, or the

rich or the poor." (The Qur'an, 4:135). In one Hadith, Muhammad conveys the same message, "The awe (status) of people should not prevent a man from saying the truth when he knows it." (Jam-e-Tirmidhi Book of Al-Fitan, Hadith 2191).

The opposite of *Haq* is *Batil* which translates as falsehood. Haq and Batil are complementary opposites and the absence of one automatically presupposes the presence of the other. A statement or an idea that is not *Haq* is *Batil* by default. The strong approval of truth is inevitably tied with the strong condemnation of lying in Islam. Lying is strictly prohibited and Haram (impermissible or unlawful) in Islam (Elahi, 2007; Usmani, 2011) and it is considered one of the greatest sins in Islam. The worst and most condemned form of lying is falsely attributing things to God and the Prophet. Allah warns in the Quran, "Do not invent a lie against Allah or He will exterminate you with a punishment. (The Qur'an 20:61). According to the Qur'an, "those who have believed in falsehood" are the ones who "disbelieved in Allah" (The Qur'an 29:52). Just as truthfulness is the quality of a believer, lying is the hallmark of disbelievers: "That is because those who disbelieve follow falsehood and who believe follow the truth from their Lord" (The Qur'an 47:3).

Lying is regarded as *Umm-ur-Razail* (the mother of all sins) because it leads to other evils and moral vices (Abdul Malik & Alvi, 1994). The Prophet said, "Truthfulness leads to righteousness, and righteousness leads to Paradise. And a man keeps on telling the truth until he becomes a truthful person. Falsehood leads to Al-Fajur (i.e., wickedness, evil-doing), and Al-Fajur (wickedness) leads to the (Hell) Fire, and a man may keep on telling lies till he is written before Allah, a liar." (Al-Bukhari, Book 78 No 6094). The Prophet Muhammad detested lies to the extent of counting lying among the greatest sins a follower can commit. He apprised believers of the three great sins, including setting up equals to Allah, neglecting one's duty towards one's parents and lying (Al-Muslim, Book1 No 158). One story of Islam that has almost acquired the status of a cultural legend narrates the story of a man who suffered from all the major sins and came to the prophet Muhammad to seek his help in giving up all the bad habits. The prophet advised him to quit telling lies first and always speak the truth. He promised the prophet to always remain truthful. Whenever he thought thereon of indulging in any sin, he abstained from it because lying was not an option for him and telling the truth about his indulgence would have invited public outrage or the wrath of the prophet. Avoidance of lies saved him from all other major sins (Dawat-e-

Islami, 2018).

Lying can stain the reputation of a Muslim as a holy man or a true believer. The submission to the ways of God prohibits one from lying of all types. According to Islamic theology, Allah does not bestow His blessings on someone who transgresses from the right path and fails to speak the truth. The Quran has instructed against lying on innumerable occasions, some examples are "…Indeed, Allah does not guide he who is a liar and [confirmed] disbeliever." (The Qur'an 39:3), "…Indeed Allah does not guide one who is a transgressor and a liar." (The Qur'an 40:28). The one who lies invites the wrath of God and is doomed forever.

Allah says "…The curse of Allah be upon him if he should be among the liars." (The Qur'an 24:7). There are numerous hadiths of the prophet which clearly state that one cannot be a believer and a liar at the same time. "The Messenger of Allah, was asked, 'Can a believer be a coward?' He said, 'Yes.' He was asked, 'Can a believer be a miser?' He said, 'Yes.' He was asked, 'Can a believer be a liar?' He said, NO!" (Maalik Book 56 Hadith 3630).

Notwithstanding this non-flexible prohibition of lying, there are some exceptions in which lying is legitimized, for example, to save someone's life or to maintain love between spouses. Prophet Muhammad says, "Lying is not permitted except in three cases: a man's speaking to his wife to make her happy; lying at times of war and lying in order to reconcile between people." (Jami at Tirmidhi Chapter 28 No. 1938). The prophet did not give license to anyone for saying something falsely except three in three matters "I do not count liar a man who puts things right between people, saying a word by which he intends only putting things right, and a man who says something in the war, and a man who says something to his wife and the wife says something to his husband." (Sunan Abu Dawood Book 43 No 4291). These hadiths, if seen in isolation, can be taken as legitimizing harmless prosocial lying; however, when placed in the context of other Islamic injunctions, these sayings of the Prophet Muhammad inform exceptional circumstances and not normative behaviour. Furthermore, saying something good is explained as speaking euphemistically and not necessarily lying about the facts. Lying for any practical gains, for example, in the domain of buying and selling, is strongly disapproved.

Here it would be apt to briefly touch upon a contentious argument made against the honesty principle of Islam in the form of a Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad. Since

the catastrophic event of 9/11in which the main architect and the perpetrators were found to be the radical Muslim extremists, a Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad 'War is deceit' surfaced again and again to legitimize the distrust and hatred directed towards the religion Islam. If wrongly interpreted, this saying can unsettle the force of evidence presented thus far. Apparently, the Hadith is similar to the Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu famous dictum, "All warfare is the way of deception" (Dulek & Campbell, 2015, p. 125). The saying of the Prophet Muhammad is used by Anti- Islamist polemicists to substantiate their belief that the Prophet Muhammad took the expedient view of lying and used deception to gain strategic advantages against his enemies. Furthermore, the critics of Islam stretch the meaning of the statement to suggest that Islam is always at war with the enemy and it is always rightful to bypass the principle of honesty when dealing with non-Muslims (Hayward, 2017).

The interpretive confusion mainly arises from the mistranslation of the Arabic word *khud'a* into deception. Hayword (2017), in his monograph, elucidates that it is beneficial to look at the genealogical evolution of the Arabic word *khud'a* and discover the various shades of the meaning associated with the various grammatical variants of the word. Apart from denoting the personal act of duplicity or moral dishonesty, the word is used to denote such things as a lizard concealing itself to escape predators or the sleight of hand used by magicians to captivate the audience. In this sense, the word is translated as ruse or stratagem to gain an advantage. The prophet's war strategy was not based on deceiving the enemy or compromising personal integrity but to "make every effort not to be transparent or predictable to the enemy." (Hayward, 2017, p. 26). Moreover, all religions and cultures acknowledge that war is a quintessentially strategic context in which one cannot afford to reveal one's assets, moves and plans to the rivals (Dulek & Campbell, 2015).

Here it would be apt to briefly review what evidence the Islamic concept of lying and deception brings for the semantic script. The polarity of the semantic script and the dichotomy of the concept of truth and lying are evident in Islamic ethics as well. Lying is bad without exception; One cannot simultaneously be a believer and a liar. However, if lying occurs in permissible or exceptional contexts, the person is not classed as a liar. The Prophet says, "A person who reconciles between two people and says good things, even if it is not true, *is not a liar* [emphasis added]." (Sahih Muslim Book 32 No 6303). Saying certain things that are untrue but beneficial for the sake of mutual harmony is not considered a legit or good form of lying but a case of non-lying.

The utterer of well-meaning lies is not a liar with good intentions but a non-liar altogether. Since speech acts assigned to lying are invariably bad and those assigned to truth are always good, if something good arises out of lying, it needs to be a non-case of lying.

4.6 The Islamic Imprint on Urdu Vocabulary

This section aims to trace the cultural antecedents of some of the Urdu vocabulary items related to lying and deception. As the religion Islam forms the spine of cultural schemata and moral system of Pakistani culture (Khilji, 2003; Evason et al.,2016)), many of the Urdu vocabulary items can be traced back to the ideology found in the dominant religion (Narang, 2007). If we look at the semantics of the Urdu vocabulary, the etymological correlation of these words with Islamic injunctions and the Arabic language seems to transpire automatically. In the Urdu language, the concept of truth as a soulful pursuit of faith is denoted by the Urdu word *Haq*. The word is considered a significant exponent of idea of truth in Eastern philosophy. *Haq* on the one hand means 'Objective truth' or 'higher truth' denoting the absolute knowledge or enlightenment obtained through revelation. *Haq* refers to what is inherently true due to its metaphysical or cosmic significance (Smith, 1980). In this sense it is supremely applicable to God. *Haq* is also one of the attributive names of God in Islam (Satha-Anand, 2018). It refers to anything that is real and genuine including God (Smith, 1980). The Urdu language echoes the idea "Truth is God, God is Truth", which is found consistently in Eastern theological thought (Petrova, 2019, p. 282). *Haq* is the most commonly used alternative or the closest synonym for *Sach*; it can replace *Sach* in the majority of the context. Here it is important to note that *Haq* is a polysemous word that also means 'rights'. In this sense, it can be subjective as well as objective in nature. The superiority of Haq is reflected in its collocation with the verbs like *talaash karna* (seek) and *pehchan karna* (recognize). Haq is closer to the Russian concept "istina" (higher truth) (Wierzbicka, 2002, p.407)) or the concept of "paramarthasatya" (ultimate truth) found in Buddhism (Silk, 2017, para.6) but has no English counterpart. *Haq* and *Sach,* as a part of a language system, contrast sharply with the English language system, which does not accord such a bipartite understanding of truth as two truths; one existing in speech and the other in superior knowledge. The superimposabilty of *Haq* (God) and *Sach* (truth) is reflected in a number of lexical and phrasal items. *Haq Aashna* is literally used to refer to a righteous/pious as well as truthful person. *Haq bajanab* (right, on justice) is used to denote someone right and true. *Bar haq* refers to something true

and rightful. *Haq kay liay larna* means both to fight for God or to fight for the truth. *Haq Goyi* is the habit of speaking the pure truth. The correspondence between God and truth is invariably stamped on Urdu vocabulary.

Another linguistic counterpart to this cultural preference for truth in Pakistani culture is also inscribed in the form of an extended metaphor based on more than one common grounds between *Eman* (Faith) and *Such* (truth). The thought that "Lying is the opposite of *Eman*" (Ibn Hanbal et al., 2012, p. 22) makes *Eman* and *Sach* semantically related words. In Islamic thought, it is believed that lying cripples, hollows and undermines *Eman* (faith) (Elahi, 2007; Usmani, 2011). The result of this correspondence between these two concepts is that the words and idioms that denote preserving/safeguarding *Eman* by default mean being truthful and honest. On the other hand, the lexical units that denote the absence of *Eman* idiomatically refer to the state/quality of being deceptive or dishonest. *Emandar* (lit. the one who protects their faith) is synonymous with Saccha (truthful) and *Bey eman* (lit. the one lacking faith) is semantically analogous to a liar or a dishonest person. The idiom *kisi per say eman uthna* (to lose trust in one's truthfulness) denote the loss/absence of faith, which makes one less trustworthy. Idiomatic constructions like *eman kee kehna* (to speak what is commensurate with faith/truth) and *eman* say (I swear by my faith) based on *Eman* are semantically equivalent to speaking truth. Equivalent to the English concept 'honesty' is an Urdu word *Emandari*, a derivative of *Eman* has the literal meaning of 'Protecting one's faith'. The Urdu concept of *Emandari* is closer to the English concept of honesty as avoidance of stealing, cheating and lying. Such correspondence of truth and faith is symptomatic of higher significance associated with the values of speaking the truth and avoiding lies.

The fact that *jhoot* is *Haraam* (completely forbidden) in Islam is reflected in Urdu lexicon as well. The proverb *Jhoot barabar paap nahi* (there is no sin greater than a lie) is a literal derivative of the denouncement of lying found in the Qur'an and the teaching of the Prophet Muhammad. Urdu idioms *khuda khuda kero, Allah Allah kero* and *Allah ka naam lo* which literally mean 'Remember thy Lord' are used to entreat someone to stop producing blatant lies. The idiom *Panchon Shara'i aib hona* (to have all the five imperfections prohibited by the religion) is used to refer to someone who is a stealer, a fornicator, a liar, a gambler and a tippler, all at once. Such a person is considered an utter social failure. The extreme disapproval for mendacious lies is

reflected in Urdu proverbs that use much more harsh wording than any English counterparts. Proverbs that literally curse the liar (for example, *Jhootay pay laanat* meaning 'curse be upon the liar') and malign him with the worst reputation (for example, *Jhootay ka munh kala* meaning 'May the liar's face be sooty') are derived overtly from the translation of the Quranic verse "Invoke the curse of Allah on those who lie" (The Qur'an 3:61). In his poem '*Sach kaho*', famous Urdu Poet Ismail Meerthi expresses the similar belief. He tends a bit of advice to children to avoid lying in the following words:

> *Hai bura Jhoot bolnay wala*
>
> *Aap karta hai apna munh kala*
>
> *Faida is ko kuch na day ga jhoot*
>
> *Jaey ga aik roz bhanda phoot*
>
> *Jhoot ki bhool kar na daalo khu*
>
> *Jhoot ki zillat ki baat hai akh thu*

[A Liar is always vile/ He makes his face black/ A lie will never benefit him/It would uncover itself one day/Do not adopt the habit of lying/ Because lying is spiteful Bah!] (Meerthi, 2013, p.9)

The use of '*Akh thoo*! (lit. spit) an Urdu interjection reflects the extreme aversion to lying found in Pakistani culture. Similarly, the proverb *jhootay kay munh say boo aati hai* (The liar's mouth stinks) not only refers to the detectability of the liar but also to the verbatim stench emitted from the mouth of a liar that keeps the angels away (Jam-e-Tirimdhi Book on Righteousness and Maintaining Good relations with Relatives No. 1972). It is a cultural belief that lying is a sign of inner filth which results in the foul smell coming from the mouth of the liar (Dawat-e-Islami, 2017).

The source of many proverbs on the subject of lying can be traced back to the prohibition of lying in Islam. The proverb *Munh main zuban halal hai* (lit. The tongue in our mouth is sacred) means that our tongue in our mouth is meant for telling the truth (which is permissible or halal) and not to tell lies which are haram (impermissible/strictly forbidden) (Dehlvi 1908 Vol 4:461). The proverb *Jhoota maray na shahr paak howay* (Neither the liar dies, nor the city gets cleansed) reverberates the same cultural meaning of lying being impure or haram. The presence of a liar defiles and desecrates the entire locality which he inhabits. The place can regain its purity only

if the liar perishes.

In the (modern) Anglophonic belief system, such glorification of truth as commensurate with (religious) Faith or *Haq* is not visible. From the belief in the sacred text as a source of truth (Conkle, 1995) to the proverbs like "Go to the Devil for truth and to a lawyer for a lie" the diachronic shift suggests that like other religious terms which have been secularized in modern Anglo-American society (Petrova, 2014, p.159), the truth has also become a mundane affair and not a religious obligation.

4.7 Dysfunctionality of Lying

In Pakistani culture, truth is considered self-sustaining, self-evident, irrefutable and discoverable. The idea of the dysfunctionality of lying gets its expression in Urdu proverbs and idioms. The proverbs like *Jhoot kay paon nahi hotay* (A lie has no limbs to stand upon), *darogh ko farogh nahi* (a lie cannot prosper), *jhoot kee nao nahi chalti* (A sham/false boat does not float) portray lie as a least efficient alternative. The proverb *aik jhoot ko chupanay kay liay so jhoot bolnay partay hain* (One lie draws hundred after it) is widely believed and quoted in Pakistani culture. It refers to the problematic nature of lying, which needs continuous maintenance and after-work support. In comparison, the expressions like *saanch ko anch nahi* (truth has nothing to fear) and *such kehna aor sukhi rehna* (speak the truth and be at peace) reverberate the self-sustainability of truth.

By looking at the counter-evidence for the dysfunctionality of lying, some proverbs can be found that contradict the view. Proverbs such as *Saanch kahay so mara jaey, jhoot kahay so laddu khaey* (Speak the truth and suffer, tell a lie and be soothed) and *succha ja'ey rota aa'ye, jhoota ja'ey hunsta aa'ye* (A truthful person comes clean and gets doomed; the liar goes around lying and returns triumphant) hint that lying is more fulfilling or rewarding than truth. However, it would be pertinent to note that the evaluative and expressive value these proverbs carry is essentially negative. The proverbs are not used approvingly or with a positive evaluation of the state of affairs they convey but as an expression of one's distress over the lying becoming increasingly functional. The expressions like *Such ka zamana nahi* (This is not the time of truth anymore) are used to express remorse over decaying social values, which create permissibility for lying and deception and not as a pragmatic acceptance of the moral relativism concerning lying. The proverb *Jeet/Fatah hamaisha such kee hoti hai* (Truth always triumphs) reflects an unflinching cultural belief that truth will be out and establish itself. There is a collective optimism that "Truth will triumph/against the

falsehood of the day" (Pirzado, 1995, pp. 384–385). It is believed that the crux of all social debate lies in the certainty of the assertion that truth cannot be forsaken or hidden by men (The Sufi, 2019).

The idea seems consistent with the Islamic philosophy. Lying is prohibited in Islam because it is considered not only sinful but also dysfunctional, transient and unable to sustain itself. In Islamic tradition, the endurance and permanence of truth has always been abiding principle (Asghar, 2012). The Qur'an explains the dysfunctionality of lying by using a parable of rain water.

He sends down rain from the sky, causing the valleys to flow, each according to its capacity. The currents then carry along rising foam, similar to the slag produced from metal that people melt in the fire for ornaments or tools. This is how Allah compares truth to falsehood. The ˹worthless˺ residue is then cast away, but what benefits people remains on the earth. This is how Allah sets forth parables. (The Qur'an 13:17)

Lying is like the erosion of the rainwater that damages and corrodes while truth seeps in to survive for the commonweal. Lying is like the temporary froth that floats on the surface and disappears. Truth is like pure water that makes the land fertile and makes the fruits and vegetables grow. In the second set of comparisons, lying is compared with the frothy scum expelled by the smelting metal and truth with decontaminated pure metal that is left once impurities of falsehood are separated and removed. The dysfunctionality of lying is further revealed by this verse, "Falsehood can neither begin [anything] nor repeat [it]." (The Qur'an, 34:49). Lying is devoid of ascendency, permanence and sustenance. Truth is enduring, self-sustaining and functional. The Qur'an says, "Truth has come and falsehood has departed. Indeed is falsehood [by nature], ever bound to depart." (The Qur'an 17:81), "Rather We dash the truth upon falsehood, and it destroys it, and thereupon it departs." (The Qur'an 21:18). Truth has the power to prevail, ascend and surpass lying because the truth is powerful, permanent and sustainable. The distinction between lying and truth in Islam is more about being indispensable/indispensable, essential/inessential and functional/dysfunctional than merely being good/bad. Truth is indispensable for the world to sustain. The time when truth will cease to dominate, the end of the world would ensue. The era would mark the social disaster presaged by the Prophet Muhammad. When the world would be nearing its end, lying would prevail (Jam-e-

Tirmidhi Book of Al-Fitan No. 2165).

Based on the linguistic evidence discussed so far, the semantic component of the Pakistani cultural script for truth and lying in Natural Semantic Metalanguage will be like this:

[A]

People think like this:
People can say two kinds of
things Someone can say
something true Someone can say
something not true
It is very good to say something true all
time. It is very bad to say something not
true.

[B]

If someone says something all true
This is kind of true
This is not kind of not true
If someone says something
not all true This something is
some true.
This is not kind of
true. This is kind
of not true.
When compared with the explication of the English word 'Lying' provided by
Wierzbicka (2006)
 When X said it X was lying
X said something like this: "I want you to know that Z" to
someone X knew that Z was not true
X wanted this someone to think that Z was true. (Wierzbicka, 2006, p. 45)
the Semantic script [A] for the Pakistani concept of lying and truth may appear truncated and overly simplistic. However, the choice seems inevitable if seen in conjunction with the linguistic evidence. *Sach* or 'True' as a semantic prime is already indefinable or irreducible to simpler components. If opposition of 'true' is the

only/primary definitional criterion for falsehood in Pakistani culture, there is no need to go beyond the simple true/not true dichotomy. Consequently, it is exactly what the semantic data portrays. The dichotomy of truth and lying in Pakistani culture, as explicated in 'People can say two kinds of things' informs the script [B], which illustrates the cultural fixation with assigning speech acts either to truth or to lies with no middle ground. It is important to note that this assignment only occurs if this script is found relevant to the content of discourse i.e., if the context is appropriate to activate lie/truth judgment (Sweetser, 1987). In the case of irony, jokes, metaphors and other verbal acts, some other cultural scripts are activated and not necessarily the semantic script of lying and truth.

There are at least two things that need to be discussed regarding the semantic script: First, this script applies to moral truth or truth as an abstraction and not to the actual instances of lying. It is an explication of the people's pattern of thought shaped within the cultural constraints as emanating from linguistic evidence. The introductory line 'People think like this' in the script [A] and 'If' clause in the script [B] formulate the thought that applies to a hypothetical but possible situation. It is the code that moderates the way people think or feel towards the concept of truth and lies and not the ways of speaking.

Second, given the exceptions that always apply, the inclusion of the axiomatic principle as the invariable component of the meaning can be theoretically a problematic choice (Peeters, 2018). Nevertheless, retaining the social evaluation as a part of the semantic script is indispensable to convey the full spectrum of meaning. The axiomatic element is an integral part of the semantic explication of lying and truth. The cultural knowledge is grafted both on the semantics of the terms as well as on their evaluation (Petrova, 2019). Since the script captures what people think about lying, it is instructive to reflect on people's moral attitudes towards the act of lying inside the script. Finally, the script may be derived from some axiomatic principle; however, conflating it with any strict, unbreakable rule is a theoretically misguided assumption. The semantic script is not the definitive description of what people do and speak or how they behave but the formulation of shared thought that most people in the given culture accept, understand and believe.

The non-polar and scalar nature of the Anglophonic concept of truth is not only attested by the linguistic studies of lying but is also a part of everyday experience. One

such elaboration is based on American fact-checking agencies which run patent fact-checker services like Pinocchio from The Washington Post, Fact checker and Pulitzer award-winning Truth-o- meter[TM] of Politifact (a recognized fact-checking news network run by a non-political organization working under the supervision of Times). Truth-o-meter gathers data to rate the statements on a scale ranging between truth and pants on fire categories. In between is the range of other options that denote half true, mostly true, and half lie and mostly lie. The fact-finding team rates popular figures, chiefly politicians, on this scale based on their statements. In the same vein, Pinocchio analyses the statements in the light of facts and rates them as Pinocchio or Geppetto-worthy depending upon their authenticity or mendacity. But Pinocchio reports offer a third possibility as well. They suspend the decisions about a statement if it is equivocal or ambivalent. It is difficult to find comparable fact-checking data in Pakistan; however, an example akin to this scalar nature of truthfulness and deceitfulness is also difficult to find in Pakistani culture. For instance, no such survey is available that asks the respondents to rate a political figure on the continuum of lying or honesty. When judgments about the truthfulness or vice versa are to be made, for example, in the form of Pre-poll surveys, the respondents are requested to vote a political figure as honest or dishonest usually carrying no middle ground suggested by any in-between categories (see Cheema & Liaqat, 2017).

Another interesting manifestation of the Pakistani understanding of truthfulness and honesty as absolute and non-negotiable qualities is found in the Pakistani constitution. Articles 62 and 63 of the original 1973 constitution prescribe general qualifications for the public office holder which are almost the same across the world. However, the Pakistani constitution sets an additional criterion for public officeholders. Apart from attesting to Islamic and Pakistani Ideology, Parliamentarians need to be *Sadiq* (truthful) and *Ameen* (trustworthy). The presence of the *Sadiq* and *Ameen* provision in the Pakistani constitution attests to the high premium placed on the value of truthfulness. Despite repeated reservations voiced by the legislator and numerous controversies arising as a result, the provision is sustained by invoking the polar and sacred nature of truthfulness. The lifelong disqualification of Nawaz Sharif, the former prime minister of Pakistan and a few other notable parliamentarians, based on the same provision is a testimony of the high premium placed on the value of truthfulness. These court decisions can be motivated by several other political concerns that fall outside the current inquiry's scope. What interests here is the cultural allowance that makes the

provisions permissible. Telling a lie at one specific occasion or about one specific event makes the person unworthy of the title of *Sadiq* and *Ameen* and therefore, ineligible for holding any public office. One cannot mix lies and truths and remain *Sadiq* and *Ameen*. This presents an interesting contrast with President Clinton's impeachment which was made for similar reasons but backed by a different cultural understanding. Primarily, the difference lies in the scope and specificity of the *Sadiq and Ameen* Clause and the Perjury Statute. In comparison with the globalized expectation for a person to stay truthful all the time expressed in *Sadiq and Ameen clause*, the US Supreme court defines perjury very narrowly, pragmatically and specifically. According to the federal statute, "perjury as a statement made under oath on a material matter that the person "does not believe to be true.". It says nothing about the literal truth or falsity of the statement" (Solan, 2011, p. 200). Throughout the scandal, President Clinton distinguished between being truthful but deceptive and being dishonest and pleaded innocence for not crossing the line from one to another. "Legally, Clinton was right. The American perjury statute has been interpreted to prohibit statements that are literally false" (Solan, 2002, p.180). President Clinton was held accountable for lying about one episode of his life about a matter material to the course proceedings without any comment, reference or expectation about his general integrity or truthfulness. The specific charge against Clinton was that he *lied* under oath while Nawaz Shareef was ousted for being *a liar* and losing the qualities of *Sadiq* and *Ameen* once and for all for that matter. The use of grammatical categories to associate offence with lying is very significant here. Adjectives communicate more temporal stability than an action denoted by a verb (Harwood, 2014). Our judgement is always harsher when we see lying as a dispositional matter than an act of producing a false statement (Harwood, 2014). The accusation that 'He is a liar' associates far greater culpability than the statement 'He lied on that particular occasion'. The contrast is evident from the fact that in a post-impeachment survey, 65% of Americans approved Clinton for handling the affairs of the state, while only 35% considered him honest and truthful (Renshon, 2002). In American society, there is a widespread realization that politicians can be liars and people are still willing to believe them (Vincent Marrelli 2004a). While in Pakistan, the moral opprobrium is magnified when a public office holder is suspected of lying. The very fact illustrates how American culture has pragmatized its views about the ethical status of truth. While in Pakistani culture, the necessity of being honest and truthful takes precedence over other concerns.

The polarity of Pakistani cultural script reflected through semantic script may sound strange to Anglophones whose cultures are rooted in the relativist philosophy of morals. In the Western world, there is a growing tendency to question absolute moral imperatives with the increase in per capita GDP (Fancy, 2004). In contrast, the non-Western world is deeply invested in moral absolutes based on religious faith. However, such discussion needs a lot of elaboration which is not possible within the scope of the current study. What lies in the interest of study is to move to the pragmatic component of this cultural script and see how the semantics of truth and lying shape pragmatic decisions about telling or not telling a lie.

4.8 The Pragmatic Script

Culturally shared assumptions translated in the form of a semantically motivated script influence the decision-making process of prioritizing one pragmatic value over the other in a speech event but this effect is not deterministic. When lies and truth assume the form and shape of a speech act, they enter in the domains of pragmatics. In this domain, the semantically motivated cultural script is rewritten, making modifications in the light of the input coming from other cultural scripts about different social values or social gains that come in competition with each other. We call this rewritten code the Pragmatic component of the cultural script or the pragmatic script. While the semantic script helps in meaning-making, the pragmatic component/s guide the way through decision-making about speaking/evaluating truth or lying. In Goddard and Wierzbicka's terms, this script is more particularistic in nature and spells out the norms of interaction (Goddard & Wierzbicka, 2004) or the norms of production in a cultural context (Wierzbicka, 2004). It is a cultural code that guides the ways of speaking and involves the competition between the value of speaking truth and the other social values such as solidarity, social harmony and respect for other's feelings. This script becomes functional when social actors are faced with the choice to assign speech acts to lying or when the speech act of lying is actively produced. Since the pragmatic script mainly relies on social norms and cultural expectations, the evidence for this part of the analysis comes from relevant linguistic items and various historical, religious and literary sources.

Since pragmatic considerations about the context and exigence that can come to the fore at a particular speech event cannot be limited to a fixed number, it is not possible to draw a one-size-fits-all pragmatic script. To be precise, the pragmatic script is a hyponym for a series of very specific cultural scripts that may or may not exist

simultaneously. Some of these directly address the cultural rules to speak the truth and avoid lying, while others spell out the norms of speaking, which can have immediate consequences for lying and truth. These pragmatic scripts are hierarchical; however, the hierarchy is fluid and contextually contingent. The number and the order of the pragmatic scripts that get activated in a situation are reliant on the immediate context in which the interaction is taking place.

4.8.1 On Saying What is True

Two questions that are central to the examination of lying and deception are the expectations about saying what one knows is not true and not saying what one knows is true. From the Anglo-American perspective, the truth can be seen as the opposite of not only lying i.e., Saying what is not true but also to concealment i.e., not saying what one knows is true (Wierzbicka, 2003). As per Anglo-American language ideology, if one has relevant information, one is honour bound to give it (Blum, 2005). Being truthful not only means maintaining a tight fit between language and reality but also means not keeping anything back and not being secretive (Vincent Marrelli, 2004c).

In Urdu, *Haq Goyi* (the quality or state of telling the truth) is a very salient cultural keyword. The suffix, '*goyi*' is associated with the active production of something as reflected in *ghazal goyi* (writing poetry), *pesheen goyi* (making predictions), *fazool goyi* (gossiping/bullshitting). A rough English equivalent of *Haq goyi* will be 'Speaking the truth' rather than 'telling the truth'. Though used interchangeably, there are fine-grained differences between the meaning of the two terms: Truth-telling is avoidance of lies, whereas speaking the truth is saying the truth in its own accord without any reference to lying, speak as a verb refers to using the voice to say something while telling presupposes a dialogic situation and most importantly, speaking is a continuous process while telling suggests an instance of speaking (Audiolaik, 2010). The courts require the witness to 'tell the truth' in answer to a question and does not seem to require speaking the truth. When seen as an equivalent of speaking the truth, Haq Goyi appears to signify an ongoing, (pro)active production of truth. The word synonymizes with another verb *Kalma-e-haq buland kerna* (To raise voice/word of God/truth). The salience of these words reveals the importance of speaking the truth as an appreciated social value. These lexical items which seem to combine the meaning of saying something true and being forthcoming in saying it, carry unequivocal positive moral valence, '*Haq*' as objective, superior, impersonal and public truth needs to be voiced actively. The word Haq Goyii routinely

collocates with *bebaki* and *jur'at* which mean bravely and valour. Upholding truth or not holding it back is a way to testify to the strength of one's character. The classic Urdu poet, Mirza Ghalib's poetic declaration '*Sadiq hun apnay qol main Ghaalib, Khuda gawah/kehta hun such keh jhoot kee adat nahi mujhay*' (May God be my witness, I am honest in my words/ I speak but the truth as I am not accustomed to lying) has become an almost proverbial badge of honour to celebrate, acknowledge or testify personal strength. Since knowing something true and communicating it when asked for is too passive to be glorified, the verse seems to promote the cultural idea of being active with the truth.

The Muslim poet and philosopher Allama Iqbal, whose philosophy is greatly revered and admired in Pakistani culture, has also made voicing truth a major theme of his poetry. Describing the character of an ideal youth, Iqbal says, "*Aaeen-e-Jawanmardan, Haq Goyi-o- Bebaki/Allah Ke Sheron Ko Ati Nahin Roobahi*" (Men bold and firm uphold the truth and let no fears assail their hearts:/No doubt, the mighty Lions of God Know no tricks and know no arts) (Iqbal., 1935, p. 61). Trickery and deceit are the gears of the coward. There are situations where truth can be bitter or dangerous for the speaker but nothing can deter a strong person from speaking truth. Iqbal elaborates his '*haq goyi*' (veracious-ness) in the following words:

Kehta Hun Wohi Baat Samajhta Hun Jissay Haq Na
Abla-e-Masjid Hun, Na Tehzeeb Ka Farzand

Apnay Bhi Khafa Mujh Say hain Beganay Bhi Na-khush
Main Zehr-e-Halahil Ko Kabhi Keh Na Saka Qand

Mushkil Hai Keh Ek Bunda'ay Haq Been-o- Haq Andaish
Khashak ke To Day ko Kahe Koh-e-Damawand (Iqbal 1935:33)

God-filled I roam, speaking what truth I
 see No fool for priests, nor yet of this
 age's fry.
My folk berate me, the stranger does not love me:
Hemlock for sherbet I could never cry;
How could a weigher of truth (True Believer)
See Mount Damawand and think a common refuse-heap as high? (Kiernan, 2004)
The verses highlight the concept of *Haq* (truth) as something that cannot be

withheld, withdrawn or suspended for the danger of being disclosed. Pakistani concept of truth (based on Islamic philosophy) is that " truth matters and humans in no way can afford to dismiss it" (Asghar, 2012, p. 310). If it is (objectively) true, it needs to be communicated. In order to fortify one's character, one needs to foster the courage to speak the truth regardless of the consequences it can invite. *Haq goyi* reflects the indomitable fighting spirit that refuses to yield before any adversary. It is the test of one's strength and character to voice truth during peril. In another verse, Iqbal says, "*Hazar Khof Ho Lekin Zuban Ho Dil Ki Rafeeq/ Yehi Raha Hai Azal Se Qalanderon Ka Tareeq*" (A host of peril though you face, yet your tongue with heart ally/ From times antique and eternity, *Qalandars* on this mode rely on) (Iqbal., 1935, p. 45). The pious people always rely on their power to speak up about what is right or *Haq*.

The essence of this cultural thought appears to be religious in its origin. The Qur'an enjoins believers to only say what is true and prohibits them from concealing what is true. The Qur'an says, "If you distort [your testimony] or refuse [to give it], then indeed Allah is ever, with what you do, Acquainted." (The Qur'an 4:135) and "O People of the Scripture, why do you mix the truth with falsehood and conceal the truth while you know [it]?" (The Qur'an 3:71). The Qur'an binds Muslims to not refuse when called upon to testify. A Muslim has to offer their testimony when and where it is needed. Allah says in Qur'an (meaning), "And who is more unjust than he who conceals the testimony" (The Qur'an 2:140). These verses clarify that Islam proscribes swerving or veering away from the truth as vehemently as it does the contortion of truth. The fact is reiterated in the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad as well. He also promotes the value of being forthcoming in speaking the truth. In one of his Hadiths, he declares, "Shall I not inform you of the best of witnesses? The one who comes with his testimony before being asked for it." (Jam e Tirmidhi Chapter on Witnesses Hadith No.2295).

The lexical items, phraseology and literary and religious texts jointly construct the following script about saying what is true:

[C]

It is bad to say what is not

true. It is good to say what

is true.

The script is similar to the Anglo-American script proposed by Wierzbicka (2003) elucidating the Anglo attitude towards not saying what one knows to be true. Caution is in order, however, about the scope of generalization we can associate with the script. Keeping in view the linguistic evidence, 'It is good to say what is true' seems to apply to the objective, impersonal and public truth and not to interpersonal truth. Moreover, though backed by religious injunctions, we need to be careful in widening the scope of 'It is good to say what is true' to 'It is always bad not to say what is true'. It would be like stretching the script too thin. While we have clear evidence for the former, we have no clear linguistic signal to prove the truth of the latter. We cannot find a linguistic item that associates deviousness with the Urdu equivalents of the word 'concealment' as it evidently does in English. The words such as '*Akhfa*' '*Raazdari*' and '*Posheedgi*' all roughly meaning 'concealment' have no strong evaluative loading associated with them. Certain things are culturally encouraged to be concealed. For example, it is advisable to keep family problems, financial matters and gossip away from public knowledge. It is done to protect family honour from being tainted (Evason et al., 2016). The debate about what needs to be communicated and what needs to be held back requires a completely different course that falls outside the scope of the current theme. Here it would suffice to restrict the conclusion to two broad generalizations that the script in question draws: It is bad to say what is not true and it is good to say what is true.

