

**POLITICS OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN
KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA (2002-2018): A
STUDY OF DISTRICT LAKKI MARWAT**

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**NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF MODERN LANGUAGES
ISLAMABAD**

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A CASE STUDY OF DISTRICT LAKKI MARWAT**

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ABSTRACT

Most studies on decentralization in developing countries reveal that the failure of decentralizing was due to insufficient local government framework, ineffective implementation or capture of local government by interest groups or a combination of these factors. The result was the insufficient delivery of services at the local level and failure to strengthen grassroots democracy. We argue that unlike most developing countries, the lessons learned from the case of Pakistan demonstrates that right from the outset the purpose of decentralization was not to decentralize power and authority but to meet two prime objectives. First, strengthening of civil and military bureaucracies to establish the most centralized and coercive government structures through the political marginalization of mainstream political parties and; second to co-opt newly emerging politicians from local councils who could act as conduits between the local constituencies and military established governments.

Keywords: decentralization, good governance, military dominance, client politic.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT	2
1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY	3
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS	4
1.4 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY	5
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	5
1.6 CHARACTERIZATION OF THE THESIS	6
1.7 LITERATURE REVIEW	6
II. A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF LOCAL SELF- GOVERNMENT SYSTEM IN KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA (KP)	10
2.1 INTRODUCTION	10
2.2 PRE-MUGHAL AND MUGHAL PERIOD	10
2.3 THE BRITISH PERIOD	11
2.4 LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM IN KPK	14
2.5 AYUB KHANS SETUP OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN KPK	14
2.6 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF BASIC DEMOCRACIES	15
2.7 STRUCTURE OF ZULFIQAR ALI BHUTTO'S ERA	19
2.8 LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM FROM ZIA TO MUSHARRAF	19
III. POLITICS OF LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT IN LAKKI MARWAT KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA	22
3.1 GEOGRAPHY AND ADMINISTRATION KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA	22
3.2 MUSHARRAF'S SEVEN POINTS AGENDA	23
3.3 FORMATION OF NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION BUREAU	23
3.4 NATURE OF POWER DEVOLUTION	23

3.5 POLITICAL DEVOLUTION.....	24
3.6 ADMINISTRATIVE DEVOLUTION.....	24
3.7 FISCAL DEVOLUTION	26
3.8 TOURIST ATTRACTIONS AND DESTINATION DEVELOPMENT.....	27
3.9 LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN LAKKI MARWAT	28
3.10 LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN LAKKI MARWAT	28
3.10 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF TEHSIL COUNCIL	45
3.12 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF UNION COUNCIL	30
3.13 VILLAGE AND NEIGHBORHOOD COUNCIL IN LAKKI MARWAT	31
3.14 CITIZEN COMMUNITY BOARDS (CCBS).....	32
3.15 MUSALIHAT ANJUMAN (RECONCILIATION COMMITTEE)	33
3.16 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF THE CITY DISTRICT	34

IV.RELATIONS OF POLITICS AND BUREAUCRACY IN LOCAL SELF

GOVERNMENT	36
4.1 COMPOSITION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT... ..	38
4.2. ELECTIONS.....	39
4.3. ORGANISED LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT.....	39
4.4 THE POSITION OF THE BUREAUCRACY	44
4.4 THE POSITION OF THE BUREAUCRACY	44
4.5 RURAL VS. URBAN BIAS.....	47
4.6 AYUB’S ERA BASIC DEMOCRACIES SYSTEM... ..	48

4.7 CIVIL ARMED FORCES REFORM UNDER Z. A. BHUTTO	49
4.8 GENERAL ZIA-UL-HAQ'S ERA	49
4.9 DEMOCRATIC ERAS OF BENAZIR BHUTTO AND NAWAZ SHARIF	50
4.10 LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM IN MUSHARAFERA	51
4.11 THE 18TH CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERATION	51
4.12 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT 2013	52
4.13 RETURN OF DEPUTY COMMISSIONER	53
4.14 POLITICAL FORMATION AND LOCAL BODIES ORGANIZATION	54
4.15 POSITION AND RESPONSIBILITIES	56
4.16 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THREE TIERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS	58
4.17 CONSTRAINTS TO WORK	58
4.18 RELATIONSHIP OF LOCAL, NATIONAL & PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS	59
4.19 COUNCILORS AND MEMBER PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES	60
V. CONCLUSION AND RESULTS	62
5.1 LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN	64
5.1.2 LEGAL BASIS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN PAKISTAN	65
5.1.3 LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT IN KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA	65
5.1.4 GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE	66
5.1.5 LOCAL AREAS	66
5.1.6 CONSTITUTIONS OF LOCAL COUNCIL	67
5.2 COMPOSITION OF LOCAL COUNCILS	67

5.2.1 MUNICIPAL COMMUNITY	68
5.2.2 ORGANIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT	68
5.3 N.W.F.P MUNICIPAL ACT 1950.....	70
5.3.1 TOWN SETUP ACT 1953.....	70
5.3.2 VILLAGE AID PROGRAMMED.....	71
5.3.3 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ORDINANCE, 1979	71
5.3.4 NAWAZ SHARIF ERA.....	73
5.3.5 KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT 2013.....	74
5.4 CONCLUSION.....	76
5.4.1 DE-CENTRALIZED CENTRALIZATION AND PAKISTAN.....	77

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Signature of Candidate

Date

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 The Theoretical Framework for Politics-bureaucracy Relations.....	37
Table 2 Elected representatives in District council (UC's) members in Lakki Marwat....	39
Table 3 distributions of councils and populations.....	40
Table 4 Table 4: Local government election conducted in Pakistan	51
Table 5 Political devolution Indicators	54
Table 6 Dimension of transference.....	55
Table 7 Pakistan Local Government Elections and manufacture Percentage	64
Table 8 Vote-Block criteria for choosing the candidate (%age)	81

Terminologies

BD- Basic Democracy

KP - Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

DC- Deputy Commissioner

LBO - local body's ordinance

UC- Union Council

FATA- Federally Administered Tribal Areas

NWFP- North Western Frontier Province

NRB- National Reconstruction Bureau

DCO- District Coordination Officer

LGO- Local Government Ordinances

CCB - Citizen Community Board

PEC- Provincial economics Commission

PCAO- Punjab Civil Administration Ordinance

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

A local government system can simply be defined as an organization that operates at a local level. The individuals that run this particular type of government are elected by the citizens residing in the district, town, country or region. According to V. Vankata Rao “Local Government is that part of the government which deals mainly with local affairs, administered by authorities subordinate to the state government but elected independently of the state authority by the qualified residents’ (Kaur & Gupta, 2005)¹. The main emphasis of this type of governance is to devolve and decentralize the power structure of administration. It provides the power to countercheck the excessive power that is often enjoyed by the center. It not only addresses the over-centralization of the federation but also relieves the respective federal and provincial governments of the unnecessary burden concerning local administration. This reason why an active local government system is considered the peak of democracy. There is much need in Pakistan to understand the important consideration of decentralization. But in stark contrast to this notion, this region has witnessed devolution in several eras. This factor is imminent when we take a look at the nature of the dictatorships of a non-representative military form of governments under General Ayub Khan, General Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf respectively. The main objective of such a type of authoritarian regime is to enhance the scope of stipulation and manner of services. Therefore, the local authorities are deemed as the perfect tool to strengthen influence through engines for enlargement and progress. Thus, such regimes overburden the local governments with administrative tasks. Hence, the responsibility to deal with fiscal matters is vested upon the local government (Coudhary, 2005)².

The scope and nature of decentralization have always been different in the democratic and dictatorial eras. The military rulers opted for decentralization to fit their respective agendas. For example, in 1959, Ayub Khan introduced the ‘Basic Democracies System’ to safeguard his interests. Likewise, General Zia–UI-Haq heralded a similar system but under

¹ H. Kaur & K.L. Gupta, *Meaning, nature and scope of local governments. New Indian economy and reforms*, (India: Deep & deep Publication, 2005) 44.

² Dr. Muhammad Azam Coudhary, *Local Governments*, (Lahore: Abdullah Brothers, 2005), 70.

the new guise better known as ‘Local Bodies’ when he took over in the year 1979. In a similar fashion Musharraf’s regime changed the logo but the brand remained the same as he now went for decentralization under the euphemism of ‘Devolution of Powers.’ All of the aforementioned mentioned dictators wanted to crumble the democratic institution and rebuild a system that catered to their inspirations. As mentioned before, the main purpose of the local indigenous bodies is to facilitate the people. But in the case of Pakistan, these local bodies remained static and immobile in their venture for local welfare. Such systems never got out of the experimental stage and remained prototype endeavors (Khan, 2009)³. The powers to be had no reason to nourish the democratic structure at the helm of affairs of the state. On the other hand, the situation in the democratic era was also no different as the democratic parties never favored democratic practice amidst their ranks. This research will deal with this matter in both a macroscopic and macroscopic manner.

In Pakistan, both the democratic and dictatorial leadership utilized the local body system to serve their interests. The Pakistani political landscape has developed a culture in which all parties take advantage of the system. If we were to focus on the demeanor of the dictators, then we will find out that they also manipulated the system through lope holes to legitimize their authority. The core spirit of the system in no way aligns with the mutated form that this system has been reduced to (Rizvi, 2000)⁴. Almost all of the dictators tried to decentralize the system to plant seeds of loyalty in the core of the system yet they failed. This research aims to understand the perception of the common public about two recent attempts to form an ample local body system. The experiences of the individuals that participated vehemently in both respective eras will present a clear picture of the phenomena. That’s the reason why the demeanor of both the Musharraf and Imran regimes will help the researcher in developing a better understanding of the system. The comparative analysis will also be beneficial in understanding the effective local government of both regimes.

1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The purpose of inquiry in this research is to compare the KP local government system during the PTI era with the Musharraf era. The analysis will be conducted on four parameters in each local

³ Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 437.

⁴ Hasan Askari Rizvi, *The Military & Politics in Pakistan 1947-1986*, (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 2000), 232.

government system: inclusiveness, political autonomy, fiscal/financial autonomy and accountability. The issue regarding the nature of governance has always been considered a core issue in Pakistan especially when it comes to understanding policymaking and implementation. Hence, relevant institutional arrangements and mechanisms are deemed imperative for good governance (Steytler, 2005)⁵. The state apparatus functions to strengthen the state-society relationship and public service delivery. It also plays a pivotal role in strengthening democracy and achieving progress. To ensure the effectiveness of any system, the basic arrangement of systematic governance has been deemed paramount in this regard. No policy objectives can be achieved without the credible implementation of competencies and strong capabilities. Nonetheless, any system that entails merit can be productive to some extent.

The government is comprised of many tiers that are organized to facilitate the process of administration. Such sections are institutionally arranged according to the function and calibre that they possess. For this purpose, the principle of centralization serves as a facilitating tool at the behest of such institutions. This principle can simply be described as a vital institutional arrangement of effective governance that serves the government in the formulation and implementation of state policies. Simply put, decentralization can be beneficial for the democratization of society, state-building, developmental goals, strengthening state-society relationships, economic integration, social uplift, conflict resolution and peacebuilding by the strengthening of democratic governance in a country.

1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The pre and post 18th amendment eras provide a better understanding of the inner working of the political dynamic of Pakistan. With the advent of this particular amendment, the political landscape within Pakistan changed. Thus, the comparison of local bodies in the overall centralized or participatory federalism provides interesting material to ponder upon. Without a shadow of a doubt, this amendment devolved into and decentralized administrative structure. The upper echelon of the Pakistani government had finally acknowledged the importance of democratic participation in

⁵ N. Steytler, *The place and role of local government in federal systems*. (Republic of South Africa: Konard Adenauer Stiftung, 2005),

order to efficiently run administration (Baig, 2005)⁶. An effective local body system is imperative for both political and economic progress. The direct participation of democratic forces in the establishment of this system indicates that all sectors within Pakistan have reluctantly recognized the need for a system that is robust and operates at a micro-level. Hence one may say that without the presence of this system we cannot expect a strong state-society relationship, robust long-term economic growth and uninterrupted democratic development. This research has focused on the analyses of the pre and post 18th amendment local government systems of both the Musharraf and PTI eras. It will analyse how the devolution scheme in each era facilitated the process of improving governance through decentralization of power for the empowerment of communities at the grass-root level. The researcher opted for the district of Lakki Marwat because that particular locale rather than all federating units provides a better avenue to analyze how both regimes legislated differently on the same issue. Plus it also provides a better picture of indigenous variables that are often missed when we look at a bigger picture. On the other hand, the approaches by both respective governments will also be useful in building an understanding of how the institutions in the government function on a wider scale.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This dissertation would attempt to answer the following questions:

1. What were the key differences in the structure and composition of local governments in the Musharraf and PTI era?
2. Which were the powers and functions that each regime has devolved to its local government?
3. What was the nature of power devolution in Musharraf and the PTI government?
4. What was the functional status of the Local Government in Lakki Marwat?

⁶ M. Baig, Decentralization through Devolution, *The Nation*, (Lahore: March 2010). 7. 28

1.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH

Good research requires clear objectives to be considered valid. In this regard, an in-depth analysis is for the identification and understanding of the four features of the institutional design which are as follows.

- 1) Inclusiveness
- 2) Political Autonomy
- 3) Fiscal/Financial Autonomy
- 4) Accountability

Two major reasons dictated the selection of the features selected above. Those reasons were;

1. These factors can be identified as the variables that help in understanding the capacity and capability of institutional arrangements of the local governments.
2. Such variables also describe patterns of differences in each devolution scheme. Such differences are vital for a better understanding of structures and mechanisms within the intricately woven system.

This research aims to rationally analyze the strengths and shortcomings of each attempt to decentralize the government. Hopefully, the findings of this research will provide an insight to create a better governance system that is functional and somewhat complete. The research also aspires to recommend creating public policies that cater to the common masses. For this reason, this research will deal with structural gaps in inclusiveness, political autonomy, fiscal autonomy and accountability of local government institutions.

1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The researcher has chosen a mixed methodology to carry out this research as it will utilize both primary and secondary sources as the means for the collection of data. To analyze and make sense of the data, documents including the Acts related to the issue will be included. For example, the 2013 Acts provide insight into the inner working of the system. The secondary research method is most beneficial in the research of this particular nature especially if we wish to understand the capacity of institutional arrangements and the difference in patterns of features of

the institutional design of local government institutions. In the later stage of research, the primary research method will be used to evaluate and confirm the inferences made earlier on. The formulation and the implementation of policies are two entirely different beasts that require primary research approaches to be understood. It is often observed that the government easily frames policies but when it comes to the implementation of such policies a clear disparity in the actions can be observed. For this purpose, semi-structured interviews, interview guides (questionnaires) will be designed by keeping in view the research statement and research questions. Several queries on each research question were designed and asked from respondents by keeping in view the multi-dimensionality of the research topic. The sample size for the primary units of data collection (respondents) will be around thirty.

1.6 CHAPTERIZATION OF THE THESIS

This thesis will contain the politics of local self-government in KP Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2002-2018) a case study of district Lakki Marwat. This study will be made up of five parts. The first chapter will entail the introduction to the entire thesis which is necessary to set the context for the study. The second chapter will deal with the historical evolution of local government in the subcontinent.

The third chapter is an important chapter to this study. It will focus on Musharraf and PTI governments and local government. Their power structures, nature of power devolution, and politics will be analyzed. Chapter four highlights the relations between politics and bureaucracy in local self-government Chapter five, which is the final stage, will conclude the major findings, state recommendations and suggest further research.

1.7 LITERATURE REVIEW

When we take a look at the historical context regarding the governance system in Pakistan, it would be evident that the establishment of a democratic institution has always been a major issue that was neglected by the powerful strata that governed this county. This whole predicament leads to the fragility of democratic institutions within Pakistan. The historical experience of the colonized area dominated the post-partition era of Pakistan while such tendencies lead to the formation of the centralized system (Niaz, 2006)⁷. Niaz presented the model of continual which provided an understanding of the origin and evolution of the governance system present

⁷ Ilhan Niaz, *A Survey of Proprietorship, Continental Bureaucratic Empires, and the Culture of Power, in South Asian History* (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad The Pakistan Development Review, 2006), 327-339

within this system. At first, the East India Company formulated a system that better suited their need for dominance. After that, the British crown took over and nudged the system ever slightly to facilitate their needs. Such bureaucratic empires created a system that supported centralization as the means to govern. Such a centralized structure depended upon the quality of authority of the bureaucratic executives that governed this region. Thus, it is not hard to imagine why democratic tendencies were never given any space to flourish. The most common side effects of this kind of governance include arbitrariness, centralization and ideological delusions that affect institutions of governance. If we dive even deeper into the history of this region, it will become apparent that the ancient civilizations of the Indus valley utilized the continental bureaucratic structure to govern (Ahsan, 2001)⁸. The Mauryan and Gupta empires similarly governed the masses as well. In all the examples presented above, the state was regarded as the private property of the ruling elite or to be more specific the king. The duty to govern was shared with the bureaucrats and the confidants of the rulers. Such duties included areas related to agriculture, maintaining law and order, generating and collecting revenue, building palaces etc. The selection of these bureaucrats was done at the behest of the king. The Delhi Sultanate 1206-1526 (including Turks, Khaljis, Afghans and Tughluqids) changed the rules of the game when it came to the nature of governance. Even though the nature of the governance remained authoritative, other classes were given an ample share in the rule. The Great Mughals 1526-1707 (like their predecessors) also relied on authoritative centrality as the core tool for governance. The governance was given to the loyal servants of the rulers to secure empirical interests.

Now coming back to the British era, the east India Company was staunch imperialist in its essence. Thus, it was never inspired or obliged to reform the structure of the state within the subcontinent. Thus, it also secured the vested interests of the British Empire and the crown. Lord Cornwallis 1785-1793, firmly attributed the low productivity in this to the ‘oriental principles of government.’ He believed that this system was full of error thus it hindered good governance. Thus, the first action he took entailed reforms in all major fields including civil service, police, taxation, and the judiciary (Siddiqui, 1992)⁹. It should not come as a surprise that such reforms were heavily biased toward the protection of British interests. Thus, this system was made to systematically tilt in favour of the party. In the aftermath of the first world

⁸ Aitzaz Ahsan, *The Indus Saga and the Making of Pakistan* (Lahore: Nehr Ghar Publications, 2001).

⁹ Kamal Siddiqui, *Local government in South Asia, A Comparative Study*, (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1992), 108.

war, the British somewhat introduced the system that catered for the idea of decentralization. Thus, in the Government of India Acts of 1919, they loosened their grip yet the final authority was still vested with British bureaucracy. Pakistan inherited this culture even after gaining freedom. The local nationalist government that took charge of Pakistan adopted the authoritative model to govern the masses. This situation further worsened with the advent of the first martial law of Ayub Khan. All the martial regimes that followed Ayub introduced a corrupted form of purpose-driven decentralized/local governments. Thus, it is needless to say that the subcontinent suffered from an authoritative rule that was never in favour of the decentralization of power. The liberal democratic governance was never given space thus the whole ordeal adversely impacted public service delivery, impeded the achievement of developmental goals like SDG, weakened state-society relationships and sponsored socio-economic-political turmoil (Hayat, 2008)¹⁰.

There are many ways to deal with the issue of bad governance especially if we consider the authoritarian culture of power. The principle of subsidiarity is one way of dealing with this issue as it encourages the central government to perform the subsidiary functions of the state. In such a system the decentralized section of the state relinquishes the powers to the centre if the situation comes to shove (Panizza, 2018)¹¹. This principle also advocates an immediate and hasty resolution to local conflicts. In the year 2010, the 18th Constitutional Amendment in the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan In 2010 was passed by parliament under the context of this particular principle. Twenty-seven members of the parliamentary committee pondered on the implication and practicality of said principle. Eventually, the amendment was drafted and passed after taking the consent of the aforementioned parliamentary members (The News, 2010)¹². This amendment tried to strengthen democracy by empowering the provinces. This act further laid the foundation for the true federalism that this country needed immensely. Now, the provinces were enjoying legislative power at the grass-root level. Thus, such units utilized this amendment and legislated many acts that were in their favour. After 2013, both KPK along with other provinces also legislated such laws. This time the province of KPK was being ruled under the banner of the PTI government. Thus, this scenario presents an ideal situation to analyze the actions taken by this government in comparison to the Musharraf regime. Even in this democratic environment, it took quite a while for the KPK government to enact such laws due to

¹⁰ Sikandar A. Hayat, *Decentralization without democracy in Pakistan*. (Switzerland: Institute of Federalism, 2008), 20.

