

**CHANGING GEOPOLITICS OF INDIAN
OCEAN REGION IN 21ST CENTURY:
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN**

By

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DEDICATION

With utmost devotions, I dedicated my whole work to my beloved and affectionate maternal grandfather Muhammad Khan (Late) who was a beacon of knowledge, wisdom and a great inspiration for me. My respect and love for him is beyond the words. May Allah (SWT) grant him eternal peace. Amen

LIST OF ABBREVIATION

ADMM-Plus	ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CARs	Central Asian Republics
COMCASA	Communications, Compatibility and Security Agreement
CPEC	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
FACM	Fast Attack Craft Missile
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
IOR	Indian Ocean Region
IORA	Indian Ocean Rim Association
LEMOA	Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement
MSRI	Maritime Silk Road Initiative
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OBOR	One Belt One Road
ORPAT	Coordinated Patrol
QUAD	Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
RSC	Regional Security Complex
RSCT	Regional Security Complex Theory
SAM	Surface to Air Missile
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SCS	South China Sea
SEZ	Special Economic Zone
SIMBEX	Singapore-India Maritime Bilateral Exercise
SLOCs	Sea Lines of Communication
SSBN	Subversive Ship with Ballistic Missile

INTRODUCTION

The Indian Ocean is defined by the continent of Asia in north, Africa in the west, Japan and Australia in the east and Antarctica in the south and is home to world's busiest waterways and choke points, including Suez Canal, Babul-Mandeb, Strait of Hormuz and Malacca Straits.¹ These waterways are crucial for the rising nations of world particularly China and India for their economic as well as political interests. Robert D Kaplan explained in *Monsoon* that "While China seeks to expand its influence vertically, that is, reaching southward down to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean, India seeks to expand its influence horizontally, reaching eastward and westward".²

Globalization has vastly enhanced economic activities not only around the world but also in the Indian Ocean region (IOR). It has become the region where global economic activity conjoined the political interests. While predicting future of the Indian IOR, Kaplan contends that the IOR will be center stage of twenty-first century in terms of security aspects.³ His argument seems to be spot-on, while looking at the current scenario in the IOR. For instance, India is positioning itself as a policeman in the Indian Ocean, while China has vastly improved its maritime powers and is now making efforts to mark its presence in the IOR, particularly through Maritime Silk Road under the ambit of its "String of Pearls" strategy. This is the ocean where the great powers rivalry between the United States and China in the Pacific Ocean intertwines with the rivalry between China and India at regional level. The Indo-Pacific strategy adopted by the US and its aspiration for effective Quadrilateral Alliance of four countries including USA, Japan, India and Australia - a strategy to challenge China's BRI project, ostensibly has the potential to produce a seismic shift in geopolitical landscape of the region.

China's upsurges as an influential presence in the IOR and India's rapid economic

¹ Qamar Fatima and Asma Jamshed. "The Political and Economic Significance of Indian Ocean: An Analysis." *South Asian Studies* 30, No 2 (July – December 2015): 73-89.

http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/csas/PDF/5%20Qamir%20Fatima_30_2.pdf

² Robert D Kaplan, *Monsoon*, (New York; Random House, 2010), 10.

³ Robert D Kaplan, "Center Stage for the 21st Century", *Foreign Affairs*, March. 1, 2009.

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2009-03-01/center-stage-21st-century>

development have heightened the strategic value of IOR. Both are rapidly rising economies, hence dependent on smooth and uninterrupted flow of energy reserves through Sea lines of Communications (SLOCs) in the Indian Ocean. Nearly 10 million of trade ships per year transit through Indian Ocean waters. West Asia is the key markets of Oil from where India imports nearly 80% of its energy needs.⁴ Similarly, China heavily relies on SLOCs in the Indian Ocean, as most of its energy supply passes through IOR all the to the Strait of Malacca and South China Sea. According to a report by the US Department of Defense-2018;

“Approximately 78 percent of China’s oil imports and 16 percent of natural gas imports transited the South China Sea and Strait of Malacca. Despite China’s efforts to diversify energy suppliers, the sheer volume of oil and liquefied natural gas imported from the Middle East and Africa will make securing strategic SLOCs a priority for China for many years”.⁵

In order to protect its economic investments along the Silk Road, it is perceived that China would need military footprint in the Indian Ocean. The 2015 Defense White Paper establishes China’s ambition to become a maritime power and expands its naval outreach from “offshore waters defense” to “open seas protection” for the first time. This indicates the growing Chinese interests beyond the South China Sea region, particularly securing its trade routes and access to natural resources in the Middle East and Africa, on which China is critically dependent. In fact, the Chinese navy has been increasing its presence in the Indian Ocean since 2008, first with anti-piracy patrols and followed by nuclear and conventional submarine deployments. China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2016, which is sizeable and sophisticated, demonstrates China’s rise as a maritime power as well as its use of naval power to protect overseas interests in the Indian Ocean. At the end of January 2018, a Chinese “surface action group”, which included amphibious vessel for troops to make a marine landing, crossed into the Indian Ocean through Indonesia’s Sunda Straits. Countries like India, Indonesia, and others have raised

⁴. Tissa Jayatilaka, “Indian Ocean politics of the 21st century – A view from Sri Lanka”, *Daily FT*, Dec.7, 2017. <http://www.ft.lk/columns/Indian-Ocean-politics-of-the-21st-century-%E2%80%93-A-view-from-Sri-Lanka/4-644650>

⁵. US Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress- Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China”, 2019.

concerns about the motives behind these amphibious drills.

China is also setting up port projects along vital SLOCs as part of the Maritime Silk Road, a long section of which passes through the Indian Ocean. China has several ongoing projects in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan, Djibouti, Kenya, and Tanzania under the ambit of BRI. The 'dual use' of these ports for commercial and military purposes is an emerging trend in the Indian Ocean. For example, Colombo, Gwadar, and Djibouti have been used to refuel or station PLA Navy (PLAN) ships. In November 2014, the unannounced stationing of a PLAN Submarine Changzheng-2 and warship Chang Xing Dao⁶ at the commercial Colombo Port City Project set alarm bells ringing in India. Analysts argue that China's acquisition of strategically located deep water ports in Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Maldives could eventually serve a military purpose in the forthcoming.⁷

In the recent years one of the contributing factors for the geopolitical flux in IOR is the US foreign policy shift from Middle East to the Indo-Pacific Region. Apart from this US has also changed the nomenclature of its Asia Pacific strategy to Indo-Pacific which indicates the transformation of IOR into a new power theater, where regional and global powers will compete for their interests and influence. Energy security, smuggling, piracy and military rivalries are few of the factors that are leading towards the security challenges in the region.

Being a littoral of IOR and a strategic partner of China Pakistan occupy an important position in 21st century geopolitics of IOR. For Pakistan the Indian Ocean Region has become more significant due to the endure of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) under BRI. The port of Gwadar is strategically significant for Pakistan and the projects like CPEC has increased its significance manifold as it appears to be Economic Hub of Business, Trade and Development. This growing maritime partnership between Pakistan and China in IOR has become major concerns for arch-rival India as well as USA. Keeping in view the scenario discussed above the ongoing situation may have serious security as

⁶ Shihar Aneez and Ranga Sirilal, "Chinese Submarine Docks in Sri Lanka despite Indian Concerns," *Reuters*, November 2, 2014.

⁷ Garima Mohan, "Great Game in the Indian Ocean," *Global Public Policy Institute (GPPI)*, June 11, 2018. <https://www.gppi.net/2018/06/11/great-game-in-the-indian-ocean>

well as strategic implications for Pakistan. This research is aimed at encompassing all the possible scenarios being developed in the region its potential impacts on Pakistan.

Statement of the Problem

The center of international political and economic gravity is shifting to Asia. For past few years, IOR has become a key strategic region and is being considered as strategically vital for the powers at regional as well as global level. In last few years, the region has witnessed a growing strategic rivalry between major powers such as China and India as they expand their roles in the region. In term of extra regional interventions, China's influence in IOR is obvious through application of soft power including mega economic projects, political influence as well as through the presence of military along its Maritime Silk Road, is significantly altering geo-political environment of the region. It further accelerates China-India friction, which conjoins with China-US rivalry. Meanwhile, the US foreign policy has taken a shift in its focus from Middle East to Indo-Pacific. In this regard, the US has made the Indo-Pacific to a top-level regional priority as evident by keeping it in the National Security Strategy (NSS) 2017 and is seeking to increase cooperation with India, Japan and Australia. This has also contributed in geo-political change in the IOR and became a contributing factor on the concerns over its security. Keeping this in view, it seems that IOR is becoming the new theater of competition that would be having the spillover effects in realm of security on the littoral states particularly on Pakistan and would have serious security as well as strategic implications.

Objectives of Research

The key objectives for the undertaken research are following:

- To examine geo-strategic significance of IOR
- To assess the geo-political developments in IOR
- To elucidate the security dynamics of regional actors and powers play of extra regional and global powers in IOR
- To evaluate the security implications for Pakistan in the wake of changing geopolitics in IOR

- To suggest and recommend the policy measures for Pakistan on the global fronts to counter the potential drastic changes in contemporary security environment in IOR

Research questions

The study revolves around the following key questions:

- Q1. How are patterns of geo-politics in the IOR shaping dynamics of international politics?
- Q2. How major powers are pursuing their interests in IOR?
- Q3. How can these developing geo-political patterns implicate the security of Pakistan?

Core Argument

In order to counter growing Chinese presence in the Indian region, US and Indian has joined hands under auspicious of Indo-Pacific strategy, which gives India a more central role in the region. The Indo-US partnership in the Indian Ocean would pose severe security implications for Pakistan in the region, due to Pakistan's strategic rivalry with India and close partnership with China.

Research Methodology

Since the study is descriptive and analytical in nature. The study employs a qualitative research method by taking three variables i.e., Independent Variables, Dependent Variables and Intervening Variables and describes the cause-and-effect relationship among these three. "Geo-politics of the IOR" is considered as independent variable. In this sense the geo-politics is defined as power relations of states on the basis of geographical features. "Security implications for Pakistan" is taken as dependent variables whereas "the pursuit of extra regional players i.e., US and China in IOR" are taken as intervening variables.

Secondary sources of information are used to carry out the research, to support arguments and for the establishment of relationships between the variables. A comprehensive literature review is done for which the data is collected through different sources including books written by eminent scholars, reports published by international and national think tanks, renowned journals, researcher articles, published reviews and interviews, web sources and social media contents. Moreover, data was divided into categories and is

analyzed accordingly. Besides, during the course of this research official statements and press release of Governments of Pakistan, India, China, US and other stakeholders were also utilized.

Significance of Study

This research study provides an in-depth analysis of the existing and impending interests of regional and extra regional players in IOR, which would help the policy makers and practitioners to customize, mold and amend the state policies according to changing geo-political atmosphere and for the academia, researchers and student to gain insight about the global and regional power dynamics more specifically about the IOR. The study classifies that how the changing dynamics in IOR and Indian pursuits would craft the security issues for region in general and, particularly for Pakistan. The study also suggests and recommend policy measure for Pakistan on the global-fronts in the backdrop of changing geopolitics in IOR

Delimitation

The study is an in-depth analysis of changing geo-political scenario of IOR since the dawn of 21st century. In the backdrop of changing geo-political scenario in IOR, regional states within IOR will receive enormous implications. However, this research embraces only security implications for only one littoral state Pakistan.

Organization of Study

Introduction is comprised of the research methodology employed and be explaining main subject matter which also gives an oversight of the whole research work.

Chapter One: “Historical Perspective of IOR” discusses the history of Geopolitics, economics and trade in Indian Ocean Region and pertaining to regional actors in respective times.

Chapter Two: “Theoretical Framework” reviews the literature on the change of geopolitics with a focus on Regional Security Complex (RSC) theory. The discussion tests the basic principles of the theory of Regional Security Complex by using the emerging changes in the geo-politics in Indian Ocean Regions, which is becoming a new theater of power politics.

Chapter Three: “Regional Security Complexes in the IOR” explain the regional security complexes and its relevance in changing geopolitics of IOR in 21st century. The chapter

highlights the role of regional as well as extra regional actors in shaping and molding the geopolitics of region. Moreover, the chapter analyzes the converging and diverging interests of states in IOR, and their impacts on the changing geopolitical situation in IOR.

Chapter Four: “Security Implications for Pakistan” provides an in-depth insight about the security implications for Pakistan in the backdrop of changing and/or emerging geopolitical environment in IOR.

Chapter Five: “Future security architecture of the IOR” discusses the geopolitical environment of IOR in the future.

Conclusion: a concise discussion on the overall study, and research findings. Moreover, it gives a concise set of recommendation and way forward.

CHAPTER ONE

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF IOR

The chapter discusses the history of Geopolitics, economics and trade in Indian Ocean Region and pertaining to regional actors in respective times. Usually, it is very challenging for the historian when it comes to writing the history of oceans. The fundamental challenge is to determine the geographical, cultural and political boundaries throughout different periods in history. The oceans around the globe possess no identifiable frontiers neither they are governed by any single central political state. Same is the case with Indian Ocean. Sugata Bose writes that “Since Indian Ocean bears no trace of history, no message really, but the very act of crossing and re-crossing it makes this ocean a “symbol of universal humanity”.⁸ This implies, that since we do not have the trace of history on the ocean, however, frequent transit across the coast of Indian Ocean made this Ocean a symbol of Universal humanity.

Geo strategic significance of this ocean is proven from the history. The Ocean have been providing the trade routes to ancient civilizations hence held them together by informal diplomatic relations. Historical evidence states that various nation i.e., Asians, African and Europeans have been interacting with each other over a period of thousands of years. They were linked with each other by a sophisticated structure of commerce and politics characterize by the monsoon system. Though, for many years of near past particularly during the Cold War Period, Indian Ocean was neglected by academia as well as practitioners and was of the least significant for the world’s great oceanic systems. But at present the ocean is no-more neglected ocean.

The IOR has provided major transits through its waters for at least seven thousand years, which was further accelerated by the rise and expansion of Islam from the seventh century CE⁹, Spreading from the Horn of Africa all the way to Indian subcontinent and Malacca region through the IOR.¹⁰ While the region has witnessed a series of local conflicts, dominance and foreign quest in different ways. The extra regional colonial expansionist

⁸ Sugata Bose, *A Hundred Horizon: The Indian Ocean in the age of Global Empire*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006) ,10,34

⁹ Edward A. Alpers, *The Indian Ocean in World History*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014),1.

¹⁰ Kaplan, *Monsoon*, 5

and the pre capitalist quest for empire by the native powers in 15th and 19th century shared the similar intents of dominating and conquering the Indian Ocean region. All of local powers and the extra regional powers have tailed the same goals of national splendor, might and admittance to the assets by using force and political suppression of pertinent areas.

The lack of integrity in local powers and their rivalries have greatly added to the openness of the region to the peripheral infiltration on land from waters. Egyptian were among the first to campaign the region which were then followed by Muslims (Arabs). Whereas the pivotal role was played by Europeans in exposing the boundaries of region to Europe and to America in 18th century. The erosion of local powers and the economic penetration by the Europeans gave birth to the power rivalry in the Indian Ocean region. The vacuum created after the British withdrawal and the entrance of numerous stakeholders in the region made it a chess board for geopolitical and economic activities of great powers.

This chapter encompasses brief discussion on the development occurred in the IOR throughout the history. To make the discussion more articulate and comprehensive, history of IOR is discussed by dissecting it into three distinguishing eras;

- 1. Pre-Colonial Networks**
- 2. Colonial Period: Era of British Lake**
- 3. Decolonization and Cold War Period**

1.1. Precolonial Period

In order to develop argument on the current development within IOR, it is very important to understand the states historical perspective with the lenses of civilization. It is generally perceived and noted by many scholars that there is a pride, glory and honor attached with the civilizational entitlement which compelled states to devise policies and strategies to establish the power and prestige befitting their country size, geography, people and historical heritage.¹¹ This section provides a compendious account on emergence of these civilizations and how the inter-civilization interactions were carried out at those times. However, major focus remains on exchange and politics (Inter-Civilization Politics) among the different civilization in IOR in ancient times. South Asian people have had an important role throughout the history particularly in politics and economics. For instance, the people

¹¹. Malik, *China and India: Great Power Rivals*, 28.

of Indus Valley Civilization (The Indian West Coast) have long been connected to Mesopotamian Civilization (Middle Eastern).

The maritime trade between Indus Civilization and Political economies of Mesopotamia and other Gulf societies had commenced as early as 3000 BCE.¹² Port of Lothal located in Gulf of Cambay, the most famous and significant port of Indus Valley was the main hub of trade between Indus Valley Civilization and Mesopotamia most importantly the city of Ur.¹³

Mesopotamia was the region, of southwest Asia along the Tigris and Euphrates River, are termed as the creators of civilization as presumed by the modern people. They have been considered pioneers for making ships, which helped them to trade with numerous rich civilizations of the time like Indus civilization in northern India, who use to trade in textiles, tannery and jewels pearls, and ivory. This was the time when farming emerged in various places i.e., Southwest Asia between the Nile and the Tigris-Euphrates rivers and then the Indus Valley in Southeast Asia of IOR¹⁴ as the sea level started to rise and dry and barren lands transformed into fertile farms following the monsoon.

Period spans from the invasion of Muslim to the emergence of colonial period is the pre modern period of Indian Ocean history. During this period the western part of Indian Ocean was dominated by Muslim with spread of Islam by Holy Prophet Hazrat Muhammad ﷺ (PBUH), hence the larger western part came under Muslim's patronage governed by Abbasids and Umayyad's. Under the rule of Muslims, the trade via the ocean increased to a greater extent, as the area ruled by the Muslim was rich. The region was wealthy in terms of crops (wheat, vegetables and fruits) a major product in west science, learning and art were the major source of attraction for Muslims as well as non-Muslims in the west.¹⁵ However no Muslim power had ever tried to control the trade routes along the ocean, but Islam grew exponentially along west with the trade by the Muslim traders. Arabian Gulf, the Byzantine, Mediterranean Italian and Persian empires were connected via road links

¹² Michael N Pearson, *The Indian Ocean* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 37.

¹³ George F Hourani, *Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Medieval Times*, ed. John Carswell (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 129.

¹⁴ "Indian Ocean in World History," Indian Ocean in World History, <https://www.indianoceanhistory.org/Learning-Tools/Historical-Overviews.aspx>.