4.8.2 On Saying What One Believes

Saying something one does not believe always begs the vexed question of deceptive intent. Presence of deceptive intent has been vital to philosophical discussion of lying. From the Anglo-American perspective, the deceptive intent is so much vital to the question of lying that even a factually true statement X can become a lie if the speaker believes it as 'not X' and tries to convey it as 'X'. It is not the falsity of the information but the speaker's belief that is constitutive of lying (Galasiński, 2000). In Anglo-American culture, a distinction is maintained between lying i.e., saying something opposite to one's belief and hypocrisy i.e., practising something opposite to one's pretended belief. In Anglo-American culture, since lying is characterized by uttering (literal) falsehood and verbal manipulation of information, hypocrisy cannot be classified as lying. Simply put, though a situational correspondence can exist between the two terms and a person can simultaneously be a liar and a hypocrite, a hypocrite person is not essentially a liar.

Linguistically speaking, American culture maintains an axiological distinction between honesty and transparency. Citing the evidence from the public response towards misleading statements made by Donald Trump, Koerner (2109) suggests a two-by-two matrix of truthfulness which comprises *transparent-opaque* and *honest-dishonest* coordinates. Highlighting the distinction between honesty and transparency, he elaborates, "It seems that people display and respond differently to two distinct types of truthfulness. The first concerns statements about their inner world, including values, motivations, and intentions; the second concerns statements about the outer world, including facts, events, and past actions" (Koerner, 2019, para.8). The breach of honesty results in lying while the breach of transparency results in hypocrisy. A single person can exhibit one without practising the other. The English quote "The only thing worse than a liar is a liar that is also a hypocrite" (Williams, 1979, p.107), highlights the distinctive nature of the two words. Furthermore, Americans prefer transparency over honesty when faced with a moral choice (Koener, 2019). The relative popularity of politicians in the United States, who are infamous for being promiscuous with the truth proves that what turns people off politicians is not lying, but hypocrisy (*What's Worse in Politics — Lying or Hypocrisy?*, 2022).

In Pakistani conceptualization, a person cannot be a hypocrite without being a liar and a deceiver. Inconsistency between intention, speech and action is considered to be the greatest source of lying (Abdul Malik and Alvi 1994). Pursuant to the spirit of the dominant religion, in Pakistani culture, *Munafqat or Nifaq* (Hypocrisy) as saying/doing something without practising/believing belongs to the general category of deception and scheming (Al- Hunbali, 2010). A person's character is the product of *Zahir* (what is manifest/outward appearance) and *Baatin* (what is hidden/inward essence) and his *Qol* (words) and *Fael* (deeds). *Nifaq* is defined as the difference between the inner and the appearance, between statement and action and between internal and external; for that matter, it is closely related to lying. An honest person is the one whose *Zahir* and *Baatin* and *Qol* and *Fael* are synchronized and harmonized. The linguistic meanings and the moral valence associated with the phrasal constructions like *Zahir- o-Batin main tazad* or *Qol-o-Fael main tazad* reveal that any contradiction between *Zahir-o- Batin* and *Qol-o-Fael* is seen as a breach of uprightness and integrity. The lack of such consistency between the components of one's character is culturally lamented and abhorred. Since *jhoot* is defined as reporting something contradictory to reality or fact, it applies to situations that involve misreporting or

misrepresenting one's inner states and beliefs. By applying this definition, *Zahir-o-Batin ka ikhtilaf* (a contradiction between appearance and inner reality) is an undisputed case of lying (Elahi, 2007). One is upright and truthful only if one is consistent in what one says, does, and believes. Likewise, the tongue is often described as the interpreter of the heart and there should be a close connection between what the heart believes and what the tongue says. A person who fails to put his heart beneath his tongue eventually becomes a hypocritical person (Saleem, 2007).

The idea seems to have its root in Islamic theology. From the Islamic perspective, a believer is honour-bound not only to say what is true and but also to say only what one believes to be true. Shahada (testimony), the Muslim declaration of belief in the oneness of Allah and acceptance of Muhammad as the last Prophet of Allah, is not complete if the declaration is not honest or if it is not uttered publicly. Shahada obligates a believer to say and to believe the statement of the faith. The lack of any one component can lead to the loss of *Eman* (Faith).

Saying only what one earnestly believes is also a precondition to being truthful in Islam. The Qur'an rails against *Munafqeen* (Hypocrites), a group of false Muslims in early Islam days who apparently claimed to be Muslims but inwardly sought to undermine the Muslim community. The *Munafqeen* made the social declaration pronouncing their faith in God without believing it inwardly. The hypocrites pretended to be loyal to the prophet and apparently testified that he is the Messenger of Allah, which is true but because of the inconsistency between what they say and what they believe, they are pronounced as liars by Allah in The Qur'an. The Qur'an says, "And Allah testifies that the hypocrites are liars. (The Qur'an 63:1). Describing hypocrites, Allah says in the Qur'an, "There is the type of man whose speech about this world's life may dazzle thee, and he calls Allah to witness about what is in his heart; yet is he the most contentious of enemies." (The Qur'an 2:204). Hypocrisy and lying are closely related. Lying is reported as the defining characteristics of a hypocrite. According to a Hadith, "whoever has one of the following four characteristics will have one characteristic of hypocrisy until he gives it up. These are: (1) Whenever he talks, he tells a lie; (2) whenever he makes a promise, he breaks it; (3) whenever he makes a covenant, he proves treacherous; (4) and whenever he quarrels, he behaves impudently in an evil insulting manner (Sahih Bukhari, Chapter 47 No.2459). Unlike Anglo-American conceptualization of lying and hypocrisy as related but distinct phenomena,

in Islamic tradition, lying is equivalent to hypocrisy in its verbal and practical forms. All the characteristic listed as the trademark of a hypocrite are inherently different manifestations of lying (Abdul Malik & Alvi, 1994).

The evidence from the Urdu lexis also authorizes that the close fit between what is said and what is intended is desirable social behaviour. The negative moral valence attached with the proverbs *Munh per kuch, dil main kuch* (something in the heart and something else in the mouth instead), *Baghal main churri munh main Raam Raam* (A honey tongue, a heart of gall), *samnay kuch aor peeth pay kuch* (a double-faced person) and *Zahir Rehman ka Baatin Shaitan ka* (Godly in appearances, devilish in soul) indicate that contradiction or dissonance between one's speech, action and beliefs is socially problematic and morally disapproved. It is culturally expected to be transparent in one's beliefs. *Zahir daari* or putting on a false show, is defined in connection with pretence and other forms of deception (Sarhindi, 1976, p. 998). *Zahir-o- Baatin yaksan hona* (being consistent in one's words and beliefs) is a positive personal trait. Similarly, *Zahir-o Baatin main farq hona* (Being inconsistent in one's words and beliefs) is defined as being deceptive (Sarhindi, 1976, p. 998).

The cultural norm in question can be presented as follows:

[D]

X says something like this: "I want you to know that Z" to

someone X thinks it is not Z

X wants this someone to think that X thinks it is Z When X

says Z, X is saying one kind of untrue.

As it is obvious from the explication, the falsity of proposition Z is not relevant here. In this case, the falsity of what the speaker thinks (or believes) is the defining characteristic of the untruth. 'One kind of untrue' saves the script from specifying the intent as the precondition of lying. The script does not generalize the condition to all forms of lying.

4.8.3 On Lying Unknowingly

Unlike English dictionaries which define lying as a deliberate attempt to mislead, no Urdu dictionary includes such intent in the meaning of lying. If someone says anything unfactual, *jhoot* occurs regardless of the knowledge and intent of the speaker. At first

blush, the idea seems counterintuitive; if something is considered not only factually wrong but also morally inappropriate, it should involve intentional intent or at least the knowledge of it. From the Anglo-American point of view, one cannot be blamed for mendacity if it happens inadvertently or unconsciously. The trying component in Grice's Quality maxim refers to the social actors' intentional effort to produce a linguistic token that is not false. The Quality violations are thought to occur not by literal falsehood but by the speaker's failure to be truthful or avoid falsehood (Danziger, 2010).

Notwithstanding, cultural attitudes vary in assigning an individual the responsibility of the truth of the statement (Brown, 2002). There exist folk models of meaning and responsibility that measure an act not by the belief states of the social actors but by the degree of damage the act can cause (Danziger, 2010). Besides taking the 'deliberate intent' course, Pakistani culture adopts another exacting standard to assign the responsibility of lying to the speaker. which can be called 'the deliberation' course. One famous Persian quote widely understood, acknowledged and cited in Pakistani culture is '*Darogh bar gardan e ravi*' (The sin of lying is on the narrator). The quote sums up the cultural thought that the onus of establishing the veracity of the statement is on the speaker. It is obligatory for the speaker to pull out all the stops to check the veracity of the statement before a statement has been made, as one cannot plead ignorance once a lie has been told. The summarized cultural script in the words of Imam Ali "Know, then speak" (Al- Fath & Al-Amudi, 2011, p. 1092) requires social actors to exercise their sense of judgment and seek the truth well before uttering or relating any piece of information. Even if the intent to deceive is missing, saying something untrue is blameworthy for lacking the knowledge or deliberation required by the speaker.

Pakistani model does not preclude accompanying belief states; however, it does not restrict the view of falsehood to intended speech acts only. *Jhoot* occurs even if the falsehood it includes arises out of the speaker's ignorance about a particular fact. The excuse 'I did not know the truth/fact' is generally unavailable to the liars in the Pakistani context as it is culturally expected to seek the truth of the matter before relating it. The rule applies not only to matters of great significance but also to small matters of everyday life. Listing the common etiquettes of Pakistani society, Thanvi (1953) dedicates etiquette No. 81 to establish the facts before narrating them. He gives

the example of his student who casually reported about a servant that he was sleeping in his quarters and was not available for work while he was actually awake and available. Thanvi (1953) makes the following point in this regard:

> *Awwal to mehz takhmeen per aik baat ko tehqeeqi samajhna ghalti hai. Aor agar khud is ko ghair tehqeeqi samajhtay thay to mukhatib per is kay takhmeeni honay ko zahir kerna chahiay tha…..warna asal jawab to yeh tha keh maloom nahi, dekh kar batlaon ga phir dekh kar sahi jawab daitay* [First of all, it is wrong to conflate conjecturing with verified truth. If he knew he was just conjecturing, he should have clearly communicated it to the interlocutor….. His actual response should have been, "I don't know exactly, I tell you after confirming" and then he should have replied after careful verification]. (p.34)

Khair (2012) emphasizes the same conscientiousness in writing as well. Good prose is always an outcome of a thorough research process. He also notes that a carefully verified speech is never complex or ambiguous. A linguistic corollary of this cultural expectation is syntax-independent means to not alter the truth-conditional meaning of the utterance.

The expectation of seeking the truth is an offshoot of the general expectation to seek knowledge about everything around. The idea stems from Islamic epistemology that links the subjective pole of knowing with the objective pole of being. "In fact, human beings are theomorphic beings and by nature, they are in need of ultimate reality….thus knowing is a part of being" (Asghar, 2012, p.304). The social actors cannot plead ignorance because they are culturally [and religiously] bound to go all out and seek the knowledge of facts. The evidence for this cultural expectation to stay in the know comes from the fact that there are no 'innocent mistakes' made concerning certain obligations. For example, one cannot be exempted from the responsibility of mispronouncing or misinterpreting religious text just because they were plain oblivious. If something is true, there is a way to know that it is true and one must deliberately find that way.

Elaborating upon the act of lying, Elahi (2007) remarks that if there is no lie in a person's speech other than that he narrates every *suni sunai baat* (hearsay) without establishing its veracity or checking for the facts, then that lie will suffice to make him a liar. It is imperative to establish the truth of an anecdote, hearsay or an item of news before sharing. The quest and verification of truth is a desirable personal trait that

makes people strong and saves them from being gullible or credulous. It is the individual's responsibility not to be the person who is *kaanon ka kaccha* (credulous). The closest counterparts to what is meant by *kanon ka kaccha* are gullible or too naïve; both carry a negative connotation. While in English, one can find words like 'trusting' or 'naïve' with the same meaning but positive connotation, it is hard to find a positive word to denote someone who believes everything or the most of what one hears. As what counts as gullible or intelligent is not universal but culture-specific (Vincent Marrelli, 1997), in Pakistani culture, *kanon ka kaccha hona* (be gullible) is a very negative personal attribute that refers to a person simply believing everything that he has been told without the effort of checking the facts and establishing the truth. Culturally speaking, it is within the individual control not to be this kind of a person. God has given man *Aqal* (intelligence) to discern what is right and what is wrong. One sign of *Aqal*, according to Ali Ibn-e-Talib, is to speak only of what one knows and act upon what one says (Al-Fath & Al- Amudi, 2011). If a person fails to demonstrate this form of social intelligence, he is considered bad and dangerous (Iqbal, 2019). The person's gullibility can become a source of continuing the chain of lies arising from ignorance of facts. Abdul Malik and Alvi (1994) attribute the prevalence of lies in Pakistani society to the practice adopted by social actors of heedlessly narrating what one has gathered in various social interactions without researching about the facts.

An interesting corollary of this expectation of deliberation is the presence of lexical items such as *Tehqiq, Tasdeeq* which denote the concept of authenticating the truth and *Takzeeb, Abtal* and *Batlan* which refer to countermanding a lie. *Tehqiq* (Indagation/truth- seeking) and *Tasdeeq* (Validation) are not only related to the concept of *Sach* but also considered semantically identical to *Sach*. Farhang-e- Asifia, besides the regular meaning i.e., research, gloss *Tehqiq* in the same fashion as it does *Such i.e.,* retaining all those semantic components which are used to define *sach* (Dehlvi 1908, p.595). *Tasdeeq* is glossed as *sacchai* and *Sadaqat* which means truthfulness (Dehlvi 1908, p.609). *Sach* is not only the product of verification and strict scrutiny but also superposable to the very acts of verification and inquiry. Conversely, the Urdu words *Abtaal* 'defeasance of a lie' and *Takzeeb* 'falsification of the untruth' and *Batlaan* (rendering a lie ineffective or inefficacious) denote the act of negating/nullifying the lie. The sense of these words is difficult to transfer into English. These acts denote a sense somewhat different from the sense of the verb 'falsify'. According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, 'Falsify' as a polysemic verb denotes both to make

something false and to prove or declare something false. One can falsify something false as well as something true by altering existing beliefs about it, whereas *takzeeb, batlan* and *abtal* denote only the acts of making falsehood false. The strangeness of this semantic explication suggests that this concept is not completely transferable in English in a straightforward manner. The presence of Urdu verbs *jhoota banana* (lit. to prove someone a liar) and *jhoot pakarna* (to detect a lie) also manifest this complex cultural nugget of making the truth of falsehood known in order to nullify or abort it. It is not only mandatory to avoid lying but also to proactively confront it and make it unfruitful or abortive for the liar. Urdu proverb *jhootay ko us kay ghar tak puhanchana* (lit. Usher the liar to his home) idiomatically means to disarm a liar by presenting him with the truth.

It is important to do *Tasdeeq* of truth because it enables social actors to do the *Takzeeb* of lying. The practice is considered obligatory to make truth sustainable and enduring in society and render lying inefficacious. In his poem Dua, the legendary Pakistani poet Faiz Ahmad Faiz, laments for those who follow untruth and implores God to give them the strength to do *Tehqeeq*. Faiz says, " *Jin ka dee'n pairvee e kizb o Riya hai un ko/ Himmat-e- kufr milay, Jurrat-e-tehqeeq milay*" (Those whose creed is practising of falsehood and hypocrisy, May they are blessed with the power to deny and seek the truth) (Faiz, 1967, p. 53). The quest for truth is a noble trait that makes a person noble, trustworthy and admirable. Recounting an episode from the life of a religious scholar who adopted the course of primary source verification to debunk the popular Urban myth of Neil Armstrong's conversion to Islam that held sway in the parts of the world for decades, Yasir Peerzada, a Pakistani writer recounts, "This is the mark of an upright and impartial person who goes beyond his prejudices and seeks only the truth and does not care what is in accordance with his thoughts and what is in opposition to him." (Peerzada, 2020).

The idea has its roots in Islamic teachings. Qur'an instructs believers not to say anything of which they have no knowledge (Qur'an 17:36). It is mandatory for the speaker to not say or relate something if the truth of the statement is unbeknown to them. It is the defining characteristic of a liar that he does not check the veracity of the source as well as of the evidence and narrates it to other people (Abdul Malik & Alvi, 1994). The believers should not only abstain from lying but also take practical steps to eliminate falsehood. It is the attribute of the Lord that He establishes truth and abolishes

falsehood. Allay says, "And Allah eliminates falsehood and establishes the truth by His words. Indeed, He is Knowing of that within the breasts". (The Qur'an 42:24). Believers are advised to verify any piece of information before sharing or believing. Allah says in the Qur'an, "O you who have believed, if there comes to you a disobedient one with information, investigate, lest you harm a people out of ignorance and become, over what you have done, regretful." (The Qur'an 49:6). "It is Fard (obligation) to gain the knowledge of *Muhlikat* (the acts leading to doom and destruction) such as lying, backbiting and tale-telling…" (Ilyas, 2016, p. 105). One Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad that is very salient in Pakistani culture also attests to the validity of the proposition made thus far. The prophet of Allah says (meaning), "It is sufficient lying for a man to narrate everything he hears" (Sahih Muslim: 3 Introduction 8) and "Know that a man who relates everything he hears is not safe, and he can never be an Imam as long as he narrates everything he hears' (Sahih Muslim: Book 3 Introduction No.10). Muslims must validate the truth (*haq*) and nullify the falsehood (*batil*). In Islamic eschatology, it is believed that treachery would become common when people would shun the practice of doing takzeeb (nullification) of lying and tasdeeq (Validation) of truth. The honest man will be regarded as a liar and a traitor will be regarded as faithful and the era would mark the end of the world (Sunan Ibn-e-Maja Book 36 No. 4036).

To sum up the cultural thought, the responsibility of lying to a person does not apply only to the intentional acts of misleading; A person who communicates everything he hears, not reckoned by the facts, is a liar even though he believes in the truth of the information he is disseminating. It is important to validate, verify and substantiate the truth because it would inevitably annul the lies and deceits. Making truth known is an effective way to make lies futile.

[E]

If someone says something like this: "I want you to know that Z" to

someone. Z is not true.

That someone does not know that Z is not true. That someone can know that Z is not

true.

It is bad to say something before someone can know/knows it is true

It is good to say something after someone can know/knows it is true

At first blush, the inclusion of both 'it is good' and 'it is bad' clauses may appear redundant or superfluous. However, the inclusion is opted for purposefully; It is not sufficient to 'not say for which you lack evidence'. For Pakistani culture, it is equally important to 'say which is backed by the evidence'. The idea is somewhat similar to Grice's Quality submaxim "Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence," (Grice, 1975, p.46) but it requires more active engagement on the part of the speaker to not only withhold which is not supported by facts but also seek the facts and make them known by uttering them.

4.8.4 On Equivocating

The ambivalence of the cultural scripts of truth and lying starts transpiring when the focus is shifted from what to say to how it is said. While lying categorically relates to what is said, equivocation relates to how it is said. Equivocation is potentially associated with the manner and not the content of the information being presented (Bavelas et al., 1990). It is a social imperative in Anglo-American cultures (as exemplified in Gricean Quality and Manner maxims) to not only avoid saying what is false or lacks evidence but also present information in an unambiguous, unequivocal and direct manner. With such cultural expectations, equivocation would be seen as a way to manipulate information in ways other than bald-faced falsifications (McCornack, 1992). In English, the verbs 'lie', 'fib' 'equivocate' and 'prevaricate', despite possessing varying shades of meaning, are used synonymously.

The result of such cultural association between lying and equivocation is that in Anglo-American culture, equivocal messages are likely to be perceived as deceptive (McCornack et al., 1992). The Pakistani attitude towards equivocation can be located at the intersection of straight talk and sagacious talk. In situations when the truth is not sayable but lying is morally wrong, the speakers are tempted to say something that is difficult to pin down (Blum, 2005).

The Urdu idiom *gol gol baat kerna/gol mol baat kerna* (To equivocate) is defined as saying something which is multifaceted, confused or not clearly avowed (Dehlvi 1908 Vol 4, p. 99). To prevaricate in Urdu means to say something lacking commitment and clarity. A piece of preliminary but inconclusive evidence for the correlation between equivocating and deception comes from the dictionaries meaning. In Farhang-e- Asifia, *lapaitwan baat*, another synonym of *gol mol baat* is glossed both as a complicated and unclear talk as well as deceptive and fraudulent talk (Dehlvi 1908

Vol 4, p.175). However, the noun phrase also synonymizes with other Urdu terms like *lachaydar batain* which mean interesting and engaging talk. Consequently, without the contextual information in which the speech act of equivocating is performed, it is difficult to say anything with confidence about the cultural attitude towards equivocation. Even the semantic information one can get from the connotation is not unequivocally available in the case of equivocation. The opinion of the key informants was mostly divided in assigning connotational value to the lexical items denoting the verbal act of equivocating. Their response varied between positive, negative and neutral.

In the Anglo-American context, information should be represented beyond the cosmetic of doublespeak or equivocation. Contrarily, the Urdu equivalent *Zo maani baat* (equivocal talk) receives different evaluation. Khair (2012) exposes the cultural attitude towards equivocation in the following words:

> *Zo maanwiyat darasal zuban ka husn hai. Ye kehnay, sunnay, likhnay aor parhnay walay ki khushzoqi ka ghammaz hota hai. Fiqra baazi ka yehi to maza hai keh baat dil par asar to zaroor karay magar dil na toray. Yeh hunar zaban-o-Biyan per dastras say aata hai.* [Equivocation is the beauty of language. It reflects the fine taste of the speaker, listener, writer and reader. This is the fun of phrasing: the words must touch the heart but should not hurt the heart. This skill comes from the command of language and expression]. (p.17).

However, on another occasion, he notes that effective speech is always direct, forthright and candid. He advises against using bombastic rhetoric or indirect speech because it cannot touch the heart or inspire. Ambiguity can be a virtue in poetry, but it is inimical to the clarity of prose. His remarks highlight that equivocation and directness are not set on a contrastive plane in his worldview. Both have different yet related functions to perform in the speech.

In the light of the foregoing evidence, it can be argued that Urdu lexical items such as *Zo Maanwiyat* and idioms such as *ghuma phira kay baat kerna* or *gol mol baat kerna* carry some sense of information management. However, the acts denoted by these idioms, by definition, are not incompatible to *Sach* (truth) which presupposes strict adherence to the factual narration. Since nothing is produced contrary to facts in equivocation, it cannot be seen in opposition to *sach* and therefore is not a *jhoot* in and of itself. The evidence for the non- deceptiveness of equivocation comes in the form of

speech acts. It is understood that no illocutionary act is associated with lying (Meibauer, 2018). One cannot say 'I hereby lie.' in Urdu as well as in English as the success of the speech act of the lying-proper lies in being concealed. However, the report of the speech act of lying is possible. Such reports inevitably come with evaluations of the act. For example, one cannot say 'I lied on that occasion' without removing the implicature 'I confess that…'. However, saying 'I spoke equivocally' in Urdu does not report any intent to deceive but to be indirect. From the perspective of the Urdu language, equivocation and prevarication are acts of indirectness or ambiguity and not of deception.

Substantiating the preliminary semantic evidence, some other cultural texts portray equivocation as a serviceable linguistic strategy having multiple social functions. Here it would be apt to present popular local legends that provide cultural clues about the role of equivocation in balancing the value of 'saying good' and the value of 'saying truth'. The first is the story of Asma which is also a part of a PTB (Punjab Textbook Board) of Grade 9. The chapter named Hazrat Asma narrates the story of Asma, the daughter of the closest confidant of the prophet Muhammad. On the night of migration, when his father and the Prophet secretly left for Makkah, one of the infuriated chiefs of the Quraish tribe headed towards the house of Abu Bakar Siddique and started knocking on the door violently shouting, "Where is your father?" Asma replied with a counter-question, "How would I know?" The story's author appreciates Asma's response in the following words: "This response shows the wisdom and courage of Hazrat Asma. She did not make a statement that would give them a clue" (Malik et al., 2019, p. 34). Since the situation was life-threatening and she could not afford to be completely disclosive, it was very wise on her part to opt for an ambiguous answer that saved the life of his father and preserved the value of truth at the same time.

In a second episode of the same story, Asma's blind grandfather visited her and inquired if her father had left any money or valuables for her and the kids. She ran to a corner of her house, collected some pebbles and stones, covered them with a cloth and told her apprehensive grandfather, "Come grandfather, Look! He has left all this for us". He took the pebbles and stones for the jewels and his concern was alleviated. (Malik et al., 2019, p. 34). Her responses in both cases were not lies in and of themselves because they did not contravene the truth. Her equivocal statements took the benefit of the understanding of the immediate audience to be taken as a fact she

wanted to convey. The legend portrays her verbal responses as intelligent, considerate, and consistent with the moral of truthfulness.

In another oral legend (The written version retrieved from 'Is it acceptable to lie? n.d), Negus, an Abyssinian King who offered refuge to the Muslims fleeing from persecution, was accused by the Christians of renouncing his religion. Negus wrote the Muslim testimony and a Quranic verse about the status of Christ on a piece of paper which he earnestly believed and pinned the note underneath his shirt over his heart. He went out to his Abyssinian countrymen, placed his hand over his heart (and on the pinned message) and said, "I testify Jesus is not no more than this." (Is it acceptable to lie?,n.d., para 2). His Christian countrymen took him for testifying the Christian belief and returned satisfied. What Negus said was not contradictory to reality or his belief. He made special arrangements to create a specific referent of his words while the hearers understood him referring to the ordinary referent.

In the third oral legend, it is narrated that once a man who was chased by a group of people went into hiding in his own house. When his enemies reached his house and asked his wife where he was, she secretly drew a circle and replied, "He is not here." while pointing towards the circle. Though from the Anglo-American standpoint, such clever manipulation of information would appear deceptive, in Pakistani culture, the legend is told with a very lofty moral that lying (proper) should be avoided at all costs, even in a life-threatening situation. The speaker can make wise use of words to say something that gives a misleading impression but does not involve deliberately contravening the truth.

The examples in which social actors used equivocation in problematic contexts abound in religious and cultural texts. In another incident, during their escape from Makkah, the Apostle of Allah was riding alongside his close confidant Abu Bakr Siddique. If someone met them on their way to Madinah and inquired Abu Bakr about the young man accompanying him, Abu Bakr would reply, "This man shows me the way." The people would think that he meant the road, while Abu Bakr intended to refer to the path of virtue and goodness. (Sahih Bukhari, Book 58 No 3911). Illustrating upon the Hadith, Molana Taqi Usmani, a Pakistani scholar, approves of the way the companion of the Prophet refrained from blatant lying and uttered a word that not only worked to save the apostle from harm but also saved him from the sin of lying (Usmani, 2011).

Though Islamic thought forms the spine of Pakistani cultural thought, it may be argued against taking these legends or real-life events which have origin in Arabic culture as representative of the practices in Pakistani culture. The argument is not defensible as it is not the origin but the salience and prevalence of the folklores that matter and reflect the cultural thought. The moral or message conveyed by these stories informs people's opinion about doublespeak or equivocation. Moreover, parallel stories from Indo- Pak history appear to repeat and reinforce this cultural pattern of thought.

In his book *Jhoot aor us kee Murawajah Soortain* (Lying and its Common Forms), Molana Taqi Usmani categorically recounts the forms of lying prevalent in Pakistani society and condemns all forms of verbal and practical deception. However, he presents a few accounts of renowned figures from Indo-Pak history who navigated their path in challenging situations by avoiding bald-faced lying as vigilantly as possible. It is interesting to note that all his appreciation is centred around their use of equivocation in difficult circumstances. He recounts the story of a renowned freedom fighter who was booked by the British government for the charges of treason and illegal arms possession. When he was brought in front of the court and asked if he owned any weapon, which he most certainly did, he raised his hand in which he held a rosary and said, "This is our weapon." (Usmani, 2011, p.27). His statement, coupled with his modest demeanour, helped him escape the tricky situation. In another incident, the police issued arrest warrants against a famous religious scholar Maulana Muhammad Qasim in a false accusation. When the police arrived to arrest him, he was alone in his mosque. The police officer moved near him and inquired where Maulana was. Maulana Qasim stepped a few steps back from his position, pointed to his previous position, "He was just here a while ago". The police got the impression that he was not there and moved out of the mosque (Usmani, 2011, p.28).

The stories and the remarks made by the author are quite illuminating to reveal the cultural thought. While appreciating the character of these legendary characters who resorted to equivocation to avoid the unlawful persecution of the mighty governmental machinery, he says that the faithful servants of Allah, even when their life is in danger, are still cautious that their tongue does not utter a wrong word and the blatant or outright lie does not come out of their mouth. Furthermore, he adds the role of equivocation in the following words, "*Agar Kabhi Mushkil waqt aa jaey to is waqt*

bhi toriyeh ker kay aor gol mol baat ker kay kaam chal jaey, yeh behter hai." (If there is ever a difficult time, it is better to equivocate [instead of lying]). "(Usmani, 2011, p. 28). His remarks testify to the semantic correlation between wrongness and lying and the distinction between saying something wrong or untrue and simply escaping the truth by creating an alternate meaning. Creating alternate meaning or *Toriyeh* is not equivalent to lying; instead, its use is motivated by the desire to avoid lies (Alinouri & Heidari, 2015). At the same time, it is considered a prized social skill that only a few people possess. It requires a person to have an exceptional mastery over words and their meaning (Alinouri & Heidari, 2015).

It is interesting to note that the characters in these legends are pious people presented with situations that allow for the permissibility of lying as per Islamic injunctions. However, they decide to use their wit and wisdom to avoid falsification and uphold truth even in difficult circumstances like these. If measured from Anglo-perspective, such tactfulness will be labelled as duplicitous, disingenuous and immoral. The English proverb "Some people have tact, others tell truth" echoes the cultural thought that being tactful is equivalent to being a liar (Petrova, 2019, p.307). However, from the perspective of Pakistani people, being tactful equates to exhausting all your possibilities before resorting to lying in harm-inducing, life-threatening situations. Equivocation of the kind created by these saintly figures is a desirable and enviable skill that not many people possess. Moreover, the use of strategic communication in these special circumstances cannot be taken to create an allowance for the latent manipulation of information in day-to-day social interactions. This discussion brings us to another context in which equivocation can be used as an alternate to bald-faced lying.

It has been elaborated in the preceding sections that lying is completely forbidden in Islam except in three special contexts. It is not permissible to lie for entertainment or amusement purposes. To be a true believer, one needs to abandon lying for the sake of fun and argument. In one of his Hadith, The Apostle of God said, "Woe to him who tells things, speaking falsely, to make people laugh thereby. Woe to him! Woe to him" (Abu-Dawood Book 42 No 4990). Wanton lying as a form of entertainment (as instantiated in harmless pranks made on the eve of April Fool) is strictly prohibited. The idea of loosening certain social norms on religious festivals like Holi in Hinduism or Jewish festival Purim is non-existent in Pakistani culture.

Notwithstanding, the use of equivocation for benign jesting that does not jeopardize any religious commandments is reportedly attested in the very practices of the prophet Muhammad. It is narrated that once an older woman came to the prophet Muhammad and requested him to pray for her entrance in Jannah. The prophet told her that there would be no old women in Jannah. The old woman started crying in pure dejection. Then the Prophet revealed his joke to her by explaining that "one will not enter in a state of old age, but Allah will make all the women of Jannah young virgins." (Tirmidhi et al., 1994, p. 116). Another instance recounts the story of a man who came to the prophet and requested him to grant him a beast to ride. The prophet jokingly told him that he would give him a baby of the she-camel. The man baulked at the offer by saying that a young offspring of a camel would be useless for him as he wanted one for conveyance purposes. The prophet then amusingly replied, "Are riding-camels born except from she-camels?" (Tirmidhi et al., 1994, p. 114). The intelligent use of words that do not contravene truth is the only permissible form of joking to offer a break from ongoing seriousness.

Explaining in pragmatic terms, the treatment of equivocation in Pakistani culture suggests that the locus of sincerity or truth-value is placed at the literal level. It is a literal falsehood that needs to be avoided at all costs and in all situations. Equivocation can serve as an unguilty or above-reproach alternate in situations where plain truth is too problematic to disclose. Here it would be interesting to note that from the Anglo-American perspective, it is not only the literal falsehood but also the false implicature that is blameworthy for creating a deceptive message (Meibauer 2005). From the Anglo-American perspective, equivocation and doublespeak are instances of deception (Bull 2015; Levine 2014) because they involve covertly created false implicature that is bound to mislead. Conversely, in the Pakistani context, the appreciative use of equivocation in specific contexts reflects that false implicature does not fall within the definitional criterion of deception. All the cultural legends discussed in this section reveal that even the covertness of the false implicature does not generate potential culpability.

The following approximation sums up the semantic formula of equivocation for Pakistani culture:

[F]

It is bad to say something not

true. It is good to say

something true.

If someone cannot say something true because something bad can

happen, that someone can say X

X can be true

The same X can be not true at the same time.

It is not bad to want someone think that X is true.

The presence of an evaluative component in the script reflects that the acceptance of equivocation as a very useful verbal strategy to serve multiple functions in social interaction. However, a note of caution is in order here: The scope of 'something bad' that can happen as a result of telling the truth is limited and cannot be seen to imply 'everything bad'. Any generalization that equivocation is permissible across all interactional contexts should be made with caution. As reported earlier, the use of semantic ambiguity is morally less reprehensible than blatant or outright lying; however, when paired with other cultural scripts, for example, the need to be direct, clear and unambiguous in one's talk, equivocation occupies a lower position. The judgment about the use of equivocation may be divided depending upon the context of the utterance and the consequences such utterance can draw.

4.8.5 On Prevaricating

Besides the bald-faced lying, the cultural attitudes also differ in how they consider departures from the truth other than plain falsification (Vincent Marrelli, 2004a). The violation of the relevance to the preceding discourse topic is a major source to ambiguate the clarity of the information (Bavelas et al., 1990). From the Anglo-American perspective, any departure from the relevant information in the discourse is considered a violation of honest, direct or cooperative communication. Varying the level of relevance of the information to the topic at hand is an oft- used strategy to deceive while saying the truth (McCornack et al., 1992).

In Urdu, it is not difficult to establish that presenting irrelevant or unrelated information receives negative connotations. Based on the affective value assigned by Key informants, the idioms such as *idhar udhar kee batain kerna* (side step an issue),

fazool goi kerna (bullshit) and *tall matol kerna* (prevaricate) carry negative valence and therefore represent undesirable speech behaviours. The robust negative connotation attached with *betukki baat* (prattle) hints at the cultural expectation to avoid beating about the bush or prevaricating. One is expected to stick to the topic of the discourse and make a meaningful contribution.

Sawal kuch jawab kuch / sawal deegar jawab deegar (asking about one thing and saying another) is used without fail to express one's disappointment at the contribution made by a person that digresses from the expected topic of the talk. Similarly, proverbs such as *Sawal gundum jawab Chana* (lit. one is asking about wheat but the answer is about chickpea), *sawal az asmaan, jawab az reesman* (The question is about one thing, the answer is about a completely different thing), *Kaho din kee sunay raat kee* (You talk of the day, they listen of the night) and *Kaho khait kee sunay khalian kee* (You speak of the fields, they listen of the granary) are invariably used to refer to a breach of conversational expectation disapprovingly. They convey a sense of a dialogic exchange where the speaker fails to adhere to the principle of relevance. The presence of elaborate lexical items to denote a mismatch between the expected and the presented answer reveals the cultural expectation that there should be a close fit between the question being asked and the answer being produced.

Though a certain degree of confidence can be rested on the negative evaluation of the verbal acts denoted by above mentioned lexical, phrasal and proverbial items, it is not possible to ascertain at least solely by looking at the semantic categories if presenting irrelevant information is considered deceptive in Pakistani culture or not. Unlike English words 'evasion' and 'prevarication' which include the deliberate intent to deceive in their very senses, the kind of 'irrelevance' denoted by these Urdu multi-word expressions is not deliberate i.e., intentionality is not part of these linguistic unites. One cannot prevaricate unknowingly but it is possible for someone to produce an irrelevant message out of one's simplistic naivety. The semantic explication of a very salient Urdu proverb *sawal gundum jawab chana* (which idiomatically means 'to prevaricate') as gleaned from an online question posted at Quora.com and by the informal remarks made by the Key Informants reveals that such cloaking of information as is codified in this proverb can be a sign of two things. First, the naïve ignorance of the respondent and second, a strategic choice to avoid the question (Atif 2017; Dasa 2016). The decision about evasion as an assumed condition of imperfect

knowledge and simplistic naivety or as a sign of the manipulation of information needs further contextualization.

