



THESIS AND DEFENCE APPROVAL FORM

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Thesis Title: **INDIA'S GROWING INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN IN POST 9/11 ERA: SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN**

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DEDICATION

With utmost devotions, I dedicated my whole work to my beloved and affectionate Parents, Better Half, Brothers, Friends and Respected Staff of International Relations Department who have always been source of encouragement, knowledge, illumination and wisdom for me, whose pray and guidance showed me the right path and made the blessing of God shower on me.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANA	Afghan National Army
BEIC	British East India Company
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CPEC	China Pakistan Economic Corridor
DIIS	Danish Institute for International Studies
DNI	Director of National Intelligence
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organization
EEU	Eurasian Economic Union
IEEE	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
KKP	Khyber Pukhtunkhwa
NDS	National Directorate of Security
RAW	Research and Analysis Wing
WoT	War on Terror
SAARC	South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation
TTP	Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan
USD	U.S. Dollar

ABSTRACT

The US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 is considered as a turning point in the politics of Afghanistan with special context to Pakistan and India. Pakistan and India both jumped into the race of joining US global war on terror (WOT) and gaining the status of most friendly nation of US. India manipulated the happenings in Afghanistan in its favor by increasing its physical, diplomatic, economic and socio-cultural presence in the war-torn country and tried to manipulate the situation in its anti-Pakistan stance. Owing to its bilateral cleavages, ethnic differences, border clash, and Pashtunistan factor, Afghanistan strongly cooperated with India in destabilizing Pakistan from the two fronts of border. The theory of soft power is the appropriate theory regarding the underlying problem and provided the best scenario to understand the India usage of developmental and infrastructural projects in Afghanistan to increase its influence to damage the Pakistan's image and sovereignty with ease. Regional actors and specially US strongly recommended and appreciated India's role in Afghanistan at the expense of Pakistan, which directly went into India's favour to increase the maneuverings in Afghanistan vis-à-vis Pakistan. This research aims at specifically elucidating India's intentions to manipulate the 9/11 event to pursue its anti-Pakistan agenda. It evaluates the Indian efforts to defame and disrepute Pakistan associating it with Islamic militancy, fundamentalism and terrorism and especially how India pampered Afghanistan through soft penetration to win the hearts of Afghan youth and the society. The important point in this research is to emphasize on Pakistan's security apprehension with Indian presence in the very next bordering country that has ethnic, religious and cultural similarities.

INTRODUCTION

Afghanistan is a landlocked country at the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East. Owing to its significant geostrategic location it remained vital to the great powers like Britain, Soviet Russia and USA. Afghanistan is a buffer state with Rocky Mountains and rough environment. Its mountainous existence and rugged terrain provided a safe haven for rebels, guerrillas and terrorists throughout. The 9/11 attacks on US twin towers turned the US foreign policy towards focusing on Afghanistan as a hub of terrorism and its networks. US waged a war in Afghanistan with the objective of eradicating the terrorist Al Qaeda and its related networks. Pakistan and India both jumped for supporting US war on terror particularly in Afghanistan. At that time US policy towards South Asia was very centric and Pakistan became a Non-NATO ally of US war on terrorism. US placed its bases in Pakistan and used its territory for the transportation of military and logistic supply through NATO. Since, Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan also shifted from pro-Taliban to anti-Taliban, which took the ire of different Islamic parties of Pakistan. India took the advantage of rifts between domestic parties and government and under the garb of development and reconstruction in Afghanistan massively aided rebellious factions of Pakistan operating in Afghanistan. Pakistan faced serious security implications after joining this war on terror. Pakistan suffered an extensive wave of terrorist attacks, suicide bombing, violence, target killing, kidnapping and heavy bloodshed throughout the country. Pakistan not only in security realm but also paid a huge cost economically, politically and diplomatically after Indian involvement in Afghanistan after the incident of 9/11.

The politics of South Asia is deeply connected with each other's security concerns. Pak-Afghan relations remained intact to the Indian context. India deemed itself a great power

of South Asia and since its independence it had been engaged in making amicable foreign relations with Afghanistan. The objectives of Indian foreign policy in Afghanistan were not limited to South Asia rather they were beyond its horizons. India ensured strong foothold in Afghanistan for using it as a transit route to reach resourceful Central Asian states. Indian foreign policy in Afghanistan with the context of Pakistan remained inimical. India tried to manipulate every single moment; be it an ethnic conflict, political ambiguity or cultural divide and infiltrated insurgency in Pakistan through Afghanistan's soil that aggravated already strained relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 provided India an opportunity to destabilize Pakistan diplomatically, politically and economically and tend to forge amicable relations with Karzai government. The post 9/11 war provided an open ground to India to entrap Afghanistan through soft power tactics and poured an extensive amount of aid, money and social assistance to maneuver the happenings against Pakistan. Under the garb of reconstruction of war-torn country of Afghanistan, India made Afghanistan totally dependent on Indian aid and donated worth \$2 billion since 2001. India became the fifth largest donor of Afghanistan globally and top donor regionally which dismantled all the barriers for India to have a greater role in Afghanistan. India helped Afghanistan in education sector, health, construction of roads, bridges, construction of electricity transmission lines, women empowerment, vocational training etc. The important projects which India started in Afghanistan are building of Kabul's new parliament building, construction of 218-km long highway road of Zaranj-Delaram, construction of hydropower project at Salma Dam at a cost of \$180 million and provision of 500 scholarships on an annual basis to Afghan students.

Besides the developmental agenda, India remained proactive with the objective of manipulating Afghanistan's territory against Pakistan. India fueled terrorism from Afghanistan across the border in Pakistan's restive areas of Baluchistan and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa. Indian intention was to engage Pakistan towards its western border to divert its attention from the Kashmir issue. Pakistan was of the view that India funneled nationalism in Afghanistan on the lines of Pashtun movement and manipulated the Pashtun sentiments among the people straddling between Pak Afghan borders. It used its embassy and consulates as training camps for nurturing and supporting Pakistani rebels in Baluchistan and KPK. India played its role to debilitate Pakistan's trade with Afghanistan in a robust manner and through propaganda hindered every coordination between the two Muslim neighbours that might normalize their relations.

India indoctrinated Afghan refugees returning from Pakistan and recruited them in their secret intelligence agencies. India also used scholarships to lure Afghan students into the Indian sphere of influence vis-à-vis Pakistan. Indian embassies poured massive money to Pakistani rebels and trained them to attack Pakistan's important installations, which Pakistan faced courageously. Indian Bollywood film industry played an important role in distorting Pakistan's image in the minds of Afghanistan by depicting Pakistani heroes as terrorist and inimical to Afghan interests. India even posed the non-traditional security threats to Pakistan and sowed the seeds of water controversy between Pakistan and Afghanistan which gravely affected water volumes of river flowing in Pakistan from Afghanistan. India perpetrated cross border rebel crossings, held criminal and illegal trafficking between Pakistan and Afghanistan and instigated short skirmishes between Pakistan and Afghanistan which pushed Pakistan to close its border from Afghan side several

times.

This research examined the Indian presence and influencing role in Afghanistan through politically, culturally and diplomatically by using soft power tactics. It also elucidated the objectives and mechanisms of Indian foreign policy execution in Afghanistan. The focus of this research was to highlight the implications of Indian soft power penetration in Afghanistan and its security implications for Pakistan. It presented a thorough analysis of Pakistan's concerns and insecurities with Indian involvement in Afghanistan after the incident of 9/11. The research work also made efforts to outline the array of options through which Pakistan can handle the security risks that India posed with its anti-Pakistan agenda in Afghanistan.

Statement of the Problem

After 9/11 India seized the opportunity of US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, India started investing in development and reconstruction of war torn country. Since 2001, India gave worth 2 billion USD of aid to Afghanistan and engaged in making of roads, buildings, hospitals, and electricity transmission lines, Dams, Schools, and Universities etc. India also ensured its diplomatic presence in Afghanistan and opened its embassy in Kabul in 2003 and consulates in different cities. Pakistan was wary of India's huge investment and presence in Afghanistan. Pakistan deemed Indian influence in Afghanistan as a tactic to encircle Pakistan in the region and nurturing an aggressive and hostile neighborhood in its western border to destabilize Pakistan. This research is aimed at examining the Indian foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan with special context to Pakistan. The purpose of this research is also to highlight Pakistan's internal insecurities as well as external difficulties by Indian growing influence in Afghanistan and to unveil the motives and interests of Indian growing influence

in Afghanistan.

Hypothesis

Indian ambitions in Afghanistan to penetrate through soft power tactics are creating reservations in Pakistan vis-à-vis its security concerns. It is argued that Pakistan suspects Indian presence in Afghanistan as a tactic to create vulnerabilities for Pakistan's security concerns as well as to dominate regional architecture further squeezing Pakistan's role as a regional and international actor.

Objectives of Research

This study aims to find out the following objectives:

- To elucidate the objectives of Indian foreign policy towards Afghanistan in post9/11 era.
- To understand Indian strategy to execute its foreign policy in Afghanistan.
- To evaluate the security implications to Pakistan as a consequence of Indian growing presence in Afghanistan.
- To find out the prospects of improved Pak-Afghan relations with special context to India.

Literature Review

Dr. Saroj Kumar Rath in his article "Asia's Changing History: India's Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan" pictured the relations between India and Afghanistan from the beginning of 300 BC period. Alexander the Great's General 'Seleucus' gifted a large part of Gandhara (Afghanistan), up to Herat and Kabul, to Chandragupta Maurya (340-298 BC), who was the ruler of Mauryan Indian Empire.¹ Huma Qayum, Zahir Shah & Jan Alam in

¹Saroj Kumar Rath, "Asia's Changing History: India's Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan." *Asian and African Studies* 22, no. 2 (2013).

their article, “Afghanistan in the Historical Perspective”, narrated about the historical linkages between India and Afghanistan under the Mughal Empire. They said that the Mughal emperor, Zaheerudin Babur expanded his territory towards Northern India, ruled out Lodhi dynasty of Afghan origin (1451-1526) from India, which have great historical influence in indo-Afghan relations.²The relations between Afghanistan and British India had always been monetary oriented in which British India had always played a role of donor and subsidizer country to Afghanistan. These subsidies were mostly to cushion India against any provocative aggression of Russian territorial expansion. In the article Frontier “Fanaticism” and State, Violence in British India Elizabeth Kolsky says that the British India made policy of separating Afghanistan into smaller communities between 1876-80, to ensure influence over Afghanistan and used massive flow of Indian currency into Afghanistan to transfer Afghanistan into a ‘fiscal colony’ of Britain.³

The British India signed different treaties with Afghanistan to assuage the frosty relations between them and ensured the control of Afghan foreign policy. Dr. Jayasree Nath in his article “Significance of Afghanistan in India’s foreign policy” says that Afghanistan served as a buffer state between the Anglo-Russia rivalries and succumbed to British India to serve as a buffer state after the two Anglo-Afghan wars of 1839-42 and 1878-1881.⁴

Masato Toriya in the article “Afghanistan as a Buffer State between Regional Powers in the Late Nineteenth Century: An Analysis of Internal Politics Focusing on the Local Actors and the British Policy” states that the demise of Amir Sher Ali in 1879 raised his son,

²Huma Qayum, Zahir Shah, and Jan Alam. "Afghanistan in the Historical Perspective." *Global Economics Review* 2, no. 1 (2017): pp. 46-53.

³Elizabeth Kolsky. "The colonial rule of law and the legal regime of exception: Frontier “fanaticism” and state violence in British India." *The American Historical Review* 120, no. 4 (2015): pp.1218-1246.

⁴Jayasree Nath. "Significance of Afanistan in India’s Foreign Policy." *Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews* 7, no. 4 (2019): pp. 472-476.

Amir Yaqub Khan to the throne and he signed Treaty of Gandamak with Indian British government on May 1879, which halted the first phase of 2nd Anglo-Afghan war.⁵

Avinash Paliwal in article, “Securing Afghanistan: Historic Sources of India's Contemporary Challenge”, says that Britain made Treaty of Gandamak’ with Khan of Kalat for taking owner of territory of Baluchistan.⁶ British India even maintained the control of Afghan foreign policy even after its independence. As stated in the journal of Special Edition of Viewpoints, “Afghanistan, 1979-2009: In the Grip of Conflict” that even after the downfall of monarchy in Afghanistan in 1929, it restored again with the help of British India in 1930.⁷

Talal Hassan in “Afghanistan complex Situation and its Implications on Pakistan” discusses about the challenges and difficulties of British demarcation plans. It also highlighted the implications and territorial problems Pakistan faced in the wake of complex British division of the territories.⁸ Soon after the independence of Pakistan, India courted Afghanistan at its side and instigated Pashtunistan issue in the areas straddling Durand line. Larry Hanauer and Peter Chalk in article “India’s and Pakistan’s Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United States and the Afghanistan against Pakistan” says that owing to the historic enmity towards Pakistan, India had always been engaged in instigating Pashtun nationalism against Pakistan in Pashtun dominated areas straddling with Durand line. India also exploited the Durand line controversy between Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1949 to an extent that numerous short skirmishes had been viewed after the

⁵Masato Toriya. "Afghanistan as a Buffer State Between Regional Powers." *Patterns of Human Mobility in Eurasia*, pp. 49-62. Hokkaido Slavic-Eurasian Research Center, 2014.

⁶Avinash Paliwal. "Securing Afghanistan: Historic Sources of India's Contemporary Challenge." *ORD Occasional Paper# 43* (2013).

⁷Arif Rafiq and Asfandyar Mir, “Introduction to Afghanistan, 1979-2009: In the Grip of Conflict,” Middle East Institute, November 17, 2020.

⁸Talal Hassan, "*Afghanistan Complex Situation and its Implications on Pakistan*", (2009), pp. 2-8.

tense relations between the two neighboring states. According to Larry Hanauer and Peter Chalk after the division of subcontinent, India fully supported the Afghan irredentist claims on the NWFP and tribal areas of Pakistan and made amicable relations with the successive governments of Afghanistan to exploit this lacuna between Pakistan and Afghanistan.⁹

The friendship treaty between India and Afghanistan soon after the independence of Pakistan served as a catalyst in differentiation of Afghanistan's relations vis-à-vis Pakistan and India. According to Qandeel Siddique in her DIIS Report "Pakistan's Future Policy toward Afghanistan: A look at strategic depth, militant movement and the role of India and the US". Kabul had remained in the Indian orbit which was evident by the signing of friendship treaty between Kabul and British India in 1950.¹⁰

Similarly, another author indicated towards historical relationship between India and Afghanistan. Sumit Ganguly in his article *India's role in Afghanistan* says that India had enjoyed excellent relations with Afghanistan during the reign of King Zahir Shah(1933-1973).¹¹ India exploited its historical relations with Afghanistan against Pakistan after the division of subcontinent and tried its best to contain Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan. India also had a deep eye on the natural resources of Afghanistan for which it invested massively in Afghanistan to become the sole arbitrator of Afghan resources. In the journal "India–Afghanistan Strategic Relations in the Post-Taliban Period" by Rajan Jha says that, the prime motive of India in Afghanistan was to curtail Pakistan's influence in the war-torn country and increased its hegemony in the country. Owing to the important geo strategic

⁹ Larry Hanauer, and Peter Chalk. "India's and Pakistan's Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United States and the Region." (2012).

¹⁰ Qandeel Siddique, "Pakistan's Future Policy Toward Afghanistan" (Copenhagen, Denmark: DIIS, 2011), pp. 1-72.

¹¹ Sumit Ganguly , "India's Role in Afghanistan ," *CIDOB Policy Research Project*, 2012

location of Afghanistan, India looked it as a gateway to the resourceful Central Asian states and also craved for Afghanistan's untapped natural resources, which had abundant quantity of copper and iron ore deposits.¹² These close relations between India and Afghanistan provided the immense opportunity to India to maneuver Pashtunistan issue between the two neighboring Muslim countries. Pakistan also took the hard stance as a result of Indian maneuverings in Afghanistan in the shape of Pashtunistan issue. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh in his article "South Asia and Afghanistan: The Robust India-Pakistan Rivalry" says that Pakistan criticized India and Afghanistan on their nexus in sabotaging Pakistan by funneling the issues of Durand Line and Kashmir.¹³ Pakistan also took some active steps diplomatically to quell the insurgency funneled by India in both the countries of Pakistan and Afghanistan in terms of Pashtunistan issue.

Surendra Chopra in his article "Afghan Pakistan Relations: The Pashtunistan Issue" highlights the visit of the then President of Pakistan in 1956 to Afghanistan and Afghan PM subsequent visit to Pakistan which contributed in the normalization of relations between the two hostile countries.¹⁴ Pakistan made some important bilateral agreements with Afghanistan to enhance the bilateral trade between the two states and decreased the Indian influence from Afghanistan in an efficient way. Marvin G. Weinbaum in his special report "Afghanistan and its neighbors: An ever dangerous neighborhood states that Pakistan signed transit trade agreement with Afghanistan in 1965, which updated the earlier 1958's accord between the two states and, two telecommunication links in the shape of Peshawar-Kabul and Quetta-

¹²Bhashyam Kasturi. "India's Role In Afghanistan." *Indian Defence Review*, 2012.

¹³ Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh. *South Asia and Afghanistan: The Robust India-Pakistan Rivalry*. PRIO, 2011.

¹⁴ Surendra Chopra. "Afghan Pakistan relations the Pakhtoonistan issue." *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 4 (1974):pp. 310-331.

Kandahar were also initiated between the two states.¹⁵

When Soviets intervened Afghanistan in 1979, India did not react on this intervention, which antagonized relations between Afghanistan and India. Despite the temporary rifts between India and Afghanistan due to the former's silence on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the war-torn country of Afghanistan was not in a position to continue these frosty relations with India. Paliwal in his book "My enemy's enemy: India in Afghanistan: From the Soviet Union to US withdrawal" highlighted 'the low ebb in relations between the two states of India and Afghanistan, when India did not react to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and also did not comply with the Afghanistan's aspirations in highlighting the Pashtunistan issue at global forums in this period.¹⁶

In Special Edition of Viewpoints "Afghanistan, 1979-2009: In the Grip of Conflict" Ruhollah Shaikhzada articulated that India was the first country which accepted the communist regime in Afghanistan and vowed to make amicable relations with the communist government. India diplomatically enhanced its visit in Afghanistan and also remained persistent in assuring its support to Afghan government even after the end of communist government in Afghanistan.¹⁷

In the era of Soviet Union of Afghanistan in 1979, India also remained engaged in making friendly ties with Communist governments of Afghanistan foisted by Soviets. Christine Fair in its report "India in Afghanistan and beyond: Opportunities and constraints" says that India made several agreements and protocols with various pro- soviet regimes in

¹⁵Marvin G Weinbaum. *Afghanistan and its neighbors: An ever dangerous neighborhood*. Vol. 31. United States Institute of Peace, 2006.

¹⁶ Avinash Paliwal. *My Enemy's Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion to the US Withdrawal*. Oxford University Press, 2017.

¹⁷Ruhollah Shaikhzada. "Viewpoints Special Edition Afghanistan, 1979-2009: In the Grip of Conflict," Scribd, 2009.

Kabul.¹⁸After the withdrawal of Soviet Union from Afghanistan, India made good relations with the newly Afghan government and its intelligence agency also collaborated with the Afghan intelligence agency to destabilize Pakistan.

In the book “India and the Dynamics of World Politics” by Reetika Sharma, Ramvir Gorla & Vivek Mishra says that the then PM Rajiv Gandhi collaborated with President Najibullah to destabilize Pakistan and active collaboration between R&W and KHAD was seen in keeping an eye on Pakistan secret agency ISI’s action. Indian pilots fought hand in hand with Najibullah’s forces against Mujahedeen in 1989 to solidify its government in Afghanistan, which was in the favor of India.¹⁹

From 1979 onwards until 1992, different events constrained India in making close relations with Afghanistan. As Frederic Grare in his article “Pakistan- Afghanistan relations in the post-9/11 era” talks about civil war of Afghanistan in 1992, which made internal split between Pakistani backed Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and all other parties. During this civil war, India supported whosoever opposed Pakistan. Taliban accession to power in 1996 banned foreign relations with Afghanistan. India soon became solid supporter of Northern alliance against Taliban.²⁰

Pakistan took the advantage of Indo-Afghan rifts and exploited the loopholes between these two countries. Pakistan made overtures in Central Asian states after the demise of Soviet Union through Afghanistan. Chapter 3 of “India relations with Afghanistan during cold war period (1947-1991)” stated the then PM Benazir Bhutto Pakistan’s PM Benazir

¹⁸Christine Fair, “India in Afghanistan and Beyond: Opportunities and Constraints,” *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2010, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1681753>.

¹⁹ Reetika Sharma, Vivek Mishra, and Ramvir Gorla. *India and the Dynamics of World Politics*. Pearson India, 2010.

²⁰ Frederic Grare, “Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations in the Post-9/11 ERA / Frandeaacute;Dandeaacute;Ric, Grare.,” *Policy Archive*, 2006, https://doi.org/10.2458/azu_acku_pamphlet_ds357_6_p18_g73_2006.