¹⁵ Pearson, *The Indian Ocean*, 46-48

and use to carry merchandises to northern and to western lands.¹⁶

From its beginnings as a land-based religious and social revolution in the *Hejaz* region of Arabia, the rapid expansion of Islam very quickly registered a major transformation across the western Indian Ocean world. Following the submission of the Arabian Peninsula during the lifetime of the Holy Prophet Hazrat Muhammad ﷺ (PBUH), the conquest of Egypt to the west and of Persia to the east Islam established as the dominant faith of the Red Sea, the Gulf, and the Arabian Sea coasts. Under the Umayyad Caliphate by the middle of the eighth century Islam had spread east to beyond the Indus River delta, while merchants from the Islamic world of the Gulf had begun to explore Indian Ocean markets down the coasts of eastern Africa and western India.¹⁷

Indian Ocean has witnessed the growing prosperity and harmony in the reign of Arabs, who had strived for making the trade flow in Bay of Bengal by outlasting the monopoly of Indonesian and Indians in 11th century. The commencement of diplomatic relations marked the initiation of trade in the eastern half of Indian Ocean as well. This development of relation had actually impelled the industry of shipbuilding by improving the orientation and infrastructure. With the improvement in shipbuilding industry and the development of seaworthy compass-guided Arab dhows had eased the trade and had encouraged the supply of cargos like timber, wheat, barley, rice, salt, and sugar. The development of rudder altogether with sails and oar have heavily made the ship controlled in a sophisticated manner.

With all these developments spurred by Muslims, the religion of Islam has also got spread in every nook and corner of western and southern Indian Ocean. In 710 Muslims managed to capture the Sindh. In 12th and 16th centuries, a distinct form of Islamic thought and practice developed among Muslim trading communities of the Indian Ocean particularly in the Malabar, modern Kerala - an Indian coastal state. In Malabar, Islam was shaped by merchants, strengthened by commercial imperatives, and defined by the interaction of ordinary Muslims. This interaction helped in thriving the Islamic norms and practices in other regions of the Indian Ocean, also, which came under Muslim rule eventually. Over

¹⁶. Nile Green, *Bombay Islam: The Religious Economy of the West Indian Ocean, 1840–1915* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 90.

¹⁷. Alpers, *The Indian Ocean in World History*, 40.

the time these regions developed into majority Muslim societies, for instance; the Swahili Coast and the Maldives.¹⁸

Whereas the Persian brought Sugarcane, rice gains and saffron with themselves, which had later become the staple food for Asian. It was the time when Arabs and Persians embarked towards east Africa and have developed the economic centers from where they got the ivory, gold and slaves and in return they used to sell the nicely made rugs, cloth and currency. While from Burma and Thailand they used to get the spices.¹⁹

While on the on the eastern side of Indian Ocean, the Chinese dynasties of Song and Tang had expedited the development of marine trade. Song dynasties are considered as pioneers in overland maritime trade among the Chinese dynasties. Song greatly relied on the trade and for that purpose they have built cordial diplomatic relations with various countries and encouraged traders from Southeast Asian Countries which bolstered Chinese trade and economy, resultantly. Moreover, this diplomatic move expatriate Indian and Arab traders from South Sea and paved the way for the Chinese trade ships to exclusively cruise across the IOR waters.

At that time, access to markets in IOR became very easy, hence Chinese hold these markets for years. Chinese had expedited the export of silk and porcelain along the Indian Ocean and have tended to import spices and cotton.²⁰ Further the Tang ruler encouraged the trade and river transport for the supply of merchandises. Evidence have claim that almost 4000 ships used to travel in Guangzhou per year for trade. This swing of trade was abruptly upset with the Mongol invasion in 13th century. Later on the earlier pattern got restored by the Chinese Ming dynasty.²¹

In the medieval era, India has served as the imperative gateway for trade as the ports in Gujarat and Bengal were connected to the trader's colonies and were effective in trading goods. Gupta and Chola empires were known to be the major Indian prosperous empire of that time. The region of south East Asia and Malay were also in their full swing and were

¹⁸ Sebastian R. Prange, *Monsoon Islam Trade and Faith on the Medieval Malabar Coast* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 3

¹⁹ Milo Kearney, *The Indian Ocean in World History* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 63.

²⁰ "Song Engagement with the Outside World," *The Song Dynasty in China*, accessed 2020, <http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/songdynasty-module/outside-trade.html>.

²¹ Fatima, Jamshed, "The Political and Economic Significance of Indian Ocean: An Analysis." 82

embroiled in trade. The traders used to travel via Strait of Malacca thus flourishing the new era of navigation and ships during this era.²²

In the precolonial India, Mughal navy was considered to be one of the most arduous navy. The Mughals were basically inspired by the complex web of economics, military, technological and cultural exchange. The Mughals not just connected the nearby region but also had connected India with Africa and Europe. The Mughal navy had proved to be very effective in maintaining the boundaries and expanding them along the regions, though they have employed out rightly different approach from that of Mahan and Mackinder.²³

There focus was on covering the “Command of Coast” rather than establishing its rank in “Command of Seas”. As of their approach of commanding the coast they were mainly focused on controlling the choke points, strategic points and strategically beneficial ports rather than patrolling the whole sea. Moreover, Mughal navy was mainly engrossed on littoral and riverine warfare, the primary strikers of Mughal were the fleets of war galleys. The Mughal naval way of operation includes the close cooperation between the battleship, land forces and defenses. While this approach of Mughal navy seems to be very regressive in nature but had persisted for some hundred years and had sufficiently serve the needs of Mughal empire.

Mughals as a new power was emerging in the interior India across Indian Ocean but didn't have the access to frontiers of sea, but its rudiments grow very quickly across Indian Ocean. The Mughals were dominating the northern part of Indian geography which was serving the best for trade and warfare in Indian Ocean. Babur was the first Mughal emperor who has created a fleet of 400 ships for campaign in Gang's valley, the ships were used for both transporting troops and supplies across the Indian Ocean. The forces of Babur had made several river crossings under fire using ships and vessels with the help of battery standing on shores.²⁴

Akbar was also one of the valiant emperors of Mughals, assembled the first salt water navy

²². Monica L Smith, “The Dynamic Realm of the Indian Ocean: A Review,” *Asian Perspectives* 36, no. 2 (1997): 245-259.

²³. Andrew De la Garza, “Command of the Coast: The Mughal Navy and Regional Strategy,” *World History Connected*, February 2014, https://worldhistoryconnected.press.uiillinois.edu/12.1/forum_delagarza.html.

²⁴ Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur, *The Baburnama*, trans. Wheeler M Thackston (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 427-439.

in 16th century after conquering Bengal and Gujarat which finally provided Mughals access to the sea. Akbar not only secured access to sea but also provided a coherent structure to the navy. Afterward he has started the rationalization campaign in navy as well as in other institution. The details of reforms done by Akbar are defined in detail in *ain-e-akbar*, which states that he has made the 12-separate category for sailors each of them with different pay scale. The naval setting was divided into two fronts the western and eastern fronts, eastern front referred to Bengal while the western one was Gujarat. Both the fronts were covered by the nucleus of ship and were maintained by the central govt.²⁵

With the conquering of Gujarat and Bengal Mughal laid the claim of two primary hub for shipping and trade in subcontinent. As the empire extended towards south it came in contact with the major maritime center located in Tamil Nadu and Kerala. The network of trade based in this seafaring extended from Africa, red sea and Persian Gulf.

The Mughal battle fleet was mainly comprised of war galleys, the standard galley was *Jalba* or *Jalia* which closely resemble with the war galliot, it has a crew of 60 peoples with 40 oars over it. *Kosa* was another Indian galley variant which was primarily used for sprinting. Most of the *Kosas* were very small carried to about 30-40 crew but some of them varied in length up to 150 feet and could have 150 men. Another important galley variant was the *Khelnas*, these were basically small boats primarily used for coordination i.e., sending messages.²⁶

From 1610-1612, during the successful campaign Mughals consolidated the Bengal sates by defeating the local emperors Musa khan and Pradatyapa. The wars are evident of the use of high scale naval galleys by both the sides with involving hundreds of ships. The prince Shah Shuja one of the main arch rivals of Aurangzeb had made the Bengal as his operational base camp and fought many wars over it. He had built a makeshift fleet for many galleys but could not get success against Aurangzeb and was sent to exile in Arakan.²⁷

²⁵ Abu al-Fazl, *Ain-I-Akbari*, trans. H. Blochmann (New Delhi: Oriental, 1977), Pg 288 – 292. See also Jan A. Qaisar, "From Port to Port: Life on Indian Ships in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in Panikkar, *India and the Indian Ocean*, 331 – 347.

²⁶. Andrew Garza, "Command of the Coast"

²⁷. Andrew Garza, "Command of the Coast."

At the same time there was also the growing concern of the European Powers, the prominent among were the Portuguese, who had maintained their influence in India for decades, especially the time when the empire reached coast. They were expanding their influence from the Bengal to Kerala, whereas based on the one principle of controlling the Indian commerce and the maritime labor market. Though Portuguese because of their lack in their resources, often failed to meet their defined interests, when it comes to the question of the human resources and the available pertinent assets like ships and material resources. Whereas this grew the same discontent among the present Britain rule, against the threat of the growing Portuguese. They also had their consent in some areas of the extortion of the private merchants, however on the same time they were in conflict on the aspects of their conflicts on the Sea lanes in the ocean, and their galley-based navy. Nonetheless, at the same time maintaining deterrence among the both sides were quite hard because of the heavily fortified standings and the strongly armed merchants of the Portuguese along the coasts. So, the age witnessed some slight confrontations at large, whereas the pertinent solution followed was keeping combined influence along the coast.

As the Mughals naval powers were restricted to their coasts, the other growing naval influences were stronger in comparison to confront the Mughal Empire, with the prominent threat of Pirates from the Madagascar and the East Africa. Mughals were very organized in their regional rather than the global naval power, so it was comparatively more frustrating for them to counter the threat of the rising new naval fractions.

The most important hindrance faced by the Mughals Naval Power, was their lack in the availability of the new technological means. The equipment that the Mughals were bestowed with like the blast furnaces were also obsolete in comparison to the naval equipment been adopted by other contemporary naval powers. Among other hindrance identified by European writers was the absence of the Iron Guns to the evolution of the Mughal Naval Power. Moreover, as the roots of Mughal regime was from Central Asia Social and Cultural stratification was also major reason for its naval decline. Individuals and assigned groups of people, given with the tasks of developing their naval power at various levels misused their powers and authorities for personal gains instead for the

development of the region.²⁸

Thus, it can be inferred that, in pre-colonial period, Maritime powers had very little significance in military strategies. It might be due to coastal characteristics of naval forces and the land-oriented strategy of territorial extension. Despite the fact in those times Egyptian, Indian and Persians were the key political players in the history of IOR, however, their impact remained primarily land oriented that was loose and localized, often. The main focus of their maritime policy remained on the intra-regional exchange rather than territorial expansions over the ocean and high seas. The transformation in Indian Ocean Region started with European arrival in 1400s while the Portuguese surrounded the Cape of Good Hope in end of the century. Rise of Dutch and East Indian Companies made their entry in the Indian Ocean in early 1600s.

1.2. The Colonial Period: Era of British Lake

Modern history of this IOR started with colonial era, with its calling of Portuguese royal lake when the Vasco de Gama arrived in the region. Portuguese influence started to gain currency with their immediate entrance to IOR and got successful in getting hold of different sea routes and trading networks along the ocean and most importantly between East Africa and modern-day Indonesia.²⁹ It is worthy to note here that Portuguese were not the only distant power who got hold in the region, but they were the first to gain an inclusive control of the region.³⁰

With their surging influence across the ocean, they have started to gain hold of strategic vital. Portuguese soldiers and mariners have occupied Goa in 1510, Malacca in 1510 and Colombo of Sri Lanka in 1518 and Hormuz in Persian Gulf in 1515. Just after surrounding Cap of Good Hope in Africa, the Portuguese then reached Java. Previously, Asia had only one European Fort of Portuguese design but with the gaining of currency on the region the outposts which reflect the Portuguese design extended to about forty outposts in the IOR for safeguarding of Portuguese interest of controlling trade routes along the Levant, the

²⁸. Andrew Garza, "Command of the Coast."

²⁹ Landeg White, Introduction to Luiz Vaz de Camões, *The Lusíads*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

³⁰. Kaplan, *Monsoon*, 49.

Arabian sea, bay of Bengal , east Asia and the Persian gulf.³¹ In order to safeguard their interest along the ocean, Portuguese had set up trading stations at Mombasa in Kenya, Sifala, Aden, and Goa on western routes whereas on eastern routes Amboina, Timor, bantam which had future augmented the extended great Indian enter posts that Portuguese got seized from Muslim.

The Portuguese settlements were then followed by the Dutch settlements along the coastal areas like Sri Lanka, Malacca and Malabar which they got seized from Portuguese control, the English stations at Bombay, Madras and Calcutta and by the French settlements at Pondicherry Mauritius and Reunion.³² With the highly protected structure, Portuguese as a whole lack blue water strategy along the ocean which reflected their inability to control the region comparable to English and Dutch who had got the pioneer status for operating at long range from their home bases³³. Though, the English and ditches who got power seized from Portuguese were not capable of challenging the west and south Asia, however they have worked under confines with a handful of enclaves in coastal areas during the 17th century.³⁴

The commencement of 17th Century, provided a different scenario, with the emergence of new and strong naval powers including, United Kingdom and Netherland, which challenged the existing Portuguese influence in the region. The new two rising naval powers, particularly the UK, were more softly to the Indians as compare to the present Portuguese. These were softer in their naval conduct, with slight surveillance and control over the region's commerce. The same time they entered in the very domestic trade scarification of the Indian Territory along the Mughal protections.³⁵

When Dutch tried to capture the coast and maritime commerce of the Indian Region, they were countered by the Mughal Trade boycotts. However, with the change of situations, then ruler of Indian Raj, Emperor Shah Jahan, adopted the strategy of aligning the interests of the Dutch and the Englishmen to counter the threats of the Portuguese. This allowed the

³¹. Kaplan, *Monsoon*, 50.

³² Pearson, *The Indian Ocean*, 167-87.

³³ Vivian Louis Forbes, *The Maritime Boundaries of Indian Ocean Region* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1995), 43-45; See also Pearson, *The Indian Ocean*, 178-79

³⁴ Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, *Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy* (Second edition; New York; London: Routledge, 2004), 34-35

³⁵. Andrew Garza, "Command of the Coast."

Dutch and the Englishmen to drive out the Portuguese, present along the coast from the Bengal till Kerala. Wherever the Portuguese fleets were spotted they were attacked and captured with the use of the valleys and the fire ships. Shah Jahan also helped to issue the orders, legitimizing the English sailors and the captain to expand their influence in order to curb the threat of the Portuguese, while providing them with all means.

However, the following years of fight with Portuguese, there was witnessed the strength of the Dutch and English along the Indian Coast, with their positive relations with Mughal Emperors. Whereas, when the English tried to involve more in the internal commerce of empire, also in the aspects of the security, and trade, this grew the discontent between the two ruling fractions. This also resulted in the small wars and conflicts, particularly in the last quarter of the 17th Century. However, the conflicts in the last years of the 17th Century grew stronger, and happened to create differences among the East India Company and the English, while questioning their influence and presence in every sphere. Later on, the monopoly over trade was summoned to the crown, so grew the English influence. The private defense of the East India Company was well-organized in a way that used to create the anti-Mughal culture of the Empire.

With the technological rise of the Englishmen and the evolution, they grew stronger in the following years, and the Mughals also haven't lost their influence. By the end of the 17th Century, it was realized that the Mughals are even same and as stronger as they were with the little expanding influence of the Englishmen.³⁶

The first great military engagement along the Indian Ocean appears to be the land based in the early modern period. With regards to the imperativeness of maritime and land battles for Mughals and the Anglo-French war in 16th and 17th century, Jeremy black one of the renowned military historians has narrated only two battles. First was fought by Mughals in which they gain the decisive victory and thereby established their realm across the Indian ocean and second was the battle of Plessey which had paved the way for the creation of British raj in Indian Ocean.³⁷

As the time went by, Indian ocean region got embroiled in series of certain meshing crisis

³⁶ Andrew Garza, "Command of the Coast."

³⁷ Jeremy Black, ed., *The Seventy Great Battles in History* (Thames & Hudson, 2005), 107-109.

which have got its roots all along the societies existing in Indian ocean, Muslims got distributed into sects, Hindus got into factions and a climate of sectarianism had spread across Indian ocean which had further decayed the already decayed roots of Mughals and the local govt by 18th century. The great Mughal Empire had been held under the shackles of its own doing and had been fallen into prey of imperial strain. The great empire which had been holding the areas for centuries had now got indulge in even worse challenges.³⁸

Across the subcontinent, the Mughal empire started to decay and its weakening in holding the greater area had soon surges the internal autonomy which had furthered the numerous of ethnic capitalism. The East India Company got highly benefited from this turbulent scenario and had bought them time to augment themselves.³⁹ The internal turbulent scenario got intensified by the involvement of extra regional empires which were up to surging their influence across the IOR. The Anglo-French duel for holding greater influence has further intensified the military activity along the subcontinent. The upsurge created by the extra regional powers resulted in the expansion of military activity which eventually turned into the ever-expanding military market along IOR predominantly in subcontinent.

The climate of Subcontinent turned out to be favorable for the British, which have turned the table over the indigenous and French supported leaders of local vicinities. The battle of Plessey witnessed decisive Britain victory and have added onto the imperial voyage. The British had drove out French form Pondicherry in 1761 whereas in 1765 they have succeeded in acquiring vast land along the bay of Bengal which had turned lucrative for Britain's and made them able to finance a huge army to fight with locals.⁴⁰ Along with land victories , British had continued their journey and had proved their valor in sea too by defeating the France in Nile which had effectively curb out the French influence along the region and conceived the commencement of a 'British Lake' along Indian Ocean.

The Uni-polarity of Britain along Indian Ocean would prove to be more significant for

³⁸ Christopher Alan Bayly, *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World 1780-1830* (New York: Routledge, 1989), 16-74.

³⁹ Christopher Alan Bayly, *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 47-48.

⁴⁰ Bayly, *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire*, 50-53, 84-87; see also Bose and Jalal, *Modern South Asia*, 46-59.

Britain in 1798, with the uprooting of other European opposition in sea and with the absence of local navy Britain had the chance of proliferating their interest. The main elements that had Brokered the British supremacy along the Indian ocean was effective leadership, sound economic conditions, industrial strength, the shipbuilding and seamanship capacity and a transatlantic network of naval posts and oceanic bases erected along strategic sea lanes.⁴¹

The start of 20th century appears to be relatively devastating for Britannia, that they no longer rule the waves of Indian Ocean. It has also witnessed two new emerging powers that appears to be vital in sea lanes, US and Japan. Contrary to the scenarios in Indian Ocean, following certain devastating outcome of WWII Britain naval capacity was agreed to be limited in Washington conference. The Washington conference come up within certain limitation over to the Britannia naval capacity, in which a ratio of five British to five American to three Japanese ship was maintained. The end of WWII tends to be decisive in nature and appears to be the end of British raj across the Indian subcontinent. Indian Ocean became the home of International Shipping and global trade by the end of 19th century. This continued through the mid of 20th century even in the war period of WWI and WWII.