The following semantic formula can describe the cultural attitude towards prevarication:

[G]

If someone says to X: "I want you to say something

about Z" It is good if X says something about Z.

It is bad if X says something that is not about Z.

As the semantic evidence is inconclusive, the script simply postulates the cultural idiom about 'irrelevance being bad' but not the 'irrelevance being deceptive'. Moreover, the failure to present relevant information is regretted in an informational context where the interlocutors are engaged in a dialogic exchange: X is invited to say something about a phenomenon Z. The script does not say anything about situations where no such request is explicitly made. Therefore, the script does not apply to conversational contexts involving an unpleasant, hurtful or problematic topic.

4.8.6 On Straight Talk

Straight talk can be translated as the directness of what one says. Anglo-American model of social interaction is based on speaking one's mind, not holding anything back, blurting out the truth and parrhesia or free speech (Vincent Marrelli, 2004c). Straightness of speech as "calling a spade a spade" and "telling as it is" is a prized social value in Anglo-American culture. Metalinguistic descriptors such as "straight talk" and "plain talk" which denote speaking literally carry positive loading in the English language (Vincent Marrelli, 2004b, p.415). Straightness in the Anglo-American context refers to giving plain answers to simple questions by disclosing all the truthful information that is relevant to the context in an unambiguous manner. To be precise, talking straight entails abiding by Grice's cooperative principle.

What makes the discussion about straight talk or directness of speech relevant to the topic at hand is the prevalence of the assumption that straight talk is always anti-tact and non- deceptive (Blum 2005). Brown (2002) notes that the relationship between lying and (in)directness is the function of cultural expectations about how a message should be conveyed. Since Anglo-American culture poses expectations about verbal

clarity and explicitness of the message content (Lapinski & Levine, 2000), messages deficient in any one of these components are considered deceptive and less honest (McCornack et al., 1992). Couched in semantico-referential ideology, Anglo-American culture presupposes direct, unembellished and straight transmission of information as the precondition of being truthful.

Anglo-American culture mainly encourages directness in seeking information from the addressee but not "in acts aiming at bringing about an action from the addressee" (Wierzbicka, 2003, p. 63). This accounts for the wide use of indirect speech acts or whimperatives in common English directives. The Anglo-American cultural preference for straight talk cannot be extended to what is called personal remarks or invasive comments about anyone's personal attributes. In Anglo-American cultures, a straight or direct communication style is related to another cultural value of avoiding rudeness and having pleasant interaction (Wierzbicka 2010). The straight talk is not necessarily rude but the bluntness or the sharpness of the message needs to be mitigated in certain contexts to make it more acceptable. Allan and Burridge (2006) use the term "Orthophemism" to describe this mode of speaking that is direct and straight but not overly blunt or offensive (Allan & Burridge, 2006, p.2). The Anglo-American discourse style, though prototypically characterized as a direct communication style, is balanced between being honest and being polite.

In commensuration with the semantic script, Urdu folk terminology for talk also demonstrates the same cultural penchant for straightness and the plain truth. The cultural preferences for saying what one believes and for saying 'how it is' inadvertently necessitate straight talk. The Urdu language has an exuberant vocabulary in the form of words, idioms and phrases denoting straight talk. The adjectives such as *Saaf* (clear), *khuli* (open), *belaag* (candid), *seedhi* (straight) and *khari* (transparent) which routinely collocate with *baat* (talk) are notable for their positive loading. The positive evaluation of these collocations indicates a cultural preference for a straightforward way of talking. Furthermore, the idioms such as *Khuda lagti Kehna* (lit. to say something that pleases God and not the people) and *Eman kee kehna* (lit. to say something in keeping with one's *Eman* [and not in someone's favour]) are symptomatic of a cultural attitude to say things unequivocally based on the principles of honesty and truthfulness. *Munh pay baat kerna* (saying something to somebody's face), *lagi liptee na rakhna* (to talk distinctly and impartially) and *seedhi baat kerna*

(talk straight) are more favoured communicative behaviours than Gol *mol baat kerna* (equivocation) and *ghuma phira k baat kerna* (prevarication) which involve playing around the words.

In Pakistani cultural idiom, truth needs no pruning or embellishment to make it acceptable. One cannot find any word, phrase or idiom equivalent to English expression like 'sugar-coating the truth' or "to soften the blow", "to cushion the blow", "to wrap up (bad news)", "to take the sting out of (something)", "to take the edge off (something)", "to sweeten the pill." (Wierzbicka, 2010, p. 58). The meanings and the strong negative loading associated with the phrasal units *chiknee chupree batain* (slick and polished talk) and *churb zubani* (glibness) affirm that overly smooth speech is considered deceptive, insincere or sycophantic.

At the same time, it is hard to find the English equivalent of Urdu idioms *Munh tor jawab daina* (lit. replying with face-breaking outspokenness) and *dandaan shikan jawab daina* (lit. Breaking the opponent's teeth by a direct remark). These idioms signify the bold, clear, unhedged and free response that silences the opponents (Dehlvi 1908 Vol 4, p. 442). The rough semantic equivalence of these idioms with English lexical items such as comeback, rejoinder, riposte or retort can be challenged on two semantic grounds. First, though both Urdu and English items denote the same process, i.e., saying something that renders the opponent speechless, they differ in what counts as the force of the argument. Urdu idioms denote the unadulterated, clear, straight and direct messages that do not mask truth or tone down its sharpness. It is the undeniability or the vigour of truth that renders the opponent silent, while in case of riposte or retort, it is the wittiness or shrewd acumen that plays its role in knocking out the rival. The meaning of these Urdu idioms is semantically closer to the sense conveyed by the French word 'Replique', which denotes an irrefutable, no-nonsense argument. Second, Urdu idioms depict truth as a primary concern possessing a value superior to the value of guarding someone's face. Such a direct style of communication will seem rude, inconsiderate and insensitive from the Anglo-American perspective. The physical damage to one's face through naked truth is simply untranslatable in Anglo-American culture obsessed with saving one's and others' (metaphoric) face.

It is not that the Pakistani conceptualization of truth is unmindful of or insensitive to the harshness of truth or is unaware of the bitterness of truth. The thought is culturally registered in the form of a proverb *Sach karwa hota hai* (Truth is always

bitter) and *Sach bolna adhi larai mol laina hota hia* (Speaking truth is equivalent to asking for troubles). However, the higher value associated with being truthful takes precedence over the supposed paybacks of speaking strategically. The dictum by Ali Abni Abu Talib, the fourth Caliph of Islam "Truth that harms is better than falsehood that brings joy" (Al-Fath & Al- Amudi, 2011, p. 344), has wide cultural currency in Pakistani society. The religious directions also enjoin believers to be proper and straightforward in their words. The Qur'an says, "Believers! Take Allâh as a shield and say the right thing in a straightforward word that hits the mark [and is devoid of hidden meanings] (The Qur'an 33:70). Since the truth/fulness is the key attribute of the ideal speech, the speech needs to be open and above-board, candid and correct. In Pakistani culture, Straight talk and truth are also connected because of the definitional isomorphism between truth and reality. As a truthful statement is defined in terms of its close correspondence with reality, it is merely the record of observable facts. Speaking truthfully inevitably entails speaking directly without any crookedness, distortion.

One interesting manifestation of this cultural norm about the straight and plain talk is found in the popularity of a catchphrase '*Seedhi baat, no bakwas'* (straight talk, no rubbish) introduced by a beverage company in their advertisement campaign launched in 2009. The catchphrase is very popular among Pakistani youth to signal their preference for cutting to the chase, leaving out all the unnecessary details. The slogan is used to warrant a non-pretentious, forthright and direct way of communicating truth that needs to be asserted unequivocally.

In the light of the preceding discussion, this component of the pragmatic script can be postulated as follows:

[H]

People can all say to one another:
"I want you to know that X"
X is true.
It is good to say X as X and not something else.
It is good to say X even if someone can feel something bad because of this.

The inclusion of 'X as X' is equivalent to 'saying as it is'. As the meaning of truth in the Urdu language is mainly the correspondence of thought with reality, the

script [H] presupposes the capacity of the language to narrate facts or reality in a reasonably partial and objective manner. In saying X as X , one is conveying plain, unembellished and simple truth.

4.8.7 On Silence

The role of silence as a communicative strategy largely depends on the language ideologies followed and believed in the corresponding culture. Though the correlation of deception and silence in Anglo-American cultures remains understudied, there are some oblique ways to garner evidence for any such cultural expectation. In Anglo-American culture, non-disclosure of information can be considered misleading because the Anglo-American folk ideology rests mainly on the idea that the primary purpose of the language is to convey information (Blum, 2005). Since the information that comprises the best available stock of true facts cannot be conveyed without words, words are always superior and more prized than silence. In Anglo-American culture, one is honour bound to give relevant and true information and concealing information either by withholding a part of it or by not sharing it at all is considered socially problematic (Wierzbicka, 1991). Even Grice and those working in the Gricean paradigm regard silence as a violation of the maxims (Ephratt, 2012). A silent person can be suspected of hiding something due to the negative assumption about the meaning of silence. Silence is viewed as a violation of Grice's Quantity maxim. The contrast between truthfulness on one hand and reticence, secrecy, privacy and secretiveness, on the other hand, highlights the folk understanding of non-truthfulness in Anglo-American culture. There are different types of non-truthfulness, which range from explicitly presenting false information (lying) and complete absence of speech (silence) (Vincent Marrelli, 2004c). The cultural expectation that one must say what one knows makes silence dubious. The English word truth not only contrasts with the word 'lie' but also with 'concealment' (Wierzbicka, 1991) and silence as a form of concealment is considered a sign of deception.

Apart from the language ideologies, the relationship between deception and silence also rests on the cultural assumption about the nature of silence. Silence, if viewed as inarticulation, would be conceived as least competent, deceptive or an attempt to mask reality. Contrarily, if a culture regards silence as the ability to control information when needed, it would evaluate silent episodes in communication as prudent and wise. Anglo-American culture seems to follow what Jullien and Lloyd (2002) call the Philosopher's Path or the favourite presumption of the Western

philosophy that there is always something to be said which needs to be said. Conversely, what Jullien and Lloyd call Sage's path, the Eastern way of thinking, values silence more than words. Silence is not inarticulation; A sage is silent not because there is nothing to say but because there is nothing to be told. Reality transcends words and silence makes what is evident transpire and emanate (Jullien & Lloyd, 2002). The idea rings true in the philosophy of leading Eastern thinkers. Dalai Lama XIV 's famous dictum "Silence is sometimes the best answer" is an elaboration of the cultural attitude towards the role of silence in human communication. In eastern thought, silence is full of meaning and conveys more than words can do. Silence is not inarticulation or having nothing to say; it is a choice to say nothing when you have plenty to says. Being a person of much silence without being inarticulate is a sign of personal strength, forbearance and insight (Al-Fath & Al-Amudi, 2011).

Wierzbicka (1994) has observed cultural differences in the value placed on speech and silence. Eastern societies value silence more than Western societies. Though prevalent globally, the proverb "Speech is silver; silence is gold" is thought to have an Eastern origin (Jente, 1932, p.346). Silence in Eastern cultures is a valued response, a sign of wisdom, mutual respect and dignity (Gundlach, 2013). The cultural preference for silence is predominantly motivated by Buddhist, Confucian and Islamic religious philosophies, which recommend silence as a superior virtue connoting thoughtfulness (Kim, 2003).

Urdu has a very rich vocabulary and exuberant somatic imagery to express optional and forced restraint on speech. The semantic density of the concept of silence in Urdu is evident from the range of meanings associated with silence. Silence is represented through rich somatic images. In the case of restraint on speech, the tongue, being the prime articulatory organ, is part of many such somatic images. Controlling one's tongue (zuban *sambhal kay rakhna*), sewing one's tongue (*zuban see laina*) and putting the tongue under teeth (*zuban danton main day laina*) are common idioms meaning observing control on one's speech. Similarly, the mouth as the site of articulatory activity is also a part of a number of idioms and proverbs which convey the meaning of being silent. *Munh pay muhr lagna/lagana* (Sealing the mouth), *Munh pay qufl lagna/lagana* (Locking the mouth), *Munh bund ho jana/ker laina* (shutting one's mouth) reflect different states of observing silence.

Sewing one's lips, mouth or tongue is suggestive of enforced or willing silence

suppressing the freedom to express truth. This check on expressing truth or truthful feelings is ambivalent. On one side, it is a cultural decision to respond either with the truth, be indirect, or keep silent where truth is problematic, dangerous or hurtful. On the other hand, it may be a societal trend to check freedom of speech by making someone silent. For the scope of the current study, it is the first case that is theoretically relevant: Keeping silent as an appropriate social response. The cultural attitude is divided between these two types of silence. All lexical items with positive loading (*lab see laina, chup ker jana, pee jana*, *chup sadhana* etc.) are causative verbs that assign agency to the subject. On the contrary, inchoative verbs which take an object as a patient (*munh bund kera daina, chup kera daina, munh per qufal lag jana*) denote unappreciated silence. The silence that is well contemplated and voluntarily adopted is positively evaluated, while the silence that is extraneously enforced carries negative social loading. *Khamoshi ikhtiar kerna* (opting silence) assumes a degree of intentionality and willingness on the speaker's part. While on the other side, *khamosh/chup kera daina* (to silence someone) is negatively loaded and considered oppressive.

There seems to be some cultural understanding about the truth being ideal but not an easy or pleasing choice in the interpersonal domain. In comparison, silence in the face of argument and confrontation is not easy but safe and pleasant. Speaking up is the right way to function in society but silence offers a safe way (Al-Harahsheh, 2012). One has to choose between being easy or being safe. In Pakistani culture, the choice seems to be based on safety and pleasantness and not on ease. Pakistani people like to converse in a non-controversial and non-confrontational manner (Evason et al., 2016; Pakistan- Language, religion, culture, 2020). Resultantly, silence is used as an important tool of communication in Pakistani culture (Pakistan- Language, religion, culture, 2020). Ali Ibn-e- Abu Talib, the fourth Muslim Caliph whose thoughts are greatly revered in Pakistani culture, recommends the course of silence for the safety it can offer against error, embarrassment, confrontation or foul speech. He admires silence for being non-confrontational, forbearing and full of wisdom (Al-Fath & Al-Amudi, 2011).

These views about the role of silence mainly concern the cultural understanding of the nature of speech. A detailed discussion of this point can be found in the next section; nevertheless, here it would suffice to say that unlike the Anglo-American

model of talk as a tension diffusing and problem-solving activity (Blum,2005), excessive talk is considered tumultuous and troublesome in the Pakistani context. Contrasting with the role of speech to convey the best stock of available facts (Vincent Marrelli, 2004), the ideal use of the speech in some Eastern cultures is to guard against the harms of uncontemplated, excessive and insensitive talk (Ahmad, 2005). Silence serves as a saving grace in problematic and embarrassing situations by allowing a chance to observe profoundly and reflect deeply (Al-Harahsheh, 2014; Gundlach, 2013).

The problematic nature of speech transpires in the Urdu idiom *baat barhana,* which literally means extending the talk and figuratively means 'to aggravate the situation'. Urdu Proverb *aik chup so sukh* (once silent, hundred times happier) predicts the positive outcomes that silence can draw. The one who keeps silent in the moment of confrontation can avert or avoid provocative situations created by pointless argumentation. In situations where some cultures make lying permissible (for example, see a discussion on Mexican indirectness in Blum, 2005), silence acts as an alternative to lying to avoid any unpleasant moment in Pakistani culture. According to religious teachings, when you're quiet, you avoid unnecessary talk that might lead to lying (Al-Fath & Al-Amudi, 2011).

Pakistani culture also differs from the Anglo-American culture in what silence can convey. While in Anglo-American culture, silence is interpreted as concealment (Eades, 2012), in Pakistani culture, silence is interpreted as consent, approval and affirmation. Proverbs like *khamoshi neem raza* (silence is half of the consent) and *khamoshi bolti hai* (Silence speaks) reflect the cultural meaning associated with silence. These two different interpretations result in two entirely different outcomes concerning deception. From the Anglo-American perspective, silence is deceptive because something is being concealed; from the Pakistani perspective, silence is revelatory because something is still being conveyed.

Once again, the idea of silence being meaningful, contemplative and non-confrontational resonates the Islamic philosophy of speech. The numerous Hadiths of Prophet Muhammad urge his follower to refrain from careless speech and adopt silence. Al- Harasheh (2012) quotes many Hadith of Prophet Muhammad to highlight the importance of silence in a believer's life:

Worship is ten parts, nine of them are in silence, My God ordered me to do nine

things…, Glorify yourself by keeping silent, When you encounter someone who is angry and reviles you, ignore him since if you reply, he may hurt you by words or deeds, Silence is the best worship; God sympathizes with one who keeps silent, Shall I teach you something lighter on the body, but heavier in the scale of your good deeds… silence, good behaviour, and do not interfere with what is not your business. (Al-Harahsheh, 2012, p. 35)

The prophet's saying that believers "… should speak what is good or keep silent" (Sahih Bukhari 78: 6136) has unremitting cultural resonance. Ali Ibn-e-Talib, who is repeatedly quoted and cited in Pakistan for his philosophy of silence, has also offered a rank order of preferences between truth, silence and problematic speech. "Speaking the truth is better than inarticulateness and silence" (Al-Fath and Al-Amudi 2011, p.354). However, silence is always better than problematic talk. "Silence that covers you with honour is better than speech that earns you regret" (Al-Fath and Al-Amudi 2011, p. 862), "Silence that earns you reverence is better than words that drape you with disgrace" (Al-Fath and Al-Amudi 2011, p.862). The crux of all these aphorisms is that truth is always better than silence, but silence is always better than inappropriate speech that invites regret, reproach or disgrace (Al-Fath and Al-Amudi 2011). Though these aphorisms cannot be called cultural in their origin and location, these adages are collected from the various social media sources shared by the Pakistani people over the three years of this research. The fact lends some credence to the utility of this evidence. Furthermore, the folk categories of the Urdu language also support the proposition.

The cultural norm for the silence can be approximated as follows:

[I]

People can say some

words These words

say something

when people hear these words, they know what someone wants to say

with these words

People can also want to not say

something Saying no words says

something

People know what someone wants to say by not saying words.

Sometimes it is good to not say words if something bad can happen because of this.

When contrasted with [C] 'It is good to say what is true' and [H] 'It is good to say something true even if someone can feel something bad because of this', the cultural script [I] may seem contradictory to the norm proposed in [C] and [H]. However, the contrast that exists between 'saying something true' and 'not saying words' is too obvious to ignore. The truth remains the dominant cultural priority; however, the judicious and prudent use of words/silence is also encouraged and appreciated.

4.8.8 On Cautious Speech

The direct ideology which has acquired the status of a naturalized norm in Anglo-American culture warrants the expectation about the spontaneity of speech. Honest speech is spontaneous speech that stems directly from one's heart (Blum, 2005). The result of this cultural predilection for spontaneity is that in Anglo-American culture, spontaneous expression of one's beliefs and facts is considered more natural and, therefore, more sincere and honest than careful and planned speech (Pierce, 2011). Consequently, in ordinary conversations, the response latency of an interactant is met with suspicions of duplicity or insincerity (Blum, 2005; Pierce, 2011). This Anglo-American cultural script is consistent with the general US ethos of "just doing it", which prioritizes talking about reality in a direct and plain manner over thinking twice before speaking (Vincent Marrelli, 2004a, p.360).

Here it would be apt to introduce the nuance that exists between spontaneity and blurting it out. The verb 'Blurt' carries a pejorative connotation in Anglo-American culture and Americans do not think very highly of saying everything that pops in one's head (Wierzbicka, 2010). Spontaneity simply applies to saying [most of the time] what is on one's mind in the spur of the moment and not to what is significantly planned well in advance. Though ordinary conversations are expected to be marked by candour, the Anglo-American script does not preclude the necessary verbal caution under some circumstances. It is just that Anglo-American script does not set globalized expectations about always thinking first (Wierzbicka, 2010).

Contrasting with the plea for directness and spontaneity is the script of 'thinking

before saying', which appears to hold much salience in Pakistani culture. Folk theories about the nature of speech have a deterministic effect on how the ideal speech is envisaged. By the same token, folk logonyms or metalinguistic categories used to describe speech carry insight into the nature of underlying folk ideology (Vincent Marrelli, 2004b). In Pakistani culture, speech is viewed as a material possession that needs to be guarded and protected. Like other Eastern cultures, which view speech as an irreversible and enduring entity (see Ahmad, 2005, for example), the linguistic data of the Urdu language also seem to share the cultural understanding of longevity and uncontrollability of talk. The proverb *munh say nikli baat parai hoti hai* (the words that come out of the mouth are not yours anymore) along with its close variant *kehnay say baat parai ho jati hai* (Once you say it, you do not own it anymore) and some other proverbs such as *munh say nikli kothon charhi* (Once uttered, the talk becomes public) and *munh say baat nikli hawa main bhari* (what comes out of mouth diffuses in the air [becomes out of control]) all reflect the cultural meaning of talk as a possession irretrievably lost during interactions. As the exchange is irreversible once communicated, one needs to be double sure of what one is handing over to the hearer/s. Personal control over speech or talk is exercisable only before and at the moment of its production as what follows is beyond individual control. One inevitable outcome of this folk ideology is the script of being vigilant and cautious with one's words. It is not difficult to see that such caution can be translated as planning or premeditation that [should] precede each verbal act.

The Urdu proverb *'Pehlay tolo phir bolo'* (lit. First weigh, then speak) summarizes the cultural attitudes towards cautious speech. Since one is responsible for one's words and the outcome they draw, it is a prerequisite to perform a thorough contextual evaluation and decide accordingly between what to say and what to withhold and between what to say and how to say it.

The superiority of planned speech over spontaneous speech can also be established by looking at the folk categories used to denote various types of talk. The concept of an ideal speech is discernible by looking at the positive and negative adjectives used to modify the noun '*baat*' (talk) and '*Guftagoo*' (conversation). The positive moral valence associated with *napi tulli baat* (lit. measured and weighed speech) mirrors the cultural ideal of producing speech after carefully evaluating its social appropriacy. A measured and weighed talk is not the first thing that pops in one's

head. It is the speech produced after carefully estimating its weightage and length. It is a sign of civility and social propriety that one is careful with one's words. It contrasts sharply with the negative moral valence associated with the speech behaviours signified by the idioms *Zuban kay agay khundaq hona* (lit. to have a ditch in front of one's mouth) and *jo munh main aye boltay jana* (blurt out everything that comes in one's mouth). The idioms denote the negative acts of saying everything that pops in one's mind without exercising one's judgement about the circumstances in which talk occurs or the consequences it can invite.

Culturally speaking, one is honour bound to follow the social imperative '*Soch samajh kay bolo*' (Think before you speak). The idiom builds the expectation to speak after a period of premeditation (*ghor-o-fikar*), under the conscious control (*hosh-o-hawas*) (Dehlvi 1908 Vol 3, p. 121). The more prohibitive cautions like '*Zuban sambhal kay baat kero* (lit. guard your tongue while talking) and '*Munh ko lagam day ker baat kero*' (lit. Bridle your mouth while talking) are used to warn someone who fails to abide by the social imperative of thinking before speaking. One is expected to assume some conscious control over what one says by carefully considering the plausibility of one's words. It is interesting to note that the English counterpart to the Urdu proverb '*Soch samajh kay bolo*' (Think before you speak) is 'Think before you leap' which denotes the restraint on action rather than speech. Though literally, the English proverb can be used on occasions that involve minding one's speech, the cultural advice is to be careful with one's action in general. From the Pakistani perspective, it is improper speech that one needs to guard against the most. The words have the potential to cause more damage than actions can. The tendency to consider improper speech more detrimental than improper action is what Pakistani culture shares with some other cultures such as Judaism (see Galasiński 2000).

Pakistani script for cautious speech is very close to what Wierzbicka (2010) calls the Anglo-American script of 'not blurting it out' though backed by different cultural assumptions (p.55). Unlike the cultural precept of thinking first to avoid the hurtful damage to the addressee's face and feelings, Pakistani script is not restricted to regard for others' feelings only. It is not that the concern for the addressee's feelings is absent in Pakistani culture, but it is not the only key determining factor. The meaning and usage of folk categories reveal that various folk ideals combine to form the cultural determiners of ideal speech. As elaborated earlier, the folk view of speech as a material

possession requires social actors to be mindful of what they say before losing it entirely or making it averse to their interests. It gives social actors a sense of control that is lacking for spontaneous or blurted-out speech.

Careful speech is not necessarily an anti-truth speech. When it is inevitable to speak the truth that might disrupt social ranking, there are certain preparatory conditions or linguistic primers to mediate the bluntness of truth. One such way of doing this is to issue a pre-warning of the truth before actually speaking it in order to prepare the listener for the truth. Urdu has many conversational routines that are used to preannounce the truthfulness of the statement and take pre-emptive measures to mitigate its adverse outcomes. Interactional routines such as *such kahoon to/such to ye hai,* meaning roughly the same as the English idiom 'truth be told 'are commonly used in Pakistani culture.

In contrast, 'truth be told' is not part of the English interactional routine. The practice reflects what Blum (2005) calls 'making the basis of statement explicit' or an 'epistemological fastidiousness' found in some cultures (Blum, 2005, p.304). Another way the (problematic) truth is introduced in the hierarchical interaction is by seeking a pre-emptive pardon or making an apologetic preamble. The conversation routines like *Chota munh bari baat* (lit. little mouth, big words) or *Gustakhi mua'af* (Pardon me for my audacity/insolence) are used before saying something above one's league, position and social status. Anjuman's Urdu-English Dictionary (1987) glosses *chota munh bari baat* as "an ordinary person criticizing a big man" (Abdul Haq, 1987, p. 579). The unmarked nature of the proverb hints at the value of social hierarchy that restricts or limits what can be said between unequal interactants.

In the light of the foregoing evidence, the following script can be formulated: **[J]**

It is good to say something true

it can be bad if someone says something true

if that someone hasn't thought about it for a short time before he says it.

With this cultural precept in place, it is not difficult to see why Pakistani conversations are characterized by long pauses (Evason et al., 2016). In a cross-cultural situation, such long pauses can be interpreted as a lack of fluency, hedging or even

mendacity, while from the perspective of Pakistani culture, such long pauses are a sign of thoughtfulness and premeditation.

4.8.9 On Sweet Talk

No matter how much honesty the cultural preference for truth entails, it is important to note that this principle of forthrightness operates in certain cloistered domains and does not enjoy pan-domain vitality. A person demonstrating unremitting honesty across all social contexts might evoke social criticism and can finally become socially isolated (Peeters, 2018). No culture seems to be exempted from the linguistic censoring of what is sayable and what is not. Careful speech is inadvertently linked with sweet-talking, which is inclined more towards politeness and avoidance of profanity than honesty and truthfulness. Thinking before speaking gives one a chance to process one's thoughts and filter out words for harshness, profanity or expletives.

Unlike Anglo-American culture, where speech is watched against causing hurtful feelings in addressee, in Pakistani culture, the regard for the status and ranking in the social hierarchy accounts for the primary need to think before speaking. Pakistani culture is more deference-oriented than being politeness-oriented. Talking about the social context of the Urdu language, Dalvi (1992) notes, "*Shaista aor ehtram kay haamil khitabat, urdu ki lisani muasharat main aik zabta ikhlaq ki haisiyat rakhtay hain. Saray insan barabar hain is liay ehtram kay mustahiq hain*" [Polite and deferent terms of address are very central to the Linguistic socialization of the Urdu language. All human beings are created equal and therefore deserve respect] (p.142). Though used interchangeably with politeness, deference here reflects the relative status of the participants on a hierarchical social dimension. Elaborating further on the polite and deferent use of language, Dalvi (1992) adds, " *Shaista aor ehtram kay alfaz ka istemaal aam tor par per aisay ashkhas kay liay kia jata hai jo haisiyat-o-martabay, san-o-saal, jins, dolat-o-sarwat, taaleemi liaqut aor mazhabi aitbar say bazurgi aor taqwa kay haamil hotay hain*" [the polite and deferent words are used for the people who occupy a higher status in terms of social position, age, wealth, educational qualification or religious piety] (p. 130). The elaboration clearly shows that social code in Pakistani culture is a matter of choosing an appropriate level of deference in speech.

Like any other collectivist and hierarchical society, the values of social agreement and a sense of social hierarchy are fundamental in Pakistani culture. The social actors must demonstrate deference to the elders and the most senior person in

the group (Pakistan-Language, religion, culture, 2020; Evason et al., 2016). Speech is considered to be an important agent in maintaining social decorum. In Farhang-e-Asifia, the idiom *Munh sambhal kay baat kerna* (Speak cautiously) is glossed as speaking carefully with concern for *had-e- adab* (deference) and *Hifz-e-Maratab* (the respect for the social ranking) (Dehlvi, 1908 Vol 2, p.398). *Hifz-e-maratab* (lit. the respect for social position) is inadvertently linked with *guftagoo kay adaab* or *baat kernay kee tameez* both meaning the manner of conversation. A large part of the art of the conversation rules is derived from one's understanding of the relative position of the interlocutors. *Adab Adaab*, the Urdu equivalent of the English word 'Etiquettes', not only signifies the customary code of agreeable behaviour as it does in the English language but also denotes *hifz-e-maratab* (the regard for social ranking) (Sarhindi 1976, p. 89). The cultural concern for the social hierarchy is clearly expressed in the following excerpt taken from a book on Pakistani social etiquette:

> *Maghrabi to shukriyay ka lafz her kas-o-nakas kay liay yaksaan tor per istemaal ker kay is farz say ada ho jatay hain laikin humaray yahan keh hifz-e-maratab aor san-o-saal ka khas khial rakha jata hai. Shukriya ada kerna aadab-e-zindagi ka aik mushkil aor eham tareen pehloo bun gia hai. Hum apnay choton ka shukria kisi aor andaz say kartay hain aor bazurgon ka kisi aor andaz say. Isi tarah maratab ki kami beshi kay lihaz say shukriyay ka andaaz badalta jata hai. Ghareebon aor karobari qisam kay taluqat walon ka shukria aor tarah ada kerna parta hai aor doston say kuch aor he andaaz hota hai.* [In the West, the word 'Thanks' is used equally for everyone to fulfil their social duty, but here, we pay special attention to the preservation of social rank and age. Expressing gratitude has become one of the most difficult and important aspects of life. We thank our younger ones in a different way and our elders in a different way. In this way, the style of gratitude changes depending on the rank level. We thank the poor and business people in one way, and friends in another]. (Fatima, 1967, p.191)

The literal equivalent of manners in the Urdu language is *tameez,* which literally means discernment or the ability to distinguish. The regard for the addressee's social position presupposes a degree of control over one's words. The cultural metaphors such as *munh phat* (lit. the one whose mouth is rent)*, Budzuban* (bad-tongued) and *zuban daraz* (long- tongued) describe an irreverent person who does not adhere to the principle of verbal caution. These words present interesting evidence for the inhibition

of unpremeditated words. These somatic images reveal that uttering one's thoughts before filtering them for '*Hifz-e-maratab*' is considered a malfunction of articulatory organs.

Some cultural keywords such as *muslihat, murrawwat* and *lihaz* corresponding with social harmony and social hierarchy are highly relevant for this thematic fragment of cultural thought. *Muslihat,* as a cultural keyword, is equivalent to the English word 'expediency' sans its connotation of selfish preference over principles. Urdu equivalent is full of positive connotations and has no personal motives associated with the (speech) acts done under *muslihat*. The collocation of the word with the noun *taqaza* (demand) indicates its urgency. Though the word may mean expedient decisions about one's action, it is primarily related to the ways of speaking. Acts done under *muslihat* are the acts of compromised and smoothed-out speech responses. Out of *muslihat* one cannot blurt out the naked truth but can only observe silence or make fair adjustments in the amount and presentation of information to avoid confronting, disrespecting or hurting someone. *Muslihat* requires social actors to perform something other than the default way of behaving. One cannot say that one spoke the truth out of *Muslihat*. Truth is normative behaviour.   The departure from this normative behaviour that seeks support and justification in *Muslihat*. Simply put, it is culturally desirable to make an expedient decision in favour of an alternate response (silence or indirectness) rather than speaking the (naked) truth or uttering the first thing that comes in one's mind.

An interesting manifestation of this cultural thought can be found in the parable of lying and truth narrated in the essay *Sach aor Jhoot ka Razmnama* written by Muhammad Hussain Azad. Describing the antagonistic nature of the main characters Giant lying and Queen Truth, Azad (1970) makes illuminating remarks about *Muslihat* as a softer and more attractive version of Truth. He tells that when Queen Truth feared losing her hold on the universe, she decided to change her garb, and started wearing glittery attire to make herself popular again among the masses. The attire was named "*Muslihat-e-Zamana*" (Stratagem of time) (Azad,1970, p. 44). It proved very helpful in restoring the popularity and acceptance of Queen Truth who continued to bedazzle Giant Lying with her brilliance. The parable is an interesting example of the positive evaluation of smoothing out the brusqueness of truth. Notwithstanding, *Muslihat* does not apply to mendacious lies that are told for some social advantage or material reward but only to the expedient and prudent use of words to diffuse a situation of conflict.

Another culturally salient word *lihaz* (deference) and its near-synonym *murrawwat* (complaisance) are closely associated with social hierarchy. In colloquial terms, if someone has *lihaz* for another person, the bluntness of honest opinion needs to be moderated in favour of a deferent version of the speech. Like the case of *muslihat*, one cannot jump to bold truth out of one's *lihaz* for the addressee. Speech made under the concern of '*muslihat*' and '*lihaz*' is a form of speech smoothed out for its bluntness.

Here it would be appropriate to mention the contrast between Anglo-American treatment of polite speech acts and Pakistani treatment of verbal acts done under '*muslihat*' and '*lihaz*'. From the perspective of Anglo-American culture, politeness is inadvertently linked with telling white lies to avoid hurting someone's feelings (Guthrie & Kunkel, 2013). The contexts that call for the activation of Lakoff's politeness principle are considered situations where expectations about the accurate representation of reality are suspended. Politeness in direct cultures is used to buff and trim one's speech to save others from the brusqueness of truth (Xie et al., 2005). In consonance with direct ideology, various linguistic strategies used to mitigate the bluntness of truth are considered deceptive in the US (Lapinski & Levine, 2000). In contrast, using similar strategies in Pakistani culture is not interpreted as lying or deception. Prudent and polite use of words is not considered deceptive or mendacious in collectivist cultures (Blum, 2005; Yeung et al., 1999). The descriptors '*Bhali baat*' (speaking good), *narmi say kee hui baat* (polite/kind talk), *achi baat* (virtuous talk) and *seedhi aor sacchi baat* (straight and truthful talk) jointly construct the cultural model of ideal speech and do not form either/or options. Genuineness and authenticity are the prime features of an ideal talk. One can be truthful and polite at the same time. It is polite speech without the semblance of sincerity that is considered deceptive in Pakistani culture.

When the components of deference and politeness are added to the generalized script of exercising inhibition on unpremeditated thoughts, the script can be rewritten as follows:

[K]

There are two kinds of people:

Some people are above us.

Some people are below us.

It is bad to say something true to someone above us

If we have not thought about it for a short time before we say it.

 It is good to say something true to someone above us

If we say it in good words.