¹¹ Roberta Panizza, *European Parliament The principle of subsidiarity* (Italy: Fact Sheets on the European Union, 2018)

¹² The News, *CM Murad says rollback of 18th amendment to be resisted* (Pakistan: September 11, 2018)

authoritarian culture of power. Ironically, the local governments enacted laws only after the intervention of the supreme court of Pakistan. This delay by the local government was in direct violation of the constitution of Pakistan. Therefore, the Supreme Court issued an order to conduct local body elections in such provinces (Dawn 2015)¹³. It can be argued that this intervention by the Supreme Court was a democratic act to ensure the sanctity of the constitution. On 30th May 2015, a local government election in KPK was held. For public policy formulation, adoption and implementation, relevant and necessary institutional arrangements are imperative. Hence, this research will cover that aspect in detail.

¹³ DAWN, *Delay in local government elections irks Supreme Court* (Pakistan: February 13, 2015)

CHAPTER TWO

A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT SYSTEM IN KHYBER PAKHTOON KHUWA (KPK)

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The idea of a local government system is not new in the subcontinent including the current KPK, Pakistan. The order of local government was found and regulated according to the desires of that time by the rulers. The administrator of the local government system was empowered to deal with and regulate their local affairs which in reflection were bound to provide military aid and muscle from their concerned area to the central government. Meanwhile, the primary purpose was revenue generation for central government and the sustenance of law and order, by neglecting public welfare. The progress of Local government consists of the pre-Mughal, Mughal, British and post-independence times post-partition in Pakistan, the setup of local government witnessed multiple alterations but was prominent once under the dictatorial governments of military rulers who sustained elected local bodies for municipal affairs. On the other hand, the elected governments early held local government elections and maintain the local government system via local and provincial government servants, which was controlled by bureaucracy. The system depended on the objective of the executive magistracy the leftover of the colonial rule which gave the rulers, the bureaucracy, and the political elite to govern the masses.

The change was witnessed when the government of president general Pervaiz Musharraf announced a new setup of local government through the national construction bureau in 2020. In this system, for the first time in the history of Pakistan bureaucracy at the district level was made subordinate to the elected *nazims*. Since then, the people are empowered at the local level and chances have been provided to them to design their destiny. The local government system provides a participatory version of development in which the people at the local level get involved in the planning, formulation, and execution of policies for them.

2.2 PRE-MUGHAL AND MUGHAL PERIOD

In the areas consisting of Pakistan, the centre while busy gaining power over the community's ruler had to manage their matters. Panchayats were the first form of a local institution that

were to end local desires and administer justice where people were strengthened through the patterns of community allegiance¹⁴.

In the eighth century under Muslim rule, the country was demarcated into Surkars, Parganas, Towns, and Deaths Mirdeh, the Mohala by Meer Mohala and the city by kotwal led Deh or village¹⁵. There were offices of Qazi and Mohtasib as well. These offices were prearranged. The setup of local government established by the Muslim rulers was rearranged in the Mughal period (1526-1857). According to Sir Jadu Nath Sarkar, the Mughals were an urban people and their government was centralized and autocratic that was responsive but not responsible to public demand and thought¹⁶. In remote areas, the Mughals rarely interacted with the old customs village government; they encompassed the village under the administration as a unit for revenue generation and security purposes only¹⁷. Village life was a distinct world of its own having its own rules and regulations. The fear of an oppressive feudal or looter often proved to be a source of strength for villagers¹⁸.

2.3 THE BRITISH PERIOD

The British arrived in India in 1609 for trade and business. The Mughal king Jehangir in 1613, by royal order, allowed the British to develop a factory permanently at Surat close to Bombay¹⁹. By 1650 the British constructed more factories under the name of East India Company in Madras, Bombay and Calcutta where they could trade freely. This, finally, established the British government in different parts of India through the East India Company²⁰.

When the British came to India they came along with the customs and conventions of the English System of local government and applied them in their colonial settlements which they labelled as Company Presidencies²¹. That was based upon White towns (English town centre) and black towns (the Indian remote towns). The latter relied upon the former. In 1687, the directors of the company decided to find a corporation for the provision of public services to the presidency of Madras, where the administration of the cooperation was in the hands of the English man, the assembly of the alderman could elect an Indian as its mayor. It was destined to enforce further

¹⁴ Afzal, Muhammad. *Local Government in Pakistan: Government and Administration in Pakistan*, (Islamabad: Pakistan Public Administration Research Center, 1987), p633

¹⁵ Afzal Muhammad. *Local Government in Pakistan: Government and Administration in Pakistan*, p633

¹⁶ Tinker, Hugh. *Foundations of Local Self-Government in India, Pakistan, and Burma*, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), p17

¹⁷ Tinker, Hugh. *Foundations of Local Self-Government in India, Pakistan, and Burma*, p19

¹⁸ Tinker, Hugh. *Foundations of Local Self-Government in India, Pakistan, and Burma*, p18.

¹⁹ Ayaz, Muhammad. *Local Government Finance*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2004), p16.

²⁰ Ayaz, Muhammad. *Local Government Finance*, p17.

²¹ Khan, Muhammad Afzal. *The Historical Perspective: Grass Roots Government*, (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Patriotic Publication, 1963), p44.

taxes but the local people, white also black, argued for new taxes so in the experiment could not succeed²².

In 1726, in the presidencies of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras close corporations were found that were best upon a mayor and nine aldermen. These corporations were to execute judicial functions only. The Mayor was appointed by the governor general²³. As time passed the British order in India started expansion from small trading ports to the governing of the subcontinent. In 1793 small changes took place in the Presidency Corporations and the rancorous English mercantile community over enhanced taxes, the Bench of Justices conflicted with the government and occasionally with the courts²⁴. It was in the 1840s that a major step was taken to facilitate machinery more capable of leading public affairs. The election rules were announced to a certain level and municipal services were rendered to a Board of Conservancy (BOC) consisting of seven members of which Justices of Peace elected five members²⁵. From this, a kind of haphazard municipal system grew which has no legislative prohibition or centralized dictation and local bodies were appointed in larger towns to help the district magistrate in fundraising which aimed at policing conservancy, and road maintenance.

According to Hugh Tinker, a great number of Indian publics reside in villages. The effect of both revenue and judicial administration was to ruin village unity and sensitized the individual in society. it was uncommon to incorporate the life of the village deliberately, but the old order was gradually shrinking by an act of contact with the new government with its uniformity, its centralization, and its foreign courts of law²⁶. Lord Rippon explained by Hugh Tinker as state forward and liberal thought to political and social questions could be witnessed in his argument that if local government were to have any importance, it should grow up of local conditions: If it has to be established in genuinely, it should be devised by the local administrators and not be imposed prepared by the central government²⁷. The resolution that was adopted on local self-government in May 1882 was not basically to improve administration but was designed as a tool of political and popular education meanwhile, as for as the liberal approach of lord Rippon is concerned, according to him he was only as of the great majority of local Anglo-Indian officials

²² Khan, Muhammad Afzal. *The Historical Perspective: Grass Roots Government*, p44.

²³ Tinker, Hugh. *Foundations of Local Self-Government in India, Pakistan, and Burma*, p26.

²⁴ Tinker, Hugh. *Foundations of Local Self-Government in India, Pakistan, and Burma*, p26.

²⁵ Tinker, Hugh. *Foundations of Local Self-Government in India, Pakistan, and Burma*, p27.

²⁶ Tinker, Hugh. *Foundations of Local Self-Government in India, Pakistan, and Burma*, p32-33.

²⁷ Tinker, Hugh. *Foundations of Local Self-Government in India, Pakistan, and Burma*, p33 & 43.

were conservatives and in favor of a paternal administration, so the reforms introduced by Lord Ripon were sided by the political governments and district officers who were in charge of execution²⁸. Soon after the retirement of Lord Rippon from India, initiatives were taken to restore the policies that proceeded in the 1882 act. The association of civil servants honoring Lord Curzon, who ascended power to Lord Ripon, presented him a silver broom to the new viceregal those reforms incorporated by lord Ripon would be undone²⁹. Local government institutions did not make worthy progress until the Minto Morley reforms were introduced, in the Minto Morley decentralization report, 1909 selective local government laws of the 1882 Act were added³⁰. In Punjab municipal act was adopted in 1911. In Sindh same act was passed in 1933. However, in Baluchistan and NWFP the municipal administration was supervised by civil servants³¹. Post-World War one, more local government laws were introduced because of communal representation issues that ultimately resulted in the birth of Pakistan. The Montague Chelmsford report of 1918 tried to find some level of provincial autonomy. The rural self-government act of 1921 established gave birth to district and sub-district councils for the entire subcontinent³². Union boards for above 8000 persons were created. The body established comprised elected and nominated members and local police monitoring, and assistance were primary functions. Though the government of India act 1919 established a system of diarchy under which Indian ministers answerable to provincial assemblies were made head of certain departments. This act allowed limited space to Indian politicians that were further cut down by the limited assignment of expenditure functions and fiscal resources³³. With the rise of the Indian nationalist movement, a valuable stage of provincial autonomy was introduced under the government of Indian act 1935. The act with the established federal form of government announced a fully responsible government in the provinces. It enlarged the set of the expenditure given to the elected Indian provincial governments and was supported by the 1937 Niemeger award which was the beginning attempt at fiscal federalism in India³⁴. Despite introducing these acts, the control of the imperial centre over the provinces was maintained through discretionary powers that were given to non-elected provincial governors. World war two altered the direction of the events. The provincial

²⁸ Tinker, Hugh. *Foundations of Local Self-Government in India, Pakistan, and Burma*, p44

²⁹ Khan, Muhammad Afzal. *The Historical Perspective: Grass Roots Government*, p636.

³⁰ Douglas E, Ashford. *National Development and Local Reform-Political Participation in Morocco, Tunisia, and Pakistan*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), p101.

³¹ Khan, Muhammad Afzal. *The Historical Perspective: Grass Roots Government*, p636

³² Douglas E, Ashford. *National Development and Local Reform-Political Participation in Morocco, Tunisia, and Pakistan*, p101

³³ Cheema, Ali et al. *Decentralization in Pakistan: Content, Context, and Causes*, (2004), p3

³⁴ Cheema, Ali et al. *Decentralization in Pakistan: Content, Context, and Causes*, (2004), p3

legislatures were dismissed, and governors' rule was enacted in all the provinces. Communal rights across India further worsened the condition and in 1947, the order of local government in Indo-Pakistan remain neglected³⁵.

2.4 LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM IN KPK: POST PARTITION TILL ZIA UL HAQ

The areas which formed Pakistan including KPK had no progressive system of Local government. Pakistan replicated the British system in which the deputy commissioner (DC) administrative in charge of the district monitors administration, development, revenue, and criminal justice³⁶. In KPK less honest steps were taken to strengthen civic sense among the Pashtuns. Post-independence much of the structure that had developed under the British era was retained and quick attention could not be utilized towards the growth of local government due to unstable situations created by partition³⁷. In 1948, the Muslim league manifesto included a Local self-government model like England, but the condition was bad in KPK whereby 1951-52 all the six district boards and nine municipal committees were made unfunctional and administered by government-appointed administrators, MPA's³⁸.

On such nature of affairs, the prime minister of Pakistan in 1957 said that many district boards lie dysfunctional because no elections had been conducted after the expiry of their tenure. When the elections were conducted, there were irregularities to a great extent. In the late 20th century, local government in Pakistan specifically in KPK was in a bad position where rural local government was politically dead³⁹. While the urban municipalities were dominated by the elite class.

2.5 AYUB KHANS SETUP OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN KPK

Basic democracies (BDS) is established by the Basic Democracies Ordinance 1959, which was the responsibility of the provincial government. As the government was based on the central government and the two provincial governments (East Pakistan- and West Pakistan), the central government had small to do with BD's accept altering the ordinance, fiscal rural development and co-coordinating policies⁴⁰. The new system of the local government was the same for all the

³⁵ Rizvi, S. Shahid Ali. *Local Government in Pakistan: A Study in Clash of Ideas*, (Karachi: The Center for Research in Local Government, 1980), p28

³⁶ Asia, ICG. *Devolution in Pakistan: Reform or Regression?* (Islamabad/Brussels: Report. ICG Asia, 70,22nd, March 2004), p3. <http://www.icg.org.com>

³⁷ Rizvi, S. Shahid Ali. *Local Government in Pakistan: A Study in Clash of Ideas*, p29.

³⁸ Rizvi, S. Shahid Ali. *Local Government in Pakistan: A Study in Clash of Ideas*, p30-31

³⁹ Rizvi, S. Shahid Ali. *Local Government in Pakistan: A Study in Clash of Ideas*, p32

⁴⁰ Khan, Muhammad Afzal. *The Historical Perspective: Grass Roots Government*, p32

the country including the six districts and two divisions of KPK⁴¹. The system was hierarchical.

2.6 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF BASIC DEMOCRACIES

The term basic democracies reflect basic democratic institutions which have been created under the basic democracies order, 1959 this system is based upon four tiers beginning from the lowest, they were based on Union Councils and town committees (rural areas) and union committees (urban areas), Thana councils and (East Pakistan) and Tehsil councils (West Pakistan) (Rural Areas) and Municipal committees and cantonment board (Urban Areas) and district council and four divisional councils. This system influenced the political system. This was the beginning of the detailed system in post-partition which functioned in KPK. Union council constitutionally head to cover an area with a population of 8000 to 10000, lower and upper limitations were 4000 to 40000 respectively in KPK⁴². Neighbouring villages were united to gather to make a union and the limitations of Patwars, Halqas, and Thanas were retained⁴³. The size and population of union councils were different from region to region. Town committees were established for small towns having a population of not more than 40000 persons. Union committees were formulated in urban areas with a population of 15000. Under section 7 of the MAO of 1960, the provincial government could label any urban area other than a cantonment to be a municipality⁴⁴.

There were about 10 to 15 members in a union council two thirds of the members were elected representatives and one third based on nominated nonofficial members selected by the government. The Union council is the only structure in the system where elected members are in majority and every council elected its chairman⁴⁵. The way of electing the members of the town committee and its chairman was the same as that of a union council⁴⁶. A union committee depended upon 6-

10 members with an elected chairman who was an ex officio member of the municipal committee or cantonment board. Every municipal committee had a council that was based upon all the chairman of union committees. The government selected its chairman. The council elected a vice-chairman who might be removed by two Third votes of non-confidence⁴⁷.

⁴¹ Rizvi, S. Shahid Ali. *Local Government in Pakistan: A Study in Clash of Ideas*, p34

⁴² Rizvi, S. Shahid Ali. *Local Government in Pakistan: A Study in Clash of Ideas*, p35

⁴³ Rizvi, S. Shahid Ali. *Basic Democracies: Ayub Khan's System of Local Government in Pakistan*, (Islamabad: Journal of Social Sciences, Vol vii, no 1&2, 1981), p88

⁴⁴ Rizvi, S. Shahid Ali. *Basic Democracies: Ayub Khan's System of Local Government in Pakistan*, p89

⁴⁵ Douglas E, Ashford. *National Development and Local Reform-Political Participation in Morocco, Tunisia, and Pakistan*, p117

⁴⁶ Rizvi, S. Shahid Ali. *Local Government in Pakistan: A Study in Clash of Ideas*, p41-41

⁴⁷ Rizvi, S. Shahid Ali. *Local Government in Pakistan: A Study in Clash of Ideas*, p43

Functions of union councils were limited from provision and maintenance of public ways, water supply, sanitation etc. to adopting ways concerning welfare health etc. The Union council had local responsibilities for the agriculture industry and trade etc. It also had exaction authority over 29 items⁴⁸. A union committee must follow these functions as described by the provincial government. for example, methods mandatory for the national reconstruction and social progress. The municipal committee could also relieve any of its functions to a union committee and had to act under jurisdiction⁴⁹. The Union committee had to serve the union time by time the committee had no power to impose taxes. The municipal committee provided the needed funds. Some of the functions of the municipal committee included mandatory while others were noncompulsory. The committee also had coordinative responsibilities regarding the actions of union committees⁵⁰. Tehsil councils in which Pakistan including districts of KP also of thana council in east Pakistan were articulated to coordinate actions of the union councils. These were intended to be set where development models goals submitted by the union council were to be coordinated and filtered. The said tehsil/ thana councils use to cover 15 union councils and 150 villages. Tehsils included in West Pakistan included 211 tehsils while 411 Thana councils in East Pakistan. A tehsil or thana council were based upon representative and official members. The later members of tehsil or thana council were officers of multiple government institutions, while the formers were chairman of the union councils and union town committees. Tehsil/ thana councils included 30- 40 members. The chairman of the councils were officials. In East Pakistan they were a sub-divisional officer and in West Pakistan were Tehsil Dar or assistant commissioner⁵¹. The tehsil or thana council did not perform executive responsibilities, but the role of coordinator as described earlier. They were handed over dysfunctional union council. The council had no authority over taxation and funds to them were given by the district council to meet the expenditures and other matters⁵². In Ayub Khan's system, the district council was the third order of local government. East Pakistan had 19 district councils while the west consisted of 46. Among the six were in KP including 6 districts councils of Banu, Dera Ismail Khan, Hazara, Mardan, Kohat and Peshawar. The structure of the district council included the chairman of the tehsil or Thana council, representatives of

⁴⁸ Rizvi, S. Shahid Ali. *Basic Democracies: Ayub Khan's System of Local Government in Pakistan*, p93

⁴⁹ Rizvi, S. Shahid Ali. *Basic Democracies: Ayub Khan's System of Local Government in Pakistan*, p93

⁵⁰ Article 18, *Municipal Administration Ordinance 1960*

⁵¹ Douglas E, Ashford. *National Development and Local Reform-Political Participation in Morocco, Tunisia, and Pakistan*, p117

⁵² Rizvi, S. Shahid Ali. *Local Government in Pakistan: A Study in Clash of Ideas*, p46-47

multiple departments and appointed members who were half of the total membership⁵³. The District Council the 40 members. Electoral College was based on chairman union council town and union committees elected district members. Elected members were more in numbers than official members, Deputy Commissioner was the chairman of the district council and district council members for 5 years⁵⁴.

District council had mandatory and optional functions to perform the former included 28 functions like responsibilities of primary schools, libraries reading rooms, hospitals, roads, bridges, sanitation, public health etc⁵⁵. The latter had a list of functions including, culture, social welfare, economic welfare, public works, and promotion of religious harmony⁵⁶. The council functioned as a coordinating plate form for all local councils and municipal committees within the jurisdiction. The divisional council was the fourth and last order of the local government. In East Pakistan, there were four while 12 in west Pakistan including Dera Ismail khan and Peshawar divisional council in KP. The divisional council had 45 members elected and non-elected. Municipal committee and cantonment boards bestowed elected members. While district councils were elected on the vote of concerned authority's commissioner of the division was a chairman⁵⁷. Monitor and coordinate work of the lower council came under the domain of the divisional council. Formulation and the recommendation to the provincial government on the development projects were its development function it had no taxation authority but to receive Adhoc grants from provincial governments⁵⁸.

⁵³ Douglas E, Ashford. *National Development and Local Reform-Political Participation in Morocco, Tunisia, and Pakistan*, p117

⁵⁴ Rizvi, S. Shahid Ali. *Basic Democracies: Ayub Khan's System of Local Government in Pakistan*, p92


⁵⁵ Article 33(1), Schedule iv. Part 1, BDO. *Grass Roots Government*, (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Patriotic Publication, 1963), p184-185

⁵⁶ Article 60, Schedule v, Part 11, BDO. *Grass Roots Government*, (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Patriotic Publication, 1963), p186-190

⁵⁷ Rizvi, S. Shahid Ali. *Local Government in Pakistan: A Study in Clash of Ideas*, p44

⁵⁸ Rizvi, S. Shahid Ali. *Local Government in Pakistan: A Study in Clash of Ideas*, p47-48

Structure of local government under General Ayub Khan



2.7 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF ZULFIQAR ALI BHUTTO'S LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM

When General Yahya Khan came into power, he did not dismantle the functioning of the local government ordained by president general Ayub Khan. After assuming power than PM Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto repealed the BDO of 1959 and the municipal administration ordinance of 1961 in December 1971. He introduced various ordinances including the local government ordinance of 1972. A few ordinances among them were passed as Acts by provincial governments. In KP the same ordinance passed under the name of provincial local government ordinance 1972⁵⁹. The previous union, tehsil, districts, and divisional councils were suspended, and members of local government were deprived of an electoral representation in provincial and national assembly elections.