Bhutto severely criticized role of Rabbani government in Afghanistan and made amicable relations with Afghanistan to use it as a safe passage to reach newly emerged Central Asian states after the demise of Soviet Union.²¹

India even started to make relations with the Taliban regime to dismantle the nexus between Pakistan and Taliban and made overtures to court them towards Indian side. Dr. Jayasree Nath in the article “Significance of Afghanistan in India’s foreign policy” discussed the transition of relations between India and the Afghan Taliban. He says that, the hijacked plane landing in southern Afghanistan was an eye opening incident for India, which enhanced Indian attention towards gaining favor of Taliban to avoid further incidents like this one happened earlier.²²

Then comes the golden era of India in Afghanistan after USA invasion of Afghanistan and India grabbed this opportunity and fully diplomatically supported Afghanistan. Rajan Jha in the journal “India–Afghanistan Strategic Relations in the Post-Taliban Period” says that India actively participated in the Bonn conference in 2001 regarding Afghanistan’s future government and supported pro Indian Hamid Karzai as a president of Afghanistan. India also increased its pressure on Afghanistan and international forces to put pressure on Pakistan to stop supporting the militants in Indian Occupied Kashmir.²³

Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe in his strategic analysis paper “Pakistan’s Strategic and Foreign Policy Objectives” pointed out that, the India opened its four consulates in different cities in Afghanistan, which have been closed down since Taliban ascended to the power

²¹ Fahmida Ashraf, “INDIA-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS: POST-9/11,” jstore, 2007.

²²Jayasree Nath. "Significance of Afghanistan in India’s Foreign Policy." *Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews* 7, no. 4 (2019): pp. 472-476.

²³Rajan Jha. "India–Afghanistan Strategic Relations In The Post-Taliban Period." *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues* 19, no. 4 (2015): pp. 92-107.

corridors in 1999-2001.²⁴ Umbreen Javaid and Tehmina Aslam in the journal “Growing Geo-economic and Geo- strategic Interests of India in Afghanistan: Implications for Pakistan” highlights that India supported Bonn process and provided financial, diplomatic and political aid to Afghanistan. India had become 5th largest donor of Afghanistan globally and top donor regionally since 2001. India revisited its foreign policy towards Afghanistan after down fall of Taliban by USA invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. They adopted strategy of confinement of Pakistan from every side by opening consulates in western and northern parts of Afghanistan.²⁵

Umbreen Javaid and Rameesha Javaid in article “Indian Influence in Afghanistan and its Implications for Pakistan” mentioned that after USA invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, India developed not only the diplomatic relations but also offered intelligence support to Afghanistan in becoming eighth SAARC member.²⁶ Muhammad Ishaque Fani in his article “Pakistan’s Foreign policy: Challenges and opportunities after 9/11” talks about Indian foreign policy shift after 2001 with the US invasion of Afghanistan. India fully cooperated unconditionally with USA on its war against terror to portray India as a great power of South Asia and strategically significant for USA in this war.²⁷

India massively invested in Afghanistan and became the largest donor of Afghanistan regionally which paved the way for India’s strong foothold in Afghanistan comparatively with Pakistan. Rani D. Mullen in article “India in Afghanistan: Understanding Development

²⁴Sergei deSilva-Ranasinghe. "Pakistan's Strategic and Foreign Policy Objectives." *Future Directions International, Strategic Analysis Paper* (2011): pp. 4.

²⁵ Umbreen Javaid, and Tehmina Aslam, “Growing Geo-Economic and Geostrategic Interests of India InAfghanistan: Implications for Pakistan,” *Journal of Political Studies* 23, no. 2 (2016).

²⁶ Umbreen Javaid and Rameesha Javaid, “Indian Influence in Afghanistan and Its Implications for Pakistan,” *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan* 53, no. 1 (2016): pp. 1-12.

²⁷ Muhammad Ishaque Fani, “Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities after 9/11,” *Pakistan Horizon* 58, 2005, pp. 53-64.

Assistance by Emerging Donors to Conflict-Affected Countries” talks about Indian foreign policy shift in Afghanistan post 9/11. India seized the opportunity of USA invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and started engaging with government of Afghanistan through development and economic assistance. India gave economic aid of 2 billion USD to Afghanistan since 2001 that lead India to become the largest aid donor country to Afghanistan. India was witnessing boom in its economy by the time of first Afghan presidential elections in 2004 and took advantage of its booming economy and invested in Afghanistan.²⁸

Salih Doğan in his article “International Aid to Afghanistan and Its Importance in the Post-2014 era” says that, Afghanistan’s economy had increased from 9 percent in 2009 to 15% in 2011 and its (GDP- purchasing power parity) had climaxed to 35 billion USD in the year 2013. This ratio was the outcome of international and most importantly regionally Indian financial and economic aid in the field of agriculture, on which Afghanistan’s whole economy depended.²⁹ Rajendra M. Abhyankar in his article “Afghanistan after the 2014 U.S. Drawdown: The Transformation of India’s Policy” says that Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Kabul in 2011 and announced Indian support to Afghan government’s reconciliation plans with Taliban and also donated 500 million USD for developmental projects.³⁰ Shanthie Mariet D’Souza in article “India’s role in the economic stabilization of Afghanistan” says that India trained Afghan civil servants, diplomats, parliamentary staff and legislators to solidify the democracy in Afghanistan. After the visit of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to India in September 2016, India increased its economic

²⁸ Rani D Mullen, “India in Afghanistan: Understanding Development Assistance by Emerging Donors to Conflict-Affected Countries,” *Stimson Center*, 2017.

²⁹Salih Dogan. "International aid to Afghanistan and its importance in the post-2014 era." *The Washington Review* (2014).

³⁰Rajendra M Abhyankar. "Afghanistan after the 2014 US Drawdown: The Transformation of India's Policy." *Asian Survey* 55, no. 2 (2015): pp. 371-397.

assistance by another 1 Billion USD.³¹ Indian aid in Afghanistan earned a lot of respect and they praised India for its generosity. This generosity played an active role in upgrading the Indian graph in Afghanistan. Indian way of executing was also been different and unique from the western power's aid method. Bibhu Prasad Routray in his Report "India's Afghanistan Policy Report: National Security Decision Making in India" argues that Indian aid and economic development in Afghanistan through its soft power projection earned a lot of respect among common Afghan. The Indian aid transferred to Afghan government directly from the Indian government which made it unique from the other western aid, which usually engaged their INGOs to transfer aid to Afghanistan. The direct channel of Indian procurement of aid to Afghanistan had consolidated the writ of Central government on the periphery and enhanced its credibility among the people of Afghanistan. India had also provided women great opportunities to excel through self-employment generation schemes, capacity building programs and health care.³²

Jin Wang in his article "India's policy towards Afghanistan: Implications to the regional security governance" Prime Minister Manmohan official visited Afghanistan in 2006 and became the first Indian PM visitor to Afghanistan, since 1970. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh once stated that: "Our cooperation with Afghanistan is an open book. We had civilization links, and we are both here to stay".³³ Afghanistan responded in a tremendous and positive way to the Indian economic assistance and soft policy in the war-torn country. This economic assistance of India to Afghanistan severely damaged Pak-

³¹Shanthie Mariet D'Souza. "India's role in the economic stabilisation of Afghanistan." *Retrieved 5* (2016): pp.17.

³²Bibhu Prasad Routray. "National Security Decision-making in India." *RSIS Monograph No. 27*(2013).

³³ Jin Wang, "India's Policy toward Afghanistan: Implications to the Regional Security Governance," *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies* 11, no. 4 (2017): pp. 112-120, <https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2017.12023321>.

Afghan relations. Pakistan had remained unsuccessful in matching and showing its soft power policy in Afghanistan.

ORF (Observer research foundation) ISSUE BRIEF “The way a head for India-Afghanistan relations” says that India pledged approximately 2 Billion USD for Afghanistan’s reconstruction and developmental works. This massive investment in Afghanistan pushed Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to publicly ridicule Pakistan, when it offered 500 million USD aid to Afghanistan for reconstruction works.³⁴ The reason of massive Indian aid to Afghanistan was to make Afghanistan totally dependent on India and make him act like a clown on its signals against Pakistan.

Anant Mishra in his article “Winning hearts and minds”: Assessing India’s soft power diplomacy in Afghanistan articulates that, Afghanistan boycotted the 2016, SAARC Summit of Islamabad on the pretext that India held Pakistan accountable for the deadly attack on the Uri town of Indian former state of Jammu and Kashmir.³⁵

India had also stepped forward in the trade realm of Afghanistan and by passed Pakistan already fledgling trade ratio with Afghanistan. India remained successful in outperforming the Pakistan in trade relations with Afghanistan and the bilateral trade between India and Afghanistan was worth 358 million USD in 2008. Similarly India became the fifth largest donor to Afghanistan since 2001 with the provision of 1.2 billion USD to the later. This all contributed to halt Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan nicely by Indian soft power politics in Afghanistan in post-9/11 Afghanistan.³⁶

³⁴ -Policy Review: Getting India Right.| *Hoover Institution*, accessed January 02, 2021, <https://www.hoover.org/research/getting-india-right>.

³⁵Anant Mishra. "Winning hearts and minds": Assessing India’s soft power diplomacy in Afghanistan." *South Asia Journal* 23 (2017).

³⁶Ibid., 12.

The signing of preferential trade agreement between India and Afghanistan uplifted the trade volume between the two countries. Gareth Price in his article “India’s Policy towards Afghanistan” elucidates the trade volume between India and Afghanistan witnessed continuously boom since 2001. He says that trade volume between the two countries expedited from 80 million USD in 2001 to 280 million USD in 2010. India became fifth largest importer of Afghanistan and 20 per cent exports of Afghanistan were directed towards India.³⁷

India made a tripartite agreement with Iran and Afghanistan in 2014. According to this agreement India will help Iran in constructing Chahbahar port. Pakistan deemed this Indian venture as a tactical move to counter balance the Gwadar port of Baluchistan province of Pakistan. It was Indian strategy to alleviate Afghanistan’s transit dependence on Pakistan for trade. Zahid Shahab Ahmed and Stuti Bhatnagar in journal “Conflict or Cooperation?” The Role of India and Pakistan in Post-2014 Afghanistan” explained that Indian involvement in establishment of Chahbahar Free Zone Authority would reduce Afghan dependence on Pakistan for transit facility.³⁸ India exploited the tense relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan in its own benefit and made a tripartite agreement with Iran and Afghanistan in 2014. Through this agreement India helped and funded the construction of Chahbahar port in Iran. Completion of Chahbahar port will ensure Indian dominance on Afghanistan’s market and alleviate Afghanistan’s dependence on Pakistan for transit trade route. It will further deteriorate trade volume between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Shafiq Ur Rehman Solangi and Shah Abdul Latif in article “Development of Chahbahar Port: Challenges and Implications for

³⁷ Gareth Price, ‘India’s Policy towards Afghanistan’ Chatham House, 2013

³⁸Dr Zahid Shahab Ahmed, and Stuti Bhatnagar. "Conflict or Cooperation? The Role of India and Pakistan in Post-2014 Afghanistan." *South Asian Studies* 30, no. 1 (2020).

Pakistan and CPEC” writes that in last three years trade volume between Pakistan and Afghanistan had witnessed downward spiral, as it degraded from 2 billion USD to mere 500million USD.³⁹

Dr. Naseema Akhter and Arif Hussain Malik in the article “India’s Involvement in Afghanistan: An Analytic Perspective of Current Interests and Future Prospects” says that India channeled for Afghanistan’s inclusion in the SAARC. This Indian move ensured the safe passage of Indian goods to reach Central Asia and West Asia, which was previously hindered by Pakistan and the latter never allowed the passage to Indian goods imported into Afghanistan. India signed a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) with Afghanistan in 2003, and got substantial duty concessions for Indian goods in Afghanistan and vice versa. This agreement decreased Pakistan’s already bleak trade volume with Afghanistan and increased interdependence between India and Afghanistan.⁴⁰ India had witnessed increase in its trade with Afghanistan in the post 9/11 era, which severely affected Pakistan’s economic trade with Afghanistan. The APTTA agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan signed on 2010, also affected Pakistan’s trade with Afghanistan. Which was highly perceived as a US connivance with India to benefit India in tapping Afghan precious natural resources.

Dr. Richard Ponzio in his article “Building Peace in Afghanistan through Regional Economic Integration” mention that Afghanistan imported goods from India 50% more than its exports and after construction of Chahbahar port in Iran and investment in Hajigak Iron Ore Mine, the prospects of increasing Indian trade with Afghanistan were high.⁴¹ Anjana

³⁹ Shafiq Ur Rehman Solangi, “Development of Chabahar Port: Challenges and Implications for Pakistan and CPEC,” *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3576064>.

⁴⁰ Naseema Akhtar, and Arif Hussain Malik. "India's Involvement in Afghanistan: An Analytic Perspective of Current Interests and Future Prospects." *International Affairs* 63, no. 1 (2009): pp.127-140.

⁴¹ Richard Ponzio . “Building Peace in Afghanistan through Regional Economic Integration” *The Hague Institute for global justice* (2015).

Pasricha in her article “India and Afghanistan Open Air Freight Corridor to Bypass Pakistan” highlighted Indian decision to initiate air freight between Kabul and New Delhi initially in June 2017 and later extended it to the Kandahar to New Delhi respectively. India was the second largest endpoint for exports from Afghanistan but Pakistan’s intransigence in giving the trade route hampered the bilateral trade between them. India’s initiative would boost the bilateral annual trade between the two countries from 700 million USD to 1 billion USD in the next three years. It will impact Afghanistan’s agricultural and carpet industries in a positive nod and give India an immense benefit in selling perishable products to Afghanistan without fear of being rotten or Pakistan’s involvement. Through this initiative India gave two messages to Pakistan that the former is fully committed with its stance to stand with Afghanistan in every circumstances and Pakistan could not be able to stop India’s entry and influence in Afghanistan and further in Central Asian States.⁴²

John Shroder in journal article “Afghanistan's development and functionality: Renewing a collapsed state” states that in March 2003, Afghan president visited India and signed the Preferential Trade Agreement, which gave Afghanistan 100% tariff concession on its 38 items exporting to India. Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh signed agreement on co-operation in the healthcare medicinal sciences, MoU on Small Developmental projects and another MoU on cooperation in Agricultural Research and Education. India also contributed in the promotion of Afghan rural life by signing MoU on Cooperation in the rural development, cooperation in educational field and in the field of rural development. These all developmental projects uplifted

⁴²Anjana Pasricha -East Asia Pacific: India and Afghanistan Open Air Freight Corridor to Bypass Pakistan.| *Voa News*. accessed September 02, 2020. <https://www.voanews.com/east-asia/india-and-afghanistan-open-air-freight-corridor-bypass-pakistan>

Indian soft image among the rural areas in which maximum population of Afghanistan resided.⁴³

Ahmad Bilal Khalil in his article "Pakistan and China: Don't Fear Chabahar Port" quoted Afghanistan's deputy minister of commerce and Industries, Muzamil Shinwari's interview which said that Afghan imports from Pakistan witnessed gradual decrease with the time due to the Pak-Afghan transit and trade problems. Afghan imports from Pakistan in 2008-2009 were 60% but in 2016, they witnessed the stark decline and stood at 30 percent. This scenario increased the ratio of Afghan imports from Iran, which were now at 37-40%, from the 15-20% in 2008-2009. Pakistan planned of signing quadrilateral transit agreement with Central Asian republics and China to reach Central Asia through China and CPEC by bypassing Afghanistan that will more aggravate the trade relations between the two neighboring states.⁴⁴

Mirajulhamid U Nasri in article "Afghanistan, trade and regional stability" articulates that Pakistan levied high tariffs on imports from Afghanistan, which acted as a constraint in the trade realms between the two countries. These already strained relations had further witnessed great blow from Indian side, which reduced the custom duties and taxes on Afghan goods in India by 50%. This Indian move resultantly increased the bilateral trade between the two countries manifold in comparison with the Pak-Afghan trade. Afghanistan had a fast booming industry of plastics, rubber and paper, which were facing high tariffs in Pakistan. The comparison between Indian and Pakistani charged tariffs on Afghan imports were grossly different in size. Pakistan charged average tariff on plastics and rubber of Afghanistan were 17% and 15.8% respectively but the case in India was different, which

⁴³John Shroder. "Afghanistan's development and functionality: Renewing a collapsed state." *GeoJournal* 70, no. 2-3 (2007): pp.91-107.

⁴⁴Ahmad Bilal Khalil. "Pakistan and China: Don't Fear Chabahar Port." *The Diplomat* (2017).

were charging 9.5% and 9.1% respectively for these products. As a result the plastic industry boomed in Afghanistan and established gradually and witnessed in decline of exports of plastics from Pakistan.⁴⁵

Jamshed Ayaz Khan in a Report “Regionalism in South Asian Diplomacy” stated that in 1997, the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) was launched and the Indian Ocean Rim Consultative Business Network (IORCBN) and the Indian Ocean Rim Business Forum (IORBF) were two forum formed under its auspices. The aim of IOR-ARC was to facilitate trade and investment among the member countries by 2010. China, Egypt, France, Japan and the UK were IOR-ARC dialogue partners. India totally rejected the Pakistan’s inclusion in this forum and vetoed the entry of Pakistan in IOR-ARC, despite the fact that it contained the 805-km coastline on the Indian Ocean and had the ability to link landlocked Afghanistan and Central Asian states to the Rim. Pakistan gave a befitting reply of Indian intransigence in its inclusion in the forum and signed a protocol with Kazakhstan to help it in gaining the membership of WTO and offered Kazakhstan a road link to join Karakoram Highway that would enable the CARs to use Karachi ports and Gwadar as well. Pakistani PM had also acknowledged the requirement for the creation of an ECO free trade area and oil and gas pipeline for effective regional energy grid.⁴⁶

Suleman Yousaf in his article “Afghanistan’s Mineral Resource Potential: A Boon or Bane?” says that India companies had succeeded in making the 10 billion USD deal with Afghanistan for tapping the Hajigak Deposit in the Bamiyan province of Afghanistan, which

⁴⁵Mairajulhamid Nasri. “Afghanistan, Trade and Regional Stability” *Academia* (2019)

⁴⁶ Jamshed Ayaz Khan. “Regionalism in South Asian Diplomacy.” *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, (2007).

were considered one of the largest undeveloped deposits in the world. These deposits had the potential to produce steel for the coming next 40 years.⁴⁷

Roman Muzalevsky in the Report “Unlocking India’s Strategic Potential in Central Asia” and Report: “India’s Search for a Way Out” articulates that India launched the “Connect Central Asia” policy in 2012 via Afghanistan to expand its regional presence vis-à-vis Pakistan. India launched 14 flight links with Central Asian States; developed its local industries of IT, banking, energy, pharmaceuticals and e-networks. Indian Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) were bidding to buy ConocoPhillips 8.4% shares in the Kazakhstan's Kashagan oil field. India imported cotton, zinc, uranium, iron, steel, raw materials and dried fruits from the CARs in the large quantity and exports textiles, leather, rice, tea, pharmaceuticals and chemical products into these states. These all Indian steps had sidelined Pakistani trade options vis-à-vis Central Asian States.⁴⁸

Pakistan also took some positive steps to quell the Indian influence from Afghanistan and to increase its sway in Afghanistan, especially in the realm of trade and economics. Muhammad Faisal in article “CPEC and Regional Connectivity” says that Pakistan courted Afghanistan in talking with Tajikistan to expand their bilateral trade agreement up to the Central Asia. Pakistan had remained adamant in pursuing Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline despite the noncompliance of India due to USA’s pressure. Pakistan was optimistic to penetrate into the markets of Afghanistan and Iran through offering the products produced in the new SEZs by leveraging comparative advantages.⁴⁹

⁴⁷Suleman Yousaf. "Afghanistan's Mineral Resource Potential: A Boon or Bane?." *Journal of Current Affairs* Vol 1, no. 1&2 (2016): pp.86-109.

⁴⁸Roman Muzalevsky. *Unlocking India's Strategic Potential in Central Asia*. Army War College Carlisle Barracks PA Strategic Studies Institute, 2015.

⁴⁹Muhammad Faisal. "CPEC and Regional Connectivity." *Strategic Studies* 39, no. 2 (2019): pp.1-17.

Huma Qayum, Syed Ali Shah & Zubaria Andlib in the article “Implications of Pak-Afghan Transit Trade for Regional Security” says that, President Musharraf paid an official visit to Kabul on January 7, 2009 and discussed the ways to expand the trade and curtail the drug trafficking between them. As a result Pakistan’s trade witnessed a slight increase in 2006 and reached up to the 1.2 billion USD.⁵⁰ Asia Report 28 October 2014 “Resetting Pakistan’s Relations with Afghanistan” indicates that Pakistan signed ‘The agreement of Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement’ (APTTA) with Afghanistan on July 2010 and updated the old Afghan Transit Trade Agreement of 1965. This agreement made the trade between the two countries easy and secured. Pakistan along with Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan established the Central Asia-South Asia Electricity and Transmission and Trade project (CASA-1000) in February 2014. The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline, signed between the participants in December 2010 was another milestone for improved relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan.⁵¹

India also used Afghanistan’s natural resources against Pakistan, in which Kabul River’s dam was most controversial infrastructural program in Afghanistan, which India perpetrated to challenge Pakistan’s security. Tehseena Usman and Minhas Majeed Khan in article “Pak-Afghan Relations (2001-2017)” mentioned that India proposed the plans of building dams on Kunar and Kabul rivers, which flowed from Afghanistan into Pakistan. Pakistan believed that this act of building dams on these rivers will deprive it from these water resources, which would surely enhance the already factitious and hostile relations

⁵⁰Huma Qayum, Syed Ali Shah, and Zubaria Andlib. "Implications of Pak-Afghan Transit Trade for Regional Security." *History* (2012).