Though semantic primes 'above and 'below' are relational and spatial notions, they are used in semantic explications to refer to the hierarchical relationships between humans (Wong, 2011). They portray the "vertical model of the society" which segregates human relations into hierarchical clusters based on age or social status (Goddard 2006, p.14). Since the concern of this thematic unit is to portray the effects of deference or politeness on the expression of truth, the script [J] and [K] are limited to 'saying something *true* to someone above us' and not to other markers of deference common in any language or culture. The script is primarily concerned with how verbal caution affects the cultural expectation to stay truthful regardless of the outcome it draws. When contrasted with the script [H] 'It is good to say X as X even if someone can feel something bad because of this' the two scripts can repeal each other. Arguably there can be one and only one of these two scripts that can be true for Pakistani culture. Their contradictory nature does not allow both of them to be true at the same time. However, as the ambivalence of Pakistani script has already been proposed, a plausible explanation exists to reconcile between these two apparently contradictory scripts. The two scripts belong to two different discourse domains. The Urdu language maintains a distinction between *Baat* (Speech/talk) and *Guftagoo* (conversation). *Baat* is a monologic, factual, objective or informative discourse, while *guftagoo* is dialogic, interpersonal and transactional. *Baat* needs an audience, while *guftagoo* needs an addressee. The presence/absence of a live and interactive addressee determines the cultural norm/script that is applicable in a particular situation. A line from an Urdu couplet, '*Kerta hun khul kay baat agar guftagoo na ho*' (I talk frankly if I am not in a conversation), can highlight the distinction that holds between '*baat*' and '*guftagoo*'.

Guftagoo has some more exacting standards than truth-telling, which limits what can be said. Script [H] is relevant when some objective statement of truth needs to be made, while the script [K] is applicable in conversational contexts involving interlocutors. In non- informational or conversational contexts, Indirectness is

interpreted as politeness and not as mendacious or deceptive (Vincent Marrelli, 1997). Straight talk which refers to stating facts and moral stances unequivocally, by no means enjoys unprecedented freedom in expressing one's private truth in interpersonal communication. Rejecting an invitation, turning down a request, accepting compliments and apologies are much trickier (Evason et al., 2016) than this ideal preference for telling the truth in the face of someone. Here the value of truth is juxtaposed with the values of seeking social agreement and showing deference. Unlike Russian culture, truth is not the only key concept in Pakistani culture. It coexists with other determinants of Pakistani interactional style, like a sense of social hierarchy, which does not allow someone to rub his honest feelings to everyone's face. In one of his Hadiths, the Apostle of God says, "He who makes peace between the people by inventing good information or saying good things, is not a liar." (Sahih Bukhari Chapter 53 No 2692). Saying good things to maintain good social relations is exempted from the blameworthiness of lying and deception.

In light of the preceding discussion, the pragmatic component of the Pakistani cultural script appears to be quite ambivalent. On one side, it promotes unmitigated directness; on the other, it has a special concession for a deferent style of interpersonal communication. The decision about saying something or making it as if to say something is domain and context-specific. One has four options to speak about something. Speaking the truth directly, keeping silent, speaking indirectly, and telling a lie. The options are hierarchical, with truth coming out on top and lies falling at the bottom.

As hoped, various pragmatic scripts explain the mismatch between a strong preference for truth and even stronger disapproval for lies at the semantic level and context-based evaluation of the speech act of lying at the pragmatic level. Speech acts of lying are assigned only to verbal acts that violate the cultural expectation of being consistent with reality. Despite possessing strong approval for truth, the pragmatic decision about telling unedited truth, mitigating the brusqueness of truth or withholding the truth altogether is mediated by the values of social hierarchy and social harmony.

4.9 Findings

This section summarises the findings and contributions of phase I of the current study. The following key findings emerge from the detailed analysis of culturally salient key terms, folk logonyms and religious and cultural texts.

The denotative and associative meanings of the key terms used to denote lying in the Urdu language revealed that the factual falsity, the falsity of accompanying belief states and/or both constitute the necessary conditions for the speech act of lying. Truth, on the other hand, is defined as a statement that that is strictly isomorphous with reality. Reality is used in this context as a generic term to describe both an internal and exterior condition of circumstances. A statement is considered to be a lie if it fulfils at least one of these requirements: it must be in conflict with either the speaker's internal reality or the world's exterior reality. Instead of further qualifications, lying is defined as a statement that expresses a condition diametrical opposite to the fact or reality. Contrarily, the English term 'lie' which denotes a deliberate intent to mislead presuppose the accompanying belief states as the necessary condition for lying to happen. From the Anglo-American perspective, if a person is trying to make his contribution true, he is speaking the truth regardless of the factual falsity of the statement. In contrast, Pakistani culture appears to operate on another model of social responsibility that tacitly assumes the literal falsehood of the statement as the only precondition of lying. Furthermore, as seen in opposition to truth, a false statement is a lie even when the intention to mislead is weak or simply non-existent. It does not mean that Pakistani culture precludes intentional acts of misleading from the definition of lying. It simply means that the presence of deceptive intent is not the precondition of lying but merely a subtype of lying in which what is said contradicts what is believed.

From the perspective of Pakistani culture, the term truth is a common label for at least three components i.e., the real fact about something, the quality of being true to facts and sincerity or genuineness. If one says something true without believing in it or says something that he believes to be true but is not factually true, it is by definition not a truth. Similarly, contradiction or dissonance between one's speech, action and beliefs is socially problematic and morally disapproved. It is culturally expected to be transparent about one's beliefs. Conversely, the current findings demonstrated that from the Anglo-American perspective, any of the three components described above can fall under the definition of truth.

This analysis found evidence for another interesting observation about the semantic relation between lying and truth: In abstraction, the semantic meanings of truthfulness and lying in Pakistani culture are bipolar, categorical or black and white.

Urdu equivalent of lying and truth are all-or-nothing dichotomous categories that do not form cline the way English categories make. The English language has many expressions to denote lying that vary in the degree of culpability attached to the communicative act (Vincent Marrelli, 2004b). In sharp contrast with the kaleidoscopic view of lying and truth as multi-shaded concepts (Petrova, 2019; Satha-Anand, 2018; Wierzbicka, 2002), the Pakistani conceptualization of truth and lying is very monochromatic.

Two significant sets of evidence support this monochromous view of lying in Pakistani culture. First, socially acceptable or benevolent forms of lying are non-existent in the Urdu data. Broadly translated, the current findings indicate that harmless, inconsequential, benign or playful lying is not lexicalized in the Urdu language. Lying is invariably serious, malicious and spiteful, while truth is always a positive, unmarked and desirable social alternative. When lying occurs for socially sanctioned good reasons, it is classed as a non-case of lying and not as a good form of lying. The second manifestation of the black-and-whiteness of the cultural scripts of lying can be found in the way various speech acts are assigned to the category of lying. Pakistani data reveals that the labels are very parsimoniously assigned to the category of lying. The semantic unrelatedness of the concept of lying with other communicative acts such as irony, jokes and teasing, which are characterized by literal falsehood but lack deceptive intent, reveals that in Pakistani culture, lying constitutes a narrow set of conditions rather than an umbrella term for all kinds of falsehood. For Pakistani culture, overt untruthfulness whose success lies in its being transparent does not count as an instance of lying and only serious and consequential forms of untruth are registered as lying.

The results manifested by linguistic evidence also reveal that the semantic and pragmatic understanding of truth, lying and deception in Pakistani culture are very different from each other. In the semantic domain, lying and truth are dichotomous constructs that promote lying as a non-defeasible morally wrong act. In the pragmatic domain, the decision about the status of truth as a cultural value is ambivalent and a contextual matter. In some contexts, it is encouraged to convey unembellished naked truth, whereas in some other contexts, a careful appraisal of one's words is valued and appreciated. Nevertheless, axiological dualism is maintained at both levels with no middle ground in between. The moral attitude towards lying is invariably negative. The

American understanding of truth and lies is consistent in both domains. It maintains a semantic understanding of greyness lexicalized in the form of 'white lies' and 'dark truth'. To sum up, the Anglo-American notion of lying is scalar in nature with acceptable and non-acceptable grades of lying, allowing the degree of shared membership (Chen et al., 2013; Hardin, 2010). In contrast, the Pakistani concept of *jhoot* is polar in nature and the membership to the group is more of a yes-no question than a more or less decision.

Talking about the specific cultural scripts in the pragmatic domain, there are several domain-specific cultural scripts which take effect under certain conditions. For instance, 'Saying what is true' or voicing the truth is considered a prized cultural value in Pakistan. If a statement is (objectively) true, it needs to be communicated. In order to fortify one's character, one needs to foster the courage to speak the truth regardless of the consequences it can invite. Nevertheless, keeping in view the linguistic evidence, the script 'It is good to say what is true' seems to apply to the objective, impersonal and public truth and not to the interpersonal truth.

The cultural script for 'Lying Unknowingly' mandates that the onus of establishing the veracity of the statement is primarily on the speaker. It is obligatory for the speaker to pull out all the stops to check the veracity of the statement before a statement has been made, as one cannot plead ignorance once a lie has been told. Similar to the Anglo-American script on 'trying to say what's true', Pakistani script also necessitates the deliberate effort to verify the truth but it lays an extra emphasis on making the effort successful. To sum up the cultural thought, the responsibility of lying to a person does not apply only to the intentional acts of misleading; A person who communicates everything he hears, not reckoned by the facts, is a liar even though he believes in the truth of the information he is disseminating.

The treatment of equivocation in Pakistani culture suggests that the locus of sincerity or truth-value is placed at the literal level. It is the literal falsehood that needs to be avoided at all costs and in all situations. Equivocation can serve as an unguilty or above-reproach alternate in situations where plain truth is too problematic to disclose. Here it would be interesting to note that from the Anglo-American perspective, it is not only the literal falsehood but also the false implicature that is blameworthy for creating a deceptive message (Meibauer 2005). From the Anglo-American perspective, equivocation and doublespeak are instances of deception (Bull 2015; Levine 2014)

because they involve covertly created false implicature that is bound to mislead. Conversely, in the Pakistani context, the appreciative use of equivocation in specific contexts reflects that false implicature does not fall within the definitional criterion of lying.

The cultural script on 'Prevarication' simply postulates the cultural idiom about 'irrelevance being bad' but not the 'irrelevance being deceptive'. The current findings hint that the failure in presenting relevant information is regretted in an informational context where the interlocutors are engaged in a dialogic exchange. However, the semantic evidence about the irrelevance being deceptive is inconclusive in the Pakistani context. Contrarily, in Anglo-American culture, any departure from the relevant information in the discourse is considered a violation of honest, direct or cooperative communication.

Pakistani culture also differs from the Anglo-American culture in what silence can convey. In Anglo-American culture, silence is interpreted as concealment (Eades, 2012), while in Pakistani culture, silence is interpreted as consent, approval and affirmation. From the Anglo-American perspective, silence is deceptive because something is being concealed; from the Pakistani perspective, silence is revelatory because something is still being conveyed.

The cultural scripts on 'Straight Talk', 'Sweet Talk' and 'Cautious Speech' appear to be quite ambivalent. On one side, there is a cultural preference to promote unmitigated directness and convey direct, unembellished, straight truth. On the other side, Pakistani culture has a special concession for a deferent and carefully guarded style of communication in interpersonal communication. In Pakistani culture, speech is viewed as a material possession that needs to be guarded and protected. The linguistic data from the Urdu language seem to share the cultural understanding of longevity and uncontrollability of talk. Since one is responsible for one's words and the outcome they draw, it is a prerequisite to perform a thorough contextual evaluation and decide accordingly between what to say and what to withhold and between what to say and how to say it. The decision about saying something as it as or making it as if to say something is domain and context-specific. One has four options to speak about something. Speaking the truth directly, keeping silent, speaking indirectly and telling a lie. The options are hierarchical, with truths coming out on top and lies falling at the bottom.

4.10 Discussion

It is important to consider the theoretical appropriateness of the conclusion for something like deception/lying, which is the function of a person and the context. The first and foremost reason to do so is that despite having the potential to explicate cultural assumptions and expectations, the theory acknowledges that cultures are heterogeneous. Social actors show considerable variation in social behaviour in various contexts (Wierzbicka, 1996). It is also important to acknowledge that these scripts "are not a description of behaviour" but all kinds of social behaviours occur in a cultural context backed by certain implicit knowledge guiding their norms and expectations (Goddard & Wierzbicka, 2004, p. 154). It also acknowledges the fact that "cultures can be violated or ignored or rebelled against" (Wierzbicka, 1996: 528), but cultural scripts remain there as a backdrop against which the communicative behaviour of cultural actors can be explained or interpreted (Goddard & Wierzbicka, 2004). The theory of cultural script presupposes that these scripts are equally distributed in society, not because all the members act accordingly but because all the members of a given culture are aware of their presence (Goddard, 2009b). The fact that people can choose to follow or violate culture- specific speech norms to tell a lie or deceive a partner does not undermine the fact that what they obey or violate differ from one belief system to another (Wierzbicka, 1996) and their actions and motivations are determined by the value system they espouse (Axinn et al., 2004). Blum (2005) justifies the generalizing power of scripts by drawing an interesting parallel: Predictive power of statements like "people have two arms and two legs" cannot be dented by any exception that exists, neither it denies any such occurrence (p.308). The fact that people flout conversational maxims to achieve a certain communicative purpose or social gain does not make the Gricean theory irrelevant for studying the Western communication system. Even when the talk does not proceed in expected direction, maxims are adhered at deeper level (McCornack, 1992). In the same vein, unconventional behaviour of the people motivated by contextual and personal factors does not make cultural scripts invaluable or inaccurate for studying deception and lying. The study rests on the assumptions that if cultures differ in their baseline speech norms and expectations, their deceptive speech might also be qualitatively different.

The linguistic data reveal that Pakistani cultural scripts maintain an axiological dualism at the semantic and pragmatic level. At the semantic level, Pakistani understanding of lying and truth is very black and white, polar and dichotomous.

Proscription of lying is an unwavering moral absolute which is derived from the explicit and rigid prohibition of lying in Islam (Levine et al., 2016). The absolute preference for truth is also attested in other Muslim countries, which promote truth regardless of the consequences it may invite since commandments of God dictate people's life, a liar, as a transgressor, is equally hated by God and people (Ahmad, 2005).

The difference between Pakistani and American cultural scripts can be explained in terms of cultural dimensions. As the US culture scores as low as 46 on uncertainty avoidance, it displays a lot of acceptance for innovative ideas and changing rules. Rules are important but acceptance and change are more important than abiding by the traditional rules and ideas (Hofstede et al., 2010). In contrast, much of the black and whiteness of Pakistani scripts stems from the extremely low self-indulgence and a very high uncertainty avoidance scale. Such cultures put a rigid code of ethics in place and celebrate rules even if they are hard to follow in practice (*What about Pakistan?*, 2017). To deal with the anxiety of uncertainty, they chose to live by strict social regulations (Hofstede et al., 2010).

The findings are also commensurate with Wierzbicka (2002)'s understanding of Western and Eastern cultures. She proposes that the antecedents of a dual or polar model of thought found in the Eastern world and the Western scalar model of thought lie in the difference between the Christian and Orthodox faith of the Eastern world. West Christian afterlife is tripartite i.e., heaven, purgatory and hell. Correspondingly, this scheme has given birth to a tripartite system of thought of having a neutral axiological zone between definitely holy and definitely sinful. In comparison, the Eastern post-existence life is divided into heaven or hell. Consequently, the behaviours are either sinful or holy, with no middle ground in between (Wierzbicka, 2002).

Conversely, the pragmatic script of truth and lying is ambivalent and context-sensitive. The pragmatic script maintains the extreme aversions of the lying proper; however, the decision is divided about other subtle forms of deception. The decision to convey unembellished, straightforward truth or adopt a well-contemplated, pre-meditated deferent response is mediated by the immediate social context and the purpose of interaction. One plausible explanation for the axiological dualism can be sought in the findings of Yeung et al. (1999). Westerners exercise their judgement based on universally applicable, independently held morals, while for Eastern cultures,

moral judgement is based on social roles and role expectations. Eastern cultures are subject to dual moral obligations i.e., the need to act according to role expectations and the moral responsibility to be honest.

This struggle with balancing between the absolute value of truth and the social usefulness of lying is also registered in other cultures. St Augustine's admonition against all types of lies (including life-saving ones) and contemporary acceptance of lies (white lies, for instance) is reconciled by permitting "assertion and distraction but not lies" under certain circumstances (Blum, 2005, p. 304). Friedman and Weisel (2013) explain how Jewish culture sways between the extreme importance of truthfulness and pragmatic use of lying without making light of lying or negotiating the offence associated with it. According to Talmudic belief, the first question a person would be asked in the afterlife would be how fair and honest they were in their dealings. A person who breaks his bond or lies unnecessarily will be deprived of Divine company. Notwithstanding, if the stakes involved in a situation are tremendously serious and no alternate course of action exists, one is allowed to act perversely. Even there are occasions when one is obligated to lie, for instance, people *should* [emphasis added] lie to bring peace between people (Friedman & Weisel, 2013).

The current study adds additional evidence for a relatively recent but long-due realization that cultures exhibit a lot of variance in how they define and evaluate lying. A few other studies conducted within Wierzbicka's (1991/2003) programme of study using her natural semantic metalanguage to conduct semantic componential analysis of cultural key concepts are noteworthy exceptions. She proposes to identify keywords as indices of cultural values that reveal underlying cultural expectations concerning truth-telling. Her analysis of Russian (Wierzbicka, 2002), Japanese (Wierzbicka, 1996) and English (Wierzbicka, 2006) key terms demonstrate that beyond the assumptions of the rudimentary universal model, cultures exhibit enormous variance in assumptions, expectations and norms regarding truth-telling and its converse. The current study attests that two cultures (Pakistani and North-American) share some commonalities concerning the concept of lying and deception but markedly differ in nuanced definitions of the related concepts. These definitions are largely determined by the cultural views about individual roles and responsibilities, mutual rights and obligations and the value and expectation about (non) information (Vincent Marrelli 2004a). It is methodologically incorrect to make generic statements about people of any culture that

they lie less or more without operationalizing their definition of lying (Vincent Marrelli, 2004a). For Pakistani culture, lying is equated with literal falsehood, which does not need further qualifications to be dubbed as a lie.

Cultural beliefs that sub-prioritize the deliberate intent to deceive as the primary definitional criterion of lying in Pakistani culture are far from being common but not unique to the current study. At least for one other culture, similar findings are reportedly attested. In Danziger's (2010) much-discussed study, Maya Mopan speakers judged a story as a lie in which a statement contradictory to reality was made unknowingly without any non-notified prior intention to deceive. The only difference is that for Maya speakers' intention seeking is entirely irrelevant for the evaluation of lying. Still, for Pakistani culture, the presence of deceptive intent is a sub-type of lying but not the precondition to qualify falsehood as lying. The idea is similar to the suggestions made by Sweetser (1985), who challenges the prototype notion of lying by stating that prototype elements like the intent to deceive are not a part of the definition of lying, which is simply a false statement. It is the context that enables prototype elements (Sweetser, 1987).

The findings of this study reveal that the moral turpitude associated with lying and deception is very high at the semantic level and no morally approved forms of lying are registered at the lexical level. Previous studies have found that the moral attitude associated with lying also affects how lying is perceived in a cultural context. The cultures that endorse the concept of lying as transgression associate strong negative moral attitudes towards deceptive communication, while the cultures which sanction lying as a social necessity adopt a more pragmatic attitude towards lying (Kim et al., 2008). Pakistani culture adopts more stringent measures of lying as a social evil and does not condone lying as a social necessity.

Taking Anglo terms as a point of reference to describe other cultures can muddle the cultural logic on which the other cultures operate (Wierzbicka, 2003). For instance, the evidence furnished in section 4.7.6 and the approximation proposed in [H] (It is good to say X (something true) even if someone can feel something bad because of this) suggest that Pakistani culture is more direct in presenting truth without cushioning the blow or softening the edges. Contrarily, many existing studies confirm that Non-Western cultural norms value indirectness while Western cultures have more direct and more blunt conversation styles (Geertz, 1976). Wierzbicka's (2003)

exploration of Polish culture makes her suggest that Anglo culture is much more indirect than Polish culture. Such confusions arise out of terminological differences that exist between various studies. Wierzbicka's conclusion is based on the indirectness of Anglo cultures in bringing out an action, while Geertz' classical study talks about directness in seeking and presenting the information. The current study takes directness as presenting (impersonal) truth in a straightforward and unpretentious manner. The idea is attested by the existing evidence on the Pakistani conversational style. Pakistani people come across as honest and sincere by vehemently asserting what they mean (Evason et al., 2016). On the other side, the value of social agreement or social validation in the face of the hierarchical system comes into conflict with the value of straightforwardness and people prefer indirectness or silence over confrontation. Since the way various studies operationalize directness is dissimilar, the findings cannot be taken as mutually consistent or divergent. Wierzbicka (2003) suggests that "The terms such as 'directness' or 'indirectness' are much too general, much too vague to be safe to use in cross-cultural studies unless the specific nature of a given cultural norm is spelt out" (Wierzbicka, 2003, p. 63).

The observations about the greyness of the American concept of lying and truth contrasts with some studies that view American culture to be holding an absolutist view of truthfulness (See Blum, 2005, for example). The findings of such type result from a rather outdated view of lying in the US culture. The absolutist moral position on lying is the result of tracing the antecedent of the American ideal of truth back to the absolute and rigid prohibition of lying in Christianity (Levine et al., 2016). Though such linkage between Christian theology and truth is undoubtedly convincing, there is a need to look at the counter- evidence accumulated over time.

Some other studies demonstrate how current Anglo-American culture has moved past religious fundamentalism (Conkle, 1995) and American fixation of truth has dramatically diminished over the course of a few centuries (Wierzbicka, 2002). Like all other social constructs that have been secularized in the Anglo-American culture (Petrova, 2014), truth has long surpassed the absolutism of Gospel truth (Conkle, 1995). Apart from religion as the source of truth, the idea of objective and rational truth has thinned down in the 21st century, which has evolved into a post-truth society. The emotional appeal to people's opinions is more influential than presenting them with objective facts (Satha-Anand, 2018). The trend is reflected through the profusion of

euphemistic and dysphemistic English expressions that have burgeoned as less aggressive, less culpable forms of lying and deceit (Vincent Marrelli, 2004b).

It is also important to address the gap that exists between strong moral aversion against lies and the social reality in which social lies abound in Pakistani culture. For instance, a direct refusal is considered very rude in Pakistan. Out of politeness concerns, people can commit to more than what they can actually deliver or intend to deliver (Evason et al., 2016). If prosocial lying is attestably reported in Pakistani culture, the absence of any semantic category to denote goodwill lies can present a logical contradiction. Chen (2013) posits two ways to explain this contradiction. Cultures can demonstrate two types of attitudes towards prosocial lying. First, some cultures take every instance of lying as a lie proper, no matter how justifiable it is in the social context. Second, socially justifiable lies can be treated as non-lies and morally less objectionable. Anglo-American culture adopts the first course in treating all kinds of lies as lies, though gradable in the degree of seriousness, culpability and moral offence. Pakistani cultural script operates on the second principle. Instead of viewing certain linguistic acts as instances of 'lies' and making them acceptable, it categorizes them outside the lie-domain and keeps insisting on the absolute prohibition of lies.

The semantic explication that Pakistani people assign speech acts to lies only parsimoniously and categorize jokes, irony and other polite expressions independent of the concept of lying and truth can also be explained using Sweetser's (1985) theoretical justification. Sweetser (1985) emphasizes that our understanding of lying cannot be complete without considering our cultural understanding of what information and knowledge are. There are different speech settings and the concept of the word lie can only be applicable in the setting in which the information exchange view of the language is operative. She differentiates between various speech settings depending upon the fact that the truth-value of the statement is in effect or not. A lie is a false statement only within the speech setting in which the knowledge is beneficial for the hearer and the truth-value of the statement is relevant. In other situations (jokes, fiction, politeness) in which truth value is irrelevant to the exchange, the expectation about information does not hold, and despite the factual falsity, the statement is not considered a lie. By making this distinction, she is able to differentiate falsehood from a lie neatly. A falsehood is a lie only if it occurs in a prototypical informational context.

For deception research, the findings of these types are of vital importance. Despite being tangentially related to the findings of deception research in the social behaviour area, the cultural knowledge derived from these cultural scripts is not counterintuitive or irreconcilable. Thinking of deception merely as a function of person and context is akin to questioning the very existence of cultural and linguistic studies and making the whole cultural knowledge in which individuals operate irrelevant or redundant. In the light of the anthropological observation that there are culture-specific cues and deception motives but the relationship between the culture and deception is mediated by the situational context (Kim, 2008), it is not difficult to see how cultural scripts have something to offer for every component of the culture, context and deception trio. By exteriorizing the attitudes, norms and expectations about truth and lies, cultural scripts have great potential to set the stage for mediation between the components.

The awareness of cultural differences helps to approach deception as a cultural and contextual matter rather than a universal one. It raises meta-communicative awareness about cultures and promotes acceptance and appreciation for the difference. In the absence of the findings of these types, there is a fair chance that any investigation of deception rooted in the Anglo-American tradition may find the ambivalent attitude of the Pakistani people as inherently deceitful in nature. From the perspective of an Anglo-American eye, the ambivalence found in Pakistani scripts may look like an instance of mendacity and hypocrisy. The finding of Levine et al.'s (2016) study of self-reported deception is one interesting example. The study concludes that Pakistani respondents reported the most harmful and mendacious lies among all other participants and expressed deep resentment about rising deception levels. Though Levine et al. (2016) correlate the findings with loose economic regulation, the explanation can equally be sought in cultural logic. The lies that Pakistani respondents report are the most salient, mendacious, or prototypical members of their schema of deception legitimized by their shared cultural idiom. They do not register softer forms of deceptions such as jokes, humour or prosocial lies as instances of deception or at least report-worthy cases.

From the Pakistani perspective, maintaining a distinction between mendacious lies and goodwill lies is a way to show no compromise on the value of truth and social harmony at the same time. A few domains call for strict adherence to truth, while others call for

mitigating the truth in favour of social harmony/hierarchy. Such differences in understanding of truth get reflected in all kinds of linguistic behaviours (normal or deceitful) and create a different baseline and deceptive speech produced in Pakistani as well as in the Anglo-American context. Deception research needs to be sensitive to these differences to achieve objective findings free from ethnocentric bias.

As a denaturalized code of cultural norms, these scripts spell out shared cultural values, belief systems and attitudinal frameworks that guide people's perception of what it means to lie. Almost all of these scripts make an axiological statement about the nature of the norm they cover. The scripts also help to carefully estimate the degree of moral turpitude associated with the act of lying. However, it needs to be noted that these scrips are not neat compulsory rules that prescribe everyone's actual behaviour (Wierzbicka, 1996). By stating these scripts, no case is made that all interactants share these cultural priorities or abide by all these rules in their social behaviours. Nevertheless, what all social actors share is at least the knowledge of what is conventionally believed and prioritized (Vincent Marrelli, 2004a). Given the ethnolinguistic diversity that Pakistan hosts, it is impossible to have cultural norms uniformly distributed across all geographic regions and ethnic groups; however, some overarching values are common to all Pakistanis (Evason et al., 2016). The scripts are not a prescription of actual behaviour but the prediction of general ethos shared in Pakistani society. The effect of these scripts is not deterministic and individuals may suspend the dominant cultural norm to achieve certain social and personal goals. Nevertheless, everything happens within a broader cultural context, which remains a point of departure from which individuals may choose to deviate.

4.11 Limitations of the Phase I Study

Though strictly grounded in linguistic and cultural data, the findings of this type of analysis may be limited and inconclusive for at least four reasons. First, these scripts present initial approximations of what social actors think should be done. There is some need to collect data to get information about what people would actually do. All these scripts except

[K] are notable for third person impersonal tone to capture people's general expectation about truth-telling. The lie-judgment is significantly affected if the evaluator is a partaker in the situation. Vincent Marrelli (2004b) uses the term emotive conjugation to indicate the practice of using more negatively loaded terms when describing others' lying and a gradual increase in the positively loaded terms to narrate first-person

accounts of lying. Similarly, though speaking the truth is pleasing and ennobling, listening to the truth may not be as pleasant or as easy as one expects it to be (Wierzbicka, 2002). Correspondingly, there can exist two diametrically opposite scripts about speaking the truth and listening to the truth framed from the perspective of the speaker and addressee, respectively.

Second, some areas remain uncovered by these scripts. For instance, the study does not deal with the correlation that exists between cultural expectations about the optimal amount of information to be revealed and message honesty. Though the evidence is not difficult to collect that talking too much is considered bad in Pakistani culture, no finite set of metalinguistic descriptors and folk categories unequivocally demonstrate the relationship that exists between long-winded speech and deception in Pakistani culture. Pakistani baseline speech style is characterized by exaggerations and lengthy statements (Evason et al., 2016), which might appear dishonest to Quantity conscious Anglo-American culture. This initial approximation needs further testing.

Third, a large part of this evidence is based on the native speaker intuition of the researcher or key informants. Though registered as an attested method in studying the meaning and connotation of folk categories, the native speaker impulse of a small number of cultural informants may need cross-validation. Vincent Marrelli (2004a) suggests considering the collection and analysis of keywords as a methodological exercise towards a more nuanced experimental phase. In order to increase methodological rigour, these findings need to be cross-validated by using other experimental methods.

Fourth, the discussion in the current study is grounded in the Urdu language. The characteristic nature and history of the Urdu language have a direct bearing on the study results.   Urdu emerged in the sub-continent as an expression of the distinct Muslim identity. It borrowed heavily from the Arabic and Persian languages to purge it of Sanskrit words. It served as a lingua franca for the Muslims of British India. Resultantly, the cultural antecedents of many Urdu vocabulary items trace back mainly to the dominant religious ideology (Narang, 2007). Consequently, the cultural scripts drawn in this study bear strong religious imprints. These findings can be challenged in the light of linguistic data from the other regional languages with stronger local and regional influences than found in the Urdu language. Furthermore, the Urdu language received a great part of its legacy from the highly ornate and florid style of conversation

practised in the Mughal Courts and courts of Nawabs of other Indian states. Though the official language of the court was Persian, the ruling elite spoke Urdu. This influence makes Urdu a language of urban civilization (Dalvi, 1992). If cultural scripts are based on an urban language, chances are that some local, ethnic and agricultural influences might have been downplayed. It is acknowledged that the results of the study are limited and any local language may have generated a somewhat different understanding of lying and deception in Pakistani culture.

The analyses performed in this chapter cover a lot of ground and act only as primers to further fine-grained, detailed analysis. As people's perception of honesty spawns over a host of sub-criteria, the choice of breadth over depth was inevitable for the scope of the current study. Nevertheless, by asking specific questions and narrowing down the focus, each thematic unit of this study can be expanded to a full-length exploration.

4.12 Hypotheses

The study treats these tentatively illustrative semantic and pragmatic scripts and sub-scripts as falsifiable hypotheses or strong hints about Pakistani understanding of truth and lying, which can be tested by carrying out more systematic research. Though each cultural script can be tested by building a careful experimental design, testing all of these scripts is not possible within the constraints and limits of a single study. Nevertheless, some of the propositions can be tested using IMT/IMT2's apparatus. From the assumption about the polar nature of lying and truth to the cultural norms about equivocation and prevarication and from the nature and meaning of silence in interactional contexts to the prudent or indirect use of words, these tentative hypotheses can be tested by using IMT/IMT2's experimental method. When phrased in the form of a hypothesis, some of the cultural scripts presented in this chapter can be written as follows:

The semantic script [A] can be written in the form of two hypotheses;

H1a: Completely truthful responses would always be perceived as the most honest of all other message types.

H1b: Completely truthful responses would always be considered morally the most appropriate of all other message types.

H2a: Falsifications would always be perceived least honest of all message

types. H2b: Falsifications would consistently score lowest on the moral

goodness scale.

[F] and [G] lead to two broad generalizations about the message's indirectness.

H3: Indirectness would be perceived as more deceptive and morally less appropriate than the truthful statement but rank higher than the falsifications both in terms of perceived message honesty and moral goodness of the message.

[E], [F], [G], [J] and [K], when combined, anticipate the following outcome.

H4: The honesty judgement about indirectness would vary across different deception contexts.

The script [I] can be posited in the form of the following hypothesis:

H5: Silence would be perceived as more honest and morally more acceptable than the falsifications on the message honesty and moral goodness scale.

4.13 Summary

This chapter comprised the results of the lexical analyses of cultural keywords and Urdu emic labels performed using the Ethnopragmatic approach. The results of these analyses were presented in the form of cultural scripts formulated in the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) of semantic primes, a highly constrained 'mini-language of simple words which have equivalents in all languages.

This chapter mainly tried to answer two broad questions: First, what do lying and deception constitute in Pakistani culture? and second, what is the degree of moral turpitude associated with the acts of lying? The chapter also included a point-by-point comparison of the current findings with comparable results in the Anglo-American culture.

The linguistic data revealed that in Pakistani culture, the judgment about lying splits between the two senses of lying and two distinct components of cultural scripts emerge for 'Lie as an abstraction' and 'lie as a communicative act'. The first script was called the semantic script while the latter was labelled as the pragmatic script. The semantic script revealed that the semantic meanings of truthfulness and lying in Pakistani culture are bipolar, categorical or black and white. Urdu equivalent of lying and truth are all-or-nothing dichotomous categories that do not form cline the way English categories make. Furthermore, lying as an absolute opposite of truth, is characterized by factual falsity, the falsity of accompanying belief states and/or both.

Furthermore, the moral attitude towards lying is characterized by the absolute and non-negotiable prohibition of lying.

The pragmatic script consisted of more particularistic norms about the ways of speaking. It addressed various forms of information management strategies and the cultural premium associated with them. The results of linguistic evidence revealed that in the pragmatic domain, the decision about the status of truth as a cultural value is ambivalent and a contextual matter. In some contexts, it is encouraged to convey unembellished naked truth, whereas, in some other contexts, a careful appraisal of one's words is valued and appreciated.

Following the data analysis, a discussion about the key findings of this part of the study was generated and the limitations of the phase I research were identified. The chapter concluded by rephrasing a few cultural scripts in the form of testable hypotheses.

The next chapter not only tests IMT/IMT2's core propositions about deception for Pakistani culture but also brings empirical evidence to falsify or validate these tentative hypotheses derived from the cultural scripts.

CHAPTER V

PRODUCTION AND PERCEPTION OF DECEPTION

5.1 Introduction

Guided by the overall aim of creating meta-pragmatic awareness about deception across cultures, two important research questions of the current research address the linguistic strategies used to design deceptive messages, the perception of honesty associated with these strategies and the degree of moral opprobrium attached with each one of them. In order to answer these questions about Pakistani culture, two empirical investigations were conducted to find out the linguistic strategies used to produce deceptive messages and the way these messages are perceived in terms of honesty and moral appropriateness, respectively. As the empirical design of these two studies involved sequential ordering and overlapping data, these two studies are collectively called Phase II of the current research. However, a distinction between different stages is maintained in the form of Phase II- Part A (Deceptive discourse production task) and Phase II-Part B (Deceptive discourse perception task).

This chapter presents the result of deceptive discourse production and deceptive discourse perception tasks. The empirical design is based on eight recruited scenarios belonging to three deception motives (Instrumental, Interpersonal, Identity) and two benefit conditions (Self and other-oriented). The participants who identified themselves as belonging to three gender groups (male, female and unspecified), three age groups (18-25, 26-40, 40 and above), three educational levels (Intermediate, Graduate and Post Graduate) and seven ethnic groups (Baloch, Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushtoon, Kashmiri, Balti and others) were requested to read two scenarios each and respond to survey questions.

The results of Phase II- Part A cover the descriptive statistics (percentages, frequencies) and measures of association (calculated by chi-square test) between

deception motives and type of manipulation and association benefit conditions and type of manipulation type, respectively. The results of Phase II-Part B are based on the cumulative honesty index of each message type, 2 (self, other-benefit) X 3 (instrumental, interpersonal and identity) analyses of variance with honesty ratings as the dependent measure and bivariate Pearson Correlation analysis to measure the strength of correlation between message honesty and moral goodness.