1.3. The Cold War and Decolonization

The 2nd half of twentieth century appear to be rigorous, during this time two major makeovers occur across the Indian ocean in fact in the world in the form of decolonization and cold war. The decolonization in IOR assured that these countries are no longer under the auspices of Britain and would know to be common wealth countries. Countries got independence from colonial countries and were brought into reality in the geo political map of the world gradually. After the U2 incident between USSR and America, Cold War got intensified across the globe. With the increase in the pace of globalization and military reassurances new trade routes was established while most of the primitive routes got diminished gradually. Mumbai, Jakarta, Colombo, Perth and Durban got recognition and are being embraced as the key naval point in Strait of Malacca and Hurmuz and are being used most exclusively for shipping merchandises.

⁴¹ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (London: A. Lane, 1976), 154-55.

A major regime change was seen across the Indian Ocean region with the outbreak of cold war, the mighty UK had decolonized the region. The region has witnessed a strong hold for over 200 years in the shape of imperial raj and had remained engulfed by the British colonies in east Africa, south Asia (Indian sub-continent) and south East Asia. Globally, Britain had gained a lot more influence in the Victorian era and was recognized as imperial power all along the world. But with the outbreak of WW-II the British crown's power started to diminish. Since then, the crown never truly recovered as the imperial power, by 1968 the Britain has made a highly strategic move of withdrawing from the "east of Aden" in the Arabian Peninsula. The withdrawal of Britain has created a vacuum along the Arabian Peninsula. The naturally created vacuum was then filled by the fleets of US and the Russia. Either of the contenders remain focused on surging their influence along the ocean. Both the nations had contrasting interest in the region, the US was mainly focused on maintaining the stability on a largely regularized maritime commons by marinating the flow of oil tankers to and for the Arabian gulf while the Russians were here to counter the influence of US amongst the nation and to create a strategic partnership with India.⁴²

Until the mid of 20th century the Gulf States had not achieved the status of major oil producer. The discovery of oil in late 20th century opened the doors of fortune for these states. The discovery of the large reservoirs of oil has added to the regional significance and has attracted world attention by making them dependent on the supply of oil. With this the maritime importance of the region gone so high, the American war analyst were apprehensive of USSR possibility of making a drive to the warm waters of Indian ocean. It is imperative to note that neither of the two of have bases in the Indian Ocean waters. The influence of both the contenders was negligible, US had kept a very small navy at Bahrain while the Russia was in agreement with Iraq that entails the USSR access at Basra. With the increase in the importance of region the nations of region started to ponder how to sought influence across the region. Within this period the American has worked closely with the KSA and Iran for making lasting influence. The US had also utilized the British outpost called Diego Garcia where the US engineers have built significant housing, docks,

⁴². James Stavridis, *Sea Power: The History and Geopolitics of the World's Oceans* (New York: Penguin Press, 2017), 46-48.

huge oil tanks and the intelligence gathering facilities to uphold their influence.⁴³

Conversely the USSR had sought for show the flag campaign to Pakistan, India, Iraq, Yemen and to Sri-Lanka and have succeeded in making agreements with Yemen, India and Somalia. Consequently, got access to the ports for stationing their war ships. Both of the contenders have followed Mahan's doctrine for shaping their strategies. Primarily, both have fought for attaining control over energy and the oil of the gulf and the minerals of sub-Saharan Africa, the apparently perceived "treasure houses". The influence of US in the region crumbled with the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini who is said to be an anti-American. The rise of Khomeini govt. has bolted one side of Arabian Gulf. Alongside that the Russia has had success in the meantime, the soviet ventures to the Mozambique and Angola in the South Africa went successful and the two new client states materialized. While in East Africa when Ethiopia and Somalia went out to war, the USSR sided with Ethiopia and had gained a dominant nation at the cost of a smaller one. With the USSR active politicization, the only USA ally Saudi Arabia started to incline towards the USSR. despite the existing ideological conflict, Moscow and Riyadh had stepped up for restoring relation in 1982. At the very moment, the Saudi Govt. has established a medium of communication via London for exchanging critical information relating to regional problems i.e., Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the Palestine-Israeli conflict.⁴⁴

The Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea are the home to state-on-state confrontations, while the deadliest of all is the arch rivalry between the Pakistan and India. The British exodus from the subcontinent have laid birth to three countries: India, the most populous after China, Pakistan the 2nd most populous Muslim country and Bangladesh. The deep-seated Indian-Pakistani hatred is currently insurmountable because of the different issues prevailing simultaneously. It is imperative to note that both the states carry nuclear capability and an incident can flare up the war between the two. The conflicting nature of countries in the Indian Ocean is the most dangerous aspect, which has been generally a commercial and not a war-fighting body of water.⁴⁵

⁴³. Stavridis, *Sea Power*, 46-48.

⁴⁴ Andrej Kreutz, "Russia and The Arabian Peninsula," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 7, no. 2 (2004), <https://jmss.org/article/view/57765>.

⁴⁵ Stavridis, *Sea Power*, 46-48.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.

The subsequent sections in this chapter explain the applicability of The Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) in Indian Ocean. The chapter starts with a comprehensive and thorough explanation of the RSCT while the its applicability is discussed in the underlying sections.

2.1. Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)

The Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) form the basis of this research. The study tries to test the basic principles of the theory of Regional Security Complex by using the Changing pattern of geo-politics in Indian Ocean Region, which has become a new theater of global politics during the past two decades. It aims at obtaining a better understanding of the complicated Geo-politics with a variable of security while evaluating the abstract assumptions of this theory against the facts through the empirical critique of this theoretical approach.

The end of Cold War opened a new chapter for security studies. Given the dramatic developments occurred in the international system, traditional approaches to study and analyze security dynamics including the definition, scope and analysis level of security were extensively reconsidered. The need for theoretical rethinking and appropriate explanation of the different dimensions of security in the new scene of international politics led to the emergence of different theoretical schools. Copenhagen School is one of the most pertinent schools, which presents a wide and multi-dimensional definition of the concept of security and pays attention to regional level of analysis in international relations. This school of thought has found a prominent place in the scientific field of security studies during the past two decades. In the process, the theory of Regional Security Complex is one of the most important achievements of this school advanced by Barry Buzan, a famous figure of Copenhagen School, to explain security dynamics in the different parts of the world.

Barry Buzan sketched the concept of regional security in his seminal work *“People States and Fear”*, in 1983. He then along with Ole Weaver further advanced this concept in *“Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security”* in 2003. The RSCT receive

special significance in International Studies as it provides medium level of analysis, while linking the other two level of analysis i.e., Micro and Macro. Combination of micro and macro level analysis provides more comprehensive and suitable analytical approach to study certain countries and region based on their geographical location and experience. Thus, it can be deduced that there happens a mutual interaction among the different levels of analysis, where local security concerns may be transformed into international ones and vice versa. Whenever there is decentralization in international system new actors and issues penetrates into the system and influences it.

Moreover, this theory has the streaks of realist as well as liberal school of thoughts as it derives the power polarity concept from realists, concept of international system from liberal school of thought. Moreover, when it comes to study formation & operation of RSCs, it derives roots from constructivism, as these pivot on the pattern the enmity and amity not solely on the distribution of power among the actors in system.⁴⁶ Hence make the theory interoperable with mainstream liberals, Constructivists and Realist approaches. In RSCT, International events and happening are analyzed and explained empirically and more broadly at regional level. Buzan and Wæver name the region as Complex where security issues of member states are interlinked in a way which can't be reasonably separated. The main idea of the complex security has come from their earlier book in 1983 in which they defined that security of states are interlinked. RSCT is considered significant to understand and analyze political events at international level. Buzan and Wæver argues that: "RSCT enables one to understand this new structure and to evaluate the relative balance of power of, and mutual relationship within it between, regionalizing and globalizing trends".⁴⁷

In RSCT focus remained on the state's groups whose actions dominate the security considerations of other member states. To further enriched this approach, Buzan and Waever define a regional security complex as: "A set of units whose major processes of securitization and de-securitization or both are so interlinked that their security problems

⁴⁶ Barry Gordon Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 40

⁴⁷ Buzan, Ole Waiver, *Regions and Powers*, 4.

cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another.”⁴⁸

For the purpose of undertaken research, Let’s expand the above definition and for better understanding and to analyze the impact of member state/actors with a focus on external factors with the description given by Lake and Morgan that drives the regional security complex in a way that; “The members are so interrelated in terms of their security that actions by any member, and significant security-related developments inside any member, have a major impact on the others.”⁴⁹

The regional states are interconnected in such integrated manner that the matters related to domestic security of one state have a major and profound impact on the other. Buzan and his colleagues have expanded the scope of the security complex by including non-military aspects, thus giving rise to constructivist methodology. The basic concept which RSCT underlines is: “Political and military threats are more potent to create the sense of insecurity as compared to other threats. The insecurity of the state is closely interlinked with the proximity factor.”⁵⁰

Barry Buzan's concept of "**Regional Security Complex**" offers a useful tool to investigate regional security in the contemporary international system, which emerged in the post-Cold War era. It is worth mentioning that this theory makes two significant contributions in the field of international relations.

- First, it shows relative importance of the regional security and the role of great powers in the international security system.
- Second, and most important factor is, “Regional Security Complex” is embedded in security interdependence and not by following common and systematic factors which determine the nature of the contemporary international security system.

The RSCT primarily addresses the security and military engagements of a particular set of countries located in geographically proximate space, and these countries have a high degree of security interdependence with each other because security threats travel a short distance.

⁴⁸ Buzan, Ole Waiver, *Regions and Powers*, 44.

⁴⁹ David A Lake, *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*, 1st (Penn State University Press, 1997), 12.

⁵⁰. Nadine Godehardt, *The Chinese Constitution of Central Asia: Regions and Intertwined Actors in International Relations* (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 31.

2.2. Regional Security Complexes (RSCs)

Regional Security Complexes are defined as;

“Regional Security Complex is a set of units whose major processes of securitization, de-securitization or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another”⁵¹.

Keeping the definition stated above, the basic concept underpinning RSCs is that;

- Political and military threats pass easily over short distances
- Proximity and insecurity are directly proportional

Barry Buzan the associate of Copenhagen School set the theoretical foundation for regional security complex. He suggests that for the establishment of regional security complex there should be greater degree of security interdependence among the member states and they must be having the distinguishing attributes in comparison with surrounding regions. Moreover, there must be differentiation of the unit and should be some sort of amity and enmity among the member states. Buzan and Weaver suggest; “a group of states must possess a greater degree of security interdependence which is sufficient both to establish them as a linked set and to differentiate them from surrounding security regions”⁵².

2.2.1. Criterion for the Establishment of RSC

The RSCT describes the basic criteria for the establishment of Regional Security Complex which is:

- Number of units/states must be two or more;
- There must be coherence in their geographical attributes or these states constituted a geographically coherent group;
- The security interdependence is mean of relationship and this should be significantly stronger
- The patterns of security interdependence must to be deep and durable although not permanent.⁵³

⁵¹ Buzan, Ole Waiver, *Regions and Powers*,44.

⁵² Buzan, Ole Waiver, *Regions and Powers*,47–48

⁵³. Barry Gordon Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 15.

2.2.2. Essential Structure for the Establishment of RSC

Boundary, Polarity, Anarchic Structure, and Social Construction are essential attributes to form an RSC.⁵⁴

2.2.2.1. Boundary – The RSC has a boundary distinguishing the units of complex from others

Buzan and Waever argues that within certain geopolitical context an RSC must encapsulates distinct dynamics. As a result, the relationship between the states within the complex is intensified by elements of familiarity and proximity. Thus, it is pertinent to note that a clear boundary exists and “that the local factors are given their proper weight in security analysis.”⁵⁵

2.2.2.2. Anarchic Structure - presence of two or more autonomous unit?

For the formation of RSC anarchic structure of RSC is essential. Presence of two or more autonomous unit makes the subsystem anarchic. Without the presence of autonomous unit, the RSC will be failed to emerge as region and will be easily penetrated by the outside powers.

2.2.2.3. Polarity - power distribution

As posited by Buzan and Waever, “the structure of anarchy, the essential structure and character of RSCs are defined by two kinds of relations, power relations and patterns of amity and enmity.”⁵⁶ Since the RSCs are termed as substructure of International System incorporating the distinctive dynamics in which either the security may be facilitated or hindered by the distribution of power within the structure of RSC. Thus, the regional level “can be analyzed in terms of polarity, ranging from unipolar, through bipolar and tripolar, to multipolar”⁵⁷ and it should be distinguished from the global level polarity. Barry Buzan and his associate emphasis on the historical interaction of actors within the RSC while explaining polarity, they say;

“it is thus not enough to look at the distribution of power in order to predict

⁵⁴ Buzan, Ole Waiver, *Regions and Powers*, 53.

⁵⁵ Buzan, Ole Waiver, *Regions and Powers*,46 -47

⁵⁶ Buzan, Ole Waiver, *Regions and Powers*,49

⁵⁷ Buzan, Ole Waiver, *Regions and Powers*,49

patterns of conflict. Historical hatreds and friendships, as well as specific issues trigger conflict or cooperation, and take part in the formation of an overall security constellation of fears, threats, and friendships that define an RSC.”⁵⁸

2.2.2.3.1. Social Construction - do the patterns of amity and enmity exist?

Though the patterns of enmity and amity received less debate in the International Theory as much the “power” receive. These patterns basically denote the interactions of states within a given regional context and put these interactions on the spectrum of enmity and amity. These patterns describe the dominance of relations within a system whether these are friendly or on the basis of some rivalry or enmity and are “influenced by various background factors such as history, culture, religion, geography, but to a large extent they are both path dependent and this become their own best explanation.”⁵⁹

Power, while still necessary, is not sufficient as an indication of a regionally coherent subsystem. Whilst the distribution of power within a security complex does contribute to shaping the possibilities for alignment; it does not, however, shape the entire character of the region.⁶⁰

The essential structure of an RSC can be derived from four key variables; boundary, anarchy, polarity and social construction. Furthermore, that characterizing the parameters of an RSC allows one to identify where the complex sits on the spectrum from conflict formation, through to security regime or security community and what this may explain about the regional dynamic itself. The merit of RSCT, as Buzan suggests, is that it “stays more narrowly with security and security defined activities, and uses RSCT as a general instrument for telling a structured version of world history, past, present and future.”⁶¹ The strength of RSCT rests the fact that it is “allowed to define the possible orders on the outcome side and to select the relevant parameters on the input side,”⁶² which, in turn, rids the analysis of loose, ad hoc variables and, thereby, show both its virtues and its limitations. The theory has identified the role of external powers, and it stressed out that the amity and enmity relations among the members of the complex could be subjected to the power and

⁵⁸ Buzan, Ole Waiver, *Regions and Powers*, 50

⁵⁹ Buzan, Ole Waiver, *Regions and Powers*, 50

⁶⁰ Buzan, Ole Waiver, *Regions and Powers*, 213

⁶¹ Buzan, Ole Waiver, *Regions and Powers*, 79

⁶² Buzan, Ole Waiver, *Regions and Powers*, 79

influence of external forces, expressly the penetration of external powers of the neighboring region. However, “the patterns of the conflict stem from factors indigenous to the region and the external powers cannot, even if heavily involved usually define, organize, construct or reshape the region”.⁶³

2.3. Indian Ocean Regional Security Complex (IORRSC)

Though the IOR was somehow a neglected Ocean during the cold war period, however, in the 21st the ocean has received an increased attention from Regional and Extra Regional Powers. The interests and objectives of these powers are intertribally meshed in the Indian Ocean Waters. The global focus has been shifted from Atlantic to Indian Ocean since the end of Cold war as this ocean is conducive to supplies of military and economic resources along with the abundance of energy resources in the Gulf Region. All these factors have increased the geostrategic significance of various waterways within the IOR. An addition to this, US military operations in West Asia and Afghanistan along with the rise of China as a global power have made the IOR as a crucial geopolitical arena, where various medium, small and major powers are competing for their national interests. The ongoing rivalries in Gulf and Horn of Africa, the aspirations of India in Arabian Sea and beyond, Malacca Dilemma, growing Chinese intrusion and US Counterbalance strategies have made the region an epicenter for the regional and global powers, hence making maritime security crucial for the littoral states of IOR. Keeping the scenario in view the study applies the RSCT on the littoral state of IOR by dividing the IOR into various subcomplex on the basis of pattern of their enmities, history, proximity and geopolitical constructs.

The theory of Regional Security for this study is convenient, as it provides the most suitable level of analysis while studying security, it has the capacity to organize empirical studies and more importantly one can establish theory-based scenario on the basis of RSCs Knowledge.⁶⁴ On the base of its distinctive features this theoretical lens is being employed for the study under consideration. Geographical proximity, long standing cultural and historical Pattern of enmity and amity define the RSCs, whose security pattern have some coherence and are mutually interdependent. Threats travel on shorter distance more easily

⁶³ Buzan, Ole Waiver, *Regions and Powers*,79

⁶⁴ Buzan, Ole Waiver, *Regions and Powers*, 45.

and effectively, therefore proximity is crucial for security. The geographical proximate units interact more often, hence their security interdependence remain interdependent and reflect in the political, military, economic and environmental spheres.⁶⁵ Keeping in view the anarchic structure of IOR, it can be deduced that, the littoral states in of IOR are proximate neighbors due to Indian ocean therefore their security is interdependent. On the basis of definitions provided by the Barry Buzan and Ole Waiver the study has established subcomplexes of IOR littoral sates and analyzed accordingly.

Whilst the Indian Ocean Regional Security Complex is pigeon-holed on to the different aspects, but primarily it has deduced the whole aspect into the orientation of nations primarily laid upon the qualms and desires of discrete nation state within the same geographical areas and having same geographical proximity. The proponents of regional security complex, Ole Waver and Buzan have defined the RSC as “a set of units whose major processes of securitization, de-securitization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another.”⁶⁶

The entities which may be involved in the Indian regional security complex as narrated by proponents are different actors such as nation states, non-governmental organization, Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and international actors/ bodies.⁶⁷ However, it has been claimed that nation-state are the only idealized unit which deemed fit in international system.⁶⁸ Moreover, Buzan and Weaver are of the view that the regions of South Asia, East Asia, Middle East and South East Asia have mainly remained state grounded although some of the states still today aren't that much strong. Taking nations states as the only profound actor in international system for purely describing the regional security complex can permit the easier linkage of states with other regional states. However, it further strengthens the kinds of relations a state makes with others.