⁵¹ Miller Laurel. “Resetting Pakistan's Relations with Afghanistan,” *Crisis Group*, September 15, 2016.

between the two neighboring Muslim countries.⁵²

Indian objectives in Afghanistan were vast in nature, but the basic objective of Indian influence in Afghanistan was to stem Islamabad in gaining strong foothold in Afghanistan. Harsh V. Pant and Avinash Paliwal in a newspaper article “India’s Afghan Dilemma is Tougher than Ever” argued that Indian involvement in Afghanistan is motivated by a desire to limit Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan because of Indian fear of being alienated and marginalized in the region and falling in prey of Pakistani- inspired terrorism.⁵³ Zahid Shahab Ahmed and Stuti Bhatnagar in the Article “Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations and the Indian Factor” says that India was looking at Afghanistan, as an opportunity to gain economic benefits from its resources and use Afghanistan as a transit route to access Central Asia.⁵⁴

India deemed itself great power of region, so it was necessary for India to had a sway in its backyard. Qadar Bakhsh Baloch and Abdul Hafeez Khan Niazi in the article “Indian Encroachment in Afghanistan: A New Imperialism in the Making” says that India wanted to gain a status of hegemony in South Asia and created hurdles for Pakistan in Afghanistan. Indian-US so called technical assistance in education and nation building activities, was a strategy to prevent Taliban return and to isolate Pakistan in the region.⁵⁵ Shireen Mushtaq in Journal of Political Studies “The Proximity of US-Indian Interest in Afghanistan and Its Implication on Pakistan” says that both India-US had same aims and motives in Afghanistan. They controlled Afghanistan’s oil and gas reserves and countered China’s political and

⁵²Tehseena Usman, and Minhas Majeed Khan. "Pak-Afghan Relations (2001-2017)." *Strategic Studies* 37, no. 1 (2017): pp. 1-17.

⁵³Harsh V Pant and Avinash Paliwal. "India’s Afghan Dilemma Is Tougher Than Ever." *Foreign Policy* 19, no. 02 (2019).

⁵⁴Zahid Shahab Ahmed and Stuti Bhatnagar. "Pakistan-Afghanistan relations and the Indian factor." *Pakistan Horizon* 60, no. 2 (2007): pp. 159-174.

⁵⁵Qadar Bakhsh Baloch and Abdul Hafeez Khan Niazi. "Indian Encroachment in Afghanistan: A New Imperialism in the Making." *The Dialogue* 3, no. 1 (2008): pp. 16-33.

economic interests in Central Asia through Afghanistan. They limited Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan and cut its ties with Taliban and denied Pakistan's rhetoric of strategic depth. India was seeking strong foothold in Afghanistan for closely monitor separatist movements in Baluchistan and water crisis situation in Pakistan for exploiting these issues to sabotage Pakistan's security fabric.⁵⁶

Sumit Ganguly and Feisala.R.Al-Istrabadi in the article "Twilight in Afghanistan: An Introduction" quoted the summary of different papers, written by different authors, among them Rajendra M. Abhyankar eloquently indicated Indian main objective in Afghanistan was to stem the terrorism, emanating from Pakistan and Afghanistan into India. The second most important aim of India was to stop terrorists from gaining strong foothold in Afghanistan and subsequently launching attacks on Indian troops in Indian held Kashmir (IoK) and India also. Thirdly, India deemed to make Afghanistan a pure democratic country, which could ensure peaceful relations with India and could condemn every sort of extremist policy to implement.⁵⁷Dr. Mavara Inayat in her article "Conflict and Cooperation in South Asia Post 9/11: Implications for Pakistan's Security" India fully supported insurrection in the restive province of Pakistan after 9/11 to force Pakistan to divert its concentration from Kashmir.⁵⁸

The publication "Pakistan India Relations: The Afghanistan Factor Post -9/11 Era" submitted by Bushra Fatima says that India was clamoring for great power status after the invasion of Afghanistan by US in 2001. India deemed necessary to foster amicable relations with Afghanistan. India stepped forward in the field of aid donation to Afghanistan after

⁵⁶Shireen Mushtaq. "The Proximity of Us-Indian Interest in Afghanistan and Its Implication on Pakistan." *Journal of Political Studies* (2018): pp. 15-29.

⁵⁷Sumit Ganguly, and Feisal AR Al-Istrabadi. "Twilight in Afghanistan: An Introduction." *Asian Survey* 55, no. 2 (2015): pp. 235-248.

⁵⁸Mavara Inayat. "Conflict and cooperation in South Asia report 9/11" *Margalla Papers* (2013): pp. 75-96.

destruction of war to get influence over Afghan economy and made it dependable on India for economic progress. Indian strategic moves in Afghanistan played a villainous role in the disturbance of military and political leadership of Pakistan.⁵⁹

Christine in "India in Afghanistan, part I: strategic interests, regional concerns" states that India was keen in establishing cordial and amicable relations with Afghanistan, due to the fact that latter could give it a platform to monitor and counter Pakistan's strategically harmful activities against India. India was much dreadful and afraid from the burgeoning influence of Islamic militancy from Pakistan and Afghanistan into India, which were affecting the India's domestic social fabric and spurring the sentiments of Nationalism among the Hindu populace. India was desperate to curb this effect and to stop this problem from aggravating more, it was imperative for India to take over the decision making circles of Afghanistan, for amicable foreign relations with Afghanistan.⁶⁰ India had also some global interests and aims in Afghanistan which it tried to gain by making amicable relations with Afghanistan. Lisa Anne Hartenberger in her PhD dissertation "Mediating Transition in Afghanistan, 2001-2004" articulates that India wanted Afghanistan's support on reforming UN Security Council rules to gain the permanent seat in the United Nation's Security Council. Afghanistan had primary importance in Indian foreign policy, as it could help India in promoting its positive image at all regional and international forums by acknowledging its developmental and economic support to Afghanistan. India gave militarily support and training to Afghan personnel for gaining their support and weapons, in case of war between India and Pakistan in the future.⁶¹

Roshni Kapur in Chapter four "Peace building through Development Partnership: An

⁵⁹Bushra Fatima. "Pakistan –India Relations: The Afghanistan Factor Post -9/11 Era." *University of Punjab, Lahore*, 2016.

⁶⁰Christine Fair. "India in Afghanistan, part I: strategic interests, regional concerns." *Foreign Policy* (2010).

⁶¹Lisa Anne Hartenberger. "Mediating transition in Afghanistan, 2001-2004." PhD diss., 2005.

Indian Perspective” of the book “Rising Powers and Peace building: Breaking the Mold?” says that India constructed a 218 km road from Zaranj to Delaram and the purpose of constructing this road was to facilitate the Indian and Afghan goods towards Iran and vice versa. India also constructed 220 KV DC transmission line between region of Pul-e-Khumri and Kabul and a sub-station of 220/110/20 KV at Chimtala. India upgraded telephone exchanges in 11 provinces of Afghanistan, expanded national TV network by procurement of an uplink from Kabul and downlinks in all of 34 provincial capitals of Afghanistan, which effectively integrated the whole country’s communication link. India gifted three airbus aircraft to Afghan Ariana Airlines and also constructed Afghan new Parliament building. Singh further says that India in the large extent worked well for the restoration of water capacity in Afghanistan by building Salma Dam, Doshi and Charikar power substations. India was keen on uplifting the transport infrastructure of Afghanistan by deliberating on handing over 1000 more buses to it. India had also made difference in the India’s Small Development Projects (SDP) scheme with initially procurement of 20 million USD to Afghanistan in 2005 and further 100 million USD in November 2012.⁶²The India’s way of implementing its developmental work in Afghanistan was quite unique and different from the other regional and international donors who gained the praise among the local Afghans and it increased the Indian credibility in the eyes of every Afghani. Indian investment in Afghanistan made the latter dependent on India, which pushed the Pakistan away from Afghanistan. Shanthie Mariet D’Souza in article “India’s role in the economic stabilization of Afghanistan” says that India projected big projects in relatively stable areas of Afghanistan and small projects in relatively lawless, remote and unstable areas. India constructed the

⁶²Roshni Kapur. "Rising powers and peacebuilding: Breaking the mold?." (2019): pp.128-130.

biggest children's hospital in Afghanistan and helped Afghanistan in construction of its new Parliament building and procured the 250,000 tons of wheat to Afghanistan. Indian annual 1,000 scholarships to Afghan students gained much popularity, which played an important role in lowering the Pakistan's graph in Afghanistan vis-à-vis India.⁶³ India pursued its strategic interest in Afghanistan during this time. India signed Strategic Partnership Agreement with Afghanistan in 2011, to ensure long term engagement with Afghanistan and helped in rebuilding Afghan infrastructure, institutions, education and technical assistance.

In the book "Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War" Edited by Richard D. Hooker, Jr., and Joseph J. Collins says that USA invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 provided an opportunity to India to develop economic relations with Afghanistan and targeted those areas of Afghanistan which were geographically contiguous with Pakistan.⁶⁴

Partha Pratim Basu in his article "India and Post-Taliban Afghanistan: Stakes, Opportunities and Challenges" says that India invested in different Greenfield projects for the development of hydrocarbon resources in the region, showed interest in the gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan into India and another pipeline from Iran into India through Pakistan. India also made sure its participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's meeting in July 2006, which clearly manifested its ambitions and interests in the region.⁶⁵ Roman Muzalevsky in the Report "India's Search for a Way Out" states that India had used Afghanistan for launching its "connect" policy through its soft power policy by perpetrating initiatives like TAPI (Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan

⁶³Ibid., 14.

⁶⁴Richard D Hooker and Joseph J. Collins, eds. *Lessons encountered: Learning from the long war*. Government Printing Office, 2015.

⁶⁵Partha Pratim Basu. "India and post-Taliban Afghanistan: Stakes, opportunities and challenges." *India Quarterly* 63, no. 3 (2007): pp.84-122.

and India), CASA-1000(Central Asia South Asia Electricity) and INSTC (International North South Transport Corridor). TAPI gas pipeline project would ameliorate the ties of Pakistan and India, connect Afghanistan with the outer world and also reduce the Indian dependence on Middle East imports. This project also challenged the Russia's monopoly over Central Asian States and also affected the EEU's quest for Caspian energy resources. India helped Afghanistan to become a member of SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) and also clamored for Central Asian States to join it, which would open the flood of natural resources for India.⁶⁶

Despite the struggles of Indian marginalization of Pakistan in the region the latter did not succumb to the wishes of India. Pakistan had endeared much to boost its efforts for extending support to the Karzai government and cooperated vigorously in construction and capacity building process of Afghanistan's institutions. Pakistan had also dedicated to procure 250 million USD for Afghanistan's reconstruction and developmental work. Daryl Morini in his article "A Diplomatic Surge in Afghanistan, 2011-14" quotes Kenneth Katzman, says that "Pakistan was fearful from Indian growing influence in Afghanistan, through its soft power policy, which might instigate Afghan government against Pakistan in the future. Pakistan had totally rejected Indian disguise of soft power initiatives in the shape of Indian consulates, which actually worked for India's clandestine secret intelligence agency RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) against Pakistan to sabotage and encircle it."⁶⁷

Umar Sheraz in his article "Afghanistan mineral resources and implications on India's future" states that Afghanistan's geographical location attracted the energy needed

⁶⁶ Roman Muzalevsky. *Unlocking India's Strategic Potential in Central Asia*. Army war college Carlisle Barracks PA Strategic Studies Institute, 2015.

⁶⁷Daryl Morini. "A Diplomatic Surge in Afghanistan, 2011-14." *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 4, no. 4 (2010): pp.68-100.

states of India, Pakistan and China. He says that vast mineral deposits were discovered in Afghanistan in 2010, like iron, gold, copper, cobalt and lithium, with estimation of 1-3 trillion US Dollars extractable resources. This discovery spurred regional actors to gain much leverage in Afghanistan's growing mineral field and India witnessed a transition from a silent donor country into a natural resource stakeholder. The transition in Afghanistan's natural resources after 2010 pushed India to diligently focus its energies for the exploration and development of Afghan coal reserves. India had participated in number of pipeline projects for tapping oil and gas reserves of Iran and Central Asia to fulfill India's growing energy needs and Afghanistan played a role of conduit in this process. India's engagement with Afghanistan emulated as the East India Company did with India subcontinent about 200 years ago.⁶⁸

Kulbushan Warikoo in his article "Central Asia and South Asia" states that India had substantially increased exploitation and distribution of Central Asian energy resources by securing great presence in the region through its strong foothold in Afghanistan. India was looking for establishing petroleum refineries, placing pipelines and marketing of petroleum products in Afghanistan and Central Asian States, to integrate the region with Indian domination. India used Afghanistan as a lynch pin for making separate amicable trade relations with every Central Asian State like engaging with Kazakhstan for urging its uranium, with Tajikistan for its silver and aluminum, with Kyrgyzstan for its pharmaceutical and with Uzbekistan for its textiles. This all happened due to Indian strong foothold and vast infrastructural structure in Afghanistan, which became a strong source of implantation of India's ambitions in the region. India engaged in swap arrangement dealings with Iran and

⁶⁸Umar Sheraz. "Afghanistan mineral resources and implications on India's future." *Futures* 56 (2014): pp.94-97.

Central Asian states, in which India got Iranian energy from its terminals and in return it sent an equal quantity of oil gained from Central Asian reserves by Indian firms to Iran. This all became easily for India by its mega construction and developmental projects in Afghanistan and contiguity with Central Asian states and good relations with Iran.⁶⁹

Roshni Kapur in Chapter four “Peace building through Development Partnership: An Indian Perspective” of the book “Rising Powers and Peace building: Breaking the Mold?” articulates that India offered Afghan national’s training in different fields through allocation of 500 ITEC slots annually, ICAR scholarships under India-Afghanistan Fellowship Program during the years 2012-13 to 20120-21. India had announced 1000 ICCR under graduate scholarships to Afghans every year in various Indian universities and trained Afghan National Agriculture Sciences and Medical students at different universities of Afghanistan.⁷⁰

Yow Peter Raiphea in article “India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership: An Analysis of India, Afghanistan and Pakistan Perspectives” says that after the ‘London Conference’ India severely lashed at the policy of and also lambasted Pakistan of its alleged role in luring western powers to trust Pakistan for its role as an interlocutor between Taliban and western power. India said Pakistan will continue its support to Haqqani network in Afghanistan and played a double game with western powers and pressured India for giving concessions to Pakistan in Kashmir.⁷¹ Through the SCO forum, India courted China towards its side to pressurize Pakistan to leave the support of Taliban and extremist factions in the region

⁶⁹Kulbhushan Warikoo. "Central Asia and South Asia: Opportunities and Challenges." *India Quarterly* 72, no. 1 (2016): pp. 1-15.

⁷⁰Ibid., 27.

⁷¹Yow Peter Raiphea. "India-Afghanistan strategic partnership: An analysis of India, Afghanistan and Pakistan perspectives." *International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications* 3, no. 4 (2013): pp. 1.

against India. Daniel Norfolk in article “India's Engagement with Afghanistan: Developing a 'Durable Policy Architecture’” says that India struggled hard for Afghanistan’s inclusion in SCO, which is Chinese and Russian dominated intergovernmental organization. Through this forum India joined hands with China against Jihadist proliferation in the South Asian region and pressurized Pakistan to do effective and stringent activities against terrorist’s outfits.⁷²

Avijet Kumar Biswas in journal published in International Journal of Research in Social Sciences “Indo-Afghan Relationship and the Pakistan Conundrum” explains that India had contributed in assisting Afghanistan in Small Development Projects in agriculture field, vocational training and rural development. India had engaged in training Afghans on Indian soil and also deployed paramilitary forces in Afghanistan to guard its diplomatic services and construction workers. India delivered four Mi-24 attack helicopters to Kabul.⁷³

India supported Afghanistan with latest weapons, which was a source of threat for Pakistan. These weapons could be used against Pakistan any time on Indian’s directions. Iram Khalidin Research Journal “The New Great Game in Afghanistan: Role of India (A Pakistani Perspective)” says that India procured 8 million USD worth of high-altitude equipment to Afghanistan in 2011.⁷⁴ India had procured military weapons to Afghanistan but it remained restricted in providing non-lethal weapons, owing to the fear of backlash from Pakistan. Mehmood Hussain and Ahmed Bux Jamali in Article “Geo-Political Dynamics of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor: A New Great Game in South Asia” says that back in 2011, India and Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership agreement to boost security cooperation,

⁷²Daniel Norfolk. "India's Engagement with Afghanistan: Developing a Durable Policy Architecture'." *Afghanistan in Transition, Beyond* (2014): pp. 161-83.

⁷³Avijet Kumar Biswas. "Indo-Afghan Relationship and the Pakistan Conundrum." *International Journal of Research in Social Sciences* 9, no. 5 (2019): pp. 1.

⁷⁴Iram Khalid. "The New Great Game in Afghanistan: Role of India (A Pakistani Perspective)." *South Asian Studies* 26, no. 2 (2020).

including the transfer of military equipment. New Delhi transferred four combat helicopters to Kabul (Mohan 2017).⁷⁵

Christine Fair in her article “India’s plan to diplomatically isolate Pakistan is not Enough” states that India launched a new campaign against Pakistan in 2016 to isolate it internationally and waging a direct threat from its western side in the shape of Afghanistan. The Uri attack in India in 2016 provided an immense opportunity to India to launch a powerful and forceful campaign to connect terrorism with Pakistan. During the Heart of Asia conference in India about Afghanistan, both the states of India and Afghanistan jointly blatantly and openly accused Pakistan for this attack and vowed to hold Pakistan accountable for this act. Indian PM also took advantage of growing cold relations between USA and Pakistan in perpetrating this agenda of Pakistan’s global isolation for terrorist activities in the region.⁷⁶

India made a tripartite agreement with Iran and Afghanistan in 2014. According to this agreement India will help Iran in constructing Chahbahar port. Pakistan deemed this Indian venture as a tactical move to counter balance the Gwadar port of Baluchistan province of Pakistan. It was Indian strategy to alleviate Afghanistan’s transit dependence on Pakistan for trade. Zahid Shahab Ahmed and Stuti Bhatnagar in journal “Conflict or Cooperation?” The Role of India and Pakistan in Post-2014 Afghanistan” explained that Indian involvement in establishment of Chahbahar Free Zone Authority would reduce Afghan dependence on Pakistan for transit facility.⁷⁷Sandra Destradi “Regional Powers and Security Governance: ISAF Withdrawal, Regional Competition, and Domestic Norms in India's Afghanistan Policy”

⁷⁵Mehmood Hussain, and Ahmed Bux Jamali. "Geo-political dynamics of the China–Pakistan economic corridor: a new great game in South Asia." *Chinese Political Science Review* 4, no. 3 (2019): pp. 303-326.

⁷⁶Christine Fair , “India's Plan to Diplomatically Isolate Pakistan Is Not Enough,” *Politics*, 2016.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, 17.

articulated that India signed a strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan in 2011, which envisaged the ‘security cooperation’ between the two states. This agreement proved as a main transition in relations between India and Afghanistan in security sector.⁷⁸

Indian secret intelligence agency RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) was in connivance with Afghan secret agency NDS (National Directorate of Security) in destabilizing Pakistan. Arshi Saleem Hashmi and Muhammad Saqib in article “Terror Financing and Growth of Terrorist Groups: A Case Study of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan” says that the reports published during 2014 and 2016 repeatedly mentioned the emerging nexus between RAW and NDS using TTP militants against Pakistan. Christian Fair of Georgetown University claimed that, “Indian officials had told me privately that they were pumping money into Baluchistan. Kabul had supported and encouraged India to engage in offensive activities against Pakistan.”⁷⁹

Nishtha Kaushiki in her article “Factors Contributing to an Emerging Russia-Pakistan Strategic Proximity” states Indian desperate overtures in Afghanistan by gaining the Iran’s favor. Iran’s geo-strategic position had an important value of a gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia. India had benefitted a lot through its amicable relations with Iran by signing Tehran Declaration and the 2003 Delhi Declaration, which provided India to made strategic inroads in Afghanistan by undertaking several humanitarian aid projects. India, Iran, and Afghanistan signed agreement to convert Chahbahar port into a transit hub in May, 2016. This agreement would provide India a direct access to Central Asia, which would increase its trade with the resourceful Central Asian States and will provide an opportunity to import

⁷⁸Sandra Destradi. "Regional powers and security governance: ISAF withdrawal, regional competition, and domestic norms in India's Afghanistan policy." *Asian perspective* 38, no. 4 (2014): pp. 565-587.

⁷⁹Arshi Saleem Hashmi, and Muhammad Saqib. "Terror Financing and Growth of Terrorist Groups: A Case Study of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan." *NDU Journal*, 2017.

the natural resources from the latter states.⁸⁰

Yoel Guzansky and Gil Hurvitz in article “A Port Rush: Competition for Control of Trade Routes” stated that India had indulged in constructing the Chahbahar Port outside its border in Iran, which would serve as an entry point for India to the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which will connect India, Afghanistan, Russia and Central Asian states. Indian interest in Afghanistan was to challenge Pakistani and Chinese influence in the region, which insured it to become the policeman of the region without any hiccups and obstacles from the neighboring Pakistan.⁸¹

Mir Sherbaz Khetran in his article “Indian Interference in Baluchistan” states that India desired to become the regional policeman after the 9/11 incident and started engaging in developmental and economic project in Afghanistan to control Afghan internal affairs and made it dependent on India. The main obstacle for the implementation of Indian dream was the state of Pakistan, which was having an eye on the Indian covert activities in Afghanistan against Pakistan and severely criticized the Indian maneuverings in Baluchistan from Afghanistan by opening numerous consulates on Afghan territory.⁸² USA and other regional and global players also fully supported India for its hegemonic rule in Afghanistan which severely damaged proclivity towards Afghanistan. Pakistan numerously tried to indicate the Indian negative role in Afghanistan against Pakistan but global powers did not pay any heed to Pakistan’s fear. They deemed these allegations as mere old enmity between Pakistan and India.