This chapter is structured as follows. First, the results of the deceptive discourse production task are presented, followed by a discussion. Next, the findings from the deceptive discourse perception task are presented, along with the discussion of the results. After that, the results of hypotheses testing are reported along with their implications for the cultural scripts. The chapter concludes by listing the limitations of the Phase II study.

5.2 Phase II-Part A: Deceptive Discourse Production Analysis

The deceptive message production task yielded 856 messages which were coded as fully disclosive (FD), falsification(F), omission(O), equivocation (Eq) and evasion (Ev) according to the coding scheme given in Table 6. As only pure message types were retained, the final pool of messages was reduced to 761 messages. The pattern of information manipulation within messages across all eight scenarios involving different motive and benefit types was cumulatively analyzed. All message types for all eight scenarios were counted to determine the frequency of each type and the percentages were also calculated to check the frequency of occurrence of each type in the empirical data. The results are summarized in Table 9 and Figure 3. For the sake of consistency with the previous tests of IMT, the tables in the result section refer to the message types as violations of Grice's maxims. However, in the subsequent analysis, the terms specified in the coding scheme, as well as their definitions are used interchangeably to refer to any specific violation.

5.3 Results of Deceptive Discourse Production Task

5.3.1 Overall Pattern of Information Manipulation
Table 9

Overall Percentage of Information Manipulation Types

Violation Type	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
Baseline	123	16.2%
Quality	455	59.8%
Quantity	69	9.1%
Manner	61	8.0%

Relevance	36	4.7%
Silence	17	2.2%
Total	761	100

Figure 3

Overall Index of Information Manipulation Types

Out of the total pool of 761 pure messages retained after the coding process, the highest number of messages violated the expectation of quality. Put differently, falsifications ranked highest amongst all message types, with more than 50% of messages falling in this category. Next, 123 (16.2 %) messages comprised completely disclosive or truthful messages that did not involve any covert violation of any of the conversational maxims. The number is significant, given that the prompt question required respondents to produce a message based on deception. After Quality violation, Quantity violations fell in second place, with manner violations coming next. Out of all covert violations of cooperative principle, relevance violations were the most infrequent consisting of only 4.7% of the data. The number of responses based on silence was significantly small and ranked the lowest amongst all message types (2.2%). According to the results, the descending rank-order of frequency of occurrence of various message types would be as follows; Quality (n=455,60%) > baseline (n=123,16%) > quantity (n=69,9%) > manner (n=61,8%) > relevance (n=36,5%) > silence (n=17,2%).

The honesty scores of quantity, manner and relevance violations were combined to create an index of the perceived honesty of indirect messages. Based on these results, the descending rank order of frequency of occurrence of various message

types yielded the following sequence; Falsifications (n=455, 60%)> Indirect messages (n=166, 22%) > Baseline (n=123,16%)> Silence (n=17, 2%).

5.3.2 Association between Motive type and Information Manipulation

A clustered bar graph was created to illustrate motive-wise frequencies of different forms of information management visually. The clustered bar graph in Figure 4 reflects the dissimilarities in the heights of the bars and displays considerable variance across motive types. Clustered bar graph of frequencies of manipulation types across motive types predicted that the groups are dissimilar and the variables are dependent.

Figure 4

Comparison of Information Manipulation Types (%) Across Motives

To confirm the prediction, a chi-square test was calculated to test the statistical independence or association between motive type and type of manipulation. Results revealed that the manipulation type and motive type are statistically associated X^2 (10, N = 761) = 19.52, p= .034. As can be seen by the frequencies cross-tabulated in Table 9, the highest number of bald-faced lies are reported in interpersonal deception motives. Instrumental needs motivated the smallest number of falsifications. Conversely, the least number of truthful messages were told in an interpersonal context while the highest number of baseline messages were produced in an instrumental context. The largest number of Quantity violations were reported in the interpersonal

domain, while the least number of omissions were produced in instrumental conditions. Manner violations are the most frequent in instrumental settings while the least frequent in the identity domain. Evasions or prevarications are again the highest in the instrumental context and the lowest in the interpersonal context. The use of silence was reported to be the highest in face-maintaining contexts and the lowest in interpersonal domains. These results confirm that there is a strong association between motive and manipulation type.

Table 10

*Motive Type * Manipulation Type Crosstabulation*

| Manipulation Type | Motive Type | | | | | | Total | |
| | Instrumental | | Interpersonal | | Identity | | | |
	n	%	n	%	N	%	n	%
Baseline	67	17.0%	29	14.6%	27	16.0%	123	16.2%
Quality	222	56.5%	130	65.3%	103	60.9%	455	59.8%
Quantity	33	8.4%	20	10.1%	16	9.5%	69	9.1%
Manner	40	10.2%	14	7.0%	7	4.1%	61	8.0%
Relevance	24	6.1%	4	2.0%	8	4.7%	36	4.7%
Silence	7	1.8%	2	1.0%	8	4.7%	17	2.2%
Total	393	100.0%	199	100.0%	169	100.0%	761	100.0%

5.3.3 Association between Benefit Type and Manipulation Type

A clustered bar graph of benefit-wise manipulation types produced by the crosstab procedure was created to see the association between benefit-type and manipulation type (Figure 5). The heights of the bars for each manipulation category were noticeably similar for most of the violations across benefit types. The clustered bar graph predicted that there would be little association between variables. To test the assumption further, a chi-square test of independence was performed. Test statistics revealed that no significant association was found between benefit type and manipulation types, X^2 (05, N = 761) = 4.15, p < .05.

Table 11

Manipulation Type Benefit Type Crosstabulation*

| Manipulation Type | Benefit Type | | | | Total | |
| | self-benefit | | other-benefit | | | |
	n	%	N	%	n	%

Baseline	63	16.4%	60	16.0%	123	16.2%
Quality	234	60.8%	221	58.8%	455	59.8%
Quantity	29	7.5%	40	10.6%	69	9.1%
Manner	32	8.3%	29	7.7%	61	8.0%
Relevance	16	4.2%	20	5.3%	36	4.7%
Silence	11	2.9%	6	1.6%	17	2.2%
Total	385	100.0%	376	100.0%	761	100.0%

Figure 5

Comparison of Information Manipulation Types (%) Across Benefit Types

The crosstab table above (Table 10) shows that the chi-square results are consistent with the data. The observed frequencies of self-benefitting baseline messages and self-serving falsifications are quite similar to other-benefitting baseline messages and other-benefitting falsifications. There can be observed some degree of variance between self-oriented Quantity, Manner and Relevance violations and their corresponding other-oriented counterparts; however, the difference is not statistically significant. To wit, the results show that information manipulation type and the locus of the benefit are independent, unrelated and not associated.

To sum up, the findings of this part of the research revealed that the deception strategy was not restricted to plain falsifications in a lie-eliciting context. The respondents used various linguistic strategies to deal with a potentially difficult interactional context. Having said that, falsifications or Quality violations were still the

most frequent type of information manipulation. Indirectness (as a combined measure of Quantity, Manner and Relation violations) was the next most frequent response type followed by completely truthful or baseline messages and silence respectively. The results also hinted at a strong association between different types of manipulations and the primary motive behind the deceptive messages. Deception motive affected the respondent's choice of a particular strategy. Respondents were the most willing to resort to bald-faced lying in the interpersonal domain, while the smallest number of falsifications occurred in lies told for instrumental reasons. The benefit condition (self-benefitting lies vs other benefitting lies) did not have any systematic effect on the respondents' choice of linguistic strategies.

5.4 Discussion of the Deceptive Discourse Production Results

The results of the deception production task confirm the theoretical predictions made in IMT2 about the human mind's limitless creativity reflected in how information is disclosed or manipulated. The results testify to one of the primary contestations of IMT and IMT2 that the way people disclose or manipulate information in real life is not an either-or situation the way it is presumed in the traditional deception paradigm. Deception is realized in natural discourses more creatively than is presumed in bald-faced truth and bald-faced lying dichotomy (McCornack, 1992; McCornack et al., 1996, 2014; Morrison et al., 2020). The data revealed that deception is not restricted to falsifications or explicit contradictions to reality but comprises complex verbal acts that vary on multiple dimensions and are only functionally deceptive (McCornack, 1992, 1997). The presence of omissions, exaggerations, fabrications, contortions, prevarications, equivocations and complete concealment of information in the current data is a testimony to the fact that verbal deception involves more subtle and complex forms of information manipulation than plain falsifications (McCornack, 1992; McCornack et al., 2014).

The study strengthens a relatively recent but emergent line of inquiry in deception research that breaks away from the pedantic tradition of establishing one-on-one correspondence between deception and lying. The neo-Gricean framework allows to tease apart various forms of deception that were previously placed under the blanket term of lying (Li & Yuan, 2020). IMT/IMT2 specifically argues against dumping different types of deception under the common label of falsification (McCornack, 1992; McCornack et al., 2014). The current data from the deception production task provides evidence that deception strategies are not limited to lies of commission which

involve active manipulation of information. Verbal strategies can also encompass passive forms of deception like omissions in which no lie has been told and the deceiver does nothing to stop the receiver from acquiring or maintaining a belief state except withholding a part of relevant information (Galasiński, 2000; Kim, 2008; McCornack, 1992; McCornack et al., 1992). Deceptiveness can also arise out of the flouting of the maxim of relation (relevance), which manifests itself in the responses that run contrary to a question's intended meaning by providing irrelevant information or attending only to a part of requested information (Carter, 2014; McCornack et al., 1992, 1996). The flouts of the Manner maxim, which result in ambiguous messages, also create deceptiveness not by the sheer falsity of what is said but by adjusting the way how it is said (Bavelas et al., 1990; McCornack et al., 1992, 1996). Message examples of all these types of violations can be found in Appendix C.

The data yielded mixed results concerning the predictions of IMT2 about rank-order of the frequency of occurrence of various manipulation types. The findings are in line with the propositional statement IM3 "Relation violations are the least frequent form of deceptive discourse." (McCornack et al., 2014, p. 366) and IM4 "Manner violations will occur less frequently than Quantity and/or Quality violations, but more frequently than Relation violations" (McCornack et al., 2014, p. 267). The data confirmed that out of all covert violations of Grice's maxims, evasions are found to be the least recurrent (only 4.2% of the total data) in the participants' responses. In the same vein, the results also demonstrated that Manner violations are the second least occurring manipulation type, thus confirming 50% of the IMT2's propositions about the frequency of occurrence.

The rank-order of the frequency of occurrence of Manner and Relation violations lend credence to some of the assumptions on which these predictions rest. Deception is a non- cooperative activity that only occurs when the expectation for cooperativeness are covertly violated (McCornack et al., 2014). The cooperative effort that takes place between interactants during the flouts is not deceptive as it does not mislead the listener by the sheer quality of being grossly apparent (McCornack et al., 2014). Building on the assumption of covertness, it is not very hard to see why Manner and Relevance violations are rare to find in deceptive discourses.

It is very difficult to keep Relevance violations covert. Abrupt change of topic or plain failure to answer a question is too apparent to create any misleading effect;

therefore, Relevance violations rarely get their way into an efficient problem-solving toolkit (McCornack et al., 2014). The respondents opted for Relevance violations only when truthful information was untenable to disclose and no other substitutable information was readily available. For instance, the scenario Lost Tablet evoked numerous relation violations as parent/elder sibling finds the relevant information too complex to construct a plausible explanation of their act of hiding their kids/siblings' tablet. When confronted by complex information in familiar contexts, the respondents resort to simpler decision rules of avoiding relevant information (Trefry, 1999). Nevertheless, the pragmatic constraints limit the use of this strategy in most contexts (McCornack et al., 2014)

IMT2 postulates that akin to Relevance violations, Manner violations are also difficult to deploy covertly. They occur only in open-ended situations in which antecedent utterance does not strictly constrain the conditional relevance of the response (McCornack et al., 2014). For instance, in the scenario Plagiarized Project which evoked the highest number of deceptive manner violations, the teacher asks a generic question 'How it happened?' than asking the stricter close-ended question 'Who did this?'. A question like this offers broader flexibility in what constitutes a clear response, allowing respondents to opt for deceptive ambiguity.

The minimal presence of silence as a deceptive strategy in the current data can also be explained using the principle of covertness. Verbal silence can be deployed as an alternate means of communication; however, it is very difficult to deploy silence covertly. Where the communicative context is dictated by the overarching contextual constraint to speak, for instance, in case of specific questions, keeping silent or not speaking inevitably becomes communicative (Ephratt, 2012). In this context, silence signals the transition from verbal to non-verbal communication (Al-Harahsheh, 2014). Some earlier studies confirm the infrequent presence of silent responses in deceptive discourses. Turner et al. (1975) report that secrets (instances when the deceiver remains silent about relevant information) comprise only 3% of misleading discourse.

On the other hand, the theoretical purports of the proposition IM1 that Quality violations would be infrequent when compared with truthful messages and other forms of manipulative discourses could not be supported by the evidence from the current data. Quality violations ranked the highest in the count when compared with all other forms of information management. Similarly, the postulate IM2 of IMT2 that "Quantity

violations are the most frequent form of deceptive discourse" (McCornack et al., 2014, p. 366) could only be partially supported. Quantity violations were greater in number than Manner and Relevance violations across the board; however, they were far less frequent when compared with the Quality violations. The conclusion that Quantity violations should outnumber all other violations is drawn out of two premises stated in IMT: First, editing out the problematic information is far less challenging than constructing completely false information, which results in more omissions than bald-faced lies (McCornack et al., 2014) and second, the use of omissions helps the deceiver to avoid the moral opprobrium associated with having said false stuff (McCornack, 1992; McCornack et al., 1992, 2014; Morrison et al., 2020). Since the current findings ostensibly challenge the conclusion, it can be argued that at least one of the premises on which the conclusion rests is not applicable to Pakistani culture.

There can be two plausible explanations for such divergence between theory and the evidence generated by the existing data. The first one is to challenge the theoretical assumption as spurious or unwarranted on which the proposition rests and dispense with it altogether. Some of the earlier studies provide evidence for this approach. In Turner et al.'s (1975) study also conducted in a North American setting, lies or falsifications comprised 30% of the total deception strategies, much greater than what is anticipated in IMT2. The findings implied that falsifications afford the deceiver an easy chance to maximally control information and offer an efficacious solution to avoid potentially embarrassing or harmful communication of facts (Turner et al., 1975). These contradictory findings can be used to nullify the claims made in IMT2. However, keeping in view the facts that some parts of the rank-ordering (proposed in IMT2) are already validated by the current data and there exists some preliminary evidence about Quality violations being less frequent than omissions in the North American context (Morrison et al., 2020), the outright rejection of the very assumption of the theory can be problematic. The second course is to look for alternate methodological and cultural reasons which might have influenced the current results.

To begin with, it would also be apt to point out a caveat in the current study design that might have caused the difference. As mentioned earlier in the methodology section, the results of the pilot study confirmed the observation made by Pierce (2011) that when a more conservative measure of deception would be adopted and respondents would be given the freedom to choose between deceptive and honest responses, the

potential for overall deception would tend to decrease significantly. During pilot testing, when not clearly prompted to include deception as one of the options, the research participants resorted to completely disclosive messages and hardly produced any deception. The trend provided preliminary evidence for the obsession with the value of truth in Pakistani culture, as suggested by linguistic data. However, as a study of deception production, the outcome was problematic for the study goals. Consequently, the researcher had to make changes in the experimental design. In the revised version of the survey, the respondents were not asked an open-ended question to report about what they would have actually said, the way they were asked in Morrison et al. (2020) but a directional lie-eliciting question that required the respondents to report what they would say if they have to lie or deceive about the situation, like the ones asked in McCornack (1992) and Levine et al. (2016). Consequently, when categorically asked to lie, people are most likely to produce a response that is the most prototypical form of lying in their perception about which their lie-judgement is undivided. IMT also offers a similar proposal by suggesting that such designs that ask participants to report a non-truthful response generate the most clear-cut and most salient examples of deception (McCornack, 1992). Since lying is viewed as the most prototypical form of deception (Galasiński, 2000; Kim, 2008), the number of falsifications in the lie-eliciting data tend to rise consequently. The current data may/may not necessarily speak for the actual pattern of lying people follow in their real lives but assuredly bring some insight into people's assumptions about the exact constitution of lies. Falsifications or bald-faced lies being the most frequently reported response can be taken as the archetype of deception in Pakistani culture. The results are consistent with the findings of Yeung, Levine, & Nishiyama (1999), who state that violations of quality as an out-and-out intentional manipulation of information are most likely to be seen as universally most deceptive. The cultural differences lie in the use and evaluation of more subtle forms of deception (Yeung et al., 1999).

Since no formal test of deceptive discourse production within the IMT2 paradigm has been conducted so far, there is little evidence for ascribing findings' differences to cultural effects. The only available study conducted by Morrison et al. (2020) in the North American context confirms the purports of the proposition IM1and IM2 about the presence of falsifications in naturally occurring deceptive discourses. But this study does not share the overarching research goals and experimental design

with the current study; both are non- comparable and likely to generate different results. In Morrison et al.'s study (2020), complete falsifications are negligible to the extent of being non-existent, while in the current study, falsifications comprise the most conspicuous portion of the data. The current evidence lacks across the board support for the proposition stating that under general conditions, people are disinclined to include false information in their discourse unless or until the situational complexity remains within upper bounds. The major stock of naturally occurring deception comprises other more subtle forms of information manipulation (Morrison et al., 2020). Given the methodological caveat stated earlier, it cannot be affirmed with confidence if the results stem from the cultural variation or the nature of questions being asked in the questionnaire.

The presence of a sufficiently large number of completely honest messages (16.2%) in the lie-eliciting situations is also very significant from the cultural point of view. Even when categorically instructed to report deception, the respondents avoided lying and responded with completely truthful messages. This trend is suggestive of the cultural attitude towards truth as the most preferred type of response. The absolute prohibition of lying motivated the respondents to avoid lying even in the hypothetical experimental setting.

The presence of other deceptive strategies in the reported data explains that the conceptual spectrum of deception is quite wide in Pakistani culture. Verbal indirectness (measured by combining the frequency for equivocations, omissions and evasions) forms the second most opted deceptive strategy (21.81% of the total messages) in the current data. Using the same cultural logic used earlier to explain the presence of falsifications strategy, indirect responses in deceptive discourse data suggests that the Pakistani culture is not unmindful of the use of indirectness to achieve various practical and social goals. Though the results are symptomatic of cultural evaluation of indirectness as one of the possible ways to deceive, the findings need to be interpreted with caution. Though equivocations, omissions and evasions can be potentially deceptive, it is only the covert indirectness that counts as deceptive (Levine et al., 2016). For indirect cultures where indirectness is culturally recognized conveying particular implicature, indirectness does not mask the intended meaning and therefore does not relate to lying (Brown, 2002; Levine et al., 2016). A more nuanced estimation of the perceived honesty of indirectness in Pakistani culture can be found in the

deceptive discourse perception study; here it will suffice to say that indirectness serves as one possible alternative between conveying or distorting the reality.

The fact that deceptive discourse production task is carried out across various interactional contexts lends some additional weight to the current findings concerning deceptive strategies used in Pakistani culture. It has been empirically established that the overarching motive of the deceptive verbal act moderates the selection of a particular deceptive strategy and any approximation of deceptive strategies carried out in relational contexts cannot be generalized to instrumental context with an optimal degree of confidence (Buller & Burgoon, 1994). People have different reasons behind lying and they match their deception strategy with the communication goal they want to achieve. Consequently, the effect of deceptive goals on the communication patterns of deceptive discourse is not uniform (Markowitz & Hancock, 2018). The results indicate that when deception is motivated by interpersonal and identity needs, the tendency to use completely truthful messages tends to decline and the use of falsifications upsurges. The findings are similar to the findings of previous research located in the US culture. These studies suggest that when the deception is motivated by the deceiver's desire to protect the recipient from hurt or relational trauma or to protect the deceiver's image, the negative feelings associated with the bald-faced lying are considerably reduced and falsification strategies abound (Buller & Burgoon, 1994; McCornack et al., 1996). Similarly, the locus of the benefit also determines the use of deceptive strategy deployed to gain certain instrumental or relational ends. Deception motivated by altruistic reasons differs from self-serving deception (Li & Yuan, 2020). Nevertheless, any systematic effect of benefit type could not be found on the use of a specific deception strategy. Previous research has also found benefit type a weak predictor of deception strategies; however, the interaction of benefit and violation type is significant (Lapinski & Levine, 2000).

From the cultural perspective, the declining number of truth in the interpersonal domain signals the need to have pleasant interactions taking precedence over the need to be truthful. People become increasingly willing to lie if the goal of deception is to maintain smooth social relations (Peeters, 2018). This proclivity of Pakistani culture is similar to the increasing tolerance for the white lies in Anglo-American culture (Wierzbicka, 2002). Though the phenomenon of prosocial lying is not registered as salient at the lexical level, the empirical data shows that the cultural norm to strictly avoid lying appears to be loosening up a bit in the case of prosocial lying.

5.5 Phase II-Part B: Deception Perception Data Analysis

Honesty ratings were assessed by combining scores on the four honesty scales and dividing through by the number of items to create an overall 'honesty index' ranging from 1-7. The honesty ratings were calculated for the six types of messages; baseline (fully disclosive messages), falsifications (quality violations), omissions (quantity violations), equivocations (manner violations), evasions (relevance violations) and responses in which the respondents chose to remain silent. Honesty ratings for each response type for each of the eight scenarios were calculated separately. The honesty ratings for the six message types for eight scenarios were then computed as a single variable to find the cumulative honesty index for each message type. Cell means (See Table 12) are based on the average value of this cumulative score.

5.6 Results of Deceptive Discourse Perception Task

The result of Welch's ANOVA indicated a significant and large main effect of the violation type upon the respondents' perception of message honesty, $F\ (19,311.620) = 21.946$, p< .001. A Tukey Post-hoc test showed that baseline (Fully disclosive) messages were rated more honest than the violations of quantity, manner and relevance, (p<.001). The violations of quality were rated more deceptive than the baseline messages, (p<.001) or the message violating the quantity and manner expectations, (p<.001 for each). Quantity violations were rated more deceptive than baseline messages; however, they were less deceptive than manner (p=0.04) and quality violations, (p<.001) for each. Cell means for baseline messages (fully disclosive messages) and quality violations (Falsifications) differed significantly from each other and from the means of violations of quantity(omissions), manner (equivocations), relevance (evasions) and silence; however, no significant difference was observed between the means for quantity, manner and relevance violations. Means are presented in Table 12.

Table 12

Cell Means for the Honesty Ratings of Each Violation Type

	Violation Type					
	Baseline	Quality	Quantity	Manner	Relevance	Silence
Mean	5.97	2.36	3.50	3.30	3.49	3.30
Standard Deviation	1.17	1.34	1.79	1.78	1.85	1.64

Note. All scores are averaged on a scale of 1 to 7, where a higher score reflects higher message honesty ratings.

The average honesty ratings for omissions, equivocations and evasions were also computed to create a cumulative honesty perception index about the use of indirectness to convey information. The mean value for indirectness was 3.48 with a standard deviation of 1.53   which is significantly lower than baseline messages but notably higher than falsifications.

5.6.1 The Effect of Deception Motives and Benefit Conditions on Overall Honesty Ratings

To test the main effect and interaction for motive and benefit, a 2 (self, other-benefit) X 3 (instrumental, interpersonal and identity) analysis of variance was performed with respondent's perception of message honesty as the dependent variable. The main effect of motive type yielded an F ratio $F_{(2,1506)} = 87.55$, P<.001, indicating a significant difference between honesty ratings of the messages motivated by instrumental, interpersonal and identity motives. A Tukey Post-hoc test indicated that manipulation of information for instrumental purposes was rated significantly more deceptive, therefore, less honest (M= 3.39, SD= 1.11) than the deception carried out for interpersonal (M=3.86, SD=1.04) and identity (M=4.25, SD=1.08) needs. Identity lies were rated the least deceptive of all other motive types. The main effect of the benefit type yielded an F ratio $F_{(1,1506)} = 2.21$, p=.14, indicating that the benefit type has a non-significant main effect on honesty ratings of self-serving messages (M=3.88, SD=.04) and other-oriented messages (3.79, SD= .04). The interaction effect between motive type and benefit type was significant, $F_{(2,1506)} = 56.62$, p<.001.

Bonferroni-adjusted comparisons indicated that self-benefitting instrumental violations were rated 1.17 points lower than the messages enacted to fulfil self-serving interpersonal needs (p < .001, 95% CI of the difference = 1.35 to .98) and .98 points lower than self-serving identity protecting messages (p< .001, 95 % CI of the difference= 1.17 to .80).

Figure 6

Estimated Marginal Means of Honesty Ratings Across Deception Motives

In contrast, ratings of self-serving interpersonal messages and self-serving identity messages did not significantly differ for manipulation types (p = 0.10). Messages produced in other-oriented instrumental context were rated .23 points higher than other-benefitting interpersonal messages (p=.02, 95 % CI of the difference= .041 to .04) and .74 points lower than the messages produced in other-oriented identity context (p< .001, 95 % CI of the difference= .93 to .55). Other-benefitting interpersonal messages were rated .97 lower than other-benefitting identity messages (p< .001, 95 % CI of the difference= 1.18 to .75).

5.6.2 The Effect of Deception Motives and Benefit Conditions on Honesty Ratings of Specific Message Types

To test the robustness of the results, a 2 (self and other-benefit) x3 (Instrumental, interpersonal and identity) analysis of variance was conducted separately for each message type with the respondents' perception of honesty as a dependent measure.

The main effect of motive type on honesty ratings of baseline messages yielded

an F ratio, F (2,1415) = 1.33, P=.27, indicating a non-significant main effect on the honesty ratings of the baseline messages motivated by instrumental, interpersonal and identity needs. The main effect of the benefit type yielded an F ratio F (1,1415) =2.08, p=.15, indicating that the benefit type has a non-significant main effect on honesty ratings of self-serving baseline messages (M=3.88, SD=.04) and other-oriented baseline messages (3.79, SD= .04). The interaction effect between motive type and benefit type was also non-significant for baseline messages, F (2,1421) = 1.33, p= .26.

The main effect of motive type on the honesty ratings of quality violations was significant, F (2,1328) = 46.53, p <.001. The main effect of benefit type on the honesty ratings of falsifications was also significant, F (1,1328) = 5.61, p=.02. However, these main effects were qualified by a significant interaction between motive and benefit type, F (2,1328) = 21.54, p < .001. Bonferroni-adjusted comparisons indicated that self-benefitting instrumental falsifications were rated .89 points lower than the falsifications enacted to fulfil self-serving interpersonal needs (p < .001, 95% CI of the difference = 1.17 to .61) and .98 points lower than self-serving identity protecting quality violations (p< .001, 95 % CI of the difference= 1.28 to .69). In contrast, ratings of self-serving interpersonal falsifications and self-serving identity falsifications did not significantly differ (p = 1.00). Quality violations produced in other- oriented instrumental contexts were rated .73 points higher than other-benefitting identity falsifications (p< .001, 95 % CI of the difference= 1.04 to .42), however, it did not differ from other-oriented interpersonal falsifications (p=.27). Other-benefitting interpersonal messages were rated .93 lower than other-benefitting identity messages (p< .001, 95 % CI of the difference= 1.28 to .59).

The results of 2x3 factorial ANOVA for Quantity violations indicated that the main effect of motive type yielded an F ratio F (2.1457) =55.07, p<.001, marking a significant main effect of motive type on the honesty ratings of quantity violations in instrumental, interpersonal and identity context. The results of the Tukey post-hoc test revealed that omissions made to gain or protect resources were rated less honest than omissions made to maintain the relationship or protect face (p<.001 each). Quantity violations in the interpersonal domain were rated more honest than the resources (p<.001) or face protecting omissions (p=0.03). Quantity violations to protect face were reported to be less deceptive than the quantity violations for instrumental reasons (p<.001); however, more deceptive than relational violations of quantity (p=0.03). The

main effect of benefit type on honesty ratings of omissions yielded an F ration F (1,1457) =3.28, p-.07 indicating that the main effect on benefit type on quantity violations was non-significant. The interaction of motive and benefit type for quantity violations was found to be significant, F (2, 1457) =29.31, p<.001.

Bonferroni-adjusted comparisons indicated that self-benefitting instrumental omissions were rated 1.77 points lower than the omissions enacted to fulfil self-serving interpersonal needs (p < .001, 95% CI of the difference = 2.14 to 1.41) and .59 points lower than self-serving identity protecting quantity violations (p< .001, 95 % CI of the difference= .96 to .23). The ratings of self-serving interpersonal omissions were 1.18 points higher than self-serving identity falsifications (p <.001, 95% CI of the difference= .75 to 1.60). The ratings of Quantity violations produced in other-oriented instrumental contexts and other-benefitting interpersonal omissions were not statistically significant (p=.09); however, other-oriented instrumental omissions were rated .86 lower than the other-benefitting identity motivated omissions. Other- oriented interpersonal omissions were rated .53 points lower than other-oriented identity protecting messages (p=.008, 95 % CI of the difference= .11 to .96).

The main effect of motive type on the honesty perception of manner violations was significant, F (2,1419) = 84.77, p <.001. Post-hoc analysis indicated that manner violation carried out in instrumental context (M=2.85, SD=.06) was perceived more deceptive than interpersonal (M=3.54, SD=.09) and identity-based ambiguities (M=4.24, SD=.09). Identity motivated ambiguous messages were rated the most honest of all manner violations enacted in the instrumental and interpersonal context. The main effect of benefit type on the honesty ratings of equivocation was also significant, F (1,1419) = 25.15, p< .001. Self-serving ambiguous messages were perceived more honest (M=3.78, SD= .07) than other-oriented ambiguous messages (M=3.30, SD= .07). However, these main effects were qualified by a significant interaction between motive and benefit type, F (2,1419) = 47.18, p < .001.

Bonferroni-adjusted comparisons indicated that self-benefitting instrumental equivocations were rated 1.68 points lower than the manner violations enacted to fulfil self- serving interpersonal needs (p < .001, 95% CI of the difference = 2.05 to 1.31) and 1.40 points lower than self-serving identity protecting manner violations (p< .001, 95 % CI of the difference= 1.75 to 1.04). In contrast, ratings of self-serving interpersonal equivocations and self-serving identity equivocations did not

significantly differ (p = .33). Manner violations produced in other-oriented instrumental context were rated 1.38 points higher than other- benefitting identity-based equivocations (p< .001, 95 % CI of the difference= 1.76 to .99), however, they did not differ from other-oriented interpersonal equivocations (p=.12). Other-benefitting interpersonal ambiguous messages were rated 1.68 lower than the other-benefitting identity-based ambiguous messages (p< .001, 95 % CI of the difference= 2.11 to 1.24).

The main effect of motive type on the honesty perception of Relevance violations yielded an F ratio F (2,1491) = 56.90, p <.001, which indicated the main effect of motive type on honesty perception of Relevance violations was significant. Post-hoc analysis indicated that Relevance violations carried out in the instrumental context (M=3.1, SD=.06) were perceived more deceptive than interpersonal (M=3.36, SD=.09) and identity-based evasions (M=4.31, SD=.09). Identity-motivated evasive messages were rated the most honest of all other Relevance violations enacted in the instrumental and interpersonal context. The main effect of benefit type on the honesty ratings of evasions was also significant, F (1,1491) = 26.68, p< .001. Self-serving evasive messages were perceived as more honest (M=3.85, SD=.07) than other-oriented evasive messages (M=3.37, SD=.07). However, these main effects were qualified by a significant interaction between motive and benefit type, F (2,1491) =61.06, p <.001.

Bonferroni-adjusted comparisons indicated that self-benefitting instrumental evasions were rated 1.40 points lower than the Relevance violations enacted to fulfil self-serving interpersonal needs (p < .001, 95% CI of the difference = 1.76 to 1.03) and 1.50 points lower than self-serving identity protecting Relevance violations (p< .001, 95 % CI of the difference=1.87 to 1.13). In contrast, ratings of self-serving interpersonal evasions and self-serving identity evasions did not significantly differ (p =1.00). Relevance violations produced in other-oriented instrumental context were rated .99 points higher than other-benefitting identity-based evasions (p< .001, 95 % CI of the difference=.63 to 1.36) and .82 points higher than the other-oriented interpersonal evasions (p< .001, 95 % CI of the difference= 1.20 to .45). Other-benefitting interpersonal evasive messages were rated 1.81 points lower than the other-benefitting identity- based evasive messages (p< .001, 95 % CI of the difference= 2.25 to 1.39).

Finally, the main effect of motive type on the honesty perception of silence yielded an F ratio F (2, 1486) =41.55, p <.001, which indicated the main effect of motive type on honesty perception of silence was significant. Post-hoc analysis indicated that the silent responses produced in instrumental context (M=2.92, SD=.06.) were perceived more deceptive than interpersonal (M=3.48, SD=.08.) and identity-based silence (M=3.38, SD=.08). Identity motivated silent messages were rated the most honest of all other silent responses enacted in the instrumental and interpersonal context. The main effect of benefit type on the honesty ratings of silence was non-significant, F (1,1486) = .60, p= .44. However, these main effects were qualified by a significant interaction between motive and benefit type, F (2, 1486) =24.24, p < .001.

Bonferroni-adjusted comparisons indicated that self-benefitting instrumental silence was rated 1.23 points lower than the silence enacted to fulfil self-serving interpersonal needs (p < .001, 95% CI of the difference = 1.56 to .89) and 1.17 points lower than self-serving identity-protecting silence (p< .001, 95 % CI of the difference= 1.51 to .83). In contrast, ratings of self-serving interpersonal silence and self-serving identity-motivated silence did not differ (p =1.00) significantly. Silent responses produced in other-oriented instrumental context were rated .55 points higher than the other-benefitting identity-based silent message (p< .001, 95 % CI of the difference=.89 to .21) and other-benefitting interpersonal silent messages were rated points .68 lower than the other-benefitting identity based silent messages (p< .001, 95 % CI of the difference= 1.07 to .29). The other-oriented interpersonal silence did not differ from other- oriented instrumental silence (p= 1.00).

The results prove the prediction made in the study that the main effects of motive and benefit type and the simple main effect of their interaction have a significant effect not only on overall honesty ratings but also on the perceived honesty of each specific message type. Simply put, people's perception of message honesty is the function of motive and benefit conditions. Overall, there is a general trend of judging self-serving deceptive messages in instrumental context more harshly than the disclosure or manipulation of information enacted to protect interpersonal or identity needs.

5.7 Correlation between Message Honesty and Moral Goodness

The moral goodness ratings for the six message types for eight scenarios were computed as a single variable to find the cumulative moral goodness index for each message type. Cell means (See Table 13) are based on the average ratings of this

cumulative score.

Table 13

Cell Means for the Moral Goodness of Each Violation Type

	Violation Type					
	Baseline	Quality	Quantity	Manner	Relevance	Silence
Mean	4.92	3.37	4.03	4.10	4.09	3.70
Standard Deviation	2.08	1.87	1.97	2.05	2.02	2.18

Note. A higher score reflects higher moral goodness ratings.

In order to test the correlation between message honesty and moral goodness, the bivariate Pearson Correlation test was conducted. The results reveal that the perception of the message honesty and moral goodness of the message have a statistically significant linear

relationship r (1511) =.07, p<.001. The direction of the relationship is positive (i.e., message honesty and moral goodness are positively correlated), meaning that variables tend to increase together. The strength or the magnitude of association is moderate 5<r<.7.

In order to refine this simple observation, a One-way ANOVA was performed to test the main effect of the motive type on moral goodness ratings of a message. The result of Welch's ANOVA indicated a significant and large main effect of the motive type upon the moral goodness scores of all other message types except completely truthful statements for which the motive type remained a very weak predictor of moral appropriateness F (2, 1509) = 3.68, p=.026.