Some of the regional security complexes have different sub complexes in their spheres. Sub complexes can be defined as the RSCs but they are wholly entrenched in Larger RSCs. Primarily, RSCs can be comprised of different Sub complexes, while the definition remains

⁶⁵ Buzan, Ole Waiver, *Regions and Powers*, 46

⁶⁶ Buzan, Ole Waiver, *Regions and Powers*, 44.

⁶⁷ Buzan, Weaver and Wilde, *Security*, 6.

⁶⁸ . Barry Gordan Buzan, *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 9.

the same as of RSC. For better understanding let's simplify it, the Indian Ocean contains five RSCs which includes; South Asian Regional Security Complex, The Gulf Sub Complex, The Red Sea- Horn of African Sub Complex, The Australasia (South East Asian + Australia) Sub Complex and The South African Sub Complex.

The aforementioned complexes are the standard anarchic erection of two or more regional level powers while no global powers. Polarization is another distinctive of any RSC. Polarization in regional security complex is defined by regional powers, hence the RSCs may Unipolar, Multipolar and Bipolar. For instance, the complex of Africa is Unipolar as South Africa is the sole regional power, South Asia is bipolar, while multipolar schemes can be seen in Gulf and Australasia. Moreover, the social construction over the forms of antagonism and friendliness in the South Asian and African region have been a reason to conflict formation along the region.

Standard RSC and centered RSC are two different types of complexes. The basic difference is that of actor quality, which is termed as the lowest denominator of to which the Standard and the Centered power differs. Secondly the standard RSCs have the tendency for penetration by super powers. IOR RSCT is a clear example of standard RSCT as there is no single powers which dominates the security relations rather there are multiple players with wide-ranging level of powers. Moreover, a clear penetration of global powers can also be observed in the Ocean to protect their interests as well as to increase their sphere of influence. Within the subcomplexes in the larger IOR complex, we see that in South Asia, India aspires for the status of great power and if such happened the entire security pattern of South Asian complex will be changed. South Africa is likely to be transformed from the conflict formation to security regime.

CHAPTER THREE

REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEXES (RSCs) IN IOR

This chapter analyses the development of geopolitics of IOR by using the lens of Regional Security Theory. As discussed, earlier that in order to qualify for the establishment of any RSC the first and crucial criterion is security interdependence so that they can be differentiate from the surrounding RSCTs. In this chapter RSCTs in IOR are discussed in the light of patterns of enmity and amity, which creates security issues for the other countries in the RSCs. Moreover, the penetration of extra regional actors in the security matters of regional actors are discussed in detail. Lastly the geopolitical construct of securitization and de-securitization are discussed for each of RSCs established on the shore of IOR. This chapter discuss the following key sub complexes of IOR.

- **South Asian Regional Security Sub Complex**
- **Red Sea and Horn of Africa Regional Security Sub Complex**
- **Gulf Sub Regional Security Complex**
- **Australasian Regional Security Sub Complex**
- **South African Regional Security Sub Complex**

As per Barry Buzan, the definition of Sub Complex remains same as of Regional Security Complex. There may be multiple complexes within the broader security complex. The broader complex in this case is called super complex. Keeping this in view, Indian Ocean Security Complex is taken as super complex which comprises of various sub complexes extended from Australasia to Horn of Africa Security Complexes.

3.1. South Asian Regional Security Complex (SARSC)

Barry Buzan claims that “South Asia is a clear example of a security complex centered on the rivalry between India and Pakistan”⁶⁹. It is the conflict forming RSC, which is centered on India surrounded by Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka in the IOR. SARSC littoral states are diverse in term of religious, ethnicity and political division, at domestic level. In this RSC India is as Major power, Pakistan is reasonably cohesive and significant middle

⁶⁹. Buzan, Weaver and Wilde, *Security*, 14

power, Bangladesh is a weak middle power while Sri Lanka is weak small power. SARSC is a volatile region predominately occupied with the Indo-Pak rivalries.

3.1.1. Enmity and Amity in SARSC

In the SARSC, the rivalry between India and Pakistan is prevalent. The roots of this enmity are historical since the partition in 1947. India, lying in the middle of Indian Ocean grabs the undue strategic leverage over its neighbor thus creating a natural security dilemma for others over India. India is having high ambition in Indian Ocean. Indian naval approach typically based on spreading its influence across the entire region by entailing high spending on its naval expansion, amplifying trade and diplomatic ventures. Moreover, it is ensuring its economic firmness by extending augmented relation with energy rich regions like Middle East, Africa and south East Asia. India is also being threatened by the possible rise of Chinese interest in region. thus, for countering Chinese threat it is extending security relation with littoral states like Oman and Singapore to gain control of major choke points in Indian ocean region. With such soft balancing and robust strategy Indian is hoping to secure its own position against Chinese interest in region. It is imperative that Indian naval strategy is gaining tangible shape since previous decade in the form of Military Strategy for India 1989–2014 (1998), Indian Maritime Doctrine (2004), Navy’s Maritime Capability Perspective Plan (2005) and India’s Maritime Military Strategy (2007).⁷⁰

The geostrategic location of India, lying in the middle of ocean has given India an edge to construct a gigantic naval station across the region. This geographical advantage of India is being fused into its naval infrastructure development plans on “Mainland (its Western, Eastern and Southern Commands), the Lakshadweep Islands, and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The Western Command, based at Mumbai, focuses on the Arabian Sea.” Currently, India is dynamically tailing its endeavor of constructing a dedicated naval base with the name of “Project Seabird” in INS Kadamba near kantar in Karnataka. With its completion Indian navy would have an edge in region and would be “able to base 27 major warships there against 11 at present.”⁷¹ The geographic location of INS Kadmaba further

⁷⁰ David Scott, “India's Aspirations and Strategy for the Indian Ocean - Securing the Waves?”, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 2013, vol.36, No.4, 484-511

⁷¹ Anand McNair, ‘Gujarat helps push India’s maritime military strategy’, *The Times of India*, 7 July 2012 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-07-07/vadodara/32577059_1_indian-navy-porbandar-

facilitates the rapid dispositions into the southwestern Indian ocean and the Arabian sea.

3.1.2. Extra Regional Actors in SARSC

When an outside power makes security alignment within an RSC member state, RSCT terms its occurrence of penetration. The long-lasting indigenous Indo-Pak rivalry may provide opportunity or demand the great powers to penetrate. Given this scenario, Sino-Pak arrangements in IOR may be considered as penetration from China. Actually, the balance of power logic works here when an inside member of RSC calls for the help from outside power, hence dragged the local power rivalry to the global scale.⁷² From the basic argument of balance of power theory, the current Indian security engagement in the IOR with US is to counter balance China in the region. Similar examples can be derived from the cold war era when Pakistan aligned itself with the US to balance India in South Asia. The region of South Asia holds a great impetus for Chinese as most the trade tabling to almost eighty percent of shipment is done by using the passage of gulf through Strait of Malacca, thus making the South Asia and Indian Ocean pertinent for its energy supplies. However Indian being the nightmare for China is seated at the ingress of Malacca in form of Great Nicobar Island positing a grave danger to China. For the curtailing the Indian presence along the Malaccan strait, the Chinese leadership has been cognizant of the prominence of controlling this channel and are cognizant of the fact that whosoever will control the straits will definitely have a leverage of choking Chinese energy supplies. In order to avoid such situation China has Orchestrated a new policy with a special focus on South Asia and IOR. Moreover, since most the Chinese trade is done through Maritime routes, China is modernizing its Navy at neck-breaking speed.

“China’s most important maritime concerns in its relations with South Asia are oceanic trade transit points for western China, the sea lanes connecting the Straits of Hormuz and the Straits of Malacca which carry its energy imports”.⁷³ The current China’s focus on the development of its maritime force originates from the fact that, it has shifted focus from a

[gujarat-government](#)

⁷² Buzan, Ole Waiver, *Regions and Powers*, 46

⁷³. Sithara N. Fernando, “China’s Relations with the Indian Ocean Region: Combining Realist and Constructivist Perspectives,” *The Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi*, no. 2 (2012), <https://doi.org/https://www.icsin.org/uploads/2015/04/12/725819398bea3439c1d6fc11ae3abb0d.pdf>.

land-centric strategy to an ocean-centric strategy. Moreover, Beijing has reorganized its maritime strategy from Pacific centered to a “Two Ocean” strategy due to the growing importance of IOR for Chinese trade and energy security. Under this China will extend its naval presence to the IOR to protect its vested maritime interests.

China is using a blend of hybrid technique for countering the ailments in the IOR, it has employed hard military tactics along with economic endeavors for getting firm hold across South Asia and has also been developing ports under its string of Pearls strategy for countering the US encirclement Strategy while operationalizing, Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh and Gwadar in Pakistan beside the development of underground naval facility in Hainan Island.

Moreover, China has also developed a large network of infrastructures along South Asia for getting a strong foothold in the region. The ‘Maritime Silk Route’ (MSR) and the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) are one of the offshoots of its strategies and are depicting the Chinese version of interlinked ports across the Indian Ocean. Whereas for protecting and solidifying its turf of influence, China is employing a more naval muscle for strengthening its maritime economic and trade interests. Chinese presence and its activities along the IOR have geographically and geopolitically delimited India and is referred to as the manifestation of Chinese ‘String of Pearls’ policy. This policy is actually aimed at curtailing the Indian leverage and its influence across the Indian Ocean.

Seeking the Chinese influence across the ocean, India has been escalating its military investments since the inception of Modi Government in India. In the Nicobar Islands at Campbell and Andaman in Bay of Bengal India has modernized all of its facilities seeking the possible increasing influence⁷⁴. In 2019, A development plan of worth 56.5 billion INR was finalized, which seeks to install ships and troops at Nicobar and Andaman Islands. Moreover, India has commissioned a new naval station with the name INF *Kohaassa* in Bay of Bengal Island. With the commissioning of new naval station, a lot of rousing was seen that it is done to counter Chinese influence.

It is pertinent to note that that the way India is pursuing second sea-based strike capability,

⁷⁴. “Indian Navy,” *Indian Navy* (Indian Navy, January 24, 2019), <https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/ins-kohassa-%E2%80%93-new-bird%E2%80%99s-nest-andamans>

definitely for the sake of independent foreign policy, will destabilize the military balance in the region and would lead to new arm race in the region. This may also have the strategic ramification in the region and security of Pakistan due to its lack of equal advancement. While in milieu of Pakistan, CPEC has given great importance to Pakistan from which India fears the BRI, undergirded by CPEC, can give Pakistan a margin over both the land and sea Asia and can elevate it to regional power seeking the global stirring of BRI. The choice of Gwadar can be very decisive for Pakistan and can get Pakistan great lucrative returns. With this, Pakistan will have a great presence over IOR and it seeks a larger maritime security for the protecting of its own and allied interests.

This can prove to be a very daunting task for Pakistan as China would be there to guard its own interest while Pakistan will need to enhance its Naval Strength, it would have to build a conventional and strategic force as the IOR is transforming because of the three reasons, firstly, rebalancing of USA pivot to Asia ,secondly , China's rise as an emerging economy and its inauguration of maritime Silk Road; One Belt One Road (OBOR) and thirdly emerging economies which are littoral in the Indian Ocean. In the years to come modernization can be witnessed in the maritime domain.

China is supporting Pakistan in every possible way ranging from economy to human resource. It is helping Pakistan in capacity building of its technician and engineers along with the provision of arsenals. Russia agreed to help Pakistan in making F-22 frigates and also in making of Surface to Air Missile (SAM). Moreover, Pakistan has also commissioned a second Fast Attack Craft Missile (FACM) named PNS *Himmat* and is the upgraded program of *Azmat* fast attack craft missile which was started in 2013 with the cooperation of China and now Pakistan has become self-sufficient and has made an indigenous second FACM and first one was PNS *Dehshat*, though its small but have tendency to hit surface ships.⁷⁵

The main attraction power between Pakistan and China is Gwadar port, it has brought the two neighbors together, for which Pakistan is enhancing its naval Capability. An agreement for the delivery of eight submarines between Pakistan and China has been finalized,

⁷⁵. Asima Ashraf, "Militarization of Indian Ocean and Its Implications on Pakistan," Modern Diplomacy (Modern Diplomacy , July 31, 2020), https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/07/31/militarization-of-indian-ocean-and-its-implications-on-pakistan/#_ftn8.

according to which China will provide Pakistan with S20 and SSK submarines, respectively. As per the said agreement four of the ships will be built in Pakistan while the other four in China. Pakistan has made an agreement over the upgradation of naval assets and arsenals with turkey in terms of undersea combat competences. During the course of Cold war, many of the external powers has tried to infiltrate into the regional security complex of Asia but none of them had been able to define, reorient and organize the security design of complex.

The Chinese rise and its orchestration of mega energy and infrastructure projects has entirely transformed the security patterns of Regional Security Complex and most importantly the bilateral relations between the states in regards to India and smaller states. Moreover, the growing involvement of China in South Asia has probed the prevailing stature of China as a penetrating eternal agent in RSC of South Asia. Also, the Chinese “creditor imperialism and debt diplomacy”⁷⁶ has alarmed the small state for new security issues while fusing the Chinese position as a strong external power in the key geopolitical location. For example, Chinese had lured Sri Lanka into the massive projects and have added them in BRI and now locked them in the debt diplomacy, while obliging them to lease back the land that were pledged during the loan liquidation.

The concept of Chinese “debt-trap diplomacy” presents China as devious creditor while the developing states like Sri Lanka and many other as the gullible preys. However, on examining it closely, situation seems more complex as it is being casted. Numerous projects of BRI are being financed from Chinese sourced loans which usually targets countries that have destitute economic plight, a similar example can be seen in case of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka was agreed to grant a 99 years lease of Hambantota port to China and were also agreed to China Merchant Port Holdings acquiring 70 percent of the port’s operating company, serves as a cautionary tale of the dangers attached to countries’ overreliance upon Chinese financing. A wave of recent negotiation done along the BRI project have highlighted the fact that debt burdens are legitimate. However, the realization

⁷⁶ Shruti Pandalai, “Post Doklam, India Needs to Watch China’s Bullish Economics Led Cultural Embrace of South Asia,” Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) (MP-IDSA, January 1, 2018), 1. https://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/post-doklam-india-needs-to-watch-china-bullish-economics-led-cultural-embrace-of-south-asia_spandalai_010118.

could damage the growth of BRI related loans in future, acceleration of growth in Chinese outbound lending for BRI-related projects is probably off the table.⁷⁷

Chinese development in different countries is marking a new wave of learning process which is marked by Chinese adjustment. For instance, after the construction of Hambantota port, Chinese companies and banks have learned that strongmen fall and they can have better strategies to deal with political turmoil. As of now the Chinese are developing massive strategies for attaining better business opportunities and are retreating from where they assume they can't win.⁷⁸

Moreover, the smaller states in south Asian RSC of IOR are overwhelmingly looking to China as best alternative to India. The Indians intrusions and mingling with the smaller states' affairs have questioned the equating relation of smaller states with India in the face of mistrust vis-à-vis their neighbors. In this scenario the smaller states are ready to face the Chinese debt trap diplomacy in the wake of their mid and long term national and improvement securities. As narrated by Tom Miller, Chinese mega projects in the region are actually a necessary evil for smaller states for securing the security and economic interests. The influx of Chinese mega projects, BRI has almost changed the security patterns in many ways, it has actually diverted the attention to middle and small states from the India-Pakistan ages old rivalry. Moreover, the bilateral relation of states with India has significantly deteriorated in the wake of BRI. However, that didn't mean that the tensions between the India and Pakistan have ceased to exist in the RSC. The smaller states of the region were inextricably attached to the India for the fortification of their economic and security interest. Moreover, their collective efforts couldn't even budge the India from its bases and even they don't want to bandwagon with entirely with India but are in shackles due to their interests. Similarly, many of the smaller states desire to balance the power against India but couldn't do so owing to their political and economic interdependency on India.

The above discussed eccentricities infer that transformed the bilateral relation with India

⁷⁷ Agatha Kratz, Allen Feng, and Logan Wright, "New Data on the 'Debt Trap' Question," Rhodium Group (Rhodium Group, LLC, April 29, 2019), <https://rhg.com/research/new-data-on-the-debt-trap-question/>.

⁷⁸ Meg Rithmire Deborah Brautigam, "The Chinese 'Debt Trap' Is a Myth," The Atlantic (Atlantic Media Company, April 12, 2021), <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2021/02/china-debt-trap-diplomacy/617953/>.

and with BRI of China while constituting the deep interdependencies over to the members of complex. Although China is an external power penetrating the South Asian complex but with the Chinese deep engagements with the South Asian countries it is impossible to look at China as an eternal power. With the Chinese massive engagement in the region, we can infer that China is no longer penetrating the South Asia but is playing a pivotal role in uplifting the destitute plight of smaller states.

3.1.3. Securitization

The security patterns of south Asia have always remained hostage to Indo-Pak tense relation, which is then followed by the building of nuclear arsenals and other war materials. The post 9/11 scenario has attracted the world attention towards Asia. The attention of powers has orchestrated new patterns of security along the Asia. The US campaign after 9/11 has made the region volatile and vulnerable to nontraditional security threats. However, the US spearheaded alliance has further highlighted the vulnerability of the complex and reluctance of Pakistan and India to cooperate with each other. The reluctance has further caused the power to penetrate which has helped the US to solve the matters of South Asia, however, with the entrance of India and US getting into the relation South Asia has intensified the relation of countries residing

3.2. The Gulf Regional Security Complex (GRSC)

The gulf sub-complex comprises of Iran and other states of Arabian Peninsula: Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Yemen, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. This complex is one of the most volatile complexes within the larger complex of IOR. The region is seen as geopolitical arena where the relations between the Arabs and Iran are molded. RSCT observes the interaction of Iran and Saudi Arab in the region and considers the security of one state is directly a threat to the security of other states. As per the orientation of RSCT one can seek that Gulf RSC is standard RSCT with anarchic structure. In the course of world trade none of the waterways as much important then gulf in general and Hormuz in particular. Strait of Hormuz being the world largest gateway is critical node for global energy supply, though its smaller in size but is of greater significance for energy shipments. The strait comprises of narrow passages which passes between the Iran, UAE and Oman to the south, and is an only channel linking Oman and Persian Gulf. It also

provides the passage to the Arabian Sea.

The presence of external powers has made the security of passage an ever worsened since past. The competition of great powers has fostered the competition of influence between the existing regional powers which has further worsen the already tense pattern of security in Persian Gulf. Moreover, the inter-GCC dispute between the member's countries depicts the weakening of gulf. The alliance of Saudi Arabia and UAE is of profound attraction because of their political, economic and military might. However, Qatar being the one of the regional powers, it is deepening its ties the other half of regional rivals, turkey and Iran. The geopolitics of Gulf is primarily dependent upon the competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia altogether with their Gulf cooperation council partners. The two are considered as the main entities in Gulf and are competing for influence in the adjacent countries like Iraq, Yemen, Syria and Qatar. They are consistently employing their religious identities for fostering their agenda and as a tool for extending their influence whereas the global powers like the U.S. and Russia engages political, economic, and military resources.