⁵⁹ Afzal, Muhammad. *Local Government in Pakistan: Government and Administration in Pakistan*, p640

Under Z.A Bhutto's naïve local government system in rural areas, the three-tier council was an established-Dehi council at the village level, Halaqa council at the sub-district level, and district level, there were people's district councils in Punjab and Balochistan. However, KP and Sindh adopted a single-tier rural council named as people's district council⁶⁰. For urban areas in all units of the federation, there were town committees for towns and municipal committees for cities. Lahore and Karachi were based upon six- and four people's municipalities respectively⁶¹.

A few basic changes were introduced in the structure, composition, and election process of a local government system. Now, local government members were elected through an adult franchise for 4 years. The chairman of various local bodies was elected directly⁶². The new local government system of ZA Bhutto gave representation to disadvantaged groups such as tenants, workers, Peasants, women etc.

The newly introduced system could not strengthen its roots because no elections were conducted for its survival⁶³. Therefore, official administrator's controlled local institutions in Bhutto Era. Also, the problems faced by the people were not resolved because of the autocratic rule of DC.

2.8 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM FROM ZIA TO MUSHARRAF

Zia ul Haq suspend the government of Bhutto and declared martial law in the country in 1977. Coming to power a few years later, Zia introduced his version of the local government system by announcing the local body's ordinance (LBO)⁶⁴. Under the local government system, three tiers of the power structure in rural areas were designed: Union Councils in villages, tehsil/taluka councils and district councils. At the same time in urban areas, town committees were formulated for towns (five to thirty thousand persons) Municipal committees for towns (twenty-five thousand) and municipal/ metro polytan corporations for big cities (two lac and fifty thousand).

Rural councils under Zia-Ul-Haq, Zilla council, Tehsil Council, and Union Council. Urban Councils under Zia-Ul-Haq, Municipal Corporations, Municipal Committees, and Town Committees. Union council elections were to be conducted on nonparty criteria. The same adult

⁶⁰ Afzal, Muhammad. *Local Government in Pakistan: Government and Administration in Pakistan*, p641-642

⁶¹ Rizvi, S. Shahid Ali. *Local Government in Pakistan: A Study in Clash of Ideas*, p231

⁶² Rizvi, S. Shahid Ali. *Local Government in Pakistan: A Study in Clash of Ideas*, p230

⁶³ Asia, ICG. *Devolution in Pakistan: Reform or Regression*, p4

⁶⁴ Qudus, Syed Abdullah. *Local Self Government in Pakistan*, (Lahore: Vanguard Publishers, 1981), p110-204

franchise standard was set for the electoral system. The election for the chairman was to be held among elected members who had no electoral role⁶⁵. Tehsil or Taluka councils were based upon union council chairman and town committee chairman and members of nation-building institutions. District councils consisted of elected members of the UC and tehsil/ Taluqa councils and others as mentioned by the LBO⁶⁶.

Under the new local government system, a kind of friction between bureaucracy and local councils was made. To lessen the friction co-coordinating committees were established in all districts of KP⁶⁷. For the first time, under the capital territory local government ordinance, 1979, a local government system was established in federally administered tribal areas (FATA). Before this, there was no concept of local government in the FATA⁶⁸. Union councils and agency councils were set up in rural areas of FATA. And town committees in agency headquarters were established under provincial government⁶⁹. Marginalized groups such as tenants, peasants, workers, minorities, and women were given special quotas in councils⁷⁰. The three-tier order of councils had many functions to perform in the agriculture industry-main power, housing, social welfare etc. for settlement of conflicts⁷¹. Financial expenses for that purpose were derived from taxes, different projects, and special grants by the federal and provincial governments. Taxation included property taxes, immovable property taxes, agriculture, execution etc.

⁶⁵ Rizvi, S. Shahid Ali. *Basic Democracies: Ayub Khan's System of Local Government in Pakistan*, p118

⁶⁶ Baxter, Craig. *Zia's Pakistan: Politics and Stability in Frontline State*, (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1985), p37

⁶⁷ Afzal, Muhammad. *Local Government in Pakistan: Government and Administration in Pakistan*, p646


⁶⁸ Afzal, Muhammad. *Local Government in Pakistan: Government and Administration in Pakistan*, p642-643

⁶⁹ Rizvi, S. Shahid Ali. *Local Government in Pakistan: A Study in Clash of Ideas*, p249

⁷⁰ Rizvi, S. Shahid Ali. *Local Government in Pakistan: A Study in Clash of Ideas*, p2248

⁷¹ Asia, ICG. *Devolution in Pakistan: Reform or Regression*, p4

Structure Under Zia Ul Haq LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM



Source: Cheema, et. al 2004, pp.33.

No significant modifications were witnessed under Zia ul Haq's Local government system. Local councils were run by appointed administrators: civil servants on behalf of elected governments. However, the conflict remained between provincial and local governments during the 1990s resulting in no existence of a local government system in the country.

CHAPTER THREE

POLITICS OF LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT IN LAKKI MARWAT KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA

3.1 GEOGRAPHY AND ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA

Khyber Pakhtun khuwa (KP) earlier named North Western Frontier Post (NWFP) had its territorial presence from the Himalayas in the north to deserts in the South. There, it shares borders with Balochistan and Punjab. On its Western side, there exist Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and later Afghanistan. It has an area of 74,521 sq. km. the province can be alienated into two zones in terms of geography: the northern one starting from Hindukush ranges to the borders of the Peshawar basin. And the southern one from Peshawar to Derajat basin. The northern side is cold and freezing owing to snowy winters and including heavy rainfall and wonderful summers with exceptional cases to Peshawar basin which is hot in summer season and cold in winter. It has reasonable rainfall.

Earlier NWFP was administered through seven divisions and FATA. The divisions were,

- Malakand division,
- Hazara division,
- Mardan division.
- Peshawar division,
- Kohat division,
- Banu division, and
- D.I.Khan division

After seven divisions of the province, it has twenty-four district administrative units as well. It also has fifty-four municipal administrations. The district administrations are further segregated into Tehsil and town municipal administrations. Overall, the province is alienated into thirty-four Tehsil Municipal Administration and four Town Municipal administrations.

It was October 1999 when the elected government of then prime minister Nawaz Sharif was de-throned through a military coup d'état. The military government laid by Pervaiz Musharraf soon after taking control decided to get the public in his favor. To this, he along with his military leadership announced a seven points agenda to deal with so-called bad governance in the country and give it a new road of progress.

3.2 MUSHARRAF'S SEVEN POINTS AGENDA

Musharraf's seven agenda was based on the following points,

- Guaranteeing law and order and providing quick justice.
- Re-establishing nation's confidence and prestige.
- Devolving power to grass root levels.
- Consolidation of the federation and erasing enter provincial conflicts.
- Quick and across the board accountability.
- De-politicizing state institutions.
- Stimulating and re-building investor confidence⁷².

3.3 FORMATION OF THE NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION BUREAU (NRB)

The NRB was established to redesign political stature and service structures. It had to be done by devolving power like decentralization of administrative authority, enablement of citizens, de-concentration of professional functions and devolution of financial power to the local government along with a check and balance system. it was owing to breaking the power authority relationship. The seventeenth amendment to the 1973 constitution blessed the local government system with six years of protection. Meanwhile, in this tenure, no alterations could be made to the local government system introduced by the seventeenth amendment⁷³.

3.4 NATURE OF POWER DEVOLUTION

“Pakistan's military government introduced a campaign for political devolution in 2000 that it said was at military transferring administrative and financial power to local governments. The

⁷²Paracha, Saad Abdullah. *Devolution Plan in Pakistan: Context, Implementation, and Issues*, (Europe: Open Society Institute, 2003)

⁷³ Mezzera, Macro et.al. *Devolution row: An assessment of Pakistan's 2001 Local Government Ordinance*, (Netherlands: Conflict resolution unit, 201the 0)

the scheme was to fortify local control and accountability. According to President Pervaiz Musharraf, it was to empower the impoverished”⁷⁴

3.5 POLITICAL DEVOLUTION

Pervaiz Musharraf introduced his local government set up from the centre in this way he followed the footprints of president Ayub Khan. Contrary, Zia ul Haq had introduced a local government system through the provincial government. Musharraf introduced LG systems across the country via a single Sindh/ Balochistan/Punjab/ KP LG ordinance 2001 this was added to four provincial ordinances issued by the four governors of the provinces. In this way provincial legislative bodies were bypassed which was against the spirit of federalism. Multiple initiatives were adopted to increase the representation of disadvantaged groups adult franchise was decreased from 21 to 18 so that youth can participate in the electoral system. 1/3 seats were reserved for women everywhere at all three power structures this was experienced in Lakki Marwat as well. The woman from remote areas was provided with opportunities to take part in the power structures of the two union councils of Lakki Marwat.

Also, Musharraf sustained the policy of non-party LG elections to manipulate the results at tehsil and district levels and shelter many Nazim seats for the party, PML (Q) for his government. Moreover, the LGs could still be indiscriminately sacked by the provinces and there was no constitutional prerequisite for instantaneous elections after untimely termination or close of tenure. Furthermore, provincial Chief Ministers could detach district Nazims with the consent of the provincial assembly including the KP assembly on some ambiguous grounds like the Nazim acting against the public policy or interest of the people or being mortified of delinquency.

3.6 ADMINISTRATIVE DEVOLUTION

It is a body of policies that deliver the administration and transfer of social services like education, health, social welfare, or housing to local governments. Administrative decentralization may embrace the transfer of decision-making authority over these policies, but it is conditional.

⁷⁴ The executive summary, *Devolution reforms or regression in Pakistan*, (Brussels: the crisis group.org), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-Asia/Pakistan/devolution-Pakistan-reform-or-regression-0>

Under the Musharraf LG plan, districts were given unordinary administrative powers across the LG setups of the country. In this regard, district lakki Marwat was no exceptional case. The said district had enjoyed the same kind of administrative powers in its domain which were enjoyed by other districts of KP in the province during Musharraf's tenure. To meet his seven points agenda and get the masses to support in his favour, he devolved following administrative powers to district governments across the country including Lakki Marwat.

Agriculture	Fisheries, Forest, Livestock, Soil Fertility, Farm water management, Soil Conservation, and Agriculture
Education	Special education, Technical education, Girls schools, Boys schools, Colleges other than professionals, and Sports education
Health	Population welfare, District and Tehsils (HQ) hospitals, Child and woman health, Basic and rural health, and Public health
District coordination	Human resource management, Coordination, and civil defense
Community development	Registration office, Labour, community organization, Sports and culture, Cooperatives, and Social welfare
Finance and planning	Investment promotion, Enterprise, Finance and budgeting, Planning and development, Accounts, and Enterprise.
Law	Environment, Drafting and legal advice.
Literacy	Vocational education, literacy campaign, and Continuing education
Works and services	Energy and Transport, Spatial planning and development, Districts roads and buildings
Revenue	Excise and taxation, Land revenue and estate
Information technology	Information technology promotion, database, and information technology development

Enterprise and investment promotion	Investment promotion and protection, cottage, small and medium sized enterprise promotion, Industrial estates and technological parks
Public Transport	Engineering and parking, traffic planning, public transportation and mass transit, passenger and freight transit terminals.

Source: Rid, Dr. Saeed & Murtaza, Dr. Nazir⁷⁵

The colonial model of inclusive bureaucratic control over the local government system that had only received minor impediments in the Zia ul Haq era received far greater setbacks in the Musharraf era. The posts of assistant commissioner, deputy commissioner, and commissioner vanished that used to enjoy executive, judicial, and revenue functions in tehsil, district, and divisions under Zia ul Haq's tenure. "Instead, a new office of District Coordination Officer (DCO) was created to head the bureaucratic administration in a district and coordinate with the elected district Nazim. The DCOs and the appointed district administrative staff under them were made to work under the district Nazim who could write Nazim's ACR and could appoint and remove a DCO with the approval of the district council. The DCO did not enjoy magisterial and legal powers as they were allocated to the lower judiciary under LGO 2001 and the police oversight powers were also now transferred directly to the district Nazim."⁷⁶

3.7 FISCAL DEVOLUTION

It means a clan of policies formulated to ameliorate the revenues or fiscal autonomy of sub-national or local governments. An enhancement of transfers from the central government, the establishment of new subnational taxes, and the delegation of tax authority are vital examples of fiscal decentralization. "First, decentralization programs encourage institutional intelligibility and transparency in budgeting only if expenditure matches resources at the sub-national level and sub-national governments are dedicated to fiscal discipline. Second, an effective decentralization program is also based largely on the subnational readiness of expertise without which those governments cannot grip amplified resources and guarantee operative expenditure management. Third, although there is evidence that locally provided services are likely to cost less than centrally provided services, effective decentralization requires significant local

⁷⁵ Rid, Dr. Saeed Ahmed & Murtaza, Dr. Nazeer. *Undermining the Local Governance: A review of the Sindh Local Government System 2013*, (Karachi: PILER), p19

⁷⁶ Rid, Dr. Saeed Ahmed et. al. *Undermining the Local Governance: A review of the Sindh Local Government System 2013*, p19

administration capacity and locally responsive and responsible officials with substantial discretionary financial control to deliver services. Fourth, the potential, for improving the institutional framework for macro-economic policy can only be realized provided that careful attention is paid to the design of the institution”⁷⁷

3.8 FISCAL AUTONOMY

“When raising taxes, the highest autonomy corresponds to full decision-making power on the tax base and tax rate. The lowest autonomy corresponds to conditional grants, where the centre keeps control not only of the number of revenues but also of the use of resources. For example, tax sharing implies a great degree of fiscal autonomy than grants and provides a positive incentive to local governments to protect the base. Under tax sharing, however, local governments generally cannot set tax rates and are left with little revenue-raising power. Even when there is a high degree of autonomy, especially where financial markets are not fully developed, the central government may need to coordinate the fiscal stance of local governments to secure macroeconomic stability”⁷⁸

Under the Provincial Local Government Ordinances (LGOs) of 2001 (measures safeguarded by Schedule VI of the Constitution) which regulate local government systems and provincial-local relationships, administrative and financial authority concerning the delivery of prime social services (e.g., basic health care, schooling, municipal functions such as sanitation and drinking water facilities) has been devolved to lower order of government. Meanwhile, there was a discrepancy between the responsibilities dispensed to them and the financial resources accessible to them to execute said duties.⁷⁹ Keeping all the multifaceted challenges in his mind, Pervaiz Musharraf devolved as many fiscal powers to district councils as possible under the banner of his modernization and local government process. This could also be witnessed in district Lakki Marwat. The earlier experience of LGs in Lakki Marwat had been less praised compared to the Musharraf plan of LG in 2001. It was because the LBs were much more autonomous.

And people from less advantaged groups were part of this system. This caused many things to happen which were different from the early experiences of LGs in Lakki Marwat. This

⁷⁷ Mansoor, Ali. And Drummond, Paulo. *Macroeconomic Management and the Devolution of Fiscal powers*, (New York: IMF working paper, 2002). P6

⁷⁸ Mansoor, Ali et.al, *Macroeconomic Management and the Devolution of Fiscal powers*, p7

⁷⁹ Kardar, Shahid. *Local Government Finance in Pakistan Post 2001*. (Lahore: The Lahore Journal of Economics)

the fact could be understood from the following table which illustrates the range and number of fiscal powers that were devolved to the LGs under the Musharraf era.

UNION COUNCIL	TEHSIL / TOWN COUNCIL	CITY / DISTRICT COUNCIL
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fee for licensing of professions and vocations. • Registration fee for births, marriages and deaths. • Charges for services rendered by UC. Union • Rate for remuneration of Village and Neighborhood guards. • Rate for the maintenance of any work of public utility • Rent for land, buildings, machine and vehicles. • Collection charges for recovery of any tax on behalf of other Governments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local tax on services. • Fee on sale in animal markets. • Market fees. • Tax on transfer of immovable property • Fee for public events organized by the Town. • Fee for licenses or permits and penalties or fines for violations. • Collection charges for recovery of any tax on behalf of other Governments • Fee on cinemas and shows. • Rent for land, building, machines and vehicles. • Fees for specific services. • Property taxes • Fee on approving building plans. • Tax on vehicles other than those registered in Town. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Education tax. • Health tax. • Local rate on lands assessable to land revenue. • Fees on educational and health facilities maintained by the District. • Fee for licenses or permits and penalties or fines for violations. • Fees for specific services rendered • Collection charges for recovery of tax on behalf of other Governments • Toll on roads, bridges, ferries within District, other than national/provincial highway • Rent for land, buildings, machinery and vehicles. • Fee for public events organized by the District

SOURCE: RID, DR. SAEED & MURTAZA, DR. NAZIR⁸⁰

3.9 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN LAKKI MARWAT

The provincial governments enacted the local government ordinance 2001 in their respective provinces after this three-tiered local government structure at union, tehsil, and district levels was established on 14 august 2001. This also included district lakki marwat of KP. To engage as many people as possible in community development grass-root organizations like village councils, neighbourhood councils, Citizen Community Boards were structured. Ordinance number No. XIV of 2001 in KP defines the structure functioning of the LG system.

3.10 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF ZILA COUNCIL

A Zila council of Unions in each district had all union nazims in the districts with the changing number of unions in each district the number of seats in the zila council varied across the province

⁸⁰ Rid, Dr. Saeed Ahmed et. al. *Undermining the Local Governance: A review of the Sindh Local Government System 2013*, p2

the Zila council had 33% of reserved seats for women 5% for workers and minority communities.⁸¹ The union councilors and union Nazim of the district were electoral colleges for indirect election of zila Nazim naib zila Nazim as joint candidates and the reserved seats of district councils in lakki marwat. The qualification was set at a minimum of a secondary school certificate or equivalent for Zila Nazim and naib nazim⁸².

The functions of the Zila council in Lakki Marwat included.

- Development plans,
- Code of conduct committee,
- Approval of taxes,
- Annual budgets,
- Insaaf committee,
- Election of monitoring committees' sports and culture committee,
- Zila accounts committee,
- Adaptation of method for disabled, old, abused, sick etc.

The functions authorized nazims and naib nazims of union councils and district councils to have travelling and daily expenses from local funds in Lakki Marwat.⁸³

3.11 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF TEHSIL COUNCIL

The Tehsil council was based on naib union Nazim of all the unions in the tehsil including members elected on reserved seats i.e., minority and woman, peasant and workers.⁸⁴ Union councilors from Tehsil elected the Tehsil Nazim and naib tehsil Nazim as joint candidates. Academic qualification of these two was set secondary school certificate is equivalent, for further general seats of Tehsil Council had thirty-three percent for woman, five percent peasants/workers or five percent for minorities in district Lakki Marwat there are two tehsil councils.⁸⁵

Functions of the tehsil council in lucky marwat included,

- Approval of fees,

⁸¹ Government of Pakistan, *The Local Government Book*, (Islamabad: NRB, 2002) p101

⁸² Dawn, *Local Government Plan 2000*, (Islamabad: The dawn, August 2000).

⁸³ Article 39, *North-West Frontier Province Local Government Ordinance, 2001*

⁸⁴ Government of Pakistan, *The Local Government Book*, p65

⁸⁵ Article 65, *North West Frontier Province Local Government Ordinance, 2001*

- Taxes,
- Fees,
- Fines,
- Penalties set by tehsil municipal administration,
- Election of monitoring committees,
- Approval of development plans,
- Insaaf committee,
- Tehsil accounts committee of the Tehsil Council,
- Monitoring performance of the Tehsil municipal administration.⁸⁶

3.12 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF UNION COUNCIL

The Union council depended on twenty-one members. All the members of the Union Council in Lakki Marwat were directly elected on adult franchises. It was the structure of power where the democratic electoral system was experienced in the Musharraf period. At this lower tier of power structure seats of the Union, the council was divided into different categories these categories including minority seats women seats and worker-peasant seats.

