# ISRAEL FACTOR IN THE US POLICY TOWARDS IRAN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF OBAMA AND TRUMP ADMINISTRATIONS

Ву

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#### **DEDICATION**

With utmost devotions, I dedicated my whole work to my beloved and affectionate Parents, Sisters, Brother, Friends and Respected Staff of International Relations Department who have always been source of encourage ment, knowledge, illumination and wisdom for me, whose pray and guidance showed me the right path and made the blessing of Allah shower on me.

#### LIST OF ABBREVIATION

AIPAC American Israel Public Affairs Committee

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CISADA Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,

Accountability, and Divestment Act of

2010.

EU Europe an Union

FARA Foreign Agents Registration Act

HIV/AIDS Human Immunode ficiency Virus/ Acquired

Immunode ficiency Syndrome

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

ILSA Iran-Libya Sanction Act

IRGC Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

LEU Low Enriched Uranium

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCA National Security Council

PLO Palestine Liberation Organization

RJC Republican Jewish Coalition

RSF Regional Security Forum

TRR Tehran Research Reactor

UNSCR United Nation Security Council Resolution

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

#### **Abstract**

# Thesis Topic: Israel Factor in the US Policy Towards Iran: A Comparative Analysis of Obama and Trump Administrations

The Persian Gulf region's strategic significance is on the grounds that it contains more than two-thirds (66%) of the world current oil assets and connects three continents Europe, Africa and Asia. Iran's position on the North shores of Persian Gulf with full command over the strait of Hurmuz, the chokepoint that a large portion of the Middle East oil supplies need to go through, is strategically significant. Iran historically experienced the involvement of great powers because of its unique strategic location. Since the foundation of the state of Israel, the Middle East has been the most significant and complex area of American foreign policy. The impact of the Jewish lobby, among other things, is a dominant and extremely significant issue when considering US foreign affairs in the Gulf region. This Research has focused on Effects of various types of lobbying by Israel, as well as its attitude and effectiveness in US foreign affairs toward Iran and have highlighted unconditional US support to Israel and its impacts on Iran. This study aimed to examine the influence of Israeli lobby on the US foreign policy, especially of Obama and Trump period towards Iran. A leader's reasonable decision is critical to the effectiveness of foreign policy. During Obama and Trump's two presidential terms, US foreign policy with Iran was contradictory, with different patterns of dealing with Iran ranging from conciliation to antagonism, all based on American interests. Diplomacy is the only option to find a long-term solution to the security issues that Iran poses to the US in the Middle East. So, there is a need for non-confrontational policies that vanish hostile relations between the US and Iran and also bring stability in Middle East region.

#### INTRODUCTION

The fundamental motivating factor behind the United States of America's foreign policy is its national interest. Parties, such as Democrats and Republicans, notable leaders and legislators in Congress, public opinion, large-company owners, conference rooms, and pressure organizations, all play a role in the creation of foreign policy. The influence of the Israel lobby, among other things, is a dominant and extremely significant issue when considering US foreign policy in the Middle East region. The US diplomatic relations with Iran were established in 1883. Until Iran's oil was discovered, 1909 US interests were secondary in the region particularly in Iran to its global interests. In 1941 Anglo-Soviet invasion, US provided economic support and also sent 30,000 soldiers to Iran. When British left Persian Gulf (1969), Iran acted as the police man of the region and the significant American allay. Muhammad Raza Shan replaced his father in 1967 with the help of US which increased US involvement in Iran. In 1979 Ayatollah Khomeini brought Islamic Revolution in Iran which caused shifts in military and political arrangements in the Middle East.

Till 1979 Iran and Israel were having close geo-strategic friendship. As the first Iran Muslim country Iran established diplomatic relation with Israel. In 1956 S uez crisis, Iran provided oil to Israel.<sup>2</sup> Periphery Doctrine was also accepted by Muhammad Raza Shah. In Yom Kippur war 1973, Iran supported Israel and supplied it oil. This close relation came to an end by Iranian Revolution 1979. As Iran's power rose in the region, Israel's concerns heightened as well. Iran's foreign policy changed towards Israel to disrupt Israel's credibility and capacity to self-determination and made a shift from anti-Israel to pro-Palestinian. So, with Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, Iran's ties with radical states of Middle East and Jihadist groups as Hamas, Hezbollah and the Islamic Jihad further intensified their relations.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Dr. Nazir Hussain, "US-Iran Relations: Issues, Challenges and prospects," *Policy Perspectives* 12 (2015): 30-31

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Farhad Razaei, and Ronen A. Cohen "Iran's Nuclear Program and the Israeli- Rivalry in the Post-Revolutionary Era," *Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 10 (2014): 443-445.

The Israel Lobby in America has the greatest influence on the formulation of foreign affairs. In Israeli lobby individuals and organizations work in a way to impact US foreign policy in favor of Israeli and to establish a special connection between US and Israel.<sup>3</sup> The Israel lobby maintains influence in the US ranging from media to university campus. The Israel lobby maintains influence in the US ranging from media to university campus. AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) monitors what teachers write and teach about Israel to eliminate criticism of Israel and giving politicians clear incentives to adopt position that they favor in election sampans. 4 In the US, the Israeli Lobby is using different penetrating tools which work in two ways: formal and informal. AIPAC is one of the most powerful and more organized lobby which works formally while having powers in the fields of administration and law. This lobby always impact the key figures of Congress and Senate the majority of whom are supporters of Israeli Lobby in order to protect Israeli interests. Groups and organizations like Christian Right Organization, Southern Whites, Conservatives and Neo Conservatives considered also as a non-Jew agent do not work directly but informally as a facilitator for the Israel.<sup>5</sup> Inhabitant Jews in the US participate in political, social, and economic events, as well as volunteering their time and energy in support of Israel.

America provides Israel with consistent unconditional, diplomatic and economic support and main objective of the US in Middle East is the security of Israel and protection of its military basis in the region. That lobby itself is working with Israel to push US Middle East policy in ways that are not in US National Interest but are favorable to Israel interests and to gain a hegemonic position in the region. Iran tried to establish itself as a serious regional power through its nuclear program. Because Iran's officials have frequently said that "Israel must be wiped off the map" Israel is in bigger risk.

Iran's atomic program began in the 1950s with US assistance, but it lost Western assistant just after the Islamic revolution of 1979, and it has been contentious since 2000. The United States devised a set of energy and financial sanctions, which had

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, 32.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Stephen M. Walt and John J. Mearsheimer, *The Israel Lobby and U.S foreign policy* (London: Macmillan Audio,2006), 5-6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Marziehe Shakoori, "Effect of AIPC lobby on America's Foreign Policy Towards the Islamic Republic of Iran," Journal of Politics and Law 9 (2016): 129-131.

damaging impact on Iran's economy. President Bush addressed Iran as a part of 'Axis of Evil'. Barack Obama administration had a conciliatory tone towards Iran. Obama had expressed that US is willing to open process of communication with Iran and adjust its nuclear policy. 6 In 2009 Ahmadi Najad was elected in Iran. Obama administration tried several efforts to negotiate with Iran as the part of his policy but it was unproductive because Ahmadi Najad was a religious conservative. In 2003 Hassan Rouhani came in to Iran's. Hassan Rouhani was liberal reformer and more open to negotiation. Obama's administration sheered several policies with Hassan Rouhani's government. Obama adopted coercive diplomacy based on soft power 'punishment and containment 'than hard power military itinerary'. President Hassan Rouhani soft stance towards West and Obama's accommodative gesture paved way for negotiations on Iran nuclear issue. In September 2013 the p5+1 and Iran dialogue were started. US led international diplomatic efforts forced Iran to conclude the nuclear deal with p5+1 power in July 2015. However, two countries opposed this deal, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Jewish lobby also criticized the deal. Republican leader Donald Trump's election campaign in 2016 promised that he would withdraw from the deal. On 8<sup>th</sup> May, 2018 Trump declared the U. S withdrawal from the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) due to political reasons rather than Iran's noncompliance. Trump claimed Iran was violating core spirit of the agreement. US imposed multi-layered new sanctions on Iran. Death of general Qassem Soleimani on 3<sup>rd</sup> Jan 2020 bringing relations between US and Iran to a new low. So, U.S unconditional support to Israel and Iran nuclear program intensifies armed struggle in the Gulf Region, further disrupting this significant area.

#### **Statement of the Problem**

Although Iran claimed its nuclear program for peaceful purposes but Israel always perceived it as a security threat for itself in the Middle East. This threat perception gets intensified as Iran's authorities have stated numerous times that "Israel must be wiped off the map". Iran tried to build itself as a strong regional power through its nuclear

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Jin Liang xian, "Analysis on Obama Administration's Policy Adjustment of Iranian Nuclear Issue," *Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia)* 4 (2010):15-16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Dr Muhammad Riaz Shad and Tansir Abbas, "US withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal: The cases and the Implications," *Pakistan Journal of American Studies* 37 (2018): 1.

program. Israeli perception is that Iran with nuclear capability can potentially directly attack Israel, and United States and its asserts in the Middle East through intercontinental ballistic missiles. Israel builds connection with pragmatic Gulf states and the US an alternative camp to Iran in order as isolate it and control its regional strength.

Pro -Israeli lobby is advocated by diverse groups. Barack Obama's accommodative gesture has paved way for dialogue on the Iran nuclear issue so he then led international diplomatic efforts forced Iran to conclude the nuclear deal with p5+1 power in July 2015. This study has investigated Obama's policies towards Iran and formation of the Iran nuclear deal.

Jewish lobby groups also finance pro-Israeli Republican candidates during campaign for the 2016 presidential election to achieve pro-Israel political objectives. Israeli lobby deeply influential over President trump which lead to offensive initiatives from trump in favor of Israel. Trump took controversial decisions to relocate the US consulate in Israel to contested city of Jerusalem, recognizing Golan Heights as a part of Israel trough a presidential proclamation signed by Trump on March 25,2019 and unilateral withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear deal on which AIPAC dedicated \$20 million for an anti-deal campaign. This study has focused on Effects of various types of lobbying by Israel, as well as its attitude and effectiveness in US foreign affairs toward Iran and have highlighted unconditional US support to Israel and its impacts on Iran. Study has focused on to find out strategic importance of nuclear Iran and the reasons of trump withdrawal from JCPOA and implications of this unilateral act on the US itself and rest of the world and how US withdrawal from JCPOA have favored Israeli's interests.

This study aimed to examine the influence of Israeli lobby on the US foreign policy, especially of Obama and Trump regimes towards Iran.

# **Objectives of the Study**

Following are the objectives of this study

- To analyze Israel as a factor in the US Foreign policy to the Middle East.
- To examine the role of Israel in US foreign policy towards Iran since 2008.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Ibid, 10.

To analyze the influence of Israel on US foreign policy towards Iran during
 Obama and Trump administrations in comparative terms.

#### **Research Questions**

- 1. How does Israel stand as a factor in the US foreign policy to the Middle East?
- 2. How did Israel influence the US foreign policy towards Iran since 2008?
- 3. How has Israel influenced the US foreign policy towards Iran during Obama and Trump administrations in comparative terms?

# literature Review and Research Gap

On this study, there are numerous books, research articles, and relevant materials published, and each author has approached the subject from a unique perspective. This study relied on the following sources of information. The research article, "Effect of AIPAC Lobby on America's Foreign Policy towards the Islamic Republic of Iran (2016) by Marziehe Shakoori and Davood Kiani, has addressed defining the foreign affairs of any country i.e., a set of contribution at internal, national and international level factors. There are Prominent parties' groups and organizations are striving to alter US foreign policy and persuade legislators, officials, and cabinet members to influence their opinions and proposals to safeguard Israeli concerns. These lobbies work formally and informally. Author also investigates various influential Israeli groups, regime position, US foreign policy, roots of Israeli lobby, influential group's structure and penetrating tools (which include influence in Congress, Senate, White House, president, media, think tank and academic centers monitoring etc.). Authors also address the role and activities of the lobby in US foreign policy making process and the US impressionability by the lobby on foreign affairs against Iran and lobbies activities against Iran.

The book *The Israel Lobby and U. S foreign policy America* (2006) by two authors, Stephen M. Walt and John J. Mearsheimer, addresses Jewish lobby structure which rules America and Europe. Book examined one of the most prohibited issue in America. Authors describe extraordinary level of economic and diplomatic assistance of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Marziehe Shakoori, Davood Kiani and Masha Allah Heidarpour, "Effect of AIPC lobby on America's Foreign Policy Towards the Islamic Republic of Iran," *Journal of Politics and Law* 9 (2016): 129-136.

US to Israel. This distinctive relation is due to political influence and insecure alliance of personalities and groups constantly attempting to sway US foreign affairs in favor of Israel. Stephen M. Walt and John J. Mearsheimer describe the consequential impact of the lobby on US stance throughout the Middle East and the policies which lobby has supported are greatly damaging America's national interests and Israeli security in long term. The influence of the lobby also damages America's relations with significant key allies and intensify the dangers that many states face from global jihadist terror. Concerns about the impact of Zionist lobbying on America's foreign affairs regarding Iran, U.S and Israel interests are essentially identical. The function of the lobby is defined in detail in this book, Christian Zionism and lobby evolution over time. The content states Israel's past and present behavior towards Palestinians and highlights Israeli misconduct. Book also explains US unconditional support to Israel, US response to Iraq war, the power of the lobby and its harmful influence on US and Israeli interests. It also discusses US objectives in the Middle East and how the US and majority of the country should view the pro-Israeli lobby's impact.

"US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal: The causes and the implication "research article written by Dr. Riaz shad and Tansir Abbas (2018) addresses the historical context of Iran nuclear program which was initiated in 1950 with the help of US but lost western assistance after Islamic evolution in 1979 and became disputable from 2000 onwards. The imposition of hard sanctions, international diplomatic efforts, coercive policies and Hassan Rouhani's moderate approach forced Iran for the formation of the joint comprehension plan of action JCPOA with p5+1 in July 2015. <sup>11</sup> On 8<sup>th</sup> May, 2018 Trump announced the U. S withdrawal from the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) due to political reasons rather than Iran's noncompliance. Trump claimed Iran was violating core spirit of the agreement so US imposed multi-layered new sanctions on Iran. This article addresses the reasons of trump withdrawal from JCPOA and implications of this unilateral act on the US itself and rest of the world and how US

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Stephen M. Walt and John J. Mearsheimer, *The Israel Lobby and U.S foreign policy* (London: Macmillan Audio 2006), 24-25.

Audio,2006), 24-25.

11 Dr Muhammad Riaz Shad and Tansir Abbas, "US withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal: The cases and the Implications," *Pakistan Journal of American Studies* 37 (2018):11-17.

withdrawal from JCPOA would favor Israeli's interests. It also enlightens the role of the Jewish lobby on the US foreign policy and also on Trump administration.

"Iran's Nuclear Program and the Israeli-Iranian Rivalry in the Post-Revolutionary Era" research article (2014) by Farhad Razaei and Ronen A. Cohen states that Iran's pursuits of atomic weapons and regional power split has resulted in a fundamental competition between the two countries. This article has four parts first part covers the history of this hostile relationship between Iran and Israel. Before Islamic revolution 1979 Iran and Israel were having close friendly relations but after the Islamic revolution their came a major shift in their relationship which turned in to a hostile relations and struggle for regional supremacy. <sup>12</sup> Second section addresses the segmentation of major regional forces and the resulting confrontation. Iran's expansion in power, regional influence and its nuclear weapon ambition confront Israel military supremacy in thein the Gulf region. The third section deals with Iran atomic issue and concerns Israel. Iran with nuclear weapon can put Israel into a vulnerable position as it would encourage militant groups who are against Israel and can adopt more aggressive approach towards Israel. The fourth half concentrates on sanctions and disputes about what indicators might be effective in pressuring Iran to abandon its nuclear program.

"US-Iran Relations: Issues, Challenges and Prospects" research article (2015) written by Nazir Hussain analyses through historical backdrop, difficulties, and constraints, the US-Iran relationship has become even more antagonistic, with uncertain future possibilities. This article also addresses the continued US influence in Iran which caused anti American sentiments in Iran and Jewish lobby influence on US foreign affairs to Iran. To lessen the US Israel, influence in the regional security dynamics Iran had established relations with non-state actors. <sup>13</sup> It states Israeli perception about Iran nuclear weapon as an 'existential threat' to Israel's existence, as well as Iran's support for Hamas and Hezbollah as region allies. In the Gulf States security complex, the United States and Iran are inextricably intertwined. Both nations are linked by regional and international

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Farhad Razaei and Ronen A. Cohen, "Iran's Nuclear Program and the Israeli- Rivalry in the Post-Revolutionary Era," *Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 10 (2014): 1-19.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Dr. Nazir Hussain, "US-Iran Relations: Issues, Challenges and prospects," *Policy Prospective* 12 (2015):29-47.

security complexes in a variety of political, economic, and military aspects. So, both the countries need each other for regional security complex environment of the region.

"Analysis on Obama Administration's Policy Adjustment of Iranian Nuclear Issue" research article written by JIN Liangxiang unfolds Iran-US relations in Obama era. Barack Obama administration had a conciliatory tone towards Iran. Obama has expressed that US is willing to open process of communication with Iran and adjust its nuclear policy. <sup>14</sup> It was a major turning point as it was the considerable major diplomatic measure on Iranian nuclear weapon issue where America representatives were direct in talk with Iran and also promote the talks success. President Hassan Rouhani soft stance towards West and Obama's accommodating move opened the door to discussion on Iran issue. In September 2013 the p5+1-Iran negotiations were started and after many rounds of talk over 2 years on 14 July 2015 joint Comprehension Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed. Obama administration hailed it as a diplomatic victory. This research article analyzes the substance and scope of Obama's administration modifications on the Iran nuclear program in order to comprehend and evaluate the Obama administration's policy or ientation.

"Iran Nuclear Deal: Implications for the Middle East and Possibility of a Regional Security Forum" research article written by Muhammad Tehsin seeks to explain that because of strategic, economic and historical factors, the Gulf Region enjoys symbolic status in global politics. After the Suez Crisis in 1956, US involvement in the Middle East formally began mostly exercised through an alliance system. <sup>15</sup> This research article also talks about regional environment especially Iran Saudi relations. The focus of this article is also on the formation of complex and multilayered regional forum and need of intra-regional collaboration. Saudi Arabia must find ways to collaborate in the region. To lower the region's fragility and strengthen peace in the region, a Regional Security Forum (RSF) and a sophisticated and multi-layered collaborative structure are required. As only

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Jin Liang xian, "Analysis on Obama Administration's Policy Adjustment of Iranian Nuclear Issue," *Journal of Middle Fastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia)* 4 (2010): 14-31

Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) 4 (2010):14-31.

15 Dr Muhammad Tehsin, "Iran Nuclear Deal: Implications for the Middle East and Possibility of a Regional Security Forum," IPRI Journal 17 (2017): 49-68.

JCPOA could not solve all the regional issues but can provide framework and patterns for regional cooperation.

"Current perspectives of Tehran's nuclear program: Iranian necessity versus US hostility" research article written by Md. Abul Kalam Azad article attempts to explore that the nuclear program has become the point of contention between Iran and the US. As US encouraged Iran's Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi to establish nuclear program in 1957 but with the start of 1979 Islamic Revolution, a new phase of hostile relations between Iran and the US started. 16 When Iran restarted its temporarily-halted nuclear program, the US not only opposed it but also showed its strong hostility towards Iran and imposed series of sanctions on it. This article deals with Iran's pursuits of nuclear weapons under different perspectives economic, military and political. US perspective towards Iran nuclear program. As Iran claiming nuclear program only for civilian (nuclear energy) and for peaceful purpose but US rejected that claim as Iran has huge oil (5<sup>th</sup> world largest oil reserves country) and gas reserves (3<sup>th</sup> world largest gas reserves country). US claiming that Iran sponsored terrorism and backing extremist Islamic antiwestern organizations from Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine namely Hizballah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. So, the transfer of nuclear weapon to these organizations would be a threat for US and Israel as Israel is the strongest ally of US in the Middle East whose security is the primary objective of the US in the Middle East. US perceives that Iran with nuclear weapons could revoke US hegemonic position in the Middle East, increase its political and ideological position in the region which could harm Israeli security, undermine US interests in the Middle East and could disturb balance of power in the region. US hostility towards Iran's nuclear program is still going on even after concluding a negotiated deal over the nuclear program between Iran and six world powers including the US during the Obama administration in 2015.

"The United States, Iran and the Middle East's New Cold War" research article two authors Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett addresses that today Middle East is divided in to two camps which can be described as a new 'Cold War' for regional

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Md. Abul Kalam Azad, "Current Perspectives of Tehran's Nuclear Programme: Iranian Necessity Versus US Hostility," *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bangladesh (Hum.)* 63 (2018): 17-37.

hegemony. Those two types of division in the Middle East can be described as: on one side there are those states who are willing to work in different forms of strategic alliances with the US and accepting US hegemonic position over the region. This camp includes Israel, those states who have made peace with Israel (Egypt and Jordan), Moderate Arabs (Saudi Arabia) and rest of Gulf Cooperation Council. On other side comprises those Middle Eastern states and non-state actors who are unwilling to legitimize US hegemonic position over the region included Iran (perceive as leader of this camp), Syria, non-state actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Qatar and Turkey also included on some issues. Authors also address that this better relation needs to improvement between Iran and the US otherwise it could erupt in a large-scale military confrontation. Readjustment of the US and Iran relations can only be achieved through a comprehensive rapprochement.

"Iran Nuclear Deal: Implications for Regional Security" written by two authors Nazir Hussain and Sannia Abdullah addresses that diplomacy is the best tool to resolve contention among states. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was the outcome of diplomatic efforts of p5 +1 and Iran to resolve Iran nuclear issue since 2002. 18 The Iran Nuclear Deal is the result of twelve years of diplomacy, negotiations and compromises. Despite of the resistance from its two strategic allies Israel and Saudi Arabia, Obama tries to secure regional peace with Iran Nuclear deal which has direct implications for the middle East and Gulf states. The deal was a win win situation for both the sides especially for Iran as its economy would boost up with that deal. This article deals with Iran's nuclear controversy, negotiation process of the deal, JCPOA and its implications on regional security, deal's opportunities for the rest of the world. Arab states and Israel perceive that to lessen the US and Israeli influence in the regional security dynamics Iran had established relations with non-state actors and after the removal of sanctions Iran would invest in proxy wars in Lebanon, Yemen and Syria to increase its political influence in the region for regional hegemony. Only national interests are permanent in international political system.

#### Research Gap

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, "The United States Iran and the Middle East's New Cold," *The International Spectator* 45(2010):76-87.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Nazir Hussain and Sannia Abdullah, "Iran Nuclear Deal: Implications for Regional Security," *Journal of Political Studies* 22 (2015):475-493.

After the analysis of the literature review following research gap has been observed that it is the perception that Israel being factor influence US policies in the Middle East for their own interests. This study focused on Middle East which is the vital conflict-ridden region of the world. It has also analyzed the Israeli factors in the US policy towards Iran. This study also has investigated Israeli factor in the US foreign policy during Obama administration (2009-2012 to 2012-2016) and Trump administration from 2016 towards Iran and Iran Nuclear Deal. After reviewing the literature regarding the topic, it has been observed that a lot of work has been done regarding the influence of Israeli lobby in US foreign policy, however in the wake of recent US-Iran escalation the impact of Israeli lobby their interests has not been highlighted in detail, at the same time there has been a wide difference in US policy towards Iran during Obama and Trump administration. So, there is a need to find out the different influence of Israeli lobby under the both administrations. Therefore, this study would be contributing in filling the research gap by comparing the influence of Israeli lobby on both administrations.

# **Major argument/ Core Argument**

It is a dominant perception that Israel deeply influences the US policies in the Middle East in its own interests. The influence of Israel on US foreign policy, US unconditional support to Israel and Tensions over Iran's nuclear program are escalating an armed conflict in the Middle East, which might further destabilize this vital region.

# Theoretical / Conceptual Framework

Neo classical realism is an approach to foreign policy analysis initially coined by Gideon Rose. Gideon Rose published an article in 1998 "Neo Classical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy" in which he presented a new vision for realist understanding of the world which became the foundation of "Neo Classical Realism Approach". Similar argument was presented by Fareed Zakaria (co-founder of neo classical realism) in "From Wealth to Power: The Unseal Origins of America" (1998) and "Realism and Domestic Politics" (1992).

Neo classical realism is a new glance at classical realism and neo realism. Neo classical realism is consequence of foreign policy studies through studying structure of international system, domestic intervening factors and complex interaction between them. The main objective of this theory is to discover power distribution in international system, motivations and subjective structures of unit towards international system which shapes their foreign policy. <sup>19</sup> Gideon Rose and Fareed Zakaria combined classical realism and neo realism which deals with "autonomous realms" and added domestic factors and irrationality into state behavior. Neo classical realism assumes that domestic factors unit level (political system, decision making process, leader's perceptions, values, culture, states institutions, elite's perceptions, social actors, regime ideology, regime type and nationalism) matter and influence state's behavior. While external threats (systemic factor) are still considered as the key driver of foreign policy. This allows irrational behavior.

Gideon Rose also argues that theories of foreign policy can be characterized in two groups. The one is Innenpolitik theories of liberals in early twentieth century which talk about state behavior at domestic level politics nature of human, mental and intellectual perception of leadership, ideology, economy, decision making processes, nature of local regime decide nation's act towards rest of the world Foreign policy is related to country's internal dynamics. The other is structural theories which focuses on international structure which define state's behavior. This was a completely new development in the conditions of previous realist concepts because before that concept both classical realism (Hans Morgenthau) neo realism (Kenneth Waltz) argued that Domestic affairs are of no significance. It does not matter that what is the nature of political regime, what is the system of forming foreign policy, who really occupied the presidential chair, who is the head of the state and what are his aims, but it is the anarchic international system which drives state behavior.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Jalal Dehghani Firoozabadi and Mojtaba Zare Ashkezari, "Neo-classical Realism in International Relations," *Asian Social Science* 12 (2016):95.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Mentor Beqa, "Neoclassical Realism: Its Promises and Limits as a Theory of Foreign Policy," *European Academic Research* v (2017):322.

Neo classical realism claims that foreign policy of a state is not only affected by external factors but also by domestic factors. As neoclassical realism theory drawn from thoughts of classical realism and structural realism (defensive realism) which deals with "autonomous realms". Realist thought that Foreign policy is driven first by state's position in international system and through its relative material capabilities. Thomas Hobbes talks about conflictual nature of international relation, it's a jungle, anarchy is the standard, order, equity, justice and morality are the exemptions, politics is led by objective laws established in human nature. In international system, politics is struggle for power egoistic, states peruse their objectives defined in terms of power. Domestic politics is hierarchal and organized but international politics is based on anarchy.

Neo realism talks about the nature of international system and politics. In anarchical environment unitary actors try to survive with the help of self-help, rational states are motivated by security desire which they achieve by maximizing their relative power. It talks about balance of power which is achieved through competition and interaction of actors. International anarchic system forces state to obtain self-help continuously. To achieve security rational states, try to expand. States feel secure and act calmly when get defense advantage over technology and geography.

Kenneth Waltz's theory of neo realism (balance of power) argued that systemic pressures formulate state's foreign policy behavior. Realist do not reject that internal factors influence state foreign policy, yet the pressure of international competition is worth more than ideological and political pressures. Structural realism depicts international politics through systemic analysis and the impact of anarchical system occurred on unit without any additional elements acting as mediators while neo classical realism claimed that impact of anarchical environment on units occurred through mediating factors. Neo classical realism did not completely deny the systemic explanation but focuses on combining systemic and until level intervening variables in the study of foreign Policy formation of a unit which has its roots in domestic politics.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay," *International Security* 17 (1992):180.

According to Zakaria liberals and constructivists follow an inside out view of Foreign policy in which internal factors determined states foreign policy behavior.

According to Neo Classical realism Interaction between any two of the units is affected by much more or than simply their relative military power and GDP or by their particular institutions, ideologies and internal group interests. States geopolitical position, historical background of their past interactions and with other politics, core decision makers perception as well as the expectation of the other party's react, shapes the decision-making process. For state's security the domestic politics played a main role in deciding its Foreign Policy. This theory focuses on unit level intervening variables and relative material power which is interpreted and operationalized in to the conduct of state actors which shapes state's behavior. Systemic pressures are interpreted through unit level intervening factors elite's perceptions and domestic state structure. <sup>22</sup> So according to neoclassical realism foreign policy is consisted on combination of domestic level intervening variables and independent variables. This theory deals with Internal and external factors how psychological, cultural and ideational factors may force, how political actor's perception about capabilities of own and others which may translate further into foreign affairs.

New classical realism evaluates foreign policy and international politics through focusing on relative capabilities of states in anarchical international system as independent variable, structure of state elite perception towards decision making as intervening variables and conduct of states in international systems as dependent variable (result of foreign policy), leader perceptions and evaluations towards relative power unit have great significance according to neo classical realism.

This theory clarifies how, why and under what conditions internal factors of state as its capacity to assemble militaristic political institution, impact of inside social actors, interest groups and other cultural components remain and mediate among decision makers perception from international threats and opportunities and their conduct in international system as foreign affairs. Neo classical realism argues that systemic factors

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics 51 (1998): 152.

as well as internal factors of states effect state behavior in anarchical system. It is the perception and misperception of the states to indulge in arms struggle. So, decision makers perceptions and values effect the relation among relative capability and foreign policy of unit, perception of leaders are core reasons of specific foreign affairs. It is the major difference among neo realism and neo classical realism.