5.8 Hypothesis Testing

5.8.1 Hypothesis H1

Hypothesis H1a and H1b predicted that completely truthful responses would consistently be rated the most honest and morally the most appropriate of all other message types, respectively. The results of two-way ANOVA demonstrated that the perceived honesty of truthful messages remained unaltered by the benefit or motive type or even for their interaction. These findings provide strong evidence for the across-the-board value of truth in the Pakistani context. To test the hypothesis further, the cell means of baseline or fully disclosive messages for all eight scenarios were compared with the honesty ratings for other message types across all the recruited scenarios.

Table 14 shows that the mean honesty value of the fully disclosive messages always remained highest across all scenarios. The results of the comparison between motive-wise honesty scores of various messages are summarized in Figure 7. Table 14, Figure 8 and Figure 9 cumulatively show that the results confirm the predictions made in hypothesis H1a.

Table 14

Scenario-wise Honesty Scores

Violation Type		Replica Seller	Hospital Card	Plagiarized Project	Lost Tablet	Wedding Invitation	Commitment Crisis	Fired	Friendly Feast
Baseline	M	5.03	5.23	6.00	6.30	5.81	6.00	5.72	5.62
	SD	1.67	1.71	1.44	1.03	1.34	1.40	1.50	1.57
Quality	M	2.11	2.91	2.40	2.75	2.90	2.36	3.30	3.85
	SD	1.61	1.74	1.87	1.78	1.53	1.47	1.82	1.68
Quantity	M	3.66	4.27	2.30	2.79	4.55	3.70	3.41	4.21
	SD	1.52	1.93	1.61	1.64	1.73	1.64	1.73	1.65
Manner	M	3.25	2.95	2.35	3.22	4.83	2.71	4.19	4.82
	SD	1.55	1.90	1.63	1.85	1.82	1.61	1.50	1.80
Relevance	M	3.25	4.21	2.60	2.71	4.31	2.48	4.41	4.26
	SD	1.69	1.90	1.66	1.57	1.66	1.60	1.87	1.53
Silence	M	2.73	3.54	2.67	3.01	3.88	3.18	3.86	3.79
	SD	1.46	1.60	1.67	1.64	1.55	1.53	1.68	1.63

Column header: Scenario Names

Completely truthful messages are always rated the most honest across all scenarios and deception motive and benefit conditions. No situational context offers an exemption to the general rule.

The overall results are also consistent with the prediction made in H1b, which stated that completely truthful responses would always be rated morally the most appropriate of all other message types. The moral goodness score of baseline or truthful messages (M=4.93, SD=.39) was significantly higher than falsifications (M=3.37,

SD=.48), and silence (M=3.71, SD=.71). Even though the moral goodness ratings of completely honest messages was the highest, it did not differ significantly than that of indirect messages based on equivocations (M=4.12, SD=.84), omissions (M=4.03, SD=.54) and evasions (M=4.11, SD=.76).

Figure 7
Comparison of Motive-wise Honesty Score

The results of the motive-wise and benefit-wise comparison between the moral goodness score of various message types are summarized in Figure 9 and Figure 10, respectively. These results also demonstrate that completely honest messages are always rated the highest on the moral goodness scale even when the filter of motive and benefit is applied.

Figure 8

Comparison of Benefit-wise Honesty Scores

Figure 9

Comparison of Motive-wise Moral Goodness Score

Figure 10

Comparison of Benefit-wise Moral Goodness Score

5.8.2 Hypothesis H2

The predictions made in light of the hypothesis H2a and H2b that falsifications would score the lowest on the message honesty and moral goodness scales can be verified by the results displayed in Table 11 and Table 12. The cell means for the message honesty (M=2.82, SD=.57) and moral goodness (M=3.37, SD= .49) remained the lowest for falsifications. The results summarized in Figure 5 and Figure 6 also support Hypothesis

H2. Falsifications are the most deceptive and morally the most objected forms of deception even when the filter of deception motive is applied. Prosocial lying does not alter the perception of the deceptiveness and moral reprehensibility of the completely false message.

5.8.3 Hypothesis H3

Hypothesis H3 predicted that indirectness (a combined measure of Quantity, Manner and Relation Violations) would score lower than the truthful statement but higher than the falsifications both on the message honesty and moral goodness scale. The comparison of honesty score of omissions (M=3.50, SD=1.79), equivocation (M=3.54, SD=.95) and evasion (M=3.53, SD=.85) with falsification (M=2.82, SD=.57) and baseline messages (M=5.71, SD= .42) confirm one part of hypothesis H3. In the same vein, the moral goodness score of equivocations (M=4.10, SD=2.05) and evasions (M=4.09 SD=2.02) is lower than the truthful messages (M=4.92, SD=2.08) and higher than the falsification (M=3.37, SD= 1.87). However, here it is important to note that the moral goodness scores of omissions, equivocations and evasion do not differ remarkably from that of honest messages.

5.8.4 Hypothesis H4

To test the prediction made in hypothesis H4 that the honesty judgement about indirectness would fluctuate across different deception contexts, the motive-wise honesty value of indirectness was computed by combining the scores of omissions, equivocations and evasions. Since the data violated the assumption of homogeneity of variance, Welch's F test was performed to investigate the effects of motive type on honesty ratings of indirect messages. The results revealed a statistically significant effect of motive type on the honesty ratings of indirect messages, $F_{(2,763)} = 78.58$, p<.001. Tukey's test of post-hoc analysis revealed that indirectness in instrumental context was rated less honest than indirectness in identity and relational context (p<.001). Indirectness adopted for face-saving purposes was rated the least deceptive (M=4.14, SD=1.37) among all contexts (p<.001). The effect of benefit type on the perception of honesty of indirect messages was found to be statistically non-significant $F_{(1,1490)} = .953$, p=.33. The findings bring some kind of support in favour of hypothesis H4. At least the motive of deception influences the way deceptive messages are perceived in a significant manner.

5.8.5 Hypothesis H5

Hypothesis H5 predicted that silence would score higher than the falsifications on the message honesty and moral goodness scale. The comparison of cell means for honesty ratings of silent messages (M=3.33, SD=.50) confirms that silence is perceived as less deceptive than covert violations of the Quality maxim (M=2.82, SD=.57). The moral goodness score of silence (M=3.71, SD=.71) and falsifications (M=3.37, SD=.48) were found to be only slightly different; however, the silence was rated more honest than the falsification strategies. Hence proven that the data are consistent with hypothesis 5.

5.9 Concise Summary of Deceptive Discourse Perception Results

Part B of Phase II of the study tested various components of the respondents' perception of deceptive discourse. The first part measured the perceived honesty/deceptiveness of different types of linguistic strategies used to communicate honest or deceptive messages. People's perception of message honesty was found significantly related with the violation of Grice's maxims. Baseline messages which did not involve any type of violation were rated the most honest and Quality violations were rated the least honest of all message types. Indirectness (computed as a combined measure of Quantity, Manner and Relevance violations) rated significantly lower than the baseline messages but higher than plain falsifications.

The perception of baseline, completely disclosive messages remained independent of any independent variable. Respondents' judgement about truthful messages remained consistent across all domains and baseline messages were rated the most honest for all motive and benefit conditions. However, the perception of the deceptiveness of all other message types was found strongly correlated with the motive and the potential beneficiary of the deceptive speech act. Self-serving lies produced for some instrumental gains were rated the most deceptive of all other types of manipulations.

The study also measured the moral turpitude associated with different linguistic strategies used to communicate or manipulate information. The results revealed a strong correlation between the perceived honesty and the moral goodness of various speech acts. The more honest a message was on the perceived honesty scale, the higher it was rated on the moral goodness scale.

The results of hypothesis testing confirmed many predictions made in the light of cultural scripts. Hypothesis H1 which predicted that completely truthful responses

would consistently be rated the most honest and morally the most appropriate of all other message types was proven in the light of existing data. Completely truthful messages were always rated the most honest and morally the most appropriate across all scenarios and deception motive and benefit conditions. No situational context offered an exemption to the general rule. Similarly, the predictions made in the hypotheses H2a and H2b that falsifications would score the lowest on the message honesty and moral goodness scales were verified by the results. Prosocial lying did not alter the perception of the deceptiveness and moral reprehensibility of the completely false message.

Predictions made in Hypothesis H3 about the perceived honesty and moral goodness of indirect messages also proved correct in the light of the current data. Honesty and moral goodness ratings fell the midway between truthful and completely false messages. Furthermore, the honesty and moral goodness ratings of indirect messages were found significantly correlated with the deception motive, partially proving Hypothesis H4. The silence was also rated less deceptive and morally less reprehensible than bald-faced lies, thus proving Hypothesis H5.

5.10 Discussion of the Deceptive Discourse Perception Results

The findings of the current study are not only based on the perceived differences in the cultural context but also on at least some aspects of immediate interactional context (motive and benefit). It makes this study the most robust test of the perceived honesty of various information management strategies so far. Based on a demographically diverse research sample, such methodological rigour not only holds a decided advantage in overcoming some of the limitation mentioned in the previous research but also offer a relatively more dependable method to draw reliable conclusions about Pakistani culture. For instance, McCornack et al. (1992) recognise that their findings about deception are partially reliant on the relational context and different contextual conditions would have evoked different results. Similarly, Yeung et al. (1999) acknowledge that some of their theory-inconsistent findings stemmed from the specific situation prompt they used in their study. Findings located in interpersonal context inadvertently relate to prosocial lying and cannot be generalized to instrumental contexts in which the lying-proper occurs (Buller & Burgoon, 1994). Since the current study has used diverse situational prompts involving different deception motives, the risk of facile generalizations is negligible as compared with the original IMT and its

subsequent replication across different cultures. Moreover, despite being based on diverse situational contexts, overall results are similar to the previous empirical replications of IMT, which lends additional support to the applicability of the purports of the theory across diverse cultures.

The overall pattern of message honesty confirms the rank-ordering of message honesty based on violation type. Like other tests of IMT (Jacobs et al., 1996; Kim, 2008; Lapinski & Levine, 2000; McCornack et al., 1992; Yeung et al., 1999), there was found the main effect of violation type on the perceived honesty of the messages. The Pakistani data indicates that messages involving violations are perceived as more deceptive than the maxim-adhering baseline messages. Furthermore, Quality violations are perceived as the most deceitful of all manipulation types. The results tie well with previous studies wherein Quality violations are always regarded as the prototype of deception (Kim, 2008; McCornack et al., 1992). It can be concluded that at least for Pakistani, Korean and American culture, any contradiction to reality is unequivocally judged as an instance of lying. Once again, the result of honesty perception analysis validates Yeung et al.'s (1999) findings, which indicate that violations of quality as an out-and-out intentional manipulation of information are most likely to be seen as universally most deceptive. The results are also similar to those demonstrated by Danziger's (2010) experimental design in which the US and Maya respondents judged falsifications as prototypical lies. Even for the collectivist cultures that adhere to the politeness principle and maintain Face, there is little point in considering lying proper as socially appropriate or acceptable. To wit, the findings confirm that the perceived deceptiveness of Quality violations generalizes across cultural orientations (Lapinski & Levine, 2000). Lastly, Quantity, Manner and Relevance violations are rated more deceptive than completely disclosive messages but less mendacious than falsifications. These findings enforce credence in the applicability of this theory, at least for one South-Asian country.

Table 15

Cell Means for the Current Study, Yeung et al. (1999), Jacob et al. (1996) and McCornack et al. (1992)

Population	Violation Type				
	Baseline	Quality	Quantity	Manner	Relevance
Pakistan	5.97	2.36	3.50	3.30	3.49
Hong Kong	4.94	3.34	4.90	4.61	3.50
Arizona	5.41	1.82	4.51	3.92	3.25
Michigan	5.47	1.74	4.20	3.43	2.93

Note. All scores are averaged on a scale of 1 to 7, where higher scores reflect higher message honesty ratings.

Given the fact that different researchers working in different cultural contexts and using different scenarios achieved similar results lends credence to the robustness of the findings of IMT (Lapinski & Levine, 2000). However, this preliminary evidence for the universality of results should be cautiously accepted. Working within cross-cultural paradigms like the theory of cultural scripts, it is advisable to tease the surface sameness apart to delve deeper into the nuanced understanding of cultural differences.

Comparing the current results with the previous replications of IMT in the US (Arizona: Jacobs, Dawson, & Brashers, 1996; Michigan: McCornack, 1992) and Hong Kong (Yeung et al., 1999), the results are strikingly similar to those obtained in the United States (See Table 15). However, when results are statistically compared with McCornack 's (1992) original results, the means in each condition reveal exciting patterns. Pakistani respondents rated baseline messages as honest as their North American counterparts did; however, Quality violations were rated less deceptive by the Pakistani sample than the US sample. Similarly, Quantity and Manner violations were rated more deceptive in Pakistani data than their US counterparts. Pakistani respondents rated Relation violations more honest than that of the US respondents. The differences in the means of this kind reflect the cultural variance in what counts as truthful or deceptive (Yeung et al., 1999). Behind the pretence of sameness suggested by the results, there are fine-grained differences in how various violations of Grice's maxims are viewed across cultures. The results are in accordance with findings reported by Kim et al. (2008) who conclude that the higher degree of the deceptiveness of outright lies in the US culture has mainly to do with a higher degree of independence, while cultures characterized by higher interdependence perceive falsifications less

deceptive.

As illustrated in Table 15, the honesty ratings of Quantity and Relevance violations in the US results align more to the opposites sides of bipolar, contrasting adjectives (deceitful/truthful, dishonest/honest, deceptive/not deceptive, misleading/not misleading). Unlike its US counterpart, the honesty ratings of Quantity, Manner, Relation violations in Pakistani data did not differ significantly from each other. Moreover, the ratings of these violations fall precisely in the middle of the semantic scale, which connotes a neutral value (DePoy & Gitlin, 2016). Though violations of Quantity, Manner and Relation maxim are rated more honest than the falsifications, their overall score falls near the neutral zone of the semantic scales. It indicates that though these violations are viewed as less honest than the baseline messages, Pakistani respondents are reluctant to associate these violations with either side of the cline. Given the definitional criteria illustrated earlier in the study, a combined measure of Quantity, Manner and Relation violations, honesty perception ratings of all these violation types reflect the perceived honesty of indirectness (Yeung et al., 1999). The perceived honesty of verbal indirectness remains exactly midway between lying and truth. Indirectness is neither as mendacious as lying nor as honest as complete disclosure of information. These findings challenge conclusions drawn about the Asian cultures in the previous tests of IMT. Since the use of indirectness serves to fulfil individual roles and responsibilities, the violations of these maxims are not seen as deceptive in Asian countries (Yeung et al., 1999). Though it is true that Pakistani culture judges indirectness less harshly than falsifications, indirect messages are not rated as honest as truthful messages as they do in Hong Kong culture. To sum up, it can be concluded that cultures with a higher degree of interdependence demonstrate a greater acceptance threshold for the violations that do not involve blatant disregard for reality (Lapinski & Levine, 2000; Yeung et al., 1999), however, the degree of acceptance may vary cross- culturally.

The current findings also include the inquiry of the perceived honesty of verbal silence. Akin to the indirectness ratings, silence is rated more deceptive than the baseline messages and less deceptive than falsifications. Nevertheless, the honesty ratings of the silence also fall within the middle value or the neutral zone of the semantic scales. These findings implicate that Pakistani respondents group silence with neither fully disclosive nor downright deceptive messages but with speech acts

involving verbal indirectness. The results sit well with other studies from Eastern cultures that view silence not as a covert violation of Grice's maxims the way it does in the Anglo-American culture but as an indirect way to avoid untruthful, inadequate or irrelevant information (Al-Harahsheh, 2014).

As predicted, a significant main effect of motive type was found on the perceived honesty of the messages. Deception in interpersonal and identity domains was perceived as less deceptive than the manipulations performed in the instrumental context. The results are in accordance with the pragmatic explanation of the divided lie-judgment based on the nature of the lie being told. Prosocial lying, which falls into the category of benevolent lying (Meibauer, 2014a), is judged less harshly than the lies told for instrumental gains (Meibauer, 2017). Lying to defend one's emotions and self-esteem seems much more socially desirable than lying to rob someone of financial gain (Pierce, 2011).

Though no parallel data from empirical investigations of IMT is available for the interaction of honesty ratings and deception motives for other cultures, culture is believed to be inadvertently linked with the perceived acceptability of deception in a particular context (Seiter et al., 2002). The results of one-way ANOVA indicate that identity-based deceptions are rated more honest than interpersonal and instrumental lies. Given the fact that the motivation to deceive varies across cultures, this trend can be explained in cross-cultural terms. People with individualistic cultures are more likely to deceive for individual needs to protect privacy or face (Kim, 2008), while individuals from collectivist cultures would be willing to deceive more if deception involves some group or family concern (Lapinski & Levine, 2000). Lies commensurate with socially tolerable deception motives are judged less harshly than lies that contradict societal norms and expectations (Seiter et al., 2002). From this, it can be argued that the concept of face holds some vitality for Pakistani culture. Face-protecting lies appear to be the most acceptable type of lies in the current data as they are perceived as the least deceptive even when the violation of maxims occurs.

Though it is commonly supposed that other-oriented lies are considered more acceptable than egoistic lies designed to benefit the liar (Arcimowicz et al., 2015; Meibauer, 2017), there was no significant main effect of benefit type on honesty ratings. Lapinski & Levine (2000) also reached a similar conclusion, who found out that the benefit condition did not alter the respondents' perception of message honesty.

Nevertheless, an interaction of benefit and violation type affected how conniving or devious a message appeared (Lapinski & Levine, 2000). Again, a similar pattern of interaction was observed in the current study. Not only the interaction of violation and benefit type but also the interaction of the motive type and benefit type has a significant effect on how mendacious a statement was rated. Self-serving instrumental lies were rated the most mendacious of all other types of lies, while self-oriented instrumental and identity lies were perceived as the most honest of all lie types. The results were broadly in line with the previous research, which suggests that impression management and conflict-avoiding lies that aim at removing harm are the most acceptable form of lying (Arcimowicz et al., 2015). The findings, however, contrast with the popular assumption that egoistic lies are perceived more stringently in collectivist cultures than other-benefiting lies.

Though the study doesn't test Grice's work but IMT/IMT2's predictions based on Grice's maxims, this part of the study indirectly reveals some important insights about the validity of Grice's cooperative principle for Pakistani culture. All covert violations of Grice's maxims were rated as more deceptive than messages not involving any violation. It proves that Grice's cooperative principle holds some vitality for Pakistani culture. People expect the verbal message to be as truthful, informative, perspicuous and relevant as possible. Nevertheless, the honesty ratings of Quantity, Manner and Relations maxims which together constitute cultural attitude towards verbal indirectness showed that indirectness is appraised less critically in terms of message honesty. Additionally, the honest judgement of indirect messages was significantly moderated by contextual aspects such as deception motive. Pakistani respondents adopted a more tolerant view of indirectness that served identity or impression management function. The treatment of Quantity, Manner and Relation maxims in linguistic and empirical data shows that the locus of honesty or truth-value in Pakistani culture is primarily placed at the literal level. In contrast, untruthfulness in Anglo-American culture is not only characterized by literal falsehood but also by false implicature created by the covert violations of Quantity, Manner and Relevance violations. These observations show that though Grice's theory of human communication is not totally irrelevant to Pakistani culture, there are differences in the degree to which members are expected to conform to these maxims, specifically with reference to (un) truthfulness.

5.11 Implications for Cultural Scripts

The cultural differences pointed out in the previous sections fetch a lot of empirical support for the cultural scripts proposed in the previous chapter. The data from deception production and perception tasks provide additional support to the answers to two broad questions: What it means to lie in Pakistan and what is the degree of the moral turpitude associated with the verbal acts of deception? The respondents' choices regarding the production or perception of deceptive discourse are not random or arbitrary decisions made on a personal whim. It is presumed that their choices are consistent with their cultures or local theories of language or meaning and their responses make these norms somehow get-at-able (Vincent Marrelli, 1997). These empirical findings are a way to elucidate cultural (un)acceptability of deception and perception of the degree of the deceptiveness of various message types (Vincent Marrelli, 2004a).

The view of deception as moral transgression or social necessity can shape how deception is perceived in any culture (Kim et al., 2008). Keeping in view the suggestions made in relevant cross-cultural research on deception, deception production pattern, honesty ratings for various types of messages and their corresponding score on the moral goodness scale can be used to trace the impact of culture in one's motivation to engage in the deceptive communication, one's perceptions of the degree of 'deceptiveness' of a range of message types, and one's evaluation of the moral turpitude associated with the deceptive messages in various situations. It is apt to address all these points one by one and see how consistent they are with the cultural scripts that emerged from the lexical analyses of culturally salient emic labels.

Since the prompt required the participants to report what they would have said if they had to lie or deceive, the presence of a staggering number of bald-faced lies in the production data can also be explained using the apparatus of the theory of cultural scripts. Given the fact that people's judgment about what constitutes a lie is shaped by their cultural context (Meibauer, 2014), we can use the frequency of violation type to get an idea of what Pakistani people believe a lie is. This data does not reflect the prevalence of deceptive strategies in actual discourse. The reported accounts do not necessarily reflect the most frequent type of deception but the most salient, noteworthy, memorable and detectable forms of lying (Levine et al. 2016) that are compatible with

the respondents' cultural model of what is counted as deceptive (Kim 2008). The idea is closer to Coleman and Kay's (1981) idea that the concept of lying consists of the most prototypical instances of lying, with cases falling further or closer to this prototype. By producing the bald-faced lies in abundance, the deception production data brings evidence for the black and whiteness of the Pakistani cultural scripts. A vast majority of the respondents viewed bald-faced lying as a categorical and absolute form of lying which fits well with the cultural schema in their heads. Similarly, the presence of a reasonably large number of fully disclosive messages in the lie-eliciting survey hint at the cultural attitude towards truth as the most preferred response.

The perception data are also in harmony with the black and whiteness of the semantic script of truth and lying proposed in the previous chapter. The cultural pattern of thought is attested by the way various forms of disclosure and deceptive strategies are rated on honesty scales. The tipping point of a seven-point semantic scale is 3.5, marking precisely the middle of the scale. A rating lower than 3.5 suggests that the verbal act is rated as more deceptive, while higher scores reflect more message honesty. However, the mean values corresponding precisely to the tipping point make it difficult to assign speech acts to either side of the cline. Pakistani respondents rated baseline messages and falsifications (Quality violations) as dichotomous constructs aligning on either side of the cline. However, exhibiting a general trend of observing restrain to assigning other deceptive strategies to the bipolar evaluation. Given the continuity of semantic differential scale, the trend is a very clear reflection of the cultural assumptions outlined in the previous chapter; A bald-faced falsification is the uncontested opposite of truthful statements, while other forms of information manipulation fall midway between these polar opposites without any conclusive or decisive appraisal about the status of these linguistic strategies as categorically deceptive or truthful.

The positive correlation between the honesty perception and the moral goodness of deceptive messages reflects the moral opprobrium associated with an act of deception in Pakistani culture. Like other cultures promoting moral absoluteness related to an act of lying, the results indicate no noteworthy exception to the rule. The cell means of the moral goodness of honest messages in interpersonal (M=4.02, SD=1.05) and identity domains (M=4.53, SD=1.14) are higher than the instrumental domain (M=3.8, SD=1.26), which suggest that truth is even more appreciated when it

is told in Face-threatening or conflict-ridden situations. One plausible explanation of this moral absolutism regarding lying comes from the underlying principle that though the conflict between the value of truth and the value of peace and social harmony is difficult to resolve, introducing exceptions can undermine the value of truth and can open a floodgate of subjective interpretations (Friedman & Weisel, 2013; Homolka, 2017). In one respect, Pakistani respondents tend to associate lie-likeness (in terms of honesty ratings) with a robust moral objection, similar to the one demonstrated by the American respondents of Chen et al.'s (2013) study. The more lie-like a statement looked, the more harshly the respondents judged it for moral reprehensibility.

The results of the deceptive discourse production task across three motive types inform that maintaining the harmonious relationship is the chief motivation for Pakistani people to deceive. The fewest number of truths were told in the interpersonal domain, where the respondents were engaged in protecting the target or self from relational damage or potential hurt. The findings are congruent with the pragmatic assumption that politeness concerns are more vital to communication than the need to adhere to Grice's cooperative principle (Li & Yuan, 2020). Verbal responses motivated by '*muslihat*' '*murawwat*' and '*lihaz*' come under this category. Being a collectivist culture, maintaining harmonious relationships holds prime value in Pakistani society and in such cultures lying serves the function of lubricant in maintaining smooth personal relationships (Walczyk, 2014).

After relational information management, impression management forms the second most frequent deception motive. Deception serves as a means to mitigate the force of threats to one's or addressee's face inherent in some speech acts (Chen et al., 2013). However, it is important to note that the terms like face are not interpreted similarly within all cultures and can mean an entirely different thing for different cultures. For instance, the notion of Face in Chinese culture incorporates two different notions of the moral integrity of the individual and one's social repute that one earns as a result of accomplishments and success (Yeung et al., 1999). Moreover, in collectivist cultures, a greater premium is placed on the value of maintaining the positive face of the self or addressee than those in the individualistic cultures (Lapinski & Levine, 2000). For Pakistani culture, it can be speculated that the facework involves careful appraisal of the context and attend to vital politeness and deference concerns that context evokes.

Consistent with hypotheses H1a and H1b, the main effect of motive and benefit type, which affected the degree of the deceptiveness of a range of other deceptive messages, consistently remained insignificant for completely disclosive messages. The perceived honesty and moral goodness of completely disclosive messages remain unaltered by what deception goal is being pursued or who the beneficiary of deception is. The results knit well with the cultural script proposed in [A], stating that 'It is very good to say something true all time. It is very bad to say something not true'.

The data are also consistent with hypothesis H2. Bald-faced lies or falsifications are perceived as the most deceptive of all message types. The results are not only consistent with IMT's theoretical predictions valid for American culture but also with the findings in some other cultures. Quality violations are considered as the prototype of deception. As long as the message contradicts the true information or explicitly denies the validity of true information, the American and Korean respondents are likely to unconditionally judge the message as a lie (Kim, 2008; McCornack et al., 1992). However, it is interesting to note that in Kim's (2008) study, the deceptiveness of Quality violations was not moderated by the condition, but in the current study, the perceived (dis)honesty of falsifications was not only moderated by the motive and benefit types but also by their interactions. These results imply that in Pakistani culture, bald-faced lies are always perceived as the most deceptive of all other messages but the contextual elements moderate the degree of deceptiveness. The results also indicate that Quality violations are not only the most deceptive but also socially the least approved form of presenting information across all contextual situations. Simply put, it is always bad to tell a lie, no matter what contextual constraints apply; nevertheless, some forms of lying are judged less harshly than others.

Statistical hypothesis testing of H1a (Completely truthful responses would be perceived as the most honest of all other message types across all contexts.), H1b (Completely truthful responses would be considered morally the most appropriate of all other message types across all contexts) and H2a (Falsifications would be perceived least honest of all message types across all contexts) and H2b (Falsifications would score lowest on the moral goodness scale for all situational contexts) validate the semantic explications made in the semantic superscript [A] and [B]. Experimental data is consistent with the theoretical underpinning derived from semantic analysis of cultural keywords. It is interesting to note that the rank-order of the perceived honesty

of various linguistic strategies to manage information proposed by IMT/IMT2 is surprisingly compatible with the order of preference of the various type of responses proposed in the pragmatic script of truth, lying and deception in Pakistani culture. Truth is always the most preferred response, followed by indirect and silence-based messages, with the use of falsifications being the most reprehensible moral choice. From the perspective of cultural insiders, this hierarchy of preference may appear intrinsically intuitive and neutral; nevertheless, the presence of evidence from some other cultures reveals that the pattern is neither neutral nor universal. Some cultures view some forms of verbal indirectness as honest as completely truthful messages (Hong Kong culture in Yeung et al.'s 1999 study, for example) and yet some others deem truth gratuitous and unjustified in certain social contexts (for instance, Wierzbicka's 2003 discussion on Javanese culture).

The confirmation of Hypothesis H3 speaks for the plausibility of the explications made in the cultural script [F]. The experimental data brings empirical evidence for the two speculations made in the cultural script [F] addressing the cultural attitude towards equivocations. First, 'X can be true/ The same X can be not true at the same time' and second, 'It is not bad to want someone think that X is true'. The honesty ratings of Manner and Relation violations which fall exactly in the middle of cline, create cultural allowance to conclude that for Pakistani respondents, equivocations and omissions are neither completely honest nor decisively mendacious. The findings have clear implications for the script [G] which says:

If someone says to X: "I want you to say something about

Z" It is good if X says something about Z.

It is bad if X says something that is not about Z.

which needs to be rewritten as follows to make it consistent with empirical evidence:

[G]

If someone says to X: "I want you to say something about

Z" Saying something that is not about Z is not 'not true'

It is not bad if X says something that is not about Z.

As the two contrasting versions of the script [G] reveal, the honesty score of evasion has enabled us to add an additional component into the existing script, which

could not be verified through linguistic evidence; the status of evasions as 'true' or 'not true'. Secondly, the statistical evidence in the form of moral goodness ratings resulted in removing the speculation that 'It is bad if X says something that is not about Z'. However, since we had compelling linguistic evidence that evasive or irrelevant remarks are not culturally approved, it can be concluded that in the experimental data, moral goodness associates strongly with the degree of deceptiveness and not with the generic expectation to stay relevant to the topic. It is in the context of deceptiveness that evasions are considered morally acceptable.

The results of Hypothesis H4 confirm that at least the motive of deception has a significant influence on the way indirect messages are perceived. The judgement of indirectness is contingent and involves active evaluation of the context. In Pakistani culture, indirectness is not perceived as decisively deceptive or conclusively unacceptable or ethically immoral. It is the context that decides if indirectness is perceived as more or less misleading. The use of verbal indirectness in specific domains acts as a strategy to reconcile between the absolute preference for truth and the need to attend to other social concerns such as politeness, deference and avoidance of conflict. Indirectness offers a way to navigate between the competing goals of avoiding lying or present information that may incriminate the speaker (Carter, 2014). Though IMT/IMT2 acknowledge the use of this strategy to deal with the moral turpitude associated with bald-faced lying, cultural differences still arise out of the ways in which such violations are perceived. Couched in semantico-referential ideology, Western communication is characterized by the direct and unembellished transmission of information (Blum, 2005). The plea of directness (strictly operationalized as the direct communication of facts in the informational context) found in Gricean maxims is interpreted as signalling honest and truthful communication, while any covert violation of the maxims is deemed deceptive or mendacious (McCornack 1992). However, empirical findings of the current study show that the relationship between lying and indirectness is the function of cultural expectations about how a message should be conveyed in a context. Instrumental indirectness is perceived as more conniving and devious than the relation or impression management lies, while indirectness in interpersonal and identity contexts is subject to less stringent moral scrutiny. Findings are not only compatible with the semantic explications posited in the cultural scripts [E], [F], [G], [H] and [K] but also with the little research evidence which is known of Pakistani culture thus far. The existing research on Pakistani culture suggests that being

a collectivist country, direct refusals are considered impolite and discourteous in Pakistan culture (Evason et al., 2016). In interpersonal domains, people may commit more than they can deliver without having real intentions or means to fulfil the promise (Evason et al., 2016). In such cultural contexts, since the mutual ground is known to the interlocutors to compute correct implicature, verbal indirectness is not perceived as deceptive because being direct is not relevant to meet the communicative needs of others (Brown 2002).

The perceived honesty of silence in Pakistani communication as predicted in Hypothesis H5 and confirmed by the data bring evidence for the role of verbal silence in human communication. The communicative and self-revelatory nature of silence as explicated in the script [I] makes silence less covert, therefore less devious and morally less objectionable than the blatant contortion of facts. However, it is surprising to note that though silence is perceived as more honest than falsifications, the moral goodness scores of Quality violations and silence only differ slightly. The plausible explanation of these results can stem from the particular nature of the scenarios and the question prompt used for the study. Each situation involves an informational context that requires the respondent to answer a particular question. Being silent or devious in the informational context where the truth-value of the response is relevant is considered more deceptive than a non-informational context in which the speaker's belief state constitutes correct information (Sweetser, 1987).

When two methods yield similar results, more confidence can be rested in the findings (Given, 2008). Given the fact that most of the semantic explications which could be tested by using IMT/IMT2 apparatus were validated by the experimental data, it can be concluded that our results are substantially more robust than the studies working within one framework.

5.12 Limitations of the Phase II Study

This study has several limitations which merit discussion. First and foremost, following McCornack et al. (1992), McCornack et al. (2014), Yeung et al. (1999), Lapinski and Levine (2000) and Kim (2008), the findings of deceptive discourse production and perception task are based on pure message types. The study utilized only those messages which were primary violations of each maxim. The message types were taken only as exemplars of various forms of the deceptive message and not as descriptors of how people actually deceive. Using pure message types contradicts the very assumptions of IMT. In the natural human speech production process, people do not

produce bounded, discrete and unitary messages based on any single violation of Grice's maxim (Morrison et al., 2020). Moreover, the violations of maxims are inherently dependent and the manipulation along one coordinate may bleed into other violation types (Jacobs et al., 1996; Lapinski & Levine, 2000).

Another potential limitation of the accuracy of the results might arise from the way data was collected. Initially, it was planned to administer the surveys in in-person, physical settings, but due to prevalent Covid-19 situations, which restricted the researcher's mobility and access, the questionnaires were circulated and collected online. It is acknowledged that an online survey presupposes basic literacy and digital skills, meaning that a large chunk of the Pakistani population was left out during the study. Nevertheless, the choice was indispensable for a study of deceptive discourse production and perception. It would have been very difficult for illiterate respondents to comprehend and respond to situational prompts and semantic scales. Another potential limitation of the online survey was the absence of face-to-face instructions that only a physical setting would have afforded. A few of the respondents found the surveys complicated and requiring too much meticulous attention to detail. Moreover, the surveys were not incentivized at any stage, which might have influenced the motivation of some respondents to engage in an intricate task. One possible outcome of this situation is survey fatigue which stimulates satisficing behaviour resulting in speeded or non-differentiated responses (Hamby & Taylor, 2016). The presence of outliers in the current data indicates that at least some respondents lacked the ability, time or motivation to respond more consciously and resorted to satisficing behaviour. Having said that, the online mode offered better opportunities to make the sample more diverse and inclusive. The researcher could get some data from areas which were otherwise inaccessible because of limited time and resources.

As the study is based on experimental settings, one limitation of this study design is the lack of naturally occurring data. During empirical surveys of deception across cultures, any speculation about the role of culture should be grounded in that culture's natural and real discourse world (Vincent Marrelli, 2004a). As the results of this study are based on hypothetical lie-eliciting situational prompts, there is no guarantee that the participants' responses would correspond to the real-life context that may differ exponentially in the urgency and the stakes involved in the act of lying. One should exercise a high degree of caution in generalizing the findings driven in

hypothetical experimental situations to natural discourse settings (Galasiński, 2000; Oswald et al., 2016). However, one strength of the study lies in avoiding borrowed or artificially created scenarios and making an effort to generate scenarios close to the respondents' lived experiences.

Even though the study offers a robust replication of IMT/IMT2 and affords an opportunity to test some of the semantic explications made in the study, not all the expatiations on the specific components of the pragmatic script could be tested using this paradigm. The study ventures to explicate many cultural scripts derived from the linguistic evidence that need dedicated addressal but given the scope of the study, it is not possible to accommodate an empirical test for all of them. Nevertheless, the study provides preliminary cultural insights into the production and perception of deception in Pakistani culture.

The last and the most crucial limitation of the study has to do with the term 'Pakistani culture' used as a generic title to refer to an ethnically, linguistically and geographically diverse populace. Any speculation of culture which does not account for within-culture diversity should be accepted with caution. Talking of Pakistani culture presumes that there is some essential 'Pakistani way' of doing things which all the people in Pakistan uniformly practise. This issue comes to the fore more vehemently for a country like Pakistan which is known for its cultural diversity. **Commisceo Global Consulting Ltd.** put a disclaimer next to an article on Pakistani culture (Pakistan- Language, religion, culture, 2020) on their website stating that their account does not stereotype all Pakistani people one can meet on the street. The current study also acknowledges that the country is usually an imperfect container of culture and there can be significant within- culture variations. Notwithstanding, the country-culture conundrum is not easy to resolve in cross-cultural studies and nationality and country of citizenship are routinely used as a proxy for cultural values (Taras et al., 2016).