There were twelve Muslim seats which had four reserved seats for women, and there were six seats allocated to workers or peasants that had reserved seats for a woman as well. In this way women were encouraged to take part in the local government system in Musharraf's time among 18 union councillors at least there were six-woman members seats other than this which three in number were of union Nazim, the naib union Nazim and one reserved seat for the minority.⁸⁷

The functions of union councils were as below:

- Formulation and functioning of citizen community boards (CCBs),
- Community engagement in development works via the CCBs,
- Assistance to the district government, tehsil municipal administration, and town municipal administration for the achievement of socio-economic development and betterment of services,
- Election of various committees such as,

⁸⁶ Article 66-67-A, *North-West Frontier Province Local Government Ordinance, 2001*

⁸⁷ Article 87, *North-West Frontier Province Local Government Ordinance, 2001*

- Monitoring committees,
- Code of conduct committee,
- Insaaf committee,
- Union account committee,
- Assistance to tehsil and town council in the formation of village and neighbourhood council.⁸⁸

3.13 VILLAGE AND NEIGHBORHOOD COUNCIL IN LAKKI MARWAT

Village in the best political and democratic unit where participation of every adult is observed neighborhood councils are the replica of the village council. The former exists in urban areas while the latter came under the domain of rural areas. The union was the lowest order of local government where there exists public participation in full zeal that consisted of village or neighborhood councils and citizen community boards. In this regard, the center of public participation under the union lies in the village or neighborhood council.⁸⁹ The number of representatives in the village or neighborhood council was five to eleven each all these seats reserved for the woman was one and one for peasants and workers. The chairman of the village or neighborhood council was elected by its members. Directions of the elections for the village or neighborhood council came through district government to tehsil municipal administration and town municipal administration in Lakki Marwat.⁹⁰

The village or neighborhood council played a mediatory role between the people and the union. The village and neighborhood council were the body where the public mindset was made proactive from reactive. The functions of the village or neighborhood council were as below.

- Sanitation,
- Water supply,
- Utilizing voluntary resources,
- Caring for public buildings,
- Establishing cooperatives for economic betterment,
- Parks,

⁸⁸ Article 88, *North West Frontier Province Local Government Ordinance, 2001*

⁸⁹ Government of Pakistan, *The Local Government Book*, p49

⁹⁰ Article 94-95, *North-West Frontier Province Local Government Ordinance, 2001*

- Playgrounds and,
- Public streets,
- Promotion of tree plantation,
- Beautifying village and neighborhood,
- Assisting the union council in the conduct of serves,
- Land revenue collection and marking encroachment,
- Raising funds for welfare works,
- Services for the worth of the CCBs for the development of municipal and community welfare facilities.⁹¹

The village or neighborhood council perform all those functions which improved public lives and society by not tracing passing its set limit and functions. The village or neighborhood council eased the functions of the citizen community board. It also engaged the community concerning civic projects and services under the domain of citizen community boards. The level of completion of the project and the aims and objectives of village or neighborhood councils were based on leadership and community participation.⁹²

3.14 CITIZEN COMMUNITY BOARDS (CCBS)

The Citizen Community boards were designed to have changed society. The institution was established having the soul aim of organizing and ensuring proactive rudiments of the society. Also, it provided options for community engagement in public works.⁹³ The institution gave space to all those individuals who wished to work voluntarily for the progress of society. The local government ordinance of Musharraf not only accentuated but also facilitated the achievement of their motives by offering maximum funds to projects by citizen community boards.⁹⁴

The institution of citizen community board (CCBs) was the body of volunteer and non-elected members of the society it consisted of a general body having all its members which were to elect its chairman, executive committee and the secretary of the board for performing its functions.

⁹¹ Article 96-97, *North West Frontier Province Local Government Ordinance, 2001*

⁹² Government of Pakistan, *The Local Government Book*, p51

⁹³ Government of Pakistan, *The Local Government Book*, p125

⁹⁴ Government of Pakistan, *The Local Government Book*, p125

The institution of CCBs raised its funds from voluntary contributions gifts, grants, and donations the institution of citizen community board also developed an atmosphere where people from different categories arranged and managed development projects in society.⁹⁵ The citizen community board created avenues for all those people who are interested in various kinds of social political and economic activities. The primary function of the citizen community board in lakki marwat was to activate the community for the betterment of delivery of services, for the development and welfare of disadvantaged and poor people.⁹⁶ The institution of citizen community boards gave birth to a positive environment where citizens participated by heart. The institution was designed to improve service delivery, help deserving, widows, poor, and families in grave poverty. It also scrutinized the working of hospitals, schools, health units, irrigation, and transport. The board performed its responsibilities enclose coordination with the monitoring committees of the union council in Lakki Marwat.⁹⁷

3.15 MUSALIHAT ANJUMAN (RECONCILIATION COMMITTEE)

One of the primary objectives of the local government system is to address public issues within the district the mechanism of this approach exist in the LG system so that people could have access to quick justice and solution to their problems in a limited time.⁹⁸ In every union council including the UCs of Lakki Marwat, had the Insaaf committees. The mechanism of musalehat Anju man lied under Insaaf committee which after consulting union Nazim and other union council members was produced. The body of Anjuman had three Musclemen (conciliators), that were selected from union residents.⁹⁹ Responsibilities of Musalehat Anjuman were peaceful settlement of disputes within union councils through mediation, conciliation and arbitration.¹⁰⁰ It worked as an informal body to dispense justice and decide conflicting matters within union councils so that tussle could be avoided.

⁹⁵ Government of Pakistan, *The Local Government Book*, p126

⁹⁶ Article 98, *North West Frontier Province Local Government Ordinance, 2001*

⁹⁷ Dawn, *Local Government Plan 2000*,

⁹⁸ Government of Pakistan, *The Local Government Book*, p44

⁹⁹ Government of Pakistan, *The Local Government Book*, p44

¹⁰⁰ Article 102-103, *North West Frontier Province Local Government Ordinance, 2001*

3.16 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF THE CITY DISTRICT


The city district was a naïve order which had greater resources for the provision of municipal services at the macro level and accomplish all residence demands within its jurisdiction.¹⁰¹ the city district was divided into towns and unions as the unions were based on neighborhood councils in the urban areas and village councils in rural areas within the district. The functions of the city district were multilevel planning culture business municipal works like land water waste and civil defence planning such as transport and promoting investment. The town council under the city district had a Nazim, a naib Nazim, and a town council like a tehsil in any district with the same electoral system. The functions of the town council included,

- management and regulation of service delivery in municipal affairs,
- development of unions,
- monitoring,
- zoning control and
- land use and other functions were,
- execution of rules and regulations,
- environmental loss,
- supply of water sanitation and sewerage,
- construction and maintenance of streets and roads,
- development and maintenance of public libraries, and
- growth of commercial centres.¹⁰²

¹⁰¹ Government of Pakistan, *The Local Government Book*, p162

¹⁰² Government of Pakistan, *The Local Government Book*, p1169-171

Structure of Local Government under Musharraf era in Lakki Marwat, KP



Pakistan: Annex-I, July 2004, p8

CHAPTER FOUR

RELATIONS OF POLITICS AND BUREAUCRACY IN LOCAL SELF- GOVERNMENT

4. INTRODUCTION

The majority of the administration in the modern period was run by two key actors; politicians, who approach supremacy through community votes and selected bureaucrats. Bureaucracy-Politics' next of kin determines the potency of authenticity in a country. Pakistan, person a self-governing country, promote local government in every province and emphasizes that the political, organizational, and fiscal farm duty be devolved to the local fine governance at home point particularly country similar to Pakistan where an official who jobs for middle and provincial governments do not make available proficient government because they don't have the compulsory acquaintance of local relationships. Notwithstanding the information that Local Government institutions provide as micro-manager, upper bureaucracy has attempted to grow weaker local chosen bodies. The intervention of bureaucracy is one of the key challenges in the way of well-organized and answerable local management in Pakistan. though in the governance organization bureaucracy has been gain a derogatory status by associating it with red-tapism, a dishonest organization, a standing mineral that mechanism with it possess homogeneous rules and guideline, going next to reforms in its organization and prevent those who struggle investment them answerable (Ejersbo & Svava, 2012)¹⁰³. An appealing fact about Local Government is that. Three major reforms have also been introduced by the force's regime. Even though the constitution of Pakistan documented local government as the third level of the government, there are a few noticeable trends that point out that supremacy is yet to be devolved to Local Government. Such as revisiting of District Commissioner, transmission of the function of Local Government to the provincial administration, provincial management disinclination to get ahead of Local Government laws (Shafqat, 2014)¹⁰⁴ consequently, this research principally delves into the life of Local Self-Government. It investigates the next questions: What was the key difference in the arrangement and work of art of local governments in the Musharraf and PakistanTehrek-e-Insaf era? Which were the powers and functions that every one government has devolved to its local government? What was the natural history of authority decentralization?

¹⁰³ Ejersbo, N., & Svava, J. H. (2012). *Bureaucracy and Democracy in Local Government*. Oxford University Press.

¹⁰⁴ Shafqat, S. (2014, January 29). Local Government Act 2013 and Province-Local Government relations. *Development Advocate Pakistan*. *Development Advocate Pakistan*, pp. 4- 9.

in Musharraf and Pakistan Tehrek-e-Insaf government? What was the purposeful position of the Local Government in Lakki Marwat? This research is a challenge to conclude hypothetical model perspectives from obtainable journalism on politics-bureaucracy relationships and recognize “dichotomy” and “support” as the main two models of the hypothetical perspective.

Table 1: The Theoretical Framework for Politics-bureaucracy Relations

Theoretical Models	Principal Characteristics	Governance Attributes
Dichotomy	I. Self-governing duties II. Political impartiality III. Specialized capability	I. Political power II. Self-governing responsibility III. Together is professional IV. A smaller amount of Politicization V. Mechanistic communication
Mutuality	I. Overlaps Roles/Duties II. Political association of Bureaucrats III. Political openness	I. Mostly routine Domination II. Joint liability III. Bureaucrats are specialized IV. More Politicization V. Mutual Interaction
Symbiosis	I. Separate Roles/Duties with Complementarily II. Political Neutrality III. Mutual admiration with Self- Identity	I. Mutual command II. Shared responsibility III. Both are Professional IV. Less Politicization Shared and Balance V. Pressure

source: Assumed from (Rahman, 2015)

Pakistan is a centralized republic with three tiers of government: national, provincial and local. Local government is secluded by the constitution in Articles 32 and 140- A and every one province to has its local-government-enabling legislation and ministry accountable for accomplishment. District councils and municipal corporations are correspondingly the uppermost countrysides and urban tier of local government in the provinces. together urban and rural local governments have two or three tiers in all provinces except for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where the council are not acknowledged as moreover urban or rural. There are 128 district councils transversely to the four provinces, 620 urban councils complete up of one city district, four urban corporations, 13 community corporations, 96 municipal committees, 149 town councils, 361 urban union committees, and 1,926 rural councils. In addition, there are 3340 neighbourhoods, ‘Tehsil’ and village councils in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Aptitude to lift local proceeds varies according to

provincial legislation. District councils and city corporations have important household tasks, often together with the moreover superior provincial government for policing (union guards), learning, healthcare, roads and local financial development or with subordinate levels of local government for water and cleanliness, museums and libraries and ecological defence.

4.1 COMPOSITION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

4.1.1 Local self-government inside the state

The local government system is based on the federated structures of three rank systems of the district (Zillah), tehsil and union councils. Both levels have clear functions and repair household tasks. There is a centre on crop growing, group of people growth, teaching and wellbeing at the district stage municipal communications armed services at the Tehsil level; and community-based services at the union level. The levels of government are incorporated from side to side a bottom-up preparation organization, the council electoral preparations and precise measures for monitoring overhaul delivery. Where there has not been a local government election, the management of each district is assigned to a selected district superintendent.

4.1.2 Ministerial oversight

At the central level, the department of put in the ground Provincial harmonization.^{3b} provides a coordination role. Though local governments are fashioned by the provinces and therefore ministerial misunderstanding rests with local government departments at the provincial level. All departments are headed by a provincial preacher of local government.

4.1.3 Council types

District councils and municipal corporations are the maximum layers of local government, at the same time both urban and rural local governments have two or three tiers in every one of the provinces excluding Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, anywhere councils are neither urban or rural (Table 32.1a).

4.1.4 District councils: There are 128 district council's crossways the five provinces.

4.1.5 Urban councils: There are 2,056 urban councils completed up of one metropolis district, four-city corporations, 23 public corporations, 281 municipal committees, 148 town councils and 1,599 union committees.

4.1.6 Rural councils: There are 8,146 rural councils: 167 District councils and 7,980 union councils.

4.1.7 Cantonment boards: 57 armed cantonments are enduring stationed areas,

readministered by Cantonment Boards beneath the manager of the forces Lands & Cantonments section (MLCD), office of Defense, Cantonments are reputable underneath and governed by the Cantonments Act, 1923. There are 43 cantonment boards somewhere narrow government elections were held in 2015.

4.2. ELECTIONS

4.2.1 Recent local elections

Elections were held in Baluchistan in 2013 and 2015 in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh and Punjab as vigorous as in cantonment areas.

4.2.2 Voting system Every local election employs the first-past-the position arrangement.

4.2.3 Elected representatives in District council (UC's) members in Lakki Marwat

District	General	Women	Peasants/Workers	Minorities	Youth	Total
Lakki Marwat	33	11	2	2	2	50

Source: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa act 2013

4.2.4 WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION

In the elections in 2013 and 2015, more or less 19.6% of councillors were women. There is a condition for women councillors: 33% in Baluchistan, 22% in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh, 15% in Punjab. In the 2013 Baluchistan home council elections, 2,335 out of 7,169 councillors were women: 2,332 employed held in reserve seats and three via non-reserved chairs. In the 2015 cantonment elections, 2 out of 199 seating were won by women, and the 33% condition was not implemented.

4.3. ORGANISED LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

4.3.1 National local government association

There is right now no official national local self-government friendship in Pakistan. Other than, a new national dead body to endorse the local democratic system, the relationship for the Development of Local Government (ADLG), is an organism set up.

Table:3 distributions of councils and populations

Balochistan	32	0	1	4	53	-	-	58	32	635	667	-	-	-	757	7	12,344,408	72.4
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa*	26	1	0	0	-	4	-	509	69	2,835	2,904	504	69	2,835	3,439	10	30,523,371	91.2
Punjab	36	0	1	11	184	-	634	930	35	3,281	3,316	-	-	-	36	26	110,012,442	73.3
Sindh**	29	0	1	9	37	144	360	551	24	1,126	1,150	-	-	-	1,730	10	30,439,893	48.0
FATA***	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	5,001,676	97.2	
Gilgit Baltistan	6	0	0	0	6	0	0	6	6	102	108	-	-	-	120	2	-	n.a
Islamabad CT	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	-	-	-	0	2,006,572	49.4	
Total	129	1	4	24	280	148	1598	2055	166	7979	8145	504	69	2835	9398	56	190328362	73.6

Foundation: compiled by CLGF from the 2017 poll

4.3.1.2 BUREAUCRACY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The position of the Local government is significant as the meticulous benefit dishonesty in its aptitude to systematize for the liberation of local community military in column with local flavours and preferences. A lot of countries in the centre East, America, Asia, Africa, North America and Europe nearby four key reasons for empowering Local government at the local level (Sikander, 2015)¹⁰⁵. Local bodies are simple to arrive at for each ordinary inhabitant and local programs and armed forces can be attuned according to the precise require the group of people. Narrow bodies can apportion the capital in the majority competent way. Local citizens' willpower uses currency in an additional competent way if they are known admission to growth development expenditures. It resolves helps in plummeting the price also. The local government serves as a display place for locals to contribute to managerial. This intelligence of tenure makes the locals prepared in investing their period and possessions in

¹⁰⁵ Siddiq, A. (2007). *Military Inc.* Pakistan: Pluto Press. Sikander, T. (2015). *A Theoretical Framework of Local*

expansion projects. Noting the natural world of technical pressure in mounting countries, (Riggs, 1962)¹⁰⁶, mentions that the command of the system of government in the government of mounting countries will be elevated outstanding to the feeble following organs.

4.3.1.3 BUREAUCRACY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT RELATIONS

Pakistan is born its system of government from its conurbation, so its arrangement was moulded to hand rounds the British attention. Therefore, the managerial bureaucrat didn't prove sympathetic in manufacturing the recently conventional state stable (Kennedy, 1988). In 1947, Pakistan's appearance as an autonomous state was so astounding and unexpected that for the first decade (1947 – 1958) Pakistan, "at the same time as hypothetically a parliamentary democratic organization was wrinkled by a group of junior common servant with the military as for children collaborator" (Group, 2010). As a result, this oligarchy of the system of government and armed didn't let any supporting revelry found and run the government democratically (Ashutosh, 2009)¹⁰⁷. Before in arrange to control India, the British strengthen its condition bureaucracy, so as was the prototype of ascendancy in the resulting time where the manager of the condition was in the handover of martial and government. Observing the talking of over governor-Generaleral of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, at administration House in Peshawar, April 14, 1948 (Ali, 1983)¹⁰⁸ renowned that Mohammad Ali Jinnah was clandestinely needy on bureaucrats as he optional bureaucrats in this talking not to be prejudiced by government. According to researchers similar (Kennedy, 1988), this addiction was due to feeble the following structure of Pakistan. The cause for the preeminence of the system of management in political affairs was their knowledge of the painting of ascendancy which the politicians didn't have (Ahmed, 1980). The bureaucrat is so commanding and dependable that, with the Governor-General and omnipotent sanctioned officials, over and over again discharges Prime Minister, the breakfront and the national and provincial legislatures (Leftwich, 1993). One of the celebrated bureaucrats of that point was Ghulam Muhammad, the third governor-general, who launched the first legitimate assaults on the legislature by discharging Prime Minister Khawaja Nizamuddin. Ayub Khan, the commandant was

¹⁰⁶ Riggs, F. (1962). *Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View*. Bloomington.

¹⁰⁷ Ashutosh, M. (2009). Saving democracy from the Democrats in Pakistan. *AIIA Policy Commentary*, 21-31.

¹⁰⁸ Ali, T. (1983). *Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State*. Bungay Suffolk: Richard Clay (The Chaucer Press) Ltd.

also selected by Ghulam Muhammad as protection minister, which was all formalizing the entrance of the army into political affairs (Group, 2010).

4.2.1.2 DISTORTIONS AND CONFLICTS IN POLITICS AND LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

Not astonishingly, given the innermost propensity acknowledged above, non-representative designers of local government electoral processes have habitually placed a succession of boundaries on prearranged political illustration, which has indistinct electoral antagonism at the local level. Nearly everyone tremendous restraint was placed for the duration of the early British epoch when local government members were designated by the centre, a regulation calculated to chip away at local electoral opposition. Every military government, as well as the in-progress regime, have necessary local government elections to be held on a non-party foundation. A to be expected object of this determination has been to grow weaker the attendance of disagreement political parties on the local stage. Under the Zia government, winning candidates with a Pakistan People's Party (PPP) relationship were prohibited on different pretexts in the 1979 narrow bodies' elections (Wilder 1999). Similarly, fresh press reports point out that candidates with antagonistic social gathering affiliations, who were victorious in Southern Punjab and pastoral Sindh, were under pressure to take out their party affiliations. Antagonist politicians have interpreted these interventions as resources to generate a challenging class of two-way politicians and to grow weaker the base of political parties on the provincial stage. Historical proof suggests that the importance of Zia's non-party based narrow elections has been the turnaround of a more universalistic foundation of the political collection, which had emerged with the superiority of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in the seventies, consequential in the localization of political affairs (Wilder 1999). Supplementary to this localization has been a personalization of political principles with local clientelistic rudiments introduced even at provincial and state levels. While such benefaction is to be predictable in local political affairs where the elected official is to be expected to be in undeviating and customary contact with his constituents, because Zia's consequent local and state elections were based on promoting these same restricted politicians, local client list benefaction also became an imperative element at advanced levels of ascendancy. Substantiation of this was the foreword of out of the ordinary "development grants" awarded to members of provincial

and national assemblies, whereby these politicians possibly will and did distribute public merchandise at tremendously localized levels in arrange to make happy their supporters. More considerably, the non-party foundation of local government elections has habitually ended up deteriorating political linkage sandwiched between elected provincial governments, which have tended to be get-together based, and local governments. supporting parties, when in government at the provincial stage, have tended to observe local governments as an opposing tier of 'patronage' (Wilder 1999) and as a consequence they have not made any effort for empowering the local government organization. If no matter which, *they have tended to hang up and/or put an end to established local governments when in supremacy*. Therefore, each chosen government that has followed the military regimes that introduced local governments, has at the very smallest amount unobserved these local governments and over and over again suspended them on the whole. This aggressive relationship between local and provincial governments also arises for the reason that local government reforms are supposed as a way to grow weaker the ability and the liberation functions assigned to provincial politicians devoid of a proportionate compensation in the form of decentralization of powers and possessions from the centralized to the provincial height. These provincial- local government tensions have finely tuned during the present reform pere middle other reasons this is since no effort was made to put together political possession of these reforms in the middle of elected provincial governments. This is in fraction because local administration reforms, which represented a major relocation of provincial functions and possessions to the local stage, were enacted aforementioned to the organization of designated provincial governments. Local self-governments were another time legally empowered in the nonappearance of designated provincial governments, even though the information that local government is a provincial subject matter under the 1973 constitution. prearranged these times gone by and the information that the powers, powers that be and possessions of designated Members of the Provincial Assemblies (MPAs) have been appreciably curtailed by the in progress system, it is not astonishing that there is the unfortunate tenure of the local government system in the middle of provinces. In fact, in Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) there have been unlocking conflicts stuck sandwiched between the two

tiers (Manning et. al. 2003), which have been managed from beginning to end by the interference of the innermost government. Smooth in Punjab, wherever the Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam Party (PMLQ) is in supremacy, Member Provisional Assembly's (MPAs) have not tendered prevalent acceptance of the in-attendance system.