The history of the Peloponnesian war composed by Thucydides might be known as the primary version of neo classical realism in which the primary cause of the war was the inclination of fear among Spartans due to increase in relative power of Athens, threat perception of Sparta where systemic variables are interpreted through unit level intervening variables in to foreign policy of different Greek city states. So systemic motives (losing balance of power) and unit variables of Greek city -state (fear perception of losing balance of power) foreign policy crucial to comprehending foreign policy.

Neo Classical realism argues that idea matters specifically when that idea is given by powerful individuals, state is collection of individuals which form system, institution, bureaucracies and leaders. As perceptions, capabilities and personality of a president can directly influence foreign policy of a state. Adolf Hitler's gained power and Lebensraum Turned in to an ideological rule of Nazism and gave justification for the German territorial expansion into Central and Eastern Europe during (1930-40). It specified that Germany required a Lebensraum essential for its survival and that the greater part of the Central and Eastern Europe would need to be removed permanently. Hitler was adopting ideology of Nazism which was the extreme form of German nationalism which was reflected into Germany foreign policy towards the world. There are ideological, strong international, domestic, bureaucratic and personality-based reasons for Germany aggressive behavior.<sup>23</sup>

World war II may have wiped out the Axis but it did not bring hierarch between the victorious allies and brought endless disputes among superpowers from 1940s to 1980s because of ambiguities of relative power and policy makers perceptions. During Cold War USSR struggled to captured a share of international spoils, impact abroad, authority over institutions, glory and respect. The US perceived its own abilities to be greater and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Ibid. 159.

more enhanced US attempted to counter USSR global role. US and USSR during the cold war perceived their relative power capability differently which drove the two forces to react in the different way, clashing or contradictory with neo realist's thoughts that unit with similar situation in the system would respond similar way to systemic pressure. US success and USSR expansionism's failure were causes due to West more vital relative economic strength, technological gap between two blocks and productivity between capitalism and communism.

Neo Classical realism combines factors of micro and systemic theories, so as give clearer perception of state foreign affairs. Systemic pressures are interpreted through unit level intervening factors, alite perceptions and domestic state structure which formulate state's foreign policy. US external behavior consists of US decision makers perceptions, Sino US cooperation (economic) during 1970 is example of combine realist desire to balance against USSR. US chines leadership felt constrained to mobilize national assets so as to react perceives shift in international balance of power engage in "internal balancing" against perceived fear and threat.

Neo Classical realism assumes that domestic factors unit level (political system, decision making process, states institutions, elite's perceptions, social actors, regime ideology, regime type and nationalism) matter and influence state's behavior. It was a perception that Bush core decision makers Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice president Dick Cheney were highly influenced by Israeli lobby. After the incident of 9/11 US Foreign policy has been highly influenced by domestic agenda and by threatening international environment. As it was a perception that US security was at stake (major security crises), Bush was forced to switch policy. So, to safeguard and continue its prestige as a hegemon which was declined in the eye of the world after 9/11. That threat perception became more intensified with the advancement of nuclear weapon and missile innovation by alleged rogue states (Iran, Iraq, North Korea). Bush officials and Israeli lobby spread the perception/propagated through difficult tools that Iraq had a nuclear program, US imposed sanctions on Iraq and then attacked on Iran mainly out of security worries over WMD and also to toppled Saddam regime because of his policies. US also attacked on Afghanistan against Al-Qaeda and its supporters Taliban.US

decision makers were not primarily threatened by an excepted attack by these rogue nations rather it would be difficult for US to successfully intervene in the gulf or the Far East.


As according to neo classical realism Foreign policy decisions are formulated by political leaders and elites, so their relative power perception maters a lot, but they do not always have entire authority to extract and direct national resources according to their choice. Reliance of state from civil society, political alliances, organizational politics and its relation among military and civil area all collectively influence leaders how to deploy resources.

Neo classical realism theory is helpful to understand US policy towards Iran specifically in Obama and Trump era. Israeli lobby (individuals and organizations) works in a way to influence US foreign policy in a pro-Israeli direction and promotes a special relationship between US and Israel. The Israel lobby maintains influence in the US ranging from media to university—campus. AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) monitors what teachers write and teach about Israel to eliminate criticism of Israel and give politicians clear incentives to adopt position that they favor in election sampans.

During Obama era, Israeli lobby places some of its missionaries to sit on critical position in the government to influence US foreign policy. Israel, Americans and Americans Jews expectations with Obama's administration, have held serious reservations about his policies in the Middle East especially towards Iran on signing Iran Nuclear Deal. Through multiple initiatives, pro-Israeli forces amplified views against the Iran Deal in impact public perception and policy authorities. AIPAC spent \$20 million on an anti-deal effort that comprised debates and advertisements in printing and online media. On 8<sup>th</sup> May 2018 US announced withdrawal from Iran Nuclear Deal under Trump Administration.

Israeli lobby has deep influence over President trump which leads to offensive initiatives from trump in favor of Israel. Trump took controversial decisions to relocate the US consulate in Israel to the contested city of Jerusalem, recognition of Golan Heights as a part of Israel through a presidential proclamation signed by Trump on March

25,2019 and unilateral withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear deal on which AIPAC dedicated \$20 million for an anti-deal campaign. Trump said, "defective at its core" and "Therefore, I am announcing today, that the United States will withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal". Speaking at a press conference in West Jerusalem, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu praised Trump's decision "Israel fully supports President Trump's bold decision today to reject the disastrous nuclear deal with the terrorist regime in Iran" and "Israel has opposed the nuclear deal from the start because we said that rather than blocking Iran's path to a bomb, the deal actually paves Iran's path to an actual arsenal of nuclear bombs and this within a few years' time". Sha neo classical realism claims that domestic factors drive the foreign policy of the state along with systemic factor. As the Israeli lobby has an influence on US domestic politics and it also convinces US administration through different tools, to mold the US foreign policy in Israeli interests.



# Research Methodology

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> "Donald Trump declaration US withdrawal from Iran Nuclear Deal," *Aljazeera*, accessed May 8,2021, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/donald-trump-declares-withdrawal-iran-nuclear-deal-180508141155625.html">https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/donald-trump-declares-withdrawal-iran-nuclear-deal-180508141155625.html</a>.

<sup>25 &</sup>quot;World leaders react to US withdrawal from Iranian nuclear deal," *Aljazeera*, accessed May 9,2021, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/world-leaders-react-withdrawal-iranian-nuclear-deal-180508184130931.html">https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/world-leaders-react-withdrawal-iranian-nuclear-deal-180508184130931.html</a>

This research has been conducted for academic purpose. Middle East is the most important region of the world as it is conflict riding region with huge natural resources. It is a deep perception that US foreign policy is highly influenced by Israeli lobby specifically towards Iran so it is a worthful topic for research. This study is descriptive, analytical and explanatory in nature based on doc uments. This study aims to analyses and explain the Israeli influence on the US policy towards Iran especially in Obama and Trump regimes for this qualitative research method has been used. There are two methods regarding data collection methods qualitative and quantitative. This study is essentially qualitative in nature with historical and analytical approach. In social sciences qualitative research methods is used to analysis the problem. Qualitative methods are related to strategies of date collection and data analysis of non-numeric data. Qualitative methods are utilized to understand and make sense of the world around us, and needs emphasis on interpretation and procedures that shape international affairs which is done through in-depth studies of particular events, phenomena, regions, states, organizations and individuals. Qualitative research method based on collection and analysis of nonnumeric data that is in the form of spoken or written language but not in number. Qualitative research method provides a broader range of methods to research scholars which they can use for broader range of research. In this qualitative research non-numeric data about the penetrated effect of Jewish lobby on the US policy towards Iran have been collected and analyzed.

#### Collection of data

Mostly scholars of international relations used strategies for qualitative data collection are in form of interviews, focus groups, internet-based research and archival or document-based research. Archival or document-based research documents include treaties, official reports, legislation, policy statements and media report. Those documents are in two different forms primary source documents and secondary source documents. Primary source documents are those documents which are original documents wrote by those who had direct access or directly experienced to the information which they are writing. Secondary source documents include those documents which make reference, analysis, interpretation, generalization of the original information. In research interviews are conducted for factual data about a certain phenomenon, events to get the opinions of

an interview participant. Focus group is a kind of group interviewing to gain opinion in the context of social interaction on particular topic or question. Internet based research is based on using internet to gain authentic scholarly material which includes authentic journal articles and books to collect information about research topic.

Most of the data for this research has been collected from secondary sources which includes various books, opinion articles, research papers, journal publications and websites. Books are the most significant source of data collection. For this research different books have been considered and reviewed such as book written by western scholars Stephen M. Walt and John J. Mearsheimer The Israel Lobby and U. S foreign policy America (2006). Different research articles written by known academic scholars from journal publications have been considered for this study to answer the research questions. Data has been collected from different journals published in well-known journals such as IPRI Journal, Journal of Middle Eastern studies, Pakistan Journal of American Studies, the International Spectator, Journal of Politics and Law. Government publications have also used as basic source. Various libraries for example, National Library of Pakistan, HEC library, Z-library (online), have been considered along with browsing websites on the internet. This study aims to identify the impact of Israeli lobby on the US foreign affairs towards Iran, its causes and implications on this vital region along with the possible solution to this problem in descriptive and explanatory way. This study will contribute to highlight the importance of US foreign policy towards Iran and instigate an academic debate on this pressing topic.

#### Analysis of data

Once qualitative data is collected the process of data analyzing stared. In this study documentary analysis technique was followed and relied on secondary published sources such as journal articles, news, papers and books.

So, the authentic data have been analyzed after the collection of required data, and it has been justified that how Israel factor influence US policies towards Iran in Obama and Trump administration. Through discourse analysis, role of Israeli lobby on US policies specifically towards Iran can be understand clearly that why this influence has emerged and become dominant. The contemporary research is an important addition to the field of

research regarding the influence of Israeli lobby on the US foreign policy towards Iran and provides a comparative analysis of Obama and Trump administration and will initiate an academic debate on this prestigious topic. The current study will be a useful addition to the field of research on international relations and will cast shadow on triangular relationship among countries and their consequences. It will provide a guiding outline to future researchers about US-Iran relationship. The contemporary research will be an important document for policy makers to get the information about importance of Israel in US policies and its efforts on Muslim Ummah. The contemporary research will help policy makers and politicians to understand the degree of Israel influence on super power's foreign policy and then they can further get a better understanding on this topic.

# **Significance of the Study**

The contemporary research will be an important addition to the field of research regarding the influence of Israeli lobby on the US foreign policy towards Iran and provides a comparative analysis of Obama and Trump administration and will initiate an academic debate on this prestigious topic. This study has mainly focused on the impact of various types of Israeli lobbying, as well as its direct operations, stance, impressionability, and efficiency in US foreign affairs toward Iran. The study has analyzed the perception of US unconditional support of Israel and its impacts on Iran.

Barack Obama's accommodative gesture has paved way for dialogue on the Iran nuclear issue so he then led international diplomatic efforts forced Iran to conclude the nuclear deal with p5+1 power in July 2015. This study has also investigated Obama's policies towards Iran and formation of the Iran nuclear deal. The study focused on the influential role of Israel on Trump administration, reasons of trump withdrawal from JCPOA and implications of this unilateral act on the US itself and rest of the world and how US withdrawal from JCPOA would favor Israeli's interests. The current study will be a useful addition to the field of research on international relations and will cast shadow on triangular relationship among countries and their consequences. It will provide a guiding outline to future researchers about US-Iran relationship. The contemporary research will be an important document for policy makers to get the information about importance of Israel in US policies and its efforts on Muslim Ummah. The contemporary

research will help politicians to understand the degree of Israel influence on super power's foreign policy and then they can further able to guides policy makes positively.

#### **Delimitation**

Israeli lobby is manipulating US foreign affairs in the Gulf region specifically for Iran. Lobby is defined with its political agenda not religion or ethnicity. Iran tried to establish itself as a regional power through its nuclear program which is a direct threat for Israel's security as Iran's leaders have repeatedly declared that "Israel must be wiped off the map".

The United States has devised a set of energy and financial sanctions that are also promoted by Israel, which seems to be damaging Iran's economy. <sup>26</sup> US main interest in Middle East is the safety and security of the Israel, therefore US is involved in number of regional conflicts, to enhance Israeli dominance over the region.

This study has focused only on the Middle East which is the vital conflict ridding region of the world, and further it has analyzed the Israeli factor in the US policy towards Iran. This study has also investigated the Israeli factor in the US foreign policy during Obama administration which started from 2009-2012 to 2012-2016. Further it has investigated the Israeli role in the Trump administration from 2016 towards Iran and Iran Nuclear Deal.

#### **Organizational Structure**

This study has five chapters in total.

Introduction part consists of statement of the problem, objective of the study, research questions, literature review, theorical framework, research methodology, significance of the study and delimitations.

Chapter 1 covers historical background in which Iran -US relations journey from old friend to new enemy (pillar become foe), Cold War and Post-Cold war Geopolitical Order and policies of US Presidents towards Iran, Iran- Israel relations convergence from companionship to animosity will be discussed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Marziehe Shakoori, "Effect of AIPC lobby on America's Foreign Policy Towards the Islamic Republic of Iran," *Journal of Politics and Law* 9 (2016): 129-130.

Chapter 2 is about the performance and impressionability of Israeli lobby on the US foreign policy, US unconditional support to Israel and Israeli lobby, lobby's influence and its negative impact on US interests will be discussed.

Chapter 3 of this thesis is an analysis of the influential role of Israeli lobby on US foreign policy towards Iran.

Chapter 4 has discussed the influential role of Israel on Barack Obama and Donald Trump's policies towards Iran.

Chapter 5 is the comparative analysis of US foreign policy during Barak Obama and Donald Trump administration. It also covers the conclusion, findings and recommendations.

#### CHAPTER-1

# **Historical Background of US-Iran Relations**

Iran historically experienced the involvement of great powers because of its unique strategic location. Iran's position on the North shores of Persian Gulf with full command over the strait of Hurmuz, the chokepoint that a large portion of the Middle East oil supplies need to go through, is strategically significant. The Persian Gulf region's strategic significance is on the grounds that it contains more than two-thirds (66%) of the world current oil assets and connects three continents Europe, Africa and Asia. When the British left in 1971 the US assumed control of the Persian Gulf with some economic and political objectives such as safeguarding free flow of oil and security of Israel.

Policies have an influence along both parts as they move from state to region to global scale, or vise - versa. Both countries' foreign affairs decision forming bodies, the US Congress and the Iranian Majlis, are governed by hardline groups that seek to prevent better possibilities. Multiple entities make up the US political decision forming body, including the White House, which is supported by the National Security Council (NSC) and the CIA, the Department of Defense, the State Department, Congress, and the Pentagon. The National Security Council (NCS) is the president's top decision forming council, consisting of important cabinet officials, secretary of state, national security advisor, and finance, as well as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense. NCA guides the president in deciding the security policies of the country. Congress can approve any legislation under the law considered 'necessary and proper'

and can even neglect Presidential powers. In the past and at present US congress is influenced by the hardliners and hawkish who resisted any Iran agreement. Iranian decision-making body is based on three schools of thoughts radical, conservative and moderate. Radical, led the way by Larijani and Shamkhani see inherent animosity among Iran and West, believes negotiations as a defeat. Conservatives, led by Ayatollah Khamenei, perceived that US will never abandon its hegemonic stance over the world but do not reject negotiations options. Moderates such as Rafsanjani, Khatami and Rouhani support negotiations and also believe in the hostility of West and US. They pay key role in decision making process in Iran.

# 1.1 Journey from Old Friend to New Enemy (pillar became foe)

In the 19<sup>th</sup> century US missionaries arrived in Persia and established their diplomatic relations with Iran in 1883. Till the discovery of oil, US interests in the Middle East were secondary than to its global interests. Soon due to US economic and commercial interests, US established its friendly relations with Iran. Till 1941 US security interests did not come forward, in 1941 Anglo -Soviet occupation Iran which considered America as its strong allay, US provided economic support and also sent 30,000 soldiers to Iran. On September 16,1941 Muhammad Raza Shan replaced his father with the help of US which increased US involvement in Iran. Muhammad Raza Shah adopted and maintained pro-Western foreign policy especially pro US. During 1950 struggle was going on between Muhammad Raza Shah and Muhammad Mosaddegh to control the government of Iran. In 1951 Muhammad Mosaddegh presented a bill in the Majlis to nationalize the huge British petroleum interests in Iran. Mosaddegh as prime minister. But in 1953, with the support of US and British, Muhammad Raza Shah restored power.

That growing involvement of the US was not viewed friendly by the Nationalist forces and aroused Islamic leadership in Iran when Muhammad Mosaddegh (democratically elected prime minister) was overthrown by coup (1953) by US backed counter-coup strengthen monarchical rule of the Shah which increased and strengthened

US involvement in Iran. In 1956 Suez crisis, Iran provided oil to Israel.<sup>27</sup> When British left Persian Gulf (1969), Iran acted as the police man of the region and the significant American allay. After more than two decades Ayatollah Khomeini gained sufficient backing to lead a revolution and replace shah and remove US economic, military and political influence from Iran and adopted the 'Neither East nor West' policy. Iran's combative and confrontational approach benefited the country domestically but resulted in global solitary.<sup>28</sup> It persisted during Khomeini's revolutionary period and then Muhammad Ahmadinejad's administration.

To bring desired changes, US has been involved in Iran for regime change in 1942 and 1953 even in revolutionary Iran, as in 2009 Mir Hussain Mousavi was supported by US for presidency but that support was discarded by US when this was discovered Mir Hussain Mousavi was the follower of same nationalistic Iranian approach.

### 1.2 Cold War and Post-Cold War Geopolitical Order and Policies of

#### **US Presidents Towards Iran**

Geopolitical global order emerges, evolves, and eventually deteriorates, just like an organism then within a certain historical time. Each geopolitical world order, on the other hand, is formed by a time of geopolitical transformation. What matters much in any geopolitical global order are the relationships between a few strong states or a most dominant state and the numerous elements of a structure that define and interact with the system's activities. These relationships are shaped by a mix of material resources, ideas, and organizations, as well as international political structures. Each country has a number of apparent political and strategic implications that it makes about other countries in order to formulate its international affairs. The state's authorities play a significant role in defining the state's geopolitical norms and foreign affairs. Such codes are used in a variety of locations outside of and even beyond county lines to determine the strategic importance of locations as well as potential threats.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Farhad Razaei, and Ronen A. Cohen "Iran's Nuclear Program and the Israeli- Rivalry in the Post-Revolutionary Era," *Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 10 (2014): 443-445.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Ibid, 446.

With the ending of Cold War geopolitical international order, the world was astounded by the substantial improvements and trends in the environment system's framework, which resulted in dramatic shifts in major power conduct and strategy. The year 1989 was marked by geopolitical seismic events in Eastern Europe and the beginning of a geopolitical transitional phase. Geopolitical international order is defined as a geopolitical framework, a tolerably stable global trend that combines a complicated of inter-state connections, nation-state positions, and capabilities, with the goal of making many states' behavior effective.

When British left Persian Gulf (1969), Iran acted as the police man of the region and the significant American allay. <sup>29</sup> Iran captivated the attention of opponent great forces from the ancient Greeks to the Mongols, and from the Arabs to the Ottomans. In the last nineteenth century, Russia and Britain made efforts for influence. Iran's location between the USSR and the Persian Gulf, and the presence of significant oil holds ensured the country's significance during the Cold War. The development, even before the end of World War II, of the global military and ideological rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union and the dread of losing impact in a crucial part of the world to Soviet-led Communism pushed quite a bit of American foreign policy for the following several decades with a craving to shield the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf and an assurance to obstruct the Soviets from acquiring influence in the region.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union made a significant geopolitical region in the north of Iran. While it assisted with merging radical rule over the nation, though the takeover of Iranian Revolution as well made a political crisis for Iran, landing it in long stretch diplomatic isolation, and prompting incredible hatred from Washington. The harshness of the hostage crisis keeps on harming official American behavior toward the Islamic regime. Different presidents had different policies and perception towards Iran during different era.

## 1.2.1 Richard Nixon Era (1969-1974) and the Rise of Pro-Israeli Sentiments in US

#### **Politics**

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Dr. Nazir Hussain, "US-Iran Relations: Issues, Challenges and prospects," *Policy Perspectives* 12 (2015): 30-31.

Richard Nixon (1969-1974) in contrast to his ancestors president Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson, owed nothing to Israel politically. In November 1968 elections Richard Nixon got only 15% of the American Jewish vote. However, Richard Nixon wound up being the most Israeli accommodating president. Military and financial aid to Israel, also political sponsorship "special relationship" had expanded fundamentally during his term in office. Nixon and his influential National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, established special relationship between US and Israel based on common interests in the Middle East and on global level. Nixon expected that by expanding US military and economic aid would farther made US position stronger in the Middle East. U.S. - Israeli relations that had consistently developed since the Six-Day Arab Israel War of 1967, as US placed significant size of aid to its patters especially to Israel for Middle East peacemaking process. The period between September 1970 and November 1971 was a significant defining moment in Nixon's attitude towards Israel, in which he understood that Israel could contain Soviet expansion in the Middle East. The Syrian military invaded Jordan, and in each settlement in which Israel would give back the territories which it occupied in 1967, would strengthen the USSR's position in the Middle East. Nixon influenced Israel to move the peace process forward up to the start of the Yom Kippur War. Nixon offered Israel massive economic and military aid.

The common trust and appreciation that was created among Nixon and Kissinger from one viewpoint and Israel's ambassador to the US Yitzhak Rabin on the other, affected improving Israeli-U.S. relations. During his five years (from 1968 to 1973) being an ambassador in US with integration attempted to consolidate bilateral relations and played a great role in increasing "strategic cooperation "with US which resulted in a huge US military aid to Israel. The Israeli government, and particularly Rabin transparently supported Nixon in his 1972 election campaign against Democratic competitor George McGovern. This further improved the connections among Washington and Israel and further fortified the US President's hesitance to ask Israel to push toward signing a peace agreement with Egypt.

As the administration was decided to increase arms deals, Israel's support in the US Congress was starting to develop. Committed pro-Israel sentiments in Congress was a result of this period and would before long become an apparatus of Washington politics.

The 1971 and 1972 Memorandum of Understanding (MOUs) agreements showed clear gesture of change in US policy towards Israel in which US would supply engines for a new Israeli built combat aircraft. Egypt and Syria, were supported by Soviet Union and received huge scale aid from USSR. US arranged foreign aid at vital level to manage the Arab–Israeli conflict, as US perceived that by promoting military and economic aid to Israel and other friendly countries of the region was a suitable strategy to manage Arab Israel conflict. In Israeli lobby individuals and organizations work in a way to impact US foreign policy in favor of Israeli and to establish a special connection between US and Israel. <sup>30</sup>

At the point when the British announced that they were withdrawing East of Suez and would pull back their military powers from the Gulf in 1971 because of desperate financial conditions and overexpansion, Nixon looked to the Shah to have the significant influence in preventing any post-British vacuum permitting the Soviets to step in. Because of a crucial situation of Iran for the United States, the Shah's administration was acknowledged as an essential by Washington so as to keep up continuous interests of the West in the Persian Gulf. Iran was given full military and political help until the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran.

The Shah's longing for military supremacy over his neighbors and his mistrust of the Soviets saw him look for a military relationship (1950) with the United States following the end of the Second World War. Richard Nixon who had given a "blank cheque" to the Shah of Iran to buy whatever US arms he wanted. Once the Nixon Doctrine was built up and it armed the Shah so he could go about as a police man of the Gulf for the benefit of the US, Iran was overwhelmed with huge US made weapons. The Nixon Doctrine's "Twin Pillars Policy" depended on the perception that Iran and Saudi Arabia needed to ensure the security of the Persian Gulf and the unrestricted oil supply while also controlling Soviet antagonism. If Iran would had acted as the police man of the Persian Gulf, the US would be able for its military inclusion in the Middle East. Under Nixon and Kissinger's direction, Shah was adequately granted complete freedom to construct a military that satisfied the job US imagined for Iran in Persian Gulf.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Stephen M. Walt and John J. Mearsheimer, *The Israel Lobby and U.S foreign policy* (London: Macmillan Audio, 2006), 5-6.

In that sense, the Nixon Doctrine's rationale was to support certain capable partners to pay for their own guards, as opposed to depend on direct American forces projection and military guide in global containment. The number of American partners had gotten scant because of Washington's increasing help for Israel and the unpredictability of Arab Nationalism. Iran by rising its oil prices increased up to large extent its purchase of weapons from Washington, as well as from other Western countries. Iran was soon blamed for purchasing huge amounts of military equipment that didn't match to the nation's needs. Kissinger, on the other hand, defended and even supported the Shah's weaponry expenditure, arguing that it would benefit the American military industrial complex at a time when US was lowering its defense budget limit. Furthermore, Kissinger portrayed the military transactions program as a positive development in the US balance of trade with Iran.

Kissinger claimed that because the US acquired a lot of oil from Tehran, the cost of weaponry to Iran could be reused, resulting in an equality transfer rate between the two countries. However, the Shah was limited in his requests to pay for Iran's ever-increasing need for weaponry purchases, so he raised oil market value. Meanwhile, the Pentagon proceeded to raise the cost of weapons and systems, urged by the Nixon and Ford administrations. The Nixon Doctrine's Twin Pillars Strategy, which included a bad handling of ties with Iran, resulted in unacceptably inflationary pressures and an additional financial impact due to arms purchases and dangerous management of oil expenses.

As the administration decided to increase arms sales and military aid to Israel, Israel's support in the US Congress was starting to develop. Committed pro-Israel sentiments in Congress was a result of this period and would become a permanent framework of Washington politics. The 1971 and 1972 Memorandum of Understanding (MOUs) agreements showed clear gesture of change in US policy towards Israel in which US would supply engines for a new Israeli built combat aircraft. Cold War, Realpolitik strategy, Israeli influence in the Congress, the rise of the Israel lobby to create a domestic support for Israel and Senator Henry Jackson, a forefather of the neo-conservative movement, were a driving force behind increased foreign aid to Israel and a clear change

of US policy towards Israel. Groups and organizations like Christian Right Organization, Southern Whites, Conservatives and Neo Conservatives considered also as a non-Jew agent do not work directly but informally as a facilitator for the Israel. <sup>31</sup> The strategy of economic incentives of Nixon was so effective as it strengthens emerging alliance structure rather than isolated attempt. That strategy was also continued by Ford period.

#### 1.2.2 Gerald Rudolph Ford Period (1974 -1977)

Following the overthrow Muhammad Mosaddegh 1953, Iran's military aid was recharged, maintained and later enhanced by arms credit buys in the mid-1960s. By 1968 Iran was America's biggest single arms client. The approach proceeded under Carter until the Iranian revolution 1979 which finished America influence in Iran. During President Gerald Ford era (1974-1977) US and Iran both having complex relations, at the point when President Gerald Ford had chosen to keep up and extended arms relations with Iran to continue the policy of Richard Nixon who had given "blank cheque" to the Shah of Iran to buy whatever US arms he wanted. Ford faced some challenges from his own administration but the need to help partners in the Middle East against the danger of the Soviet Union, in any event, during a period of détente, stayed vital. Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger Secretary of State and Yitzhak Rabin each attempted to shape the political culture and influenced one another. 32 Yom Kippur War 1973 among Israel and Egypt were crucial time, where in U. S contribution with the Arab-Israeli conflict extended. As President Gerald R. Ford wrestled with the breakdown of postwar dealings in 1974, the organized Jewish people group assumed an influential role over shaping his strategies and modify his arrangements. Organized Jewish people group played a key role in US decision making process towards the Arab Israel conflict.

The Ford Administration faced many difficulties during his era as Congress had started to communicate comparable concerns, making provisional moves to set up an autonomous situation on arming Iran. At the point when President Gerald Ford had chosen to keep up and to extend arms relations with Iran, he faced some challenges from

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Marziehe Shakoori, "Effect of AIPC lobby on America's Foreign Policy Towards the Islamic Republic of Iran," *Journal of Politics and Law* 9 (2016): 129-131.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Ibid, 132.

his own administration. At last, with the American economy experiencing rising oil costs and sharply despised by the Shah due to his hardline behavior on the matter, the administration of Ford chose to rebuff Iran besides indirectly contacting with Saudi Arabia to significantly raise its oil supply, increasing prices and cutting prices. Accordingly, Iran lost billions of dollars in oil income, economic turbulence compelling Tehran to depend on credits what's more, complete profound spending cuts costs. The strategy of economic incentives was so effective as it strengthens emerging alliance structure rather than isolated attempt. That strategy was continued by Carter period also when Israel and Egypt signed" Camp David" peace making treaty.

#### **1.2.3** Jimmy Earl Carter Era (1977-1981)

During the Carter period (1977-1981) Congress had become worn out on the pattern of affairs and chose to dismiss a significant Iran arms deal that had its underlying foundations in the Nixon-Ford years. At the point when the Shah inevitably put in a request in 1977 for an armada of AWACS radar airplane, both Houses of Congress rejected the sale. When Shah most required the United States to face the emerging resistance in Iran, Carter wavered, offering confounding and insufficient help to the Shah. Carter's arrangement for Shah experienced three various phases. First Carter attempted to modify the Shah regime second, when such changes unleashed Iranian resistance, Carter at that point attempted to save the Shah and third when it turned out to be evident that the Shah would not endure all that, Carter intended to replacing the Shah with a friendly government. However, the issue was that in all the three phases Carter over and again wouldn't submit the vital resources and assurance to accomplish those objectives. The Iranian nation perceived atomic weapons as a significant national force component.<sup>33</sup> Especially, having oil and atomic force could give them self-assurance and a conviction that they could be a regional power which can resist Israel and US. When Carter came into power, the arrangements to over throw the Shah were already set and Carter did not find the time to reverse the situation which was created by vital armed export gesture of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Dr. Nazir Hussain, "US-Iran Relations: Issues, Challenges and prospects," *Policy Perspectives* 12 (2015): 30-31.