3.2.1. Enmity and amity in Gulf

The orientation of interstate relations actually depends upon the patterns of enmity and amity that depicts who fears whom and is linked with whom. However, in the Gulf the orientation is quite different and the crucial role is played by the age-old enmities between the two dominant entities, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Both of the countries are highly rich in hydrocarbons and their main economic reserve is also oil. Iran's site over the Persian Gulf contains the Strait of Hormuz, which has been labeled as "the world's most important oil chokepoint"⁷⁹. Similarly, Iran is providing transit to the Central Asian countries, thus making Iran a strategic actor as it potentially reins the access of significant global energy supplies.⁸⁰

Likewise, the Saudi Arabia has attained large oil reserves and has engaged the central west Asian location to both the north red sea and Persian Gulf. Maintaining domestic stability

⁷⁹ McDevitt, Michael A., Michael Connell, Martin N. Murphy, and Satu Limaye. 2012. *The Long Littoral Project: Arabian Sea: A Maritime Perspective on IndoPacific Security*. Washington, DC: CAN page 2

⁸⁰ Morady, Farhang. 2011. *Iran Ambitions for Regional Supremacy: The Great Powers, Geopolitics and Energy Resources*. *Journal of Indian Ocean Studies* 7 (1): 75–94

is a mounting trial for the both the regime as their population is growing and the sustenance of economic reservoir is highly imperative and underpins the survival of ruling regimes. Both the strategically important entities have relatively small yet modern and capable maritime forces for coping up with threats and risks. It is presumed that they would be likely be able to get a strong control over the sea. Moreover, Iran has got the tendency of disrupting trade in the Strait of Hormuz if it chooses to showcase its power and for politico-strategic reasons. The history of Saudi Arabia is quite suggestive that it has always supported collective measures for security while Iran choses to remain independent while pursuing its security interest. However, other states like Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain etc. have small yet heavily mechanized forces for effectively controlling and doing maritime security risk treatment. Yemen has exclusively got modest local patrol competence although the existing Yemeni civil war and inner political uproar cast doubt on likely effectiveness.⁸¹

In addition to the resource conflict and absurdity of power, the rivalry between the two majorly fueled by the religious identities which further creates tensions and are tensing them apart. The ideational fissures trunks from the religious identities. The Middle Eastern region is massively fraught with conceptual competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The vigorous nature of historical trends demands the ongoing rivalry between the two is to be comprehended in complicit way for digging out the reasons. Iranian are embracing the Shiite faction while Saudis had embraced Sunni faction as identity for religion. The power paradox between the two is to stabilize the Balance of Power in political and religion sphere of influence.⁸² They are trying to seek maximum power for attaining a sphere of influence and to legit their presence in the region. The major antagonistic ailment occurs from the power paradox they are involved in, while the struggle is asymmetric which involves the indulgence of proxies and ideological discern. Besides, the power brawl is not limited to

⁸¹ George Christou, ed., *Maritime Security Risks, Vulnerabilities and Cooperation: Uncertainty in the Indian Ocean* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 202.

⁸² Farhat Konain Shujahi and Muhammad Shafiq, "Evaluating Iran-Saudi Strategic competition in Middle East: implications for Regional Security," *NDU Journal*, 2018, pp. 142-149, <https://ndu.edu.pk/ndu-journal/2018/13-Eval-Iran-Saudi-Strat.pdf>. See also, Max Fisher, "How the Iranian-Saudi Proxy Struggle Tore Apart the Middle East" *New York Times*, November, 19, 2016. Shah.Z.,Shah, S. A., & Khan, H. U. (2015). Conflict and Cooperation in Pak-Iran Relations Post 9/11. *Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities* (1994-7046), 23(2).

swelling stimulus only but it also “intra-regional and extra-regional, intra-state and non-state, direct and indirect, resolute and irresolute, and in-line and in-limbo parties of the rivalry.”⁸³

The rivalry which actually stems from power struggle and is taking a new form as of now and is steadily becoming a pivotal parameter during economic, military, political, and social developments in the Middle Eastern region. However, the happening of Arab spring has caused the shifting of nature of threats and vest the non-state actors in the state systems and marvel of global terrorism.

3.2.2. Extra Regional Actors in Gulf

Regional security complex can be acutely penetrated by the major powers, penetration infers that an external power can manipulate the already existent structure by play a key role in creating such structures. Penetration usually occurs when an external power makes security configuration within the RSC. Gulf tends to be a penetrated structure as it is deeply manipulated by Major Powers and the role played by super powers is quite evident there. Bary Buzan and Weaver contended that RSC are autonomous entities but are highly volatile to get penetrated by external forces. The history is suggestive of the fact that Middle east had remained prone to the influence of external powers in the form of Western colonialism and economic and military interdependence.

Great powers remained embroiled in making conflicts in the Gulf RSC although they weren't fighting each other. The Chinese, Russians and the American are extending their wings to get their influence concede across the middle east. in pace of getting into the direct confrontation US and Russia are involved in manipulating the regional powers that are shaping the middle east according to their own ends.

Middle East is becoming a mess of powers and is being multipolar as the power is diffused among a diversity of regional and extra regional powers. With such a mess, India is concealing its economic and strategic interest in the Gulf RSC. India's expanded interest in middle east are of varying endeavors they are extending from areas including trade,

⁸³ Farhat Konain Shujahi and Muhammad Shafiq, “Evaluating Iran-Saudi Strategic competition in Middle East: implications for Regional Security,” *NDU Journal*, 2018, pp. 142-149, <https://ndu.edu.pk/ndu-journal/2018/13-Eval-Iran-Saudi-Strat.pdf>. See also; Eyup Ersoy, “The Rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Middle East” *Today's Zaman*, December 31, 2012.

littoral security, investment, energy security, migrant workers, counter-terrorism, , and the development and salvation of ocean resources. The recent Indian incursion across the middle east is a part of deliberate attempt of involving the littoral states for getting returns. Iran is a most pertinent factor of India's Chabahar port project which is vital chain and strategic point in Indian policy of Afghanistan and beyond and is being furnished by Indian's locale at the Pakistan-Afghan border. This had ultimately rung the bell for Pakistan, if Indian get to strengthen its footprints across the Chabahar project Pakistan would be highly vulnerable to Indians. Consequently, a novel geopolitical rivalry is evolving here, and we ought to interval for future developments.

Besides, Pakistan is also active in the region while embroiling to the forums Like OIC for gathering support for Kashmir issue by establishing links with key Arabian countries. Hence India is taking part in Middle East for conducting erudite balance-of-power diplomacy, India is trying to contain and malign Pakistani sway in the Gulf region.

3.2.3. Securitization in Gulf

Securitization can be defined as the process of transmuted an issue into a security concern by steering public dissertations. That hints the securitizing actors to transform traditional politics into emergency politics which denote to "extraordinary measures and the actors who call for them, how they do so, with whom they form relationships to achieve their objectives and what factors determine their success or failure".⁸⁴

In RSCT, security is observed as social construction which means that the securitization process affects the security of member states by linking them together. The concept of saucerization stems from Copenhagen school of thought and is defined by Barry Buzan and Waever as "the distinctive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat"⁸⁵

In Gulf, Saudi Arabia and Iran are securitizing actors who compete for securing a relevant object, by compelling the recipients to ponder the problem to the security of latter.

⁸⁴ Kristian Åtland and Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, "When Security Speech Acts Misfire: Russia and the 'Elektron' Incident," *Security Dialogue* 14, no. 03 (June 2009): pp. 333-353.

⁸⁵ Buzan & Wæver, 2003

Securitization statements are issued by political leaders or revolutionist who convinces the general public to find and recognize the revolutionary Shiism or Sunni supremacy in the region as a menace (often overestimated) to national or regional security.

3.3. The Horn of Africa-Red Sea Sub Complex

Horn of African can also be perceived as regional security complex. The region is innately a diverse space which is encompassing the Gulf of Aden and Horn of Africa. Withstanding the long history of collaboration economic and cultural system presents a greater challenge in grander coordination. This has been further aggravated by the conventional definition of Africa and the Middle East, in which the red sea acted as the dividing lane in spite of unifying one.

3.3.1. Enmity and Amity in The Horn of Africa-Red Sea RSC

The history is evident of the patterns of enmity and amity between the countries that have coupled with different layers of security had consistently animated the foreign policies of countries specifically in regards with the state formation, regime security. Contemporarily, the regional geopolitical orientation has been very complex since the arrival of eternal powers and certain developments in Horn of Africa. However, a very intense and gruesome competition is being seen in the horn of Africa.

Since the past five years the prevalent order in horn of Africa has been manipulated by the increasing commitment from the Gulf States along the red sea. The expanding economic endeavors are lashing the activities on both shores however great powers are utilizing the choke point of Bab al Man dab, which is highly busy gateway from the Red Sea.

In the few recent years. the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia has taken pace, the battlefield of Yemen can trace as the proxy being utilized by both the powers for showcasing their might. The gulf countries are trying to secure alliances for better projection of power and influence. The ancient rivalries among the Arabs are imbedding themselves onto present local conflicts and generating new tensions.

3.3.2. Extra Regional Powers in The Horn of Africa-Red Sea RSC

Since the past decade the Horn of Africa region have become the apple of eye for many powers. Djibouti one of very small port in Horn of Africa have gained currency and is now acting as port for international shipping. The geostrategic value of Djibouti port has added

onto its significance for the international powers. Moreover, it has now become a key port for American bases for shielding their interest in the red sea. The very reason of the Djibouti gaining currency is that it has befittingly utilized its geostrategic importance for gaining respect.

The growing engagement of military across the red sea has fueled a great deal of vested interest and have fostered the inextricable competition between the two giants US and China. it is understandable that the driver of instability and tension are the regional competitors who are competing for gaining influence. Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Egypt, the UAE, Turkey, Qatar, have all chased their comforts in the region and have exported their conflicts to the Horn of Africa.

It is notable to note that US African command is headquarters in Djibouti whereas the French have historically been involved there and most importantly Chinese have established their port as well. The mature presence of China at the key spot of Bab al-Mandab Strait exemplifies the Chinese far reaching goals in a really aloof strategic environment that further demonstrates the Chinese urge of showcasing its military colors. This sort of intricate strategic condition that have the tendency to fuel up the friction and can agitate the dangers of instability.⁸⁶

3.3.3. Securitization in The Horn of Africa-Red Sea RSC

Since the War on terror the horn of Africa has become increasingly significant for the major powers, and have become progressively securitized as the extra regional powers have open up their military outposts for combating the threats. The engagement has been seen are largely driven under the multilateral frameworks with international mandate's and in direction. Yet the primary actor has been the foreign military forces, consequently, the horn has experienced a large amount of increasing foreign engagements in the region. The quest of security has, therefore, involved the external militarization of the Horn region.

3.4. The Australasia Sub Complex

Australasian regional security complex comprises of Indonesia, Thailand, Burma, and

⁸⁶ Abdulwahab Al-Qassab, "Worrisome Competition in the Red Sea Subsystem," *Worrisome Competition in the Red Sea Subsystem* (Arab Center Washington DC, May 1, 2019), http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/worrisome-competition-in-the-red-sea-subsystem/.

Singapore altogether with the countries from south East Asia. The reason why Australia is included in Australasian complex is because of its significant geographical proximity and intrinsically attached geographically-derived interests. Being the prime power in the region Australia has nurtured aimed for securing the interest for playing the larger role in the IOR, as evident by their national Defense security strategy published in 2013. Australia has also been embroiled in making defense agreement with Indonesia and three other mainstream countries for establishing a security parameter along the Strait of Malacca. Hence Australia is seen as the basic organ in the Asia Pacific Rim and is characterize as the strategically crucial in Indian Ocean.⁸⁷ Moreover the FDPA (five powers defense agreement) had been signed between the New Zealand, Australia, Malaysia, Indonesia and UK for expediting the efforts of making security arrangements along the Malaccan strait which is still operational.

The Recent two decades from 20th and one from 21st century has presumed an extraordinary notch for the centrality and increasing ASEAN success in becoming the hub of regional security orientation of Asia-pacific. Nevertheless, the region is increasingly becoming nexus for a varying range of activities ranging from illegal trafficking to extreme weathers. Also the regional pertinent waterways have grown increasingly high with more than one third of the global maritime traffic passing every day from Persian gulf and Indian ocean to the one of the apex of economy, north east Asia.⁸⁸

3.4.1. Enmity and Amity in Australasian Sub Complex

Australasia can be called a repository to numerous unsettled conflicts which encompasses the unresolved conflicts pertaining to territorial and maritime claims within the countries, however, the particular of all is the enraged insurgencies in Myanmar, Thailand and Philippe, though Australia didn't witness any conflict since the cold war.

Singapore being one of the primary littoral states of the region and reliance on commerce and trade, drew devotion towards the piracy in Passage of Malacca. Moreover, its leading

⁸⁷ Manuj Gupta, 2009, 64

⁸⁸ Brian Harding, "Southeast Asia's Role in Geopolitics," School of Public Policy and Global Affairs (School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, October 2017), <https://sppga.ubc.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2017/10/8-Brian-Harding.pdf>. see also Robert D. Kaplan, "Why the South China Sea is So Crucial." The Business Insider (20 February 2015), <https://www.businessinsider.com.au/why-the-south-china-sea-is-so-crucial-2015-2> Accessed 11 August 2017.

mistrust over to the Malaysia and Indonesia, Singapore priorities are shifting towards bargaining the External power particularly the US and Japan.

The rift between military and civil govt is depressingly surmounting but this got obscures the complex structure lying within the Myanmar with the media covering of Aung Sang Suu Ki. Though the Military secures a greater influence over the political elites but the civilian lead govt. is leading the country. Furthermore, the Burmese Govt. is in strike with different ethnic groups. Thailand is struggling to get itself out from the decades long ethnic conflicts that have been rejuvenated itself into more intense form in the three of Muslim majority provinces. While the country is struggling from Insurgencies, the governance structure is also wrecked by coups since the insurgency have taken pace.⁸⁹

The striking concern in IOR is of nontraditional threats that are worsening the plight of trade in along the Strait of Malacca while the Piracy and sea robbery remains the most concerned things along the Strait of Malacca. However, the wave of terrorism at the shores embarks the concern of vandalizing of ports and sea-lanes to be used by terrorists for their heinous activities.⁹⁰

Whereas in regard to the cooperation measures, the ASEAN remains the most critical as it has settled the most important agenda for multilateral security institution. Since the inception of ASEAN, the major goals were of prosperity and Peace: ensemble together to avert the outsiders from reaching you out.⁹¹ The tools used by ASEAN for preventing the outsiders from coming in was the initiation of different forums “East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus).”⁹²

3.4.2. Extra Regional Actors in the region

The region is facing a serious intensification of relation with the rising competition between

⁸⁹ Prashanth Parameswaran, “Wilson Center,” *Wilson Center* (blog), April 14, 2020, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/how-will-southeast-asias-conflict-zones-fare-2020-and-beyond>.

⁹⁰ Andrew Forbes, ed., “Asian Energy Security: Regional Cooperation in the Malacca Strait,” Sea Power Centre, Australia (2008), <https://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/PIAMA23.pdf> , 148.

⁹¹ Brian Harding, “Southeast Asia’s Role in Geopolitics,” School of Public Policy and Global Affairs (School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, October 2017), <https://sppga.ubc.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2017/10/8-Brian-Harding.pdf>.

⁹² Brian Harding, “Southeast Asia’s Role in Geopolitics,” School of Public Policy and Global Affairs (School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, October 2017), <https://sppga.ubc.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2017/10/8-Brian-Harding.pdf>.

China and US. The great rivalry has entirely changed the “seascape” of overall maritime order in IOR. The great power rivalry being steered by trade and hegemonic designs over the technological omnipotence has seemingly added on the already intensive Maritime competition.

The overall geostrategic significance of Malaccan strait has led many of the countries to struggle to attain the control of Strait of Malacca moreover, the Major Sea powers are in competition for controlling the main SLOCs while partnering the regional power for attaining a sound influence. Thus, US is looking for India to contain the China. The Chinese struggles for Economic self-sufficiency and sudden growing influence has not only won the consideration of regional countries. China has attained a considerable influence by establishing a regional organization which is characterize as the most influential of all, moreover China is chief partner of ASEAN while ASEAN is the 3rd major partner of. The bilateral trade which remains the most significant has grown to USD 400 billion in 2012 from USD 55 billion in 2002. In addition to the thriving economy of China, it is also provoked by the South China Sea dispute which involve four ASEAN countries. South China Sea (SCS) is the most important waterway for the trading of oil and energy but is directly attached to issue of SCS. China is in favor of bilateral solution while the other countries are looking for a multilateral solution.⁹³

The chief Chinese interest revolves around the south east Asians resource market; thus, it desires for a peaceful yet bilateral solution for realizing its dream, of superpower. For this China is looking for a peaceful solution by taking up the development and to share its return with the aggrieved countries. Moreover because of their geographical proximity and ages old linkages China enjoys full influence over the ASEAN. As stated by the Chinese Barometer survey “despite sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea, a majority of citizens in most Southeast Asian countries (with the exception of Myanmar) view the influence of China favorably.”⁹⁴ However the two countries that will contain the Chinese rise will be Myanmar and Vietnam because of their history of being into conflicts.

⁹³ Teshu Singh , “China & Southeast Asia: The Strategy behind the Maritime Silk Road ,” *IPCS Special Focus ; The Maritime Great Game India, China, US & The Indian Ocean*, March 1, 2014, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/177823/SR150-IPCSSpecialFocus-MaritimeGreatGame.pdf>

⁹⁴ Kishore Mahbubani and Amrita V. Nair, “ASEAN and Geopolitical Rivalries,” *Horizons Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development*, no. 9 (2017).

Indian approach in the region is basically steered by geography and geopolitics which has innate several layers. Moreover, from Nicobar and Andaman Island India shares its maritime margins with Burma, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia.⁹⁵ Indians eastern seaboard resides the Indian eastern command and acts as the premier base for India and is mainly characterize for operating the ballistic missile test, significantly with this location India tries to foster the influence. Seeing this we can infer that they have a new “outward-looking maritime strategy”, the current Premier of India wants to get the contours of Indian role reformed and to project India as the aspiring power in IOR.