4.4 The position of the Bureaucracy

The past analysis shows that there has been a transformation in the propensity of non-representative centers to use the system of government to manage local governments. ceremonial control over local governments was nearly everyone unambiguous for the duration of the British and Ayub regime. The Zia regime loosened de jure technical control over local governments even though the deputy commissioner continued to keep hold of momentous de facto control. The Musharraf regime has furthered this trend from creation to end two resources: First, it has significantly weakened the provincial system of government by reassigning a huge percentage of their functions to designated local governments in addition to abolishing the place of work of the deputy commissioner. Second and additional outstandingly, are the answerability changes brought on the subject of by the present system whereby the provincial system of government at the local stage has been made held responsible to the chosen heads of district and tehsil governments. Therefore, a chain of command for the provincial system of government at the district level has been replaced in a de jure common sense by a pecking order at the district and tehsil levels. It requirements to be meaningful that the deteriorating of the provincial system of government is hemmed in as the provincial secretariats at a standstill retain considerable organizational authority greater than district bureaucrats (Manning et. al 2003), which at period has been used to trump the influence of the Nazim, even though the family member de jure bargaining supremacy between the district bureaucracy and the Nazim has been of the latter. This declining of technical control over local governments represents a noteworthy movement away from the earlier institution where the political hold up for the centre was harnessed from beginning to end in a coalition sandwiched between the bureaucracies and commanding rural notables at the local stage (van den Dungen 1972, Hasan 2002). The permanence of this association was reliant on the bureaucracy delivering benefaction, organizational protection and fortification of property constitutional human rights in favour of the leading

elites in village culture that, in turn, delivered political shore up and be short of political turbulence for the center. The competence of these elites to carry out these functions depended up their be in laying the blame on over terra firm and was institutionalized by the imposing and colonial-post state by according to them a mediating role sandwiched between the condition and the village in proceeds, civil and against the law matters (Hamid 1980, Hasan 2002, Rouse 1983). Speedy urbanization, green rebellion, industrialization and the increase of accumulation electoral politics for the duration of the sixties and seventies resulted in a stop working of this community and political institution. As a result of these changes, the factors that gave the local elite power long-drawn-out to include in the middle of other things there be in charge of over new sources of prosperity, their aptitude to agglomerate electoral prop up and their aptitude to offer unceremonious enforcement (Hasan 2002). More outstandingly, the authority of the new-fangled local elites was no longer completely contingent on the hold up of the system of government. This may have concentrated the ability of the bureaucracy to strap up political carry for the centre and greater than before the ability of local politicians to transport political bear even in the nonappearance of bureaucratic support. The breakdown of the conventional model is most obvious in the malfunction of the bureaucracy-local cream of the crop nexus to smooth out the Anti-Ayub accumulation of political turbulence during the late sixties and the overcome of state-backed local notables by Pakistan People's Party (PPP) candidates for the duration of the 1970 elections. As a result, the deteriorating capacity of the district bureaucracy to transport political hold up for the military and the greater than before organizational aptitude of local elites to tie together political hold up is one to be expected explanation for why the military has selected to discard the technical control model and allocate wide-ranging well-designed everyday jobs and possessions in favor of locally elected politicians.¹⁰⁹

4.5.3 RURAL VS. URBAN BIAS

Our study shows that the physically powerful rural bias intrinsic in the British and Ayub periods was in part the wrong way up by Zia-ul-Haq at the local point. However. Zia's predetermined notion towards built-up areas has distorted again with the taking away of

¹⁰⁹, while the military has made the provincial district and service delivery bureaucracy more accountable, not created similar accountabilities for the Police, which remains out of the purvey of the Devolution Plan.

the urban-rural difference in local governments below Musharraf. In common, these recurring changes come into view to reflect the political decision of the non-representative center at meticulous historical junctures on the subject of the relevant political residents that need to be accommodated to transport sustained political grip at the local point. The political conclusion is weighed by the mathematical importance of inhabitants and they say that the capability of mobilized groups to impress heavy political and distraction costs on the condition. For example, the Punjab convention of the British reflects the conclusion that village proprietors had to be politically accommodated for they unaccompanied combined the necessary numerical power with influence in the rural social order (van den Dungen 1972) for reason that Punjab's rural areas had emerged as the major recruiting position for the British military. The rural foregone conclusion under Ayub is also a reflection of his electoral and political prop up base, which came from the rural areas of West Pakistan (Rizvi 1976). In the same way, we have revealed that Zia's local government reforms required to provide somewhere to stay in Punjab's politically mobilized metropolitan middle classes, whose increasing income, political power and demonstration ability, an outcome of the socio-demographic changes that had in use position during the sixties and seventies had adequately manifested itself in the anti-Bhutto PNA pressure group. The somewhere to live was achieved from the beginning end the taking part of urban local councils from rural local councils, which made the political authority of urban areas proportionate to their trade and industry authority at the local stage. What is significant is that the ruling of poles apart regimes on the subject of the political significance of rural and urban areas appears to have caused noteworthy shifts in the urban and rural preconceived notions linked with restricted public expenditure. While the reasons at the back for the turnaround of the urban bias under the in-progress reforms are not understandable, given that the before biases all reflected the altering importance of urban/rural constituents in harnessing local prop up and authority, it is to be expected that the equal reasons are at engaging in recreation. What is obvious is that the present plan has wrong way up the tendency set under the Zia organization as it has legislatively eliminated the rural-urban partition in local governments by integrating urban and rural local councils at the tehsil stage and by ensuring that a rural-urban difference is not in attendance within district government.

This turnaround is partly explained by socio-demographic changes that have been in use place because the eighties. Recent demographic employment (Ali 2002) indicates that Pakistan's main cities have emerged as main urban systems, with their rural outer edge or "peri-urban" settlements incorporated into the city economies. This observable fact is nearly everyone evident in Central Punjab's heartland where neighboring districts, comprising major cities, intermediate-sized towns and peri-urban settlements have fashioned into a noteworthy inhabitant's agglomeration that has greater than before its political and trade and industry significance (Ali 2002). supplementary importantly, the region half of this populace resides in peri-urban settlements that had not been documented as "urban" under the preceding local government organization, a governmental rule that deprived of them the right of entry to the managerial benefits connected with urban local councils such as Octopi proceeds and better liberation of municipal services.¹¹⁰ The incorporation of urban and rural councils into tehsil administrations will without doubt advantage these inhabitants by creating tehsils where the peri-urban vote is in preponderance. Similarly, reimbursement will accumulate to peri-urban areas at the district level in innermost Punjab as well both for the reason that the peri-urban union councils of these districts be in charge of over partially the union council votes in the electoral academy of the District Nazim, and because the decentralization of provincial functions to the districts ensure that the peri-urban inhabitants no longer have to struggle with the rural majority of supplementary parts of the province as it would have had to in the provincial elections. Even additional telling substantiation of this somewhere to live of peri-urban areas comes from the fashionable of Musharraf's reforms, the National Reconstruction Bureau's (NRB) have possession of documents which be familiar with that "there is urbanization in rural areas through peri-urban enlargement enveloping cities and trimming urbanization the length of roads" (NRB-Local Government Plan 2002).

fascinatingly, according to the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB), in due course, such urbanizing areas, whether they be peri-urban or tehsils towns, determined form city districts and in "the Local Government diagram the city district is compulsory to suspension bridge the urban-rural partition and make a payment to organized

¹¹⁰ Andrabi and Cheema (2003) show that these settlements have done much worse than urban councils, even the smaller less prosperous ones (Town Committees), in terms of their access to local services like potable water.

urbanization rather than the disordered situation that at this time prevails” (ibid). In general, on the other hand, the personal property of eliminating this urban-rural organizational distinction is not as purely confidential: while we argue above that in Central Punjab this was to be expected to favour per urban areas, in the more agrarian region, such as Sindh and Southern and Western Punjab (Gazdar 1999), this revolutionize is likely to advantage rural areas due to their preponderance rural vote as the comparatively inexpensively prosperous urban areas will at the present have to contribute to the reimbursement of their incomes with their rural and peri-urban hinterlands. Therefore, unlike before local governments, where the preconceived notion was unquestionably rural (British and Ayub) or urban (Zia), under Musharraf, the system is supplementary flexible in that it allocates family member power to what on earth demographic group is in preponderance in the local area.

4.6 Ayub’s Era Basic Democracies Order and Bureaucracy

The first solemn attempts to smarten up local government were completed when the military unspecified power introduce the Basic Democracies Order in 1959. This was fresh inception in the political system of Pakistan (Musarrat & Azhar, 2012). The Field Marshal Ayub Khan disbanded the nationwide and provincial assembly and set the spokesperson government at the innermost and provincial layer and stimulated the Local government arrangement of British Colony as the only spokesperson level of government. The standing given to the Basic democratic organization was the power to vote for the country’s leader and members of the National and Provincial assemblies by 80, 000 members from the lowest tier (Shafqat, 2014)¹¹². Ayyub’s system provided to the bureaucrats to make stronger their dominancy. He fashioned a pay and overhaul payment to scrutinize the arrangement of a civil overhaul as well as augment his authority in the production of the state. This organization of system of government supported two programs of martial regime, the fundamental democracy and the rural expansion program. Even though local council conventional funds to carry out the civic function, bureaucracy monopolized the commanding offices of Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner (DC), and Assistant Commissioner (AC), as well as the authority to claim superiority and smooth, suspend or rebuff the council

¹¹¹ Musarrat, R., & Azhar, M. S. (2012). Decentralization Reforms in Pakistan during Ayub and Zia Era. *Journal of Public Administration and Governance*, 123-133.

¹¹² Shafqat, S. (2014, January 29). Local Government Act 2013 and Province-Local Government relations. *Development Advocate Pakistan*. *Development Advocate Pakistan*, pp. 4- 9.

decision. The Thana councils were supervised by a bureaucrat that is to say Sub-divisional Officers (SDO) and the equivalent were with Divisional and district council (Rahman, 2015)¹¹³. “The system of government held a pot of higher deliberation. Bureaucracy dealt with the community in an bigheaded and capricious manner, the higher-ranking bureaucrats had awarded unwarranted advantages to the relatives of the President and other businessmen, numerous of them had been converted into rich at the price tag of the community that had destabilized the electoral development and had contented Ayyub’s political advisors” (Jalal, 1995).

4.7 CIVIL ARMED FORCES REFORM UNDER Z. A. BHUTTO

The first designated government in Pakistan didn’t pay any most important attention to the local self-government and didn’t grasp the local body’s elections. On the other hand, the public repair was decimated by dismissing 1,300 public servants were dismissed exceptional to their incompetency and chipping in in deceitfulness while at the identical time accountability away with a justifiable guarantee (Chaudry, 2011)¹¹⁴. Public Services reshuffle 1973 was instituted to restrain the self-government of civil arm forces and transfer it under at the bottom of being in accuse of. This reorganization introduced the move toward “lateral recruitment” which was second-hand as an instrument to politicize association. This expansion of politicization made associations dependent on politicians for their reorganization, encouragement or shift (Wilder, 2010)¹¹⁵. Bhutto’s decision-making reform also brought main changes in the association of bureaucracy. The major elite CSP cadre was abolished and was labelled as a “skilled group”. The hierarchal distribution of civil servants into four modules was supplanted by the necessary Pay Scale (BPS). Unprofessional labors” each day jobs were from 1 to 4 grades, bookkeeping per scanned 5– 15 grades, superintendent 16 grade and officers under 17 -22 pay scales or grades. The majority significant motive to reverse managerial reforms of 1973 was to create sure the ascendancy of civic excess of government. For this, the reform abolished the assurance provided by the previous constitutions to countrywide servants. Though these structural changes, these reforms are ineffective to decrease bureaucracy’s ascendancy. The elite cadre enjoyed a wide-ranging power as Bhutto’s government in the development nationalization of private sector industries and this provided management new opportunities for deceitfulness

¹¹³ Rahman, M. S. (2015, December 18). Retrieved from <https://www.uni-heidelberg.de/http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/19977/>

¹¹⁴ Chaudry, A. (2011). *Political Administrators: The Story of the Civil Service of Pakistan*. Oxford University Press.

¹¹⁵ Wilder, A. (2010). The Politics of Civil Service Reform in Pakistan. *Journal of International Affairs*, 19-37.

(Kalia, 2013)¹¹⁶. The incentive for an unmatched bureaucracy was not that organization was final, but it was everyone due to the good number of important places in a meeting by top bureaucrats.

4.7 GENERAL ZIA-UL-HAQ'S ERA

General Zia-ul-Haq's era (1969-71 and 1977-88) too made to arrange the Local government of his forerunner while keeping a federal authority. Zia introduce the Local Government order in 1979 and installed local government and instituted electoral depiction in villages (Jalal, 1995). Later than assuming authority, Zia promised conducting an election in 90 days, but it's main to note that he held local bodies elections previous to the general election in 1985. Local government elections were conducted on the non-party foundation in 1979, 1983 and 1985. Important parties like Pakistan People's Party (PPP) were also eliminated from the political stadium (Musarrat & Azhar, 2012)¹¹⁷. Local government was prearranged into the next four tiers: Town Committees, Municipal Committees, Municipal Corporations, and Metropolitan Corporations. Below the LGO 1979, Local Governments were long-drawn-out, and Deputy Commissioners were empowered (Jalal, 1995). On the other hand, (Muhammad & Yasin, 2011)¹¹⁸ dispute that unlike Ayyub's BDO the Local self-government of Zia ul Haq was more autonomous and was free from practical power, but bureaucrats acted as arbitrator due to some sections of this decree. In essence, "the army required to use its old approach of divide and regulation by creating a new and opposing class of two-way local-level politicians".

4.8 The Democratic Eras of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif Flip-flop concerning the bureaucracy sustained in the so-called independent eras of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto. A achieve and ingenious trick of this era was a politicizing system of government to merge their regime therefore the use of ploy has done irretrievable harm to a civil servant of Pakistan. Even though Pakistan is present at birth with its bureaucracy on or after the same structure as neighbor India, the civil service in India is a great deal more adaptive to independent orders (Chaudry, 2011)¹¹⁹.

4.9 Musharaf Erea: Reducing Bureaucratic command in Local Government

¹¹⁶ Kalia, S. (2013). Bureaucratic Policy Making in Pakistan. *The Dialogue*, 156-170.

¹¹⁷ Musarrat, R., & Azhar, M. S. (2012). Decentralization Reforms in Pakistan During Ayub and Zia Era. *Journal of Public Administration and Governance*, 123-133.

¹¹⁸ Muhammad, A., & Yasin, M. G. (2011). Local Governance and empowerment of marginalized groups: A case Study of BDS and LSG in Pakistan. *Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences*, 115-125.

¹¹⁹ Chaudry, A. (2011). *Political Administrators: The Story of the Civil Service of Pakistan*. Oxford University Press.

Musharraf like armed regimes installed Local Government as an instrument to consolidate the military rule. Shortly after presumptuous power in October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf, in his presidential speech to explain a “seven-point agenda”. Installing was of extraordinary concern in the middle of these seven agendas. As (Musharraf, 2006)¹²⁰ claims on the subject of true democracy, “Genuine democratic organization has to develop from the waged people upwards, not be a shove from top to down and the base of the pyramid has to be physically powerful, or else it will fall”. He additionally maintains, “A local government method that is genuinely empowered politically, managerially, and financially dishonesty at the mind of democracy because it is best prepared to understand and also to lecture to the needs and troubles of the general people”. Different from other Local governments, LGO 2001 didn’t make any hierarchical association between local and provincial administration and was free from technical control. District Nazim was the major authority in the district having all executive, trial and administrative authority and the new directorial head District harmonization Officer was also responsible to him (2008). As Musharraf, (2006) avowed in his book “This regulation did away the remnants of the colonial era, when a deputy commissioner and a superintendent of police ran districts like lords. With the caress of a pen, they were both subordinated to the designated mayor (Nazim)”. Unquestionably, this reorganization in local government was only one of its kinds of all the other reforms. The intend aimed at fighting elitism, transferring power-relations, devolving authority at Nazims and eliminating centralization of authority (Alam, 2015)¹²¹. The decentralization plan also received disparagement for unduly military participation. Like other armed rulers, Musharraf’s “decentralization scheme had exacerbated the Pakistani state’s institutional disaster by rooting the services in local politics”.

Table 2: Local government election conducted in Pakistan

S. No.	Names of the Leaders	Local Elections
I.	Liaqat Ali Khan to Feroz Khan Noon	No
II.	General Ayub Khan	Yes
III.	General Yahya Khan	No
IV.	Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto	No

¹²⁰ Musharraf, P. (2006). *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir*. Free Press.

¹²¹ Alam, D. M. (2015). *Integrating Civil Service Reform with Decentrization A case Study*. UNDP Global Centre for Public Service Excellence.

V.	General Zia-ul-Haq	Yes
VI .	Benazir Bhutto	No
VII.	Nawaz Shari	No
VIII.	Benazir Bhutto	No
XIX.	Nawaz Sharif	No
X.	General Pervez Musharraf	Yes
XI.	Asif Zardari	No
XII.	Nawaz Sharif	Yes
XIII.	Imran khan	Yes

Basis: by the Researcher

4.10 THE 18TH CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERATION

The 18th adjustment, which was approved on 10th April 2010, ensures regional autonomy.

According to the change, the federal and provincial governments must move administrative, political and monetary power to at waged people level. As Article 140-A states.

(1) “Every one Province shall, by law, set up a local government organization and devolve political, organizational and financial accountability and authority to the designated representatives of the local governments”.

(2) “Elections to the local governments shall be under arrest by the Election Commission of Pakistan.” making an allowance for local government the playgroup of democracy, article 37 (i) reads “disperse the Government management to smooth the progress of expeditious discarding of its business to meet the handiness and requirements of the public”. On the organize of Supreme Court in July 2013, each government enacts local government laws so that local elections are conducted. As a result, the Sindh government approved the local government on 19th August 2013. On 21st August 2013 Punjab government passed Punjab Local Government Act 2013, Balochistan government passed Balochistan Local Government Act 2013 on August 30, 2013, and on October 30, 2013 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa approved KPK Local Government Act 2013.

4.11 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT 2013

At the closing stages of December 2009 prior system of local government was positioned to an ending. Local government elections were considerably delayed in each and every province. For 9 years the consecutive government was reluctant to behaviour local government elections in provinces suppose Balochistan where the elections were

conducted in 2013. Local government elections were held in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in May 2015 and Punjab, Sindh conducted local government in 2015. For the reason that this local government organization is an extension of the 1979 regulation, Sindh, Punjab and Balochistan doesn't transfer much substantive authority to local bodies. One of the outstanding features of all local governments is that provincial governments are official to suspend the designated heads and demeanour inquiries through Local government payment. Local Government Act of Balochistan authorizes the provincial government to get rid of the elected heads or members of the councils also. Financial Autonomy remnants an issue for Local Government since Provincial economics Commission (PEC) is recognized in all provinces under the finance minister of the province, which billed the budget through the Provincial Finance Commission Award. (This charge is named Divisional Coordination Committee in Balochistan). Extremely limited power has been given to the local government to charge taxes and regulate other functions. The Act of 2013 does not as well have a consistent period of local government for each and every one of the provinces as Punjab gives a five (5) years period, Balochistan, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa make available four (4) years terms. The Provincial Local Government Commission which comprises provincial bureaucrats and provincial congregation members is empowered to hang up and to duct special investigation against any mayor or chairman of councils.