Nixon to Iran, increasing influential role of Israel in US Congress and Ford's readjustment with Saudi Arabia.

He also pressurizes Shah with respect to human rights and political liberalization which destabilized Iran at the time of Shah Regime. Carter needed the Shah to fight communism and safeguard oil shipping trade routes through to the Gulf Region, but he also wanted him to combat poverty, unfairness, and inequity in Iran. It was perceived through Carter's Administration policies that US is not going to support Shah with force, Shah would not be able to establish a dominant and secure rule in Iran and US was not ready to support a ruthless dictator. As a reaction to the Hostage Crisis which went on for 444 days from November 1979 to January 1981, diplomatic relations were cut off and the US government bolstered the Iraqi government during the Iraq-Iran war and urged the Gulf nations to set up a regional security organization in 1981, barring both hostile nations, which was known as the Gulf Cooperation Council. When Bush came in to power, he established new engagements with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar to replace its former provision. Carter's November 14, 1979, Executive Order 12170, which declared a national emergency with respect to Iran became the backbone of United States-Iran policy. Radical democratic majority in Congress, pressuring his regime on human rights, considerable arms exports to Iran, liberalization, increased in oil rates, inflation, Iran American economies, US disappointment in Iran, the downfall of Shah's capacity, Israeli influence in US congress and the Iranian revolution changed not only Iran's way, yet additionally that of the Persian Gulf and US foreign affairs.

#### 1.2.4 Ronald Wilson Reagan Period (1981-1989)

It is a perception about Reagan as the most pro-Israeli president (1981-1989) in US history, he considered Israel as more important and secure ally in the conflict-ridden region and also allocated Israel a near permanent high-level aid which impacted US Israel relations in early 1980s. Reagan won near 40% of American Jewish vote in 1980 election. The Reagan administration initially supported Israel's attack on Lebanon. The developing Jewish impact over the political procedure and the American national media were also increasing in the US during his period. The Reagan Persian Gulf strategy was

coercive diplomacy than deterrence of any form. President Reagan extended the Carter Doctrine to incorporate inside dangers also. Such dangers were seen as rousing from Iran, Iraq and different regional powers calling for political change and socioeconomic transformation. During Iran-Iraq war (1980-88), US provided military, technological and intelligence support to attack on Iran. The Iran-Contra Affair was a covert US arms transaction in which the US exchanged missiles and other weapons for the release of certain Americans kept hostage by extremists in Lebanon, but the monies from the arms deal were also used to finance military struggle in Nicaragua. Ronald Reagan's government was imperiled by the contentious transaction and the accompanying political controversy. To deny Iraq victory, the United States supply Iran through Israel with modern military equipment to contest the Iraqi army and stop its victory. In this manner, the United States attempted and succeeded in containing the Islamic danger of Iran. The 1987-1988 reflagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers due to the Iran's attack threat and sending of the U.S. Naval force against Iran in the Persian Gulf, so the military and covert help provided all through the Reagan period against Iran.

During Iran-Iraq war when Iran's victory was very close, Reagan administration adopted two-prong strategy to stop the victory of its new enemy. First, Reagan decided to provide intelligence support to Iraq, while allowing the offer of American arms to Bagdad (through Israel). Second, the U.S. effectively occupied with an arm ban against Iran called Operation Staunch and also forced alliances to do the same. With this Regan doctrine, Iraq defeat was slow down and the war continued for few more years. During Iran-Iraq war Iran made a confidential request to purchase weapons from US. National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane started conversing with Israeli and Iranian authorities about the probability of offering American made rockets to Iran using Israel as a buffer in the exchange. <sup>34</sup> The US secretly dispatches weapons to Iran in return for Iran's assistance in liberating US hostages held by Hezbollah activists in Lebanon as it was a perception that Hezbollah received monitory and logistic support from Iran and had extensive influence. Robert McFarlane moved to president Reagan in August 1985, Reagan approved the deal and 100 US made TOW antitank missiles were given to Iran with the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Akbar E. Torbat, "A Glance at US Policies Towards Iran: Past and Present," *Journal of Iranian Research and Analysis* 20 (2004): 87-88.

hope of improvement in relations and release of hostages, later on Reagan faced political criticism on that deal. During the first seven years of the Reagan administration justification of supporting Israel shifted from moral reasoning to cluster of strategic justifications. Through concrete policy moves, further tied the defense structure closer together US-Israel relations. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU, November 1981) on strategic cooperation was one of the moves among these concrete moves. The MOU was trailed by various different agreements especially security-related agreements such as Israel's 1986 inclusion in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program, and the Reagan administration's designation of Israel, in late 1987, as "a major non-NATO ally".

#### 1.2.5 William Jefferson Clinton Period (1993-2001)

In 1993 Clinton came into power and he received a legacy of balance of power that had failed to achieve US interests in the Middle East, due to the Iranian revolution, hostage's crisis and Iraq invasion of Kuwait. Both policies of playing one country against another and US military presence in the region had enabled to maintain peace in the region. Clinton administration perceived US should not support Iran and Iraq anymore both should hold to deter their military capabilities. That policy was known as "dual containment" strategy (1993) was implemented as economic sanctions towards Iraq and selected economic measures in case of Iran as isolating Iran and Iraq economically, politically and militarily. Clinton administration was not against Islamic regime but wanted to change the behavior of Islamic regime which US perceived as threat towards US interest in the region. 1993 when containment policy was applied, US was Iran's big trade ally. US forced economic pressure on Iran by postponing its dept rebuilding, stopping new credits for its developing projects, forestalling its arms arrangement, and would not export to Iran dual use technology, that economic pressure could not change Islamic regime' behavior according to US desire.

In 1995 US Congress was dominated by republican, Israeli lobby and wanted to invoke Clinton to impose full unilateral economic sanctions on Iran. So, sanctions were imposed on Iran by banning all trade, finance loans, and financial services to Iran. In

1996, US Congress approved Iran -Libya Sanction Act (ILSA) to disappoint foreign oil companies from investment in Iran's oil and gas development projects. ILSA damaged Iran's oil and gas sector for two years. Congress perceived that by weakening Iran's financially would make Iran unable to develop nuclear weapon and sponsoring terrorism especially against Israel in Palestine-Israel conflict.

In 1998 Clinton decided to renounce the ILSA for European companies who criticized the policy and wanted to invest in Iran but could not under the threat of losing access to US markets. 35 Sanctions were imposed by Clinton on Iran with the claim of developing nuclear weapon and sponsoring Palestinian groups against Israel. US pressurized Arab sides during peace process for the economic and political agreements and arrangements which could accomplish Israeli economic and security interest in the region. Clinton launched "Principles Declaration" secret negotiations process in Oslo between Israel-Palestine. During Clinton's era Zionist economic and political influential instruments were present in US congress and in research centers which influenced US policies and decision makers in favor of Israel. Clinton and his administration which was influenced by Israeli lobby looked Iran US relations and Arab Israel conflict with Israeli lens and ignored all international resolutions which did not fulfill Israeli aims in the region. <sup>36</sup> It is a perception that Clinton's administration was biased towards Israel.

Bush era, from 2000 to 2008, was one of the most terrible periods of "diplomacy" between the two nations, also the increase in the perception of Iran as a threat and the dynamism of US policy during the Bush period. Ahmadinejad's harsh statements against Israel, particularly the utilization of atomic weapons against Israel, this being a significant staying point for U.S law makers as Israel is one of most significant worldwide partners of US. In his first year of presidency Ahmadinejad, he stated "As the imam said, Israel must be wiped off the map". He also addressed in October 2005 "And God willing, with the force of God behind it, we shall soon experience a world without the United States and Zionism". <sup>37</sup> After 2005 Iran also changed its policy fundamentally

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Ibid, 89.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Dr. Mohammad Ali Al-Rousan, "American - Israeli Relations During President Bill Clinton's Reign," European Scientific Journal 9 (2013): 198-199.

37 Saeid Naji, and Jayum A. Jawan, "US-Iran Relations in the Post-Cold War Geopolitical Order," Asian

Social Science vol 7 (2011): 99-100.

towards the US and considered US and Israel as the strong rivals of Iran. Bush reacted that Ahmadinejad isolated his nation and made terrible options for his nation.

When George W. Bush came in to power as the 43rd president of the US in 2001, after September 11th attacks, dominance of the neo-conservative faction of the Republican Party realized the need of transformation in US foreign affairs because of change in the US geopolitical code, from globalist (all parts of the world are equally important) to regionalist (certain parts of the world are more important). After September 9, 2001 Bush provoked to adopt new strategy to tackle with US enemies. This strategy was suggested by neo conservatives of his administration, mainly Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Paul Wolfowitz and the Defense policy Board Chair Richard Perl. Neo conservatives thought that diplomacy, negotiations and economic sanctions have been failed to achieve US objectives of pro-American stability in the region. They thought to find out and demolish by preemptive military strike any danger against US before it could appear.

The Trump administration utilizing the claim of Iran's quest for atomic weapons and supporting terrorism as justification for the anti-Iran policy "maximum pressure campaign" that incorporates sanctions, dangers of military activity, and coercive diplomacy. Presence of neoconservatives in Bush administration its covert and overt programs for destabilizing the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran policy towards Israel and influence of Israeli lobby were the factors behind the hostile US-Iran relation during Bush period.

However, in the United States, on January 29, 2002 and about four months just after the start of the Afghanistan war, the expression "Axis of Evil" was utilized to name a few countries which, as indicated by Bush, were supporting terrorism. President Bush mentioned Iran, North Korea and Iraq as those nations struggling to establish nuclear weapons. George W. Bush declared this animosity in the "State of the Union" address "Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet since September the 11th. But we know their true nature... Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress

the Iranian people's hope for freedom. States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world".

In June 2003 Bush announced that the US would not "tolerate the construction of a nuclear weapon". <sup>38</sup> The intricacy and assortment of thoughts inside the Bush's foreign policy making group was in itself a source of absence of coherence in Bush's Iran strategy. The group included individuals like the (pragmatist/realist) Powell and Richard N. Haass, the authoritative Cheney, just as neo-conservative /liberal interventionist Paul Wolfowitz. This ideological ambiguity prompted contrasts of supposition in opinion to the strategy toward Iran. The Bush administration refused to take part in the multiparallel European talks between the EU-3 (2003-2004) and started its way to deal with Iran's nuclear issue with war on Iran.

It is also a perception that Israeli regime and the lobby established the focal powers behind all the discussion in the Bush organization and on Capitol Hill about utilizing military power to demolish Iran's nuclear plant. Vice President Cheney and neoconservatives pushed for the military choice to destabilize Iran's atomic plant. The push for military action became fade because of the differences by Rice, Robert Gates (secretary of defense from 2006-20011), and at last President Bush himself. And afterward came the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate which pronounced, "We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program". While the neoconservatives and other pro-Israel elements neglected the importance of the 2007 NIE judgment in sabotaging the adequacy and authenticity of US strategy toward Iran, but Bush administration was unable to found any evidence for allegation and made propaganda for war on Iran.

In December 2006 heavy sanctions were approved and imposed by Security Council on Iran due to its continued resistance about its nuclear program. On September 30, 2006 "Iran Freedom Support Act" was also approved by congress. The objective of the act was "To hold the current regime in Iran accountable for its threatening behavior and to support the transition to democracy in Iran" and "to create encouraging groups of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Ibid, 98.

people for Iranian reformers, political dissenters, and human rights activists". <sup>39</sup> July 2008 Bush administration chose to send a delegate for as a "one-time deal" about issue but it faced itself criticism of neoconservative which again damaged Iran's position for negotiation. The US government kept on perceiving Iran as a "rogue state" and sponsoring of terrorism and blamed Iran for seeking after weapons of destruction and of destabilizing Iraq. With this perception Bush administration adopted strategic approach of a containment policy toward Iran which addressed coercive engagement to military confrontation.

#### 1.2.6 Barack H. Obama Period (2009-2016)

However, president Barak Obama (2001-2010) followed up his policy of "change", accommodative and conciliatory policy towards Iran, regardless of solid resistance from the Congress in which Obama had to deal with a long history of hostility. Individual people, institutions, and groups on both sides domestic levels make normalizing two nations difficult. They played key role in deteriorating their relations. President Barak Obama foreign policy was greatly avoided by the congress which consist of majority of the republicans. Congress wanted to avoid JCPOA and pose further crippling sanctions, on Iran which Barak Obama warned to veto.

Barack Obama administration had a conciliatory tone towards Iran. Obama had expressed that US is willing to open process of communication with Iran and adjust its nuclear policy. In 2009 Ahmadi Najad was elected in Iran. Obama administration tried several efforts to negotiate with Iran as the part of his policy but it was unproductive because Ahmadi Najad was a religious conservative. In 2003, Hassan Rouhani took office in Iran. He was liberal reformer and more open to negotiation. Obama directly talked on telephone with Hassan Rouhani in September 2013. Obama's administration shared several policies with Hassan Rouhani's government. Obama adopted coercive diplomacy based on soft power 'punishment and containment 'than hard power military itinerary'. President Hassan Rouhani soft stance towards West and Obama's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Hakimeh Saghaye Biriya, "Appraising the Foreign Policy Legacy of George W. Bush on Iran: The Roots of the Current Crisis," *Journal of Contemporary Research on Islamic Revolution* 2 (2020):50-51.

accommodative gesture paved way for negotiation on the Iran nuclear problem. In September 2013 the p5+1 and Iran talks were started. US led international diplomatic efforts forced Iran to conclude the nuclear deal with p5+1 power in July 2015. However, two countries opposed this deal, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Jewish lobby also criticized the deal.

The congressmen wrote to the Iranian government, warning that any agreement reached now might be undo no by the future president. It was an undiplomatic and abnormal act in the US political system. US congress highly is influenced by Israeli lobby. <sup>40</sup> This lobby is in contact with congress members and congressional committees regularly. They play influential role in making US foreign policy. AIPAC, one of the strong Israeli lobby, has played an influential role in Iranian case. In March 2015 Israeli Prime Minister addressed to the US congress against the JCPOA which was a solid indication of influential role of the lobby. <sup>41</sup> Many administrative officials who always suggested the military strike to the Iran nuclear issue as John Bolton had suggested to military strike against Iran to stop the bomb. His suggestion was also supported by republican senator John Mccain who suggested a military action to Israel against Iran.

#### **1.2.7 Donald Trump Period (2016-2021)**

Republican leader Donald Trump's election campaign in 2016 promised that he would withdraw from the deal. On 8<sup>th</sup> May, 2018 Trump announced the U. S withdrawal from the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) due to political reasons rather than Iran's noncompliance. Trump claimed Iran was violating core spirit of the agreement. US imposed multi-layered new sanctions on Iran.

Jewish lobby groups also finance pro-Israeli Republican candidates during campaign for the 2016 presidential election to achieve pro-Israel political objectives. Israeli lobby had deeply influential over President trump which led to offensive initiatives from trump in favor of Israel. Trump took controversial decisions of shifting the US embassy in Israel to the disputed territory of Jerusalem, recognition of Golan Heights as a part of Israel

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Jin Liang xian, "Analysis on Obama Administration's Policy Adjustment of Iranian Nuclear Issue," *Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia)* 4 (2010):15-16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Ibid, 17.

through a presidential proclamation signed by Trump on March 25,2019 and unilateral withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear deal on which AIPAC dedicated \$20 million for an anti-deal campaign. Death of general Qassem Soleimani on 3<sup>rd</sup> Jan 2020 are bringing relations between US and Iran to a new low.

# 1.3 Iran -Israel Relations Convergence from Companionship to Animosity

Till 1979 Iran and Israel were having close geo-strategic friendship. In 1956 Suez crisis, Iran provided oil to Israel. Periphery Doctrine was also accepted by Muhammad Raza Shah. In Yom Kippur war 1973, Iran supported Israel and supplied it oil. This close relation came to an end by Iranian Revolution 1979. As Iran's influence rose in the region, Israel's concerns heightened as well. Iran's foreign affairs toward Israel has shifted in order to weaken Israel's sovereignty, and right to exist and made a shift from anti-Israel to pro-Palestinian. So, with Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, Iran's connected to hardline neighbors of Gulf region and Jihadist groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah and the Islamic Jihad further intensified their relations.

Iran's nuclear program is seen by Israel as a "existential threat" also Iran's sponsoring of terrorist organizations such as Hammas and Hezbollah as regional proxies against Israel create awkward situation for Israel therefore Israel resist against any kind of normalization of relations between both of these countries. Although Iran claimed its nuclear program for peaceful purposes but Israel always perceived it as a security threat for itself in the Middle East. This threat perception gets intensified as Iran's leaders have repeatedly declared that "Israel must be wiped off the map". Iran tried to establish itself as a serious regional power through its nuclear program. Israeli perception is that Iran with nuclear capability has potential to directly attack Israel, and US and its asserts in the Persian Gulf through intercontinental ballistic missiles. To isolate Iran and contain its regional power, Israel established alliances with moderate Arabs, and United States as an adversary to Iran. That it is the perception that Israel being main factor, influences US policies in the Middle East for its own interests.

To lessen the US, Israel influences in the regional security dynamics Iran had established two regional proxies Hezbollah and Hamas surrounding Israel. US claimed

Iran sponsoring these terrorist organizations in the region. US has declared Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorist groups but Iran assisted these organizations towards "Israel state terrorism". In Syria, terrorist partnership is also a cause of their harsh policies towards each other. In Syria, Iran supports the Bashar-al-Assad regime by sponsoring Hezbollah fighters whereas the US and its regional allies supports the anti-Assad forces. The Al-Nusra Front and Free Syrian Army with weapons and equipment. US and Iran both having opposing measures to resolve the Syrian crisis. Assad is the enduring Iranian allay. Syria is the influential link in promoting Iran's influence in the region as Bashar-al-Assad is the enduring Iranian allay. Since 2010 the 'Arab Spring' started by youth against US supported dictatorship, Iranian regional role has declared in manifolds. Iran terms Arab Spring as an "Islamic Awakening" and supports the oppressed Arab people as a result of its important role in upholding the Islamic principles. Iran influence from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon into Sudan and Yemen after the takeover of Houthis, Ansar-Ullah and also had reestablish its friendly ties with Egypt under Muhmmad Morsi. Iran's regional position has benefited from the demise of pro-US governments in the Middle East.

Iran opposed the continued US military presence in its surrounding states Iraq and Saudi Arabia. There is a silent sectarian element between Iran and Saudi Arabia "Shia Crescent" verses the "Sunni Axis" which could cause a dangerous element to the future security of the region. The Iranian revolution and the threat of export of revolution in the Middle East create an ideological and political threat to KSA. Saudi Arabia sees Iran's nuclear weapon as a security danger, and they regard the Iranian nuclear deal as strengthening Iran's regional dominance at the expense of Saudi Arabia's stability.

From one perspective, As the only hegemonic power, the United States can expand its geo - strategic realm to the east on either hand, a massive energy area has been established in this region, which is dependent on Post-Cold War advancements in terms of the importance of geo-economic factors, resulting in contest for connectivity to these assets. This 'surprising' incident altered national attitudes and behavior, especially in Iran-US ties. As a result, this region has become a battleground for US-Iran political competition. The primary change identifies with the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, which prompted an adjustment in Iran's foreign policy under Rafsanjani's era.

Despite the Iranian Majlis' strict stance, he began to expand Iran's connections with neighboring Persian Gulf countries and Europe. In fact, it marked the beginning of a period in Iran's diplomatic strategy when national security interests took precedence over ideological-revolutionary principles. On the one side, the regimes of George W. Bush and Barak Obama in the US, and Khatami and Ahmadinejad in Iran, had seen the most notable changes based on leader's beliefs.

The usage of phrases like "Axis of Evil" "all options are on the table" "a world without the United States and Zionism", and Ahmadinejad's "American politicians are like cowboys" sparked tensions between the two countries. 42 Presidents Khatami and Obama, for example, used phrases like "break in the wall of suspicion" "dialogue among civilizations" "an extended hand" and so on to try to alleviate tensions between the two. 43 Two states attitudes and conduct have been influenced by the global environment and local realities.

Among several factors, Iran's nuclear program has been the most critical global and regional security concern, prompting the US and other nations such as Russia and China to shift their views as the geostrategic world order takes shape. It is fundamentally accompanied by means of influencing the geopolitical standards of quite powerful nations on less strong nations, and it would seem that the US is trying to push its global political standards on various states through the Iranian nuclear issue, as the US maintains and maximizes its regional dominance by trying to control the larger regional powers in the Middle East as well as the important energy reserves in the region. It also refers to global and regional geopolitical goals that influence the US's decision to participate in fight with Iran, which has geopolitical implications that the US should respect. Clearly, resistance to Iran's nuclear program on the one side, and the necessity of preventing Iran's nuclear exercises for the US and its partners, particularly Israel, on the other, have caused all states to change their views and connections in the new, chaotic Post-Cold War geopolitical world system.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Saeid Naji & Jayum A. Jawan, "US-Iran Relations in the Post-Cold War Geopolitical Order," Asian Social Science 7 (2011):103. 43 Ibid, 10.

After the Iran revolution the various serving US administrations had set three major objectives as to US policy towards Iran changing Iran's conduct, changing the Islamic Republic from inside, and changing the political framework. To accomplish these objectives, various strategies had been implemented to differing degrees containment, engagement, and covert and overt means for "regime change". The Algiers Accord (January 19,1981) is the only bilateral agreement that has been signed between Iran and US which addressed "the United States pledges that it is and from now on will be the policy of the United States not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran's internal affairs". <sup>44</sup> Each administration, including that of George W. Bush has violated the Algiers Accords by adopting harsh intervening policies towards Iran. Iran's nuclear program, established ties with terrorist entities, opposition to the region's security architecture, US regional alliances (Israel, Saudi Arabia), domestic political structure, institutional hardline approach, US Congress, Iranian Majlis and individuals with conflictual mind set are the challenges to restore their bilateral relations.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Hakimeh Saghaye Biriya, "Appraising the Foreign Policy Legacy of George W. Bush on Iran: The Roots of the Current Crisis," *Journal of Contemporary Research on Islamic Revolution* 2 (2020):53.

#### **CHAPTER-2**

## Influence of Israeli Lobby on the US Foreign Policy

At the point when Israel was established in 1948, US strategy producers didn't think of it as a distinct advantage. The new state was viewed as fragile and possibly weak, American policy makers perceived that getting a hand on Israel would eagerly undermine the position of the U.S. elsewhere in the region of Middle East. The decision of the President Truman to help the partition plan of the UN and to recognize Israel was not based on strategic values but instead on his authentic sympathy for the Jewish community facing hardship and returning to their homeland was justified, that rationale was strongly supported by many Americans Jews.

This view collapsed in the mid-1960s, and the administration of Kennedy assumed that Israel justified additional help considering increasing Soviet help to Iraq, Syria and Egypt. Israeli authorities have consistently stressed their importance as a key ally, and their shocking triumph in 1967's war, also known as Six-Day War, justified their claim by demonstrating Israel's military prowess. Nixon and Kissinger thought about extended support to Israel as a suitable strategy to counter Soviet effect all through the region. The

Israel's image as a "distinct advantage" began to take hold in the 1970s era and it had evolved into a statement of conviction by the middle of 1980s, the US support to Israel in the lance of strategic value is justified from 1967 to 1989 as Israel assisted the U.S to contain Soviet influence in the region of Middle East and others regional crisis.

## 2.1 US Unconditional Support to Israel

The U.S unconditional support to Israel perceived justified as a strategic asset, common danger from unconventional warfare like terrorism, and to set of rouge nations but that rationale is perceived as untrustworthy rationale for US unconditional support to Israel which led US to ignored chances for peace in the region for a long time. As Israel captured Sinai, Golan Heights, Sinai, and west bank in 1967 and oppression of Palestinian Arabs livings in occupied territories. American's keenness to provide Israel with considerable economics, diplomatic and military assistance would be understandable if it assisted the US's overall strategic objectives. <sup>45</sup> That support would be justified if it was a cost-effective policy for the US to treat countries that it perceives as hostile and to assist U.S as more secure and prosperous to get considerable benefits in return.

If Israel's huge natural resources such as natural gas or oil, or having significant geographic location than that support would also be justified for good relations and to keep Israel out of hostile neighbors. During the cold war, Israel was a valuable strategic tool for the US, and US aid was a deal of benefits produced for US. Israel strategic value rationale ended with the Soviet Union collapsed. That strategic value became strategic liability as unconditional support imposed heavy costs on US. That aid was convincing during that period as Israel harmed Soviet Union repute as an US ally while boost up US prestige in the region. At the same time, it also fueled up to Arab Israeli hostility, raised "Anti American" and "Islamic extremism" in the Gulf region. But Israel claimed that it is a strong strategic partner of the US due to its strategic geographical location, political stability, technological resources and military resources. But benefits were turned down after cold war years, as economic and diplomatic costs were intensified.

Growing Friendship with Israel applied significant cost on the U.S in the form of economic burden. Arab oil embargo and production reduced during the October war

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> Marziehe Shakoori, "Effect of AIPC lobby on America's Foreign Policy Towards the Islamic Republic of Iran," *Journal of Politics and Law* 9 (2016): 130-133.

(Yom Kippur war) the use of oil as "oil weapon" was a direct outcome of president Nixon's policy of providing Israel with almost 2.2 billion dollars in military aid and which resulted in damaging U.S economy. It is also a perception that Israeli lobby provided US panic reports on Iraq's nuclear program prior to 2003 invasion on Iraq. Israel attacks of Lebanon in 1982 brought instability of the region and led to the creation of Hezbollah Military group which attacked on US embassy and marine and costs 250 American lives, was the part of the lost that the U.S had to pay in order to tidy up the circumstances that Israel had made.

It is a perception that common threat of international terrorism "Global war on terror" provided a significant rationale to us unconditional support to Israel after the cold war. The incident of 9/11 Israel and US believed to be "Patters against terror" and justified strategic rationale of unconditional support. The strategic rationale of struggle against authoritarian rogue states who assumed to be supporting terrorism and attempted to gain WMD (weapon of mass destruction). These rogue states are not significant threat to US interest apart from Israeli security in the region, their interests are oil and to hold any single country from controlling the whole region. Both Israel and the U.S were concerned about "rogue states" like Syria, Libya and Iran and Iraq, after cold war but as these governments are too fragile to constitute a substantial threat to the US and US could tackle with these states by itself without Israel's cooperation. Israel's security as a commitment of US is a reason why US perceive these states as a significant threat. So, the threat of terrorism and rouge nations did not convince a strategic rationale for the U. S's persistent unconditional backing to Israel. It is also not a proper justification for US baking of Israel.

AIPAC a significant Israeli lobby, in its annual conference 2002 AIPAC emphasized on the perception of common enemy that US and Israel standing against war on terror, and both are fighting same war and common danger from Syria, Iran, Yasser Arafat, the Taliban, Osama Bin Laden, Saddam Hussain, Hamas, and Hezbollah. Zionists adopted terrorism when the struggle for their own homeland and pushing British out of Palestine. US also supported many terrorist organizations in the past (Nicara gllah Contras and UNITA guerrillas in Angola). Terrorist organization such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah do not invade the U.S and these organizations are not direct danger

to the US's core security objectives; rather, they are local phenomena that are regarded as a straight risk to the security of Israel. All terrorist activities are morally unfair but as far as US strategic interest are concerned all terrorists are not alike so in this way fighting against terrorism US Israel interests are unidentical. They were motivated by both Israeli brutal treatment towards Palestinians and by US unconditional support to Israel. So, partner against terror rationale does not give significant justification of US consistent support to Israel.

Pro-Israeli elements support the moral rationale for this unconditional support, claiming that Israel is a weak country encircled by foes and adversaries determined to destroy it, and that it is the only Middle Eastern country that has adopted democracy and American values, thus capturing the support of the American people. Israel was in a weak condition in the past but now Israel is a story and has the strong military capabilities in the region where no state wish to start a war with Israel. During war of independence in 1948, Israel fought war against five Arab states and Palestinians -IDF (Israel Defense Forces) got victories against Egypt in 1956, Jordan and Syria in 1967 and 1973 Egypt and Syria. Those victories proved Israel as a strongest military strength in the region and only nuclear power country in the region so in this way Israel has no survival issues.

History of Jewish suffering from awful Holocaust is also a justification for that special relation. Jews were oppressed from centuries and they can only be protected in a Jewish state. For this, Israel justifies special treatment and right to exist. Original Zionist program persuaded US and other countries to support Israel but it cannot be neglected fact anymore that the establishment of Israel involved suppression of innocent Palestinians.so Israel brutal treatment of Palestinians cast doubt on this justification for US support. It is widely believed that, as a result of the powerful influence of the Israeli lobby, the American government and people are pro-Israel, and that they strongly support Israel in the Middle Eastern region in its conflicts, which is not in the US's interests and harms the US's image in the Middle East and around the world. <sup>46</sup> Strategic and moral justification cast doubt on US ever increasing support. Something different must be lying behind the striking pattern of consistently growing US support. Pro-Israeli groups claim

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> Ibid, 137.

that the friendly relationship is because of solid social and religious affinities and wide public help in the society of the US, and not because of the lobby's impact.