5.13 Summary

This chapter reported the results of Phase II of the current research, based on IMT/IMT2's experimental design.The results of the discourse production task revealed that Pakistan data was consistent with the theoretical purports of IMT about the presence of various information manipulation strategies in deceptive discourse. Respondents demonstrated creative efforts to cascade information in a variety of manners that evade detection and culpability. Nevertheless, the study partially

confirmed the rank order of the frequency of occurrence of various types of deceptive messages proposed in IMT2. Contrary to the predictions made in IMT2, falsifications abounded in Pakistani data. However, evasions and equivocations followed predicted order and remained the least produced message types. The results also empirically established that the overarching motive of the deceptive verbal act moderated the selection of a particular deceptive strategy The overall results of the deception perception task confirmed the rank order of the perceived honesty of various messages in Pakistani data. Quality violations were perceived as the most deceitful of all manipulation types. Furthermore, the Pakistani data also indicated that messages involving any violation are perceived as more deceptive than the maxim-adhering baseline messages. Nevertheless, subtle forms of information manipulation were judged less harshly than falsifications. Additionally, honesty judgments were also moderated by deception motives. Data also remained consistent with the research hypotheses proposed on the basis of cultural scripts. The next chapter presents the conclusion and sums up the findings to answer the research questions of the study. The recommendations for future research are also provided in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This chapter synthesizes the key findings of the two phases of the study i.e., the study of emic labels and cultural key concepts using the apparatus of the CS approach and the empirical investigation of the perception and production of deception in Pakistani culture by using the experimental design proposed in IMT/IMT2 to answer the research questions. This chapter also summarizes the way these results compare with the parallel findings in the Anglo- American context. The chapter concludes with contemplation for future research.

Language and deception are inextricably connected in a co-evolutionary spiral that transformed the way communication operates in the communities. Evolving side by side with cooperation, deception is associated with the dynamics of group living (Meibauer, 2017) and shapes our languages, societies and emotions (Dor, 2017). No part of human interaction goes without the active, on-the-fly assessment of interlocutors' truthfulness (Abel, 2008). The question of the speaker's honesty always stays relevant in the meaning-making process. To complicate things further, culture plays a decisive role not only in determining the role of deception in communication but also in fixing what it means to lie (Yeung et al., 1999) or what are the contours of baseline model response in a culture (Dynel & Meibauer, 2016). The difference in baseline behaviours results in different deceptive behaviours across cultures and creates mistrust or misunderstanding, to say the least. Recognizing the intersection of language, culture and deception, the study tried to place cross-disciplinary perspective at the heart of cultural exploration of deception.

The study sets the broader aim of explicating locally sedimented speech practices or meta-pragmatic understanding of deception and lying that operate at an imperceptible cognitive level, remain readily available for the perusal of social actors during within-culture interactions but tend to increase scrutiny of other's behaviour in

cross-cultural situations. The ultimate goal is to sensitize deception scholarship to cultural variance in the (perceived) linguistic correlates of lying and deceit, which form the spine of formal and informal deception detection methods. Recognizing the well-acknowledged fact in social sciences that social constructs are too complex to elucidate or measure using a single theory or method (Heath, 2015), the study uses theoretical and methodological triangulation to generate and harmonize linguistic and empirical data to answer pertinent questions about the pragmatics of deception in Pakistani and Anglo-American cultures.

The study addressed the following major research questions:

1   What constitutes deception and lying in Pakistani culture?

2   What are different linguistic strategies used in deceptive discourse production in the Pakistani context?

3   How are various forms of linguistic manipulations perceived in terms of deceptiveness and moral opprobrium in Pakistani culture?

4   How do the linguistic nuances of lying and deception in Pakistani culture compare with Anglo-American settings?

6.1 Discussion of Research Questions

The ensuing discussion elaborates how the results of the two phases of the research answer the research questions asked in this study. As the answer to question number 4 requires a side-by-side comparison of the current findings with the corresponding findings in the Anglo-American culture, its detailed answer is provided throughout the discussion of the first three research questions. A brief summary of the major points of comparison is also provided at the end.

The first research question relates to the semantics and pragmatics of deception and lying in Pakistani and US culture. The objective is to uncover the denotative and connotative differences between the apparently overlapping categories of the Urdu and English languages. In order to comprehensively answer this question, it is essential to document three aspects of an untruthful assertion recognized in the semantic and philosophical definitions of lying; the factual falsity of the statement, accompanied belief states of the speaker and the presence of deceptive intent (Benton, 2019; Chen et al., 2013; Marsili, 2016; Meibauer, 2014b).

If we look at the denotative meaning of the key terms used to denote lying in the Urdu language, lying is characterized by factual falsity, the falsity of accompanying

belief states and/or both. Truth is defined as a statement that is strictly isomorphic with the state of affairs. The term state of affairs here is used as a generic term to refer both to an internal and external state of affairs. A statement that contradicts the external reality of the world or the internal reality of the speaker's state of mind is a lie if it meets at least one of these conditions. Instead of other qualifications needed for lying, it is defined as a statement that states the opposite of the truth or reality. In contrast, the English term 'lie' necessitates the accompanying belief states more than the factual falsity. From the Anglo-American perspective, if a person is trying to make his contribution true, he is speaking the truth regardless of the factual falsity of the statement (Danziger, 2010). This is evident from Grice's Quality maxim which binds the speaker to try to make their contribution one that is true (Grice, 1989). In contrast, Pakistani culture appears to operate on another model of social responsibility that tacitly assumes literal falsehood of the statement as the only precondition of lying. Furthermore, as seen in opposition to truth, a false statement is a lie even when the intention to mislead is weak or simply non-existent. It does not mean that Pakistani culture precludes intentional acts of misleading from the definition of lying. It simply means that the presence of deceptive intent is not the prerequisite of lying but merely a subtype of lying in which what is said contradicts what is believed.

Another interesting observation about the semantic relation between lying and truth is that in abstraction, the semantic meanings of truthfulness and lying in Pakistani culture are bipolar, categorical or black and white. Urdu equivalent of lying and truth are all-or-nothing dichotomous categories that do not form cline the way English categories make. The English language has many euphemistic or dysphemistic expressions to denote lying that vary in the degree of culpability attached to the communicative act. In sharp contrast with the kaleidoscopic view of lying and truth as multi-shaded concepts in the Anglo-American culture, the Pakistani conceptualization of truth and lying is very monochromatic. Two significant sets of evidence support this monochromous view of lying in Pakistani culture. First, socially acceptable or benevolent forms of lying are non- existent in the Urdu data. Broadly translated, current findings indicate that harmless, inconsequential, benign or playful lying is not lexicalized in the Urdu language. Lying is invariably serious, malicious and spiteful, while truth is always a positive, unmarked and desirable social alternative. When lying occurs for socially sanctioned good reasons, it is classed as a non-case of lying and not as a good form of lying.

The second manifestation of the black-and-whiteness of the cultural scripts of lying can be found in how various speech acts are assigned to the category of lying. The semantic studies of lying conducted in Anglo-American settings revealed that English respondents categorized various communicative acts like joke, irony and sarcasm as sub-types of lying, albeit judged them less harshly than mendacious lies . Pakistani data reveals that the labels are very parsimoniously assigned to the category of lying. The semantic unrelatedness of the concept of lying with other communicative acts such as irony, jokes and teasing, which are characterized by literal falsehood but lack deceptive intent, reveals that in Pakistani culture, lying constitutes a narrow set of conditions rather than an umbrella term for all kinds of falsehood. The same trend is observed in the experimental data of the perceived honesty of various messages. During the first stage of scenario generation, not a single respondent reported deception that belonged to the humour-joke category of Levine et al.'s (2016) pan-cultural typology. Observation is similar to Levine et al.'s (2016) finding, which also reported the absence of jokes in Pakistani data while the category was consistently present in the generated accounts of deception in all other cultures, including the US. In the light of Harwood's (2014) suggestion that those who report a lower level of lying are hyperaware of even a trivial untruth, it can be speculated that for Pakistani culture, overt untruthfulness whose success lies in being transparent does not count as an instance of lying and only serious and consequential forms of untruth are registered as lying.

The results also reveal that the semantic and pragmatic script of truth, lying and deception in Pakistani culture as propagated by linguistic evidence are very different from each other. In the semantic domain, lying and truth are dichotomous constructs that promote lying as a non-negotiable moral imperative. In the pragmatic domain, the decision about the status of truth as a cultural value is ambivalent and a contextual matter. In some contexts, it is encouraged to convey unembellished naked truth, whereas in some other contexts, a careful appraisal of one's words is valued and appreciated. Nevertheless, axiological dualism is maintained at both levels with no middle ground in between. The moral attitude towards lying is invariably negative. The American understanding of truth and lies is consistent in both domains. It maintains a semantic understanding of greyness lexicalized in the form of 'white lies' and 'dark truth'. To sum up, the Anglo-American notion of lying is scalar in nature with acceptable and non-acceptable grades of lying, allowing the degree of shared membership. In contrast, the Pakistani concept of *jhoot* is polar in nature and the

membership to the group is more of a yes-no question than a more or less decision.

Lying as a prototypical deception form brings us to the second question of the study, which investigates the range of linguistic strategies used to disclose or manipulate information. The Urdu counterpart of the English word 'lie' is used as a prototype deception term which serves as a hypernym for all other deception types. The synonymy of various deception terms with lying hints at the wide-ranging cultural repertoire of verbal strategies that are used to engage in uncooperative communication. The fact is further attested by the experimental data in which respondents self-reported various forms of information management strategies used to carry out the interactional goal of deceiving the hearer. Deception is not restricted to untruthful assertions in the Pakistani context. The use of omissions, equivocations, prevarication, evasion and silence is symptomatic of the cultural trend to deploy these communicative acts as serviceable strategies to achieve certain social functions. The use of these verbal strategies is also widely attested in the North-American context (McCornack, 1992; McCornack et al., 2014; Morrison et al., 2020); however, some quantitative differences exist in the frequency of occurrence of various forms of information disclosure or management. The existing evidence about the cross-cultural differences in the frequency of occurrence of various deceptive messages is scantily developed and requires further investigation.

It brings us to the third question of this study which relates to the perceived honesty and moral culpability associated with different linguistic strategies used to manipulate the content of the speech. The categorical understanding of truth, lying and other forms of deception found in Pakistani culture is replicated in the ways various linguistic strategies are evaluated for the degree of deceptiveness. The study investigates the linguistic meaning and the perceived honesty of six linguistic strategies used to disclose, manipulate or manage information i.e., Truth, falsifications or lying proper, omissions or editing bad bits of information, equivocations, evasions and silent responses. The results of linguistic and empirical analysis for each of these cases are summarized below along with a brief comparison with corresponding results from Anglo-American culture.

The results show that the lie-judgement about truth and lying remains undivided, unequivocal and consistent across contexts. As revealed from the results of lexical analyses outlined in the few previous paragraphs, truth enjoys pan-context

supremacy as the most prized cultural value likely to be preserved at all social costs. As the maxim adhering responses, baseline messages were rated more honest than other messages involving any violation of Grice's maxims. Not only that the truthful messages were consistently judged as the most honest, but also the ratings for fully disclosive messages remained uninfluenced by two independent variables. Respondents rated truth higher than any other message type, even in interpersonal and impression-preserving situations where plain truth could be damaging or hurtful. The findings are similar to those in the Anglo-American context, albeit with a difference. While the Anglo-American respondents demonstrated an overall preference for truth, the judgement is restricted to the informational context, which requires social actors to be as plain, precise and unpretentious as they can. Notwithstanding, the direct communication of truth in bringing out an action is considered less than desirable behaviour in the modern Anglo- American culture.

As far as the perceived deceptiveness of falsifications is concerned, Pakistani data associates the highest level of mendacity with bald-faced lies. Lying is invariably rated as the most mendacious, even in interpersonal and identity contexts involving other-oriented self-less lying. Nevertheless, unlike truthful messages, which remain unaffected by the contextual elements, the perceived deceptiveness of falsifications is moderated by deception motive, benefit type as well as by their interaction. It amounts to saying that though lying is unvaryingly the most conniving, some kinds of falsification are judged less harshly than others. The self- benefitting instrumental lies are perceived as more deceptive than lies told to safeguard interpersonal and identity needs. The perceived deceptiveness of falsifications in the Pakistani context bears a striking resemblance with the American counterpart. Quality violations always receive the severest scrutiny of all other types of maxim violations. Nevertheless, some forms of benevolent or prosocial lying are judged less harshly than the lies told to rob someone of material and financial gain. Given the diametrically opposite cultural orientation of both cultures in terms of the individualism/collectivism dimension, the similar evaluation of lying hints that cultural values hardly map neatly onto cultural dimensions. Pakistani culture exhibits an even more unyielding cultural attitude in viewing lying as a transgressive behaviour by not accommodating benign lying at the lexical level. Here it would be apt to clarify that by establishing the absolute preference for the truthfulness and extreme aversion for lying in Pakistani culture, no case is being made about the actual honesty of Pakistani people. Lying can be prevalent in cultures

that lay down high and exacting standards concerning truthfulness (Vincent Marrelli, 2004a). The only difference lies in the fact that any departure from truthfulness accompanies more cognitive dissonance in such cultures and flares up sterner resentment when detected.

The lie-judgment about omissions, equivocations and evasions in Pakistani data reveals exciting patterns. Linguistic and empirical data shows that no definite affective value is associated with verbal behaviours characterized by Quantity, Manner and Relation violations. Though rated less honest than the maxim-adhering messages, the breaches in these domains are appraised less critically in terms of message honesty. As untruth is judged solely by how it matches reality, these messages do not pose a direct challenge to the value of truth. The treatment of these deceptive strategies in linguistic and empirical data has a direct bearing on how indirectness is perceived in Pakistani culture. The results divulge that the locus of honesty or truth-value in Pakistani culture is primarily placed at the literal level. The assertion of literal falsehood is judged as the most insincere, duplicitous and mendacious. This cultural attitude to indirectness contrasts with the treatment of indirectness in the Anglo-American culture, which endorses the implicit assumptions of semantico- referential ideology. Untruthfulness is not only characterized by literal falsehood but also by false implicature created by the covert violations of Quantity, Manner and Relevance violations. In Anglo-American culture, indirectness is intrinsically linked with message honesty, as a statement's sincerity is determined not only by its close correspondence with external reality but also by the manner, relevance and length of information units presented in it. Notwithstanding, it is important to note that indirectness in Pakistani culture is rated significantly lower than the baseline honest messages and defies the trend observed for some other collectivist cultures (Hong Kong for instance) to treat indirectness as honest as truthful messages. Additionally, the honesty judgement of indirect messages was significantly moderated by the contextual aspects such as deception motive. Pakistani respondents adopted a more tolerant view of indirectness that served identity or impression management function.

Verbal silence as a strategy to manage information also enjoys an ambivalent status in Pakistani culture. Like verbal indirectness, silence receives mixed reactions when it comes to the perception of honesty. The degree of social desirability of various linguistic strategies as obtained from the linguistic data predict that silence is a more

plausible alternative than the blatant disregard for reality. It is good to speak the truth but if the speech is problematic, hurtful or unnecessary, it is better to resort to silence. The cultural attitude of Pakistani and Anglo-American cultures differ in what silence connotes. Since Anglo-American culture presupposes non- concealment of information between interlocutors as a necessary condition for honest communication, silence as a non-verbal counterpart of concealment connotes inarticulation, deception and mendacity. Conversely, in Pakistani culture, silence is interpreted as meaningful, contemplative and revelatory. The empirical results also testify that silence is perceived middle of the road alternative between the reckless disregard of the truth and strict adherence to the truthful communication of facts. In Pakistani culture, silence is interpreted more as a form of indirect communication than a clear case of honest or deceptive communication.

Another crucial component of the cross-cultural assessment of deception and lying is the degree of moral opprobrium associated with various linguistic strategies. As far as the second part of third question of the current research is concerned, Pakistani cultural scripts portray avoidance of lies as an absolute and non-negotiable moral imperative. All lexical items denoting deception and lying invariably carry negative affective and associative meanings and no positive connotation can be attached to any of the deception terms. Morally neutral lexical categories either do not exist or semantically do not align with the dichotomous understanding of truth and lying. This cultural attitude about 'how things should be' as divulged from the linguistic data translates well in the empirical data. Data reveal that the measure of message honesty is positively correlated with moral approbation. The more lie-like a statement is, the more stringently it is judged for moral reprehensibility. To this extent, Pakistani and American cultures bear a strong resemblance. US culture also demonstrates a robust tendency to base the moral objection on the lie-likeness of an assertion. The more lie-like an assertion appeared, the stronger moral objection it received. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note how the moral perception of in-between cases varies across cultures. Though Pakistani respondents rated equivocations, omissions and evasions more deceptive than completely truthful messages, the moral ratings of these messages do not differ remarkably from truthful messages. As moral reprehensibility is the defining feature of lying in Pakistani culture (as reflected in script A), these results indicate that indirect communication in Pakistani culture is not a clear-cut case of lying as it is perceived in Anglo-American culture.

Different types of data sets generated during phase I (semantic and pragmatic data), Phase II-Part A (deception production data) and Phase II-Part B (deception perception data), though overarchingly consistent with each other, offer some subtle differences in the findings. As per the semantic data, being invariably bad, lying should be non-existent from the naturally occurring discourse. In contrast, production data suggests that lying is invariably bad but in the interpersonal domain, the use of falsifications tends to rise. Similarly, deception perception data reveals that lying is invariably bad; nevertheless, impression management lies are judged less harshly than other forms of lies. The variance of this kind arises from the fact that different types of data answer different types of questions. People's perception is generally divided about how things should be (roughly corresponding to the semantic script), how they should do certain things (reflected in production task in which the participants enacted as the main character) and how others should perform or behave (reflected through the perception results in which the research participants were assigned the role of objective observers). This difference is not unique to Pakistani culture only; individuals across other cultures also practice deception despite holding a disapproving view of deception. This trend should not be taken as evidence of the hypocrisy or dishonesty of the Pakistani people. It is not the actual prevalence of lying but the perception, attitude and beliefs about lying that vary across cultures (Blum, 2005). A culture that acknowledges the greyness of the concept of truth and the usefulness of 'good lies' may be considered more honest in its conceptualization but not necessarily more honest in its social practices or vice versa.

A brief point-to-point comparison between Pakistani and Anglo-American cultures with respect to the meaning, perception and production of deceptive discourse will be as follows. In terms of definitional criteria for the semantic meaning of lying, the US culture adopts a wider purview of lying. Various definitions of the English verb *lie* document three aspects of an untruthful assertion; the factual falsity of the statement, the accompanied belief states of the speaker and the presence of deceptive intent. In contrast, Pakistani culture takes a narrower set of qualifying conditions. It defines lying as a statement characterized by factual falsity, the falsity of accompanying belief states and/or both. It tacitly assumes the literal falsehood of the statement as the only precondition of lying.

As far as the perception of various literal and functional forms of deception are

concerned, evaluative and affective meanings of the terms revealed that in the Anglo-American culture, lying is a multi-shaded concept with acceptable and unacceptable degrees of lying, while Pakistani culture considers lying as invariably bad and makes prohibition of lying a non-negotiable moral imperative. This absolute insistence on avoiding lying is made possible by excluding various speech functions played out by other forms of literal falsehood (as in irony, metaphor and jokes) from the definitional criteria of lying. The fact was also attested by experimental data in which the Pakistani respondents demonstrated a reluctance to associate definite attitudinal value with functional forms of deception, which did not involve any blatant disregard for reality. In contrast, the studies done in the North American context show that the American respondents rated all deviations from the truth (literal or functional) as lie-like; however, they categorized them as less or more acceptable. Both cultures rated plain falsifications as the most lie-like statements.

The use of various linguistic strategies in framing deceptive discourse exhibited more similarities between the two cultures than differences. The deceptive repertoire of Pakistani as well as American culture hinted at the limitless creativity of the human mind in disclosing or manipulating information. Despite contrasting tendencies in the perception of deception, data sets from both cultures demonstrated creative efforts to cascade information in a variety of manners that evade detection and culpability. Confirming the predictions made in IMT2, Pakistani as well as American respondents produced messages that covertly violated one or more of Grice's maxims. The production data hints that societies primarily differ in cultural attitudes towards deception; otherwise, deception is an unavoidable communicative strategy prevalent in all human communication. That being said, some qualitative differences were observed between the most and least frequently used deception strategies in Pakistani and Anglo-American cultures.

The cross-cultural comparison between two diametrically opposite cultures reveals some cultural differences as well as some commonalities. It is imperative to realize that each culture has both individual and collective goals, which form the impetus for indulging in deceptive behaviour. Cultures are not necessarily polar opposites when it comes to deception motives and design; the broad implications of these findings are that at least some pragmatic regularities enjoy pan-cultural vitality. The one likely candidate is the Maxim of Quality which is binding upon social actors to be truthful. The Pakistani lexical and experimental data also lend some support to

the idea that falsifications, as being prototypical and the most salient form of deception, are universally acknowledged as the most deceptive.

6.2 Implications of the Study

In this day and age, when human societies have more international makeup than they had ever before (Vincent Marrelli, 2003) and intercultural interactions are becoming the norm rather than the exception (Abel, 2008; Boxer, 2002), the findings of the current study help to combat ethnocentric assumptions and sweeping generalizations about the theoretical and moral issues concerning deception. The chief strength of the study lies in finding a means to bypass cultural predictors of deception and seek evidence in the linguistic and empirical data. By comparing languages (as a tangible repository of abstract cultural values), one is likely to get a less ethnocentric view of a social phenomenon (Vincent Marrelli, 2004b). The findings of the current study reveal certain patterns that defy the predictions based on the collectivist orientation of Pakistani culture. Being a collectivist culture, Pakistani culture is anticipated to have a more tolerant view of deception while findings reveal that the social reality is diametrically opposite to this cultural expectation. At least at the level of perception, deception and lying are viewed as moral transgressions rather than a social necessity to maintain harmonious relationships. Similarly, though not identified as essentially deceptive, Pakistani culture adopts a judicious view of indirectness and prioritizes the direct communication of facts in certain social contexts. These discrepant findings prove that cultural values such as collectivism/individualism hardly map neatly onto social and moral evaluations of lying. There should be some other way to study the antecedents of cultural values. Religion can be one of the determinants of the meaning and perception of deception. Since two major religions i.e., Islam and Christianity, which are known for their absolute prohibition of lying, are not unique to the individualist orientation or the independent self-construal, such cultural constructs seem unlikely to explain how deception would function in society (Levine et al., 2016).

In the wake of the influx of intercultural encounters, questions about the honesty or lying habits of the people have been voiced inside and outside academia alike. The greatest challenge of today's multicultural world is that we still have a very vague and biased idea of what it means to be American, Chinese, French or Pakistani (Wierzbicka, 2003). We still operate on the tacit assumptions that there is a certain right, neutral or more truthful way of coding information. Any departure from this monolithic standard is distinctly available for the evaluation of truthfulness and

honesty. By relativizing the notion of untruthfulness, the current study creates cross-cultural awareness about one specific but very important component of what it means to be a nation of Pakistani people and how is it different from its American counterparts. Such awareness has the potential to counter cross-cultural misunderstandings, mistrust and ill will and facilitates the task of intercultural communication in achieving optimal results. Furthermore, as the findings are presented in culture-neutral terms, they are readily available for the perusal of cultural insiders and outsiders alike. Cultural scripts explicated in NSM allow communicating key findings that are not grounded in Anglicized English vocabulary or arcane ethnocentric terminology. NSM transmits meaning without any cultural loss (Goddard, 2009a, 2009b).

These nuanced differences in the cultural understanding of deception have clear implications for deception scholarship to make its theorization and methods free from ethnolinguistic bias. The findings inform deception theorists, practitioners, policy-makers and common people involved in investigations of the consequential practice of deception about cultural differences in how deception is perceived and produced. The meta-pragmatic awareness generated by the research findings can sensitize deception detection methods to safeguard against the misplaced suspicions that are aroused by the violation of norms and expectations. Moreover, the results can be used to alert cue-based deception research to the variance in cognitive load associated with lying in terms of pragmatic principles. Vincent Marrelli (2004a) notes that the cognitive load is associated with the way social actors define lying. If lying is in consonance with the pragmatic principles observed in the liar's cultural world, he will experience no cognitive dissonance. There is nothing to remorse about repressing knowledge if it is not expected in the world view of social actors or vice versa (Vincent Marrelli, 2004a).

6.3 Recommendations for Future Research

As a preliminary study of interdisciplinary perspective on deception in Pakistani culture, the study sets rather ambitious goals and tries to cover a lot of ground. From speculations about the exact constitution of the speech acts of lying to specific cultural attitudes towards concealing or withholding the truth, lying unknowingly, saying without believing and speaking equivocally, evasively, straightforwardly, sweetly or cautiously, the study serves as a primer to initiate many questions concerning the ethnopragmatics of deception in Pakistan. Future investigations are needed to validate the kind of conclusions that can be drawn from this study. The variety of grounds

touched briefly in this study can be transformed into stand-alone, full- length investigations about a specific aspect of deception in Pakistani culture.

The study results are based on Urdu language that serves as the national language and lingua franca of Pakistan. Keeping in view the linguistic diversity of Pakistan, the replications of the study for other regional languages are mandatory to generate richer understanding of the phenomenon under study. Deeply rooted in the local traditions, these languages are expected to carry stronger cultural imprints than Urdu language which is relatively newer and flourished in the region after the Muslim conquest.

The study contributes to the sparse line of inquiry that studies deception at the semantic-pragmatic interface. There is a need to keep on adding to this under-researched area and generate the linguistic profiling of deception for different cultures and languages. Furthermore, it is also urged to maintain cross-disciplinary dialogue between linguistics and other functional approaches of deception to promote an interdisciplinary approach and use the linguistic findings for applied purposes.

This thesis dedicates a part of the study to explore specific linguistic strategies used to construct a deceptive message. Though the results provide significant directions about the various linguistic strategies used to manipulate information, there is little evidence from the US or other cultures to compare. The rank order of the frequency of occurrence of various messages, as proposed in IMT2 is not tested for the US. Furthermore, as stated earlier, the specific nature of the lie-eliciting survey question renders the results of rank-ordering of frequency of occurrence of various deceptive messages inconclusive. The findings undeniably inform something about the people's raw judgement of what constitutes a lie but as far as the production results are concerned, it cannot be told for sure if the findings are the result of the specific research design or the product of cultural practice. Further research is needed to verify this preliminary evidence. It is a question of future research to investigate the frequency of occurrence of various deceptive messages across cultures and develop the cross-cultural profile of deceptive strategies.

Though testing IMT/IMT2 is not the goal of the study per se, the study contributes towards the refinement of their paradigm by introducing the variable of deception motive and the locus of benefit to the IMT/IMT2 study design. Future

research should explore further how people's perception of message honesty and moral reprehensibility is shaped not only by the global effect of culture but also by one's motivation to engage in deceptive communication as well as by the potential beneficiary of the deceptive act.Last but not the least, future research should examine strategically how these cultural differences map onto observable and measurable characteristics of deceptive behaviour that can be used to detect deception. Further research is also needed to explore how these results about low-to-no stakes every day lying move across high-stake lying when there are large positive consequences associated with getting away with lying.

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APPENDIX A
Semantic Field of Sach (truth)

Lexical Entry	Reference	Dictionary Meaning
Sach	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 38 Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 563	Adjective- Raast, theek, Haq, Darust, Sahih, Noun- Rasti, Sidq, Haqeeqat Tab-e-fael: baja, darust, waqai, filhaqeeqat, beshak Haq, theek, darust, rasti, sidq, baja, darust, waqai
Sachal Sachal Bolna/kehna	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 38	Such kehna, khari khari kehna, belag lapait kehna
Sach much	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 38	Tab-e-Fael: hubahu, Baeenahe, be kam o kast
Sach hai	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 38	Idiom: baja hai, darust hai, sach kaha hai.
Saccha	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 38 Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 563	Adj: Rast go, rastbaz, sadiq, sancha, Darust, theek, Khara, khalis Seedha, saafdil, beriya, mukhlis Sach kehnay wala, sach bolnay wala, mukhlis, biriya, emandar, khara hisab
Sacchai	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 38 Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 564 Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 890	Noun Feminine: Sadiqa, raast baaz, Adj: Rast, theek Rasti, diyanat, asli hona, sacchal, jhutal ka naqeez Sach ka ism kayfiyat
Saccha pan	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 38 Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 564 Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 890	Noun: Sadaqat, rastbazi, emandari, dianatdari, wafadari, raastgoi Emandari, Sadaqat, wafadari, rastgoi Raast bazi, diyanatdari
Qol ka poora	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 1086	Baat ka saccha ya pakka, jo kahay wo ker dikhanay wala
khara	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p.618	Saaf, sacha, beriya, raast baaz, khushmamla, berooriyat, saafgo, kisi ka paas ya lihaz na rakhnay wala, munsif mizaj

Haq	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 419 Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 2, p.165 Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 651	Khuda, Allah, Sach, Sidq, Darust, Baja, theek Khuda, Allah, Sach, rast,rasti, sidq Laiq, wajib, saza war Darust baja theek Sachai, sidq, rasti, Allah taala ka sifati naam Darust theek, Sacha raast
Haq Ashna	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 654	Khuda parast, sachi aor haq baat kernay wala
Haq go	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 654	Sachi baat kernay wala
Haq bajanab	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 419	Sachai aor haq par hai
Haq par larna	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 419 Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 2, p.165	Sach k liay larna Sach par larna
Haq say razi khuda hai	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 420	Sachai say khuda bhi khush hota hai
Haqeeqat	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 420 Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 2, p.166	Asliyat, Sadaqat, sach Asal
Khuda jhoot na bulwaey	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 419	Koi bari baat kernay say pehlay kehtay hain
Khuda Khuda kero	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 429 Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 2, p.183	Jhoot n bolo, khuda say daro, toba kero
Khuda ka naam lo Allah ka naam lo	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 430 Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 2, p.218	Sach bolo, Allah say daro IL 99 Khuda khuda kero, jhoot na bolo
Khuda lagti kehna Eman kee kehna	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 430 Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 1, p.335 Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 162	Sach kehna, insaf kee kehna, tarafdari na kerna Khuda lagti kehna, sachi gawahi daina, saaf kehna, khari kehna, belag kehna, sach kehna, haq kee kehna Haq baat kehna, khuda lagti kehna
Eman kee	Ilmi Urdu Lughat	Haq haq. Sachi baat

	p. 161	
Sach bolna	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 563	Waqai baat kehna, jhoot na bolna
Sidq	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 628 Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 976	Sachai, khuloos Sachai, rasti
Siddique	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 625	Nihayat sacha
Sadiq ul qol	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 625 Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 972	Baat ka poora, bawafa, waday ka sacha, sadiq ana Such bolnay wala, qol ka sacha
Eman	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 1, p.335	Aqeeda, sach, haq, imanat, diyanat, munsafi rast bazi Islami shareeat main khuda kee tauheed k zuban say iqrar aor dil say such jannay ko eman kehtay hain
Emandar	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 1, p.335 Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 161	Deendar, ameen, rastbaaz Sacha, sadiq, bawafa Raast baaz, diyanatdaar
Ba-eman	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 1, p.340	Deendar, sacha, sadiq, diyanatdar
Tehqeeq	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 1, p.595	Rast, sahih, darust Theek, such Saboot, chanbeen,
Tasdeeq	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 1, p.609	Sadaqat, sihat, sachai, saboot
barhaq	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 654	Theek, darust, sach, baja, lazmi, rasti par, sachai par
darust	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 716	Sahih, theek, sach
Diyanatdari	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 769	Emandari, rastbazi, rasti, sachai,sidq
Raast	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 798	Darust, theek, saazgar
Raast baaz	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 798	Sacha, emandar
Raast go	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 798	Sach kehnay wala, sacha, saaf go
Saanch ko aanch nahi	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 877	Sach ko zarar nahi puhanch sakta
sancha	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 877	Sacha
Sach baat karwi lagti hai	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 890	Sach bura lagta hai

Sach bolna adhi larai mol laina hota hai	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 890	Sach logon ko pasand nahi ata
Sach kehna aor sukhi rehna	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 890	Sach bol kar admi sukhi rehta hia
Sacha jaey rota aye jhoota jaey hunsta aye	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 890	Saccha admi apna nuqsan ker laita hai, jhoota kaam bana laita hai
Saanch kahay so mara jaey, jhoot kahay so luddu khaey	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 877	Such bolnay walay ko museebat parti hai, jhoot bolnay wala mazay say guzarta hiatal

Semantic Field of Jhoot (Lying)

Lexical Entry	Reference	Dictionary Meaning
Kaazib	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p.417	Sadiq ka naqeez, jhoota, batal, darogh-go
Abtal	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 42	Jhoot sabit kerna
Batil	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 127	Khota, jhoot, ghalat
Takzeeb	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 286	Jhutlana, Jhoota thehrana
Jhoot	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 361 Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 2, p.75 Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 564	Waqay k khilaf, darogh, kizb, ghalat Dhoka, makar, bahana, faraib Waqia k khilaf, sach ka naqeez, darogh, narast, kizb, ghalat, Chal, dhoka,faraib, makar, bahana,khot Jo sach na ho, waqia k khilaf, haqeeqat k baraks, ghalat, Dhoka, bahana, makar, faraib, dagha, khot
Jhoot urana	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 361	Jhoot bolna, jhoot banana, jhooti khabar mashhoor kerna
Jhoot banana	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 361 Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 2, p.75	Jhoot bolna, sach k baraks baat kerna Tuhmat lagana, darosh tarasheedan
Jhoot ka putla	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 361	Mujassam Darogh go, bohat jhoot bolnay wala
Jhoot kee pot	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 361 Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 564	Sarasar Jhoot, Bilkul ghalt Aisa shakhs jo kasrat say jhoot bolay
Jhoot such	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 361 Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 2, p.75	Kisi qadar sach kisi qadar jhoot, bilkul jhoot Rast o darosh, darogh

Jhoti sachi lagana	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 361 Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 2, 75	Jhooti sachi batain kerna, badi karna, badgoi kerna Budguman kerna, choti sachi batain lagana
Jhoot kee nao nahi chalti	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 361	Jhoot chup nahi sakta
Jhooty k munh say boo ati hia	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 361	Jhoot pakra jata hai
Jhoot k paon nahi hotay	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 361 Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 1, p.75	Jhoot say kaam nahi chalta Jhoot ko qiam nahi hota, jhooti baat mazboot nahi hoti
Jhoot moot	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 361	Darogh, ghalat, naqis, naqli, masnooi
Jhooti zuban daina	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 361	Jhoota wada, Jhooti khabar, afwah
Ghalat	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 667	Jo sahi na ho, jhoot
kazzab	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 726 Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 1125	Nihayat jhoota, jhooton ka Badshah Bohat jhoot bolnay wala
kizb	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 726	Jhoot, darogh
Kazib	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 1093	Darogh go, Sadiq ka naqeez
darogh	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 455 Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 761	Kizb, jhoot, buhtan jhoot
Daroghgo	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 455	Jhoota, kazib
Darogh e muslihat amez ba az rasti fitnanagaiz	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 455 Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 716	Jis jhoot say fasad ruk jaey wo fasad dalnay walay such say behter hai
Jhoota	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 2, p.76 Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 564	Daroghgo, kazib, sach k khilaf, be-eman, khota, naqis Jhoot bolnay wala, such na bolnay wala, waqia k khilaf biyan kernay wala, ghalt bolnay wala, dhokay baaz, makkar, faraibi, daghabaaz, beyeman, khota, naqli masnooi
khota	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 1191	jhoota
Gup	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 1210	Guftagoo, jhooti baat, bakwas
Gup marna	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 1210	Jhoot bolna