For the reason, India has incorporated bilateral, trilateral and multilateral drills in the region that holds great significance. India has come into symbolic exercises with local states. Into this group comes “the “Ind-Indo CORPAT” exercises between the Indian and Indonesian navies which have been held since 1994, the India-Thailand Coordinated Patrol “Ind-Thai CORPAT” exercise in the Andaman Sea set up in 2006, and the joint naval exercises carried out with the Malaysian Navy in 2008 and 2010.” The more utilitarian and strategically important drills have been conducted with other countries, in the east. Joint SIMBEX exercises, of growing strength and substance with important choke point control, have been held between India and Singapore since 1993. Singapore providing friendly berthing facilities for the Indian Navy for entering and exit purposes from the Indian Ocean.⁹⁶

3.4.3. Securitization in Australasian Sub Complex

Buzan and Waever suggest, that “the security relations of regional actors become intertwined in processes of securitization and de-securitization, whereby actors either construct something (e.g. another country) as an existential security threat (thereby securitizing it) or refuse to view something (e.g. another country) as existentially threatening (thereby de-securitizing it).”⁹⁷ The interdependence in south East Asia has been characterized as the construct based on the history which has been evolving the orientation

⁹⁵ Manoj Joshi, “India (Re)Discovers the Indian Ocean,” Observer Research Foundation (ORF, August 23, 2019), <https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-rediscovers-the-indian-ocean-54684/>.

⁹⁶ David Scott, “India’s Grand Strategy for the Indian Ocean: Mahanian Visions,” *Asia-Pacific Review*, volume 13, Issue 2, 2006, pp.97-129

⁹⁷ Buzan, Ole Waiver, *Regions and Powers*, 44

of the shared interests and conflicts till today.

Since the last decade the transition from the Asia Pacific to Indo-Pacific has taken pace, the transition of changing pivotal region is itself regarded as the construct of major powers, US, Japan, Australia and India. The desertions being prevailed by the major powers are aimed at countering the perceived nature of China Foreign policy. However, the American shift from Atlantic to Indo Pacific has been started with the Obama's "Indo-Pacific" policy in which the then secretary of state had frolicked a key role. In Hawaii for the first they have disclosed the term "Indo-Pacific" in which they have discussed their endeavors with India in the wake of growing importance of IOR.

3.5. The South African-Mozambique Channel Sub Complex

The most vital of all comprises of ten states of western Indian Ocean including South Africa, Comoros, Madagascar, Seychelles, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Mauritius, and the French overseas territory of Réunion. This complex possesses an eminent geostrategic feature that holds a great interface of states including the major ones. Additionally, this complex resides the most important island onto which the geostrategic rivalry is stepping i.e., Mauritius and the Seychelles. The reach of these islands extends from India to Africa in Indian Ocean while their geostrategic significance can be drawn from their proximity with the vital key sea-lanes of communication (SLOCs). These islands host a very important feature for facilitating the longer presence of ships which makes it geostrategic ally important in the eyes of great power. Longer presence permits navies to exert along the trajectory while enhancing their profile as the net security provider. Operations from these islands give the leverage for controlling the south and central IO and thus India is developing its relations with these countries for economic and security interest.

3.5.1. Patterns of enmity and amity

The western Indian Ocean security patterns are deeply influenced by a range of factors varying from traditional to nontraditional security threats. The eruption of Somalia piracy in 2008 in east Africa and in the Gulf of Aden has depicted that the security patterns are interconnected and are inextricably attached and that "the capacity of African states are

insufficient to prevent crime at sea and to realize the developmental potential of the maritime economy.”⁹⁸

Moreover, the western Indian ocean hosts a greater amount of energy deposits and possess a large network of vital sea lanes but is being influenced by the instability which poses a risk to the maritime security. Such threats encompass the attack on ships carrying the fuel and energy supplies. The incursions in Somalia and Yemen depicts the relocation of armed conflicts from land into the Gulf of Aden. The same incursions can be seen in the Mozambique’s northern side where a potential conflict can be seen migrating from land to sea.⁹⁹

The piracy is eminent issue across the trajectory, the pirates attack the ships along the boundaries of Kenya, Madagascar, Tanzania, Seychelles and auxiliaries into the Indian Ocean. These insecurities are inextricably linked to the state brittleness on land “highlighting not only the liminal nature of challenges, but also their relationship to wider issues of development and insecurity.”¹⁰⁰

3.5.2. Extra Regional Players

The significance of the islands was known since ages but had remain underappreciated in the past decades. History had witnessed that for exerting influence major nations have controlled the strategically vital island that had a global sway. However, the current era has relegated the concept of holding the islands because of the acceptance of international order.

Along the trajectory of Mozambique France is the strongest power covering about 200km of Mauritius and hosts the French south armed forces headquarters. It’s the largest base in the Djibouti and holds the ownership of Kerguelen Islands, St Paul and Amsterdam Islands and the Crozet Islands, support France’s security presence.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ The British Academy, “Analysing Maritime Security: Capacity building in the Western Indian Ocean,” 2019, [Analysing Maritime Security: Capacity Building in the Western Indian Ocean | The British Academy](#).

⁹⁹ Francois Vreÿ And Mark Blaine, “Western Indian Ocean: Where Trouble on Land Spells Danger at Sea,” The Interpreter (The Lowy Institute, October 29, 2020), <https://www.loyyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/western-indian-ocean-where-trouble-land-spells-danger-sea>.

¹⁰⁰ “Mastering Maritime Security: Reflexive Capacity Building and the Western Indian Ocean Experience,” *Safeseas, Cardiff University and University of Bristol*, 2018, p.3. <file:///C:/Users/dynamic/Downloads/Mastering%20Maritime%20Security%20final.pdf>

¹⁰¹ Chinmoyee Das, “India’s Maritime Diplomacy in South West Indian Ocean: Evaluating Strategic

In the Sino- Indian rivalry is adversely affecting all the countries residing in IOR irrespective of small or medium countries. the growing Sino attention and development in Seychelles has proved to be game changer for archipelago and as for its partners. The escalating competition between the India and China in Seychelles is quite evident from the developments being done so far by the competitor. Additionally, the growing competition is digging threats for Seychelles. As Dennis Hardy quantified: “Seychelles now finds itself caught up in this proxy battle of the titans.”¹⁰²

In the past decade India has fostered collaboration by developing security relations with key states particularly, they were focused on choke points and across the western Indian Ocean with Mozambique and over the entrance of Persian Gulf as well as in the Malaccan strait.

The island of Madagascar also holds great significance for operating in the western Indian Ocean, Madagascar also borders the Mozambique channel which was once a primary trade route between Asia, Europe and America before the furnish of Suez Canal. The weightage of Mozambique Channel has significantly been reduced with the start of Suez Canal but remain geo-strategically significant for the eastern coast of Africa.

In 2018, the visit of Indian president to Madagascar put the Madagascar Island into lime light. The first ever visit paid by Indian president accentuates the strategic location of Madagascar in the south West Indian Ocean and has embarked over a new foreign policy directive of holding the islands which was previously disregarded by Delhi which has now been corrected recently.¹⁰³ Additionally, Indians are mounting the security relations with Madagascar, Mozambique and the Seychelles, littoral states in and around the crucial Mozambique Channel for curtailing Chinese influence.

Quite evidently India has been seen active for curtailing the Chinese influence across the

Partnerships ,” *Journal of Strategic Security (JSS)* 12, no. 2 (2019): pp. 42-59, <https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1726&context=jss>.

¹⁰² Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “Seychelles: How a Small Island State Is Navigating Through the Emerging Competition Between India and China,” *Seychelles Research Journal* 3, no. 1 (February 2021): pp. 56-81, <https://seychellesresearchjournalcom.files.wordpress.com/2021/01/seychelles-how-a-small-island-state-is-navigating-through-the-emerging-competition-between-india-and-china-jp-cabestan-srj-3-1.pdf>.

¹⁰³ Darshana Baruah, “Islands As Game Changers In The Indian Ocean,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (Center For Strategic And International Studies, April 20, 2018), <https://amti.csis.org/islands-game-changers-indian-ocean/>

ocean, for which India has undertaken infrastructural development plan with dual-use logistics facilities in Mauritius and Seychelles. India also aims to upgrade and fortify the facilities on the Agaléga Islands of Mauritius.

India and Mauritius have signed an agreement entailing to improve air and sea facilities at Agaléga Island¹⁰⁴. With this agreement Indian can take assistance form Mauritius. The intended aim behind this agreement and increasing advancement are quite obvious that India wants to pursue its hegemonic goals while at the same time curtailing the Chinese rise.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴. “Development of Agalega – No Lease Agreement Contained in MOU Signed with India,” Development of Agalega – No Lease Agreement contained in MOU signed with India (2015). <http://www.govmu.org/English/News/Pages/India,-says-Minister-Koonjoo.aspx>

¹⁰⁵. “Pak-China Relations in the 21st Century: Regional Situation, Security, Economic & Trade Cooperation,” Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), Islamabad (Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), Islamabad, April 15, 2004), <https://www.ips.org.pk/pak-china-relations-in-the-21st-century-regional-situation-security-economic-a-trade-cooperation/>.

CHAPTER FOUR

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

The current epoch seems to be more vigorous as it has brought a lot of key changes onto the world map extending from technology to encompassing all of the life affairs. Moreover, this era has marked the start of globalization and has evolved the world thoroughly. The 20th century has witnessed a boom of certain mega developments ranging from colonization, decolonization, world wars, formation of UN, cognizance of environmental degradation, substantial enhancements in science and technology, digital revolution, and colossal progression in information technology shaped life in new outlines. With these massive developments Indian Ocean is affected in the same way the development did to world, enhancement of technology, emergence of power and trade has in many ways effected the IOR.

It is of no doubt with lucrative returns there come security implications as well. Indian Ocean being the hub of global trade is very volatile and is home to emerging powers. Pakistan being the primary littoral state is volatile to threats. Major challenge comes with the power projection of different states in the IOR. For Pakistan it's really a daunting task to project its sway across the IOR, moreover, it couldn't remain oblivious to the development occurring across the IOR as it's a primary actor and its security is inextricably attached to it.

The geostrategic environment of Indian Ocean is getting more and more complicated with the growing Indo-US strategic partnership. In order to counter growing Chinese presence USA is enhancing Indian naval arsenals for building military proficiencies: air craft carrier technology, drones, marine helicopters and anti-submarine gear respectively. The enhancement of capacities will ultimately create security dilemma and a risky situation for Pakistan. Besides that, India is making alliances with Iran and other gulf countries for countering the Chinese influence.

In the Persian Gulf, the relationship is strategically important, UAE and Saudi Arabia are the major financer in gulf region. Their relations with Iran are troubled because of the apparent involvement from both the parties in proxy wars against each other in the region. Another implication that is really serous is of making Pakistan isolated from rest of the

world. The Indian govt. has strong ties with the Gulf and has also gained early mover plus in Africa¹⁰⁶ which can prove disastrous for Pakistan.

Furthermore, the rising tensions of radicalism and extremism in Middle East and south Asia are of grave concern for Pakistan. Radicalism and terrorism in south Asia and Middle East are a staple of intercontinental concern towards maritime retreat for Pakistan in the Indian Ocean region from two perspectives. Firstly, the regions are prone to terrorist activities and there are chances of militant faction attacking the infrastructure and ports that can hamper the international trade. Secondly, by shipments and freights, militants can smuggle weapons and drugs to finance their activities. This depicts a vital threat to Pakistan national interest and security. Furthermore, the militarization is posturing non-traditional security threats such as piracy, terrorism and environmental issues as well and now after the partnership of China and Pakistan in Indian Ocean, it is calamitous need to overawe these encounters as this is good for both to shelter their interests.

Super complex of IOR encompasses all the littoral states in the Indian Ocean basin. The presence of extra regional and global powers i.e., China and US in the Indian Ocean region are making the security orientation complex. In the prevailing context, it is being presumed that India littoral state of South Asian Sub Complex is aspiring to enhance its influence outside its complex and likely to collaborate with US for maintaining balance of power in the region in the wake of Chinese maritime intervention the IOR. Apart from this, it is pertinent to mention that every strategic move of India is somehow linked with security of Pakistan. Recent ties of Indian with US in the field of is a move to hurt Pakistani interest in the region. Moreover, India is getting close to US which may have serious implication for Pakistan because Pakistan has been the front-line non-NATO ally of US for the past two decades. Moreover, Indian aspirations are to isolate Pakistan in the international arena while getting engaged on defense and economic assistance with the states like Japan, Australia, Indonesia, Oman, Iran, Seychelles, Madagascar and a number of African states. Though, Pakistan has a small yet highly mechanized navy for defending its interests from any aggression. Hence, this changing geopolitical environment in the IOR will be very

¹⁰⁶ Muhammad Abbas Hassan, "Growing China-India Competition in the Indian Ocean," *Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad* 39, no. 01 (Spring 2019): pp. 77-89, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/48544289>.

gruesome for Pakistan to balance power with India, in addition to the Indian factor in IOR, the scarce economic sources are also haunting Pakistan capabilities for uplifting its Naval infrastructure and for extending dominion.

4.1. Construct of Sarsct and implications for Pakistan

South Asia is characterized as unique yet complex region for its interconnectivity. In this region almost every state foreign policy is convolutedly attached to other state, hence, attracts the greater power to remain focused over to it. Pakistan and India being the arch-rivals since their inception have apprehensions from one another. India Ocean being the most pertinent and relevant water body has energy, economic and political imperatives for almost all of world. It's actually a trade route encompassing oil and energy trade which is very pertinent to the worlds industry. Indian Ocean is becoming a new playing field for the major power and all have varying interest, Indian designs are to remains active every sphere while competing Chinese influence.

In the Indo-pacific region, the US has professed the India as their net security provider for the protection of their interest. The growing relation will give it a positive breakthrough for adopting the aggression with its neighbors specifically towards Pakistan being its arch rival.¹⁰⁷ US has considered this South Asia as most pertinent of all seeing its regional connectivity. Moreover, the Chinese rise has reinvigorated the power and security politics in the region. Most importantly the Chinese rise has amplified the Indian importance for US as a strategic partner for countering China. In IOR, India has become the heir of US economic and security investment.¹⁰⁸ Additionally, the changing policy shift of US from south pacific to Indo-pacific could make the security orientation of South Asia complex while posing serious implications to Pakistan. Pakistan being the strategic partners of China would have serious ramifications for Pakistan under the US Indo-Pacific strategy. US have chosen India as partner for projecting influence across the IOR and have involved in signing the major agreement in defense, such as the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of

¹⁰⁷ Defense News, *Defense News*, June 3, 2020, <https://www.defensenews.com/interviews/2020/06/03/pakistans-naval-chief-talks-regional-security-and-tech-wish-list/>.

¹⁰⁸ Muhammad Tehseen, "Sino-US Competition: Implications for South Asia and the Asia-Pacific," *Strategic Studies* 37, no. 4 (January 12, 2018): pp. 1-17, https://www.issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/1-SS_Mohammad_Tehseen_No-4_2017.pdf.

Agreement (LEMOA) and Communications, Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA).¹⁰⁹ India has also added a nuclear-powered submarine and certain other developments to counter Chinese influence. The conclusion of such an agreement and the enhancement of Indian military engagements with help of US can pose severe challenges to Pakistan both in terms of security and from economic perspective. Moreover, Pakistan standing is firm and staunch lodging with multiple cohorts for economic development as ostensible in the case of CPEC.

The emerging rivalry between the US and China could potentially turn South Asia into arena great power competition for the quest of their goals. For instance, if a hard power succeeds the Chinese allies and regional power allying would have to suffer. Potentially, this would a disastrous effect over the CPEC, while for Pakistan improved and stable relations China and US is much important than ever before, as stability in their relation is important for CPEC to be on the winning note. On the contrary India is also pursuing its interest by promoting a parallel logistic corridor which passes through Bangladesh, Burma and Bihar in India.

In a bid to enhance its strength in IOR, India has increased its military capacity from operating only in neighborhood to operating in the entire region extending from Malacca to African coasts. In the Bay of Bengal, India has modernized and enhanced its facilities across the Andaman Islands and at Campbell in Nicobar Islands with a plan of 56.5 billion INR was finalized and aimed at letting added warships, aircraft, troops, and drones to be stationed in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. In the early month of 2021, Indian navy has commissioned a new naval station Kohassa in the BoB islands.¹¹⁰

There has been a lot of stirring that this development was done to counter the Chinese influence in IOR. Andaman and Nicobar Islands are overseas terrains of the Dominion of India.¹¹¹ The goals are evident from the developments being made across IOR that India wants an exclusive control over the IOR since it has hegemonic plans. With its growing

¹⁰⁹ Zeeshan Munir, "Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement," Center for Strategic and Contemporary Research (CSCR, 2016), <http://cscr.pk/pdf/rb/RB%20LEMOA.pdf>.

¹¹⁰ Indian Navy, "INS Kohassa- A New Bird's Nest in the Andamans," press release, 24 January 2019, <https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/ins-kohassa-%E2%80%93-new-bird%E2%80%99s-nestandamans>.

¹¹¹ Priyanjoli Ghosh, "India's Indian Ocean Region Strategy," *Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs*, August 31, 2020, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2331112/indias-indian-ocean-region-strategy/>

population and steady rise in economy and scarring resources, India will move towards a notable Maritime occurrence. The hasty development being made would have direct implications for Pakistan and can destabilize the military balance across the ocean because of lacking Pakistan's capabilities to counter the Indian growing influence. The speculation about Pakistan and India's conventional fight are fading with every passing day, however an overwhelming conformist irregularity between the two naval forces can be a very subverting variable.

Taking into consideration the developments being made by India can have a strange impact over Pakistan, it carries the potential to strangulate Pakistan's economy by blocking the essential ports and seaways. In such scenario security at maritime as well as in the air will be dealt off by the inadequacies of Pakistan Navy to deter Indian naval force's antagonistic stance.¹¹²

The Chinese new maritime silk route and the development of Gwadar port has added on to the drain of the errands over Pakistan navy. Security of naval freights of Chinese and infrastructure from traditional and non-traditional threat seems a very challenging task for a smaller navy like Pakistan. Gwadar being one of pertinent sector of BRI is of significance importance and is located at the brink of Arabian Sea. Gwadar is located at the back of most important chokepoint, Strait of Hormuz which is known for the supply of oil and energy. Gulf of Oman is just 220 nautical miles away from Gwadar.¹¹³

The implication, with the geopolitical development of IOR as one of the most important regions has raised the security implications for Pakistan ranging from military race in the region, Indo-Pak rivalry from Kashmir dispute to security dilemma for Pakistan in the wake of US-India assistance, China-Pakistan cooperation and Pakistan-India tension US-China rising tension. Indo-US collaboration in IOR can potentially impact the entire region and would twist the ties between the Pakistan and China more. For Pakistan, the consideration of US-China rivalry in terms of growing impact on region would have serious strategic and security implication. For illustration,

¹¹² Sidra Khan, "India's Quest for Hegemony in the Indian Ocean," *Journal of Security and Strategic Analyses (JISA)* 2, no. 1 (June 30, 2016): pp. 144-164.