Israel gets steady political support from Washington, which quite often agrees with Israel's side in regional conflicts. Jewish power is even viewed as responsible for the indicated as source of the "original sin" of the Middle East clash and anti-Westernism in the region. Israeli lobby spread the rationale that Israel is a little nation however has effectively persuaded progressive Administrations that in contrast to different nations in helping Israel, it will ready to safeguard itself without loss of US trooper's lives. Israel imparts to the United States priceless technology and which address its growing security difficulties that protect American lives. Israel also helps US in avert terrorist strike and weapons proliferation. Without question the Israeli lobby and Israel advocates have prevailing with regards to making sure about and keeping up significant US help since they have dominated the Constitution. The United States has consistently been at the focal point of the peace process and whenever a reasonable open door for peace introduced itself, it prevailing with regards to compelling Israel into making considerable concessions.

The U.S assist Israel not only with material support but also with diplomatic backing, the lobby is the driving force behind that support, and this unlimited and unqualified help isn't in the national interest of the US. Israel is the lone recipient of the U.S. financial aid who is not required to account for how it is used. Other countries receive aid for specific development projects (for example, anti-narcotics programs, education, children's health, HIV/AIDS prevention, and democracy promotion), whereas Israel receives a lump-sum cash transfer. Instead of loans, the US gives Israel a direct grant.

The United States is now devoting a greater portion of its resources to maintaining Israel's military advantage in the Middle Eastern region. Israel not only has access to superb US equipment (like F-15 and F-16 fighter jets, smart bombs, cluster munitions and Blackhawk helicopters, and so on), but it has also developed ties with the US intelligence and defense organizations through a variety of legal and informal agreements. Many resolutions centered on Israel were also never voted on in the Security

Council due to the prospect of a US veto. Close ties with Israel, according to key US officials, are the only option to influence Israel's actions.

The United States' pro-Israel bias extends to peace talks as well. The US played a key part in the failed peace talks that followed the 1967's Six-Days War, as well as the 1970 discussions that brought the War of Attrition to an end. Cost of supporting Israel has increased while the benefits have decreased yet US unconditional support to Israel is continued what make US to provide this unconditional support to Israel, why individuals, politicians and policy makers are reluctant to criticize Israel and to provide assistance to Israel on whether its not favorable to US interests. It is difficult for Americans to speak freely against Israeli lobby, since the lobby itself challenges anyone who considers the lobby to be anti-US. It is the role of Israeli lobby which convinced US to provide the support.

Lobby is the strong interest groups comprised of Jews and individuals whose core objective is to support Israel's affairs inside the US and control the foreign policy of the US in a direction that its members think will strengthen Israel. The lobby is very concerned about Israel and refuses to allow American politicians to take any action against or condemn Israel. Lobby tries to reach any extent to shape public discourse towards Israel by influencing media, academia and foreign policy think tanks.

## 2.2 Israeli Lobby and its Impact on US Interest

When a certain interest group is exceptionally powerful, politically or strategically, it may have an adverse impact on the country as a whole. Interest groups in the U.S constantly strive to alter public perceptions of the public interest and persuade Presidents as well as authorities to grasp their support to embrace their favored strategies. It is widely believed that the efforts of the Israeli lobby's organizations and individuals are the driving force as to why the US wants Middle East policies that are bad on both, moral as well as on strategic grounds.

It is a perception that activities of the groups and individuals who constitute the Israeli lobby are the fundamental reason why US seeks policies in the Middle East that look terrible on either strategic or moral grounds. US provides Israel with considerable level of material and diplomatic support to Israel at the expense of its own interests, which is greater from the support US provided to other States. For the last many years,

the United States has given more cash to Israel in foreign guide than it has to some other country. Each year, Israel gets around \$3 billion in direct military and financial guide. Diplomatically, the United States has been Israel's loyal partner, rejecting various UN Security Council resolutions condemning Israel, protecting and legitimizing disliked Israeli activities to the worldwide community, and urging different states to set up political relations with Israel.

The United States has additionally supplied Israel with a portion of its most developed military innovation and equipment, and often allocate to it exceptionally classified intelligence. No other American partner has reliably delighted in such advantages from the United States. Israel is not really a significant power ready to give the United States comparative advantages as a tradeoff. These advantages don't correlate those that Israel gets from the United States. In this manner, the US-Israeli relationship is unquestionably imbalanced not uneven. Israel is a vital strategic liability, instead of an asset. <sup>47</sup> Pro- Israeli elements likely believe that they advocate policies that serve the US similarly as the Israel public interests but Israel looks regardless of anything else to its own interests and it has been eager to do things as opposed to U.S interest at the point when it is accepted (properly or wrongly) that doing so would accomplish its own national interests.

During the hostage crisis in Iran in 1979-80, Israel delivered military equipment to Iran. In 1989, Israel purchased Iranian oil of worth 36 million dollar, in exchange for the release of Israeli captives held in Lebanon. Every one of these demonstrations appeared well and suitable from Israel's perspective but were in opposition to US policy and US national interests. Israel sold US weapons to US enemies and also transmitted US technology to third countries. Almost all of the policies they espouse are not in the best interests of the United States or Israel, and the two nations would be in an ideal situation if the US followed a different policy.

There are four sorts of lobbying "inside lobbying" direct attempt by lobby to impact legislators and their collaborators "outside lobbying" interest groups indirect efforts to provoke citizens to influence the public "ethnic-group" based lobbies that

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> Dov Waxman, "Beyond Realpolitik the Israel Lobby and US Support for Israel," *Israel Studies Forum* 22 (2007): 98, accessed October 15, 2020, doi: 10.3167/isf.2007.220205.

efforts to impact American foreign policy procedure and "Foreign lobbying" explained under the 1938 FARA (Foreign Agents Registration Act). The latter needs that representatives representing the interests of foreign powers are lawfully restricted to register with the Department of Justice and be appropriately recognized to the American public. The act was modified in 1966 to those working with various countries looking for political and additionally financial gains by affecting leaders. In 1953, a Supreme Court administering barely characterized "lobbying activities" as just "direct" lobbying. <sup>48</sup>

The term "Israeli lobby" is a close coalition of individuals and organization that effectively work to shape US foreign policy in a pro-Israeli direction. The lobby is not a single united movement with a central leadership. Various segments of the lobby function to influence US policy in a different way beyond simple lobbying much as other lobbies do. The boundaries of the lobby cannot be recognized clearly and there will always be some indefinite controversial individuals and groups whose positions are hard to categorize. Israeli lobby is not under a single authority hierarchical organization under a specific membership and it has no membership cards. It is comprised of organizations which pronounced object is to motivate the US government and American public to give material and political aid to Israel and to hold up its government's policies as well as dominant individuals for whom these objectives are also a top priority.

Thus a lobbyist for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), Conference of Presidents, research fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) or the leadership of organizations like the Ant-Defamation League (ADL) and Christian United for Israel (CUFI) are core elements of central part, the American Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Committee, the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism, the Israel Policy Forum (IPF), Americans for a Safe Israel, Mercaz-USA, ZOA, Hadassah, American Friends of Likud and also numerous others. These different Jewish organizations consider foreign policy as a focal Segment of their agenda.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> Natan Aridan, "Israel Lobby," *Indiana University Press* 24(2019):129.

While individuals who from time to time write letters to assist Israel to their local newspaper or provide checks to pro-Israel political action committee which should be viewed as the component of the broader organization of supporters. The lobby additionally incorporates think tanks, (for example, WINEP, MEF, and JINSA,) as well as people working in College or universities and other investigate organizations. There is additionally many pro-Israel PACs prepared to spend wealth to support Israel's political candidates or to candidates whose adversaries are regarded either inadequately strong or unfriendly to Israel.

There are almost 75 separate organizations that activity work for Israel interests. To be a member of the lobby one has to vigorously work to direct US foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction. For an organization this objective must be essential part of its goal and consume a considerable percentage of its wealth and agenda. For individual this means dedicating some part of one's professional or personal life and considerable amount of wealth to influence US policy towards Middle East. The main part of the lobby comprised of American Jewish who are deeply dedicated to ensuring that US Foreign policy push on what they accept to be Israel's interests. Some non-Jewish individuals and organization that are particularly vocal on Israel's sake, for example Christian Zionist. It is particularly political agenda that characterizes the lobby not the character of those pushing it.

## 2.3 AIPAC Most Influential Israeli Lobby and it's Performance

AIPAC is without a doubt the most important and well-known lobby group. The AIPAC and the Conference of Presidents both endorsed the overall commitment to campaigning for Israel. Both had been established during the 1950s and had sufficient influence preceding 1967. During the 1970s and 1980s, Israel's demands for political assistance propelled these two associations into prominence. AIPAC was changed from low-spending to enormous, mass-based association.

With plenty of cash and a strong political position during the Cold War, AIPAC saw its political clout bolstered by new government's rules on campaign financing, which prompted the formation of an autonomous PACs (Political Action Committees) and made it easier to funrel cash toward favorable to Israel candidates. Although AIPAC was not

particularly powerful in the mid of 1960s, but by the decade of 1980s, it had become a Washington force. The Conference of Presidents and its members have served as recognized vehicles of Israeli government policy.

The impact that organization like AIPAC now appreciated, didn't arise suddenly. During Zionism's initial years, and surprisingly after Israel's establishment, lobbying for Israel's benefit happened unnoticeable in the background and typically relied upon individual contacts between persuasive government authorities, particularly the president, pro-Zionist counselors, and few leaders of Jewish Community, and Jewish colleagues. For instance, Woodrow Wilson's help for the 1917's Balfour Declaration was expected as he was under influence of his Jewish companions: Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis, and Rabbi Stephen Wise. Britain's Balfour Declaration in 1917 probably initiated by an incredible Zionist lobby that convinced hesitant British government to help the formation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The draftsmen's driving rationale behind giving the Declaration lay in policy makers conviction that consequently, Jews would impact the United States and Russia to support Britain's war exertion because Britain was unable to stop the tendency of close defeat during World War I. 49 Similarly, Jewish companions and advisers influenced President Truman's decision to support Israel's founding and recognize the nascent country. AIPAC itself had specific Zionist roots, its founder I. L. Si Kenen, was top of the American Zionist Council in 1951, which was an enrolled external lobbying group. Kenen rearranged it as a US lobbying organization, the American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs in 1953-54, and it was renamed as AIPAC in 1959. Kenen depended on close contacts with key administrators as opposed to public campaigns or then again mass preparation, and AIPAC by and large observed "Kenen's Rules" to promote Israel's motivation. Zionist impact expanded dramatically during the Kennedy and Johnson organizations, on the grounds that the influence and impact of Jewish community in the American culture and society had expanded and besides on the grounds that Kennedy and Johnson tallied various Jewish people among their nearby instructors, benefactors and close companions. AIPAC was with little activity with adequate staff and financial plan. The lobby's size, budget, and impact became generously after the third 1967's Arab Israel War and also, the influence

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> Ibid, 130.

of Israeli lobby started growing in the US. The effective mission against anti- Semitism, supported by the extensive perception to the horror of the Holocaust wiped out unfair boundaries and Jewish Americans shed the fear that had hampered their political will in previous years. American foreign aid to Israel was also initiated to be surpassed by private commitments, favorable to Israel groups progressively concentrated on political operations in order to protect and enhance the US government support.

Israel's ability to motivate Americans has been demonstrated on several occasions,

Zionist (and later, Israeli) authorities urged American Jewish pioneers to lobby for the partition plan of the UN in 1947 as well as for the U.S. acknowledgment in 1948. They also asked to campaign against the unsuccessful peace plan prepared by Folke Bernadotte, a UN mediator, in 1948. Influential attempts like these also persuaded President Truman and his administration to expand financial assistance to Israel in the year of 1952 and to renounce the suggestions of Pentagon and the Department of State, for a 10-million-dollar military aid awarded to the Egypt.

The lobbying activities included obtaining favorable American people to write letters, research articles, and public remarks in a variety of forms with the goal of creating a public climate that would encourage Israeli allies within the government to support Israel.

It became more difficult for organizations or individuals who oppose Israeli policies or the close Israel-US- relationship to gain support and generate donations inside the Jewish people group. Increasing impact of modest number of rich conservatives who progressively rule organizations like the President's Conference and AIPAC have become progressively conservative with passage of time and are currently driven by hard-liners who uphold the places of their hawkish partners in Israel. The Conference of Presidents consisted on more than fifty organizations each has a single vote despite of size. Israeli lobby organizations such as ZOA, ADL, among others, focus on to influence not only the strategy creators and politicians, but also media to speak for Israel in the US.

## 2.4 Neo-Cons and Jewish Lobby

Since 1970s, neoconservative development has been a significant part of American scholarly and political life. Neo-conservatism believes on the rationale that promoting democracy and safeguarding US hegemony is the best way to long term peace

through strength (military force). Neo-conservatism is a particularly hawkish political belief system. They trust American force ought to be utilized to support the spreading democracy and depress possible adversaries from attempting to contend with the US. In fact, the neoconservatives operate in the same way as other think tanks, policy makers, foundations, publications and committees that have supported the closer relationship between US and Israel. These groups strive to build an elite and public outlook and thus move American foreign policy in their desired direction. The neo-conservative Association is clearly exceptional and similar to the networks that have appeared in other policy areas, such as policy reform, immigration, and the environment. Groups and organizations like Christian Right Organization, Southern Whites, Conservatives and Neo Conservatives considered also as a non-Jew agent do not work directly but informally as a facilitator for the Israel. <sup>50</sup>

Essentially all neo-conservatives are strongly committed to Israel. Numerous neoconservatives are associated with a covering set of committees, think tanks, and publications based in US, and whose plan comprise of advancing the unique connection between the US and Israel. Unusual level of influence of the lobby and the neo conservatives with in the lobby were the core forcing behind the decision of Bush administration to attack on Iraq in 2003. It can't be said that Lobby was the reason behind the war but it paved way for this war. This gathering has been noticeable in molding the Bush administrations unilateralist foreign policy, and particularly the doomed choice to attack Iraq in March 2003. According to the perception of neo-conservatives, Israel is concerned about the security of US same as it cares about security of Israel, and both nations will get benefit out of this policy. Yet, all neoconservatives are not Jewish, which evoke rational that the campaign is characterized not by religion or ethnicity yet rather by a political plan.

#### 2.5 Christian Zionist

The Bible-inspired passion for the Holy Land and its contribution to Judaism in its history paves the way for the idea of restoring Jews to their homeland. That vision

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Marziehe Shakoori, "Effect of AIPC lobby on America's Foreign Policy Towards the Islamic Republic of Iran," *Journal of Politics and Law* 9 (2016): 129-134.

supported by some religious leaders and few US politicians. The Israeli lobb y also incorporates another significant gathering of gentles in the form of Christian Zionists, which is a subgroup of Christian Right. Christian Zionists consisted on prominent religious figures. About Christian Zionists, it might be said that they can be considered as a significant "junior partner" to several pro- Israel groups in the group of Jewish people in America. They are originated from the doctrine of dispensationalist which is the kind of premillennialism which argue that the world will face a period of intensive sufferings until Christ returns and the Jews revival to Palestine is an important occurrence in the pre decided procedure that will guide to the Second Coming. The Christian Zionism is friendlier to the notion of forming a national home in Palestine for Jewish. Christian Zionists backing an expansionist Israel. <sup>51</sup>

The dispensationalist movement found a new life in 1948, with the founding of Israel, yet the War in 1967 (continued for six days) which the dispensationalists saw as a "miracle of God" and crucial to its development as a political force. With Israel's advancement in the Gaza and West Bank, they began to take the field, and these groups became more involved in religious, political, and financial ways than ever before. Their struggle was important for the more extensive rise of the claim Christian Right and were obviously supported by the increasing political quality of the orthodox movement. The Christian Zionist have supported strong perspective in the US and Israel by offering financial help to immigrants, and freely condemning territorial settlement, this way they made it harder for the US leaders and politicians to adopt hostile policies against Israel. Although it put less impact on US Middle East policy as compared to other lobbies yet it still has significant impact on US foreign policy towards Middle East.

## 2.6 Israeli Lobbies Influence in the US Political System

The Israeli lobby is so effective with respect to US foreign policy. The free structure of the US political system is one example of this impact. There is a divided type of government in the US, a settled custom of freedom of speech, conducting elections is expensive and where campaign grants are poorly provided. This climate offers various groups and wide range of approaches to get entrance or impact policy. Interested parties

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> Stephen M. Walt and John J. Mearsheimer, *The Israel Lobby and U.S foreign policy* (London: Macmillan Audio, 2006), 24-25.

can facilitate election campaign to support preferred candidates and to compete them with candidates whose views are not aligning with their interests.

They can also lobby candidates and individuals elected from executive branch of the presidential branch they can try to position their supporters in key policy-making positions. Additionally, there are several means, which interested groups use to shape the public opinion by developing thoughtful columnists, composing books, articles, and opinion piece and attempting to dishonor or minimize anybody who has dissimilar opinions. <sup>52</sup> For a group that is exceptionally energetic and has adequate assets, there are number of approaches to impact the public policy.

The Israeli lobby enjoys many favorable conditions rather than influencing the American political system. American Jews flatter political parties and have a lot of involvement in the US politics. It is a strong base when Israel gets the help from Christian Zionists in US elections period. It is the lobby's effort to ensure that Israel is portrayed in the best way possible, just as the United States and Israel are important to a common Judeo-Christian culture and are connected for a variety of reasons. Most major Jewish groups are described by enormous participations, very much prepared proficient staffs, enough financed social, government assistance and political projects, well-trained working groups for specific issues and explain inside communications networks who highly participate in election campaign during elections periods. They are efficient in opting important position in academia, business, media, and they are in addition more skillful in legislative issues.

## 2.7 Role of American Jews and Dual Loyalty

The Israeli lobby have a number of favorable circumstances to enjoy in the competition for putting their influence in the US. Jews in America are generally qualified and prosperous, with an outstanding humanitarian custom. They have a huge influence and involvement in the US political environment. A large minority of Jews in America isn't firmly dedicated to Israel, yet an absolute majority is fairly connected with and a critical minority is emphatically engaged by this issue. The influential unusual interest groups, mostly contained of American Jews and functioning to direct US policy in a pro-Israel direction, this rationality has been criticized because it breads the fear of "dual

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> Ibid. 36.

loyalty". It is a perception that Jews are loyal and devoted to each other only, and have no loyalty towards their home countries. Israeli lobby negate this rational and claim that American Jews are faithful and patriotic citizens of US, they also claim that Americans Jews who are working to impact the American foreign policy, this will benefit the both countries equally. Americans Jews who make up the lobby seek after two wide techniques to motivate loyal US uphold for Israel. First, they apply huge impact on the process of policy formation in the US. Second, these relations guarantee that discussions on Israel at public level will be useful and it enhance the moral and strategic beliefs.

In the US, the political force between legislative and executive branches is isolated, and the strategy of the Israeli Lobby and American Jewish sometimes depends on which part of the government is involved. Further to helping to select sympathizers to key positions, lobby groups want to politically evaluate officials who are convinced to lead a course which is more independent. Whatever the point of view of the legislator or policy maker, the lobby needs unnecessary help to make Israel a "smart" political decision.

Israeli lobby acquires its objectives by convincing key policymakers it wants to consider to focus on measures they will avoid, supporting those activities for US leaders. Makes it difficult to limit groups in the lobby, and key leaders easily support these groups' strategies by adapting observations and creating more options.

## 2.8 Jewish Lobby Impact on Capitol Hill

In US Congress, the impact of the Lobby is like a key backbone. Israel is to a great extent invulnerable from analysis on Capitol Hill in comparison to every other country. There is regularly an energetic conversation regarding different issues on Capitol Hill. Whenever there is an Israeli affair, the intellectuals become silent and there is usually no dialogue. A strong argument behind the lobby's deep influence in Congress is that some key individuals have been Christian Zionists. There are also representatives and Jewish congresspersons who work to formulate U.S. foreign policy to keep up with Israel's tendencies. A record number of Jewish Americans were elected to the House and Senate in 2006, a fact that emphasizes their accomplishments in the US culture and generally increases their political support and metropolitan responsibility.

Not only the representatives who can make the legislation themselves favorable to Israel, but also the legislative staff members are important in the process of lawmaking, register in place of foreign interest groups and give their leaders specific policy powers. Congressional staff individuals assume a significant function in the preparing of policy for the individuals and advisory groups whom they serve. <sup>53</sup> Representatives sometimes take part directly in the process of decision making from groups to the lobby, and to help the members of Congress to form law draft, and help them with talking points that lawmakers can utilize out in the open.

AIPAC is an important organization which influence the relation between Israel and America. It is a perception that AIPAC has an almost absolute hold on Congress, it is AIPAC that controls the key to cast impact in the Congress through influence politicians from both the parties. AIPAC's flourishing is generally a direct result of its capability to compensate legislators and congressional candidates who uphold its plan and to tear down the individuals who don't, founded basically on its capability to impact campaign commitments. Foe US elections, money is very important and it is becoming expensive to win continuously, and AIPAC guarantees to provide the monetary help so long as they don't wander from the line of AIPAC.

AIPAC has done so by building up a public organization of Jewish Political Action Committees (PACs) so that congressional applicants can rely on the measure of aid to Israel for asset sharing. AIPAC directed the network of pro-Israel PACs. AIPAC put influence on Capitol Hill, where in the process of election, a good number of pro-Israeli political action committees (PACs) are functioning, and there are also some powerful people who keeps Israel on their priority. For example, Haim Saban, who is an Israeli-American news investor, and one who is contributing for a long time, and mogul Sheldon Adelson, financed a few to organization of Israel. <sup>54</sup> AIPAC helps to attach political candidates to different donors and wellsprings of assets. It is certain that AIPAC is not a political action committee, nor does officially endorse claimants or provide cash for their movements. But the AIPAC screens possible candidates and arrange meetings

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> Robert C. Lieberman, "The "Israel Lobby" and American Politics," *Perspectives on Politics* 7 (2009): 237, accessed October 21, 2020, doi:10.1017/S153759270909077X

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> John J. Mearsheimer & Stephen M. Walt, "Is It Love or The Lobby? Explaining America's Special Relationship with Israel," *Security Studies* 18 (2009): 63, accessed October 25, 2020, doi:10.1080/09636410802678031.

with prospective donors and asset raisers. It also provides information to the growing number of Israel PACs (Political Action Committee). AIPAC additionally monitors legislative voting records and makes them available to its individuals, with the goal that they can choose which competitors or on the other hand PACs to help. AIPAC has likewise played a significant function in overthrowing various different politicians who took positions opposes to Israel. Pro-Israel PACs donated more than \$30,000 to Clinton's reelection campaign in 2006.

If the pressure and influence of elections don't work, AIPAC has been recognized to bargain officials who behaved reluctantly to follow its instructions. Its capacity to influence a politician's electoral constituent possibilities is prominent. AIPAC's capacity to have impact on elections, guarantees that Israel gets open handed help every year and makes it hazardous for representatives and to utter even gentle reactions of Israel's behavior. Irrespective, its impact on Capitol Hill goes far. Lobbying groups of various kinds practice impact not simply by direct influence and by utilizing campaign commitments to obtain access, yet in addition by giving a "legislative subsidy" to favorable legislators furthermore, providing exhausted staffs with direct help with examining issues, mapping out legislation, and offering ideas and addresses to provide for constituents.

Not exclusively does each individual from Congress get AIPAC's fortnightly newsletter Near East Report, its faculty are also likewise accessible to influence decisions of staff members whenever issues emerge regarding Israel. With everything taken into account, AIPAC implants itself clearly into the legislative and policy-formation process with significant frequency. The AIPAC sister group, the American Israel Education Establishment (AIEF), itself makes free visits to Congressional Israel. These trips polish legislator's favorable to Israel capabilities and encourage gathering funds. That is the reason why 10 percent of the congressional visits to abroad are to Israel

## 2.9 Lobby's Influence on Presidents and Administrations

The traditional strategy of influencing Congress similarly allows the lobby to focus on the executive branch when it does things that are not seen as great interest of Israel. When that happens, the president or cabinet official is receives a strong letter sent

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> Ibid. 64.

by one or both congress houses, backed by a large section of his people, as President Gerald Ford did at the time. That was when US-Israeli relations were re-examined in 1975.

In April 2002, President Bush wanted Israel to stop its military offensive in occupied territories, but he received a virtually identical letter. The inconsistent level of signatories for those letters was an expression of AIPAC's capability to wield weapons. Impact over the presidential branch gets somewhat from the impact Jewish voters have on presidential elections. They were as little as 3 percent of public there, but still American Jews make gigantic contribution to applicants from the two parties as American Jews play significant role in political fund raising. In addition, the turnout of Jewish citizens is very high and they are focused in important states such as Pennsylvania, California, New York, Florida, New Jersey, and Illinois, which adds weight to their knowledge of becoming president. In spite of the fact that they actually favor the Democratic coalition, their help for Democratic applicants cannot, at this point be underestimated. Jewish vote can influence the situation and election results in key states. Candidates are particularly concerned about lobbying AIPAC and various organizations for interest, not just as a coalition for Jewish citizens, as they believe that the seal of support for these non-partisan organizations will encourage fundraising and will enable maximum turnout for their profit.

In the lobby the, the main organizations also focus directly on the administration in power. The primary objective of president's conference is to put pressure on the White House to act in a way that contradicts the conference, as Gerald Ford did when he took steps to review US aid to Israel. George HW Bush quickly upheld the credit guarantee. In 1992. Clinton administration's Middle East approach was strongly molded by officials with close connections to Israel or to well-known favorable to Israeli organizations. During second Bush era administration was strongly based on significant pro-Israel neoconservatives like John Bolton, Aaron Friedberg, Elliott Abrams, Douglas Feith, I. Lewis Libby, Paul Wolfowitz, John Hannah, William Luti, David Wurmser, and Richard Perle. Various groups in the lobby also attempt to ensure that individuals who are viewed as unfavorable to Israel don't obtain significant foreign policy positions.

# 2.10 Impact of Israeli Lobby on US Foreign Policy in Comparison

#### with Oil Lobby

The notion that wealthy oil sheikhdoms and oil companies impact strongly in Middle East on the US policy, and has repeatedly led to claims that the 2003 Iraq war was for corporate interests such as the "oil war" and Halliburton. As US has huge strategic objectives in the energy resources of Middle East and US tries to maintain a balance of power to obtain these objectives, and also keep any unfriendly state from intervening with the movement of oil resources from that area.

The US has become the close ally of Saudi Arabia due to the increased importance of Middle Eastern oil since the World War II, and one of the reasons behind this is why the US has maintained the Shah of Iran for so long. After the fall of his government in 1979, for this purpose of maintaining the local balance of power and to maintain oil streaming, the Reagan administration turned to Saddam Hussein's Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war (1980-88).

Neither the Arab countries nor the "oil lobby" strike a serious response to the Israeli lobby. During the war in October 1973, oil did not affect the US policy in Middle East or aid to Israel as a "weapon of oil". In the same way, if the US foreign policy was been affected by the oil companies, then it was not strange if US supported major oil producers such as Muammar Gaddafi's Libya, Saddam Hussein's Iraq, or the Iran. The purpose behind was that US oil companies can earn profit by helping oil producers to build their energy assets and sell them to the public.

All in all, the US imposed sanctions on each of the three states, in the face of strong resistance from the oil companies. To benefit the US companies, the American government mediated intentionally to block business deals. If the oil lobby had been as influential as some critics would have believed, such activities would not have taken place. Arab countries and the oil lobby have significantly less influence on US foreign policy than the Israeli lobby, given the fact that the purpose of oil is less to distort foreign policy according to their own policy and that they have so much influence. Not because of pressure from American Jews and their motives to support Israel over American oil interests.

Therefore, the lobby seeks to mend the general public opinion about Middle East and Israel, with the aim that public in US support the pro-Israel direction generally and

do not criticize Israel for its unconditional US support. The goal is to convince the general public that the trends and values of the United States and Israel are exactly the same. Israeli Lobby at the same time, seeks to appease anyone who criticizes Israeli strategy or questions "special relations" and seeks to prevent that individual's point of view from being heard in public. To do so, the lobby sometimes uses unusual tactics to appease intellectuals, accusing them of being anti-Israel or anti-Semitic. It is important to lay the groundwork for a public dialogue in favor of Israel, given that open and authoritative discourse on the Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories, Israeli history, and US Middle East policy-making is open to more Americans. 56 It can help deal with current issues. US need a policy on Israel and a relationship with Israel that serves the American national interest as much as possible. Appropriately, key elements of the lobby seek to influence conversations about Israel in the media, think tanks, and academia, in light of the fact that these organizations are fundamental to shaping prominent opinions. They elevate struggles to depict Israel in a positive light, and go to significant lengths to underestimate any individual who addresses Israel's past or present behavior or challenge US unconditional support to Israel. Pro-Israel powers are very much aware that ruling conversations about the Jewish state is fundamental to their plan. These attempts don't generally succeed, ob viously, yet are still exceptionally powerful.

It is a perception that US should try to force a thorough harmony peace settlement, on essentially Arab terms. One main argument was that supremacy of the pro-Israeli lobby avert the US from putting the significant weight on Israel to accomplish this objective. In a limited sense, the two-essential steady of pro-Israeli organizations in the United States the Conference President and AIPAC can be said to do this. Other recognized American Jewish organizations also get this line yet are less straightforwardly included in pro-Israel lobbying battling related to the peace process, for instance, the Anti-Defamation Class (ADL) and to a lesser importantly the American Jewish Committee (AJC) and the American Jewish Congress. <sup>57</sup> The unconditional support from US, for Israel threatened the pro-American government in Beirut give strength to

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> Jonathan Rynhold, "Is the Pro-Israel Lobby a Block on Reaching a Comprehensive Peace Settlement in the Middle East?," *Israel Studies Forum* 25 (2010): 29, accessed 13, 2020, doi: 10.3167/isf.2010.250105.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> Ibid.