4.12 Return of Deputy Commissioner

A moment ago, promulgated Punjab Civil Administration Ordinance (PCAO) 2016 has resurrected the office of the District Commissioner legitimizing its being in charge of the departments such as physical condition, education, expansion works etc. The modification in the administrative arrangement also reintroduces the offices of commissioners and assistant commissioners in divisions and sub-divisions correspondingly. The Deputy Commissioner has been empowered with enormous financial and organizational power in district, which without a doubt negates the Article 140(A) of the constitution in which the local governments are empowered with organizational, political and monetary power. Another striking characteristic of the ordinance is the Deputy Commissioner's supervision by Commissioner - civil servant

accountable to a bureaucrat. The phenomenon will further add to the stranglehold of administration on local bodies.

4.13 POLITICAL FORMATION AND LOCAL BODIES ORGANIZATION

Since August 2001 it had been an era of transition as in good health consolidation. The Local Government spokesperson and voted Nazim’s relationship with Member National Assemblies (MNAs) and Member Provincial Assemblies (MPAs) was especially easier said than done one. Much indigestion was created due to this new-fangled political structure. The Local Government regulation, 2001 had developed political authority and decentralized organizational and financial power for good governance and effectual delivery of services from beginning to end institutionalized contribution of the people at grassroots stage.¹²²

Table: 2 Political devolution Indicators

Indicators	subdivision	Macro(Local)
Political devolution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • consequence of elected bodies in subdivision policy formulation • significance of elected bodies in part service delivery • consequence of elected bodies in decisions on the subject of levels of sector financial support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multi-part Local Government elections • chosen Local Governments • Secret opinion poll in Local elections • independence of the Judiciary • Elections held at normal intervals • Election free and pale

Source: Charlton, Jackie et al 2002

The dominating philosophy in a civilization played an important role to appreciate the structure of the political system at the countrywide as well as local stages. Local Body organization had linked with Local *Biradaries(caste Politics)*. This family member played a significant role during general elections and prejudiced the result at Local points. Andrew Wilder’s view on Local Bodies and their position: “The 1985 National and Provincial Assemblies elections established that Local Body political principles had turn

¹²² Cheema A, Khaja I A and Qadir A (2004). *Decentralization in Pakistan: Context, Content and Causes*. Kennedy School Working Paper Number: RWP05-034.

out to be the entry point into Provincial and National politics. According to one force down account 124 of the 240 members designated to the Punjab Provincial Assembly were meeting members of Local Body. This had two significant consequences. First, it predestined that Provincial and National politics begin to resemble Local Body political affairs. Benefaction politics became the order of the day, and on behalf of personal and ingredient interests became a great deal more important for legislators than on behalf of national wellbeing. The second significant consequence was that this positions the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), which had not aggressively participated in Local Body politics, at a harsh disadvantage”.¹²³ The Local democratic organization and Local Government played a significant role in the political arena. The association between the Member National Assemblies (MNAs) and Member Provisional Assemblies (MPAs), especially with the Local Government and elected Nazims were very critical. The Local Government was established to reorganize the political society by creating apolitical possession of the institutions and their outputs.

Table: Six (6) Dimension of transference

Dimension of transference	Definition	Dimension of transference In the background of District Lakki Marwat.
Political Transference	Legislative and move policy power from the middle to Local councils that had been democratically designated by their respective constituency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <input type="checkbox"/> Were Councils legitimate recognized as a level of Government? • <input type="checkbox"/> Had District, and Union Councils bee chosen under a democratic electorate based, free and pale electoral process. • <input type="checkbox"/> Could Councils set guiding principle within their jurisdiction – do their resolution have legal weight? • <input type="checkbox"/> Did they have a clearly assigned role and function vies a vies other levels?

source: World Bank, 2002

¹²³ Wilder, A. R.(1999). *The Pakistani Voter: Electoral Politics and Voting Behavior in the Punjab*. Karachi: Oxford University Press; p.133.

It is information that political devolution was fairly concluded by various stepladders. Through phased elections, Local Government was fashioned. After that consequence, the mandates were also shifted to the Local Council. Mr. Rao Asif felt the furthest advantage of the new-fangled system. He was contented that the decentralization plan gave the consciousness amongst youthful people; His consideration that we should give confidence the youthful people to position as candidates in district lakki Marwt civilization particularly those in bucolic areas. During the Devolution Plan people elected their spokesperson in the circumstances of political lack of restrictions. It was essential for this representative to reproduce the desires of the group of people they serve but we can recognize the following issues in the set-up of Local Government organization in district lakki marwat.¹²⁴

4.14 Position and Responsibilities

There was no obvious plan on the subject of the roles and household tasks of Union and District point designated representatives. For example, all and each elected legislative body, Union Council Nazim and Naib Nazim were not understandable about powers in relative to the police establishment and generally on the subject of law and Organize. The fact was that 78% of the councilor contested the ballot vote for the earliest time and 65% of them did not have any relative member who participated in the ballot vote before this procedure.⁷ In the middle of the 21% of uneducated councillors the women were 68%. Poor communication and poor harmonization between Union and District administration tiers was also a big stumbling block in the pour fin order. The District Nazims and the councilors were under emotion pressure from the community after the election. District Nazim provided the political management for the expansion of the district and made the policies that possibly will improve the superiority of a life of people both in attendance and prospect. He could plan a growth program and sent a financial statement to the District Council for the development of the district but the non – accessibility of ‘policy of Business’ was a big difficulty.⁸

4.14.1 Capacity

¹²⁴ Paracha, Saad Abdullah, (2003). *Devolution in Pakistan: Context, implementation and issues*. Available at: www.policy.hu/paracha.

In the Local Government appointment majority of councilors belonged to person's families that were entered for the first in the Local Government political affairs. Under this Local Government arrangement, the chosen councilors had been deficient in of knowledge, knowledge and skill to comprehend this system. The preponderance of the constituency members as glowing as the councilors did not be on familiar terms with the basic facial appearance of the Devolution diagram. Capacity had emerged as one of the very vital parts of the implementation of the new Local Government system.⁹

4.14.2 Social Setup

Social set up of communities based on social group, and families. It was the indispensable constitute. It becomes obvious that voting performance was most to be expected to be considered by communal instead of political factors. "Traditional" collection loyalties of relations, factions or *biradari* were the main in fluencies in the voting decisions of the citizens of Lakki Marwat. Contemporary political factors such as social gathering faithfulness, benefaction was not that significant. The *biradari* (literally brotherhood) was the nearly everyone important relationship system in commission in Lakki Marwat. It had been distinct as a patronage whereby each and every one man who possibly will trace their association to a common antecedent, no matter how inaccessible, belongs to a *biradari*. As a word, was not really precise it could as well be used to explain other relationships. In Malkhanwala, citizens felt that the choice for the *biradari* in rural areas would be additional common than in urban areas. This was because bucolic set-up was additional traditional and provided security to vote surrounded by family clans.¹²⁵ "A community body is staffed by appointees to a certain extent than politicians or civil servants". "In the United States, Mayor is most regularly separately designated as the political leader of a council. In a less important US citted Mayer is a figurehead and the city is sprinted unelected 'metropolis manager'. In Britain councilors are normally members of the society gather a in group of the city dhe preponderance party's person in charge became the chair of the committee".¹² However it is easier said than done to understand whether citizens voted

¹²⁵ Mughees Ahmed (2006). *Caste system in the Sub-Continent*, in Al- Siyasa- A Journal of Politics, Society and Culture – Issue No, IX, Lahore, p. 30.

according to their *biradari* or voted because they are required to elect the correct applicant. In his organization which has strongholds in society, there was evidence that people were beginning to give meaning to voting.

4.14.3 Continuity

The inquiry of stability of the scheme looms large in the minds of the elected legislative body. Record of Local Governments in district lakki marwat showed that surroundings of National and Provincial government were not appropriate for proper organization of the Local Governments.¹⁴

4.15 Relationship Sandwiched Between Three Tiers of Local Governments

Physically powerful democracy demands admiration, cooperation and strengthened harmonization between the poles apart tiers of government. This obsession will promote the greater friendship of national, regional and local priorities. The difficulty with this Local Government was the dissimilarity in the separation of roles sandwiched between the three tiers of Local Government. The Constitution of Pakistan confident the Local Government institutions because it was self-possessed of the elected legislative body of areas. With decentralization, the function of the Provincial government was considerably changed. This taking apart was predominantly in the sharing of development money. This thing was creating indecision between councillors. At that time management directly information to the Councilors in relation to the poles apart projects of the exacting area. Most of them did the protest against vulnerability in commerce with the system of government particularly the relationship sandwiched between Local, National and Provincial Governments.

4.16 CONSTRAINTS TO WORK

Nearly every one of the elected councilors belonged to the blue-collar class. They faced harm in getting salary travelling grants this thing was creatine anxiety in the middle of the members of Union Council. The councilors had far above the ground expectations from the organization. But the fact was that no possibility had been given to them to absolute their hope. Dr. Qureshi, a previous lecturer at the Agriculture University contemplation that the idea of Devolution and connecting the Local communities in the decisions and projects was an extremely good and imperative step. He felt that Union Council 184 had a very high-quality team

but was concerned whether they would receive the necessary funds to implement all their area development projects. Would the team have the human being and financial income to stimulate Local economic expansion which was very imperative for the area?¹²⁶

4.17 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOCAL, NATIONAL & PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS

The inhabitant government announces the development finances for the meticulous members after the entrance of elected national & provincial governments. Yet the city government did not talk to the district government concerning these funds. This meddling in the local government system created bitterness for the local government.

To get to the bottom of this problem local government commission (LGC) was recognized at the provincial stage as an oversight group for the lgo. Local government commission (lgc) was conventional to solve the evils between districts, provincial government and district government or stuck between the district ombudsman and district Nazim. But this commission was well-known very late in 2003 and it did not perform the chosen aspect as yet.¹²⁷

4.18 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COUNCILORS AND MEMBER PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES

MPA's were creating pressure at the Union height. They consider that MPA's have knowledgeable authority on every sequence, related to the District. Province was concerned with budget development and could matter the announcement. But the Councilor's priorities were dissimilar to MPA's. That was a big obsession in defeating the point of grassroots move.

4.18.1 POLITICAL AFFILIATION

Local Government Elections in Lakki Marwat were under arrest on a non-party foundation but the chosen Councilors had political accessories and resistance among the parties. That

¹²⁶ Abid, S Q (2004). *Development of Local Government in Punjab: A Critical Assessment*. IST ed. Beacon books, Lahore; p.128.

¹²⁷ Lunberg P (2002). *A comparison of decentralization in Pakistan and Nepal* [Paper].

was the big difficulty in the advancement of Local Self-Government. Citizens of the rural area did not be on familiar terms with how to cast their vote and a great number of eighteen (18) years olds authorized them to cast their vote. Preponderance of the people did not be on familiar terms with the actual characteristic of the plan. The community system of Lakki Marwat impacts the political organization. Local individuality and local issues were a fraction of Lakki Marwat politics. People throw their vote according to their political association. So, this political relationship and the disagreement among the parties were the big obstacles to the advancement of the development of Local Government.¹²⁸

4.18.2 QUALIFICATION DISJOINT

Qualification division between the literate and uneducated members was a big obstruction in the flat accomplishment of local government organizations. It was additional and more basic that the condition of seating for women by yourself had little consequence on this organization .69% of voters in rural areas and 53% of voters in urban areas did not be on familiar terms with how to cast their vote.in urban areas, the utmost consciousness about the number of seatings in the union council, the class of seats or any other feature which was connected with the union and district ballot vote did not exceed 60%. Mrs. Humera Naz is the wife of Choludhry Zahid Nazir. She contested the election of union council as a Nazim and keen to promote women's issues at the local group of people level. She had been a great deal criticized by her neighbors for rank in the elections for the reason that she was a woman. Even though she felt that 32% of seats kept for women was a high-quality start. She felt that additional needed to be completed. She said that it was significant for women to be known the opportunity to contribute to the elections and to place as candidates. She said that only women could appreciate women's issues and better stand for them at a political height. As a Nazim she tried to draw concentration of the high power to women's issues and those that have an effect on our lives. The most widespread problems facing women are connected to our

¹²⁸ MugheesAhmed (2006). *Caste system in the Sub –Continent* , in Al- Siyasa- A Journal of Politics, Society and Culture – Issue No, IX, Lahore, p. 8

neighbourhoods, with poor hygiene, sewerage, roads and of course girl's schools. These evils require an immediate solution. She said it is not easy for women to work as Nazim since there are many educational and social barriers.¹²⁹ woman was given 32% of seats in the local body ballot vote. Now it was predictable that this thing would put an important impact in the accomplishment of social policies and it would convey a tremendous chance for the woman to play a significant role but women councillors complained concerning non-helpful behaviors of nazims and naib nazims in dissimilar part, mainly in releasing of finances, travelling allowance and honorarium at dissimilar time. A woman feels tender participating in meetings. the women have not remunerated any remuneration. This was a great difficulty for the women because they did not have any foundation of income. An issue about the preparation of women councillors was also very significant. The women were designated counsellor for the local body had skills to be effective in their responsibility. This training was very much essential to understand the roles of local self-government. Some program was started for that motive but they did not come into view to be effectual among the women councilors of the district.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RESULTS

4. Local government is familiar as the playgroup of democracy. In Pakistan, it has been the injured party of three enemies: armed forces coup, incompetent politicians and dishonest bureaucracy. However, a stronghold of bureaucracy has decomposed the local government organization from within. Even if the 18th modification provides for the decentralization of administrative, political, and monetary powers, the higher establishment has ironically been antagonistic to local governments. The city dweller government's holdup in law-making and lack of enthusiasm in conducting elections at moment in time has given an perimeter to bureaucracy to control local government. LGO 2001 was an attempt to subordinate

¹²⁹ Hye, Hasnat Abdul (Editor), (2002). *Governance:South AsianPerspectives*, Oxford University Press; 107- 113.

Civil Servant to nominated representative, but this in addition couldn't run away the stranglehold of the establishment. Local Government Act 2013 doesn't too devolve adequate authority and empowers bureaucracy as the most important actor at the herd level. Thus, this paper principally delves into the natural history of the relationship connecting Civil Servants and Local Government to recognize the factors facilitating disagreement between two actors at the working-class level. Most of the administration in the up-to-date era is run by two most important actors; politicians, who come into authority by public votes and take on bureaucrats. Politics-bureaucracy relation determines the power of legitimacy in a country. Pakistan, being a self-governing country, promotes local government in every one province and emphasizes that the political, organizational, and financial household tasks be devolved to the local good ascendancy at local level in particular countries like Pakistan where officials who employment for central and provincial governments do not make available efficient government for the reason that they don't have the essential knowledge of local relationships. Despite the fact that Local Government institutions hand round as micro-manager, higher bureaucracy has attempted to grow weaker local nominated bodies. The interference of bureaucracy is one of the most important challenges in the way of well-organized and answerable local administration in Pakistan. A motivating fact about Local Government is that. Three main reforms have also been introduced by forces regimes. Although the constitution of Pakistan is familiar with local government as the third tier of the administration, there are a few visible trends that point toward that authority is yet to be devolved to Local Government. Such as going again of District Commissioner, transmission of the functions of the Local Government to the provincial bureaucracy, provincmanagement'sment reluctance to bypass Local Government laws (Shafqat, 2014)¹³⁰. Local government is an significant tier of supremacy at grass starting place stage, whereas in other countries local government institutions are well thought-out merely an organizational arrangement to achieve some of the administration tasks at local point. However, narrow government institutions are the organizational units in a superior governmental structure. In political science and public administration text, local government is careful as semi-government institutions, self-governed by the inhabitants and functioning beneath federal, middle or country

¹³⁰ Shafqat, S. (2014, January 29). Local Government Act 2013 andProvince-Local Government relations. Development Advocate Pakistan. Development Advocate Pakistan, pp. 4- 9.

government from beginning to end some commands, regulations and officially permitted bindings. As per the researcher's sympathetic, their functions, roles, and everyday jobs are not comparable to state institutions other than to redress on daily basis needs of ordinary people, chiefly local government institutions more often than not perform community functions. There are a lot of terms to recognize local government institutions, such as counties, communes, rural communities, municipal committees, districts, towns, unions and local boards. In Pakistan, we have local Boards, local bodies, district councils, local councils, home government institutions and others. Lord Ripen, the creator of local government in United India, called it the kindergarten of democracy¹³¹. As per Pakistan's standpoint, the local councils are the main institutions to make sure participation of the inhabitants of a particular neighborhood, under their have possession of supervision, to control all aspects of their custom daily life. Through contribution in elections, and afterwards by engagements in an assortment of functions or behaviour, carried out by local stage government institutions with look upon to people's daily needs, these institutions may dish up as model preparation schools for the inhabitant to become accomplished at the skills of self-rule¹³². Pakistan is an Islamic and federal democratic state with three exact tiers of government: narrow, provincial and vital. The Constitution of Pakistan protects the narrow government under Articles 140-A and 32 which is the 3rd tier of Pakistan government. Under local government acts, the country is separated into Districts, Tehsils (sub-districts) and Union Councils, with every one Union Council comprising a figure of villages. In adding together, every province has its possession of legislation, ministries and particular government acts for its accomplishment. Metropolitan corporations and district council are the uppermost urban and rural tiers in that order in the provinces. Local government in every one province consists of two or three tiers. Metropolitan corporations and district councils have considerable responsibilities as they are caught up in local economic growth, road, healthcare, ideas and policing with the provincial governments and as well with the minor tiers for the services such as environmental protection, libraries, museums as fighting fit

¹³¹ Cheema, Ghulam Shabbir (2007): "Devolution with accountability: learning from good practices", in *Decentralizing Governance: Emerging Concepts and Practices*, Washington, Brookings Institution Press, pp. 216- 301.

¹³² Abraham, Kow Kwegya Amisah (2019): "The role and activities of policy institutes for participatory governance in Ghana." In *Public Policy Research in the Global South*, Cham, Springer, pp. 151-170.

as water and cleanliness. As remote as the middle and provincial governments are anxious, Pakistan is a federal democracy that has a bi-cameral citizens elected.

5.2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN

5.2.1 LEGAL BASIS FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN PAKISTAN

As discussed in the previous sections, Pakistan’s constitution protects the local government beneath articles 140-A and Article 32. Article 32 states the encouragement of local government institutions. The condition shall give confidence in local government institutions cool, calm and collected of an elected legislative body of the areas worried and, in such institutions, a particular demonstration will be specified to peasants, personnel and women¹³³. Article 140-A states each province shall, by rule, establish a local government structure and pass to political, executive and financial liability and authority to the chosen representatives of the local governments. These two above affirmed articles of federal constitution give the base for local government in Pakistan. In adding up, every province has its have possession of local government law. beneath these laws, each province conducts the local government elections. Table 1 underneath gives an impression of the each and every one the legislations by all the provinces and territories.

Table 2: Pakistan Local Government Elections and manufacture Percentage

Province/territory	Last election	Turnout (%)
Baluchistan	Dec 2013	26.84
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	May 2015	43.52
Punjab	Oct 2015	61.11
Sindh	Oct 2015	46.26
Islamabad Capital Territory	Sept 2015	54.87

Source: Authors own elaboration, 2020

5.2.2 Distribution of Service Delivery Responsibility

There can be provincials’ differentiation in Pakistan but more often than not districts are responsible for in redistrict roads, farming, dispensaries, physical condition, sanitation and water, literacy and education. Tehsils are accountable for street services that includes hygiene, sewer, water provide and illumination etc, local streets and road, civilizing events, markets,

¹³³ Alam, Munnawar and Wajidi, Muhammad Abuzar: “Pakistan’s Devolution of Power Plan 2001: A brief dawn for local democracy?”, Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance, Vol. 12, n° 1 (2012), pp.20-34.

fairs and slaughterhouses etc¹⁷. Municipal corporations are in charge of all the integrated services. Union councils are accountable for grazing areas, cattle pounds, ponds and wells, street services, restricted streets and libraries. more often than not, these councils work the length of with neighboring villages and councils to organize and promote developmental events. They are also accountable to propose yearly plans at the tehsil and district stage to budgetary allocations. Local government reforms can be separated into five periods from 1947 in anticipation of 2001. These are explained independently in subsections. Local Governments Acts of 2013 In agreement with the 18th Amendment to the Constitution, the provincial part of Baluchistan permitted the Local Government Act in 2010, while the provincial assemblies of Punjab, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa approved their Local Government Acts in 2013. The Local Government Acts for both provinces, in their up-to-date form, provide narrow autonomy to the local councils in conditions of fiscal organization and control over examination delivery, proceeds, tax and police departments. at present, after the local government elections in all the provinces, provincial governments are under pressure to make sure that newly chosen local councils have enough resources and power to address service release and development challenges in local communities. Under each provincial local government regulation, each council is future to take a proactive position in promoting city dweller involvement, empowering the general public, identifying priorities and tribulations, organizing local microprograms, promoting civic learning and gender equality, and organizing formative years and recreational behavior.