Eman nigal jana	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 162	Jhoot bolna, bey emani kerna
Panchon sharee aib	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 335	Chori, zina, jhoot, sharab, juwa
Tab lagay jhoot na boliey, jab lag par basaaey	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 427	Jahan tak mumkin ho jhoot nahi bolna chahiay
Bey eman	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 289	Daghabaaz, jhoota, makkaar
Jhoot barabar paap nahi	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 654	Jhoot sab say bara gunah hai
Jhoot ka putla	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 564	Wo shakhs jo bohat jhoot bolta ho
Jhoot k pull bandhna	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 564	Kasrat say jhoot bolna
Jhooti sachi hankna	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 564	Jhoti khabar mashhoor kerna, jhooti batain biyan kerna
Jhoota maray na shehr paak howay	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 564	Jhootay aadmi ki muzammat karni ho to kehtay hain
Jhootay k munh kala, sach ka bol bala	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 565	Jhoota har jaga beizzat hota hai, sacha har jaga izzat hasil karta hai
Jhootay ko ghar tak puhchana	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 565	Jhootay kee tehqeeq ker k usay sharminda kerna
Jeeta jhoot	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 570	Khula jhoot
Darogh ko farogh nahi	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 716	Jhoot main kamyabi nahi
Ghalat biyani	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 1037	Jhooti bat
Ghalat salat	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 1037	Khilaf e haqeeqat
ghalt	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 1037	Nadarust, nasahih, khota
Sachay mar gay jhooton ko phir bhi sharam na aaee	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 890	Dunya main sach ko he nuqsan puhanchta hai jhoot bolnay walon ko nahi hota
Sach ka zamana nahi	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 890	Aj kal sach kee qadar nahi
Sachi hank bolna	Ilmi Urdu Lughat p. 890	Sacchi baat kehna jo bemoqa ho

Semantic Field of Dhoka (Deception)

Lexical Entry	Reference	Dictionary Meaning
Sabz baagh dikhana	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p.23	Faraib daina, dhoka daina, jhootay waaday say phuslana

Ghaban	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p.301	Khareed-o-farokht main nuqsan daina, khurdburd, khiyanat
Fiqra	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p.348	Jhooti baat, jhoota wada, chal, raib
Fiqra Baaz	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p.349 Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1054	Chalbaz, ayyar, dhokay baaz, jhansay baaz same
Fiqray bazi	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p.349	Batain banana, chalain chalna, ayyar zuban
Laag lapait	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume , p.163 Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 825	Roo Riyat, tarafdari, Himayat, makar, faraib, dagha, chal tarafdari, Himayat, pasdari
Labantwana baat	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 4, p.175	Gol baat, paicheeda baat, chal kee baat, faraib kee baat, wo baat jo saaf na ho
Dhoka	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 488 Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 2, p.305 Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.767	Faraib, heela, makar, dagha, chal, mughalta, ghalatfehmi Buta,faraib, heela, makar, dagha, chal, bhagal Dagha, faraib, jul
Dhokay baaz	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 488	Faraibi, dumbaaz, makkar, daghabaaz
dao	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 2, p.229	Makro faraib, dhoka heela
daon	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 2, p. 229	Bazi, chal, heela, makar, faraib
dhagha	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 2, p.250 Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.723	Faraib, dhoka, dum, jhansa, jul Makkari, beyemani
Dhokadahi	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 2, p.305	Faraib dahi, faraib bazi, half daroghi
Dhokay baz	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 2, p.305	Adj. Faraibi, dambaz, chalia,makar, daghabaz
bahana	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.263	Uzr, heela, zahirdari, dhoka, daam, faraib
Tuhmat	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.264	Buhtan, ikhtira, ilzam, badnami
Jul	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.	Dhoka, faraib, makar, chal, jhansa, dum, chal
faraib	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1053	Shobda, chalaki , ayyari, jhansa, dum makkar, dhoka,
fariabi	Ilmi Urdu Lughat,	Daghabaaz, makkar, dhoka baaz

	p.1053	
Fariab khana	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1053	Jaal main phunsna, dhoka khana
Fariab daina	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1053	Dhoka daina, jhaansa daina, makar o dagha kay sath paish aana
Fiqra daina	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1053	Dum daina, faraib daina, jhansa daina
Fiqray tarashna	Ilmi Urdu Lughat , p.1053	Jhooti baat keh jana
behkawa	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1053	Dhoka, faraib

Semantic field of Khamoshi (Silence)

Lexical Entry	Reference	Dictionary Meaning
Summun Bukmun	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p.226	Jo shakhs kisi baat ka jawab na day
Zabt Kerna	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 232	Peena, Jazb kerna, Ghussa rokna
Kehnay ko munh main zuban rakhtay hian	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 634	Baraey naam zuban hai Goyai k qabil nahi
Munh see laina	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 4, p.452	chup ho jana, khamoshi ikhtiar ker laina
Munh par qufal lag jana	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 4, p.438 Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1444	Munh bund ho jana, sakoot ho jana, khamoshi cha jana
Munh bund ho jana	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 4, p.435 Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1444	Khamosh ho jana
Hont see laina	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 4, p.760	Zuban bund ker laina, munh main keel laga daina
Khamoshi neem raza	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 90	Kisi baat par chup rehnay ka matlab hai k sunnnay wala us say razi hai
Pee jana	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 246	Chup ho jana
Khamosh	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 428	Chup, sakat
Khamoshi	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 428	Sakoot

		Sakoot, chup
	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 2, p.171	
Zuban par Muhar	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 538	Zuban bund rakhan
Zuban sambhalna	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 538	Khamosh hona, chup rehna
Zuban bund hona/karna	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 538	
bezuban	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 1, p.455	Goonga, chup, kamgo, sakat, khamosh, besawal
Chup	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 2, p.97 Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.583	Khamoshi,kamgoi,sakoot, Khamosh, sakit, khamoshi Sakoot, khamoshi, na bolna
khamosh	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 2, p.171	Chup, sakit
Zuban seena	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 2, p.398	Zuban bund kerna, khamosh hona, munh say na bolna, baat na kerna, chup rehna
Munh par muhr lag jana	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1438	Khamosh hona, munh bund ker laina
Munh bandh ker bethna	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1438	Chup ho jana, khamosh ho jana
Taloo say zuban lagna	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.424	Chup rehna
Zuban bureeda	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.844	Chup, khamosh
Zuban taloo say lag jana	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.844	Chup ho jana
Chup kee daad khuda k haan hai	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.583	Sabar ka phal khuda say milta hai
Chup lagana	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.583	Sakoot ikhtiar karna
Chup lag jana	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.583	Khamoshi tari ho jana
Chup sadhna	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.583	Khamosh ho jana
Kam sukhn	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1150	Chup, kam go

Semantic Field of Baat (Talk)

Lexical Entry	Reference	Dictionary Meaning
Satree Bahatree Batain	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 3, p.31	Boorhay/omar raseeda logon ki baatain
Baat kernay ka dhung/saleeqa	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 3, p. 92	Tameez, Shaor
Baat kernay kee tameez	Added by Key Informants	Moqa Mehal kay mutabiq baat kernay ka shaoor

Ehd	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 3, p. 294	Qol o qarar, iqrar, payman, wada
Aam fehm	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 3, p. 262	Adj: sehal, FA3seeh, Asan
Fiqra	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 3, p. 348	Nasar ka turka, kalam, jumla
Qol	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 3, p. 402	Baat, sukhan, kahawat Qasam, ehd o qarar,
kalam	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 3, p.538	Sukhn ,baat ,guftagoo
Kalam karna	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 3, p. 539	Baat cheet kerna, bolna, guftagoo karna, humkalam hona
Kam go	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 3, p. 555	Kam baat kernay wala, bezuban, chup, seedha
Kaha	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 3, p. 606	Maqola, qol, sukhn, guftshuda
Kehnay say baat parai hoti hia	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 3, p. 634	Munh say nikali hui baat par qaboo nahi rehta
Baat kahi aor parai hui	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.172	Raaz zahir hotay he mashhoor ho jana, munh say nikli hui baat chup nahi sakti
Munh say nikli kothon charhi	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.14443	
Munh pay I baat	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 4, p.432	Jo baat dil say nikal ker zuban pay a jaey
Munh say nikli baat parai hoti hai	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 926	Munh say nikal kar raaz raaz nahi rehta
Kehnay say baat parai ho jati hai	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1176	Munh say nikli hui baat pay qaboo nahi rehna
Munh say baat nikli hawa main bhari	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1442	Baat kehnay kay baad mashhoor ho jati hai
Baat gai phir hath nahi ati	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.173	Jab aik dafa eitbar uth jaey to phir nahi jamta
Munh main zuban halal hai	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 4, p. 461 Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p. 1447	Zuban haq aor sach baat k wastay hai, zuban barhaq hai
Yak zuban	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 4, p.784	Aik baat bolnay wala, baat ka pakka, rasakh ul qol, wasiq ul wasool
Bol	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 167	Baat, qol, tana, tanz Sukhn, baat, qol, kalma, kalam

	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 1, p.423	
Bol chal	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 167 Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 2, p.423	Baat cheet, mail milap, Guftagoo, baatcheet, guft o shaneed Tarz zuban Baat kernay ka tareeqa
Zuban	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 538 Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.844	Jeebh, bolchal, boli, qarar, qol o wada, biyan kernay ka andaz Bol chal, boli, baat, guftagoo, iqrar, qol wada
Baat	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 1, 341 Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.168	Shabd, lafz, bol, kalma Guftagoo, mukalma, kalam Qol, kehna, bol, kalma, raey, khial, jhagra Collocations: Baat chalana, baat barhana, baat cheen laina, baat parai hona, baat pee jana, baat ko pallay main bandh laina, baat gharna
Zuban Janay aik baar, maan Janay baar baar	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 4, p.399	Zuban ka iqrar aik he hota hai
Matlab kee baat	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1399	Kaam kee baat
Gol mol baat	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1250	Paicheeda baat, mubham baat
Gol baat	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1250	Mubham baat, pecheeda baat, jo baat theek tareeqay say samjhi na ja sakay
Guft o shaneed	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1232	Baat cheet
Gol Gol baat kerna	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 4, p. 99	Saaf saaf baat na kerna
Gol Gol baat	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 4, p. 99	Wo baat jo chand ehtimal rakhay, pehloodar baat, mubham baat, wo baat jo washgaf na ho, muzabzab baat
guftagoo	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1232	Baat cheet, bolchal, biyan, taqree, maqala, zikar, tazkara
Eye baat ko rokna zehn ko kund kerta hia	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.40	Munh per I baat ko rokna zehn ko kund kerta hai
Aai per nahi chooktay	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.40	Jo baat dil main a jaey usay bedharak keh daitay hian
Munh kee baat cheenna	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 4, p.456	Doosray kay dil ki baat keh daina
belag	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.296	Saaf, begharz, khara, suthra, pak
Zuban he halal hai zuban he murdar hai	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.747	Zuban jo chahay kahy

Zuban he hathi charaway, zuban he sir kataway	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.847	Zuban he say admi ki izzat hoti hai aor zuban say he zillat
Khush biyan	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.687	Sheereen guftar, khush kalam
Khush zuban	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.687	Faseeh, sheereen zuban
Khush guftar	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.689	Faseeh, khush biyan
Zoomaaniwiyat	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.794	Do maanon wali baat kerna, pehloodaar baat

Speech Practices with Positive Evaluation

Lexical Entry	Reference	Dictionary Meaning
Soch samajh k bolo	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 121	Ghor-o-fikar aor hosh-o-hawas main bolna
Seedhi kehna	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 147	FA3el mutaddi, Saaf kehna, khuli keha. Belag kehna
Saaf biyan kerna	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 209	Khari kehna, MuFA3ssil Kehna, Khulam Kehna Elania biyan kerna
Faseeh	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 342	Khushbian, khush kalam, khush guftar, sehal go, sheereen zuban, sheereen kalam, Khush go, mithbola
Qol ka poora	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 402	Baat ka pakka, rasakh ul kalam Sacha, sadiq ul qol
Koozay main darya ko bund ker daina	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 590 Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.714	Ikhtisar, badarja ghait, baray mazmoon ko mukhtasar ker k likhna same
Kia phool jhartay hain	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 654	Kaisa khush guftar hai, kaisa khush bian hai,kaisa durfishan kaisa fasih hai tanz
Fasahat	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 341	Kushada sukhni, tez zubani, khush kalami, ghair manoos alfaz, saqeel alfaz darusht o mushkila kalam say pak
Lagi lipti	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 4, p. 208	Kisi k muwafiq, kisi k dil see, Pasdari kee, tarafdari kee
Munh tor k jawab	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 4, p. 442 Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 925	Dandan shikan jawab, azadana jawab, bebakana jawab, belag jawab, azadana jawab, saaf jawab Sakht jawab
Munh par saaf Kehna	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1438	Lagi lipti na rakhna, saaf goi say kaam laina
Munh dekh kar baat kerna	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 4, p. 447	Munh per khushamad ki batain karna, munh dekhay ki batain kerna

Munh chota bari baat	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 4, p. 445	Hosla say barh k baat Apni Liaqat say barh ker baat kerna Baron kee aibgeeri
Meethi Zuban	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 4, p. 500	Sheereen sukhn, sheereen guftar, josh e biyan
Meethi batain kerna	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 4, p. 500	Narmi say bolna, sheereen kalami, fasahat kee guftagoo
Nastaleeq Guftagoo	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 4, p. 561 Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1505	Faseeh, baleegh guftagoo, saaf aor shusta kalam
Nastaleeq go	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 4, p. 562	Khush guftar, khush biyan, faseeh admi
Piari batain	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 246	Meethi Meethi batain, bholi bhali batain
Khushbiani	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 440	Khush Kalami, sheereen guftagoo, fasahat
khushbian	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 440	Khushtaqree, khushkalam
Zuban sambhal k baat kerna	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 538 Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 4, p. 398	Munh ko lagam day kar bolna, behooda bakwas say door rehna Had e adab aor hifz e maratab ka khial rakhna, soch samajh k bolna, zuban ko qaboo main rakhna, sanjeedgi say kalam kerna, zuban ko lagam daina
Munh sambhal k baat kerna	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 4, p. 450 Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.792	Zuban ko qaboo main rakhna, zuban ko lagam daina
Seedhi baat	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 599	Saaf aor maqool baat
Balaghat	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 157	Kalam ka tamam ayub say pak hona, mutaqaza e hall, aor zaroorat k mutabiq, munasib aor wazeh lafzon main ada hona
Baleekh	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 159	Kamal, poora mukuammal
Sheereen	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 622	Meetha,khushgawar
Sheereen bian	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 622	Khushbiyan, sheereen kalam, sheereen sukhan
Meethi baat/meethizuban/ Sheereen kalami	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p. 1466	Mulaim baat, narm baat,
Fasahat	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 680	Saqeel aor mushkil alfaz say pak, ghalat aor ghairmanoon tarakeeb say pak
Faseeh	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 680	Khushkalam, Sheereen zuban

Aik zuban hona	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 1, p. 334	Baat ka pakka hona, sabit qadam rehna, qol-o-qarar nibhana, apni baat ka pakka hona
Khuda lagti kehna Eman kee kehna	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 430 Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 1, p. 335 Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.670	Sach kehna, insaf kee kehna, tarafdari na kerna Khuda lagti kehna, sachi gawahi daina, saaf kehna, khari kehna, belag kehna, sach kehna, haq kee kehna Haq baat kehna, such kehna
Tarzuban	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 599	Faseeh, khushbian,
Khulay bundon kehna	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1189 IL 972	Saaf saaf kehna, Khari khari kehna, khuli khuli kehna, belag kehna
Belaq lapait kehna	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.296	Saaf, saaf, tarafdari k baghair
Bhali baat	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.280	Achi baat, naiki kee baat
Zuban main loch hona	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p. 844	Chotay baray ka lihaz hona
Zuban say phool jharn	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.844	Sheereen zuban hona
Sanjeeda guftari	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.921	Jis kee batain umda aor sheereen hon
Sanjeeda	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.921	Tula huwa, mozoon, Mateen, bawaqar
Shola biyan	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.954	Tez zuban, fiery speaker
Seedhay sabhao	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.939	Baghair ghussay k, Qudrati tor par, emandari say, saf tor par
Umda paira e main bian kerna	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1022	Achay tareeqay par batana
Sadaf zuban	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.974	Sadaf ka zuban say isteaara kertay hain keyonke zuban say gohar e kalam nikaltay hian
Suthree zuban	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.888	Saaf zuban, paak zuban

Speech Practices with Negative Evaluation

Lexical Entry	Reference	Dictionary Meaning
Jo munh main aye boltay jana	Added by Key Informants	Sochay samjhay baghair boltay jana
Sookha jawab	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 127	Rookha jawab,Khusk jawab
Seedhay munh baat na kerna	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 147	Gharoor ya ghumand k waha say seedhi tarah baat na kerna

Seedhi sunana	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 147	Khari khari kehna, khuli khuli sunana, barmila kehna, belag kehna, kisi ka lihaz aor khial na kerna
Saaf Jawab daina	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 209	Bilkul inkaar keran, barabar inkar kerna, do tok jawab daina
Saaf na kehna	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 210	Such na kehna, sahi biyan na kerna Touzee ke sath biyan na kerna, ibham say biyan kerna
Fazool batain	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 342	Nikammi batain, mehz befiada batain, bakwas
Fazool go	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 342	Batooni, bakwasi, tool kalam, baat ko barhanay wala
Qol say phirna	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 402	Baat say phirna, waday say inkar,
Karwi baat	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 505	Sukhn Namulaim, nagwar baat
Khoti bolna	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 634	Buri baat kehna
Kehnay kee batain hain	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 634 Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1174	Khali batain he batain hain Sirf zubani jama kharch hai
Chabba chabba k batain kerna	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 663	Khushamad kerna
Baat ka Sir paon na hona	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 45	Baat ke ibtida aor anjam ka pata na lagna
Lachay dar batain	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 4, p. 182	Musalsil aor mazedar batain, lapaitwan batain
Larai mol laina	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 4, p. 187	Jhagray main parna, azab mol laina, chairkhani
Larai barhana	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 4, p. 186	Jhugra barhana, takrar ko tool daina
Lassan	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 4, p. 189	+ve Bohat bolnay wala, faseeh ul kalam, -ve charb zubani kernay wala
Lafazi	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 4, p. 193	+ve fasahat, khushbiani -ve ziada goi, taweel kalami, bakwas, bak bak
Lagi lipti kehna	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 4, p. 208	Saaf saaf na kehna, tarafdari kee kehna Riyat kee kehna
Lambi chori hankna	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 4, p. 211	Bari dastan sunana, deeng marna, shaikee marna
Laina na daina baton ka jama kharch	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 4, p. 125	Niri batain he batian hain, baton main taltay hain
Munh charha	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 4, p. 444	Sar charha, gustakh, beadab, jo beadbi say paish aye
Munh sambhalo	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 4, p. 450	Zubandarazi, kalam e laghw, sanjeeda baat kero, soch samajh kar harf munh say nikalo
Munh Khulna	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 4, p. 455	Dareeda dehn, bad lagam hona, badzuban hona, munhphat hona

Munh pharna	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 4, p. 440	Zubandarazi karna, munh kholna, zuban par baat lana
Munh phat	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 4, p. 440 Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1438	Zuban daraz Jo munh main aye bila hifz e maratab keh dainay wala Nahait badtehzeeb Badzuban Zuban daraz, badzuban, munhzor, moqa be moqa bolnay wala
Budzuban	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 138 Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 1, p. 375	Sakht kalam, Gali gloch baknay wala, gustakh, Zuban ka phoar, sakht zuban, sakht kalam, munh phat, gustakh
Badlihaz	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 138 Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 1, p. 375	Besharam, baron ka pass na karnay wala, jhooton kay samnay buri baat karnay say sharam na kernay wala, khulam khula burai main mubtila rehnay wala Besharm, beadab, gustakh, beizzat
Zubandaraz	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 538	Muhn phat, gustakh
Zuban barhna	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 538	Badzubani ziada hona
Zuban k agay khundaq hona	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 538	Bolnay main azad hona
Zuban ka tanka tootna	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 538	Budzuban hona
Zubani batain	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 539	Bekar batain
Beadab	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 1, p. 453	Gushtakh, ghair mohazzab, nashaista,
Batain banana	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 1, p. 345	Sukhn sazi kerna, jhoot bolna
Baat gharna	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume Vol 1, p. 342	Jhooti baat banana
Zuban chalana	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 4, p. 398	Ziadagoi kerna, barh kar bolna, bohat bolna, lagatar bolna, taraq taraq bolna, zubandarazi kerna, badzubani kerna, gundi batain kerna
Zuban kholna	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 4, p. 401	Badkalami par utar ana,
Zuban palatna	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 4, p. 399	Iqrar say phirna
Munh par kuch,dil main kuch/munh par kuch/peeth pay kuch	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p. 1438	Zahir aor batin main farq hona
Munh pay sab kuch dil main khak nahi	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p. 1438	Zahirdari kernay walay ko kehtay hain
Gala phar ker bolna	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p. a235	Cheekh kar bolna

Gaz bhar kee zuban hona	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p. 1229	Jo larki bohat batain keray us k liay kehtay hian
Khoti baat	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p. 1119	Dhokay kee baat, buri baat
Urri pari baat	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.99	Ghair moatabir baat, afwah Suni sunai baat
Aik kee so/dus sunana	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p. 120	Bohat budzuban, badlagam, bohat munh phat
Baat ka sir pair na hona	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.169	Betukki baat, besilsila baat, naqis guftagoo
Baat kernay ka saleeqa na hona	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.169	Guftagoo kee tameez na hona, guftagoo ka tareeqa na hona
Baton ka jama kharch/zubani jama kharch	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.174	Khali batain, lafazi
Badal k biyan	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.210	Ghalat biyani, asal waqai ko phair ker biyan kerna
Barabar say jawab daina	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.212	Gustakhana jawab, guftagoo badtameezi say karna
Buri zuban	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.223	Bad zuban
Buri baat	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.223	Nazeba kalam
Barh k bolna	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.226	Beadbi karna
Bari bari zubanain hona	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.227	Badzuban hona, zuban daraz hona
Bara bol	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.229	Gharoor main kahay huway alfaz
Bak bak	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.232	Bohat batain, bohat bakwas, yawagoi
Bigri zuban	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.240	Wo zuban jo sakht kalami kee aadi ho jaey
Boodi baat	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.257	Ochi baat, kam rutba baat, naqis daleel
Behki behki batain	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.265	Istarah kee batain jaisay nashay main hon
Bepar kee urana	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.290	Beasal baat kehna, gup urana
Bhondi baat	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.284	Nikammi baat, batameezi kee baat
Taraq taraq jawab daina	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.448	Bebakana guftagoo, tez zuban chalna
Zuban ke neechay zuban/ Zuban talay zuban	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.845	Kisi baat per qaaim na rehna
Zuban dus gaz kee hona	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.845	Bohat batain karnay wala hona
Zuban khanjar kee tarah chalna	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.844	Bad kalami kerna

Zuban char haath kee hona	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.845	Bohat batain kernay wala hona
Zuban main lagam nahi	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.846	Gushtakh aor munh phat hona
Zuban Chalana	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.845	Jald Jald zuban ko harkat daina, bohat ziada bolna
Zuban tez hona	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.844	Bohat batain karna
Khalt behas	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.680	Behas ko kahin say kahin puhancha daina, ghair mutalqa guftagoo ker k behas ko taweel kerna, befaida uljhao
Tararah zuban	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.974	Tez zuban
Keh kar mukar jana	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1174	Waday say phir jana, jo baat kahi ho us k mutabiq na karna
Kallah daraz	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p. 1149	Zuban daraz, chila ker bolnay wala
Shokh zuban	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.957	Bebak, gustakh
Sakht zubani/ /sakht zuban	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.891	Bad zubani, sakht baat/ Sakht kalam/nagawar baat/karwi baat
Rookhi sookhi batain	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.832	Wo batain jin say ranjish zahir ho
Nasamjhi kee baat	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1476	Nadani kee baat

Cultural Key Words

Lexical Entry	Reference	Dictionary meaning
Shaistagi	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 166	Noun F: Khush Ikhlaq Murawwat, Insaniat
Shaista	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 166	Zeba, Mozoon Muhazzab, Tarbiat yafta
Shaistagi	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 606	Tehzeeb, darusti, admiat
Shaista	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 606	Muhazzab, Saleeqamand
Gheebat	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 3, p. 218	Badgoi, peethpeechay burai
Lihaz	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 4, p. 183 Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1291	Kisi cheez ka ankh mian khial karna, pass e adab, hifz e maratab, Murawwat, paas e khatir, tarafdari, paas, mulahiza, Hifz e maratab, adab, murawwat, mulahza, sharm o haya, khial, dhian

Lihaz utha daina	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 4, p. 183	Besharm ho jna, behijab ho jana, beghairat ho jana
	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1291	Besharm ho jana,beghairat ho jana
Lihaz na karna	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 4, p. 183	Pass rakhna, mulahiza rakhna, pass e adab rakhna
Lihaz wala	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 4, p. 184	Murawwat wala, sharm o haya wala, haya wala
Badlihaz/ Belihaz	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 138 Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 2, p. 456 Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.207	Besharam, baron ka pass na karnay wala, jhooton kay samnay buri baat karnay say sharam na kernay wala, khulam khula burai main mubtila rehnay wala Shokh, beadab, besharm, gustakh, sharer Gustakh, besharm, shareer
Muslihatan	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 4, p. 363 Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 892	Az roo e maslihat, waqt ka taqaza Musihat kee roo say
Mulahiza hona	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 912	Lihaz hona
Tameez	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 290 Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 1, p. 627 Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1022	Tehzeeb, Pehchan, aqal, shaoor, adab, qaida Shinakht, pehchan, aqal, shaoor, Adab, qaida Samajh, fehm idrak, budh, gian, shaor
Tameezdar Opp. Batameez	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 290 Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 1, p. 627 Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.166	Zeeshaor, laiq, hoshiar Zeeshaor, moaddab, ehl Tameezdar, khushsaleeqa, muhazzab, shaista
Tehzeeb	Naseem-Ul-Lughat, p. 299	Insaniat, khushikhlaqi, society k asool aor rasm o riwaj,Ikhlaq, moadab, shaista, Tarbeeiat yafta, Khush Ikhlaq
Bad Tehzeeb	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.207	Ghair mohazzab, gushtakh, nashaistagi
Aadab	Farhang-e- Asifia-Volume 1, p. 128	Qawaid, atwar, Dastoor, rasm,

		Wo tareeqay jin say baron kee barai aor choton kee chotia sabit ho Likhnay bolnay aor parhnay main guftagu ka tareeqa Husn e akhlaq, khush ikhlaqi, naik kirdari Atwar, maratab, saleeqa, qaiday, tor tareeqay
	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.12	
Adaab e mehfil	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.12	Char admion main bethnay aor baat cheet kernay k tareeqay
Adab Adaab	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.89	Muashray k pasandeeda tareeqay, Dastoor, qaiday, kisi kee uzmat or bazurgi ka paas o lihaz, hifz e maratab, ehtiram
Baadab	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.166	Adab o ehtiram k sath, moaddab, tameezdara
Murawwat	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p. 1377	Mardangi, lihaz, riyat, ikhalq, insaniat
Bamurawwat	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 1, p. 340	Khatir dari karnay wala, khush ikhlaq, bawafa, basharam
Bemurawwat	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 1, p. 456	Wo jis ko kisi baat ka lihaz na ho badikhlaq
Badakhlaq	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1119	Kaj ikhlaq, badmizah, akarh, rookha
Akhlaq	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 1, p. 127 Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.87	Adatain, khaslatain, kushada paishani say milna, khatarmdarat, aao bhagut Khaslatain, adatain, tor tareeqay, achay tor tareeqay, ilm ul akhlaq
Tehzeeb	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 1, p. 644 Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.474	Shaistagi, khushikhlaqi Ikhlaq kee darusti, insaniat, khush ikhlaqi
Tehzeeb e akhlaq	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 1, p. 644	Darusti e akhlaq Husn en akhlaq Khush akhlaqi
Ikhlaq e muasharat	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.87	Mil jul ker rehnay k tareeqay aor adab
Hifz e maratab	Farhang-e- Asifia- Volume 2, p. 165	Adab ka pass, martaba ka lihaz, darja kee riyat
Muslihat	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1395	Khoobi, bhalai, Munasib tajweez, hikmat, policy
hikmat	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.654	Danai, aqal, tadbeer, tarkeeb
Muslihat andesh	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1395	Maqool baat sochnay wala
Muslihat dekhna	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.1395	Khoobi aor bhalai dekhna

Admi banana	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.12	Insan banana, Tehzeeb sikhana, aqal o tameez sikhana
Beadab	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.289	Doosron ka lihaz na kernay wala
behikmat	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p. 296	Anari, nadan, badtameez, beaqal
bedeed	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p. 293	Belihaz, bemurawwat, behaya
Pass e khatir	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.315	Lihaz, riyat,
Paas e adab	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.315	Adab ka lihaz
Khush atwar	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.687	Basaleeqa, Muhazzab, Shaista, Khush Waza
Khush asloob	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.687	Khush Waza, acchay tareeqay wala
Sharam hazoori	Ilmi Urdu Lughat, p.952	Samnay walay kee sharam kerna

APPENDIX B
RESTRUCTURED SCENARIOS

1. Replica Seller

Samina is an online seller. She sells replicas of branded dresses. She wants to increase her sales. She posts pictures of the dresses without mentioning that they are copies, not original. When a customer approaches her and asks if the dresses are original, she says:

2. Hospital Card

Umair wants to help Ahmad Malik who once worked for him. Ahmad Malik is sick and needs a very expensive surgical procedure. Umair does not have enough money to pay his hospital bills but he seriously wants to help him. As a quick fix, Umair borrows Shabbir Malik's health card who is not even distantly related to Ahmad but incidentally shares the same family name. At the reception, the desk clerk finds out that the name of the patient and the authorized owner do not match. As per rules, only the owner or the immediate family members of the owner are entitled to get free treatment using that card. The desk clerk tells Umair that the authorized owner will have to come in person to testify that the sick patient belongs to the same family and is entitled to receive the treatment covered by this card.
Umair replies:

3. Plagiarized Project

Dina is facing difficulty in a class assignment. She approaches one of her friends and requests her to show her assignment. Her friend gives Dina her assignment and explains how to prepare the assignment but she hardly understands anything. She wants to score good marks. She copies her work and submits it as her own. When the teacher returns the assignments, she is furious about two students submitting the same project. She deducts the marks for submitting the plagiarized work. She asks both of them how it happened. Dina says:

4. Lost Tablet

Asmara's kids are getting addicted to the internet and gadgets. She wants to break their gadget addiction to save them from the potential damage. Despite her repeated

warnings, they do not pay any heed. She hides their tablet to control their usage. They ask her if she has seen the tab or if she has kept it somewhere. She replies:

5. Wedding Invitation

Amal's friend invites him to his brother's wedding. He does not feel comfortable mingling with his family. He does not attend the wedding to save himself from the annoying experience. When his friend asks him why he did not show up, he says:

6. Commitment Crisis

Adil is committed to Anaya. He has very genuine feelings for her and wants to get married to her. Anaya's parents are finding a suitable match for her and she wants him to talk to his parent and ask for her hand as soon as possible. Adil talks to his parents. They are not very happy about the whole idea and partially agree to marry him to Anaya. They strictly tell him to wait for at least two more years until he is settled well. Adil needs some time to fix that.

He knows this might upset Anaya. He wants to save her from getting hurt. The next morning, when they see each other, she asks about his parents' response. he says:

7. Fired

Haider has recently lost his job due to poor performance. He wants to protect his self-image in the family. His family members ask why he got fired. He says:

8. Friendly Feast

Aleena is managing her friend's social media promotions. After the success of one of her events, Aleena asks her to take her out for lunch to which she happily agrees. They agree upon a date and venue. A few days before lunch, Aleena comes to know through a mutual friend that her friend is facing a severe financial crisis. Aleena also feels that her friend is avoiding her these days. She wants to save her from the embarrassment. A day before lunch, they run into each other in the office corridor. After the initial exchange, her friend half- heartedly asks about the next day's plan. Aleena says:

APPENDIX C
Message Examples

1.Replica Seller

Baseline (Disclosive)

These dresses are replicas of Brand X but the quality is good.

Quality violation

Yes! the dresses on our website are 100% original.

Quantity Violation

The quality of these dresses is excellent. We have been in the market for quite some time. We have satisfied customers across the globe.

Manner Violation

We provide the best quality fabric.

Relation Violation

Thank you for contacting us. The retail price for this article is Rs.3500/- but you will get this beautiful article only for Rs.2000/-

2. Hospital Card

Baseline (Disclosive)

He is a poor man. I am also not in a position to help him financially. That's why I borrowed this card from someone I know. The person is not related to him but he has given his consent and he has no objection against treating this patient as his family member.

Quality violation

That person is suffering from Covid-19 and he is quarantined at home. He cannot come in person.

Quantity Violation

He has no objection. That's why we have this card.

Manner Violation

It's the same family. You can check both are Maliks.

Relation Violation

You should fear God. How would you feel if someone from your family suffered from the same situation?

3. Plagiarized Project

Baseline (Disclosive)

I am extremely sorry. It's totally my fault. It's me who copied from her assignment without her permission.

Quality violation

I don't know. Perhaps she copied from my assignment.

Quantity Violation

Both of us worked together and shared ideas.

Manner Violation

Probably we researched from the same source.

Relation Violation

What is plagiarism? I am hearing the word for the first time. I simply don't know what it is.

4. The Lost Tablet

Baseline (Disclosive)

Yes, I have kept it under lock and key. I don't want you to remain glued to your screens all day long and destroy your health.

Quality violation

I don't know anything about your tablet.

Quantity Violation

I saw it in the morning. It was lying there on the table in our living room.

Manner Violation

It must be lying around somewhere in the house.

Relation Violation

I myself am looking for the TV remote control since morning. I have ransacked the house but couldn't find it anywhere.

5.Wedding Invitation
Baseline (Disclosive)

I am sorry. I don't feel comfortable mingling with your family. They make me feel awkward.

Quality violation

I was about to come but I suddenly fell sick. I had to rush to the doctor. Otherwise, I would have been the first person to show up.

Quantity Violation

Sorry I couldn't.

Manner Violation

I couldn't attend the ceremony because of some personal issue.

Relation Violation

You tell how it went. I hope you enjoyed it a lot.

6.Commitment Crisis

Baseline (Disclosive)

I have talked to my parents. They are not very happy about the idea of me getting married on my will but somehow, I have convinced them for love marriage. They have partially agreed but the problem is that we will have to wait at least two more years. They are not ready to get us married until I am settled well and as far as I can see, they will not compromise on this condition.

Quality violation

My parents were very happy to know about our relationship. They would come to your parents to ask them for your hand in a month or so.

Quantity Violation

I talked to my parents last night. I have told them to talk to your parents as soon as possible. I will get a job very soon. We will get married very soon.

Manner Violation

What could their answer be? You better start planning our wedding.

Relation Violation

They are excited to know more about you. Should I tell them that their would-be daughter-in-law eats a lot, fights a lot and looks beautiful all the time?

7.Fired
Baseline (Disclosive)

I was not doing well. My performance was not satisfactory therefore, they fired me.

Quality violation

The company had a huge loss, so they were forced to downsize. They would call us again after a few months.

Quantity Violation

My supervisor didn't like me much.

Manner Violation

There were a few things that went wrong.

Relation Violation

I am looking for a new job. I hope I would get one very soon.

8.Friendly Feast

Baseline (Disclosive)

I know you are facing financial issues. You should not worry about giving me a treat. We can postpone it to some other time or even I can pay the bill.

Quality violation

Sorry I cannot go out with you. I have a respiratory issue and doctors have advised me to avoid fast food. I was just joking the other day.

Quantity Violation

I fear I will not be able to come to lunch.

Manner Violation

Whenever friends meet, it's a party.

Relation Violation

You saying that just reminded me of something very important; What are your plans for the next year's appraisal project?