Hezbollah and push Iran Syria and Hezbollah closer together which is hardly good for both US and Israel. The Israeli lobby groups negate the perception that Israel is supporting and empowering Israeli animosity against the Palestinians also Lebanese, for America's reluctance to pressure or even condemn Israel for the US 2003 attack of Iraq, breakdown of the Oslo peace process, the resurgence of Israeli-Palestinian brutality and later dangers against Iran. <sup>58</sup>

#### **CHAPTER-3**

# Influential Role of Israeli Lobby on US Foreign Policy Towards Iran

After the Iranian Revolution established in 1979, American and Iran have maintained a tense relationship. Given the US's previous engagement in Iran, in 1953 uprising that revived Reza Shah to authority and the new administration's assistance for multiple faction's extremist groups, it's not surprised both the countries have remained wary rand only sometimes collaborated. Iran poses a more serious strategic threat to the US and Israel than any other Middle Eastern country. It is a perception that Tehran support Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad which further intensify this hostile relation. It is also a perception that Iran possesses chemical and biological weapons which is a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> Dov Waxman, "Israel lobbies: A survey of pro-Israel community in the United States," *Israel Studies Forum* 25 (2010): 2-3, accessed 22, 2020, doi: 10.3167/isf.2010.250104.

threat for US and especially for Israel in the Middle East. Iran is attempting to get control of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, allowing it to build nuclear bombs. Iran apparently working on missiles that might carry nuclear bombs to its rivals, including Israel.

The decline of the shah was furthermore a significant trouble for Israel. It debilitated Israel's security environment, yet didn't influence Israel's geo- strategic objections. The threats of Iran's ideological direction and expansionism are regularly referred to as a clarification for Israeli concerns. Israel's Iran strategy is viewed as a rational reaction to Iran's ideological and harsh Israel strategy. Frequently, Israel's reaction is clarified by the idea of a balance of perils. With Iraq overthrown and sanctioned, Israel considers Iran to be the lone country left in the area with a hostile ability that can undermine Israel. With Iran's main goal for atomic advancement, which could hinder Israeli atomic credibility, Israeli inclinations and risk were additionally reinforced. <sup>59</sup> This is the reason Israelis frequently consider Iran as an "existential" risk.

Iran is unlikely to launch nuclear missiles at the United States in the foreseeable future, but whatever weapons it develops could be used against US soldiers in the Persian Gulf or Europe an states. Iran has significant position in the Persian Gulf, also has possibility to rule region's oil-rich territory. particularly evident in the aftermath of the American invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Iraq used to be Iran's main regional foe, but it is now a divided and war-torn state incapable of containing Iran. Iran has ties to a number of Iraq's dominant Shia factions, providing it arguably greater influence over the country's development when Saddam Hussein was in power. This tremendous authority switch is one of the reasons that few people assume Iran won the Iraq War. Iran's military dominance over its rivals might clearly be increasingly explicit in the event that it obtained nuclear weapon. The fall of Iraq, Israel believed, had transformed Iran into a geopolitical powerhouse.

# 3.1 US Foreign Policy Approach towards Iran

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> Farhad Razaei and Ronen A. Cohen, "Iran's Nuclear Program and the Israeli- Rivalry in the Post-Revolutionary Era," *Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 10 (2014): 18-20.

As Iran is struggling for creating nuclear weapon yet Iran's developing power isn't favorable for US, which has long attempted to keep no single state acquiring control of the region. That fundamental premise reveals why, in the 1980s, when it looked that Iran would win horrible dispute with Iraq, the Reagan administration embraced Saddam regime. The United States is likewise motivated to dissuade Iran getting atomic weapons. Similarly, Israel opposes Iran's domination over the Gulf, believing that such a regional force could represent a security risk in the future. For Israeli officials, the possibility of an atomic Iran is far more concerning, as it will be viewed as a full disastrous situation.<sup>60</sup> However, Israel isn't the only Middle Eastern country concerned Iran. Several of Iran Gulf states are worried regarding the country's atomic ambitions and rising Middle East influence. They are concerned that in the future, a particularly strong Iran would seek either compel even invade territory, like Saddam did in 1990 when he attacked Kuwait. They are also suspicious of Iran because it's a non-Arab country which concerned about the power equilibrium among Shia and Sunnis inside Religion. Iran is controlled with a substantial Shia majority, which raises concerns among authorities of Sunni-majority countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Emirates, who perceive hegemony spreading all across Middle East. Shia now govern Iraq for the first ever, while Hezbollah, a Shia movement, has grown in prominence in Lebanon since the 2006 conflict with Israel. To add to the situation, Iran developed tight ties with some Iraqi authorities and then became a long-term Hezbollah partner.

The US, Israel, and Iran's Arab neighbors, particularly many of America's Gulf allies, all have a particular stake in retaining Iran non-nuclear and preventing it from becoming a regional superpower in the Gulf. Regardless of whether Israel existed or not, US might be dedicated to maintaining Iran in control in order to preclude the other Countries in the middle east from being vanquished or frightened by Iran. However, Israel's security is likewise crucial to the United States. Inadequate Arab support would make it easier for the US to maintain its overall influence in the Gulf, and obtaining that assistance requires a strong plan.

Since the overthrow of the shah, Israel has had a tense relationship with Iran. During in the 1980s, however, both the US and Israel were substantially harmed by Iran,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> Ibid, 22.

as a result of its ongoing conflict with Iraq, that had fastened Iran back as well as drained power. The US simply needed to ensure that the battle concluded in a draw to maintain security in the region. US did so by supporting Saddam army in deterring Iran military from entering in conflict zone. When the conflict ended in 1988, Iran was depleted, and for the next few years, it was unable to make problems in the region. Moreover, Iran's nuclear development was set aside for later during the 1980s, possibly considering the war.

Since the mid-1980s, Iran's Islamic Republic has been under different US economic sanctions as a discipline for assumed international offenses. US sanctions have had a part in the hardship, yet not a key role. Since January 1984, Iran's economy has been under different US economic sanctions of expanding degree and force. Beginning with a prohibition on the vending of American arms and dual-use technology, the sanctions step by step extended to the current level with an absolute ban on all reciprocal exchange and investment, and were even reached out to auxiliary blacklists, punishing foreign companies putting resources into Iran's oil and gas area. <sup>61</sup>

# 3.2 Israeli Lobby Impact on US Foreign Policy towards Iran

As evidence of Tehran's nuclear ambitions accumulated in the mid-1990s, Israel's perception of the Iranian danger shifted dramatically. In 1993, Israeli officials began cautioning Washington that Iran posed a severe threat not only to Israel but also to the US. Since then, there has been no reduction in the area and a forceful style of speaking, owing in part to Iran's continued progress on the nuclear side. Many specialists today believe unless anything is done to overthrow the Iranian administrative government, change its objectives, or prevent its capability, the Iranians will eventually build nuclear weapons.

Following Israel's direction, the Israeli lobby has reiterated its cautions regarding the consequences of permitting Iran to develop atomic arms. Israeli lobby and Israel have

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> Jahangir Amuzegar, "Iran's Economy and the US Sanctions," *Middle East Journal* 51 (1997): 185.

pressured the US to pursue a fundamentally foolish strategy against Iran for the past years. They are, in particular, the driving forces driving all of the debate in Bush presidency and over Capitol Hill utilizing military option to sabotage Iran's atomic infrastructure. However, speaking in this manner made it more difficult, not easier, to prevent Iran from getting nuclear. Although Iran's desire to improve relations with the United States, Israel and its US partners urged Clinton government to carry a combative posture with Iran in the 1990s. In the formative days of the Bush administration, a similar pattern was repeated, notably in December 2006, when Israeli lobby attempted to destroy the Iraq Study Group's recommendation which George W. bush talk to Iran. Israel's abusive strategies in the Disputed Territories further sabotage US efforts to govern Iran, making it more difficult for the US to get Arab states' support.

State Secretary Condoleezza Rice started pushing forward the Arab-Israeli peace process in late 2006 yet, Rice's endeavors were probably to falter since Israeli leaders do not want to construct a functional Palestinian state, as well as lobbies would make it extremely challenging for George W. Bush and other future administration to persuade Israel to modify its attitude on the subject. Since the mid-1990s, the US has pursued an unproductive policy against Iran, largely to Israel and its American defenders, and has had difficulty gathering assistance from countries that use its respective motives to assist US in handling the Iran but could be inclined to accomplish accordingly. Iran's assistance for Hezbollah, its sympathy for the Palestinian people, and its unwillingness to recognize Israel's right to survive irritate Israel and the lobby. Clearly, declarations like those made by Ahmadinejad bolster these fears. Iran's policies are perceived by Israel and his allies as expressing deep ideological hostility toward the but they are more correctly viewed primarily strategic initiatives aimed at advancing Iran's overall stance in the area. Specifically, ensuring the Palestinian cause (and supporting forces such as Hezbollah) gets Arab sympathies and deters an Arab cooperation against Iran. During the 1980s, connections between Iran's clerical regime and the generally liberal PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) were tense, and Iran began entirely supporting following its exclusion from the 1991 Madrid Conference and the commencement of Oslo peace negotiations, hardline Palestinian organizations including such Islamic Jihad emerged.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> Ibid, 187.

These events drove Iran to oppose whatever they regarded as a broad US campaign to isolate it and restrict it a basic position in the region, which it accomplished through sponsoring extremist organizations who also opposed Oslo.

Israeli government and its key American allies, continues from the conviction that Iran can't be contained once it obtains nuclear weapons. This view expects that Tehran is probably going to utilize its atomic weapons against Israel, since Iranian leaders, with their prophetically catastrophic vision of history, would not fear Israeli retaliation. As US encouraged Iran's Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi to establish nuclear program in 1957 but with the start of 1979 Islamic Revolution, a new phase of hostile relations between Iran and the US started. 63 They may give atomic nuclear weapons to terrorists or use them against the United States themselves, regardless of whether doing so welcomed automatic and huge retaliation, consequently Iran can't be permitted to get a nuclear arsenal. Israel might want Washington to resolve this issue, however Israeli leaders don't preclude the possibility that the Israel Defense Forces may attempt to do the work if the Americans do not solve the issue. This approach also acknowledges that conciliatory diplomacy and positive forces won't persuade Iran to surrender nuclear weapon. In pragmatic words, Israel requires the US to implement restrictions and perhaps launch preemptive action in the situation that it pursues nuclear weapons. To help pressurize Iran, Israel requires the US to maintain a large military force in the region, rather than US before 1990 approach for serving like the offshore counterbalance as well as projecting its conventional strength far beyond its borders.

# 3.3 Iran and Dual Containment Policy of Clinton Administration

In mid-1993, as the Clinton administration took power, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and foreign minister, Shimon Peres, continued to declare bout Iran had become a looming hazard to Israel and the US. Israeli authorities depicted Iran being a powerful opponent to a certain degree because they saw it as a means to forge stronger ties across Israel and US now that the USSR menace was passed. Idea was expected the US might consider Israel like a deterrent to Iran military advancement, similar to how

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> Md. Abul Kalam Azad, "Current Perspectives of Tehran's Nuclear Programme: Iranian Necessity Versus US Hostility," *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bangladesh (Hum.)* 63 (2018): 17-37.

Israel had was viewed as a deterrent to Soviet influence in the Middle East. Israel was also frightened about Iran's increased ambition in constructing a modernized atomic capability. In response to Israel's pleas, the Clinton administration adopted the Dual Containment policy, which was essentially a copy of an Israeli concept.

The new approach required the US to abandon its traditional tactic of operating in the Gulf Region as an external counterweight and ultimately deploy large concentration of soldiers in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to contain Iran and Iraq. The approach aimed to do much than merely limit Iran it also aimed to modify Iran's conduct significantly. One of its goals was to persuade Iran to stop aiding terrorists and give up its nuclear program. During 1990s, however was rising discontent with dual containment since it required the US to preserve unfavorable ties with both regimes were bitterly opposed to one another, and it left Washington mostly alone to cope with the daunting chore of keeping them in line. As a result, temptation began to mount on the US to explore cooperating with Iran rather than fighting it. On other hand, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (Israel's Prime Minister from 1992 to 1995) was under criticism in his home country to persuade the Clinton administration to strengthen the program.

Dual containment, according to Yitzhak Rabin's detractors, lacked fangs because it did less to block significant commercial interplay with Iran as well as US. Israel as well as lobby, particularly the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, were preparing to protect Dual Containment and shut the loop holes that let American corporations to trade and invest in Iran. At Israel request AIPAC wrote and disseminated 74-page report in US in mid-1994, claiming that Iran posed a threat not only to Israel, but also to the US and the West. Additional restrictions on Iran were demanded by AIPAC and Israel. Clinton management was inclined to cooperate, owing to its concentration on the Oslo peace process (1993), the need to ensure that Israel seemed safe and the Iran, a potential competitor, would not undermine it.

#### 3.3.1 Role of Israeli Lobby During Clinton administration

Israeli lobby played a significant part during Clinton administration. In April 1995, AIPAC released a study titled Comprehensive US Sanctions Against Iran: A Plan for Action, which laid out its core agenda. At the time, though, moves were being made

to tighten the financial circle over Iran's. Senator Alfonse D'Amato (1981–1999) of the United States, with the help of the Israelis, introduced legislation in January 1995 that would cut off all commercial ties among two countries. <sup>64</sup> The Clinton officials opposed the bill from the outset, which hindered its progress in Congress. After Iran chose Conoco, a US oil corporation, to develop the Sirri oil reserves, lobbyists accomplished their first advance after two months. Iran chose Conoco above a few other unknown bids to emphasize its desire to improve connections with the US. However, because Clinton cancelled the contract on March 14, this kind recommendation went nowhere. He signed an official order preventing US corporations to supporting Iran in the development of its oil fields after only one day. Clinton later claimed that Edgar Bronfman Sr., the powerful former leader of the World Jewish Congress, was one of the most successful opponents of the Conoco agreement. AIPAC also had a significant role in the deal's cancellation. Clinton announced a further administrative order on May 6 barring all commercial and monetary activities against Iran, citing a "suspicious and exceptional threat" US domestic security, international policy, and business. Clinton had stated in a speech to the World Jewish Congress a week before that he intended to take that step. His willingness to collapse the Conoco deal and release those two presidential decisions was a major show of US backing toward Israel.

Despite the fact that Israel supported the US strategy of cutting off economic links with Iran, on law banning Israeli-Iranian trade was enacted, and Israel remained to buy Iranian items from other entities. Those presidential directives, in any instance, were inadequate for the lobby because presidential orders might be reversed at any time if Clinton reversed his mind. Senator D'Amato's bill was revised by AIPAC in 1995, and the New York Senator was convinced reinstated alongside AIPAC's in 1996 recommended revisions. The revised draught, that subsequently became the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, placed accountability on any multinational company that spending more than \$40 million on petroleum facilities in Iran or Libya.

Despite the fact that the proposed legislation offended America's European allies, it was enacted by the House 415-0 on June 19, 1996, and the Senate unanimously

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> Kenneth M. Pollack, *The Persian Puzzle* (New York: Random House, 2004), 270-71.

accepted it a month afterwards. Despite widespread opposition to the proposed legislation within the administration, Clinton accepted the bill on August 5, 1996. The D'Amato measure was reviled by a sizable portion of the executive branch. In any case Several of Clinton's interior policy experts believed that rejecting the act could be a catastrophic mistake. The oil sector opposed disrupting the Conoco arrangement, and it also opposed legislation imposing penalties on Iran. In any event, AIPAC crushed oil corporations with each ruling. When compared to Israel and the lobby, these findings demonstrate very little affect does petroleum businesses on US Middle East policy.

Much before Khatami rose to power in 1997, the lobby was largely responsible for the creation and backing of dual containment. That strategy undoubtedly contributed to the deterioration of ties among Iran and Washington, bolstering political power of Iran lawmakers opposed to the country's new, more conservative leader. When Khatami called for stronger relations with the United States in mid-December 1997, Israeli officials sought to stifle his ambition. Israel has expressed its concern to US about a possible switch in US policy against Iran, and AIPAC has acted massively in Congress to prevent such a transition. AIPAC complied with Netanyahu's and other pro-Israeli demands.

Mohammad Khatami was elected President of Iran on May 23, 1997. He was far keener over his previous to improve connections with the West, particularly with the US. Khatami additionally clarified that Iran didn't intend to annihilate or subvert the American government and that he lamented the notorious takeover of the US consulate in 1979. Observing the present animosity among Iran and Washington, he brought an end to the mistrust between the two countries, as well as a strategy for improvement and a possibility to consider a new environment. He clarified that terrorism ought to be denounced entirety of its structures and manifestations. Khatami's remarks represented a significant turnaround in Iran's viewpoint. Following Khatami's encouraging words, the Clinton administration, after consulting with Israel and important members of Congress, made a series of small moves to strengthen Iran-US relationships. Clinton and State Secretary Madeleine Albright made modest spoke regarding the West's historical

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> Ibid. 287.

leadership, and the US eased immigration restrictions on transit between the two territories.

The commercial limitations, on the other hand, stayed in force, and dual containment was maintained throughout Clinton's reelection campaign. The rejection was mostly owing to secularists in Iran, which were adamantly objected to Khatami's ambitions for join forces with the "great Satan". Israel and its American friends, on other hand, acted a crucial part sabotaging Tehran and Washington reconciliation. Although Clinton allowed the export of certain foods and emergency aid to Iran, AIPAC continued to oppose the law. The Anti-Defamation League and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations disagreed with Clinton's intention to ease the ban on caviar, Persian carpeting, and pistachios brought from Iran. President Clinton eventually got all that he may need in the two cases, mostly because each elaborate modest quantity of commerce and minimal debate. In any case, the US made no serious attempt to recover the arm that Khatami had most certainly outstretched.

#### 3.4 Bush Administration and Iran Policy

After the September 11th events, George W. bush decided to abandon dual containment and pursue a very aggressive approach to local change in the Middle East. The US militance could henceforth utilize for destabilize antagonistic administrations in throughout Gulf region. Iran was undoubtedly qualified to be the principal priority on the Bush administration's list of targets, according to Israel. Due of Iran's desire for atomic weapons, Israeli officials have preferred to depict Iran as their deadly opponent since 1990s. One year after the Iraq invasion, Israeli Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer commented "Iraq is a problem . . . But you should understand, if you ask me, today Iran is more dangerous than Iraq". 66

Meanwhile, by mid-2002, Ariel Sharon (general, politicion, 11th Prime Minister of Israel from 2001 to 2006) and his army officers had realized that the US was resolved to go after Iraq initially, then control Iran once Saddam was deposed. Despite the fact that

<sup>66</sup> Alan Sipress, "Israel Emphasizes Iranian Threat," *The Washington Post*, February 7, 2002, accessed

April 28, 2021, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/07/israel-emphasizes-iranian-threat/b033ec97-9ad4-4ed2-8b2c-c13e3dc823f0/">https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/02/07/israel-emphasizes-iranian-threat/b033ec97-9ad4-4ed2-8b2c-c13e3dc823f0/</a>.

they continued to urge the Bush administration that after the work in Iraq was over, it needed to control Tehran, they had no genuine reactions to this request for the agenda. Ariel Sharon started openly pushing the United States to go confronting Iran. <sup>67</sup> Ariel Sharon, depicting Iran focal point of global terror and intent on obtaining atomic arms, pronounced Bush administration to use a strong arm against Iran after US defeated Iraq.

Just after fall of Iraq in late April 2003, Haaretz (Israeli newspaper) reported that the Israeli representative in America was now pressing for a regime change in Iran. He stated that Saddam's defeat was "not enough". He insisted America "has to follow through. We still have great threats of that magnitude coming from Syria, coming from Iran". The neoconservatives additionally lost no time in putting forth the case for regime shift in Tehran. During Bush's presidency, the Neocons efforts to focus US attention on regime transition in Iran grew exponentially. Neocons both inside and outside the administration had been calling for a coordinated campaign to push for regime shift in Iran.

In 2003 there were bevy of articles by well-known neoconservatives basically similar individuals who had assisted to impel the conflict in Bagdad arguing that Iran should be followed. On May 12, neocon political analyst William Kristol stated in Weekly Standard that the invasion of Iraq was most spectacular struggle of survival of the Persian Gulf, but that the following big conflict, which will not, we hope, be a military combat, would be for Tehran. In 2003 Michael Ledeen (American neoconservative foreign political analyst), one of the main hawks on Iran assume that there is no more opportunity for diplomatic arrangements. US should manage the fear masters, at this very moment. Iran, regardless, offers US the chance of a critical triumph, because the Iranian individuals clearly disinclined the regime, and will excitedly combat it, if just the United States upholds them in their simple struggle and Iraq can't be at peace and secure insofar as Tehran sends its terrorist corps across the boundary. The Pentagon's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup> Stephen Farrell, Robert Thomson, and Danielle Haas, "Attack Iran the Day Iraq War Ends, Demands Israel," *Times* (London), November 5, 2002, accessed April 20, 2021,

https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/attack-iran-the-day-iraq-war-ends-demands-israel-j0kqj6tpczz.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup> "Ambassador to U.S. Calls for 'Regime Change' in Iran, Syria," *Haaretz*, April 28, 2003, accessed March 10, 2021, https://www.haaretz.com/1.4755338.

Neocons claimed that Iran was detaining some of the al Qaeda agents that attacked the US and other targets in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on May 12, 2003. The neocons have also been among the most vociferous advocates of the allegation that Iran was aiding and abetting threat to US troops in Iraq.

While attacking two of Iran's neighbors, the world's most powerful country declared Iran to be a member of the "axis of evil". The US Congress enacted a resolution advocating for new government by the Bush authority is struggling to keep up. had backed Iran exile groups and hinted at military intervention against Iran on several situations. Bush declared, "is, of course, their stated objective to destroy our strong ally Israel. That's a threat, a serious threat . . . I made it clear, 1111 make it clear again, that we will use military might to protect our ally, Israel". <sup>69</sup> Bush's remarks remained with his previous assertions. He said "we will rise to Israel's defense, if need be". <sup>70</sup> Senator John McCain declared plainly in 2007 stated they believed with President Bush that the United States was determined to rescuing Israel and guarantee that Iran could not obtain atomic arms that would jeopardize Israeli security. Bush's effort to portray Iran as a humanitarian catastrophe to Israel not towards US, through his seeming willingness of declare battle on Iran for Israel's benefit, triggered alarms in various elements of the lobby, which became active in painting Iran as a major threat to both Israel and the US.

The Bush administration had pushed hard to shut back Iran's nuclear program and had chosen a more forceful approach in generally. If Iran pursues its nuclear program, it will be subjected to international sanctions and armed intervention. "No option" American officials were partial to commented, "is off the table". 71 James Bamford (American author, journalist) Seymour Hersh (American journalist and political writer) had separately portrayed the number of similar people who arranged the Bagdad war had conceived the Pentagon's arrangements for an armed intervention towards Iran. For instance, until August 2005, Douglas Feith, the assistant secretary of defense for policy,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> "President Discusses War on Terror and Operation Iraqi Freedom," The White House, accessed March 18, 2021, https://georgewbush.whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060320-7.html.

Ori Nir, "Groups to Bush: Drop Iran-Israel Linkage," Forward, May 12, 2006, accessed March 15, 2021, <a href="https://forward.com/news/1386/groups-to-bush-drop-iran-israel-linkage/">https://forward.com/news/1386/groups-to-bush-drop-iran-israel-linkage/</a>.
 Gareth Porter, "POLITICS-US: Strategy Paper Reveals Bush Won't Attack Iran," Inter Press Service,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> Gareth Porter, "POLITICS-US: Strategy Paper Reveals Bush Won't Attack Iran," *Inter Press Service* June 20, 2006, accessed April 15, 2021, <a href="http://www.ipsnews.net/2006/06/politics-us-strategy-paper-reveals-bush-wont-attack-iran/">http://www.ipsnews.net/2006/06/politics-us-strategy-paper-reveals-bush-wont-attack-iran/</a>.

had a key role in developing measures to attack the Iran. Inside Iran, the Pentagon has performed information collecting activities and upgraded its "contingency plans for a broader invasion of Iran". The Bush administration increased Iran military sanctions in a variety in 2007. They apprehended few Iranian personnel in Erbil, Iraq, who had been in a facility that native Kurds and Iran were considering for a consulate. Both Stephens Hadley secretary of defense, and State Secretary Condoleezza Rice clarified as cabinet did not precluded probability of US military may cross into Iran in quest for Iranians dealing with side of the road bombs and different weapons. 73 Richard Bruce Cheney, the United States' vice president from 2001 to 2009, was likewise keen to work with Israel on a military strategy to eradicate nuclear weapons. While the United States relied mostly on threats rather than agreements in its interactions with Iran throughout the Bush administration, the European Union went the other way and attempted to find a peaceful resolution. The EU-3 began talks in 2003, on which Iran accepted for halt refining activities in compensation for allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct especially intrusive inspectors. After a year, Iran halt nourishment practices, as well as to begin conversations, with the overall goal of reaching a widely agreeable accord to long-term measures. Attempts to arrive at an acceptable deal vanished, but Iran declared in August 2005 that it would continue enriching its uranium.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had displaced Khatami in 2005, He had also exhibited minimal desire in establishing ties with the Bush presidency. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had offered significantly upsetting comments addressing events of the Catastrophe and Israel's unique position in the world. Despite the fact that Ahmadinejad's commented "vanish from the page of time" and "erased from the pages of history" "wipe Israel off the map" was widely misinterpreted, even still, it was a surprising statement that will surely have a huge impact alarming to Israel and various others. In any case, there were meanwhile convincing motivations to seek after a grand deal. EU-3 had kept

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> Sey mour M. Hersh, "The Coming Wars," *The New Yorker*, January 16, 2005, accessed March 23, 2021, <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/01/24/the-coming-wars">https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/01/24/the-coming-wars</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> Helene Cooper and Mark Mazzetti, "To Counter Iran's Role in Iraq, Bush Moves Beyond Diplomacy," *The New York Times*, January 11, 2007, accessed April 20, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/11/world/middleeast/11diplo.html.

negotiating with Iran, yet with no outcome. Israeli lobby putt all efforts to sabotage all efforts towards rapprochement for a grand deal between US and Iran.

After negotiation with no outcome urged UN to declare pressure towards Iran in 2005. Ultimately won out in 2006, when China and Russia agreed to a slew of limited penalties after much foot dragging. In late March 2007, the United Nations Security Council ratified a second set of restrictions against Iran for refusing to shuttered its uranium refining program. Those new measures, which were also limited in nature, comprised an embargo of Iran weaponry sales, travel restrictions on anyone connected to Iran 's uranium project, and the blocking of the resources of specific persons and communities who had escaped another round of United Nation sanction.

The Bush administration had various alternatives for ending nuclear activities, it could try to force Iran to cease by putting pressure on it with militaristic calculations brief of war, tougher US sanctions, or forming opposing Iran alliance with Israel and Arab states. The second choice was supported by Israel and the overwhelming of lobbying groups, mainly the neocons. However, Israeli officials and their American friends were well aware that there would be unavoidable opposition to an attack on Iran both within and outside the US administration, where global community particularly in light of the grave conflicts in Iraq. Also, was obvious regardless of the way of talking, President Bush had shown little eagerness for the military alternative, which was not to said that he was not able to. Bush's 2007 approach seems as advocate for ratcheting emphasis with hopes that Iran would comply with US demands to stop nuclear enrichment. In January 2007, the Bush administration made a series of aggressive military interventions aimed squarely at Iran. Furthermore, President Obama and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had begun a deliberate effort to persuade Gulf states for joining the US-Israel in their fight over Iran. Despite this background, significant lobby gatherings, which had previously been obliging Bush's approach, were becoming more active. The US efforts to made allies with Gulf states against Iran was less succeeded because US continued backing Israel against Palestinians.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> 

So far, this policy had failed to deliver results. Meanwhile, Iran kept on building up its enrichment activities also backing Shia elements in the region. Although Congress could pass harsh penalties, the administration was only mildly enthusiastic about going that way, because this tactic results in sanctions being imposed on companies doing contact with Iran. It was a strategy that was bound to irritate US relations with those allies, undercutting their enthusiasm to assist Washington in increasing leverage on Iran. The pro-Israel lobby was supporting new congressional legislative that would harden sanctions against Iran and target foreign entities conducting b usiness with Iran.

The most ideal alternative open to the Bush was eliminate the suggestion of use of force on Iran and to reached to an extensive deal with Iran. After 9/11, Iran has indicated at two distinct gatherings that it is really interested in reaching a fundamental agreement with the US. Iran aided the US in taking down the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 by providing intelligence on objectives to strike, cooperating Northern Alliance, also participating searching and helping operations. Simultaneously, Khatami stated unequivocally that he wanted improved ties with the US. During 1990s, the CIA and the State Department were generous in their support for Khatami and his efforts to normalize ties with Iran. The neocons, both inside and outside the administration, were opposed to going to extremes with Iran, and they favor with Cheney and Bush. Bush in his State of the Union speech 2002, the president remunerated Tehran for collaboration in Afghanistan remembering for notorious "axis of evil." Also, Bush also declared that after a short time that despite the fact that he was engrossed with regime shift in Iraq, he would in the end go to Iran and attempt to bring down that regime too. Despite America's hostility, Tehran attempted to approach the US again during 2003, as it had done in 1997 throughout the Clinton era.