⁸⁰Nishtha Kaushiki. "Factors Contributing to an Emerging Russia-Pakistan Strategic Proximity." *Journal of International and Area Studies* 26, no. 1 (2019): pp.43-64.

⁸¹Yoel Guzansky. *Port Rush: Competition for Control of Trade Routes*. Institute for National Security Studies, 2019.

⁸²Mir Sherbaz Khetran. "Indian Interference in Balochistan." *Strategic Studies* 37, no. 3 (2017): pp. 112-125.

Samra Naz and Zafar Nawaz Jaspal in the article “Afghanistan in the Snare of External Power Struggle” articulates that US president Donald Trump proclaimed its new South Asian Policy related with Afghanistan and Pakistan in which Trump annoyed Pakistan by demanding Indian support to USA in improving the economic situation of Afghanistan. India enhanced its influence in Afghanistan with the connivance of USA, which was evident by the signing of the strategic partnership agreement between India and Afghanistan in 2011. This agreement would have not been materialized, if US had not supported this endeavor between the two neighboring states. USA further alleged Pakistan for offering safe heavens to terror groups, which India fully endorsed and felt proud to become a part of the US policy of demanding ‘do more’ from Pakistan against Haqqani network. This all scenario putted India at a favorable position to increase its proactive role in Afghanistan and pursued its three pronged policy of firstly contain the spillover effect of terrorism in India, secondly accession to Central Asian resources through Afghanistan and thirdly to downgrade the Pakistani influence in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.⁸³

Similarly, Sitara Noor in her article “Ten Years of the Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Agreement: Implications for Pakistan” states that Pakistan demanded the same agreement from USA, like it made with India in 2008, a civil nuclear deal but USA didn’t pay any heed to Pakistan’s demand. USA attitude towards Pakistan accentuated the de-hyphenation of USA policies towards Pakistan and India, which not only consolidated India’ dominant posture in the region but decreased the possibility of any serious dialogue between the two warring states. USA strategic partnership with India; elevated the latter’s status and downgraded the Pakistan’s importance as a frontline ally in the war on terror in Afghanistan.

⁸³ Samra Naz, and Zafar Nawaz Jaspal. "Afghanistan in the Snare of External Power Struggle." *Strategic Studies* 38, no. 3 (2018): pp. 22-39

President Obama's "Af-Pak" policy showed Pakistan as a part of the Afghanistan problem rather than its solution. These all biased attitude of USA towards Pakistan had increased competition of the both neighboring countries in Afghanistan for power maximization. India was seeking greater role in Afghanistan after the full USA support and Pakistan was accusing India for promoting covert and overt rebellious activities in Pakistan's restive province of Baluchistan via Afghanistan.⁸⁴

Naveed Siddiqui in a newspaper article "India using terrorism as a state policy to destabilize neighboring countries including Pakistan: FO" articulates that the report of Monitoring Team (MT) about the Afghanistan clearly showed the Indian inner hand in the destabilization and danger for the maturity of Afghan peace process. The international community, especially the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary General had not shared or respond to these facts. The report clearly showed the Indian connivance with Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in Afghanistan against the interests of Pakistan. Pakistan proposed names of several Indian terrorist enablers to the UN Security Council's terrorism list along with solid proof of their involvement in terrorism in Pakistan. But they did not pay heed to Pakistan's fears and remained at the Indian side.⁸⁵

Research Questions

Q1: How Indian foreign policy dimensions in Afghanistan changed after 9/11?

Q2: How India pursued its foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan?

Q3: What security challenges Pakistan faced as a result of Indian influence in Afghanistan?

⁸⁴ Sitara Noor, ArashYaqin, RuheeNeog, and Jagannath Panda. "Ten Years of the Indo-U.S. Civilian Nuclear Agreement: Implications for Pakistan," South Asian Voices, November 8, 2018.

⁸⁵ Naveed Siddiqui. "India using terrorism as state policy to destabilise neighbouring countries including Pakistan: FO." *Dawn*, accessed October 4, 2020. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1561261>

Theoretical Framework

Theory presents a conceptual framework to understand any phenomena or issue. Indian Afghan policy changed its dimensions in Afghanistan after the 9/11 incidents. Indian strategies and tactics of its foreign policy execution in Afghanistan became more friendly, cooperative and empathetic. Of course, the core objective of Indian post 9/11 Afghan policy was constituted by anti-Pakistan sentiments in Afghanistan in the wake of US led global war on terrorism. For India it was the golden opportunity to win the hearts of Afghanis through social penetration, economic assistance, developmental agenda and humanitarian aid that India did through the soft power penetration. Since independence, Pakistan and India has been engaged in making amicable relations with Afghanistan. Both the countries adopted opposite approaches in gaining strong foothold in Afghanistan. Where Pakistan had been engaged in Afghanistan more strategically and militarily throughout the cold war and post-cold war era with joining the war agendas of the super powers of their respective times. India opted for soft power foreign policy for its presence in Afghanistan to manipulate happenings against Pakistan.

This study is aimed to explain the Indian increasing influence in Afghanistan after US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 by applying the “soft power” theory coined by Joseph Nye in the late 1980s. According to Nye, soft power “is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. He says that soft power arises from attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals and policies. The legitimacy of our policies in the eyes of the others enhanced our power”. India adopted this policy and seized the opportunity of US invasion of Afghanistan. After invasion, India ensured its diplomatic presence in Afghanistan and opened its embassy in Kabul and consulates in different cities

of Afghanistan. The opening of embassy and consulates in different cities of Afghanistan played an important role in disseminating the Indian rhetoric of anti-Pakistan stance among the common Afghans. India used these consulates for the recruiting, nourishing and arming the Baloch dissidents of Pakistan. The issuance of free visas for Afghans to India through these consulates also contributed in expanding gulf between Pakistan and Afghanistan. India recruited the returning Afghan refugees from Pakistan into its secret Intelligence Agency and used them as spy agents against Pakistan. These all Indian maneuverings contributed in relegating the Pak-Afghan ties to its lowest ebb.

India made Zaranj-Delaram highway connecting Chahbahar port with Afghanistan, which would alleviate Afghanistan's dependence on Pakistan for trading with India. This construction of Port and subsequently highway would increase the gulf between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It would derelict the direct interaction between the two neighboring Muslim countries, which the Afghanistan and Pakistan were witnessing by hitherto usage of latter's territory by Afghanistan to engage with the outer world.

India provided worth 2 billion USD of aid to Afghanistan since 2001 to 2011 for developmental and reconstruction work. This massive aid was used by India to equip rebellious groups of Pakistan, operating in Afghanistan like TTP and BLA. In this era India became the 5th largest donor to Afghanistan globally and top donor regionally. Indian listing of top regional donor to Afghanistan was sufficient to divert local impoverished Afghan masses towards India for the better amenities of life.

India also engaged in Afghanistan at grass root level in the field of poverty alleviation by skill development works, women empowerment programs, vocational training etc. Indian penetration in rural isolated areas of Afghanistan was its tactical move to ingest

the venomous rhetoric against Pakistan and it worked tremendously.

India promoted its soft image in the minds of Afghan people with the help of film and drama industry. In these films, India has frequently showed negative image of Pakistan and its apathetic concern towards Afghanistan, which took its tool in enlarging the trust deficit between the two Muslim countries.

Indian diasporas in Afghanistan also contributed in promoting Indian soft image by working hard in different working fields in Afghanistan. India took the advantage of this massive Indian populace presence in Afghanistan by departing the love of India in the minds of Afghans and hatred of Pakistan. Despite the same religious, cultural and ethnic affinity, Pakistan has remained unsuccessful in gaining the souls and minds of Afghan people. Pakistan has been remained the top most host of Afghan refugees in the Soviet Afghan war and also hosted millions of refugees after US invasion of Afghanistan. Pakistan had pursued hard power policy in Afghanistan, whether it was Soviet Afghan war or US Taliban fight and also used Taliban fighters against Indian soldiers in Indian occupied Kashmir. That was the reason most of Afghan people had favorable sentiments towards India and they looked Pakistan as an inimical country towards Afghanistan.

India even used its scholarship scheme to Afghan students against Pakistan by indoctrinating them against Pakistan and created a sense of harmony and same thinking vibes between India and Afghan students. India not only stopped here but conducted its underhand operations against the Afghan refugees coming back from Pakistan and used them against the sovereignty of Pakistan, as they had known the entire thick and thin about Pakistan's vulnerabilities.

India also played its villainous role in terms of religion and made approximately

seven temples in Afghanistan. This shows the acceptance of Indian soft power ingression in Afghanistan by the local Afghans. Rest India made its influence in Afghanistan through construction of cricket stadium in Afghanistan, which enhanced the Indian soft image among the local Afghans vis-à-vis Pakistan.

Research Methodology

This is a qualitative research. It is descriptive and analytical and presents an analytical evaluation on the very core issue of Indian Afghan policy and its relevance to Pakistan in post 9/11. The source of this research pertains to the secondary resource data collection through books, articles, journals, newspapers, and the online resources. The online resources include the published data in journals, opinions by the relevant academicians and practitioners and the audio and visual documentaries and statements.

Significance of the Study

This research is significant as it has the potential of policy input for Pakistan's security apparatus vis-à-vis dealing with the security threats from India on the borders. The research is important to give an insight to be vigilant on Indian actions in Pakistan's neighboring Afghanistan.

Delimitation

A lot of research work has been conducted on Indian influence in Afghanistan and primarily its security implications for Pakistan. But, this research specifies to evaluate Indian foreign policy in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2020 only.

Organizational Structure

To comprehensively understand the phenomena of India Afghan policy in post 9/11 and how it affected the security of Pakistan, this study is organized into the following chapters:

Introduction: The Introduction includes an overview of the nature of this research work and the problem. Introduction also talked about the framework of this whole research with the application of theory, the significance of the topic and organization of the research structure in detail. The introduction also described the objectives of this research work and the core argument.

Chapter One: “*India-Afghanistan Relations: An Overview*” explained the historical background of the Indian relations with the Afghanistan and its foreign policy directions. In this chapter it was stated that how India developed its relations with Afghanistan since the beginning of civilization in 300 BC and despite the various ups and downs in their relations it never succumbed in front of adversarial events happened between these two states. It also elucidated the Indo-Afghan relations before independence of India and after the independence from the British government. This chapter briefly discussed about Indian maneuverings in Afghanistan against Pakistan after the division of subcontinent from the clutches of British government. After independence the strained relations between the two states and Indian perseverance during these adversarial environments were also included in this chapter. Pakistan’s counter activities against India in Afghanistan were also discussed briefly. The main crux of the topic the security threats posed on Pakistan through Afghanistan in the post 9/11 event were also covered in this chapter.

Chapter Two: “*Indian-Afghan Policy: Post 9/11 Objectives*” discussed the objectives of India in Afghanistan and motives of India in gaining strong foothold in Afghanistan with special connection to post 9/11. This chapter briefly discussed that why India had indulged so much deeply in the affairs of Afghanistan after the US invasion and what benefits it was vying for and gained after the engagement with Afghanistan. This

chapter especially highlighted India's endeavoring in limiting Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan and getting it out from the politics of Afghanistan. Indian safe and soft policy in reaping the natural resources of Afghanistan and reaching the Central Asian states were finely discussed in the chapter also. The main policy of India in Afghanistan for gaining a special friendly state status from USA, gave it great impetus in achieving its objectives in Afghanistan vis-à-vis Pakistan that was also briefly touched in the chapter.

Chapter Three: *“Analyzing Indian Soft power policy in Afghanistan in post-9/11”* explained the pragmatic steps taken by India in gaining strong foothold in Afghanistan after US invasion in 2001. This chapter discussed the purpose of massive India aid to Afghanistan and how this aid played an important role in courting the latter on the Indian side and away from the neighboring Pakistan. The Indian diplomatic resurgence after Taliban era and how India diplomatically maligned Pakistan along with Afghanistan were also part of this chapter. The bilateral agreements between the two states which India signed with Afghanistan for implementation of its goals vis-à-vis Pakistan were also briefly discussed. How India used its culture and soft power tactics like social media, political influence and educational assistance in Afghanistan. Indian infrastructural building in Afghanistan and what was its relevance with the Pakistan's trade and political relations with Afghanistan and how these two sectors of Pakistan were affected by Indian respective steps had also described in this chapter.

Chapter Four: *“India's Post 9/11 Afghan Policy and its security Implications for Pakistan”* highlighted the challenges and implications Pakistan faced with Indian involvement in Afghanistan. This chapter briefly highlighted Indian international campaign against Pakistan to isolate it globally and designating it a pariah and terrorist harbor country.

How Afghanistan helped India in destabilizing Pakistan and how India gained success in threatening and sabotaging from its eastern and Afghan western border were also discussed. The special role of Indian consulates in Afghanistan against Pakistan's security was covered in the maximum part of this chapter.

Conclusion: Conclusion comprised upon the outcome of research as well as pragmatic recommendations and the way forward.

CHAPTER 1

INDIA-AFGHANISTAN FOREIGN RELATIONS: AN OVERVIEW

Since the beginning of mutual relations between India and Afghanistan, the latter adopted the soft power policy towards Afghanistan to widen the already strained relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Indian maneuvered in Afghanistan against Pakistan after the division of subcontinent by exploiting the Durand Line Agreement signed between British Indian government and Afghanistan in 1893, and Pashtunistan issue. Indian perseverance towards Afghanistan through soft power projection during strained relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan showed its strong commitment with limiting Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan. Pakistan's counter activities against India in Afghanistan were also seen but not got traction due to Indian connivance with Afghanistan and the latter's massive economic aid to Afghanistan.

1.1 Indian Foreign Policy towards Afghanistan: A Historical Background

India enjoyed excellent relations with Afghanistan during the reign of King Zahir Shah (1933-1973) through its soft power influence. These relations witnessed the same trajectory even at the time of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Similarly, India had also been successful in gaining amicable foreign policy relations with the Communist puppet governments foisted by Soviet masters and remained engaged in constructional and developmental works in Afghanistan. Indian friendly relations with Afghan government received set back with the collapse of Communist regime of Muhammad Najibullah. Subsequently civil war in the country left India with limited influence in the country. Even during the regime of Burhanuddin Rabbani (1992-1996) regime, India did not find favorable

environment to demonstrate any sway in Afghan affairs. India totally wiped out from the Afghan politics with the demise of Rabbani regime and rise of Taliban regime in 1996, which closed the doors of Indian interference in Afghanistan. Owing to deep hatred towards India, Taliban completely ruptured Indo-Afghan relations. During Taliban era, India started making friendly relations with Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance, headed by Ahmed Shah Massoud against Taliban.

India and Afghanistan are connected historically in socio economic, cultural and regional bond. The relations between the two states started from the period of Mauryan Indian Empire, which engaged in amicable relations with the old Gandhara (Afghanistan). India and Afghanistan also came closer to each other on the base of the common linguistic base (Persian), which reached India from Afghanistan, at the time of new Persian renaissance in arts and letters, prevailed in Afghanistan.⁸⁶ The cultural-religious relations between India and Afghanistan were evident from a 12 meters long sleeping statue of Buddha in Afghanistan and its strong example of Indian soft power ingress in Afghanistan from the beginning of civilization. Greco-Bactrians, Indo-Greek and Indo-Scythian ruled over Afghanistan. The Maurya dynasty built the Grand Trunk Road (GTR), the oldest and longest roads connecting Bangladesh's port city of Chittagong with Kabul by the route of Delhi and Lahore.⁸⁷

Another example of Indian soft power influence in Afghanistan was closeness of Gandhara and Indus Valley Civilization in the consolidation of cultural and political relations among the two contiguous territories. The relations between India and Afghanistan could be

⁸⁶Ibid., 5.

⁸⁷Anand Arni and Pranay Kotasthane. "Assessing India's Foreign Policy towards Afghanistan." *Jstor*, (2018): pp. 67-72.

traced back from the period of Gandhara civilization which thrived between 6 BC and 11 AD in these areas. The “Greater Gandhara” at that time was extending across the Indus River to the Taxila region and westwards into the Kabul and the Bamiyan province of Afghanistan, which joined these two regions with each other.⁸⁸

The relations between India and Afghanistan prior to the eleventh century were amicable, friendly and cooperative in nature but the beginning of this century was full of expeditious and warfare between the two states and the advent of Islam in Afghanistan in this century served as a catalyst in turning Afghanistan far from India. Sobia Paracha and Asiya Maharin the book “Evolving Situation in Afghanistan: Role of Major Powers and regional Countries”, talked about the rulers of Afghan origin which ruled India in the 11th century effectively. According to them between 1000-1027 AD, Mahmud Ghaznavi invaded India 17 times in these 27 years and got successful in capturing India. This made Afghanistan to get out from the sphere of India and Buddhism started declining in the country. Similarly, the other invaders like Babur, Lodhis and Khiljis came from Afghanistan, attacked India and ruled it effectively.⁸⁹

The 16th century was also witnessed Indian usage of soft power in Afghanistan which was evident from Indian Mughal emperor’s full control of Afghan territories. The relations between the two were money oriented, in which Mughal emperors paid subsidies to their masses to guard them against any surprise attack. India used Afghanistan as a buffer in the 17th century, to counter the surprise attack from Persia and Bokhara, which indicated the dependence of India on this geo-strategically important country for its defense. The Mughal

⁸⁸Fahmida Ashraf, "India-Afghanistan Relations: Post-9/11." *Strategic Studies* 27, no. 2 (2007): pp. 90-102.

⁸⁹ Sobia Saeed Paracha, Sarah SiddiqAneel, and Zahida Khalid, *Evolving Situation in Afghanistan: Role of Major Powers and Regional Countries* (Islamabad, Pakistan: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2016).

emperors used Afghanistan as a buffer state against the Persia to the West, and from the Bokhara (ruled by (Uzbeks) to the North. These rulers paid subsidies to various border Afghan chiefs to guard all the strategic routes between Peshawar and Kabul, and this trend prevailed even under the rule of Aurangzeb (1667-75).⁹⁰

The relations between Afghanistan and India were like trading partners and witnessed economic boost in both the regions in 18th century. There was trade of horses between Central Asia and India through the overland route of Afghanistan in the 18th century. Jos J. L. Gommans in his review on book “The Rise of the Indo-Afghan Empire c. 1710-1780” says that India and Afghanistan built a “dual economy” in eighteenth century, which combined the two pastoral and agrarian systems with each other. Daud Khan was the founder of the Rohilla state, which used to buy horses at North Indian economic fairs. He deemed the entire area from Indus to Rohilkhand (northeast of Delhi) as a huge semi pastoral corridor, which was conducive for easy movement of men and horses from the northwest.⁹¹

In the mid eighteenth century Ahmed Shah Abdali, consolidated all the fragment tribes and territories and made them a united country in 1747, which later became ‘Afghanistan’, and Afghanistan which was later under the ruling of Sikh emperor got under the clutches of British East Indian Company. The British Indian Government used Afghanistan as a pawn in its ‘great game’ against Russian Empire. Ahmed Shah Abdali attacked India nine times from 1747-69 and at last got success in 1769. After his death Sikh Emperor Ranjeet Singh defeated the Afghan ruler and captured India, but he did not retain this occupation and East India Company came and defeated the Sikhs in the second Anglo-

⁹⁰Ibid., 5.

⁹¹Jos JL Gommans. *The rise of the Indo-Afghan empire: c. 1710-1780*. Vol. 8. Brill, 1995.

Afghan war of 1849.⁹²

Zahidullah (Khalili) in his thesis “Pak-Afghan Relations under King Zahir Shah (1947-1973) says, Gandhara again came under the Indian rule in the 19th century with the advent of Sikhs and later their English successors captured some territories of Afghanistan. British East India Company (BEIC) defeated Sikhs in 1849 captured Punjab and annexed it into British India, which brought the Afghan territories under British Indian control. The British Empire re-evaluated Indian relations with Afghanistan, owing to the approximate geographical contingency of two states with each other.⁹³When the British Indian government started looking Afghanistan with the lens of strategically important country and used it just like pawns in its ‘Great Power’ rivalry, the relations between them witnessed downward spiral. These frosty relations pushed the Afghan people towards the rebellion, seditious activities and ambush killing of British officials, which paved the way for 1st Anglo-Afghan war between the two neighboring states in 1839.

During the First Anglo Afghan War, the ensuing cutback of subsidies by British Government in India to Gilzai Pashtun tribes, led them to revolt against the government and killed top British officials in Afghanistan in 1841 and again in 1879, during the second Anglo-Afghan war. The relations between the two started deteriorating because of British Indian government’s failure in mediating the Seistan boundary dispute between Afghanistan and Persia. The continuation of this trend prevailed, when British government of India refuted the then Prime Minister of Afghanistan, Nur Muhammad Shah’s claims of Russian aggression against Afghanistan in 1873, which paved the way for the second Anglo-Afghan

⁹²Christine Noelle-Karimi. "Afghan Politics and the Indo-Persian Literary Realm: The Durrani Rulers and Their Portrayal in Eighteenth-Century Historiography." *Afghan History through Afghan Eyes* (2015): pp. 53-77.