5.2.3 Local Self-Government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Government Act, 2012 extends to the completion of the Province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Government has the authority to exempt any area from each and every one or any of the provisions of this Act by an announcement.

5.2.4 Governance Structure

The governance arrangement followed under this Act is as follows.

- 1) In the container of City District Government and the Towns Municipal Administration fashioned in City.
- 2) District of Peshawar by the Municipal business, Peshawar to the extent of notified urban areas and functions assigned to the conglomerate under this perform.
- 3) In the container of Local Area Development power by the Local Government and Rural Development Department, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
- 4) In the holder of Tehsil Municipal Administration in each and every one other districts of the province by the own Municipal Committees to the degree of notified urban areas, if a few, in the individual districts and to the level of functions assigned to the Municipal Committees under this Act.
- 5) In the container of District Governments, as well as City District Government Peshawar, by the particular District Councils to the number of rural areas and to the level of functions assigned to district councils under this Act and by the Municipal conglomerate to the scope of notified built-up areas of Peshawar.
- 6) In the glasses case of Union Councils apart from urban union councils, the individual Union Councils to the number of functions assigned to Union Councils underneath this Act.
- 7) In the container of Union Councils lessening in the notified Urban Areas of Peshawar, their personal Urban Union Councils to the level of functions assigned to Union Councils beneath this Act.

5.2.5. LOCAL AREAS

For the purposes of this Act, the Local Areas shall be:

- a) In the container of rural areas, a Union committee and a District committee;
- b) In the holder of urban areas, apart from Peshawar, a Municipal board; and
- c) In the container of urban areas of Peshawar, a Municipal company and Urban Union Council.

Union

A Union shall be a region comprising one or additional more, in the container of a region where resolution under the rule has not to be taken, one or additional villages, notify as such by the administration.

Provided that as distant as may be,

- a) The region of a Union shall be a defensive unity;
- b) The limitations of a Union shall not irritate the limits of a income Sub Division in a district;
- c) The part of a union shall encompass a whole number of patwar circles, or a patwar ring may hold a number of complete Unions;
- d) In the container of Urban Union committee, a whole Patwar circle or survey block and
- e) The inhabitants of Unions surrounded by a district shall, supplementary or less, be standardized; provided additional that in a exact case, the Government possibly will, for the reasons to be recorded, surrender the aforesaid circumstances.

5.2.5 CONSTITUTION OF LOCAL COUNCILS

The Local Councils to be constituted underneath this Act shall be:

- a) A Municipal company for the metropolis of Peshawar;
- b) A Municipal group for every City or town additional than the town of Peshawar;
- c) A Union committee for each Union; and
- d) A District board for every District.

5.2.6 COMPOSITION OF LOCAL COUNCILS

Union Council

A Union ruling body shall, subject to other necessities of this Act, consist of following eleven members chosen through direct ballot vote based on fully developed permit and joint electorate;

- (a) Seven Muslim all-purpose members;
- (b) Two women members;

- (c) One member for peasants and human resources; and
- (d) One-member underground communities.

District Council

- a) A District Committee shall, subject to other necessities of this Act, consist of the such number of all-purpose members as the sum number of amalgamation Councils in a district.
- b) The Chairman of all Union Council shall be a universal member of the District committee ex-officio
- c) The members of the District Board shall elect the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the District committee.

5.2.7 MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE

- 1) A Municipal board shall, subject to additional provisions of this Act, consist of such number of all-purpose members as the Government possibly will by notification, conclude.
- 2) The all-purpose members of the Municipal commission shall be chosen through direct ballot vote based on mature franchise and combined electorate. Municipal conglomerate
 - (a) A Municipal company shall, subject matter to other supplies of this Act, consists of such figure of general members as whole number of Union Councils lessening within the restrictions of a Municipal company.
 - (b) The Chairman of the metropolitan Union committee in notified restrictions of Municipal Company shall be a universal member of the Municipal firm ex-officio.¹³⁴

5.2.8 ORGANIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Local government is a corpse, which is a shape of public management, active for a little and precise geographic region, like city, municipality or village. It workings like national administration, but only on a smaller scale. There is no nation, which encompass not its local government. In a number of countries the expression is used ‘Municipal government’ for local government. Other than in Pakistan it is acknowledged as a ‘District government system’. There are two types of local management.

¹³⁴ 19 khyberpakhtunkhwa.gov.pk/Departments/LG/index.php

1-Local Government: It is served by chosen bureaucrats.

2-Local Self-Government: It is served by elected legislative body. (Bhutto, 2016)

Organization of local government in Pakistan;




Figure.1 (Waseem, 2016)

In Pakistan, local government the stage its role is far removed from eras with its developmental development. The feature of the history of local government in Pakistan is agreed upon below.

Local government in Pakistan (1947-54)

Recently established state faced a lot of difficulties to manage its system. Other than it is not pale to say that Pakistan was unsuccessful to triumph over the situation. straight away, it took a lot of steps to steady its government, not merely national stage but also struggle to conquer the local issues at the municipality and village stage.

Sindh Local Authority Service Act 1947

Underneath this Act Sindh government has chosen some establishment on the input posts for Municipal Committees and a number of other local body.

Baluchistan Municipal Act 1946

Baluchistan introduced this Act for Municipal Committee Quetta in 1946, to control the local scheme of Baluchistan.

Manifesto of 1948

In 1948, Muslim League's policy was giving confinement a guiding principle, which is based on the models of parishes and communes in the United States. "The strength gradually penetration to the government's guiding principle and its main points be adult permission was introduced in local bodies.

Recommendation of members to boards and committees was abolished and elections were introduced. The place of work of the chairman was completed open for ballot vote.

A village or collection of villages with the inhabitants of not a smaller amount than two or additional than ten thousand was to contain a village committee". (Khan)

5.3 N.W.F.P MUNICIPAL ACT 1950

Beneath this Act, the administration of N.W.F.P was introduced a few changes in the preceding local scheme. The elections of local bodies were held on a foundation of adult permits, moreover also introduced a transformation in the Act that the Ward-Person was chosen in Place of selected members of local government.

5.3.1 Town step up Act 1953

This Act was approved by East Pakistan for the growth of big cities, like Dacca & Naraingunj.

A at the same time in 1956, Mr. S. D. Khan was approached as a representative of secretariat collection and re-organized East Pakistan's local organization. He prearranged three tiers of local governments.

Union boards

District Boards

Municipal Committees or Town Councils

5.3.2 Village Aid Programme (1954)

In this programme the bureaucrat was accountable for five wards of pastoral areas. His duties were to uphold roads and get better physical condition and educational department, etc.¹³⁵

5.3.3 Local Government Ordinance, 1979

"In 1979, Zia introduced indistinguishable Ordinances for four Provinces on the local government repealing the previous enactments on the topic. These were incredibly elaborate

¹³⁵ Maryam, F. Local Governance in Pakistan; historical review.

statutes and were in general welcomed as these statutes fashioned a hope in the middle of the people for declaration of their daily basis civil harms at the local stage. The new legislation provided civics bodies both for the country and urban areas with improved fiscal blame. The law also provided the notion of city corporations. The local councils were empowered to charge taxes and duties, source remove encroachments and nuisance as well as initiated prosecution of the delinquents. The new-fangled legislation surely empowered the local government institution to direct their relationships, predominantly in matters connecting to previsions of civics armed forces. It was well-thought-out that the new-fangled laws unquestionably had taken optimistic steps towards decentralization of powers to the subordinate tiers of self-governing institutions. Elections are also held in each and every one of the provinces beneath the new ordinance, but these statutes were powerfully criticized for having too much official intrusion in the relationships of the civics bodies.” (DTCE, May 2014)

The separation of the local governments beneath the Zia regime is based on four tiers.

- Town board
- Municipal Committee
- Municipal Corporation
- Metropolitan Corporation

To deal with fast and lower-level issues, intruded ‘Panchayat’ system. Panchayat was vigorously doing its duties. Society was represented by counting women, labourers, farmers and minorities. These were designated by the concerned committee, while the minorities had their divided electorates. In 1999, once again the military period immediately took more than control in its handover. General Pervez Musharraf came with his ‘seven-point agenda’. This memo has the subsequent points:

- Re-building the national confidence and morale
- Strengthening the federation, while removing inter-provincial disharmony
- Reviving and ensuring investor confidence
- Ensuring law and order and dispensing speedy justice
- De-politicizing state institutions
- Devolving power to grass-root level
- Ensuring swift and across the board accountability

National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB, 2007)

National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) is constructed the decentralization plan, which has ‘5Ds’ mock-up. The 5Ds model explains below:

D means decentralization of political authority: It has three tiers, assignment, dream, and goals. Power devolved into these three tiers.

D resources decentralization of organizational authority: The District stage departments were decentralized by prepared autonomy.

D earnings de-concentration of organization function: An move toward would be paying attention to meritocracy, performance-based appraisal system, specialized versus generalization, recognition and prize.

D means an allocation of resources to the districts: Taxes and brings upon yourself the expenditures were raised by district administration.

D income diffusion of power-authority nexus: It is monitored by civilians and chosen bodies and civil the social order participation in developmental employment for effectual check and balance.

According to Plan, “the organization is designed to make sure that the authentic interests of the people are served and their constitutional rights are protected through an enabling setting, people’s participation, clear administrative responsibilities without political interference and making it accountable to the chosen head of the districted. At the equivalent time it promises checks and sense of balance to safeguard beside abuse of power”. (Khan D. S.)¹³⁶

5.3.4 NAWAZ SHARIF ERA (RECENT GOVERNMENT)

Punjab Local Government Act, 2013

Under the Act, the lowly tier of the local government is the Union Councils, equally for the rural and urban areas. every one Union Council would have one Chairman and one Vice-Chairman.

¹³⁶ DTCE. (May 2014). Analysis of Local Government Statues of Punjab and KPK province. The

US. Khan, D. S. (n.d.). Local Government in Pakistan. Lahore: GF Printers.

each and every one Chairmen of the rural Union Councils shall be the members of the District Council all along with the subsequent members in a roundabout way elected on the held in reserve seats¹³⁷:-

Such figure of women members, not more than five, as the Provincial Government may inform on the basis of figure of Union Councils in the District Council.

Such number of peasant members, not over and above three, as the Government may inform on the foundation of number of Union Councils in the District Council.

One technocrat member.

(iv) One youth member.

Such non-Muslim members, not more than five, as the Government may inform for every District Council. The members of the Municipal Committees would be chosen their Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen as combined candidates from surrounded themselves, by preponderance votes of the members in attendance and voting. A number of women members, not over and above five, as the Government may alert on the basis of number of wards in the Municipal Committee. Such figure of worker members, not more than two, as the Government may tell based on number of wards in the Municipal board. One youth member. And Such number of non-Muslim members, not more than three, as the Government may alert for each Municipal Committee.

5.3.5 KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT, 2013

The foundation of local administration. Landlords became the local rulers, and the British regulation significantly weakened the conventional independent village government organization. They were compulsory, though, to bring in the Chowkidari Act 1870 to revive the age-old panchayat arrangement.

The British experiments with local government organizations served only regal interests, i.e. the maximization of land revenue compilation and maintenance of law and arrange. The panchayat became a local police body to supplementary British rule, with small to do with community welfare. This continues to be put into practice in today's Pakistan. Which political party, counting the PTI, in reality, intends to smash these feudal fetters? Take a close give the impression of being at the Sindh Local Government Bill

¹³⁷ ~~Waseem, S. (2016). The local Governance system in Pakistan; A Case Study of Metropolitan city Karachi.~~

2013-voted by the feudal for the feudal. royally power had diminutive understanding of and/or concentration in indigenous local self-governing institutions. The Bengal Local Self-Government Act 1885 recognized union committees accountable for the building of roads, primary education, and cleanliness, maintenance of ponds and register of vital statistics. For organizational convenience simply, the Union Council (UC) had the authority to raise finances from villagers in the red or occupying ample properties. The 1919 Act was just a minor development, conferring powers to outward appearance union bench for settlement of inconsequential offences. Village governments enjoyed a great deal more judicial authority during the medieval ages.

Ayub Khan's Basic Democracies Ordinance of 1959 through the functional authority and financial reserve base of the union council self-governing and considerably strong on the dissertation. In actuality put into practice, though, this council was beneath the complete political organize of the mid government. The four-tier organization in Bangladesh comprises 40392 Gram Parish ads (village councils) in the rural areas accordingly elected by the citizens. With the gram perished and union perished bills approved by the legislative body in September 1997, the accomplishment of the local government building was attempted at the waged people stage.

The major municipalities – Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna and Rajshahi – were given municipal status as city corporations, Sylhet and Barisal organisms added later. Electing mayors since 1994, members of the city company council (ward commissioners) are designated from individual wards. However, some tiers have been nominated instead of elected officials. Theory despite, the version put into practice in Bangladesh today enjoys exceptionally little authority. The 'feudal mindset' is the basis for why it does not work in Pakistan. In Bangladesh persons pocketing huge amounts of money from beginning to end in corrupt practices are the 'fresh feudal'. Their financial wall having them mammoth powers in the urban areas – a large amount like what the landed feudal once had in the rural areas. Self-governing local bodies have got to have fitting administrative and economic authority as well as institutional means at the grassroots stage. This is only probable through an accelerated devolution process on the principle of the area followed by diverse ministries, departments, directorates, and other agencies of the middle government. To quotation Dr Mohabbat, "several unsuccessful attempts have been complete at devolution but the arrangement has remained exceedingly centralized. Local members are characterized by fragile administrative capability, a limited monetary and human supply base and little partaking". While citizen connection in day-to-day local government thwarts attempted opinion poll ropes, more prominently the meaningful partaking of citizens in communities without delay identifies strangers, and unearths 'radical safe houses.

With laws for local government in the offing, will the 'democrats' choose to the provincial assemblies authorize democracy at the local stage? In a democratic travesty, the Sindh chief minister (CM) has power to hang up local bodies for three months at determination. Should the laws framed for local bodies as well be appropriate for the assemblies? Will the Chief Minister (CM) recognize his provincial government to on the contrary hang up by the centralized government? Notwithstanding the rose-colored disputation of the Sindh supporter general, many constitutional aberrations in the Sindh Local Government (LG) Bill 2013 could do with refinement The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Government Act, 2013, contains moderately a few provisions on the appearance of 2001 Ordinance connecting to decentralization of more than a few Provincial organizational offices, in meticulous Health and Education, to the

the designated legislative body of the local governments. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Government Act, 2012, which is based on the 1979 rule, is still in force. Smooth otherwise, no pains for holding local government election are in the spectacle. Nor in this look upon, any cautious date for such elections has been indicated.¹³⁸

Conclusion

The local governments' system of Pakistan is urbanized step by step and approved through many phases. At the moment time of early freedom, Pakistan faced a lot of difficulties to overcome the weak arrangement of the position. In those days, the management of the state was survived from beginning to end a quantity of short and impermanent policies or acts.

In 1959, Ayub Khan took more than the authority and the first time he prearranged the local government as a usual authority. He introduced 'Basic democracy in which describes the local organization for local bodies. later than him, Pakistan People's Party (PPP) came into supremacy by charming elections and introduced some latest reforms to get a better local government. Although, in 1971, India do violence against Pakistan and war was out-break, and Pakistan faced a profound loss, and as well lost East Pakistan. So, in 1977, Zia-Haq compulsory the martial law-law and became leader. Once another time, he re-energized and re-organized the local government, and introduced the 'Local Government Ordinance'.

Soon after Musharraf came into supremacy with his seven-point memo. He introduced the 5Ds representation for re-construct the local government. The current government was as well improved the local government employing its latest tactics and reforms. Manifested from outline 1, the part of votes polled for self-sufficient candidates is considerably higher. purposely in the Punjab, the contest between independents and social gathering ticket holders is close-fitting. This "personality-pull" issue reflects few structural imperatives that draw from political enlistment and election contestation in Pakistan. This draw factor, primarily, seems to be the product of entrenched judgment of cultural benefaction co-opted by previous regimes to get together their political eras (Lyon, 2002). In up-to-date local government elections, an additional trend has emerged quizzical the presence of party based appointment patterns (Fig-2). In Baluchistan, independent candidates win 500 seats (around 50 per cent). The tendency continues in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa local government and cantonment elections¹⁹, and 165 and 55 seats go to independent candidates in that order. Further, 35 supplementary independents remained runner-up with diminutive margins. While in the subject of 50 % (2441) seating went of to independents. The prototype reflects the physically powerful influence of modified political relations at micro stage.

¹³⁸ Bhutto, P. (2016, April 12). *LoThe localovernment system in Pakistan*. Retrieved from in-SlideShare: Cheema, A. (2003, October). Decentralization in Pakistan:Context,Content,Causes. p. 8.

The British abolished in cooperation the pargana and panchayat systems, replacing these effectual indigenous mechanisms with the British mold of local governance predestined to endorse and sustain the feudal organization. The Permanent conclusion System necessary the civil and criminal laws and bench to become the Imran Khan claims a real devolution of government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa will obtain place. He says, “If the in-attendance Pakistan Tehrek-e-Insaf (PTAI) led coalition in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) flops, Pakistan Tehrek-e-Insaf (PTI) flops.” This may fine come true. Notwithstanding the exceptional ‘whistleblower’ defence in the Right To Information (RTI) Act and the proposed Ehtesab Commission, the Khattak government is showing signs of becoming dysfunctional. despite the mixed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa presentation in the first 90 days, Imran Khan’s head of the Pakistan Tehrek-e-Insaf (PTI) party will almost certainly take the August 22 by-polls in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and give Mutaheda Qomi Moment (MQM) a fright – if not a fight – in Karachi. However, charisma can go merely so far in ensuring good quality governance. Imran Khan must establish he means what he says, make effectual changes in governance in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and bring in a kind of local self-governing representation that other provinces will come across difficult to pay no attention to. Effective laws for local self-governance be obliged to: (1) create sure legitimate provisions and ordinances to facilitate local government to purpose in an self-directed manner; (2) ensure institutional good organization; (3) explain the household tasks and ability of local government institution with the group and structure without a doubt defined to release these properly; and (4) by stopping practical and political interfering in their implementation eliminate outer surface pressure in making decision. Democracy’s stakeholders be obliged to genuinely keep fit their rights and administrative power at the working-class level, instead of paying mere lip-service to local self-governance.

5.4 DE-CENTRALIZED CENTRALIZATION AND PAKISTAN

The WI-FI Empowering independent devolution has a chequered times gone by of advancement and move back under poles apart political settlements in Pakistan (Zaidi, 2005)¹³⁹. Since regal times the unfettered provinces of Raj, now constitute Pakistan, were treated with officially authorized and political events different from synchronized provinces. Customary local institutions were given power after introducing the accurate to private belongings in land (Cheema et al., 2009)¹⁴⁰. The community power of affinity and inequality in ground ownership

¹³⁹ Zaidi, SA2005, The Political Economy of Decentralisation in Pakistan, In Dialogue (p. 51). Vanguard Books Ltd.