Khatami stated that Iran is ready to reach an agreement on Iran atomic weapon that would evident right away as Iran was not attempting to develop or possess weapons of mass destruction. In terms of terrorism, he stated that Iran will stop providing monetary support to Palestinian struggle factions (Hamas, Jihad, etc.) and force them to cease violence against civilians within Israel's 1967 boundaries. Khatami also mentioned "acceptance" Saudi peace process in 2002. As a result, Iran required US to withdraw Iran

in axis of evil list and to remove danger of using power over Iran. Lifting of penalties, also Iran had fully integrated into peaceful atomic energy. Khatami was essentially proposing a solution that contained all of the elements of a major deal.

Iran proposal was made in May 2003, shortly after the US seemed to had achieved a stunning win in Iraq, closely following what appeared to be a dazzling victory in Afghanistan. By then, numerous individuals accepted that the United States may really have the option to rearrange the whole Middle East region. It was optimum opportunity to press Iran to make an agreement, on the grounds that US renown and influence were at an all-time high and Iran feeling of weakness was intense. Regretfully, US strong position formed Bush quite inclined to direct action rather than negotiation. In addition, not only that Israel was compelling the Bush administration hard by then to train in on Iran, also neocons and lobby also played a vital role. Bush gave Khatami's idea for comprehensive accord among two little thought, but US diplomats were not ready to accept it

#### 3.4.1 Influence of Israeli Lobby on Bush Administration

Israel and its lobby had been very effective in persuading Bush and other key US officials as Iran with weapons of mass destruction constituted unacceptably dangerous risk for Israel, and it was US's duty to prevent that threat from growing. Senator Sam Brownback announced on May 19, 2003 that he would introduce measures to assist rebellion elements and establish democratic regime in Iran. Alleged Iran Democracy Act was supported by Iran expatriates, as well as by AIPAC, JINSA (The Jewish Institute for National Security of America), and the Coalition for Democracy in Iran, whose originators Morris Amitay of JINSA and Michael Ledeen of AEI (The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research). Brad Sherman proposed the measure in the House, another staunch supporter of Israel, and it was adopted by both chambers of Congress by late July, but the financing was deleted from the finalized package. The groups proponents of the bill had prioritized that Iran as a great threat because it upholds terrorism and is near becoming a nuclear state.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> "Senator Brownback Announces Iran Democracy Act with Iranian Exiles," terror watch, accessed March 18, 2021, <a href="http://terror-watch.blogspot.com/2005/03/convicted-terrorist-roya-sepehrrad.html">http://terror-watch.blogspot.com/2005/03/convicted-terrorist-roya-sepehrrad.html</a>

Compulsion was probably not going to change Iran assessments. This argument was not wasted on Israeli authorities and their American allies, who saw an armed Iran as a human security danger to Israel. As a result, many people fought hard for war possibility also argue agreement that Iran would be in danger by not comply with America's requirements. Consider Prime Minister Ehud Olmert (Israel's leader from 2006 to 2009) said on May 24, 2006, before a joint sitting of Congress. He compared Iran's nuclear arms to barbarism of servitude, the atrocities of World War II, and communist alliance's pogroms.

He addressed Iran with a nuclear weapon was threat for Israel as well as for the entire world's security. He went on to say that he believes the US will play a critical role in eliminating this threat Israeli authorities additionally cautioned that they may make a preemptive move if Iran would not stop making of nuclear weapon. These threats, in addition to sending a message to Iran, stayed focused on Us to address the matter, claiming that the US didn't require Israel to take up by itself. Ariel Sharon cautioned in 2005 Israel wouldn't recognize a nuclear Iran and Israel been able to manage this and making all of the mandatory fundamental arrangements to be prepared for such a circumstance. In 2007, Israel's deputy prime minister, Avigdor Lieberman, suggested that if the World did not address Iran issue than Israel could perform this duty unilaterally.

Israeli lobby had shifted after questionable demands of "regime change" began with the argument that Iran with weapon of mass destruction would be unsustainable and that US should built up to address the issue with force. Neocon thinkers have been extremely vocal about the risk posed by Iran and the requirement to use force, or even threatening force, to deal with it. AIPAC acted importantly exposing Iran threat also urging for use of force against Iran. AIPAC's yearly gatherings had heightened the tensions with Iran and emphasized the importance of ending the country's nuclear program.

Indeed, Israel is the lone country whose population always supported any military strike against Israel as Iran did not abandon nuclear weapon. Similarly, the lobby's center organizations were the only significant US organizations in favor of military action over the Iran. Let there be no uncertainty If there is an American conflict with Iran, it is a

conflict that was made in Israel and no place else. <sup>76</sup> Regardless of Israel's and the lobby's responsibilities to pursue the military option towards Iran, it was widely believed that using force versus Iran would be unproductive, and that attacking the country's nuclear sites would be disastrous. <sup>77</sup> It also further disrupt the region and provoke Iran retaliate against US and friends.

Bush was having ultimate solution for Iran was a military strike as Iran was not eliminating its nuclear program but US military was stuck in Iraq at the time and Iran was bigger as compare to Iraq in terms of population and geography so, it was not possible for bush to took any kind of military act against Iran despite of Israeli lobby pressure. If the United States dispatches such an assault, it would do as such to a limited extent for Israel benefit, and the lobby would carry significant responsibility for pushing such a risky approach. Furthermore, it would not be in America's best interests.

There were still many religious extremists in Iran who may have objected to any compromise with "great Satan". It was Bush unwise attempt not to agree on any kind of deal with Khatami, if simply because that approach was the most un-awful choice. Attempting to make an agreement may well have forestalled the appointment of President Ahmadinejad, whose harsh assertions and antagonistic attitude had exacerbated a harder situation. Furthermore, even the commitment had broken and Iran had finally obtained atomic arms, us would still rely on an intimidation policy. In 2006, the Iraq Study Group recommended that George W. bush negotiate with Iran instead of confronting it. <sup>78</sup> Its members comprehended that going up against Iran as the Bush administration had do ne previously, provides it stunning motivating forces to interfere in Afghanistan and Iraq, which is unquestionably not to US national goal.

However, in spite of these promising possibilities, Israel and the lobby had stayed at work longer than required to forestall the Clinton and Bush administrations had succeeded in keeping Iran out of the international community at nearly every stage. Unfortunately, but not unexpectedly, this challenging policy did not work as planned,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> Scott Ritter, *Target Iran* (Australia: Nation books, 2006), 211.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> Leon Hadar, "Osirak Redux?," The *American Conservative*, January 15, 2007, accessed April 10, 2021, <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/osirak-redux/">https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/osirak-redux/</a>.
James A. Baker III, Lee H. Hamilton and co-chairs, *The Iraq Study Group Report* (New York: Vintage)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> James A. Baker III, Lee H. Hamilton and co-chairs, *The Iraq Study Group Report* (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 7-8.

leaving the US in worse shape than if it had pursued a commitment approach. Because of this bombed strategy, there was a developing tune of voices inside and outside of Washington requiring another opening toward Iran. During the Clint and Bush administrations, Israel and the lobbies fought to prevent the US from changing policy and seeking peace with Iran and keep on advancing an unavoidably aggressive and counterproductive strategy instead.

#### **CHAPTER-4**

# Influential Role of Israel and Israeli Lobby on Barack Obama and Donald Trump's Policies Towards Iran

With Barack Obama's election in 2008, a new age of Obama has begun, one that seeks to overturn the Bush administration's policies. The Obama administration, which aims to strengthen relations with Muslims, intends to reinstate democratic norms in the Middle East countries which have been labelled authoritarian, competitive authoritarian, or dictatorships as a result of the Arab Spring. Barack Obama, who succeeded George W. Bush as president of the United States in 2009 under the slogan "Change", had raised

high expectations for the implementation of policies published in the region that have become critical to the new US policy's future. Obama developed strategies for the use of soft power based on this mentality. Based on its foreign policy and security approach, the Obama period had "strategic patience" and a "smart national security strategy". After decades of alienation and hatred, when Barack Obama was elected president of the United States, the new administration saw an opportunity to persuade Iran not to develop its nuclear program. This new administration aimed to established a new framework of ties with Iran, and to ultimately put an end to Iran's nuclear program.

#### 4.1 Obama Administration's Relations with Iran

The Obama administration made a concerted effort in the first half of 2009, both publicly and privately, to persuade Iran to engage in diplomatic talks about its nuclear program. In remarks to Iran in Prague, Ankara, and Cairo, Obama emphasized "new beginnings" and "engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect". 79 "If countries like Iran are willing to unclench their fist, they will find an extended hand from us" President Barack Obama addressed on January 26, 2009, only days after taking office. Iranian leadership was criticized by the opposition of isolating the Iran by opposing the UN and the international community on a number of issues including Iran's nuclear program. Despite having unfavorable circumstances, Ahmadinejad was re-elected in 2009's election as President. President Obama risks alienating Iran's government, which is the only institution that can participate in nuclear talks, if he engages the opposition. On the other hand, Obama would have a terrible time negotiating with President Ahmadinejad and his government. Another key characteristic of Obama's approach to Iran's nuclear program was removal of any prerequisites on Iran's participation in talks with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Obama administration pursued a policy of engagement with Iran.

#### 4.1.1 Mutual Fuel Swap Agreement 2010

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> William S. Harrop, "Obama's Iran Policy: Mutual Respect Matters," *Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs* 1 (2010): 67.

Within the first year of his presidency, Obama was prepared to reach Iran to the bargaining platform on its atomic program after an Iranian demand to the IAEA for extra uranium for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), which according to Iran was mostly used for medical purposes. Top officials from the US, Iran, and other countries P5+1 (the UK, France, Russia, China, and Germany) met in Geneva in early October 2009 for discussions, during which Iran appeared to agree to a US offer to swap Iranian LEU for TRR replacement fuel. <sup>80</sup> This meeting was viewed by the Obama administration as a "positive opening" to negotiations. Some academics, view this summit as the most important proposal, where Iran committed to a voluntary abandon its enrichment program. world considered it as a favorable opportunity for both parties to regain trust in nuclear negotiations.

During the Geneva meeting, the Iranian administration offered a proposal to the P5+1. The P5+1 "presented a fresh plan in which the majority of Iran's low-enriched uranium would be shipped to Russia for 20% enrichment, then to France for processing into fuel rods before being returned to Iran". As part of the agreement, Iran would obtain fuel for its research reactors. The accord gave Iran a perfect opportunity to establish the legitimacy of their program, and Obama went to the UN Security Council to lobby for modifications to resolutions forbidding the export of Iranian LEU. The chance of a mutual agreement was ruled out since Iran was divided over the accord draft and wanted to accept it with pre-conditions that the Obama administration could not accept.

#### 4.1.2 Failure of Mutual Fuel Swap Agreement 2010

Despite this progress, it was evident by early summer 2010 that a joint agreement was unlikely. Iran refused to accept deal negotiated with IAEA, but it made a number of other suggestions. Iran, on the other hand, violated the agreement three weeks later by refusing to deliver the needed amount of LEU to Russia. He claimed that Iran will enrich uranium to the requisite levels on its own, a process that initiated on 2010 at the Natanz pilot fuel enrichment plant. These recommendations were rejected by Washington, which, in concert with the EU, announced that economic and financial links with Iranian companies would be further slashed. Despite more discussions in Geneva in December

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> Mark Fitzpatrick, "Iran: The Fragile Promise of the Fuel-Swap Plan," Survival 52(2010): 67.

<sup>81</sup> Steven Hurst, "President Obama and Iran," International politics 49 (2012): 547.

2010 and Istanbul in January 2011, neither party was able to achieve convincing outcomes.

In May 2010, President Obama was given the opportunity to reunite with the Islamic Republic, but he declined for a variety of reasons. Brazil and Turkey, both able to display their diplomatic prowess, suggested a solution to the Obama administration's Iran problem. Brazil and Turkey joint proposal offered 20% enriched nuclear fuel to Iran for medical research in exchange of 1200 Kg of 3.5% LEU. 82 However, this proposal was criticized by the US. Inside Iranian territory, there was still be 20%-enriched uranium, according to the Tehran Declaration. Following talks, Iran signed the Tehran Declaration. These circumstances, combined with intense congressional and AIPAC pressure, have sucked the public support from the Obama administration. 83 In the end, the Obama administration did not accept the Tehran Declaration because it posed too significant a political risk. Following the US rejection of the Tehran Declaration, additional domestic and international sanctions were enacted. Sanctions were passed with unanimous support at the UN. Some saw US's rejection of the Tehran Declaration as a diplomatic setback.

IAEA issued a report by Director-General Yukiya Amano arguing that Iran adopted a non-cooperative behavior. He further blamed Iran of developing a nuclear payload for a missile Iranian conservative pressed President Ahmadinejad to come up with a counterproposal. President Ahmadinejad requested that low enriched uranium be exchanged for fuel simultaneously rather than sequentially. President Obama rejected the counterproposal, stating that the proposal terms cannot be changed, Obama's good will gestures to Iran and President Ahmadinejad over the nuclear program failed to thwart the program, and his administration's engagement efforts had produced no more hopeful results.

#### 4.2 Obama Administration and Iran Nuclear Deal 2015

After assuming office in 2013, President Hassan Rouhani adopted a reformist and flexible approach to domestic and international issues, including the nuclear program. His

Aylin Gürzel, "Turkey's Role in Defusing the Iranian Nuclear Issue," *The Washington Quarterly* 35 (2012): 141-145.
 Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama's Diplomacy with Iran (London: Yale University Press,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama's Diplomacy with Iran (London: Yale University Press 2012), 199-209.

accommodating gesture in his UN speech in September 2013 and President Obama's mild approach toward the West eventually prepared the door for negotiation on the Iranian nuclear problem. The Iran nuclear deal was a terrible narrative for Europe. Europeans had a significant role in encouraging nuclear diplomacy among the US and Iran between 2003 and 2015, as well as the eventual accord. <sup>84</sup> On the occasion of the UN annual session in September 2013, the P5+1 and Iran negotiations were restarted in earnest. Following that, over the next two years, numerous rounds of negotiations among the P5+1 and Iran's foreign ministers, as well as the EU's High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, took place, culminating in the Iran nuclear deal in 2015.

In return of lifting sanction Iran agreed to reduce its atomic activities. Iran was bound by the JCPOA in four nuclear-related areas as stockpile, processing, centrifuges, and inspection. According the deal, Iran's uranium storage was reduced to 300 kg, processing limit was dropped to 3.67 percent. The remaining 13,000 processing were removed, reducing the number of centrifuges to 5,060. Furthermore, the deal granted the IAEA unfettered access to Iran's nuclear facilities in order to oversee the nuclear deal's implementation. All prior UN, US, and EU sanctions on Iran's nuclear program were lifted in exchange, according to the agreement. On July 20, 2015, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2231, endorsing the Iran nuclear deal. From the standpoint of international law, this indicates that it was legally obligatory on the parties. The Obama administration praised the agreement as a historic diplomatic achievement that effectively ended Iran's nuclear development. Despite the fact that the pact represented a diplomatic defeat for Iran's nuclear capabilities, regional US allies such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other pro-US Arab states were opposed to it. Furthermore, the agreement drew criticism from pro-Israel Americans, which turned into rhetoric once Donald Trump took office. Finally, on May 8, 2018, President Trump announced the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and the resumption of US sanctions against Iran.

#### 4.3 Israeli Concerns Over Iran Nuclear Deal 2015

Iran's nuclear weapons are considered as a direct and immediate threat by Israel, America's most significant regional ally. President Ahmadinejad's anti-Israel rhetoric and

Riccardo Alcaro, "Europe's Defence of the Iran Nuclear Deal: Less than a Success, More than a Failure," *The International Spectator* 56 (2021):55, accessed May 10, 2021, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03932729.2021.1876861">https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03932729.2021.1876861</a>.

tendency for confrontational politics were well-known. Israel believes that a deterrence relationship with Iran is unachievable due to Iran's illogical leadership. The phrase "wiped from the map" was interpreted by Israel as proof that Iran was hostile and unreasonable.

Israeli lawmakers are concerned about regional implications of Iran possessing weapon of mass destruction. Under the security of a nuclear Islamic Republic, Hezbollah, a terrorist Lebanese outfit with anti-Israel sympathies, may be emboldened to strike Israel. The Israeli National Security Council stated "US initiated dialogue leading to a rapprochement between Iran, the United States, and the Arab world, or the US building a wide international coalition against Iran for which Israel might be forced to pay a price". Because of the "potential of diverging American and Israeli redlines on the nuclear problem, "US-Iran diplomacy could have an impact on Israel". Israel believes that if Iran learns how to produce and control nuclear fuel cycle, it can produce nuclear weapon at any movement. As a result, Israel believes that Iran's nuclear program should be put on hold as soon as possible in order to prevent Iran from crossing the "redline" of producing weapons of mass destruction.

Israeli officials were concerned about President Obama's early attempts to engage Iran because they wanted Iran to have zero-enrichment capability. Iran's uranium enrichment program showed no signs of stopping, and Israel believed that the only way to stop it was to threaten or employ military force. In the spring of 2008, Israel began lobbying the US to use military force towards Iran. However, President Bush, who was nearing the end of his presidency, had no desire to start another Middle East confrontation. Obama's first year in administration, Israeli authorities lobbied US to strike Iran or, at the very least, provide Israel with the assistance it needed to sabotage Iran's atomic plant. 85 As America moves closer to peace with Iran, relations between US and Israel had gotten increasingly tense. Without informing Israel US launched secret backchannel conversations with Iran in March of 2013. The talks were viewed as a betrayal by Israel because they were the initial step toward establishing diplomatic channels that led to the Geneva agreement. Netanyahu stated on same day that the November agreement with Iran was signed, calling it a "historical mistake". Netanyahu

said "Today the world has become a much more dangerous place because the most dangerous regime in the world has taken a significant step toward attaining the most dangerous weapons in the world". 86 Politicians from all sides of Israel's political spectrum criticized the accord. According to Tzipi Livini, the moderate Justice Minister, the agreement posed a threat to world security. Naftali Bennet, Israel's intelligence minister, stated about agreement "Iranian dishonesty and self-delusion". State Secretary John Kerry claimed that with the deal Israel would be safe and the US was convinced that Iran's nuclear development had been halted and that key locations had been secured. which was preferable for Israel than continuing down the road and allowing them to race towards a nuclear weapon. Israel's worries were not relieved by his statement, and Israeli officials continued to publicly oppose the deal.

#### 4.4 Influence of Israel Lobby on Congress towards JCPOA

US Congress is highly influence by Israeli lobby. New sanctions against Iran usually pass with ease, with the support of a majority of members of Congress in the United States. The Nuclear Weapons Free Iran Act contains three primary components, according to the website of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). First and foremost, America must prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Second, the prospect of more measures would be used to promote engagement and third, United Nation would remain committed to Israel. The Act was intended to show Iran that if it did not make concessions, the US would retaliate in any way.

AIPAC started efforts against the Act and urged congress individuals approved the Act and pushed sanctions. When President Barack Obama first expressed an interest in engaging Iran in 2009, AIPAC dispatched 6,000 members to Capitol Hill to advocate for sanctions legislation to be passed. The House had not followed the Act to strength the restrictions and opted to back Obama to address Iran personally. With each new twist in the political puzzle that was Iran's nuclear program, AIPAC lobbies Congress to impose punitive measures on the country. Nearly 500 members of Congress and their staff were met by AIPAC delegations in 2010. The implementation of heavy sanctions on Iran was also topic discussed in the summit. AIPAC support for legislation that protects Israel's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> Noga Tarnoplosky, "Israel's 50 Shades of Dismay over Iran Nuke Deal," *The World*, November 24,2013, accessed May 15, 2021, https://www.pri.org/stories/2013-11-24/israels-50-shades-dismay-over-iran-nuke-deal.

interests by keeping a list of members of Congress. AIPAC influence individuals in congress and persuade them to favor pro-Israeli polices in US.

Senator Barbara Mikulski of Maryland, a Democrat, was one of the politicians pursued by AIPAC lobbyists. AIPAC members in Maryland received an e-mail action reminder from AIPAC, prompting them to contact the her and persuade her to co-sponsor bill, which is defined as a diplomatic insurance policy against Iran. Members of Congress are influenced by lobbying groups to take a harsh stance. AIPAC pushes aggressive anti-Iran legislation by actively lobbying members of Congress who oppose or are hesitant to pass it. Despite the fact that the Nuclear Weapons Free Iran Act already had a veto-proof majority in the Senate, AIPAC insisted on Senator Mikulski's vote. Congress often takes concerted action against Iran to protect Israeli interests, and members of Congress have been funded.

Most members of Congress in the United States will only accept a deal that did not pose a threat to Israel's interests. While both Democrats and Republicans have expressed reservations about lifting sanctions, the Republican Party had been the most vocal in its criticism of the November agreement's parameters. Netanyahu said "are insisting on zero enrichment as a condition for relaxing any sanctions against Iran. Some would even like to authorize the use of military force". 87 Netanyahu feel zero-enrichment policy, which was not included in the November deal, was the only way to ensure that Israeli protection and US objectives.

Republicans' politicians used social media to express their dissatisfaction with Iran, claiming that it is unworthy of such trust. Several Republicans criticized the deal as a betrayal of America's alliances, particularly Israel. Others took to social media to voice their displeasure that the US would work with Iran, a country whose support for terrorism runs against to American norms. Worse than Munich, according to Texas Republican Representative John Culberson. Michele Bachmann, a Republican Minnesota, criticized Obama and team, addressing the arrangement as defeat. Congress individuals, such as Florida Republican Representative Vern Buchanan, used social media to criticize Iran. Putting your faith in Iran is similar to betting on a wet track on a blind horse. The Obama

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>87</sup> W. James Antle III, "What the Iran Deal Means for Republicans," *The American Conservative*, November 25,2013, accessed May 22, 2021,

https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/republicans-and-the-iran-deal/

administration had received strong comments from Congress and constituents for the new sanctions it has implemented.

## 4.5 Trump Administration and Iran Policy

The US foreign policy took a dramatic turn after Trump won the presidential election. Relationships between Iran and the United States were becoming increasingly tense under Trump's administration, to an extent that a future war between the two countries was a distinct possibility. As a result, the United States adopted a financial-burden-bearing partner attitude against Iran in its foreign policy. There were numerous challenges when Trump took the office. Due to this, Middle East had become a battlefield between Iran and US, where Russia would behave, they it did during the cold war, helping Iran. Trump administration was determined to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons at any cost to minimize its influence in the region. <sup>88</sup> Furthermore, despite differences in foreign policy, US foreign policy has consistently seen Iran's nuclear threat as a severe security danger. The apparent discrepancy in the US foreign policy were evident by its departure from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) pact under Trump as a result the relationship between Iran and US further deteriorated. <sup>89</sup>

Several nerve-wrecking incidents between Iran and US led to further worsening of the relationship as a result forced Trump to withdraw from the Obama's deal with Iranian. 90 Following his election victory, Trump began targeting Iran, accusing it of supporting terrorism by supplying money and weapons. 91 Trump, on the other hand immediately imposed economic sanctions on various important sectors of Iran's economy. As a result, Iran had resumed its nuclear-weapons development, strengthening its political vulnerabilities to US military intervention by assisting Saudi Arabia and Israel while undermining European and Russian interests.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup> Arif Khan and Nargis Zaman, "Trump Policy Towards Iran: Challenges and Implications," *Pakistan Journal of Humanities & Social Science Research* 1 (2018): 66.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> Muhammad Ilham Razak, "U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Iranian Nuclear Threat from Bill Clinton to Donald Trump Administration," *Insignia Journal of International Relations* 7(2020): 17.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> Dr. Mohammed Nuruzzaman, "President Trump's 'Maximum Pressure' Campaign and Iran's Endgame," *Strategic Analysis* 44 (2020): 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> Kenneth Katzman, *Iran: Internal Politics and US Policy and Options* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019), 21.

#### 4.6 Iran-US Hostilities during Trump Period

The following factors contributed significantly to worsening the ties between Iran and the United States during Trump's presidency:

The Iran nuclear deal: Trump stated that the pact provided Iran with significant benefits while not constraining its objective of developing nukes. Furthermore, it allowed Iran to use more heavy water than was previously permitted.

Iranian ballistic missile system: Despite US apprehensions, Tehran continued to develop its missile program allowing it to develop the ability to attack US military assets in the region.

Iran's role in regional destabilization: Iran's allies in the region have an ideological, political, and military presence in the region. Trump was concerned that Tehran could use its influence to destabilize the region.

## 4.7 Reasons of Trump Withdrawal from the JCPOA

When Trump declared the US withdrawal from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, it had been expected for months as he used it an important slogan during his election campaign. The deal was dealt with its first blow in October 2017, when Trump revealed that he would ratify the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA), a US law that granted Congress oversight rights over the JCPOA. Trump handed it up to Congress to determine whether or not to re impose sanctions on Iran by ratifying INARA. However, this did not occur in 2017, or in the winter or spring of 2018, when Trump decertified the law twice more. Trump brought an end to arguments regarding US membership in the JCPOA by declaring the US withdrawal in May 2018, after neither Congress nor the international system had moved on Trump's decertification of INARA. Despite the IAEA's assurance that Iran is abiding by the nuclear deal, Trump decided to pull out of it and impose new harsh sanctions on the country. The United States' withdrawal from the agreement was also due to a number of factors. First, President Trump believed that the agreement was limited in scope because it was time-limited and it ignored the Iran's ballistic missile program. Second, the agreement did not address Iran's regional agenda rather; it tended to open doors for the country's regional goals. Finally, Trump's

withdrawal from the deal was motivated by Jewish lobby anti-deal propaganda, which claimed that the accord did not better suit Israel's geopolitical regional objective.

Scope of the Deal: President Trump, on the other hand, believed that the deal's terms and conditions were inadequate to permanently halt Iran's nuclear program. For example, constraints on the number of centrifuges and research and development would be lifted in 2025, while restrictions on uranium enrichment and stockpile would be lifted in 2030. 92 Because Iran's nuclear program would be curtailed on a timetable, some argue that the country would eventually be able to obtain nuclear weapons.

Iran's Regional Agenda: Iran's relationship with both the United States and Israel since the 1979 Islamic revolution were far from ideal. Furthermore, Iran and Saudi Arabia had a tense rivalry over regional ideological rivalry. It is a perception that Iran offered military and financial assistance to its regional proxies as part of its regional priorities, and it is also determent to develop nuclear weapons to attain minimum nuclear deterrence. Therefore, the regional security balance drove both the US acceptance and rejection of Iran's nuclear agreement.

Influence of the Jewish lobby: The Jewish lobby had a tremendous influence in determining US foreign policy rhetoric. From the beginning, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu had been a very vocal opponent of the JCPOA, claiming that Iran cannot be trusted because it is not being honest about its nuclear program from day one. Pro-Israel groups used various methods to generate opposition to the Iran deal in order to sway public opinion and policy institutions. Trump's policies were built on America's consistent support for Israel and staunch hostility to Iran. Therefore, Trump bluntly exited the JCPOA with Iran, making the US a key violator of international law. <sup>93</sup>

# 4.8 Measures Adopted by Pro-Israel Lobby to Manipulate the JCPOA

Pro-Israel lobbyist confronted the Iranian nuclear deal on two fronts: first to stop the US from obliging the terms of the pact or leave the pact and secondly force Congress

<sup>93</sup> Behrooz Kalantari, "A Comparative analysis of Recent U.S. Policies in the Middle East: Obama vs. Trump," *Madridge Journal of Behavioral and Social Sciences* 2 (2018): 45-46.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> "Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action," US Department of State, accessed Jun 2, 2021, https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/nea/rt/jcpoa/index.htm

to impose stringent economic sanctions on Iran. Ultimately, both were successful in the end. While there was no confirmation that pro-Israel lobbyists were driving these decisions, there was plenty of evidence that they did. The conservative pro-Israel lobby became more vocal in its opposition to the JCPOA. The pro-Israel lobby in the US manipulated monetary and political power to influence international policy.

#### 4.8.1 Slowing down the Deal through Non-money measures

Ethnic minority groups have other options for influencing legislation. While money has a lot of influence, politics may also have a lot of clout. Alternative political influence, on the other hand, is difficult to locate and assess. Direct interaction with officials is frequently required, as is having officials speak out about covert forms of influence. This is uncommon, however, due to the fear of backlash from pro-Israel lobbyists. Criticizing Israel or the pro-Israel lobb y can have serious social and political consequences. Representative Ilhan Omar, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee is a victim of this. In the United States, the pro-Israel lobb y has used its political weight to muzzle detractors. Representative Omar's case served as a cautionary tale for other legislators who openly reject pro-Israel policies. The fact that she served on the House Committee on Foreign Affairs was particularly relevant because it might cause other to refrain from criticizing pro-Israel policy.

#### 4.8.2 Fighting the Iran Nuclear Deal with Money

Interest groups have also influenced legislation by monetary contributions. Generally, these contributions go to legislative or presidential campaigns. In addition, interest organizations frequently direct cash to committee and subcommittee ranking members and chairmen who can have a significant impact on the development of legislation, assisting or hindering the ability of particular measures to reach the House or Senate floor. Senator Jeanne Shaheen \$475,000, Senator Tim Kaine \$470,000, Senator Jeff Merkley \$231,000, Senator Ben Cardin \$916,000, and Senator Cory Booker \$445,000 during his entire career. <sup>94</sup> The pro-Israel lobby had given large donations to roughly half of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's twenty members.