⁹³ Zahid Khalili. "Afghanistan - Mohammad Zahir Shah (1933–73)", (2018), pp. 22-45.

war.⁹⁴

British Indian government again demonstrated soft power influence in Afghanistan and signed different treaties with Afghan leaders to assuage the relations between the two states, owing to the interest of India in the Afghan territory to ensure Indian security. Jazib Mumtaz, Muhammad Ramzan & Saima Gul in the article “Determinants of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy with Respect to Russia’s Past, Present and Future”, said that the ‘Treaty of Peshawar’ signed between British India and Afghanistan in 1855, which ensured both the parties to not interfere in the internal affairs of each other and considering the friend of one country, friend of the other country and an enemy vice versa. Similarly another treaty was signed between them in Peshawar on 1857, during the Anglo-Iranian war of 1856-57. This treaty confirmed the Treaty of 1855 and British Indian government promised to subsidize Amir Dost Muhammad Khan and the latter remained neutral during the uprising of 1857-59 in India against British government.⁹⁵ British India signed ‘Treaty of Gandamak’ with Afghanistan to halt the first phase of 2nd Anglo-Afghan war and mitigate the tense relations between them which was strong involvement of soft power influence in Afghanistan. This treaty gave legitimacy to British India on Afghanistan’s territories of Sibbi, Quetta, Baluchistan and it gained the control of Afghanistan’s foreign policy and allowed permanent presence of British envoy in Kabul, in return of an annual subsidy.⁹⁶

British government of India also got the right to run the foreign affairs of Kabul and perpetrated the annexation of Afghan territories, including the Khyber Pass and taking lease

⁹⁴George Passman Tate. "The kingdom of Afghanistan." *A Historical Sketch, Karachi: Indus Publications* (1973).

⁹⁵Jazib Mumtaz, Muhammad Ramzan, and Saima Gul. "Determinants of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy with Respect to Russia’s Past, Present and Future." *Global Political Review* 3, no. 1 (2018): pp.76-84.

⁹⁶*Ibid.*, 6.

of the Bolan Pass in 1883 from the Khan of Kalat permanently and declaring some area of Baluchistan as British territory in the year 1887.

1.2 The Demarcation of the Durand Line and the British India

British Indian government decided to demarcate a boundary between India and Afghanistan, owing to the strained relations between the two states, which could any time flared up into the full-fledged war from Afghanistan into India. The British government sent foreign secretary, Sir Mortimer Durand to Kabul to discuss the demarcation of border between British India and Afghanistan with Amir Abdur Rehman of Afghanistan. They finally agreed to sign an agreement on November 1893, which became famously known with the name of Durand Line Agreement.⁹⁷

The Durand Line agreement was an idea to use Afghanistan as a buffer state in between Russia and British India and made it a pawn in the British fight with Russia. The demarcation of Durand Line was not a peaceful process; rather it was full of ambiguity and disgust for Afghanistan. Despite these all circumstances Abdur Rehman was not in a position to challenge the mighty power of Indian British government due to the sprinkling massive aid by India to the Amir. The Amir Abdur Rehman voiced the claim on the entire 'Mohmand territory' at the time of physically demarcating the boundary line in 1895, which spurred an uprising in 1897 against British government. To quell the uprising, the British Indian government chose to use force and occupied the territory of Mohmand along with Bohai Dag (which was earlier given to the Amir) in retaliation.⁹⁸

The Durand line controversy continued between Afghanistan and the British Indian government even after the death of Amir Abdur Rehman, which remained the main issue

⁹⁷Talal Hassan, "*Afghanistan Complex Situation and its Implications on Pakistan*", (2009), pp. 2-8.

⁹⁸Arka Biswas. *Durand Line: History, Legality & Future*. Vivekananda International Foundation, 2014.

between the two states up to the treaty of 1905. The treaty of 1905 played an important role in assuaging the cold relations between the two states and the issues between British India and Afghanistan settled for the short time until the beginning of 1919. Amanullah took the reins of power in Afghanistan in February 1919, after the assassination of his father Habibullah (who reigned from 1901-1919). He started a war with its neighbor country, the British Empire in India. Amanullah tried to modernize Afghanistan, opened its secluded position for foreign ideas and removed status of Afghanistan as a protectorate of British, which imposed on it after Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1881) and remained neutral in the World War I. Amir Amanullah issued a royal proclamation on May 1919, which warned Indian British government to leave Afghanistan and second to stop the cruelty on Indian masses immediately.⁹⁹

British India in the 20th century had full gripe on the foreign policy of Afghanistan and the Amir of the Afghanistan was totally convinced of transferring its country's decision making power into the hands of its British Indian masters. India tackled Afghanistan through soft power policy and got control of Afghan foreign affairs. Conrad Schetter in his article "The Durand Line The Afghan-Pakistani Border Region between Pashtunistan, Tribalistan and Talibanistan" says that after the death of Amir Abdur Rehman, his son Habibullah succeeded him in 1901 and he signed a treaty with Indian British government in March 1905, which gave the reins of his country's foreign policy in the control of British Indian government.¹⁰⁰ Afghanistan got independence from British India in 1919 and proclaimed itself independent its foreign policy affairs which British India also accepted and remained

⁹⁹ Fabrizio Foschini , "The 1919 War of Independence: A Conflict the Afghans Started," *Afghanistan Analysts Network* - English, March 9, 2020.

¹⁰⁰Conrad Schetter. "The Durand Line. The Afghan-Pakistani Border Region between Pashtunistan, Tribalistan and Talibanistan." *InternationalesAsienforum* 44, no. 1-2 (2013): pp. 47-70.

reluctant from interfering in its internal problems. Another strong demonstration of Indian soft power ingress in Afghanistan was articulated in the article “Salvaging a Fractured Past: Reflections on Norms of Governance and Afghan-Rajput Relations in North India in the Late Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth Centuries”, written by Raziuddin Aquil that, the third Anglo-Afghan war started in 1919 and at the end of war, ‘the Treaty of Peace’ was signed between the two warring states, at Rawalpindi on August 1919, which confirmed the sanctity of “Durand line” and abolished the subsidies to the Amir of Afghanistan. Finally, another treaty, ‘The Treaty of 1921’ held between British India and Afghanistan, which paved the way for independence of Afghanistan, and British Indian government recognized the sovereignty of Afghanistan in its foreign relations.¹⁰¹ Despite the full independence of Afghanistan from British Indian government, the former did not remain out of influence of the later and British Indian Government used to decide the type of government in Afghanistan, which favored them. The monarchy in Afghanistan was collapsed in 1929 but it restored after one year with the help of Indian British Government in 1930.

Maulana Muhammad Ali in December 1919, at the Congress session appealed Indian Muslims to migrate to Afghanistan, owing to the religious riots in India and ensuing circumstances generated the frosty relations between the two states. *I. P. Khosla* in the article “Aspects of India–Afghanistan Relations” talked about the massive migration of approximately 25,000 Muslims from India to Afghanistan at the end of July 1920, but this honeymoon period between India and Afghanistan was proved very short. Amanullah closed down the border for Indian migrants from Afghanistan in 1921 and wrote letter to British

¹⁰¹Raziuddin Aquil. "Salvaging a Fractured Past: Reflections on Norms of Governance and Afghan-Rajput Relations in North India in the Late Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth Centuries." *Studies in History* 20, no. 1 (2004): pp. 1-29.

government of India for strengthening diplomatic relations and mutual friendship.¹⁰²

1.3 Indian Independence and the Indo Afghan Relations

The independence of India from the clutches of British distorted the physical contiguity of India and Afghanistan and separated the two historically contiguous states from each other. Independence of India from the imperialist British government was proved as the last nail in the coffin of India-Afghanistan separation.¹⁰³The ensuing circumstances after the passing of 3rd June 1947 Plan for dividing the sub-continent, witnessed the tense and frenzy relations between the British Indian Government and Afghanistan.

Indian growing influence in Afghanistan was evident soon after the division of sub-continent, when British decided to leave India and passed 3rd June 1947 plan, Afghan government under the kingship of Zahir Shah raised the issue of Durand Line's sanctity and demanded the inclusion of North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) in Afghanistan. After independence, both Pakistan and India, contended for establishing amicable relations with Afghanistan but India remained successful in attracting Afghanistan towards its sphere of influence and thwarting it from making brotherly relations with its newly independent Muslim neighboring state of Pakistan. The implications of Indian influence in Afghanistan started to appear after the Indian proclivity and ingress in Afghanistan. When Pakistan came into being, India manipulated the 'Durand Line Agreement' which was signed between British India and Afghanistan on November 1893, which became the basis of another Pak-Afghan bilateral conflict.

The prime factor which motivated India in enhancing its involvement in

¹⁰² I P khosla, "Aspects of India–Afghanistan Relations," *WorldCat Identities*, January 1, 1970.

¹⁰³Theophilus Francis Rodenbough. *Afghanistan and the Anglo-Russian Dispute: An Account of Russia's Advance Toward India...* GP Putnam's sons, 1885.

Afghanistan was historical links between the two states, which predated the creation of Pakistan. Second the main interest and mission of India was to contain Pakistani influence in Afghanistan. From the 1950s to 1970s era, India perceived Afghanistan as a strategic maneuver tool against sovereignty of Pakistan and started to harness Afghanistan against Pakistan.

The immediate implications which Pakistan endured by the Indian growing influence in Afghanistan were the diplomatic retreat of Pakistan vis-à-vis Afghanistan. The mutual cooperation of India and Afghanistan, soon after the India independence, spurred the later to refrain from casting a negative vote in the favour of recognizing Pakistan, as an independent country. When the 'Treaty of Friendship' signed between India and Afghanistan in 1950, Pakistan lashed out at the dual participation in destabilizing Pakistan by attacking it from the both sides of the border. Afghanistan joined Indian Non Alignment movement and both the states criticized Pakistan in the 1955 Bandung Conference; on the act of joining USA led Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955.¹⁰⁴

With the passage of time and increasing Indian ingression in Afghanistan made the relations bitter between Afghanistan and Pakistan that escalated to the level of short skirmishes and subsequently Pakistan closed its border for Afghanistan. The then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Bogra, lambasted India and Afghanistan on the issues of Durand Line and Kashmir, while addressing the second south-east Asia defense organization ministerial council meeting (S-EADO) in 1956 in Karachi. Similarly, after two years Prime Minister Feroz Khan Noon also echoed the same sentiments at Baghdad Pact

¹⁰⁴Bhashyam Kasturi. "India's Role In Afghanistan." *Indian Defence Review*, 2012.

Ministerial Council meeting in Ankara 1958 and accused Indo-Afghan nexus for having notorious intentions towards Pakistan.¹⁰⁵

The visit of President of Pakistan's Iskander Mirza to Kabul in August 1956 and exchange of visit between Afghan PM Muhammad Daoud Khan and Pakistani PM Suhrawardy broke the ice between the two neighboring countries. King Zahir Shah paid his royal visit to Pakistan during this period and the strained relations mitigated between the two states. Zubeida Mustafa in her article "Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations and Central Asian Politics" says that to mitigate the tension between the two warring states, Iran played a role of mediator and facilitated Tehran Agreement on 28 May 1963.¹⁰⁶

As a result of commencement of Tehran accord with the help of Iran, Afghanistan agreed not to associate the "Pakhtunistan" issue with other bilateral issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan.¹⁰⁷ The relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan started to become friendly after the commencement of Tehran accord in 1963 and both the states took steps to enhance the trade volume between them. These relations were improved to such an extent that Afghanistan remained on the Pakistan's side in the 1965 India-Pakistan war and King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan offered Pakistan to move its troops forward from the border line into Afghanistan.¹⁰⁸

Among the other tactics of India in imparting security threats to Pakistan, India fully supported Afghan irredentist claims against Pakistan under the premiership of Afghan Prime minister Mohammed Daoud Khan from 1953-1963 and afterwards also in 1973-

¹⁰⁵Shahrbano Tadjbakhsh. *South Asia and Afghanistan: The Robust India-Pakistan Rivalry*. PRIO, 2011.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., 9.

¹⁰⁷Zubeida Mustafa. "Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations and Central Asian politics (1973-1978)." *Pakistan Horizon* 31, no. 4 (1978): pp.14-37.

¹⁰⁸Mohib Ullah Durani, and Ashraf Khan. —Pakistan-Afghan Relations: Historic Mirror. *The Dialogue* 4, no. 1 (2002): pp. 25-61.

1978.in the era of King Zahir Shah. The Afghan King Zahir Shah and President of Pakistan Ayub Khan signed a transit trade agreement in 1965, which replaced the earlier 1958's accord between the two states and Peshawar-Kabul and Quetta-Kandahar, two telecommunication links were initiated also.¹⁰⁹

The September, 1965 Pak-Indo war gave an ample opportunity to India to reinvigorate the Pashtunistan issue between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which further destabilized relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The culmination of this rivalry prompted short skirmishes between Pakistan and Afghanistan; as a result Pakistan closed its border for Afghanistan, which caused severe damage to latter's economy. During this time India actively supported the Pashtun cause and sheltered and armored Baloch separatists and Pashtun dissidents. EAM Swaran Singh, while addressing the Lok Sabha in November 1965, vowed to support, Abdul Ghaffar Khan in his struggle for Pashtun cause and subsequently, All India Radio (AIR) live broadcasted about Pashtun rebellion against the government of Pakistan. Indian actively participated in fomenting this issue, according to Indian intelligence officer "we gave the Baloch everything, from money to guns during the 1970s."¹¹⁰

Despite the fact that Afghanistan remained neutral in the Indo-Pak, September 1965 war, which exacerbated the relations between India and Afghanistan. But India did not step back and again started engaging with Afghanistan for making relations more amicable through soft power influence. William Byrd in his article "Lessons from Afghanistan's History for the Current Transition and beyond" says that to mend the tense relations, Indian PM Lal Bahadur Shastri decided to visit Kabul after signing the Tashkent Declaration. He could not visit owing to his sudden death and subsequently, instead of him, India's Vice

¹⁰⁹Ibid., 9.

¹¹⁰JayshreeBajoria. "India-Afghanistan Relations." *Council on Foreign Relations* 22 (2009).

President Dr. Zakir Hussain paid his visit to Kabul in July 1966 and set the stage for mutual economic cooperation.¹¹¹

Pakistan also continued its diplomatic overtures towards Afghanistan to counter the Indian influence, but not got much success in its strategy. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto visited Afghanistan in the post 1971 India-Pakistan war to gain the favor of Afghanistan in the political crisis between India and Pakistan. Afghanistan did not entertain Pakistan's overtures and tried to remain in the India's court. Afghan Minister of Information and Culture paid an official visit to India in March 1974. Similarly Indian Minister of External Affairs, Yashwantrao Balwantrao Chavan, on the invitation of Afghan government, paid a visit to Kabul in October 1975, shared the mutual fear from Pakistan's stockpiling of military weapons. Atal Bihari Vajpayee undertook his visit to Kabul, soon after changing of government in India in September 1977 and then again visited in September 1978, to reiterated continuity in the friendship between the two neighboring states.¹¹²

India also tried to distort the domestic security fabric of Pakistan and fully supported National Awami Party (NAP), against its adversary Pakistan People's Party (PPP) led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1970 general elections. Ataullah Mengal became chief minister of Baluchistan, after NAP swept across NWFP and Baluchistan, which spurred the more insurgency between central and provincial government of Baluchistan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in his tenure fought diligently to quell the influence of India in Afghanistan and also countered all the smear campaigns of India against Pakistan diplomatically. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto mentioned the support of King Zahir Shah at UN, which he had offered to then

¹¹¹William Byrd, *Lessons from Afghanistan's History for the Current Transition and beyond*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2012.

¹¹²Kanti Bajpai, Saira Basit, and V. Krishnappa, eds. *India's grand strategy: History, theory, cases*. Routledge, 2014.

President of Pakistan General Ayub Khan as a Muslim against India, which Bhutto was unable to prove later, but it politically damaged the relations between India and Afghanistan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto cracked down on Baloch and Pashtun separatists ruthlessly spurred by India, dismissed NAP government in 1973 and imposed martial law. Pakistan also spurred an armed rising against Daud regime on July 1975, with the help of Jamiat-e-Islami, but it failed.¹¹³

Indian soft power strategy in Afghanistan could be gauged by this act that, when the ‘Saur revolution’ held in Afghanistan, India was the first country which accepted the Communist government of Afghanistan. Nur Mohammad Taraki’s communist government was immediately accepted by India after the “Saur revolution” and with the downfall of President Daud. India’s then Minister of External Affairs, Atal Behari Vajpayee in September 1978, visited Kabul, which was the first official visit of any foreign dignitary after the Saur revolution in Afghanistan.¹¹⁴

These relations witnessed the same trajectory even at the time of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The transition in relations between India and Afghanistan held by the Soviets invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and Indian silence on this intervention. Rajan Jha in his journal “India–Afghanistan Strategic Relations in the Post-Taliban Period” says that at the time of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, India did not oppose the intervention, owing to the fear of alienation from a close partner in the shape of Moscow. The relations between India and Afghanistan remained amicable except for a short period of time of Mujahedeen Jihad against Soviet Infidels in Afghanistan in 1979. Soviet intervention was an opportunity for Pakistan to hold its sway on Afghanistan and quell the Pashtunistan issue,

¹¹³Sripathi Narayanan. "Pakistan & Afghanistan." *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies*, 2010.

¹¹⁴Ibid., 10.

emanating from Afghanistan. N. A. Khalfin in the article “The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 3rd Edition (1970-1979)” says that Pakistan fully supported Jihad by sending armed mujahedeen supported militarily by USA and Saudi Arabia against Soviet infidels.¹¹⁵

Indian Building of Indira Ghandi hospital

It was the result of India’s soft power influence in Afghanistan that the latter did not carry the approach of alienating diplomatically from India for the long time, since the Indian alleged silence on the intervention of USSR in Afghanistan. At last Afghanistan succumbed to the Indian maneuverings in their war torn-country in the form of different development projects and diplomatic support. Harsh V. Pant in his monograph “India’s changing Afghanistan policy: Regional and global implications”. The India engaged in different developmental projects in Afghanistan in the period of 1970s and built Indira Ghandi hospital in Afghanistan, along with other humanitarian assistance.¹¹⁶

1.4 Indo-Afghan Relations in Post-Cold War Period

The historical amicable relations between India and Afghanistan got setback in the period of 1980s and 90s. This was the time of mujahedeen’s fight with the Soviet infidels, their withdrawal and ensuing civil war in Afghanistan. Despite these all circumstances, India’s bedrock ambitions and strategic interests in Afghanistan didn’t leave it unengaged with Afghanistan.

India continued its soft power ingress in Afghanistan in the realm of diplomatic engagements with Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and then President of India R. Venkatraman, vowed to continue its support to Najibullah government

¹¹⁵ Dr Hanifur Rehman and Faheem Ullah Khan, “ Indo-Pakistan Rivalry and Afghanistan,” *Journal of Contemporary Studies*, no.2 (2014).

¹¹⁶Harsh V Pant. *India’s Changing Afghanistan Policy: Regional and Global Implications (Enlarged Edition)*. Lulu. com, 2013.

against the mujahedeen factions.

Nasreen Akhtar in her article “India’s Regional Strategic Outlook and Influence via Afghanistan” says that Pakistan’s interference in Afghanistan from 1980s-1990s in Afghanistan had created imbalance between India and Pakistan’s sway of influence in Afghanistan. According to Chandra Suba “India enhanced its presence in its immediate neighbor (Afghanistan) during Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1980s, which was important for Indian plains to reach resourceful Central Asian states.¹¹⁷

India remained engage with India in all the tense environment between the two countries and then PM of India Rajiv Gandhi joined hands with Najibullah in crushing Pakistan’s growing influence in Afghanistan and adventurism in Kashmir and active collaboration between R&W and KhAD was seen in keeping an eye on Pakistan secret agency ISI’s action. Despite the betrayal of USA, Rajiv Gandhi, the then PM of India invited President Najibullah of Afghanistan for an official visit to India in 1988. He gave him great protocol and tried his best to court him on Indian side against Pakistan in Afghanistan. Rajiv also developed active relations with both USA and Soviet Union between 1985 and 1988, to ensure a timely Soviet withdrawal from Kabul. Indian pilots fought in the support of Najibullah’s forces against Mujahedeen in 1989.¹¹⁸

India used the tool of soft power even during the period of Taliban and officially recognized the Mujahedeen government. Soon after the fall of Najibullah government, Indian officials met with President Sibghatullah Mojadeddi and announced humanitarian aid and medical supplies worth R.S 160 lac and procurement of 44,000 tons of wheat to Afghanistan

¹¹⁷Nasreen Akhtar, “India’s Regional Strategic Outlook and Influence via Afghanistan,” *UNISCI Journal* 17, no. 49 (2019): pp. 173-190

¹¹⁸Kallol Bhattacharjee. *The Great Game in Afghanistan: Rajiv Gandhi, General Zia and the Unending War*. HarperCollins, 2017.

and continued this support from 1991-96. In the special report “Afghanistan and Its Neighbors: An Ever Dangerous Neighborhood”, Marvin G. Weinbaum articulates that when the Communist government in Afghanistan finally fell after the three years of Soviet withdrawal, the mujahedeen factions started battling one another. The fight among the different parties of mujahedeen led the country into chaos and civil war situation, which prompted the leaders of Kabul to bend towards India for economic as well as political support.¹¹⁹

Pakistan also ensured its credibility in Afghanistan during the period of civil war in the country and brokered the Peshawar Accord on April 1992, which installed Mujahedeen government in Afghanistan, while India continued lobbying with India and Russia against Pakistani installed Mujahedeen. The “Country Profile: Afghanistan” by Library of Congress Federal Research Division highlights that Pakistan brokered ‘March accord’ on 7 March 1993, to ensure the stability and formation of successful interim government in Kabul. Former DG-ISI General Hamid Gul had affirmed that departure of Soviet Union from Afghanistan encouraged us to join the two wars in Afghanistan and Kashmir with each other.¹²⁰

Another transition in relations between India and Afghanistan occurred in the period of Taliban regime (1996-2001) and fall of Narasimha Rao’s government on May 1996, who was a key conciliator. These happenings started new era of disenchantment between the states of India and Afghanistan. The ascendance of Taliban regime into the government totally shunned Indian diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. Taliban closed the Indian

¹¹⁹Marvin G Weinbaum. *Afghanistan and its neighbors: An ever dangerous neighborhood*. Vol. 31. United States Institute of Peace, 2006.