¹⁴⁰ Cheema, A, Mohmand, S, & Patnam, M 2009, Colonial proprietary elites and institutions: The persistence of de facto political dominance.

joined with limited political permit entailed a procedure of strengthening perpendicular ties of relationship at the cost of flat solidarity. These institutions of the image have helped in the institutionalization of restricted political institutions keeping pace through ownership of advantage or modern instruction. The dominance of the landed elite since day one of contemporary Pakistan is confirmation of this advantaged mode of politics (Javid, 2011). Landed cream of the crop in rural areas under enemy control politics, and Salariat (Middle classes) in urban centres under enemy control state and lively politics for the duration of colonial times and the earliest three decades of contemporary Pakistan. Then the position of the center class was swelled by the inclusion of multiple sections of traders, small peasants, retailers etc. and the style of political conclusion also shifted in favor of heart classes (Sayeed, 2002)¹⁴¹. The changes in local political financial system, domestic anxiety of political authority, and international strain of cold war political affairs have compulsory different supporting governments in Pakistan to make available universal suffrage to everyone its citizens and haul up all legal barrier to political contribution. However, even these ground-breaking steps unsuccessful to challenge the structural disparity that feed political practicality on the part of people entitled to vote. Democratic delegation was innovatively second-hand by all authoritarian regimes to merge their illegal and extra-legal hold over power by increasing their networks of benefaction by encouraging vertical relations of political contribution. The nexus between devolution and democracy leftovers to this day oxymoronic; as eras have used it to combine their grasp. The recent increase of interest in looking at delegation as a mean to clash against repeated malaise of dishonesty, bad supremacy, democratization, and expansion provide very profligate rationale for devolution but virtually it has to transaction with a number of harms that are not leaving to disappear anytime almost immediately. Vote switch over stands at the pinnacle of the challenge the democratic decentralization faces. Blau (1964) has expounded that social exchange framework embed exchange, both inherent and extrinsic, surrounded by the logic of reciprocity (Graziano, 1976; Lawson & Greene, 2011). The in-sequence exchange, stipulation of communal utilities to a village/area, getting a job for son/daughter, receiving a birth official document or register of Nikah, all these connections are conducted within clientelistic¹⁴ arrangement of unequal switch over. The norms of reciprocity anxiety from the recipient to

¹⁴¹ Sayeed, A2002, State-society Conjunctions And Disjunctions: Pakistan's Manufacturing Performance. In The post colonial-State and Social Transformation in India and Pakistan (pp. 203– 244)

return these positive discriminations from beginning to end voting or else all these favours could be denied in prospect. This unfair cul-de-sac for a widespread person is the manufactured goods of by now de-centralized experiment of Pakistani condition, which de-centralizes to hold back social configuration. Third Democratic Interregnum and Local Governments: - By show a discrepancy natural world; this learn is more worried on the up-to-the-minute round of devolution. Third autonomous interregnum in progress in 2008 after General Pervaiz Musharraf prepared to accept as President of Pakistan. The new-fangled elected government goes at a distance end to finish expunging the 1973 constitution from each and every one dictatorial trace by generally accepting the 18th amendment (PILDAT, 2010)¹⁴². It has restored the federal nature of the establishment and provided a legal safeguard to the third tier of a democratic system for the first occasion in the times gone by in Pakistan. These legitimate changes provided the most important necessary circumstances for augmentation and consolidation of democratic organization in Pakistan. The 18th Amendment in the establishment has devolved resources and on a daily basis jobs to the federate units and made it obligatory for all the local governments to behavior free and fair devolution of political, economic, and administrative power to third-tier of the government¹⁵. The thought behind this devolution is to make government additional responsive to the local requirements of citizens. Zaidi (2014)¹⁴³ has asserted an uncanny uncertainty on the fraction of independent governments to transfer power at grass ancestry level. The politicians at peak remain uncomfortable to this day –even if they be in the right place to be in possession of the party- on the subject of sharing authority with the local legislative body. Against the implication of the 18th Amendment in the background of establishing local governments, all four provinces have had finished local government elections. Interestingly, cantonment boards have as well designated their local legislative body for the first occasion in the times gone by in Pakistan. with no delving into the information of clientelistic arrangement of political affairs in Pakistan and linked moral hazard, we would quarrel that Pakistani common people is one of a good number politically moving in the the human race (Mohmand, 2011). The momentum of contribution in local elections, more than ever in rural, area stood extremely high. This far above the ground rate may be an ending of the size of the electorate smaller constituency intensify

¹⁴² PILDAT2010, Impact of 18th constitutional Amendment on Federation-Provinces Relations

¹⁴³ Zaidi, S2014, Rethinking Pakistan's Political Economy: Class, State, Power and Transition. Economic & Political Weekly.

competition that weakens competing parties to make use of every available vote 16. The velocity of participation, we quarrel, is not an exceptionally good pointer for strengthening the democratic organization and that the outcomes are hinging on the natural history of vote switch over especially when it comes to local body/government elections as it set the nucleus of the taken as a whole self-governing system/process¹⁷. The unceremonious institutions at the village/ward/union committee level work according to their have possession of local sharing of power in the middle of different social irritated sections and the logic of government, of spoils, of reciprocity. These local circumstances directly power the political choice and shape the decision of voters more often than not disregarding trustworthiness to any abstract accepted wisdom of citizenship, group action, democratic organization or philosophy. This prevails in Pakistan- The vote swap over exists. now a look at fresh elections would be sufficient to locate the pressure of informal institution at local stage as furnished in the next segment. Cantonment Elections: The individuality Pull After a number of hiccups, reversals, and claims, the first stage of local government elections (in cantonments) accomplished in May 2015. A short overview of the results possibly will help in ascertaining and illustrating implications for universal local governments. The characteristic of the cantonment election in Pakistan, under arrest on 25th April 2015 in 56 cantonments transversely the country, was “traits pull”. The high frequency of independent candidates winning their constituency reflects the occurrence of “personality-pull” that candidates use to secure their constituency. One conceivable explanation possibly will be the being there of clientelistic associations. While interpreting the consequences, another caution has got to be experimental that seats disappearing to the political party did not robotically reflect the attractiveness of any exacting party as face-to-face communication between contender and voters is far above the ground in local election thus the attribute of Biradri¹⁸ and standing of candidate position at top in political rivalry. Also it is submitted that party bosses vigilantly looked for a charming horse whether s/he belongs to their position or not. It is attractive to note that cantonment areas are more often than not adjacent to cities and occupied by aloft mobile social groups endowed with superior stocks of human beings, social, and bodily capitals these groups more often than not get pleasure from a standard of living to which Zaidi (2014)¹⁴⁴ has described as urbanism tinted by urban civic sensibilities and high-consumerist civilization. The independents broken up grabbing

¹⁴⁴ Zaidi, S2014, Rethinking Pakistan’s Political Economy: Class, State, Power and Transition. Economic & Political Weekly,

a high-quality share of the total vote polled on the day in these predominately urban centers This political emptiness is in a meeting by kinship structure shaping political relations at local height. The kinship mediates stuck between condition and civilization, and old enlightening logic of physically powerful men most important the group of people prevails. Literature and consequences of up till now conducted local elections in Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and the cantonment elections crossways the motherland displayed that; modified politics prevailed in local political dynamics in the country. This political judgment persists crossways regional, racial, provincial and expansion level differential. The made to order politics accordingly affect the appointment patterns and associate versa. The conclusion has an imperative bearing on the expectations of the democratic delegation discussed in the individual section of the learning at hand. To search out a microscopic point of view of the appointment dynamics, we go into the meadow the learning of the constituency members and ballot vote behaviors. The next segment provides the micro confirmation on the factor underlying the switch over of taking part in a ballot in local government elections. Practices of and perception on Voting in Local Elections: Evidence from review. To complement the confirmation of the previous discussion, the sequence was calm on practices and perception regarding ballot vote patterns on local elections. We would examine stimulus and compulsion which draw from a Pakistani voter to bring into play his/her correct to vote²¹. Chatterjee¹⁴⁵ (2013) has concurred that in post-colonial society the route of modernity and institutional manufacture is dissimilar from the one practiced in Europe. The civic and profitable associations that precede bureaucratic set up and contribution through political organization (voting) are wrong way up in post-colonial society. Here, it was the state achieve relative independence because of the Achilles' heel of civic and profitable relations. After self-government, the development of voting-franchise devoid of related socio-political settings of Europe has given the marginalized assemblage a duct from beginning to end through which their anxiety and aspirations possibly will flow. However, the being there of unequal community and economic patterns the voting practices have to remain differentiated, contrasting and contrary to the prospect of democratization theorists. Shandana (2008) accomplished that enlistment of marginalized group during Bhutto era was in a while curtailed, crushed, and co- opted by apolitical self-governing decentralization of Zia administration. All three preceding attempts of delegation have incentivized narrow-minded and made to order collective action

¹⁴⁵ Chatterjee, P2013, Lineages of political society: Studies in postcolonial democracy, Columbia University Press.

entrenched in local identity. The uneven trade and industry development has fashioned large social cleavages and proceeds inequality together with trade and industry insecurity which condensed any probability for nurturing straight and voluntary relatives. At a similar time, social arrangements and populist political agency remained broken because of unremitting institutional supremacy imbalances that non-representative institutions enjoyed in Pakistan replacing the communal gains with vested self-interest as the beginning brick of ballot vote decision in conditions of choice of applicant. The political affairs in the Punjab is benefaction based (Lyon 2002). The momentous trajectory in political breathing space adopt by Pakistani position, as discussed higher than, is a too decentralized dictatorship. That has dangerously reduced three key capacities that are pre-requisites of triumphant democratic devolution i) state capability to begin and organize decentralized institutional construction among poles apart levels of state ii) well-developed civil the social order that has full-fledged associational linkage and very a small number of social cleavages iii) A programmatic and ideologically interconnected political organization embedded in civil the social order at grassland roots level. Programmatic social gathering and a elongated tradition of modified politics, switch over votes through numerous vote-blocks at the village stage. The cementing building block is more often than not Biradri²², Neighborhood, or contender. The figure 3 below provides an approaching into the collection criteria for the voter in choosing the contestant (s) he has to vote.

Figure 1 Vote-Block criteria for choosing the candidate (%age)

S.No	Vote block	percentage
1	Biradari	40%
2	Neighbourhood	30%
3	Personal interest	20%
4	Religion	10%
5	Party	5%

Authors' calculation based on a survey (2015)

As is evident, the innermost pillar of voting is Biradri. Vote for Biradri beneficiary is its most widespread use in local elections (i.e. 37 %). The reason for voting Biradri fellows more often than not ranged from emotional and relational to ideological. Respondents were of estimation that life forms from their family connections such as politicians are comparatively easy to get to than others. the majority of the vote-block cream of the crop belonged to undeveloped Biradri; even though they could be in employment in another profession. These buildings block influential use all

source of representative, social, and corporeal capital to manufacture and maintain that vote- block. an additional majority of respondents take part in a ballot by intriguing into account their self-interest (30%). belief, a relatively significant vote pivot in countrywide elections, has approximately no production in local elections. conspicuously, the most noticeable absence is of class base voting, which in surroundings of social and trade and industry inequality indicates the nonappearance of horizontal cohesion and exhibits being there of clientelistic (vertical) political relations. Once built, clientelistic network sustained all the way through political resources, which sooner or later causes misuse of communal offices for assembly personal ends. The constitution of vote-block in each and every one guises incentivizes clientelistic relationships and internal dependence. Vote-blocks then advantageously tie themselves with candidates who, in their computation, could make available the best good buy. The vote-block leaders/brokers possibly will be connected with any one or supplementary political party and habitually act intentionally by making alliance with other counterpart at union council point. Such political relatives thwart any transformational capability of politics and lend a hand at the bottom of old patron-client kindred albeit in added instrumental zed ways. As is apparent from the previous conversation, the configuration of vote block has far-reaching implications for the local government elections. Given the less important scale of the constituency, a single most important block can be critical in victory/defeat. One vote-block at the bottom of any candidate consists of folks who gelled collectively for different reason and perhaps the loyalties of its constituent would transfer in next election. The voters are very cognizant about it and make use of it logically to their benefit. A look into the configuration of the voting bloc suggests that the incredibly limited experience of the common constituency to inclusive political affairs at local stage has completed political showground a place where usual notions of Izzat, competition, and reciprocity sway the voting pronouncement of any entity; the decisions incomplete by dhara bandi¹⁴⁶. Democratic devolution is seen more often than not as the most successful system to make communal policy further approachable to the requirements of citizens. The previous conversation, however, clearly manifest 16 that the attempts of top-down delegation with technocratic whim have unsuccessful to make situation and public guiding principle responsive to the requirements of political the social order more deep-rooted within the unceremonious

¹⁴⁶ Rafique, Zain., Khoo, Suet Leng, & Idrees, Muhammad Waqas: "Civic engagement among the youth: empirical evidence from Kashmir, Pakistan", *Humanomics*, Vol.32, n^o 3 (2016), pp. 376-388.

sector of the financial system. “I give you vote, what determination you give me” trend is experimental in the perspective of immediate individual gains extraction. Financial underdevelopment and top-down expansion model of state emotionally involved with apolitical transference has led to a personalization of affairs of state. The culture of benefaction has perfectly wielded with this representation of decentralization in Pakistan attenuating the political enlargement and restricting social conversion required for sustainable trade and industry growth and advance. The presence of local unceremonious political institutions dangerously undermines the autonomous nature of local political affairs because of the differential of power in the neighborhood. A vote switch, regulated by usual rules and informal institution set in in local cultural norms, is budding, which in the nonappearance of democratic political parties merely helps in recreating trade and industry inequalities into a political monarchy. The previous us role played by the situation in decimating progressive political and community narratives is more often than not responsible for the in-attendance state of associations. All family circle members vote as a element and this element is an additional a sub-element of a vote-block, dhara. Domestic and vote-block beginning take a mostly political decision. Therefore, even though people make payment in local elections the partaking is conditioned by an unceremonious institution of vote-blocks and Biradri³⁰. This being there of hierarchy made political parties superfluous in local equation of political affairs and request for analyzing consequences carefully. This political relaxed attitude is highly co-related with the in formalization of financial system. In formalization of economy is accordingly linked with this obtainable political relaxed attitude and variation in access to circumstances and marketplace which have an effect on the selection patterns. A preponderance of the manual labour force, in employment in informal subdivisions, is coalesced, manipulate or mandatory to negotiate and settle on terms of political achievement. The perplexed impact of these factors posits a quandary that demands new method of examination and critical perspective to comprehend such embryonic sociocultural phenomenon. Public guiding principle and democratization narratives must look at the process in a reflexive not a linear way. Most of the voters, in the absence of any cohesive programmatic party and a long tradition of personalized politics, exchange votes from beginning to end with multiple vote-blocks at the village plane. The cementing building block is more often than not Biradri, Neighborhood or behavior pull (candidate itself). nearly everyone of the vote-block privileged belonged to undeveloped Biradri although they may perhaps be employed in other profession. They use each and every one

sources of representative, social and corporeal capital to construct and continue that vote-block. The vote block then intentionally tied itself with candidates who, in its computation, could provide the most excellent bargain. The vote-block sustain it through increasing an internal pecking order and bargain mechanism. The organize principles or fundamental needs of these vote-blocks may perhaps be of dissimilar kinds and possibly will depend in the lead manifold power relations originating in different communal settings. This relaxed regulation of political achievement has serious implications for spokesperson democracy at huge. The social background for a well-organized and sustainable democratic delegation must be studied to make delegation purposeful and triumphant. The emergence of central point classes in Pakistan is not co-related with deepening of democracy and institutional expansion. The reasons are of in times gone by shaped interaction of focal point class within cooperation the state and community structure. The well-established nature of political affairs that pivot in the region of an unequal exchange of family member between political broker and voters, strengthens an internal dependence. Unlike the economic disinterested party, the role of political broker is more destructive, toward the back looking and domineering in nature. The programmatic and consistent political parties that could inefficiently mobilize citizens the length of horizontal solidarities is obligatory for deepening democratic organization. We quarrel that multiple challenge of good ascendancy, delivery of social utilities, social expansion and deepening of democratic organization can be meet only from first to last taking into explanation the local circumstance. Absence of cooperative action and deficient in of horizontal cohesion are big hurdle that democratic state at grass roots stage needs to triumph over. The economic dissimilarity, regard for kinship affinity and patronage entrenched within cultural arrangement are at odds with distinctive norms of contemporary political democratic organization. In order to rupture the hold of these tailored ways of politicking, within democratic and responsible political parties are argued to be a sine qua non for a spokesperson democracy but this alternative may fail to buy the proponents given the build of the social order and political parties. The maximum challenge dishonest ahead be the disobedience of clientelist relatives as this connection buy sustainability from the rationally made choices by the voters. Transformation is associated with newer forms of level-headedness and relationship as Weber in particular stated³⁵. The mounting rationality in an immature (increasingly informal) economy leads a balanced political agent to administer his/her continued existence through informal mediatory political institutions and relationships. The breakdown on

the part of situation to institute regulation of law and condition of basic requirements make politics a entertainment of rational calculations stripping missing its ethical and legitimate content. Social leaving out fragments the political freedom and turned vote into observable commodities. Thus, in front of economic lack of confidence and enriching dislocation, widespread voter is missing with only one alternative, i.e. to use his take part in an election as an apparatus and not a political responsibility. We assert that production the democratic devolution work, primarily, requirements the remedy waning away the benefaction bonds between the applicant and the person on the electoral roll. It is additional proclaimed that the interventions based on widespread practices of, for example, raising consciousness and humanizing the voter may be unsuccessful to generate the obligatory results as constituency members, given the state of affairs, are making choices judiciously and that they are in good health aware of the detail that vote can be second-hand as apparatus serving the self-interest most excellent. So, they do it. We bring to a close that making the development inclusive, ensure economic safekeeping and equitable profitable development and reshaping the financial system from principally informal to formal may diminish the clientelist relatives prevailing at the grassland roots of democratic organization and rally round reaping positives of independent decentralization in an atmosphere where collective grow takes lead more than the personal instantaneous gains in making a selection decision. in conclusion, we want to emphasize that the findings of this schoolwork in no way dishearten the role of democratic devolution in the dispensation of opportunity of economic happiness at the grass extraction level but give the impression of being at it impulsively. The disputation is that the environment, in which this role of independent decentralization can vocation, needs to be ensue ensured he higher answer and discussions, it can be completed that in Pakistan, for the duration of the military eras, local ascendancy systems and participatory reforms were well-known to legitimize the regime. Nevertheless, it promotes citizen participation and empowerment. On the different, each political government destabilized the citizen contribution and local domination and participatory reform. Moreover, it was completed that during the self-ruled government, conflicts sandwiched between local governments and provincial governments undermined decentralization reform. Currently, with a designated provincial and national government input, conflicts are arise between the province and local governments. While the local governments have modest revenue raising abilities and have successfully limited capability to decide their expenditures given that the preponderance

expenditure is in the forms of fixed “organization costs”, the liberation of most public services has now come underneath their purview. While these local governments’ outlook is still uncertain agreed their time-bound constitutional fortification, their limited economic support and disagreement with the provincial governments, what is understandable is that if they stay behind, it is likely to see a crash on the liberation of these public services. however, citizen contribution has been linked to triumphant institution construction, accountable local government and constant state-society relations. As discussed earlier, the constitution of Pakistan states that local government institutions have to make no doubt that all populace are provided with services to make happy their basic requirements, in observance of the hallucination of a developmental local government. Moreover, local administration agencies are predictable to involve populace in service liberation mechanism. In Pakistan, where nearly every one of the inhabitants is not attentive of their human rights, citizen contribution has the potential to transport change. A responsible, transparent and contribution-friendly local ascendancy system can simply be achieved from beginning to end empowerment and contribution of citizens. to end with, this study has completed that the current arrangement of citizen sharing is quite weak in the present local governance system. The recent system of citizen participation and local governance, due to aforementioned findings, is not practicable in Pakistan. underneath up and participatory ascendancy approaches are completely being unobserved by health and cleanliness sectors of Gujranwala. All the three famous components of local supremacy system, handy, financial and structural are not implemented as per the definite decentralized acts and regulations. For example, a local government organization, department or council is not structurally fit for the reason that federal or provincial lawmakers/ parliamentarians with the assistance of government officials are the most important decision-makers. Likewise, government institutions are not strong functionally as there is no instrument monitoring and evaluating the service liberation, project planning and accomplishment, involvement of the populace and other stakeholders. It was also originated that rule concerning citizen contribution and another participatory mechanism can without difficulty be manipulated even if they existed. in the same way, local government institutions have very incomplete financial independence. Mostly, they are needy on provincial government for their expenditures. Thus, the monetary component is also not enough. Precisely, the investigator is of the view that observable government organization in Pakistan, may it be two tiers, three tiers, did not reach the waged

people level and thus in addition discouragement citizen participation, bottom-up approach and participatory ascendancy. Thus, beneath these grave conditions, the researcher is of the observation that a proper vigorous legal framework, satisfactory to all stakeholders is desirable. Laws, acts and rules concerning local governance and participatory governance desired to be misrepresented. But there is a necessitate of following will to do these changes as it is not trouble-free, reason organism the socio and educational legacies of Pakistani the social order. In addition, with no bureaucratic and following will, it not be probable to conquer these lawful issues.

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