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<sup>94 &</sup>quot;Pro-Israel: Money to Congress," OpenSecrets.org Center for Responsive Politics, accessed May 19, 2021, https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/summary.php?ind=Q05&cycle=all&recipdetail=H&mem=Y

A similar pattern might be seen in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. He had collected more than \$1 million from the pro-Israel lobby over his career. <sup>95</sup> Other members had secured funding as well. Representatives Brad Sherman and Theodore Deutch each collected nearly \$500,000, while Representative Lee Zeldin received \$330,000.

The Republican Jewish Coalition (RJC), which had officially stated its opposition to the US participation in the JCPOA, is associated with Paul Singer, a prominent businessman who was affiliated with various conservative, pro-Israel lobbying organizations. As a result, Singer's associations with pro-Israel lobbying organizations both demonstrate that Singer's network extends to other pro-Israel elites and that Singer was invested in the US exit from the JCPOA. Singer, who was connected to both the pro-Israel economic and lobbying elites, was a vocal opponent of the JCPOA. Singer also donated \$240,000 to the Republican Party in May 2018, around the time Trump declared the JCPOA withdrawal. Singer's intentions and actions, the timing of events, the financial incentives offered, and Trump's intention to withdraw the US from the JCPOA all had a sufficient causal relationship.

Sheldon Adelson is another billionaire with ties to Trump and his decision on the JCPOA. During the 2016 election, he was one of Trump's most generous financial backers. During the 2016 election, Adelson and his wife contributed \$83 million to Republicans. Adelson provided a financial incentive for Trump, making him more likely to accommodate Adelson's political beliefs. Adelson had made it clear that he was opposed to the JCPOA. He even urged that the US launch a nuclear strike on Iran in order to eliminate the regime's security danger to Israel. It's widely assumed that Adelson played a key role in Trump's decision to exit the JCPOA.

# 4.9 Impacts of Pro-Israeli Lobby and Trump Withdrawal of Iran

#### **Nuclear Deal**

Another possibility for the Israeli lobby to stop the accord was to convince Trump to back out of the Iran Nuclear Deal. President Trump has the ability to withdraw

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

unilaterally because the treaty had received neither congressional approval nor condemnation. Pro-Israel lobbyists provided many of President Trump's campaign contributions, which were critical of the Iran Nuclear Deal. Another significant contributor was Sheldon Adelson, a billionaire who opposes the Iran Nuclear Deal. President Trump's inaugural team received a \$5 million donation from Adelson, the largest single donation to a presidential inaugural committee in history. During the 2016 federal elections, Adelson was the second-highest contributor. He gave \$83 million to Republicans competing for office. Adelson was not just a major donor to Trump and Republican candidates, but he was also a staunch defender of Israel and a foreign policy hawk. He had been particularly hawkish. Adelson indicated in a 2013 speech that diplomacy would be futile in halting Iran's nuclear development.

Some of Trump's most prominent anti-JCPOA foreign policy advisers were linked to Adelson. Adelson, for example, contributed \$250,000 to Nikki Haley's campaign for US Ambassador to the United Nations in 2016. Haley was said to be a strong supporter of Trump's ratification of INARA and departure from the JCPOA. On international policy problems involving Israel and Iran, Haley was regarded as a trusted adviser to the President. In October 2017, when Trump declared the decertification of INARA, he also stated that, while he did not intend to withdraw from the JCPOA at the time, he might do so "at any time". This warning was included on the recommendation of John Bolton, the former US Ambassador to the United Nations and an active supporter of the JCPOA withdrawal. While on a warm visit with Adelson in Las Vegas, Bolton allegedly called Trump to convince him to include the "threat" of withdrawal in the address. Adelson's relationship with Bolton on the JCPOA was even more intriguing when it considers that Bolton was known for wielding enormous power over Trump. In general, President Trump had linked himself with the anti-Iran Nuclear Deal conservative pro-Israel group. During an address to AIPAC in March 2016, he made his commitment clear early in his campaign. Trump stated "My number-one priority is to dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran". 96 He criticize the deal's structure as well as the dangers posed by lifting sanctions

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup> Sarah Begley, "Read Donald Trump's Speech to AIPAC," *Time*, March 21, 2016, accessed Jun 2, 2021, https://time.com/4267058/donald-trump-aipac-speech-transcript/.

against Iran. President Trump wants to be explicit about his objectives in order to gain support from the pro-Israel lobby, which was against the Iran Nuclear Deal.

General H.R. McMaster was first chosen over John Bolton as President Trump's National Security Advisor. Isolationist President Trump thought John Bolton was too hawkish and believed McMaster would be more competent. McMaster, on the other hand, was less favorable to Israel and frequently avoided queries concerning Israeli security. McMaster had also persuaded President Trump to stay in the Iran Nuclear Deal on several occasions. Bolton, on the other hand, was a staunch supporter of Israel and its Middle East security. For years, Bolton had been a vocal opponent of Iran's regime. He had even proposed aggressive regime change led by the United States on several occasions. One of the main causes for John Bolton's animosity toward the Iranian regime was their nuclear weapons program. He was so focused on Iran as a potential US adversary and concerned about nuclear weapons. Since its inception, Bolton had been a vocal opponent of the Iran Nuclear Deal, calling it "execrable". President Trump announced his withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal less than a month after Bolton became National Security Advisor.

President Trump was persuaded to exit the Iran Nuclear Deal by a mix of external and internal pressure. By quitting the Iran Nuclear Deal, President Trump was able to satisfy the pro-Israel lobby due to campaign donations and support.

# 4.10 Congress, State Secretary and Pro-Israeli Lobby

In reality, a considerable number of Republican politicians in Congress backed the withdrawal from the JCPOA. Some of these lawmakers were members of the Senate important Committee such as "The Senate Foreign Relations Committee". Marco Rubio, a Republican senator from Florida, was a significant politician in this respect. During his presidential campaign in 2016, Rubio expressed his opposition to the JCPOA. Rubio, on the other hand, openly opposed the US participation in the JCPOA in 2015 by offering an amendment to INARA that would require Iran to recognize Israel as a state. Under criticism from his Republican colleagues, Rubio eventually voted for INARA without his

suggested modification. Rubio reiterated his opposition to the JCPOA once more in October 2017, after Trump decertified INARA. Rubio was a member of a powerful coalition of legislators opposed to the JCPOA. Among those in this group was Ted Cruz, a Republican senator from Texas who was also a top candidate in the 2016 presidential primary process. Leading Senate politicians supported Cruz and Rubio. Individuals of the pro-Israel economic elite had pushed Rubio to favor a JCPOA exit because of the financial incentive they provided. Rubio got \$468,307 from pro-Israel lobbying organizations during his 2016 election campaign, making him the Senate's top beneficiary of financial donations from the pro-Israel enterprise. This alone provides Rubio with a tremendous financial motive to support the pro-Israel elites' interests in the United States. Rubio had ties to various pro-Israel lobbying groups, including AIPAC. Rubio also had ties to billionaire auto dealer Norman Braman, who was the previous President of the Greater Miami Jewish Federation, a pro-Israel organization based in Florida. Rubio's links presume that the pro-Israel views of his long-time friend and financial supporter, Braman, may have impacted his views on the JCPOA.

Several close advisers wanted Trump to withdraw the US from the JCPOA, but others were more hesitant. Rex Tillerson, Trump's former Secretary of State, is a major figure in this regard. While defending Trump's decision to ratify INARA in October 2017, Tillerson also claimed that neither he nor Trump wanted Congress to reinstate sanctions on Iran, although Trump's remarks on the decertification of INARA implying differently. In March 2018, five months after Tillerson's comment about INARA's decertification, Trump declared that Tillerson would be replaced by Mike Pompeo, a former Republican House Representative and then-Director of the CIA. During his period as a Representative in the US Congress, from 2011 to 2017, Pompeo had an effective reputation with the pro-Israel elite. Pompeo supported six bills opposing Iran and the JCPOA in 2015 and 2016. Pompeo's position on Iran and the JCPOA so matches the President's desire for a Secretary of State who could make the JCPOA exit a reality.

# 4.11 The Role of AIPAC and Other Israeli Lobby towards JCPOA Withdrawal

The withdrawal of the JCPOA was largely influenced by pro-Israel lobbying groups. AIPAC's clout extends to every corner of the US Congress. Trump had a great motivation to seek AIPAC's support. AIPAC's overall goal is to ensure a pro-Israel US foreign policy as well as a financial incentive for the political class to support this goal. Since 2006, AIPAC had spent unprecedented amounts on lobbying efforts in years when Iran had been a contentious issue. AIPAC spent more than \$3 million on lobbying in 2014.

AIPAC spent a considerable amount advocating for legislation opposing Iran's nuclear program. When the US signed the JCPOA in 2015, AIPAC persuaded Congress to reject it, and the organization even launched a \$20-40 million campaign against it, as well as meeting with over 400 congressional lawmakers to persuade them to oppose it. <sup>97</sup> During his 2016 election campaign, Trump publicly attacked the JCPOA in a speech to the AIPAC conference, declaring that dismantling the terrible deal with Iran was his top priority. The notion that Donald Trump made his announcement at AIPAC during an election season could indicate that he did it in order to gain AIPAC's support. When examining the enormous financial and political leverage that AIPAC wielded in the US political system, it's clear that Trump had a tremendous motive to try to enhance his ties with this lobbying group even after he became President.

Trump and the RJC had a better relationship after Trump assumed the presidency. RJC was specifically pursuing individuals of the political elite, praising or punishing them based on their views on the JCPOA. By December 2017, the RJC's criticism toward Trump had softened. When Trump declared that the US embassy in Israel would be relocated to Jerusalem. Furthermore, when Trump announced his departure from the JCPOA in May 2018, the RJC officially applauded him for his decision, stating that it may lead to a better agreement that puts Iran under the proper pressure only when the President behaved in accordance with the RJC's goals was he compensated with support from the lobb y.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> Alisa Chang, "Lobbyists Spending Millions to Sway The Undecided On Iran Deal," *NPR*, August 6, 2015, accessed Jun 19, 2021, <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/08/06/429911872/in-iran-deal-fight-lobbyists-are-spending-millions-to-sway-12-senators">https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/08/06/429911872/in-iran-deal-fight-lobbyists-are-spending-millions-to-sway-12-senators</a>.

The Israeli-American Coalition (IAC) was another pro-Israel group worth looking into in light of the JCPOA withdrawal. Adelson, who started the charity with his wife in 2007, was directly connected with it. Since 2015, the IAC, like Adelson and the RJC, had aggressively fought to defeat the JCPOA. For example, the IAC advised its members to contact their congressional representatives and urge them to vote against the agreement. This demonstrates that the IAC was interested in persuading members of the political elite to support the removal of the JCPOA.

Nonetheless, with Trump's election as president, there had been a significant shift in the US stance toward Iran from no confrontation to confrontation, as evidenced by the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal in May 2018 and the application of economic penalties on Iran. The withdrawal of the JCPOA was largely influenced by pro-Israel lobbying groups. Lobby clout extends to every corner of the US Congress. Trump had a great motivation to seek lobby support. Israeli lobby overall goal was to ensure a pro-Israel US foreign policy as well as a financial incentive for the political class to support this goal.

### **CHAPTER-5**

Comparative Analysis of US Foreign Policy during President Barak

# **Obama And Donald Trump Administrations**

The Middle Eastern region has been the most significant and testing area of the foreign policy of the US since the establishment of the territory of Israel. Iran has a strategic location that is unrivalled. The 9/11 attacks, the Afghanistan and Iraq war, the downfall of Soviet Union, creation of Islamic republics in the Central Asian region, and the downfall of Soviet Union have all had huge impacts on the Middle East. These occasions happe ned in the region encompassing Iran, prompting the US to tighten its blockade, which included the establishment of military bases in C.A, and stationing of the US fleet in the region of Gulf, where Iran is virtually isolated from the rest of the world. Foreign policy evolves in response to changes in a country's national interests, and US foreign policy is no exception. The US leadership's policies are critical in maintaining US hegemony around the world. The national interests of a country determine its foreign policy. The efficiency of foreign policy depends on a leader's rational choice. During Obama and Trump's two presidential terms, US foreign policy with Iran was contradictory, with different patterns of dealing with Iran ranging from conciliation to antagonism, all based on American interests.

Over the use of military force, Obama's approach favored "soft power" and strategy with partners, allies and foes. According to common belief, Obama developed positive relationships with foreign countries, but Trump became stricter and more direct in administering the state's affairs. <sup>98</sup> Trump saw that attacking Iran and siding with Gulf States would serve American interests. For decades, mistrust between US and Iran had dictated US-Iran ties. That mistrust is undoubtedly higher under Trump than it was under Obama. This increases the possibility of both sides making mistakes, as well as the possibility of escalation, whether in Syria, the Strait of Hormuz, or between Israel and Hezbollah. During Obama's presidency, he worked to find a solution to the issue of Iran's nuclear program and made progress, however, under Trump's presidency, the situation deteriorated due to Trump's policies. Trump declared Jerusalem as a capital of Israel on 6<sup>th</sup> December of 2017. In the instance of the Israel-Palestine conflict, Trump said that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>98</sup> Sadia Fayaz and Nasrullah Khan, "Comparative Analysis of US Presidents Barak Obama and Donald Trump Foreign Policies," *Global Social Sciences Review* VI (2021): 292, accessed July 25, 2021, <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gssr.2021(VI-I).29">http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gssr.2021(VI-I).29</a>

Israel's government was justified in taking Jerusalem, and the US embassy was relocated to Jerusalem as a result. 99

The foreign policy of President Obama was guided by the notion of "diplomacy first," which he advocated throughout the campaign of President. During the Obama's presidency, the US foreign policy had followed a continuous pattern of imposing economic sanctions on Iran while also trying to engage Iran diplomatically to end its atomic weapons program. However, the Trump administration had indicated substantial shifts in how the US views Iran, as evidenced by its desire to pull out from the (JCPOA) and impose maximum economic pressure on the country.

### 5.1 Obama and his Non-Confrontational Policies towards Iran

It was a massive task when Obama took office, with the Middle East hampered with a reginal conflict, under the threat of a "war on terrorism", ongoing battles in Iraq as well as in Afghanistan, Iran nuclear deal. Obama devised a policy that centered on a desire to re-engage with Muslims and the Arab world. With Barak Obama's election, the United States adopted a new worldview focusing on international law and its interactions with Middle Eastern peoples. Obama emphasized the necessity of diplomacy and the use of force in a meaningful respect for human rights. Obama was a figure that captivated the West because he was more moderate, unilateral, solution-oriented, and not concentrated on military action. He also selected diplomatic language. President Barack Obama's early strategy in the Middle Eastern region was diametrically opposed to that of his predecessor, focusing on cooperation rather than confrontation to advance the US objectives.

When it came to dealing with Iran, President Barack Obama took a unique approach that ended in the signing of the Atomic Arrangement, which helped the US with achieving its aims by reducing the fixation on Iran's atomic program and attempting to avoid nuclear weapons development. Furthermore, by removing the economic restrictions imposed on Iran, it assisted to the achievement of Iranian interests. Obama made his position on Iran's nuclear program clear in his speech to Iran on the occasion of Nowruz

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>99</sup> Ibid, 291.

which was celebrated on 21st March of 2009. In his speech, the President referred to Iran's official name, the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the traditionally significant Persian civilization. It is widely assumed that Obama's mention of the Iran's official name means he accepts Iran's system and would not pursue the "regime change" approach that has characterized the US strategy toward Iran for over thirty years. 100 President Obama designed a campaign to engage Iran with the support of his advisers that "entailed public appeals, back-channel communications, and forays at negotiations". 101 President Obama advocated a balanced and pragmatic foreign strategy that valued diplomacy and partnership over war in order to achieve US goals through foreign policy. Obama saw it as critical to the country's interests to work on the idea of transforming the US worldview from one that favors military intercessions to one that uses soft power policy as well as diplomatic instruments to strengthen allies and defeat adversaries. Obama attempted to plug the gaps created by his hostile strategy, which Russia and China exploited for their own national interests. As a result, US foreign policy has abandoned the military option in favor of establishing communication and conversation with US adversaries such as Iran, notably on the Iranian nuclear issue. Before and after his election, Obama stated his intention to carry out a significant, coordinated diplomatic initiative capable of changing world opinion about the US approach to Iran and enhancing the US attitude and credibility in the region.

Under contrast to his predecessor, Obama continuously opposed Bush's hardline tactic of cutting ties with Tehran as a tool to pressurize the Iranian leadership, and tended to favor dialogue over sanctions in the "dual track approach" of diplomacy and sanctions. As a Democratic candidate, Obama shared some of the assumptions that guided the Republican administration's policy at the time; he was adamantly opposed to any weaponization of Iran's nuclear program and vowed make vigorous efforts to stop Iran from obtaining the nuclear capability. He never gave up on the idea of Iran suspending all enrichment activities, and he never supported the NPT's recognition of Tehran's nuclear rights. He also never ruled out using military force if Iran did not renounce its nuclear

<sup>100</sup> Shahram Akbarzadeh, "Obama And the U.S. Policy Change on Iran," Global Change, Peace and Security 21(2009): 398-399.

Suzanne Maloney, "Engagement with Iran: The Sequel," Fletcher Forum of World affairs 37 (2013): 91.

goals after all other options had been exhausted. One of his foreign policy pillars was "diplomacy first". Oba ma's strategy was centered on a thorough awareness of the region's new realities and recognition of the region's changing character of events in order to achieve long-term peace in the region and Obama acknowledged this. <sup>102</sup> The president stated unequivocally that the US wanted Iran to reclaim its legitimate spot in the international community, a position that could only be achieved through peaceful efforts that demonstrated the Iranian people's and civilization's genuine greatness. In this early stage, Obama's diplomatic efforts had to focus not just on engaging Tehran, but also on stopping Congress from passing heavier sanctions before the administration had exhausted the option of direct talks.

Another sensible strategy taken by Obama was to improve relations with Iran, which was seen as building nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the Obama Administration's foreign policy continued the legacy of prior administrations, namely, to compel Iran through economic sanctions while also offering the country a series of diplomatic engagements in the expectation that Iran would abandon its nuclear weapons objectives. In an effort to push Iranian leaders to the negotiating table, Obama succeeded to implement international economic restrictions. His initiatives were effective, and the JCPOA was signed, laying the groundwork for continued talks on additional issues. Despite significant internal political constraints, such as a Republican-dominated Congress and strong opposition from AIPAC lobby, the agreement became Obama's signature foreign policy achievement during his presidency.

### 5.2 Factors of Obama Non-Confrontational Policies Towards Iran

There are many factors which played important role in Obama's Non-Confrontational Policies towards Iran some of them are following:

### 5.2.1 Leadership Factor

Individual personality plays a vital role in foreign policy formation. His rationality, adaptability, tolerance, and outreach earned him a reputation. Obama believed on cooperative and accommodating patterns. He was not in favor of confrontational

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>102</sup> Ibid, 93.

policies. The president Obama, under the slogan "Change" had raised high expectations for the implementation of policies published in the region that have become critical to the new US policy's future. Obama developed strategies for the use of soft power based on this engagement mentality. Obama personal view was based on engagement policy to engage enemy through negotiation not through confrontation. President Barack Obama steered clear of sensitive issues and concentrated his diplomatic relations on finding common agreement. He adopted engagement policy toward Iran and was successful in established Iran nuclear deal in 2015.

### 5.2.2 Obama and Liberal Approach

Obama's rational liberalism in foreign affairs focuses on promoting liberal views that do not jeopardize nation's security, emphasizing diplomatic efforts in conflict resolution, fostering humanitarian crises, developing coalitions and multilateral deals, upholding key national best interest, and strengthening national security specified in terms of economic well-being. Under Barack Obama, the United States preserved a compliance with international law and dialogue. Obama was the follower of Liberalism. In remarks to Iran in Prague, Ankara, and Cairo, Obama emphasized "new beginnings" and "engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect". President Barack Obama declared on January 26, 2009, just days after his presidency that States as Iran will receive an outstretched hand from US if they are inclined to loosen up its fist. The Obama administration pursued an engagement policy with Iran. His accommodating gesture in his UN speech in September 2013 and President Obama's mild approach toward the West eventually prepared the door for negotiation on the Iranian nuclear problem.

#### 5.2.3 Obama and Multilateralism

In remarks to Iran in the city of Prague, Cairo, and Ankara, the president Obama emphasized "new beginnings" and mutually beneficial relationship understanding and respect. Obama's foreign affairs doctrine had been founded on the conviction that,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>103</sup> William S. Harrop, "Obama's Iran Policy: Mutual Respect Matters," *Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs* 1 (2010): 67.

even as the US could act unilaterally around the world, it hardly ever should. Obama argued that multilateralism curbs arrogance. Obama was in favor of regional cooperation. Experiences learnt from Bush's Iraq war affected Obama's foreign affairs stance, particularly his desire for working as member of an alliance. Obama said that US must collaborate with others when, in these situations, collaboration was much more likely to be successful, be maintained, and result in fewer costly mistakes. <sup>104</sup> He established the Iran nuclear agreement with p5+1 count ries and Iran which shows the gesture of Obama multilateralism. The world community saw this as a favorable opportunity for both parties to regain trust in nuclear negotiations.

### 5.2.4 Obama Administration and Engage ment Policy

When Obama became President, he and his administration saw an opportunity to persuade Iran not to expand its nuclear program, to rebuild another structure of ties with Iran following quite a while of alienation and hatred, and to eventually put an end to Iran's nuclear program. In his first term Mutual Fuel Swap Agreement 2010 was seen by Obama as a "positive opening" to negotiations. Although the agreement was not successful, Obama's administration collaborated with five other countries to reach a historic nuclear accord with Iran on a global level. The accord was hailed by the Obama administration as a historic diplomatic achievement that effectively ended Iran's nuclear development.

#### 5.2.5 Obama and Partisan Politics Approach

Domestic factor has a vital role in formulation of foreign policy of a state. Partisan politics approach also played a vital role in US in formation of foreign policy. In US democratic party and Republican party are the most prominent parties in political system which played significant role in US foreign policy approach. Many of Democrats condemn Israel policy in the Palestine and Middle East and they will not be permitted Israel to adopt harsh handling of Palestine. The Democrats have been the outspoken in condemnation of Israel's leadership brutality. Democrats are having liberal approach, self-aware of concepts, harmony, negate institutional biasness and oppose contention approach. Obama stated that many of Democratic party individual who spoke loudly

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>104</sup> Ibid, 68.

against Israel they lost funding and assistance from Jewish lobby and Israel. Obama was a Democrat and he adopted a non-confrontational policy toward in Middle East especially towards Iran. As Obama was belong to republican party which was one of the reasons of his adopting non-confrontational policy towards Iran.

### 5.2.6 Obama and Je wish lobby

During Obama era Jewish lobby impacted US foreign affairs to attain Israeli objectives. Several pro-Israeli individuals were the part of Obama administration on high positions to achieve Israeli objectives. During Obama presidential election time he said he would not permit Jewish lobby to be active in Presidency. As Obama obtained 70 % US Jews support in election yet AIPAC was frightened about backing for Israel. He also stated that he will not obtain any incentive from oil corporations and Jewish lobby which became a hurdle in change process. He stated that those who "criticized Israel policy too loudly risked being tagged as anti-Israel possibly anti-Semitic and were confronted with a well-funded opponent in the next election" and during elections, he or she may face a "well-funded opponent". Obama addressed his contentious ties with Jewish lobby especially AIPAC and Israel condemned for internal resistance against his policies.

Obama assisted Israel objectives political, economic and military under the influence of Jewish lobby. Israel received 38 billion dollars considerable assistance from US during Obama era yet Obama and Netanyahu were having some friction. Netanyahu said "are insisting on zero enrichment as a condition for relaxing any sanctions against Iran. Some would even like to authorize the use of military force". <sup>105</sup> Obama also stated that Netanyahu "justify almost anything that would keep him in power". Obama addressed Netanyahu "smart, canny, tough and a gifted communicator" utilize his capabilities in US foreign affairs and oppose measures did not comply with pro-Israeli objectives. Obama said about Netanyahu's "vision of himself as the chief defender of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>105</sup> W. James Antle III, "What the Iran Deal Means for Republicans," *The American Conservative*, November 25,2013, accessed May 22, 2021,

https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/republicans-and-the-iran-deal/

Jewish people against calamity allowed him to justify almost anything that would keep him in power". Obama also stated that Netanyahu "justify almost anything that would keep him in power". Israel received 38 billion dollars considerable assistance from US during Obama era which was an extraordinary degree of collaboration between military and security services yet Obama and Netanyahu were having some friction.

During Obama's presidency, the US attempted to be a more forthright mediator and broker between the region's contending groups. Unfortunately, their hopes for Middle East peace did not come true, owing partially to Israel's conservative and extremist actions. The four major criteria for foreign affairs analysis were foreign policy involvement, authoritative ability, political opposition, and political solidarity. Firstly, foreign policy is virtually solely the focus of the pro-Israel lobby. The key problems mentioned on the websites of pro-Israel lobby interest groups demonstrate involvement with international policy. Moreover, US domestic politics has minimal influence on Israeli interests. Second, J-Street and AIPAC's organization and resources illustrate the pro-Israel lobby's strength and broad influence. Third, political opponents to Israel are frequently constrained due to the unpopularity and political backlash experienced by opponents of Israel and the US-Israel alliance. Finally, the pro-Israel lobby was becoming increasingly divided over the issue of Iran's nuclear agreement but its policy positions were largely consistent.

The NSC of Israel listed two potential political advancements that could harm Israel's interest after President Obama's election in 2008. These events included either a US-led discussion that prompted harmony between the U.S, Iran and the Middle Eastern countries or led to the US forming a broad international collaboration towards Iran, by which Israel may be obliged to face a cost. Israeli lawmakers put a lot of pressure on President Obama, especially in first year of his presidency, to strike Iran, or at the very least provide Israel with the tactical backing it required to target Iran's atomic facilities

The Iran Nuclear Deal, on the other hand, had revealed the pro-Israel lobby's rising fragmentation and partisanship. Furthermore, in terms of the US-Israel relationship, despite Israel's resistance and even antagonism towards the US over the Iran

Nuclear agreement, the Obama administration had been the most liberal in assisting Israel. Prior to leaving office, the president Obama negotiated a record-breaking pact with Israel to contribute 38 billion US dollars over the course of following ten years which was an extraordinary degree of collaboration between military and security services.

Internal opposition slowed the nuclear agreement negotiations in the United States, with the President Obama facing opposition from majority of republicans, as well as state governors. Certain congressional democrats also opposed Obama over this matter. Many in Obama's administration claimed that the policy of engagement alone is insufficient to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, and that diplomacy's best chance of success requires all aspects to operate together at the same time. <sup>106</sup>Despite internal opposition, Obama insisted on taking a new approach to Iran in order to protect American interests by eradicating the Iranian nuclear threat. He removed economic sanctions from Iran, imposed by the US and its western allies, in return for the country's agreement to cease its nuclear program and forestall the advancement of atomic weapons capabilities.

After it became clear that engagement with the Islamic Republic would not be as straightforward as he had thought, and the arrangement of Mutual Fuel Swap that broke down in 2009, the President Obama struggled to decide how to deal with Iran. Negotiating a nuclear deal with Iran is a staggered game involving both domestic and regional players. Iran policy under President Barack Obama is torn between partnership and hostility. Cooperation with Iran would infuriate Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, three of America's key partners. Israel and other countries might desire a conflict, but it would be harmful to America's diplomatic capacities. Both choices were far from ideal, and each had a number of unintended effects that might destabilize the Middle East's political balance. President Barack Obama attempted to establish an Iran policy that struck a balance between engagement and containment on several occasions during his term. President Obama's conversations with Iranian leaders have been challenging

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>106</sup> Scott Peterson, "For Iran, Wikileaks Cables Validate Its Skepticism of Obama's Sincerity," *The Christian Science Monitor*, November 30, 2010, accessed May 20,2021, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/1130/For-Iran-WikiLeaks-cables-validate-its-skepticism-of-Obama-s-sincerity

because he has tried to find a strategy that is acceptable to every major stakeholder, including Iran, key regional partners, and home constituencies. Gulf Allies, particularly Saudi Arabia, want Iran to stay out of their way, while Israel thinks Iran is a direct challenge to its security. Negotiating with Iran could jeopardize trade connections with the Gulf, but an Israeli-led military attack to destroy nuclear facilities of Iran would be terrible. To avoid having to choose between a deal and an offensive strike, the Obama administration had pursued sanctions. Sanctions were relatively safe and acceptable strategy of retaliation. They were less hazardous than military involvement, and they satisfied American friends and the Israel lobby as well as Congress. Congress, including key democrats like "Senators Chuck Schumer and Bob Menendez" was completely uninterested in supporting Obama on the Iran's nuclear deal. <sup>107</sup> Despite intense resistance from Israel, the Israeli lobby, and pro-Israeli members of Congress, Obama eventually opted for Iran nuclear deal.