¹²⁰ Profile, Country. "Afghanistan." Library of Congress: Federal Research Division, 2009.

embassy from Afghanistan and during this period India witnessed plethora of mujahedeen's transgression into India from Afghanistan with the help of Pakistan for fulfilling their holy duty of Jihad against Indian non-Muslims.¹²¹ Despite these all gloominess and precarious situation of relations between India and Afghanistan, India did not get back from engaging with Afghanistan. Kenneth Katzman and Clayton Thomas in their Congressional Research Service Report "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", says that India supported Tajik based Northern Alliance against Taliban in the mid-1990s, which helped them in countering the Pakistani backed hostile Taliban in Afghanistan against India.¹²²

After wards, the incident of hijacking of Indian Airlines from Kathmandu in 1999 by Let (Lashker e Tayaaba) had shocked India and they changed their isolationist policy, vis-à-vis, Taliban and started engaging with them. India faced increased insurgency in Indian Occupied Kashmir region and held Pakistan accountable for the incident of hijacking of its Airplane in 1999 as a bargaining strategy to put pressure on India to withdraw its troops from Kashmir. This period was the darkest period of Indian relations with Afghanistan, which gave impetus to Pakistan to enhance its sway in Afghanistan. India did not recognize the Taliban government, supported anti-Taliban, United Front (UF) financially and militarily with the support of Russia, Iran and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) and endorsed Resolution 1076 of UNSC, which criticized the Taliban's bluntly human rights violations.¹²³

Pakistan greatly benefitted from the Taliban's rise in Afghanistan in 1996 and used

¹²¹Fazal Abbas Awan, Asia Saif Alvi, and Rabia Munir. "Delhi-Kabul Nexus: Regional Dynamics and Geopolitical Perspective (With Reference to Pakistan)." *Journal of Indian Studies* 5, no. 1 (2019): pp. 91-101.

¹²²Kenneth Katzman. "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban governance, security, and US policy." *LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE*, 2010.

¹²³ Boston Massachusetts. "Rule of Law in Afghanistan," *American Institute of Afghanistan Studies*, 2010.

them efficiently against Indian interests in Afghanistan. The government of Pakistan under the then PM Benazir Bhutto Pakistan's PM Benazir Bhutto's denounced the government of Rabbani, and deemed it as an illegitimate government in early 1995 and after wards used Taliban force efficiently to protect Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan for a safe passage to newly emerged Central Asian states after the disintegration of Soviet Union.

1.5 9/11 and Indo-Afghan Relations

USA invasion of Afghanistan brought suitable atmosphere for India to manipulate the scenario in its favour and it changed its foreign policy from coercive to soft power policy. India actively participated in Bonn conference in 2001 and resultantly hailed Hamid Karzai's accession to power, owing to his favorable sentiments towards India and his educational background from India. After USA invasion, India made amicable relations with all the successive governments of Afghanistan for the fulfillment of its interests and objectives.

India adopted soft power policy in Afghanistan in this period and concealed its interests in the cover of reconstruction and development of war torn country. Indian foreign policy was motivated by using military and economic aid to Afghanistan, that's the reason that according to (Yousafzai, 1999) more than 70% of Afghans look towards India, as a favorable and beneficial country for them, contrary to Pakistan, about which most of Afghans carry negative opinions. The Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) opened its office in Kabul on March, 2001. India also organized a 'Made-in-India' program in Kabul in September 2002 and introduced Indian products in Afghanistan and Indian investors showed willingness to build up medical and industrial units in Afghanistan of worth 2.5 million USD.¹²⁴

¹²⁴Moeed Yusuf. *Decoding Pakistan's' strategic shift'in Afghanistan*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2013.

The primary goal of India in Afghanistan was to curtail Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan. Indian aim in Afghanistan was to act as a regional hegemonic and to increase the trade volume with Afghanistan, Central Asia states and Europe. India was wary of reemergence of Taliban fighters in Afghanistan, who had anti-Indian sentiments and deep hatred of India, due to its atrocities in Kashmir on Muslim community. India established a military base at Farkhor (Tajikistan) in May 2002, which helped it to increase its surveillance on Pakistan, close from the Afghan border. India pressurized the Afghan government and international forces in Afghanistan to stop the support and funding of Pakistani backed militants in Indian Occupied Kashmir. India had also developed close relations with Iran in thwarting and minimizing the common threat of ascendance of Sunni Taliban regime to the power corridors of Afghan government.¹²⁵

Indian soft power remained pervasive after the demise of Taliban regime in Afghanistan and India left no stone unturned to manipulate the scenario against the interests of Pakistan in Afghanistan. India upgraded its diplomatic representation in Afghanistan from a Liaison Office to an operational Embassy in 2002. The Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, became the first Indian head which visited Afghanistan after the period of 29 years in 2005. Indian interest and importance of Afghanistan was evident from the President Karzai's 12 visits to India which also showed India's effectively usage of soft power influence there. India pledged 750 million USD for the reconstruction of war torn country and established a Joint Committee to promote business relations between the two states, with the help of 50 million USD credits.

Another diplomatic soft Indian penetration in Afghanistan and its implications for

¹²⁵ Peerzada Tufail Ahmad. "(PDF) India's Soft Power and Pakistan's Hard Power Policy ..." *researchgate*, July 2019.

Pakistan could be assessed by Indian hard struggle to include Afghanistan in SCO, which was Chinese and Russian dominated intergovernmental organization. Through this forum India joined hands with China against Jihadist proliferation in the South Asian region, especially in Afghanistan and three countries China, Afghanistan and India came on the same page and forced Pakistan to do effective and stringent activities against terrorists outfits, which enhanced the narrative of considering Pakistan as a terrorist harbor country.

Pakistan did not leave the ground vacant for Indian maneuverings in Afghanistan and remain engaged in Afghanistan despite the Indian dominant influence in Afghanistan after 9/11 incident. Pakistan's trade with Afghanistan during the Taliban period was 70 million USD, which witnessed a slight increase in 2006 and reached to 1.2 billion USD. President Musharraf paid an official visit to Kabul on January 7, 2009 and discussed with his counterpart to expand the cooperation and curtail the drug trafficking.

The manifestation of Indian practical implementation of soft power in Afghanistan was evident by its procurement of 80 million USD to Afghanistan for 280 km road that would link it with border of Iran and also reconstructed Salma Dam in Afghanistan. India adopted a magnificent way for implementation of this strategy and it choose relatively stable areas of north and west of Afghanistan for implementing high visibility big projects and low visibility small development projects (SDP) in relatively lawless, remote and unstable areas in a sense to increase its influence all over the country. India constructed the Afghanistan's biggest children hospital and Afghan new Parliament building. India procured three Airbus aircrafts to Ariana Afghan Airlines, supplied 250,000 tons of wheat to Afghanistan and gave 1,000 scholarships to Afghan students in India annually.¹²⁶

¹²⁶Ibid., 22.

Pakistan signed 'The agreement of Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement' (APTTA) with Afghanistan on July 2010, which replaced the old Afghan Transit Trade Agreement of 1965. This updated APTTA introduced some new provisions like compulsion of bonded containers for transit trade, trucks with tracking devices, which could use Pakistani territory for picking the cargo from the ports of Pakistan. In February 2014, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan agreed to establish the Central Asia-South Asia Electricity and Transmission and Trade project (CASA-1000). Similarly, another milestone in regional energy project is the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline, signed between the participants in December 2010.¹²⁷

Under the garb of soft power proclivity towards Afghanistan, Delhi deployed 500 members of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) in Afghanistan, to secure its workers and diplomatic services against the growing attacks on Indian installments in Afghanistan. Pakistan was wary of Indian increasing number of troops in Afghanistan, the former viewed Indian surge in troops for detrimental to Pakistan's security, which could be used against it at any time from neighboring Afghanistan, in case of war broke between Pakistan and India.¹²⁸

India was not invited in the London conference, held for discussion on future of Afghanistan, in which 60 nations came to participate. As a result, India lashed at the policy of distinction between "Good and Bad" Taliban and also lambasted Pakistan of its alleged role in luring western powers to trust Pakistan for its role as an interlocutor between Taliban and western power. India was of the view that Pakistan would never relinquish its support

¹²⁷ Miller Laurel. "Resetting Pakistan's Relations with Afghanistan," *Crisis Group*, September 15, 2016.

¹²⁸ Carol Christine Fair. "India in Afghanistan and Beyond: Opportunities and Constraints." *Available at SSRN 1681753* (2010).

for Haqqani network in Afghanistan and played double game with western powers by insuring them itself as a staunch ally against terrorist outfits, but in reality Pakistan was engaging in using Haqqani network to pressurize India for giving concessions to Pakistan in Kashmir.¹²⁹

Another most prominent and important breakthrough between India and Afghanistan by the Indian soft power ingression was the Agreement on Strategic Partnership (ASP) signed in October 2011. It was a unique agreement in its nature with any neighboring country like Afghanistan by India which the former never done any other country in its history. Through this agreement India cooperated with Afghanistan in the fields of Agriculture, mining, rural development industry, information technology, civil aviation communications, and transport. Under this agreement, India trained Afghan civil servants, diplomats, parliamentary staff and legislators to develop the democratic institutions in Afghanistan. This created panic in Pakistan which was of the view that Indian training to Afghan military personnel could create a nexus between the two countries' military and could use it against Pakistan in future.

India used its soft power in dealing with Afghanistan and organized investment summit in 2012 in Delhi to highlight Afghanistan's economic potential. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani also visited India in September 2016 and subsequently increased its economic assistance by another 1 billion USD.

Indian movies also played an important role in portraying positive image of India and a negative image of Pakistan among the Afghans, which was also manifestation of Indian soft power policy in Afghanistan. A survey conducted by BBC poll in 2010, revealed that

¹²⁹Yow Peter Raiphea. "India-Afghanistan strategic partnership: An analysis of India, Afghanistan and Pakistan perspectives." *International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications* 3, no. 4 (2013): pp. 1.

71% of Afghans watched India as a favorable country towards them and maximum considered Pakistan as a destabilizing factor in the development of Afghanistan. Indian tactical soft power policy in the shape of massive investment in Afghanistan remained successful in getting out Pakistan from the list of aid donor country to Afghanistan. Since December 2015, both the heads of India and Afghanistan met more than five times with each other to strengthen mutual relations.¹³⁰

Implications of Indian soft power policy started to emerge soon as the then Afghan President Ashraf Ghani reprimanded Pakistan for its offer of investment worth 500 million USD in Afghanistan. He advised Pakistan to use this money to combat terrorism in Pakistan, instead of offering this amount to Afghanistan. The cause of these derogatory remarks was the reason of continuous Indian support to Afghanistan, and the incitement of Indian government against Pakistan's involvement in attacks on Indian installments in Afghanistan.

Sujatha Singh visited first time India on August 2013, when suicide attack happened in Indian consulate General in Jalalabad, and vowed to continue Indian support to Afghanistan in all ills and odds. Indian former External Affairs, Shri S.M.Krishna articulated the same assurance and guarantees for Afghanistan at the time of USA decision to drawdown its troops from Afghanistan.

The growing Indian influence in Afghanistan severely destabilized security fabric after 2014. Maliha Zeba Khan in her article, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy towards Afghanistan since Operation Freedom Sentinel: An Overview" says that, when USA announced to minimize its troops in Afghanistan in 2014, the law and order situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan witnessed downward trajectory, with the increasing suicide attacks, target killings

¹³⁰Harsh V Pant., *India's Changing Afghanistan Policy (Enlarged Edition)*. Lulu. com, 2013.

of Army personnel and bomb blasts in the areas of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. Pakistan accused Indian secret intelligence agency RAW's inner hand in destabilizing Pakistan's peace by supporting and nurturing Baloch dissidents and TTP factions in Afghanistan.¹³¹

India pledged approximately 2 billion USD for Afghanistan's reconstruction and development, which made it the largest donor of the region and Afghanistan as the second largest recipient of Indian aid. India collaborated with Iran in constructing a North South Corridor which would transfer Indian goods from its own port to Chahbahar port, then through Iran's rail and road route would traverse towards Caspian and beyond, that will alleviate Afghanistan and India's dependence on Pakistan for trade purpose. India launched a new air cargo corridor in June 2017 and started construction of Chahbahar port connecting Iran, India and Afghanistan with the resourceful countries of Central Asia.

Conclusion

India manipulated the happenings in its interest since the beginning of relations between the two states but it enhanced its manipulations after the independence of India with more valor and cleverness. The Indian overtures in Afghanistan were fully endorsed by Afghanistan due to the bad condition of its economy since the beginning, firstly in the British Indian government's era, then the Russian intervention and lastly by the USA invasion in 2001. If the Afghanistan had not been in bad economic situation it would not have been so much attracted towards India. It is fact that no government of Afghanistan ever recognized the Durand line agreement and always made irredentist claims on the Pakistan's territory but they would not have gone to such an extent, which the time witnessed with the passage of

¹³¹Maliha Zeba Khan. "Pakistan's Foreign Policy Towards Afghanistan Since Operation Freedom Sentinel: An Overview." *Margalla Papers* 21, no. 1 (2017).

time.

Pakistan lacked in the realm of soft power policy in Afghanistan which gave the India a plus point in engaging with Afghanistan, without any competition and it worked on this field and got the most favorite nation status in Afghanistan and internationally also. USA also gave India preference in Afghanistan, vis-à-vis Pakistan that was the reason that India faced no difficulty in gaining strong influence in Afghanistan. Regional countries also fully endorsed Indian policy in Afghanistan due to the Pakistan's historical ties with Taliban, which could prove dangerous for the regional peace.

CHAPTER 2

INDIAN POST 9/11 FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN

The large presence and influence of India in Afghanistan push the former to implicate security threats to Pakistan. India had several objectives in Afghanistan which vary in terms of hidden interests, but the utmost aim of India in Afghanistan was to counter the influence of Pakistan in Afghanistan and getting it far away from its neighboring Muslim state by all possible means. That's why Pakistan had always criticized Indian dominant role in Afghan affairs, which created a large gulf between Pak-Afghan bilateral relations.

The USA invasion of Afghanistan provided India the best opportunity to fulfill its utmost desire of gaining strong foothold in Afghanistan which ensured Afghanistan out of the ambit of Pakistan by the sprinkling of massive Indian aid to the war-ravaged country. Indian main objective in Afghanistan was to stem the terrorism, emanating from Pakistan and Afghanistan into India. The second most important aim of India was to stop terrorists from gaining strong foothold in Afghanistan and subsequently launching attacks on Indian troops in Indian held Kashmir (IoK) and India also.¹³² This Indian policy severely curtailed Pakistan's support to the freedom fighters in Kashmir, which invoked the domestically criticism of Pakistani government policies and challenged the national unity. Thirdly, India's another objective in Afghanistan was to prove itself a hegemonic and emerging great power of not only region but also a stable and largest democracy of the world.

¹³²Sumit Ganguly, and Nicholas Howenstein. "India-Pakistan Rivalry in Afghanistan." *Journal of International Affairs* 63, no. 1 (2009): pp. 127-140.

India destabilized Pakistan's security fabric in a sense that India was assuming Afghanistan, as a test case for showing its power muscles in its neighboring country, which helped it in achieving its goals easily. This power politics of India had putted Pakistan in a vulnerable position in making amicable relations with Afghanistan. Indian interests in Afghanistan were not only Pakistan centric but it had wide interests of gaining a status of great power by controlling the affairs of Afghanistan with its burgeoning influence and physical, diplomatic and military presence in Afghanistan. India deemed to make Afghanistan a pure democratic country, which could ensure peaceful relations with India.¹³³ Indian peaceful relations with Afghanistan did not bode well for Pakistan's brotherly relations with Afghanistan, owing to the deep hatred between Pakistan and India.

Indian Construction of Chabahar Port

Another setback India struck to Pakistan was that it was deeming to control land and maritime routes for Central Asia by rejecting Pakistan and China to traverse freely in the Indian Ocean and stop them from sabotaging Indian possessions in the region and ensured check and balance on Pakistan and China to reach Central Asia. These Indian ambitions would increase the already estranged relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Due to Indian fraternity with Afghanistan, the latter would use Chabahar Port for maritime trade and three countries of India, Iran and Afghanistan will be engaged in trade relations with each other by ignoring Pakistan. It will have adversely effects on Pakistan's already debilitated economy after losing a neighbor country for trading purposes.

India used Afghanistan as a chess board to collect the benefits of the region through this important country. India was among the world's fastest growing economies, so it was

¹³³John Mitton. "The India-Pakistan rivalry and failure in Afghanistan." *International Journal* 69, no. 3 (2014): pp. 353-376.

imperative for India to secure the safe and reliable import of energy resources from an outside source. The Central Asian states were rich in these resources which could fulfill the Indian growing energy needs and Afghanistan was the most nearest and easy route available for India to get these resources into the country. The stable Afghanistan was compulsory for India to transport Central Asian energy resources to the markets of India safely.

Indian strong influence in Afghanistan and its reach to Central Asian market adversely affected Pakistan's trade relations with the Central Asian States, which were already witnessing a downward spiral due to the Indian maximum penetration in the CARs market through Afghanistan. Indian interest in Afghanistan was depicted by its burgeoning demand for hydrocarbons, which had expected the 83 percent rise in its fuel needs by 2030.¹³⁴

Afghanistan's support to India for becoming UN Security Council member

Indian quest for international objectives in Afghanistan relegated Pakistan's image to the lowest ebb, as Afghanistan's support was compulsory for India for reforming UN Security Council rules to gain the permanent seat in the United Nation's Security Council. Afghanistan had primary importance in Indian foreign policy, as it could help India in promoting its positive image at all regional and international forums by acknowledging its developmental and economic support to Afghanistan. It was not good omen for Pakistan because it had witnessed the result of close relations between India and Afghanistan in the past when Afghanistan voted against Pakistan's inclusion in United Nations.

The security threats which Pakistan faced by Indian growing influence in Afghanistan were Indian militarily support and training to Afghan personnel to gain their support and

¹³⁴Raghav Sharma. *India and Afghanistan: Charting a Future*. Universitäts-und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt, 2009.

weapons, in case of war broke between India and Pakistan in the future.¹³⁵ It was a serious threat to Pakistan, which has been facing numerous surprise attacks from the western border across the border since independence of Pakistan on the directions and instigation of India.

2.1 Indian way of Execution of Soft Power Policy in Afghanistan in Post 9/11 Era

After US invasion in 2001, India developed its diplomatic and intelligence network within Afghanistan to monitor Pakistan's activities in Afghanistan to curtail them before happening. This Indian strategy challenged Pakistan internal security sanctity and India worked with Afghan Government and Afghan stakeholders to circumvent the terrorist outfits in Afghanistan and Pakistan to remain safe from these attacks.

India alliances with the regional states

India made alliances with the regional states to delicate the security fabric of Pakistan. India along with Iran, Russia, China and Central Asian States was wary from the continuation of drug trafficking from the war torn Afghanistan and Pakistan. These countries were on the same page to root out this menace from coming into their states from the both Muslim countries and adopted joint cooperation to stem jihadi ideology permeating from these two states into the Muslim population of their countries.¹³⁶ Despite the USA sanctions on Iran, India made amicable relations with the former, owing to its interests in Afghanistan through Iran. Afghanistan was complementary for India and Iran's relations, as it served as a connecting hub between the two neighboring states of Iran and India.¹³⁷

India turned no stone unturned to sabotage the construction of Pakistani Gwadar Port

¹³⁵Lisa Anne Hartenberger. "Mediating transition in Afghanistan, 2001-2004." PhD diss., 2005

¹³⁶Ashley J Tellis., and AroopMukharji. "Is a regional strategy viable in Afghanistan?." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Online verfügbarunter http://carnegieendowment.org/files/regional_approach.pdf. zuletztgeprüft am 25 (2010): 2015.*

¹³⁷Yoel Guzansky. *Port Rush: Competition for Control of Trade Routes*. Institute for National Security Studies, 2019.

with the help of China and India made alliances, with Afghanistan and Iran and it started construction of Chahbahar port in Iran to counter Gwadar port. India was also vying for connecting Afghanistan with Iran, via Rail link, that would alleviate Afghanistan's dependence on Pakistan and India will be in a state to hedge its bet in the region easily. This port would serve as an entry point for India to the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) that will connect India, Afghanistan, Russia and Central Asian states.¹³⁸

India established cultural, social and diplomatic relations with central Asian countries through Afghanistan to make relations more amicable, which helped India in tapping and gaining resources of Central Asia States without any hiccups. India started Indian cultural centers in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan and study centers in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.¹³⁹

Indian dominance over Afghan economy through aid donation

India played a vicious role in distorting the civil military relations of Pakistan through Afghanistan by engaging separately with the two institutions. India stepped forward in the field of aid donation to Afghanistan after the destruction of war to get influence over Afghan economy and made it dependable on India for economic progress. Indian strategic moves in Afghanistan played a villainous role in the disturbance of military and political leadership of Pakistan. Because the two institutions were having their separate ideologies about making relations with Afghanistan.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸Vinay Kaura. "India-Afghanistan Relations in the Modi-Ghani Era." *Indian Journal of Asian Affairs* 30, no. 1/2 (2017): pp. 29-46.