¹¹³ Mohid Iftikhar, "Maritime Security Governance: Pakistan Perspective," *Governance and Management Review* 1, no. 1 (December 2016): pp. 43-69, http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/IAS/PDF/Article-3_v1_1_16.pdf

- Since partition, India and Pakistan have had an unending orientation of enmity towards each other so keeping in view the precedence Indian maritime security strategy would possibly be Pakistan Centric along with the competition with China. Besides that, the American strategic trade authorization status given to India would amplify the Indian import of weapons for US for undermining Pakistan security.
- Whereas at geostrategic it is presumed that the beefing partnership between the US-India is to undermine the significance of CPEC, certainly. The Growing US-Indian partnership can daunt the influx of energy form the Middle East energy rich states to the Persian Gulf by grousing their naval muscles for limiting access.

Pakistan is always in quest of trying to balance the power with India. However, in bid to respond the rising challenge of US-India, Pakistan can have the Chinese military assistance. Consequently, the two nuclear powers would work under the patronage of global power which can further make the region unstable. Pakistan being the primary littoral state of the region possess a significant geo-strategic location. Certainly, with its strategic location and siding with China could potentially bring over the implications for Pakistan.

4.2. Construct of Gulf RSCT and implications for Pakistan

The surge in the relations of India and Middle East have received a push since Modi had taken over the reign in 2015. Particularly in GCC, India has seen a gain to cut off Pakistan's support from the Gulf countries while discovering the mutual advantage based on economic and security levels. India has seek an advantage to pursue the GCC for its aims while capitalizing over Pakistan non-involvement in Yemen war.¹¹⁴

Strategically, Oman is significantly an important entity with its reach extended from Pakistan to the eastern Africa and resides with the midway extending from Indian western coast to Africa eastern coast. Oman is potentially a former defense ally and a supporter to India's antipiracy campaign since then India is looking for striking a deal with Oman. Oman has also given entree to India for establishing military base along port Duqm. The port would be an eminent part of cord of military amenities located in IOR by India for

¹¹⁴ Giorgio Cafiero, "Oman Diversifies Allies with Closer India Ties," Middle East Institute (MEI, October 5, 2016), <https://www.mei.edu/publications/oman-diversifies-allies-closer-india-ties>.

countering the Chinese influence presence and would pose serious threats to Pakistan's security. The access given to India over the port Duqm will potentially enhance the Indian presence and would add on to its strategic depth in Persian Gulf, additionally it would India a leverage for increasing its patrol and ships for attaining perpetual presence. Moreover, with the access of this port, India would be on upper hand and with that being said it would have been in position for extending its outreach across the ocean, beside that port can used for surveillance of international traffic. The presence of India in DUQM will allow India to control the pertinent SLOCs which are of vital importance to both china and Pakistan maritime security. Consequently, the presence of India in Duqm will potentially act as threat to Gwadar port and ultimately to the CPEC which is going to be a game changer for Pakistan.

Considering numerous defense agreement signed with Oman and India over the course of ten years, Pakistan would no longer sees the Oman as a gas station or a foundation of transmittals but as a major threat to its strategic interest in the wake of growing relation with India.

In the last two decades the India has developed a partnership with Iran and the relation gets that deep rooted that India has aided Iran in the construction of strategically significant port Chabahar which they built for countering the Gwadar port. With the India exhibition in Iran, Pakistan can get serious upshots from seeking Indian presence in the facilitation of CPEC. Additionally, India is aiming to kill two birds with one stone while resorting to Iran for the attainment of its targets and has achieved its eminent aim of encircling Pakistan. With the presence of India in Iran, Pakistan can come across the following potential challenges.

- India through this project, boasted its Navy status by aspiring it as blue water Navy by operating in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Oman.
- The presence of India in Iran has fuelled the secessionist insurgent movement in Baluchistan. It is quite evident from the fact that one of their Serving commanders Kulbushan Jadav have been arrested from Baluchistan who was pursuing the mission of sabotaging the CPEC.

- Indian trade from Chahbahar port will let India to pressurize Pakistan by contending that if you want to have trade through Afghanistan with CARS you have to give access to Afghanistan to do trade by transiting Pakistan to trade with India.
- With its deepening presence in it can further enhance its influence over to the Central Asian republics which it couldn't have done from Pakistan. Most importantly the presence will give India a leverage to keep surveillance over the traffic inflow of ships in Pakistan and China.
- Additionally, the inking of agreements with Oman and Bangladesh have given the India a leverage to enhance its strategic influence in IOR which will help it to retain eye on Chinese and Pakistan's activities.

4.3. Australasian Construct and Implications for Pakistan

For containing China US has installed major strategic returns and has also expanded its defense agreement for encircling China in this region. On the contrary, China considers the US as a major security threat in IOR. Beijing is also explicitly extending its assistances towards south Asia countries for encircling US. For instance, Beijing has warned US not to meddle with the affairs of region in 2013, moreover China has enacted no-fly zone in the South China Sea area.¹¹⁵

In a bid to maintain the sphere of influence and to promote the interest India, US, Japan and Australia are considering getting into agreements for wielding influence across the Asia-pacific which is pigeon-holed as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad or QSD), the proposed platform is yet to solidify into a tangible force. But it has got the potential of influencing the region by making coordinated efforts and strategies. As a matter of strategic concern Pakistan is keeping an eye over it. With the naturally bestowed strategic location, possession of nuclear weapons and the ensuing age-old rivalry with India and its significant relation with US and China, Pakistan is playing a greater role in the changing shift of politics which will get Pakistan serious repercussions. It is thus vital for Pakistan to

¹¹⁵ Huma Amin, "United States Presence in Indian Ocean: Counter Strategy For China," Modern Diplomacy, January 14, 2020, <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/01/14/united-states-presence-in-indian-ocean-counter-strategy-for-china/>.

consider the impact of QUAD on future of Pakistan interest and endeavors.

Most notably, the QUAD has boosted the Indians "Act East" and "Extended Neighborhood" policies. The Indian endeavors coupled with the US Indo-pacific strategy can prove distressful for Pakistan and China. In essence, the QUAD is actually the byproduct of the renewed approach focused on increasing influence which also embraces the abridged focus on Pakistan with war on terror loses its worth. It also comprehends the Indian greater role in region with the extending ties with other states of the region. However as of now it is being deemed as threat to Pakistan's Interest. The international consensus over the perceived concerns is that Pakistan should look for maintaining equilibrium in exertion of influence and in hard power for rebutting the concerns. Most importantly, the deepening of stalemates between the US and India are termed as "Indo-US" nexus which is overtly intended to thwart the Pakistani endeavor and over the marginalization of Pakistan.

Indonesia being the primary state in IOR is very vital to the interest India in the Indo-pacific region. Indonesia is significant in many ways and is characterized in ASEAN as the primus inter pares and resides as the most important state in ASEAN. Indonesia will serve as a bridge to India for being in international institutions and most importantly will aid in developing the relations with the key associates. Additionally, the India sought off the Chinese and Indonesian historical conflict and had hit upon that by tethering Indonesia with them and had joined hands for countering the Chinese expansion, the common aim of both the aggrieved states. 2ndly the US assistance to Indonesia and binding cooperation fit in to the Indians strategic approach. Lastly the Indonesian strategic location suits the India for exerting and expanding their influence. Indonesian strategic location possesses three innate choke points, the Strait of Malacca, the Lombok Strait, and the Sunda Strait that are very vital for maritime security and trade of to which the Chinese industry is reliant, if they are to be choked by India, Chinese will have serious security implication vis-à-vis Pakistan. Most significantly, the archipelagic states serve the interest of Indians better than any other state in the Indo-pacific region.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁶ Maherbaanali Sheliya and Hitakshi Joshi, "India's Maritime Wall in the Indo-Pacific Region," (The Sigma Iota Rho (SIR) Journal of International Relations, July 1, 2019), <http://www.sirjournal.org/research/2019/7/1/indias-maritime-wall-in-the-indo-pacific-region>.

Singapore is one of the most important entity residing with the Strait of Malacca and is of extreme essence for Indians, for which they had signed an India-Singapore Bilateral Agreement for Naval Cooperation in 2018 which allows providence of logistic support and refueling of Indian ships along the coast of Disputed South China Sea, Changi Naval Base of Singapore. While the Changi Naval Base makes strategic point in Necklace of Diamonds' that India is making for countering the Chinese strings of pearls¹¹⁷.

4.4. Construct of Horn of Africa and Red Sea RSCT and implications for Pakistan

For exerting influence across the globe and for retaining dominance, India has also been doing significant expansions in Africa, which was once called as a hopeless continent by the renowned Magazine, the Economist is now a center of trade for whole world. Major Powers like US and China are making inroads for fortifying relations within Africa and for holding a strong footing.¹¹⁸

The region within the Suez Canal and Seychelles has aroused as a novel hotspot because of its significant economic growth, emergence of new threats and croak to the new US-China rivalry. The ensuing rivalry has further enhanced the trajectory of region. The Babel Mandeb strait which resides at the center of the region links the energy rich Middle East to the hydrocarbon scarce Europe is deemed as a jugular vein for the world trade.

The region has remained evident to the growing rivalry between US and China vis-a-vis their growing and concurring interests. US, China, India and Japan hold a strong footing with their military bases established across the region while the Saudi Arabia and turkey are struggling for getting the military bases. Rivalries between the Middle Eastern powers are played over the countries like Eritrea and Sudan which are drawing exclusive benefits from these rivalries. The civil war in Yemen has provided an opportunity to the powers for projecting their presence more exclusively.

The stationing of posts across the region can prove to be detrimental in the implementation of CPEC for Pakistan in different aspects. The presence can negatively trade off the supplies and can hamper the enactment of CPEC.

¹¹⁷ <https://eurasianimes.com/from-singapores-changi-naval-base-to-omans-duqm-port-how-is-india-countering-chinese-string-of-pearls/>

¹¹⁸ Zineb Boujrada, "This Tiny Country Has the Most Foreign Military Bases", Culture Trip, March 16, 2018, <https://theculturetrip.com/africa/djibouti/articles/why-does-djibouti-have-the-most-foreign-military-bases/> . Accessed on November 5, 2020

4.5. Construct of South Africa and Mozambique Channel RSC and implication for Pakistan

US determination are clear that it wants exclusive control over Indian Ocean and have established a military port on Diego Garcia on the isolated land mass of Chagos archipelago in the Indian Ocean region.¹¹⁹ India is seeing itself as an autonomous entity however it has been seen drawing closer to the US politically. The Indian maritime policy remains autonomous and has revolved around four components; sea control, power projection ashore, presence and strategic deterrence. The significance of sea control is to make sure control and usage of sea line; supremacy prognosis is a subsection of this ability. Presence is more about peacetime exhibition of country's interest by ship visiting and exercising. Strategic dissuasion are the strategic competences of the country to keep similar abilities of probable rivals in check.¹²⁰

India has developed its first listening post across the Madagascar for keeping a check on the international trade and trends in 2007.¹²¹ In addition to that, there is a consensus amongst the policy makers of India and analysts that it is of vital interest for India to exert influence in enhancing regional maritime security efforts and they have deliberately shown greater exhilaration towards the increased efforts across the Africa for making a strong foothold in the region. The Indian greater focus over the African trajectory is due to the abundance of hydrocarbons and its growing significance. While the resource enriched countries are shifting their focus towards the Indian Ocean for attaining sustainable development and growth.

The increasing orientation of India towards the Africa was manifested in their Maritime strategy document in 2015. In that India has vocalized its greater focus towards the western side of Indian Ocean by employing a broad based security approach which is then being beefed by the frequent visits and by building capacity and assistance in economic and

¹¹⁹ Huma Amin, "United States Presence in Indian Ocean: Counter Strategy For China," Modern Diplomacy, January 14, 2020, <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/01/14/united-states-presence-in-indian-ocean-counter-strategy-for-china/>.

¹²⁰ Manoj Joshi, "India (Re)Discovers the Indian Ocean," Observer Research Foundation (ORF, August 23, 2019), <https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-rediscovers-the-indian-ocean-54684/>.

¹²¹ Manu Pubby, "India activates first listening post on foreign soil: radars in Madagascar" The Indian Express, July 18, 2007, <http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/india-activates-first-listening-post-onforeign-soil-radars-in-madagascar/205416/>. Accessed on October 30, 2019

military endeavors, by sharing naval intelligence, joint exercise, Naval hardware and logistic support and by the fostering the joint Training sessions.

Seeking the growing influence and presence of India towards the African countries will prove to be fatal to BRI of to which Pakistan is part. With their presence across the Africa, they can choke the main SLOs of trade that can hamper the CPEC significance negatively.

Conclusion

Pakistan is cognizant of its vast extended neighborhood in the Indian Ocean. With a great geostrategic location, Pakistan has always supported and extended the Chinese interest while receiving their assistance in almost every sphere ranging from technology to infrastructure. China and Pakistan have signed many agreements and are working side by side for the enhancing regional connectivity. An instance of this manner is great exhibition of BRI. Pakistan is hoping that CPEC will enhance Pakistan's capacity in every sphere and would help in catering the security dilemma while providing an extremely profitable returns. by taking China into the IOR. Pakistan has actually activated the balance of influence by brining China into IOR, the presence of China will swift other relevant states to pursue contradictory policies.

As a primary littoral state Pakistan has never been able to secure lucrative returns because of lack of concentration and flawed policies which has further hampered development of maritime in Pakistan. Further, the term maritime strategy is repeatedly cast-off and tacit in the military milieu only. And it is of no surprise that in Pakistan many people connect the maritime strategy and naval strategy. Besides, IOR has been evolving as a new theater for great power rivalry. In the proximate future it seems that Indian Ocean will be highly intensive to economic activities and the chances of military confrontation among the littoral are possible.

In the heated scenario CPEC being a game changer is being seen with great thought. India is fearing that CPEC will hurt its security and can enfold India on maritime and land, both. Moreover, Indian Ocean is feasible for India to continue its activities. Being one of the major stakeholders, trade and commerce activities are directly attached to the security of Indian Ocean and if not met India can incur great loss, thus the security of SLOCS and Other line of communication are of great importance for India to endure its influence and security. The security of SLOCS is ultimately attached to security of Indian Ocean, up till

now India is leading the security pattern of Indian Ocean whereas Pakistan has significantly lacked in number and strength of Naval resources. Indian navy being a powerful one is posing serious implication of Pakistan.¹²² With the coinciding and diversified interests of great powers there is still a chance of building common platforms for effective curtailment of conflicting factors. US-China rising tension have the propensity to add on the Internal Security problems via political volatility or affecting its socio-economic progress projects. With such an environment Pakistan should immediately diversify its policy by employing different approaches by working increasingly and positively while keeping the internal harmony strong. Pakistan being the neighbor of two powerful states, China and India, its proximity with these powers made it a very important Littoral state and directly exposed to the rivalry of both. With all this the threat remains the same, Pakistan has long been remained hostage to the Indian threat. Since both the states have attained nuclear power, the clouds of nuclear war still rambling though Pakistan has always remained in quest for balancing power with India. Pakistan necessitate to turn quickly to exploit on the existing and future budding of this ocean.

¹²² Muhammad Azam Khan, "AMAN 17 and Balance of Power in Indian Ocean," The News International, February 13, 2017, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/185949-AMAN-17-and-balance-of-power-in-Indian-Ocean>

CHAPTER FIVE

FUTURE SECURITY ARCHITECTURE OF IOR

The geopolitics of Indian Ocean apparently seems to be complex and is mostly being illustrated by resource conflict and by the struggle for influence. External powers, the bolstering economies of Asia and non-traditional threats like terrorism and extremism are shaping the orientation of geopolitics. Indian Ocean is actually a fenced ocean for which the only access is through choke points and that's the reason most of the countries are trying to secure and control the chokepoints. Most of the world industry's factor of production get supplied through it. Out of world's seven most significant choke points, three of the them are located in Indian Ocean. These actually crates a bottleneck that further connects two pertinent waterways. If these choke pints get blocked, the substitute choke point are very far and are mostly expensive and are impossible for large freights to steer in the ocean.

- One of the first choke points that serves the most important supplies which is located between the Singapore, Malaysia and the Sumatra Island of Indonesia, which links the South east Asia and western pacific with Indian ocean.
- While the second one connects the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean and is known as Strait of Hormuz.
- Bab-el-Mandab connects the red and Indian ocean, and flows between the Djibouti and Eritrea in horn of Africa, and is third in row of chokepoints which flows in Indian Ocean.

Moreover, theirs Mozambique Channel flows between Madagascar and Mozambique and serves as the most vital trading route for goods shipping from Cape of Good Hope to the Middle East and Asia.¹²³If a maritime agency of a country has influence over the main chokepoint it would have a leverage to watch the entry and exit of the region. The presence near the main entry and exit point helps a nation to maintain dominance and helps in surveillance missions. The tracking mission along the entry and exit point helps in detecting the underneath submarine of enemy because in the open seas it's very

¹²³ Darshana M. Baruah, "What Is Happening in the Indian Ocean?," Carnegie, March 3, 2021, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/03/what-is-happening-in-indian-ocean-pub-83948>

problematic and affluent. However, a nation with having a strong foothold along the Indian Ocean can serve an instrumental role being the partner of littoral states across the coastline, straddling Africa, Asia and Middle East.

With the Indian ocean have gained currency and being the one of the most important trade routes, most of the regional and extra regional powers are now giving devotion to IOR region, thus making the geopolitical framework of IOR complex. The cold war has somehow defoliated the importance of Atlantic Ocean and thus the shift has made to Indian Ocean in post-cold war era. The emergence of China as aspirant super power and blustery socio-political environment has made the significance of IOR as vital for the world trade and has attracted the world attention towards it. Consequently, the security parameters in the IOR have been of great concern as the Somalian piracy is growing and the regional conflict in Persian Gulf is increasing along the main choke point moreover the IOR has got the potential to be the center for the global contestation and most importantly for commerce and trade.

5.1. US policy in IOR

In the last few years with the world shifting interest towards the Indian Ocean, the US has reinvigorated the Policy and has started to fortify its foot print across the region for effectively curtailing the increasing Chinese dominion, they have reiterated the concept of “Indo-Pacific”. As narrated by Kaplan, “it seems difficult to seize any option to incorporate China ‘s navy into international alliances because there is no such kind of understanding between US-China at sea for the stabilization of world politics in the twenty-first century.”¹²⁴

The structural and policy impairments will retain the IOR split in the US foreign policy lens for creating their sway across the region. There are high chances that US will keep the IOR as launching pad for their activities of countering terrorism and extremism in the region and will tends to make a secondary arena for deepening the competition with the aspirant power China. However, the bolstering tensions between the US and Iran will definitely compel US for focusing on the northwest crook of the region.