Furthermore, the Iran nuclear deal faced criticism from pro-Israel Americans, which turned into rhetoric after Donald Trump took office. On the same day, when the November agreement with Iran was signed, Benjamin Netanyahu delivered a public statement calling it a "historical mistake." According to Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, there is only one way to guarantee the insurance of American interests as well as the Israel's wellbeing was to execute a zero-enrichment policy, which was not included in the November pact. The agreement was slammed by politicians from all sides of Israel's political spectrum. AIPAC lobbyists immediately began a campaign to persuade the members of Congress to back Nuclear Weapons Free Iran Act, and pushed sanctions. When President Barack Obama first expressed an interest in engaging Iran in 2009, AIPAC dispatched 6,000 members to Capitol Hill to lobby for sanctions legislation to be approved before the Iranian elections. With each new twist in the political riddle that was Iran's nuclear program, AIPAC urges Congress to take tougher actions against the country. One of the fundamental subjects raised by lobbyists at such gatherings was the adoption of harsh sanctions against Iran. AIPAC pushes aggressive anti-Iran

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>107</sup> Jamil N. Jaffer, "Elements of Its Own Demise: Key Flaws in the Obama Administration's Domestic Approach to the Iran Nuclear Agreement," *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law* 51 (2019):89.

legislation by actively lobbying members of Congress who oppose or are hesitant to pass it. Following Obama's entry into the Iran Nuclear Deal, the pro-Israel lobby, particularly AIPAC, increased its spending from \$12 million to \$15.5 million in 2016. In 2015, a number of steps were taken to stop Obama from relaxing economic penalties imposed on Iran. The most egregious attempt to undermine the JCPOA occurred on September 9, 2015, when a bill was submitted in the House of Representatives that would block Obama from loosening up any approvals against Iran until the 21<sup>st</sup> of 2017. Obama's engagement approach was difficult to continue due to high levels of American suspicion of Iran, as well as constant lobbying by the favorable to Israeli vested parties along with neo conservatives in the United States. After two terms in office, Barack Obama left a mixed but positive foreign policy legacy. Obama's track record and legacy were mostly positive. <sup>108</sup>

### 5.3 Trump and his Policies Towards Iran

Instead of attempting to de-raise regional conflicts and cooperate optimistically with Iran, the US should try to de-escalate regional conflicts, which has gained the assistance of Russia to promote Iran's authoritative impact over the nations located in Gulf region, the region of Middle East has been hauled into a subsequent Cold War vital situation under Trump's presidency, which has been marked by his support for Israel. Simultaneously, the new Trump administration constructed its policy towards Iran to keep it from obtaining atomic weapons, engaging in terrorist operations, supporting terrorist groups, and interfering in regional affairs.

Trump's government had a fundamentally different agenda from Obama's, and Trump had been a vocal opponent of Obama's presidency. Many of Trump's initiatives were being analyzed, including his efforts to fight ISIS, rebuild relations with Israel, creation of an Arab NATO to assure Israel's security in the region, and pursue a more confrontational strategy towards Iran. Trump began his hardline foreign policy campaign by blaming Iran of being a dictatorial regime. Trump considered striking Iran and aligning with Gulf states as beneficial to the United States. President Trump made it a

 $<sup>^{108}</sup>$  David Unger, "The Foreign Policy Legacy of Barack Obama," *The International Spectator* 51(2016):15, accessed July 22, 2021, <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2016.1227914">http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2016.1227914</a>.

priority throughout his election campaign to reset, enhance, and improve his counterterrorism measures in reaction to the disruptive actions of Iran in the Gulf region. President Donald Trump had harshly criticized President Barack Obama's actions toward the Middle East, particularly Iran. Trump chastised President Obama during his election campaign for conducting business with Iran over the atomic problem that has led to the JCPOA. Trump dubbed the US-Iran deal "the worst deal ever negotiated in US history." It was dubbed "the stupidest deal ever" and a "awful, nasty, utterly bungling deal with Iran" according to Trump. 109 Later, he backtracked, and said he would prefer to reform the terms and conditions of the agreement, however this was not that easy as it would cause dissatisfaction among other deal partners and US allies, as well as jeopardize the credibility of international agreements because it was a multilateral agreement. Trump perceived the accord as failing to limit Iran's drive for nuclear weapons, which goes against to US interests. Trump's concern over Iran's expanding influence in the Middle East jeopardizing America's interests. As a result, Trump took a combative stance in order to limit and isolate Iran, which promotes terrorism and is working on a ballistic missile system. President Trump has also put sanctions and encouraged anti-Iran countries as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. The U.S withdrew from the Iran nuclear agreement on 8<sup>th</sup> May 8 of 2018. According to the president Trump there was a loophole in the JCPOA pact that allows Iran to pursue its nuclear weapons capacity. President Donald Trump strengthened his anti-Iran policies to keep Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. Trump embraced such attitude on the basis that, regardless of whether Iran abides by the provisions of the agreement, it would readily obtain an atomic weapon in light of the fact that, if the restrictions on nuclear program of Iran are lifted couple of years after the fact, Iran will actually want to foster military atomic weapons effortlessly.

# 5.3.1 Policy Shift from Non- Confrontation to Confrontation Under President Trump

Waseem Ishaque, Syed Jawad Shah and Aman Ullah, "Iranian Nuclear Deal: Challenges for Regional and Global Strategic Management," *Global Political Review* II (2017): 1, accessed July 25,2021, http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2017(II-I).01.

With Trump's victory, the US approach to Iran evolved from containment to confrontation, as indicated by retreated JCPOA in 2018 with foisted hard restrictions on the country. As a result of these policy changes, the relationship between the US and Iran has deteriorated. Under Obama's presidency, Iran's involvement in the Arab world depended on maintaining Iran's job as a provincial force and advancing Iran interests, particularly receiving Americans help.

The Trump administration was well concerned of Iran's expanding regional influence, which the former Obama administration ignored. Since the start of the new administration, Donald Trump and his administration had taken a bold and clear stance on Iran. Under Trump, the US saw Iran as a possible threat, while Iran is seen as a rogue state whose actions only add to the Middle East's insecurity. The Iranian government was viewed as a radical regime that was responsible for global devastation, death, and instability. Furthermore, Iran was seen as a state that had funded a large number of terror groups, was broadening its network through proxies, and trying to pursue its missile program by any means possible. They had increased their efforts to provoke hostility by expanding coercion, violating state sovereignty, trying to exploit ambiguity, and purposefully trying to bridge the gap between civil and military goals.

Iran's foreign policy toward the Arab world had evolved as a result of the movement in American strategy in terms of the country's regional position. Iran was constructing a "land bridge" connecting Tehran and the Mediterranean, which Israel saw as a threat. Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel as a former top intelligence official told Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and noted that Israel's security apparatus perceived Iran as a significant threat that must be addressed. <sup>110</sup> In the context of the American-Iranian conflict under Trump's presidency, Iran's influence had grown in the Arab world, where Iran had increased its political and military participation in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. The deployment of pro-Iranian regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the growing power of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, had strengt hened Iran, and it perceived intends to use this advantage to bolster regional Shiite

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>110</sup> Dalia Dassa Kaye and Shira Efron, "Israel's Evolving Iran Policy," *Survival* 62(2020): 7-8, accessed July 28,2021, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2020.1792095">https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2020.1792095</a>.

movements and possibly drive the US out of the Gulf. <sup>111</sup> In fact, the trump believed that Iran's aggression continues because Iran financing and assisting terrorist groups like al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Taliban.

The objective of Trump's foreign policy was to force Iran back to its own territorial boundary. To put it another way, Iran's influence in Iraq and Syria must be diminished, with the ultimate goal of forcing Iran out of Syria. Iran's financial capability to sustain the Al-Assad regime in Damascus and other allied militias in Syria had been harmed by sanctions, but there was no indication that Iran was ready to leave. Rather, one of Trump's unforeseen outcomes was that Iran was losing ground in Syria to Russia. The failure of President Obama to halt Iran's missile program was another factor that motivated President Trump and his administration to alter their predecessors' approach. Trump said that in the future, Iran will be able to hit small targets such as Israel, other Gulf countries, and maybe the United States.

The breaking of the international accord on a nuclear deal with Iran was another important decision that astonished most world leaders and experts. This action was seen as a clear breach of international law, and it weakened the position and prestige of the US, as well as international organizations such as the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as the Europe an Union and the UN Security Council.

After more than a decade of discussions between the European Union and Iran, as well as two years of rigorous diplomacy between Iran, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Russia, China, Germany, and the European Union, the JCPOA was signed.

### 5.3.2 President Trump's 'Maximum Pressure' Policy Campaign Against Iran

Relations between Iran and the United States were in turmoil as a result of President Trump's crippling sanctions, termed the "maximum pressure" campaign, aimed at forcing Iran to renegotiate the 2015 nuclear deal. The "maximum pressure" campaign was a three-pronged approach that included political, military, and economic tactics. He

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>111</sup> Kenneth Katzman, *Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses* (Washington D.C: Congressional Research Service, 2009), 56.

termed the Iran nuclear deal the "worst deal in history". Secondly, he lonely restored punitive financial penalties that had been eased under the JCPOA in order to limit Iran's economic support. All of Iran's sanctions have been increased by the Trump administration, which has threatened other countries and firms with "secondary sanctions" if they do not cooperate with US restrictions. Iran has continuously refused to engage in negotiations with Trump, claiming financial penalties first be eased. Iran and Iran-linked forces allegedly attacked US shoulders monitoring 2019, strikes against tankers in the Gulf of Oman, allegedly attacked Saudi oil facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais in September of the same year, captured commercial ships damaged some critical infrastructure in Arab Gulf states, Iran's preemptive missile strikes on Saudi oil facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais in September of the same year. Iran had also reduced its adherence to the JCPOA's obligations as part of what it calls a "maximum resistance" effort. The administration had sent more military forces to the region in an attempt to avoid further Iranian attacks.

# 5.4 Factors of Trump Confrontational Policies Towards Iran

There are many factors which played important role in Trump confrontational policies towards Iran some of them are following:

### 5.4.1 Leadership Factor

Conservative, imperialist, isolationist, and racist have all been used to define Trump's political stances. Instead of focusing on his election campaign statements concerning the country's internal issues, Trump has shifted his focus away from accomplishing U.S interests in accordance with his agenda. Trump advocated for the United States to be free of the constraints of global leadership. Trump had weakened international collaboration since taking administration. Furthermore, US foundational behavior, such as the decision to officially declare Jerusalem as Israel's capital and move the US Embassy there, had frequently been bilateral and ignored international agreement. Relationships between Iran and the United States were becoming increasingly tense

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>112</sup> Kenneth Katzman, *Iran: U.S.-Iran Conflict and Implications for U.S. Policy* (Washington D.C: Congressional Research Service, 2020),17.

under Trump's administration, to an extent that a future war between the two countries was a distinct possibility. On Iran, the Trump administration hoped that exiting the JCPOA agreement and initiating a punishing sanctions drive would push Tehran to agree to a "stronger" agreement.

### 5.4.2 Trump and Unilateralism

Trump believed on unilateralism. Trump had criticized some of the multinational ties that Obama and his administrations pushed for, increasing the possibility that the Republican's "America First" strategy may imply a more independent America. During trump election campaign, he criticized NATO and suggested that the US might not support countries who don't pay their financial responsibilities to the longstanding US-European defensive alliance. Given Trump's conservative and aggressive attitudes on national defense, it's unclear what all these military actions were involve. Trump's foreign affairs had been distinguished by unilateralism and hostility, as well as administrative change, surprise, and bewilderment. Trump had a negative attitude toward global cooperation because he believed on unilateralism. Under Trump, the United States had withdrawn from multilateral accords, deals, and associations. 113 Trump had pulled out of the Paris Climate Agreement, the Iranian Nuclear Agreement, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. His cabinet had underfunded and withdrew from the UN, while the World Trade Organization had been paralyzed. He also slammed NATO countries and called into doubt the coalition's primary promise to mutual defense. Trump withdrawal from the JCPOA calling it a "bad deal" and adopted confrontational policy against Iran by imposing hard sanctions on Iran. Trump had exploited these flaws to forge a gap between multilateralism and isolationism in the United States.

### 5.4.3 Trump Hawkish Administration

Trump presidency had slandered international collaboration as a sign of desperation and had worked to undermine the multilateral structure that America established. It had done so at significant risk to itself. In Trump's administration, there were hawkish factions. Pompeo, who was a congressman at the time, advocated for an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. In May 2018, Trump withdrew from Obama's nuclear

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>113</sup> Ibid, 19.

agreement, allowing Pompeo as well as other hawks in the cabinet the opportunity to drastically redefine US policies regarding Iran. Pompeo, Hook, as well as other Iran hardliners had condemned the government for arming and financing Shia militants in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and other proxy organizations. Soleimani, the Iranian officer killed in the US airstrike, devised the approach and was instrumental in helping proxy forces across Iraq and Syria. With such a hawkish structure in existence, Pompeo had pressed Trump to assault Iran and advocated for extraordinary, aggressive measures such as branding the Revolutionary Guards Army, an Iranian military element, as a terrorist organization.

### 5.4.4 Trump and Partisan Politics Approach

It is a perception that Republicans are less worried about the creation of Palestinian territories. Republicans adopted measures to convince Jewish lobby to assist Republican individuals. Republicans used aggressive remarks made by Democrats to gain attention of the Jewish lobby. Republican and Israeli lobby quickly condemn any action which deteriorate any of Israeli interest. It is the perception that Jewish lobby has complete influence over Republicans party, there are neocons in the Republican party who advocate unwavering support for Israel. When Obama create an Iran Nuclear Deal in 2015 Netanyahu started efforts to sabotage that deal and try to involve in US Domestic politics. On the other hand, he supported Trump in his presidency election 2016 to gain incentives. Trump was a Republicans candidate and he adopted confrontational policy towards Iran due to the influence of Jewish lobby. The influence of the partly also played vial role in formation of Foreign policy.

### 5.4.5 The Pro-Israel Lobby Influence on Trump Towards Iran

It is a popular perception that Trump was heavily influenced by Israel and the Israeli lobby. Trump's policies were built on America's consistent support for Israel and staunch hostility to Iran. The basic problems in the Middle East remain unaffected as a result of these policies, and Palestinians, who are at the root of the conflict, receive no attention. The Nuclear Agreement was opposed by the Trump administration, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Trump offered to assist Gulf countries in their fight against Iran and urged

them to join Israel. It also supports pro-Israeli measures that encourage Arab countries to cooperate with Israel in combating terrorism. Trump declared that the central issue in the Middle East was not Israel, and that Iran was the main cause of regional unrest, portraying the Iranian government as a "rogue" state that promotes terrorism.

In the context of the JCPOA, the US President had exclusive authority to withdraw the America out of the agreement. Although Congress had a vote in the JCPOA's verification through legislation linked to the agreement, Trump did not require congressional permission to withdraw. A variety of pro-Israel elites, including affluent individuals, lobbying organizations, foreign policy consultants, government officials, congressional politicians, and military experts, May had impacted Trump. Trump's lack of political experience, particularly when it comes to foreign policy, may actually made him more open to outside influences and close advisors. The apparent discrepancy in the US foreign policy were evident by its departure from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) pact under Trump as a result the relationship between Iran and US further deteriorated. <sup>114</sup>

Elites were key factors in the pro-Israeli US foreign policy regarding the JCPOA, and they were linked in complex networks from which they gave the President with numerous necessary incentives to achieve the JCPOA's withdrawal. Paul Singer, Bernard Marcus, and Sheldon Adelson, three US billionaires, had been singled out by US media as key influencers in Trump's decision to withdraw from the JCPOA. They contributed nearly \$40 million in direct support for Trump during the 2016 election. Furthermore, they contributed 44% of individual donations to the Congressional Leadership Fund (CLF) and 47% to the Senate Leadership Fund (SLF), both of which favored Republican elections. Furthermore, the donations show that these wealthy individuals have provided a financial incentive for the political elite to support their political inclinations. Withdrawal from the JCPOA was a top priority for the aforementioned members of the economic elite. Nonpolitical elites devote their money and attention towards power, implying that they donate to political candidates largely to get support for their key political concerns, rather than to continuously support a politician whose character they

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>114</sup> Muhammad Ilham Razak, "U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Iranian Nuclear Threat from Bill Clinton to Donald Trump Administration," *Insignia Journal of International Relations* 7(2020): 17.

generally believe in. Singer and Adelson were affluent members of the economic elite who had sought to assure a pro-Israel US foreign policy by providing economic incentives to the President, a major member of the political elite.

Because of their roles as reliable advisers to President Trump on foreign policy problems, Nikki Haley and John Bolton can be regarded as members of the political elite. They had been vocal in their opposition to the Iran as well as the nuclear deal. Trump's policies were built on America's consistent support for Israel and staunch hostility to Iran. Therefore, Trump bluntly exited the JCPOA with Iran, making the US a key violator of international law. 115 Adelson, a part of the economic elite, had worked to ensure a pro-Israeli US foreign policy through his ties to influential members of the political elite who share their views on the JCPOA. Secondly, Adelson's contribution was obvious to Haley's campaign for US Ambassador to the United Nations, as well as their deep involvement in the JCPOA. He had explicitly offered President Trump with a substantial financial incentive to withdraw the US from the JCPOA, as well as maintaining vital relationships with some of Trump's key advisors on the subject.

Trump closest confident advisors Tillerson was more hesitant about Trump decision to withdraw the United States from the JCPOA. On this premise, it is clear that trump's political elite did not unanimously endorse Trump's decision to withdraw the US from the JCPOA. Mike Pompeo, a former Republican House Representative and then then-Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), succeeded Tillerson as Secretary of State. During his period as a Representative in the US Congress, from 2011 to 2017, Mike Pompeo had an excellent relationship with the pro-Israel elite. Pompeo supported six bills opposing Iran and the JCPOA in 2015 and 2016. Pompeo's stance on the JCPOA contrasted sharply with Tillerson's conciliatory stance. Trump's reaction to Tillerson's lack of support for the JCPOA withdrawal, on the other hand, suggests that the President prioritized staying in line with the elites who offered him incentives in the form of power, influence, access, or money to do so, rather than listening to an official in his administration whom he had hired to advise him on Iran and the JCPOA issues. Tillerson

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>115</sup> Behrooz Kalantari, "A Comparative analysis of Recent U.S. Policies in the Middle East: Obama vs. Trump," *Madridge Journal of Behavioral and Social Sciences* 2 (2018): 44-46.

argued that the JCPOA was preferable to no deal, but Trump had refused to listen to his advice. Trump's top military advisers appear to be in the same boat. General Joseph Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and US Army General Joseph Votel, both aligned with Tillerson on the JCPOA withdrawal.

A group of politicians who can be classified as part of the political elite on US foreign policy because of their positions on relevant committees and public exposure, and who had been strongly affected by the Israeli lobby, had acted to influence US foreign policy to be pro-Israel by promoting the JCPOA withdrawal. The termination of the JCPOA was backed by Republican legislators in Congress. Some of these politicians were part of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a key political body that oversees congressional foreign affairs. Marco Rubio, a Republican from Florida, was awarded \$468,307 from pro-Israel lobbying organizations during the 2016 election, putting him as the Senate's number, one beneficiary of financial contributions from the pro-Israel industry. Marco Rubio was linked to Norman Braman, the former President of the Greater Miami Jewish Federation; this link suggests that he may have been influenced by his long-time friend and financial supporter, billionaire auto dealer Norman Braman, on topics related to the JCPOA. Rubio's ties to other pro-Israel individuals and organizations that had openly denounced the JCPOA, support the notion that he is sensitive to monetary donations. Members of the economic elite had pushed Rubio to favor a withdrawal from the JCPOA because of the economic incentive they represent.

Trump's steadfast support for the goals of several other pro-Israel elites on the JCPOA withdrawal may indicate that the incentives to accept these elites' recommendations were more appealing than the motivations to follow the suggestions of Trump's political and military advisers. Wealthy individuals, lobbying organizations, and high-profile policy advisors were among the other pro-Israel elites, and it had been confirmed that they can all provide Trump with power, money, or public exposure.

AIPAC represents powerful incentives of influence, power, and income, which may lead the political elite wishing to secure the organization's support. Trump openly attacked the JCPOA during his 2016 presidential campaign speech at the AIPAC conference, saying that dismantling the terrible deal with Iran is his prime objective. This

demonstrates that Trump wanted to show AIPAC that he was on the similar page as the influential lobbying group. The fact that Trump made his announcement at AIPAC during an election period could indicate that he did so, to gain AIPAC's support. While there is no uncertainty that elite actors have actively worked to ensure the US departure from the JCPOA by leveraging their vast wealth and wide networks, a complex network of pro-Israel elites has played a role in the executive power's decision to withdraw from the JCPOA. Thereby, there was a causal relationship between AIPAC's intentions and Trump's behavior on the JCPOA does exist. Trump's decision to suspend the US from the JCPOA was founded, at least in part, on the significant incentives of money, influence, access, and power offered to him by individuals of the pro-Israel economic and lobby elites.

Obama's approach included negotiating a nuclear agreement with Iran and trying to integrate it into regional politics in order to create a regional power balance between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other Sunni countries. Trump, on the other hand, had pledged to cancel the nuclear deal, restore economic sanctions, and enhance ties with Saudi Arabia and Israel, Iran's key regional foes.

The international community believes that the Iranian nuclear standoff will be broken, and the constructive phase of negotiations will begin if the US overcomes the impediments and maintains a moderate inclination. <sup>116</sup> President Trump's hardline actions and one-sided view of Middle East matters, as well as his zealous determination to reverse Obama's achievements, have engulfed the region in vast and fundamental new challenges. Furthermore, his poor understanding of the region's politics has broken much of the US's regional achievements, as well as hopes for achieving peace and stability in the near future. His shortsighted and one-sided policies have ruined any prospect of regional peace, rendering the region more prone to war and violence.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>116</sup> Liang xiang JIN, "Analysis on Obama Administration's Policy Adjustment of Iranian Nuclear Issue," *Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies* (in Asia) 4(2010): 29, accessed July 25,2021, https://doi.org/10.1080/19370679.2010.12023153.

### Conclusion

Disintegration of USSR, emergence of Iranian Revolution 1979, US terrorist attack 2001, and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, have all had significant implications for the Middle East. These events took place in the region surrounding Iran, leading to a tightening of US isolation of Iran, which included the creation US army facilities and Warship in the Middle East Region which cut off Iran from the rest of the world. According to historical research, the US has maintained a tight association with the political life of the Middle East since the foundation of the Israeli state, and has consistently provided Israel with steadfast diplomatic and economic backing. The security of Israel, as well as the security of its regional military bases and access to Middle Eastern oil, is the United States' main priority in the Middle East.

Apart from the rapprochements that occurred during Raza Shah and Obama period, which culminated to reaches JCPOA, US-Iranian ties have always been contentious. Nonetheless, since Trump's election as president, the US has taken a hard line against Iran, as evidenced US retreated JCPOA in 2018 with foisted hard restrictions. Over the course of Obama's and Trump's two presidential terms, US foreign affairs to Iran shifted dramatically, did their approaches to dealing with Iran, which ranged from conciliation to animosity to confrontation, depending on American interests. Each administration confronted its own unique strategic environment on an internal and international level when making the decision. Domestic politics, particularly from the Democratic and Republican parties, as well as lobbying from interest groups, particularly Israeli organizations, dominated the internal climate much of the time.

This research has focused on studying the impact of the Israeli lobby on the policies of the Trump and Obama administrations toward Iran. With Barak Obama's victory, the United States has introduced a new worldview based on international law and partnership with Middle Eastern people. Obama underlined the importance of diplomacy over action, as well as true human rights respect. The US strove to be a more honest mediator and broker between the region's warring groups during Obama's presidency. Unfortunately, his ideas for Middle East peace did not come to fruition, owing in part to the Israeli government's conservative and extremist actions. Netanyahu launched a

obama administration, US foreign policy was concentrated on a constant pattern of pressuring Iran to impose economic penalties while simultaneously attempting to engage Iran diplomatically to cease its nuclear weapons program. Because Barack Obama's conciliatory gesture created the path for conversation on the Iran nuclear problem, he then initiated international diplomatic efforts that compelled Iran to sign the nuclear deal with the P5+1 in July 2015.

During the Trump administration, American foreign policy against Iran was built on three primary fronts. The first was called "Delegitimization" and it focused on Iran's backing for terrorism and ballistic missile development. The second was the introduction of new economic sanctions against Iran, known as "sanctions". The third strategy was "Containment" which aimed to promote the policies of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as well as Israel's. All three are aimed at curbing Iran's influence in the area. With Trump's victory, the US shifted its foreign policy toward Iran, US retreated JCPOA in 2018 with foisted hard restrictions on the country, as well as backing Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israeli fronts in reducing Iran's regional influence. His unrealistic and one-sided perspective on events had wrecked any hope for peace in the region, making it more vulnerable to war and violence. In addition, his foreign policy was centered on America's unflinching support for Israel and strong anti-Iran stance.

The Israeli lobby had a lot of clout with President Trump, which culminated in Trump making aggressive moves on Israel's behalf. Trump made controversial moves such as moving the US embassy to Jerusalem, a disputed area, and recognizing the Golan Heights as part of Israel by a presidential proclamation signed on March 25, 2019, as well as unilaterally exiting the Iran Nuclear Deal on May 8, 2018, for political reasons rather than Iran's noncompliance, and putting maximum economic pressure on Iran, making the United States the most powerful country in the world. With retreatment of JCPOA in 2018 with foisted hard restrictions the ambiguity around Iran's weapon of mass destruction exists, yet important part of US foreign affairs remains unchanged: the pro Jewish lobby power. Specific findings based on discussion are provided in the chapters are following.

- US Jewish Lobby has the greatest influence on foreign policymaking. Individuals and groups in the Israeli lobby strive to sway US foreign policy in Israel's favor and build a unique relationship between the two countries. This lobby is constantly attempting to influence leading members of Congress and the Senate, the majority of whom are members of the Israeli lobby, in order to safeguard Israeli interests. That lobby is working with Israel to influence US Middle East policy in ways that are not in the US's best interests but are helpful to Israel's, in order for Israel to gain hegemony in the region.
- The Israel Lobby in America has the greatest influence on US domestic politics and formulation of foreign affairs. In Israeli lobby individuals and organizations work in a way to impact US foreign policy in favor of Israeli and to establish a special connection between US and Israel.
- Key elements of the lobby seek to influence conversations about Israel in the media, think tanks, and academia, in light of the fact that these organizations are fundamental to shaping prominent opinions.
- During Obama administration, the United States foreign policy was centered on a
  consistent pattern of pushing for economic sanctions against Iran while also
  attempting to engage Iran diplomatically to end its nuclear weapons issue which
  resulted in the signing of the Iran Nuclear Deal Agreement 2015.
- With Trump's election, the United States' strategy towards Iran had shifted from containment to confrontation "maximum pressure" campaign.
- Unilateral departure from the Iran Nuclear Deal on May 8, 2018, for political purposes rather than Iran's noncompliance, as well as placing maximum economic pressure on Iran, making the United States a serious breach of international law.

Due to geostrategic constraints and different cultures, just as stumbles in common comprehension during the previous 30 years, improving US-Iran relationship in a short period of time is tough. If Iran's attitude toward cooperation changes, the odds of a swing back increase accordingly. Strains involving US and Iran antagonistic forces have not yet brought about conflict, however that does not rule out the possibility. The US must reign

in Iran's ideological-political activities, and a military confrontation is inevitable if both Iran and the US do not lower their expectations. The United States must acknowledge that it has paid a great price for its previous erroneous policies in the Middle East by ignoring the wishes of the people in the region. Only a better and more transparent US policy can reduce the likelihood of Iran's discrediting activities, because US policies to contain Iran without devotion and genuineness will only result in a complex and uncertain strategic environment, weakening the US political establishment in the Persian Gulf rather than Iran.

Main challenge for Washington and its allies will be to design a strategy that optimizes multilateral diplomatic power in negotiations with Tehran while also restoring trust in the US and its ally's ability to handle Iran's regional goals and effects. The international community believes that if the US overcomes the impediments and maintains a moderate attitude, the Iranian nuclear standoff will be broken and the substantive phase of negotiations will begin. In the long-term interests of Iran and the region, the international community must do everything possible to amend this deal. While a respectful agreement between Iran and the P5+1 is necessary, one that will oblige Iran to reduce its aspirations in exchange for the lifting of sanctions that Iran will abide by is also required.

Diplomacy is the only option to find a long-term solution to the security issues that Iran poses to the US in the Gulf Region. It is clear that US confrontational Middle East policies, military supremacy, economic strength, and political clout are incapable of bringing political stability, democracy, and liberal principles to the region. So, there is a need for non-confrontational policies that vanish hostile relations between the US and Iran and also bring stability in Middle East region. The United States must use diplomatic rather than military alternatives to persuade Iran to stop its nuclear program. Maintaining open channels of communication and interaction among US and foes, like Iran, during Obama presidency may be accomplished by allowing leeway for exchange on the Iran atomic issue. The United States must recognize that times have changed and that new realities have evolved in the Middle East. It is critical that the US recognizes these realities, adjusts, and capitalizes on them.

The Biden administration must renegotiate a swift restoration to the core parameters of JCPOA, putting any hopes for a follow-on accord on hold for the time being. America's first priority is to persuade Iran to halt and discontinue from nuclear operations that are in breach of JCPOA, since these are weakening both the accord and Middle East overall security. Iran, according to Biden, is a "destabilizing actor" that would never be permitted to obtain nuclear arms. Simultaneously, he promised to restore the US to the JCPOA as an initial point for follow-up talks if Iran comes to "strict compliance".

Nonetheless, after a tumultuous four years, President Biden have the chance to reshape US-Iranian ties. Both Rouhani and Biden might be wise to move quickly into accordance with JCPOA while their brief tenures in office, as another Iranian administration is expected to be a harsher and more suspicious negotiation partner. The most recent session, which began on November 29, 2021, brought together delegates from China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and Iran, with Enrique Mora, deputy secretary general of the European External Action Service, serving as the chairperson. The seventh round of talks in Vienna to revive Iran's 2015 nuclear deal has concluded, and while it looks that progress has been achieved, the negotiating global powers are still far from a deal, but it would serve as a foundation for continuing the discussions ahead.

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