¹³⁹Nishtha Kaushiki. "The New Great Game and India's Connect Central Asia Policy: Strategic Perspectives and Challenges." *Journal of International and Area Studies* (2013): pp. 83-100.

¹⁴⁰Mir Sherbaz Khetrn. "Indian Interference in Balochistan." *Strategic Studies* 37, no. 3 (2017): pp. 112-125

2.2 Indian Set Back to Pakistan's Trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia

India used soft power in Afghanistan and projected it through diplomatic channels to curtail Pakistan's sway on Afghanistan which jeopardized Pakistan's trade with it and other regional countries.

Afghanistan's inclusion in the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) by Indian endeavors

India had steered the way for Afghanistan's inclusion in the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to quell the hindrances for free flow of goods across the region, which was previously hindered by Pakistan and the latter never allowed the passage to Indian goods exported to Afghanistan. Pakistan had witnessed low volume of trade with the regional states after Afghanistan's inclusion in SAARC, which India exploited for its interest and got the chance to make trade relations with regional states on the pretext of Afghanistan's entry in SAARC. Dr. Naseema Akhter and Arif Hussain Malik in the article "India's Involvement in Afghanistan: An Analytic Perspective of Current Interests and Future Prospects" highlighted the Indian soft power policy in Afghanistan and says that India signed a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) with Afghanistan in 2003, and got substantial duty concessions for Indian goods in Afghanistan and vice versa. This agreement decreased Pakistan's already bleak trade volume with Afghanistan and increased interdependence between India and Afghanistan. India had witnessed increase in its trade with Afghanistan in the post 9/11 era, which severely affected Pakistan's economic trade with Afghanistan. The APTTA agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan signed on 2010, also affected Pakistan's trade with Afghanistan, which was highly perceived as a US connivance with

India to benefit India in tapping Afghan precious natural resources.¹⁴¹

2.3 Indian Smear Campaign against Pakistan through Afghanistan after 9/11

India posed security threats to Pakistan from Afghanistan by taking the advantage of insurgency in Pakistan's tribal areas because India was much dreadful and afraid from the burgeoning influence of Islamic militancy from Pakistan and Afghanistan into India. Indian government fully supported insurrection in the restive provinces, Baluchistan and KPK of Pakistan to divert its concentration from Kashmir and stopped it to use Afghanistan as a base camp for training militants to attack Indian soldiers in Kashmir.

Collusion of India intelligence with USA and Afghanistan's intelligence agencies against Pakistan's restive regions

Indian secret intelligence agency RAW made covert collusion with CIA and KhAD to curtail Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan and trained and supported Baloch dissidents in the consulates of Afghanistan to destabilize Pakistan's security. Many experts encouraged and spurred India to adopt the strict policy towards the terrorists after the suicide bombing in Kabul in October 2009; Bibhu Prasad in the report "National Security Decision-making in India" quoted Gurmeet Kanwal, urged India to retaliate the continuous attack on Indian assets in Afghanistan. If India wanted to depict itself as a global power, it was mandatory for India to adopt the posture of global power projection in Afghanistan against the perpetrators who were engaging in these activities.¹⁴²

¹⁴¹Naseema Akthar, and Arif Hussain Malik. "India's Involvement in Afghanistan: An Analytic Perspective of Current Interests and Future Prospects." *International Affairs* 63, no. 1 (2009): pp.112-122.

¹⁴²Khalid Rahman. "India-Iran Relations and Current Regional Dynamics." *Policy Perspectives* (2010): pp. 27-49.

2.4 India Maneuverings in Gaining the USA Most Trusted Ally in the WoT after 9/11

India took the advantage of the incident of 9/11 in tarnishing Pakistan's domestic peace and national cohesion. After 9/11, India adopted a coercive diplomacy against Pakistan, same in the way the US pursued by asking Pakistan that "Either you with us or not". The further terrorist attack on Indian parliament in Afghanistan in 2001, gave an impetus to India to vilify Pakistan at every global forum and it deployed huge army on Pakistan's border and tried to influence other countries specially USA against Pakistan and portrayed itself the most faithful and trusted ally of USA vis-à-vis Pakistan.

India's fifth-generation warfare against Pakistan

India used soft power policy in Afghanistan by using fifth-generation warfare against Pakistan and got the full support of USA in exchange of developmental projects in Afghanistan. USA supported India to secure its interests in Afghanistan and in South Asia by countering China and Pakistan's nexus against them.¹⁴³

Indian connivance with USA also gave the former a golden opportunity to implicate serious security threats to Pakistan. India gained the status of most important and crucial ally of USA in Afghanistan by courting USA in signing its strategic partnership agreement with USA. The USA gave justification for this agreement that it was necessary to counter China's growing influence in South Asia, which was mere hoax, rather it might trigger nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan, which could be destructive in nature. Pakistan demanded the Civil Nuclear agreement from USA, like it made with India in 2008 but US didn't pay any heed to Pakistan's demand.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³Suleman Yousaf. "Afghanistan's Mineral Resource Potential: A Boon or Bane?." *Journal of Current Affairs* Vol 1, no. 1&2 (2016): pp.86-109.

¹⁴⁴Qandeel Siddique. *Pakistan's future policy towards Afghanistan: A look at strategic depth, militant movements and the role of India and the US*. No. 2011: 08. DIIS Report, 2011.

USA attitude towards Pakistan accentuated the de-hyphenation of USA policies towards Pakistan and India, which not only consolidated India's dominant posture in the region but decreased the possibility of any serious dialogue between the two warring states. USA strategic partnership with India; elevated the latter's status and downgraded the Pakistan's importance as a frontline ally in the war on terror in Afghanistan.

Pakistan's vulnerable security fabric exposed in front of whole world due to India which remained successful in gaining trust and favor of USA in perpetuating the latter's so called war on terror (WoR) campaign in Afghanistan and fully cooperated with USA economically, politically and diplomatically. This Indian move severely damaged Pakistan's image in the South Asia, which suffered more than any state in the war of Afghanistan and USA also gave more importance to India in comparison with Pakistan. India's hegemony during USA involvement in Afghanistan could be gauged by dividing the time in three distinct periods. The first period was from 2001-2007, with the recognition of India's indispensable role during the Bonn conference. In the second phase, India remained sidelined by the USA, owing to the fear of Pakistan's displeasure. The third phase in the period of Trump was glorious period for India, which handed over it a critical role to play despite the fierce opposition and apprehension from Pakistan.¹⁴⁵

In the period of USA President Donald Trump's presidency India left no stone unturned to sabotage Pakistan's security through Afghanistan. When Trump proclaimed its new South Asian Policy related with Afghanistan and Pakistan, it annoyed Pakistan in a sense that Trump demanded Indian support to USA in improving the economic situation of Afghanistan. USA alleged Pakistan for offering safe heavens to terror groups, which India

¹⁴⁵Samra Naz, and Zafar Nawaz Jaspal. "Afghanistan in the Snare of External Power Struggle." *Strategic Studies* 38, no. 3 (2018): pp. 22-39

fully endorsed and felt proud to become a part of the USA policy of demanding ‘do more’ from Pakistan against Haqqani network. USA secretary of State Rex Tillerson also proclaimed “shared values” between India and US in Afghanistan. Different US officials deemed India, an important ally in the US war on terror and admired its commanding role in the Asian region. Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, proclaimed India a “linchpin” for US policies in Asia, similarly former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel dubbed India as a security provider “from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific”. The Barack Obama administration was also not an exceptional in this proclamation of greater Indian role in Asia, particularly in Afghanistan, which pursued amicable security relations with India in Afghanistan for rebalancing its Asia policy. The former’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke stated that “the problem in Afghanistan is the safe sanctuaries in Pakistan for these militants”. This type of statement by an important US official for Pakistan clearly shows USA biased attitude towards Pakistan in comparison with India, which had been indulged in increasing its influence in Afghanistan for campaigning its smear campaign against Pakistan. India enhanced its influence in Afghanistan with the connivance of US, which was evident by the signing of the strategic partnership agreement between India and Afghanistan in 2011. This agreement would have not been materialized, if US had not supported this endeavor between the two neighboring states.¹⁴⁶

India took the advantage of this favour and pursued its three pronged policy of firstly containing the spillover effect of terrorism in India from Afghanistan, secondly accession to Central Asian resources through Afghanistan and thirdly to downgrade the Pakistani influence in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. India gained two profits from giving unanimous

¹⁴⁶AkshayRanade. "Trump’s Afghanistan Strategy and Emerging Alignments in the Region: Implications for India." *ORF Issue Brief* (2017).

support to USA; one was that US-Indian nexus jeopardized Pak-China cooperation in Afghanistan against India and secondly India gained USA sympathy vis-à-vis, Pakistan in the region and headed towards gaining the status of regional powerful state. It was a clear message to Pakistan that the US and India were on the same page against their mutual foe, Pakistan, despite the fact that Pakistan sacrificed and took tangible steps to uproot the menace of terrorist safe heavens from the tribal areas in its operation of Zarb-e-Azab in Waziristan.¹⁴⁷

India played its role globally to alienate US from Pakistan which severely threatened Pakistan's security owing to the US's curtailment of coalition budget fund to Pakistan which gave enough room to terrorists to attack Pakistan with greater force.

US attitude of partnering with India and alienation of Pakistan in Afghanistan war encouraged and spurred India to assume greater responsibilities in Afghanistan, which was earlier difficult with the amicable relations between Pakistan and US. UN Ambassador Nikki Haley added the fuel to the already simmering discord between US and Pakistan by asking India to "keep an eye on Pakistan" which could help Washington in containing terrorism in the region. These all biased attitude of US towards Pakistan increased the competition of the both neighboring countries in Afghanistan for power maximization. India was seeking greater role in Afghanistan after the full US support and Pakistan accused India for promoting covert and overt rebellious activities in Pakistan's restive province of Baluchistan via Afghanistan. President Obama visited India on November 2010 and ensured mutual cooperation in the development of military equipment, intelligence sharing and joint military exercises for regional peace under a cooperative security framework.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁷Sumitakumar. *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Trends and Challenges*. Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses, 2019.

¹⁴⁸Richard Weitz. "Promoting US-Indian Defense Cooperation: Opportunities and Obstacles." (2017).

Pakistan showed anger on this duplicity by the USA and the National Security Committee (NSC) of Pakistan stressed that “India could not be sole security provider in the South Asia region, especially in Afghanistan”. The criticism from USA disheartened Pakistan despite its huge sacrifices in the USA war of Afghanistan and pushed Pakistan towards China and both the states made an alliance against growing US-Indian nexus in Afghanistan and took help from China in the fields of military and infrastructural developments.

This clandestine harmony among USA and India invoked Pakistan’s two basic insecurities: firstly Indian encirclement of Pakistan in Afghanistan by increasing its influence and secondly putted Pakistan’s security in danger by US-India Civilian Nuclear Deal in 2005. With the USA announcement of drawdown of its troops in 2014, Pakistan felt insecurity due to the strong Indian foothold in Afghanistan. USA endorsement of Indian active role in the war-torn country jeopardized the balance of power in subcontinent to the detriment of Pakistan.¹⁴⁹

2.5 Indian Accession to Afghanistan and Central Asian Resources

India’s interests in Afghanistan, along with other interests were to gain untapped resources of Afghanistan and reaching the resourceful Central Asian States to the detriment of Pakistan. The USA invasion of Afghanistan proved a possible opportunity for India to fulfill its dream of using and availing these natural resources. After US invasion in 2001, India and China competed for getting iron ore minerals from Afghanistan’s Bamiyan province and short skirmishes between China and India might be possible in future.

¹⁴⁹Ahmed Awais Khaver, Muhammad Awais Umar, and Shafqat Munir Ahmad. *Evaluating Foreign Policy of Pakistan in the context of Strategic Coercion*. Sustainable Development Policy Institute., 2019.

Indian strategy to gain Afghan natural resources

It was the success of Indian soft power policy in Afghanistan that Indian Steel Authority had remained successful in getting Afghan minerals and hydrocarbons from this site. India maintained its status of largest aid donor country to Afghanistan to legitimize its maneuverings in the region.¹⁵⁰ Indian created interdependence between itself and Afghanistan with the removal of tariff barriers from the both sides on each other which affected Pakistan's trade with Afghanistan. Pakistan imposed high tariffs on Afghan exports to Pakistan which gave room to India to take advantage from this lacuna.

India had world standard petroleum refineries, which it planned to, put on the ground in Afghanistan and Central Asian States to refine and marketing petroleum products. It would create security problems for Pakistan by having its staunch enemy's strong hold on its eastern border. Through Afghanistan, India engaged with Central Asian States separately like Kazakhstan for its richness in uranium, Tajikistan for its silver and aluminum, Kyrgyzstan for its pharmaceuticals, Uzbekistan for its textiles, oil and gas. India also engaged in swap dealing with Iran by using Afghanistan and Central Asian states and getting huge benefits.¹⁵¹ Vast mineral deposits were discovered in Afghanistan in 2010, like iron, gold, copper, cobalt and lithium, with estimation of 1-3 trillion USD extractable resources. This discovery spurred regional actors to gain much leverage in Afghanistan's growing mineral field and India witnessed a transition from a silent donor country into a natural resource stakeholder.

Through soft power influence, India lured Afghanistan into its orbit that the latter also joined India in extending its influence in Afghanistan vis-à-vis Pakistan. India had

¹⁵⁰Robert M Cutler. "Kabul starts race for Afghan resources." *Asia Times Online* (2011).

¹⁵¹Alireza Koohkan, Mohammad Ali Rahiminezhad, and Eliyas Aghili Dehnavi. "Indian presence in Afghanistan through Iran." *Islamic Political Thought* 6, no. 2 (2019): pp. 85-112.

participated in number of pipeline projects for tapping oil and gas reserves of Iran and Central Asia to fulfill India's growing energy needs and Afghanistan played a role of conduit in this process. India's engagement with Afghanistan was same as the East India Company did with India subcontinent about 200 years ago.

Non-security threats faced by Pakistan by India through Afghanistan

India even used nontraditional security threats to Pakistan by collaborating with Afghanistan in building water projects on Kabul River. The joint collaboration between India and Afghanistan in constructing water dams on Kabul River posed danger for Pakistan's downstream irrigation. These dams would change the ecology of the region and as well as strained the bilateral relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan.¹⁵²

India made a regional alliance most prominently with Iran to downgrade Pakistan's importance in Afghanistan and gained Iran's support to exploit Afghanistan's natural resources. Iran's geo-strategic position had an important value for India and acted as a gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia. India had benefitted a lot through its amicable relations with Iran by signing Tehran Declaration and the 2003 Delhi Declaration, which provided India to made strategic inroads in Afghanistan by undertaking several humanitarian aid projects.

Indian soft power policy gained momentum in Afghanistan to lessen the importance of Pakistan and marginalized it in the region and the trio countries India, Iran, and Afghanistan signed agreement to convert Chahbahar port into a transit hub in May, 2016. This agreement would provide India a direct access to Central Asia, which would increase its trade with the resourceful Central Asian States and will provide an opportunity to import

¹⁵²Tasleem Malik. "Pak-Afghan Water Issue: A Case for Benefit-Sharing." *Policy Perspectives* 16, no. 1 (2019): pp. 77-98.

the natural resources from the latter states.¹⁵³

India invested in different Greenfield projects for the development of hydrocarbon resources in the region. India showed interest in the gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan into India and another pipeline from Iran into India through Pakistan. India also made sure its participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's meeting in July 2006, which clearly manifested its ambitions and interests in the region vis-à-vis Pakistan.

Indian maneuverings against CPEC project

India also endeavored a lot to stop extension of CPEC project to curtail Pakistan's economic growth. India viewed Afghanistan and Central Asian States, as its strategic neighborhood and felt weariness from Pakistan in converting Central Asian States a terrorist hub which could have a spillover effect in India. India also tried hard to stop the extension of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) up to the Central Asian region, which could be used as a strategic foil against India by Pakistan and China. Indian interests in Central Asian States were intricately linked with Afghanistan, through which it could fulfill its energy needs and could counter Pakistan's ingress in Afghanistan.¹⁵⁴

2.6 Limiting Pakistan's Influence in Afghanistan

The ongoing proxy war between India and Pakistan in Afghanistan after 9/11 was the depiction of Indian pursuance of Kautilya's theory against Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan, both militarily and economically. Pakistan was of the view that Indian "soft

¹⁵³Nishtha Kaushiki. "Factors Contributing to an Emerging Russia-Pakistan Strategic Proximity." *Journal of International and Area Studies* 26, no. 1 (2019): pp.43-64.

¹⁵⁴Celeste A Wallander, Geoffrey Kemp, Roy Allison, Rajan Menon, Julie Sirrs, ed. 2002. *Proceedings of the Afghanistan and Regional Geopolitical Dynamics after 11 Septembert*, August 2002.USA: National Intelligence Council.

power” policy in Afghanistan was a tactic to gain strategic benefit in a future conflict and all Indian humanitarian developmental projects were under cover for developing a pro-Indian Kabul government.

After the toppling of Taliban by USA invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Indian strategy remained successful in dwarfing Pakistan’s influence from Afghanistan, by supporting maximum Northern Alliance member’s ascension to the power corridors of Government in the interim government of Afghanistan. The participation of India in Bonn Agreement of 2001 helped it in forming the new cabinet under the premiership of Karzai, in which the Defense Minister Mohammad Fahim, Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah and Rashid Dostum had enjoyed amicable relations with India and frequently visited India in this period. India pursued a well-crafted strategy of encircling Pakistan after 9/11, from the two sides of eastern and as well as western border by ensuring its massive presence in Afghanistan’s every walk of life.

Indian mega infrastructural building in Afghanistan

This soft power policy was in the shape of various reconstruction and developmental projects like building Parliament building, building of the Afghan-India Friendship Dam and the most importantly construction of 135-mile road between Afghanistan’s Nimroz province and Iranian port of Chabahar to alleviate Afghanistan’s dependence on Pakistan for overland trade route, which catapulted Indian sway in Afghanistan and limited Pakistan’s interference in Afghan affairs.¹⁵⁵

Training to Afghan personnel by India

After 9/11, India remained engage in training Afghan officials in India, which proved

¹⁵⁵Christopher L Budihas. *What Drives Pakistan's Interest in Afghanistan?*. Army Command and General Staff Coll Fort Leavenworth KS School of advanced Military Studies, 2011.

inimical for Pakistan, as these officials in future could help India in maligning and smear Pakistan. Khalid Rahman in his article, "India-Iran Relations and Current Regional Dynamics" says that India had indulged in training Afghan policemen, national army, defense personnel and foreign ministry officials. Indian army officers were also sent to Afghanistan to teach local officers the basic military tactics and English language skills. India took decision to support reconciliation process with Taliban which was an indication to Pakistan that India was a mandatory stakeholder for Afghanistan's peaceful solution and whatever would be the scenario, it will not relinquish its role in Afghanistan. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Kabul in 2011 and announced Indian support to Afghan government's reconciliation plans with Taliban and also donated 500 million USD for developmental projects.¹⁵⁶

Pakistan felt severe security threats from Indian through Afghanistan when India made historical Security Agreement with Afghanistan in 2011, which was the first agreement in its kind in the history of India with any foreign country. This agreement proved as a main transition in relations between India and Afghanistan in security sector, which the previous agreements lacked and this struck a setback to Pakistan's security, as these weapons could be used against Pakistan in the future war between India and Pakistan.

Indian alliance with Iran posed serious security threats for Pakistan. India developed logistical alliance with Iran and targeted those areas of Afghanistan which were geographically contiguous with Pakistan. India approached every faction and group, which was active in Afghanistan, even India remain engaged with its staunch opponent, Taliban for ensuring its presence in the region and countering Pakistan's involvement.

¹⁵⁶Khalid Rahman. "India-Iran Relations and Current Regional Dynamics." *Policy Perspectives* (2010): pp. 27-49.

When India signed a tripartite agreement with Iran and Afghanistan in 2016, it raised the alarm bells in Pakistan for its security and future foothold in Afghanistan. Recently two retired Pakistani generals, both of them were former defense ministers, in a gathering hosted by Islamabad's think tanks labeled the tripartite deal with blatant and direct threat to Pakistan's security. They were of the view that, this agreement between these three countries would put Pakistan into the state of deep isolation.

India also ensured its diplomatic presence in Afghanistan and the former used it efficiently to thwart the latter from the ambit of Pakistan diplomatically in the post 9/11 era. India opened its four consulates in different cities of Afghanistan, which had been closed down since Taliban ascended to the power corridors in 1996-2001.

Indian massive financial aid to Afghanistan and growing trade with the country

India remained successful in outperforming the Pakistan's trade with Afghanistan and the bilateral trade between India and Afghanistan was worth 358 million USD in 2008. Similarly, India became the fifth largest donor to Afghanistan since 2001 with the provision of 1.2 billion USD to the later. This all contributed to halt Pakistani influence in Afghanistan nicely by Indian soft power politics in Afghanistan in post-9/11 Afghanistan.