¹²⁴ Kaplan, “*Monsoon*”, 28.

The US IOR policy is vocalized as ‘Indo-Asia-Pacific’. This policy directive reflects that either disregard the region or mix it with rather else. This policy directive reflects that IOR as an arena for a larger geostrategic skirmish or a route to somewhere worth. The US Navy strike forces that ply the Indian Ocean to reach the strategically vital Persian Gulf are the most visible symbol of the latter.¹²⁵

It is being contended that US can go to larger length for containing China and will eventually weaken it to the ground that China would never be a threat for US in ruling the IOR and Asia pacific. Precisely, US is probably tending to take China as they have acted with USSR during the Cold war.

The US commitments with India are growing exponentially and are expected to make a great deal to contain China in every sphere. They have been in relation for about two decades spanning about dour of the US administration. While the Biden administration will be the fourth one to proceeding the trail of conjunction.

5.2. Chinese Policy in IOR

China being the primary state and stakeholders in the IOR and holds a major manifestation in the region, and the Chinese aims in the post-cold war scenario as per their national strategic approach were to remain embroiled in land, maritime and energy security of the region. Moreover, it’s the 2nd largest consumer of oil in the world of which mist of oil is imported from gulf and provide about 54.8%¹²⁶. The veracity had led to the conception of two major foreign policy contours that are often cited by India as the reason for containing China in IOR.

- The first of the reason is ‘Malacca Dilemma, the term used by the then President of China Hu Jintao in 2003 for explaining the plan that how trade from Malacca¹²⁷ can regressive put down the transport cost and time if they would get to trade from there.

¹²⁵ “America’s Indian Ocean Strategy,” International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) <https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2017/americas-indian-ocean-strategy> , October 2017.

¹²⁶ Zhang, Z.X. (2011). China’s Energy Security, The Malacca Dilemma and Responses. Energy Security. Vol.39

¹²⁷ Chen, S. (2010). China’s Self Extrication from the “Malacca Dilemma” and Implications. International Journal of China Studies, Vol.1(1)

- 2nd reason for which India is behind the China is there ‘String of Pearls,’ policy which projects the Chinese heavily influenced islands and ports located in the primary littoral states of IOR.¹²⁸

With the Chinese development of antipiracy mission, it has emerged as a befitting partner for most of the country’s adjunct to ocean and were prone to Piracy. The maritime Silk Road underneath the BRI has provided them the already intense platform for cooperation in military and economic endeavors. The establishment of Chinese military base in the Djibouti in Indian Ocean has cemented the Chinese aspiration for becoming global power. Being one of the influential actors and having great trade transit from ocean, China is optimally increasing its activities and presence both in fortifying naval capabilities and building infrastructure in coastal States and along the ocean. While having a greater amount of trade from oceanic ways, China pursues to install its naval ships for curbing piracy in Indian Ocean. Since the last decade with the increasing presence, China has kept focus onto installation of port infrastructure, facilities and military establishment along the Indian Ocean.

China has installed its first military base in Djibouti, and has also developed a chain of maritime ports in every breadth and length of ocean from Kenya (Mombasa) to Malaysia. For making influence across the length and breadth of Indian Ocean, Chinese have installed and have signed agreement of varying nature across the ocean including Kenya, Sudan, Pakistan, Maldives, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Cambodia and Malaysia. It is of no surprise that Chinese defense budget since last 2 decades has been surging to a greater level and has increased its 2021 defense budget by 6.8 percent.¹²⁹ Seeking the Indian influence and now the Chinese installation across the ocean, Chinese policy makers are seeking for naval presence in any form for protecting and projecting their interest. We can seek from the available data and statements from the analyst, it can be sought that China is up for making an Indian Ocean force. However, China won’t make a force rather it will develop capability for deterring the states to greater level that are

¹²⁸ Khurana, G. (2008). China’s String of Pearls in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications. Strategic Analysis, Vol.32(1)

¹²⁹ Liu Xuanzun, “China Hikes Defense Budget by 6.8 % in 2021, Faster than 6.6% Growth Last Year,” *Global Times*, March 5, 2021. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1217416.shtml>

threatening the Chinese sea lines of communication¹³⁰.

Chinese priority will definitely reside with securing the energy security threats for their SLOCs extending from gulf to South China Sea. However, seeing its inferior position comparative to US thus they will seek to deploy the “harmonious sea” slant. Moreover, for effectively managing the threat factor of US and India China will project its power but will also actively work to generate substitute energy supply routes, innocuous from US and Indian encounters.

5.3. Indian Policy in IOR

India being the primary littoral state in Indian Ocean is perceiving China as greater threat under. A broad narrative is being seen and vocalized from the India’s strategic thinkers and bureaucrats that Chinese endeavor along the Indian ocean is exclusive threat to Indian security. For curtailing the Chinese dominance in the region, India is seeking for balance of power and is tending to go towards the US for establishing partnership in different sphere. Moreover, it is also deepening its ties with regional power and peripheries for growing cooperation, Comprising IOR countries such as Australia and Indonesia, as well as others outside the IOR, such as Japan and Vietnam

5.4. Russian ambitions in IOR

As of now, Russia didn’t have published its maritime framework for IOR, however the counts of analysis and publication tends to describe some of clues about their possible strategies. They have never mentioned the IOR particularly but have focused on the region within like that south Asia, Middle East and Africa.

Conceivably, the exemplary explanation of Russian regional strategy can be found in their maritime policy of 2015, which illustrates the IOR as their mainstream primacies in maritime sphere. The doctrine has listed the following points as most pertinent of all;¹³¹

- Fortification of affairs with India
- Intensifying the Russian maritime and trade activities in area.

¹³⁰. Christopher Colley, “War on the Rocks,” War on the Rocks, April 2, 2021, <https://warontherocks.com/2021/04/a-future-chinese-indian-ocean-fleet/>.

¹³¹ Alexey Muraviev, “The Interpreter,” The Interpreter, March 15, 2021.

<https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/russia-wants-be-power-be-reckoned-indian-ocean>

- While enforcing the Strategy through a combination of elements, by resorting to naval presence and by having good relations with other regional states.

In the overall course of study, Russian interest are not extravagant rather they are for securing a smaller yet strategically imperative portion of the world for retaining its presence. Russia has been intensifying its relation since 2017, Russia had entered into bilateral defense agreement with most of the key stakeholders in IOR. Whereas some of the states have given port accession rights to Russia for the operation while some have given their air space for conducting space operation.

According to one of the publications, Russia has pursued the Egypt, Eritrea, Mozambique and Madagascar for building a military base, moreover Russia has also signed deal with Sudan for new naval renewal facility for over twenty five years in 2020.¹³² It is being said that Russia has no high aims for countering the US and China rather it is promoting itself for an alternate sphere of influence. While seeking for relations Russia had pursued their rich heritage for tackling the Indian Ocean nation which they have buttressed in anti-colonial scuffle.

In addition to the Russian struggle over waters, Russian hybrid warfare campaign is growing exponentially with its private military contractors installed in many African nations where they are training the locals, promoting Russian interest and are safeguarding the Russian businesses and combating the local threats. There is consensus that Russian govt. will swiftly rely over to their private mercenaries for promoting interest and making proxies in Africa if the relation with US continues to worsen.

Russian interest in the IOR is only to contain US increasing dominion however it will softly strive with China by promoting its interest and agenda through international forums like BRICS and SCO. Apparently, the role of Russian is less visible but it surmounts and it has entered the IOR as a main factor for influencing the geopolitics and strategic matters of IOR.¹³³

¹³² Muraviev, "Russia"

¹³³ Muraviev, "Russia"

5.5. Choices for Small and Middle Powers

In the fight of bulls some get rewarded while some gets bruises, in the completion of great powers few of the states gets benefitted while some of states gets adversely affected with it. However, this competition will definitely give a boom to the underdeveloped countries i.e., small and medium powers. US being perceived as an extra regional power and most of the states are reluctant to join hands with it because they fear making China their adversary. However, some of the states don't want to get embroiled in this competition rather they urge to maintain good relation with the two giants. The middle and small powers believed it a leverage to get assisted by both the giants for future developments. The states lying within desires for maintaining good relation but are constrained by their proximity with China and are then dwell upon China for assistance. Some of the smaller states are of consensus that we feel opportunity to negotiate our choices with great powers.

The worldly focus on the IOR has given rise to many of the openings for collaboration. During the course of these transformations old partnerships will vanishes away with the arrival of new endeavors. The states lying within the sphere should try to deepen their relations and must foster the collaborative approach for getting lucrative returns. It is rally imperative to note that the activeness of small and medium powers will foster cooperation and harmony in the region. Multilateral arrangements offer a prospect for alliance without the advent of picking sides.

CONCLUSION

It is of no doubt that the 21st century is coming up with new endeavors over to blue water economy and certainly the fortune of the world is indissolubly devoted to the maritime commons. However, a significant surge is to be seen along IOR. Indian Ocean, being at the crossroads and more at the strategic front will get the main share of rivalries and is going to be the resident of manifold encounters. Hence making the Indian Ocean a noteworthy water body in 21st century. Since the region has gained currency in the blue water politics, it has become a theater for the internal and external power. The repository of Indian Ocean has major economic, political and security imperatives for the entire world. Moreover, Indian Ocean being the center of world's attention is also a global route which encompasses oil and energy supplies backbone of international political economy.

With every passing day Indian Ocean is becoming an arena for great power politics, there exist various rivals for attaining subsistent influence and are orchestrating the policies likewise. China, India and US being the eminent political powers in the Indian Ocean, are resorting to different strategies for gaining control and maximizing their turf of influence. US is trying to maintain its supremacy and control by employing the Indo-Pacific strategy in IOR. This move has prompted several other states particularly China and India who do not want lagging behind, Indian ambitions are clear with gaining active role in every faction. China is aspiring to become a great power and a main player in the IOR. Both the emerging powers in IOR have acquired a considerable amount of assets across the ocean and are hoping to gain control of important SLOCs in future. However, the Geo strategic settings are still in the process of development. Whilst the present settings depict those three main powers involved in gaining influence have their own urgencies with having propensity for conflict. However, this may not seem feasible for the powers and to the establishment of peace and prosperity.

With the coinciding and diversified interests of great powers there is still a chance of building common platforms for effective curtailment of conflicting factors. Pakistan being the neighbor of two powerful states, China and India, its proximity with these powers made it a very important Littoral state and directly exposed to their rivalry. With all this the threat remains the same, Pakistan has long been remained hostage to the Indian threat. Since both

the states are nuclear powered, the clouds of nuclear war still rambling, though Pakistan has always remained in quest for balancing power with India in South Asia. Pakistan necessities to turn quickly to exploit on the existing and future budding of this ocean.

Findings

- In the International politics of 21st century, IOR has central role owing to increased volume of trade and energy through vital SLOCs within IOR. The IOR is becoming the center of gravity for International Politics and politics has been shifting from Pacific and Atlantic to Indian Ocean.
- By employing the theory of regional security complex theory given by Buzan and Waver, it is deduced that the security dynamics making the region turbulent are due to social construct of security dynamics by regional and global power; for instance, Malaccan dilemma and Strings of Pearls by China while the shift from Asia Pacific to Indo-pacific and Act Water Wards project by US and India.
- Growing Chinese presence in IOR under the ambit of String of Pearl strategy has entirely transformed the security patterns of RSCs in the region. Thus, the growing involvement of China in South Asia has proved the prevailing stature of China as a penetrating external agent in RSC of South Asia. There are at least five Regional Security Complex, can be identified within the IOR. In IOR, both extra regional actors and the regional actors are frolicking their part to securitize the region for getting their own objective achieved. The propensity of states in making the region securitized and interplay of various players in this construct may have serious security implications whole region and, particularly Pakistan owing to its close affinity with China.
- From pivot to Asia to Indo-Pacific strategy all were primarily envisaged to curtail the Chinese rising influence vis-à-vis holding strong footing in Asia. The policy document released by the Trump administration in 2018 was reckoned at undermining the Chinese rising influence and to stall their economy from getting to first. Whereas the Chinese have somehow made efforts to curtail the policies envisaged under Indo-pacific strategy. However, in Pakistan a very little consideration is given to it on strategical level, though the analysts have reckoned

it as the Security threat to Pakistan as well. The key article of the Indo-pacific strategy is to beef up India as the main counterpart to China. The tagline of Indo-pacific strategy is “A strong India, in cooperation with like-minded countries, would act as a counter balance to China,” and for this, US is building a strong framework of foundation with India in defense and economy. Hence the building cooperation of US and India will eventually be a threat to Pakistan’s Security and conventional balance between Pakistan and India will certainly be disturbed. Hence, it can lead towards an intensified arm race between the two nuclear powers of South Asia.

- Though the Indo-Pacific strategy is China centric but its implementation will eventually pose severe security implication for Pakistan. For two particular reasons the strategy would pose security implications for Pakistan; first, the strategy gives arch-rival India the opportunity to modernized and upgrade its navy, second the strategy is basically centered of on the concept of curbing increasing Beijing presence in the Indian Ocean, a close partner of Pakistan
- Change in Foreign policy of major and regional powers within the IOR are visible. US and India are emerging as strategic partner in the IOR. A broad narrative is being seen and vocalized from India’s strategic thinkers that Chinese endeavors along the IOR are an exclusive threat to Indian security. In order to seek balance of power within the IOR, India is establishing strategic partnership with US.

Recommendations

- The proximity of Pakistan lies very close to Arabian Sea and is really close to the Strait of Hormuz in IOR. Withstanding the fact that Pakistan is one of fortunate countries having such geographical proximity of greater significance, but as of now it has neither capitalized its placement nor has established an inclusive Policy for maritime domain. Pakistan should interpret the geographical location of region well and should contemplate being a smaller power in the region that they would want to pursue the rivalry-oriented pursuits or collaborative approach for effective curtailment of issues in IOR.

- Pakistan being the most involved partner of BRI, out of the two components Land and Maritime, Pakistan has been with maritime factor but didn't yet have made the Policy Directives for this, Pakistan should make a robust and well-connected Policy for the effective Curtailment of Capitalization being done and the way thorough. The growing Indo-US strategic partnership is strengthening Indian naval presence in the IOR, which can prove to be alarming for Pakistan as India has already shown its displeasure on CPEC, being part of an anti-Chinese strategy India can sabotage CPEC through proxies. In order to counter such a threats Pakistan, need a comprehensive policy and strategy in the maritime domain.
- CPEC is vital to Pakistan's economy as its economy is dwindling and in destitute form, CPEC can prove to be a game changer for Pakistan's economy but firstly Pakistan's needs to create a Holistic yet well-versed security strategy to counter any future external and internal security threats. For that Pakistan needs to strengthen naval cooperation and coordination with China in the maritime sector.
- Though one of primary Littoral state of IOR, Pakistan is living in kind of isolation as it has not yet acquired membership in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). On the other hand, India is one of the key member states of IORA. Islamabad needs to revisit its IOR policy as lack of involvement in such regional forums are further intensifying the already isolated form of Pakistan. Moreover, acquiring membership in the IORA would put Pakistan in a good position to develop cooperation with other important littoral states of IOR. Moreover, it should envisage partnerships with the mainstream countries and should extend its support to the regional stature.
- In the vision of 2025, published by India, they have vocalized that their presence should be felt across the nook and corner of Indian Ocean pertinent choke points i.e., Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea. With these struggles India has attained secured ties with US and has inked an agreement called LEMOA (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement). However, Pakistan is lacking the policy for long which in turn is affecting adversely and therefore has been left with no choice but to adopt a more dynamic yet robust approach for countering the balance of power.

- India has adopted a series of comprehensive maritime doctrines along with a Maritime Security Strategy which have necessitated the militarization of important maritime choke points, whereas in contrast to India Pakistan didn't have such framework to pursue or to take guide from for positioning in IOR. Furthermore, Islamabad doesn't have any holistic framework for establishing sway and to check emerging trends in IOR. In order to balance arch rival in the maritime domain Pakistan need a comprehensive maritime doctrine.
- If compared with the Indian navy, Pakistan's navy is explicitly asymmetric, India is having the fifth largest navy with an operational aircraft carrier, whilst when we look at the plight of Pakistan's navy it is far smaller than the Indian navy and have almost no indigenously built crafts and is reliant on French-Built submarine force and US-supplied Harpoons and Anti-ship missiles. The Indian building of a nuclear-powered submarine has further exacerbated to the Pakistan's Maritime tensions, and had upsets the balance of power between two arch-rivals. Pakistan's navy is consistently building up its Fighting arm and is reforming the naval structure by employing modernization which is a must thing for achieving vested interest. Whereas the Indian navy is gradually stirring to attain mechanization and advancements in naval capabilities. In order to balance Indian naval power Pakistan must strengthen its naval cooperation not only with immediate friend China but with other maritime powers including France, Russia and UK. Apart from developing harmonious relations with other states Pakistan need a special focus on its naval arms industry.
- While taking into account the exponentially growing interests and influence of regional and extra regional powers in IOR, Pakistan needs an offensive yet well versed naval strategy which will not only make pack navy capable of making self-sustained operations but to help its partners in the region. For the realization of such a strategy there is a dire need of focusing on the maritime security by acquiring influence in the IOR through both political and naval diplomacy.
- The Pakistan's grant of Gwadar port to be operated by China can ease out the exaggerating concern of Indian naval advancement and presence across the IOR.

Moreover, the operationalization of Gwadar will definitely beef up the Pakistan's offensive strategy. While considering US posture of connecting to CARs through Pakistan and Afghanistan it is high time for Pakistan to build up nuclear powered Submersible Ship with Ballistic Missile (SSBN) submarines from Russia, China or Germany to maintain the balance of power in the region.

- China is opting to go for the offshore naval development and is flatterer as potential blue water navy for safeguarding its interest and trade routes. But neither Pakistan's endeavors are ambitious nor does it have the maritime security needs as that of China. Thus, the noteworthy guide for Pakistan is that it must make a coherent policy keeping in view the national and core interests. Coincidence of interest can also enhance the military assistance between the both the states.
- While taking into account the geopolitical and regional importance, Pakistan must reside only to have a good relation with regional powers but to others as well like Russia, Turkey and Germany. Taking into account the Confined Strategic Depth of Pakistan it must try to get the SSBN for a triad second strike capability from Germany, China or Russia.
- As of the regional wave going, Pakistan must uphold its friendship with China and must take other measures for assuring the Security measures of choke points and must take up good relations with Neighboring Countries like Iran for seeking a lot more guidance. More exertions should be thru to attain information regarding Indian Navy submarines maneuvers and operational doctrine for exploitation.
- A focused group in foreign office must be formed for concentrating over the orientation and endeavors along IOR and to keep a sharp eye over the transitions occurring along the region and must act accordingly.

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