Indian social media role in Afghanistan against Pakistan

By using soft power policy in Afghanistan, India had also developed social relations with Afghanistan through the medium of TV, radio and film, which played a catalyst role in showing India a peace loving and democratic state and Pakistan as a terrorist harboring and inimical country towards Afghanistan. Similarly India established the "India Afghanistan Foundation" in 2008, which was engaged in arranging seminars, conferences and exchange of historians and scholars from both the sides. The same cooperation was largely seen

between the Radio and TV Afghanistan with India Radio Akashwani & Doordurshan by exchanging programme's and media persons. This all-socio-cultural relations between India and Afghanistan paved the way for mutual cooperation against thwarting Pakistan's ingress in Afghanistan.¹⁵⁷

2.7 Indian Trade Ventures in Afghanistan

USA invasion of Afghanistan witnessed an increase in foreign investment, especially by India in Afghanistan, which had increased black-market activities, like poppy growth and lower wheat production. This surge in black market activities severely damaged Pakistan's economy and the future plans of increasing trade volume between Afghanistan and Pakistan. India signed a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) with Afghanistan in 2003, and got substantial duty concessions for Indian goods in Afghanistan and vice versa. This agreement decreased Pakistan's already bleak trade volume with Afghanistan and increased interdependence between India and Afghanistan. India had steered the way for Afghanistan's inclusion in the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to quell the hindrances for free flow of goods across the region.

Dr. Naseema Akhter and Arif Hussain Malik in the article "India's Involvement in Afghanistan: An Analytic Perspective of Current Interests and Future Prospects" highlighted Indian channeling of Afghanistan's inclusion, as a member in the SAARC and said that, this Indian move ensured the safe passage of Indian goods to reach Central Asia and West Asia, which was previously hindered by Pakistan and the latter never allowed the passage to Indian goods imported into Afghanistan.

¹⁵⁷Sarwat Sultana Sami, Noor Fatima, and Syed Ali Shah. "Development of Indo-Afghan Relations in Political Economic and Social Aspects Post 9/11 Scenario; Implication for Pakistan." *Global Social Sciences Review* 3, no. 1 (2018): pp. 411-433.

Indian target to lower Pakistan's trade volume with Afghanistan

In 2004-05, the bilateral trade between India and Afghanistan was 1.2 billion, which witnessed upward trajectory from 2005-06 and rose up to 1.5 billion dollars. Pakistan's trade volume with Afghanistan lowered due to the Iranian and Indian manufacturers as Pakistan's exports share decreased by nearly 400 million dollars in 2006-07. Pakistan signed APTTA agreement with Afghanistan on 2010, which affected Pakistan's trade with Afghanistan, which was highly perceived as a USA connivance with India to benefit India in tapping Afghan precious natural resources.¹⁵⁸

2.8 Dividends of Indian Soft Power Policy in Afghanistan in Post 9/11 Era

Indian soft power policy gained the possible dividends after 9/11 investments in Afghanistan, as maximum Afghans had positive sentiments for India and to the contrary looked Pakistan with suspicion and deemed it inimical towards them. The BBG-Gallup's survey conducted in 2016, found that approximately 62 percent of Afghani people had favorable views for India and only 3.7 percent deemed Pakistan as a favorable country to them. Indian dealings and connivance with Afghanistan showed the former's deep hatred and bedrock ideology to sabotage the sovereignty of Pakistan.

2.9 Indian Security Threats to Pakistan through Afghanistan

India had refrained from pursuing militarily or intrusive strategic ingress in Afghanistan but remained vigilant in establishing its military bases in the neighboring Tajikistan of Afghanistan in Central Asia, to had an eye on Pakistan and target it at the time of war. These military bases of India in Tajikistan had remained continuous headache for Pakistan's sovereignty, which India has established in the undercover of relief purposes for

¹⁵⁸Razia Sultana. "Pakistan-Afghan Economic Relations: Issues and Prospects." *Pakistan Horizon* 64, no. 1 (2011): 21-37.

Afghanistan by airlifting resources from Central Asia into Afghanistan. India had established its first ever historical military airbase in 'Ayni' in Tajikistan, which could be helpful for India to strike Pakistan at any time of war. India's another airbase, in Tajikistan at Farkhor, was also a worrisome development for Pakistan, which served two objectives of India, one to threaten and limit Pakistan from advancing towards Afghanistan and other securing energy needs from this resourceful area.¹⁵⁹

To counter and limit Pakistan's way for making influence in Afghanistan, India forged ties with Central Asian states to deny Pakistan's ingress in the region and ensure its credibility and strong foothold across the Afghanistan. India was wary of Pakistan's connivance with Taliban in the restive areas of Afghanistan, through which TAPI pipeline would traverse and reach to India; therefore India was reluctant to join this initiative. India became the member of SCO in 2005, and made separate amicable relations with the Central Asian states and held partnership agreements with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, respectively, which posed danger for Pakistan. India cashed the unstable atmosphere of Pakistan well in its favor by courting these Central Asian States in its sphere of influence by showing its soft image through different bilateral agreements and developmental projects.¹⁶⁰

Conclusion

India achieved its objectives in Afghanistan successfully due to the USA invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, which were totally Pakistan oriented and were based on limiting Pakistan's ingress in Afghanistan. India executed its policy in Afghanistan through the

¹⁵⁹Sarwat Sultana Sami, Noor Fatima, and Syed Ali Shah. "Development of Indo-Afghan Relations in Political Economic and Social Aspects Post 9/11 Scenario; Implication for Pakistan." *Global Social Sciences Review* 3, no. 1 (2018): pp. 411-433.

¹⁶⁰Daniel Norfolk. "India's Engagement with Afghanistan: Developing a Durable Policy Architecture'." *Afghanistan in Transition, Beyond* (2014): pp. 161-83.

developmental and economical projects, which played an important role in thwarting Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan, as the latter lacked these all tactics in Afghanistan. Pakistan saw a downward spiral in its trade relations with the advent of India in Afghanistan with the new manifestation after USA invasion. Central Asian countries also rejected Pakistan's overtures owing to their deep relations with India, which it ensured after the USA invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. India got benefitted through its smear campaign against Pakistan through Afghanistan in the shape of gaining the global admiration from the important stakeholders of the regional and global powers for exposing the Pakistan's dubious role in Afghanistan and its relations and support to terrorists. USA opted the most influential participant in the region in the shape of India which proved its importance through active participation in Afghanistan and cooperation with the USA and its allies in all respect. Pakistan had remained unsuccessful in proving its quelling the label of terrorist country by remained aloof with the affairs of Afghanistan and inability to convince USA for its positive and constructive role in Afghanistan for promotion of USA interest. The Afghan and Central Asian resources were also fully exploited and gained by India which created a no go area for Pakistan in the future, which would seriously, struck the Pakistan's trade and resource needs in the future. India made security realm of Pakistan so much vulnerable that the continuous threat from the two borders of western and eastern would engage Pakistan's army to both the borders equally and continue the skirmishes between the two Muslim countries.

CHAPTER 3

INDIAN SOFT POWER POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN IN POST

9/11 ERA

India took some pragmatic steps in gaining strong foothold in Afghanistan after USA invasion in 2001. The purpose of Indian massive aid to Afghanistan was to court the latter on Indian side and got it away from the neighboring Pakistan. India ensured its diplomatic resurgence after Taliban era and diplomatically maligned Pakistan with the help of Afghanistan.

India encouragement and support to Afghan irredentist claims against Pakistan's territory

Indian malignant activities of India gave official voice to Afghan government for claiming some areas of Pakistan's North Western areas and Baluchistan comprising of Pashtun populace by funneling the Pashtunistan issue. India signed bilateral agreements with Afghanistan for implementation of its goals vis-à-vis Pakistan. The security agreement between India and Afghanistan signed in 2011 was a disaster for Pakistan's bilateral relations with Afghanistan. India gave military training to Afghan army personnel's and equip them with latest weaponry, which they frequently used against Pakistan from across the border on the directions of India. On the pretext of this agreement India trained Afghan soldiers on Indian soil and also in Afghanistan, which boosted their militaristic interaction. India used its culture and soft power tactics like social media, political influence and educational assistance in Afghanistan to gain popularity.

Indian scholarship awards to Afghan students and campaign against Pakistan

India invited thousands of Afghan students through scholarship in India, which played an important role in mixing of both cultures with each other through the close student interaction. Though Pakistan and Afghanistan were having same religion and culture but maximum Indian interference in Afghanistan had curtailed all the good happening between the two Muslim countries. India made such infrastructural building in Afghanistan that helped in alleviating Afghanistan's dependence on Pakistan for trade purposes and struck hardly Pakistan's trade and political relations with Afghanistan.

3.1 Indian Cooperation with Regional Countries in Post 9/11 Era

India attracted its likeminded actors to cooperate with India against Pakistan to develop a connection between South Asia and Central Asia. Both the leaders of Iran and India met with Afghan President Hamid Karzai in 2012 in Tehran to develop a "southern silk road", trade route of roads and railroads that would connect the two regions of South Asia and Central Asia through Gulf of Oman.¹⁶¹

Through soft power in Afghanistan, India downgraded Pakistan image and tried to prove it as an unfriendly country towards Afghanistan. India had perpetrated soft power policy in Afghanistan which boosted its international image as a peaceful cooperative country and attracted foreign investments, technological growth, and tourism in India, especially in the era of PM Modi. Indian projection of soft power policy in Afghanistan consolidated its rhetoric of largest democracy and ameliorated its diplomatic relations with the other countries of the region and globally.¹⁶²

¹⁶¹ Alireza Nader, Ali G. Scotten and Ahmad Idrees, *Iran's Influence in Afghanistan: Implications for the U.S. Drawdown* (Santa Monica, CA, United States: RAND, 2014).

¹⁶² Arijit Mazumdar. "India's soft power diplomacy under the Modi administration: Buddhism, diaspora and yoga." *Asian Affairs* 49, no. 3 (2018): pp.468-491.

Indian soft power projection in Afghanistan increased India's credibility in the region vis-à-vis Pakistan by its recognition as a major donor in the region. It showed India a country with democratic rules and norms, tolerant for all kind of ethnicities and religion, which was mere hoax and fabricated.¹⁶³

Indian maneuverings in Afghanistan to boost Indian economic relations with the regional states

Through soft power influence India used the forum of SAARC for cooperation with Afghanistan in economic field. It opened the avenues for Indian sway of influence in South Asian trade mechanism to the detriment of Pakistan, which was already facing a bleak trade volume with the regional countries.

3.2 Pakistan's Reaction on Indian Maneuverings in Afghanistan

The growing Indian soft power policy in Afghanistan drew the ire of Pakistan, which frequently accused Indian consulates for perpetrating subversive activities against the restive provinces of Baluchistan and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa. Pakistan was fearful from Indian growing influence in Afghanistan, through its soft power policy, which instigated Afghan government against Pakistan. Pakistan had totally rejected Indian disguise of soft power initiatives in the shape of Indian consulates, which actually worked for India's clandestine secret intelligence agency RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) against Pakistan to sabotage and encircle it.¹⁶⁴

Pakistan responded to India's increased exposure in Afghanistan with stern actions. Jagmohan Meher in article "Pakistan's Strategic Obsession and the Road to Catastrophe: Is There a Way Out?" says that Pakistani army fully supported jihadist organizations and

¹⁶³Ibid., 28.

¹⁶⁴Ibid., 28.

banned outfits in Afghanistan against Indian growing presence and ingress in Afghanistan. There was evidence of Pakistan army's joint collaboration with Taliban and Al-Qaida remnants in Afghanistan against the pro-India Karzai government. The news in New York Times in 2007 wrote that without the help of ISI, the Taliban and Al-Qaida had not been in a position to control Afghanistan. Pakistani General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kiyani requested to USA vice president Joe Biden on his visit to Pakistan in 2008, to pressurize India for restraining its influence in Afghanistan.¹⁶⁵

India posed security threats to Pakistan through Afghanistan with the connivance of Afghanistan, which was depicted from the invitation of Afghanistan to India to had physically presence of Indian companies in Afghanistan's resource rich areas. This connivance antagonized Pakistan and posed serious threat to Pakistan's security and trade relations with Afghanistan. Pakistan was of the view that owing to the comparatively large Indian economy than Pakistan, the former could subsidize its exports to Afghanistan and could easily get monopoly over these markets and as well as Central Asian Republic's (CARs) market.

Pakistan responded to India's massive financial and economic aid to Afghanistan and took some prudent steps to lessen the Afghanistan's dependence on India by procuring some financial aid to Afghanistan, though it was quite less comparatively to Indian procurements. Despite the struggles of Indian marginalization of Pakistan in the region the former did not succumb to the wishes of India. Pakistan endured much to boost its efforts for extending support to the Karzai government and cooperated vigorously in construction and capacity building process of Afghanistan's institutions. India was the second largest endpoint for

¹⁶⁵Jagmohan Meher. "Pakistan's Strategic Obsession and the Road to Catastrophe: Is There a Way Out?." *India Quarterly* 68, no. 4 (2012): pp.345-362.

exports from Afghanistan but Pakistan's intransigence in giving the trade route hampered the bilateral trade between them. Pakistan had also dedicated to procure 250 million USD for Afghanistan's reconstruction and developmental work.¹⁶⁶

Pakistan was fearful for increasing Indo-Afghan trade volume, that why it did not permit India a free trade corridor to Afghanistan. According to a recent statement of State Bank of Pakistan, if Pakistan allowed India a free trade corridor towards Afghanistan, India would replace Pakistan's export market and would incur Pakistan the possible loss of 2 billion dollars in export revenue to Afghanistan. Though Pakistan was far ahead than India in terms of economic and financial aid to Afghanistan but the trade volume between Pakistan and Afghanistan exceeded after 2001 tremendously in comparison with the previous Taliban era.

3.3 Afghanistan's Acceptance for Indian Role

Afghanistan had welcomed India's massive aid and developmental projects through Indian usage of soft power influence, which resultantly worked as a catalyst in upgrading India's fame among all the ethnicities of Afghanistan and downgraded Pakistan's importance. India had provided approximately 2 billion USD in the form of aid to Afghanistan since 2001. The provision of Indian aid to Afghanistan was absolutely different from the western model of aid which usually procured aid through the international non-governmental organizations (INGOs).

India gave aid to Afghanistan through government to government interaction and this impacted the writ of Central government of Kabul in a positive manner and strengthened it much.

¹⁶⁶Hasan-Askari rizvi. "Pakistan's Defense Policy." *Pakistan Horizon* 36, no. 1 (1983): pp.32-56.

Indian instigation to Afghanistan on border issue with Pakistan

It was the impact of Indian soft power influence in Afghanistan that pro-Indian regime of Hamid Karzai in 2001 refused to accept Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan as an international boundary and coveted for Pakistan's Pashtun areas. India used its business community in Afghanistan to increase its bilateral business and cultural ties with Afghanistan which contributed in turning the soft corner of common Afghan for the India generously. The Afghan people unconditionally acknowledged and supported Indian soft power diplomacy in Afghanistan in comparison with the Pakistan's lack of soft power projection and past history of hard power usage. Afghanistan gave the proof of its commitment and support to India by boycotting the 2016, SAARC Summit held in Islamabad, after the Uri attacks, which was clear manifestation of Pakistan's vulnerable footings vis-à-vis India in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan had excitedly accepted and invited Indian diplomatic efforts to invest in the war-torn country of Afghanistan. As Afghanistan was a resource rich country which desperately needed investments to tap the hidden treasures of natural resource that had been neglected since long due to war and lack of machine apparatus. Indian presence in Afghanistan had seriously impacted Pakistan's commercial ties with Afghanistan. Afghanistan's vast natural resources of iron, cobalt, gold and copper attracted Indian attention. Owing to the largest regional donor of Afghanistan, the latter invited Indian companies to extract the approximately 1 trillion USD worth of minerals from Afghanistan.¹⁶⁷

The security implications which Pakistan faced due to Indian influence in

¹⁶⁷Ibid., 18.

Afghanistan were manifested from Afghanistan's stern action against Pakistan. Afghanistan rebuked Pakistan on intransigence of blocking Indian exports to Afghanistan and threatened it to lift the barriers otherwise Afghanistan will not let Pakistan to pass Afghanistan for entering Central Asian Countries. India took some practical steps to increase its prestige in Afghanistan vis-à-vis Pakistan and recently allowed Afghan products like fresh and dry fruits and carpets duty free market access to India.

It was the success of India's financial and economic aid and further zero tariff policy in terms of trade with Afghanistan that the latter's President Ashraf Ghani threatened Pakistan to retaliate on its stubborn attitude towards India. President Ghani told Pakistan to 'accept the "national treatment" clause of APTTA (Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement) signed in 2011, which doesn't prohibit any both of the countries to access its national boundaries, otherwise it will also not allow Pakistan excess to Central Asia.¹⁶⁸

3.4 Global Powers Posture towards Indian Role in Afghanistan

With the advent of USA in the Afghanistan in 2001, India started engaging in the economic and developmental projects in Afghanistan, which attracted the attention of USA and its NATO alliances for completion of their mission in the region generally and in Afghanistan particularly. Abdurrahman Utku Haciloğlu in his article "The case for NATO's global partnership with India" states that Indian soft power projection and interest in Afghanistan attracted the attention of NATO allies of USA to thwart Chinese hegemonic intentions in the region and also cooperated with India to counter Russian disruptive ambitions in Afghanistan against USA and its allies. This cooperation between India and NATO also contributed in improving India's defensive institutions, which it bolstered to

¹⁶⁸Kulbhushan Warikoo. "Central Asia and South Asia: Opportunities and Challenges." *India Quarterly* 72, no. 1 (2016): pp.1-15.

sideline Pakistan from the affairs of Afghanistan in the future.

3.5 Indian Financial Aid to Afghanistan

India took some pragmatic steps after 9/11 to gain strong foothold in Afghanistan through its soft power projection. India took the help of its massive aid to made Afghanistan dependable on it and thwart it away from Pakistan. To match Pakistan's initiative at the International Conference in Tokyo on the Reconstruction of Afghanistan, India lent 100 million USD to Afghanistan for the next three years in 2002. India added 200,000 USD in the World Bank managed Trust Fund for Afghan Reconstruction. India granted 10 million USD to Afghan government in July 2002, as a budget subsidy and further procured full grant of 100 million USD in the month of October 2002.¹⁶⁹

India had become the largest donor of Afghanistan and surpassed its economic aid to Afghanistan in comparison with Bhutan. India procured 750 million USD to Afghanistan, since 2002, which increased the Afghanistan's dependence and trust on India.¹⁷⁰ The Indian massive financial aid to Afghanistan at the time of Taliban's regaining strength and emergence of ISIS had played an important role in stabilizing Afghanistan. This financial support contributed a lot in countering drug addiction, extremism and terrorism amongst young populace of Afghanistan.¹⁷¹

Indian diplomatic and economic support to Afghanistan against Pakistan

India announced 750 million USD aid package to Afghanistan during the Afghan President Hamid Karzai's visit to India in 2008. Afghan economy was agricultural and

¹⁶⁹ Policy Review: Getting India Right. | *Hoover Institution*, accessed January 02, 2021, <https://www.hoover.org/research/getting-india-right>

¹⁷⁰ Subhash Agrawal. "Emerging donors in international development assistance: The India case." (2007).

¹⁷¹ Raghav Sharma. *Afghan Cauldron: Achieving India's Interests*. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies., 2008.

industrialist based which faced downward spiral in the 80s and 90s due to the war, which caused massive unemployment and infrastructural devastation. The USA invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 made this country aid dependent on international donors, in which India among the regional countries came with the most generous passion for aiding this country massively. Indian aid improved the economic condition of Afghanistan efficiently and it transformed from an economically failed state to an economic enviable country. The deficiency or loophole in this all situation was that, if the donor countries stopped aiding Afghanistan, it might be again fell back on the previous economic condition. Afghanistan's economy had witnessed upward trajectory from 9% in 2009 to 15% in 2011 and its (GDP-purchasing power parity) had climaxed to 35 billion USD in the year 2013. This ration was the outcome of international and most importantly regionally Indian financial and economic aid in the field of agriculture, on which Afghanistan's whole economy depended.¹⁷²

When USA toppled Taliban government in Afghanistan in 2001, India grabbed this opportunity and adopted soft power policy in Afghanistan to gain strong foothold in Afghanistan. India soon became the largest regional and fourth largest globally financial aid donor to Afghanistan. This mega financial aid was enough to list India in the good books of Afghanistan, which accepted India as their iron friend in the time of devastation from war, when no one was willing to make developmental work in Afghanistan.

Through massive aid to Afghanistan, India boosted the rhetoric of labeling Pakistan as a terrorist country. It was the result of Indian massive financial aid to Afghanistan that the latter rejected the paucity of Pakistan's economic aid in the era of Ashraf Ghani. Ashraf Ghani contemptuously refused this offer by saying that; it should be served on countering

¹⁷²Ibid., 14.

terrorism. In short India got the status through this financial aid, which Pakistan didn't enjoy despite same religious proclivity and accommodation of millions of refugees in its soil in the time of wars.

Afghanistan's dependence on India had been gradually increasing since 2001, which had affected Pakistan's trade with Afghanistan. Afghanistan imported goods from India 50% more than its exports and after construction of Chahbahar port in Iran and investment in Hajigak Iron Ore Mine, the prospects of increasing Indian trade with Afghanistan were high. India had impacted on Afghanistan through financial investment which had sidelined the so called Asian Tiger economies of Asia. Indian massive investment in Afghanistan had left behind the other emerging economies of the region, as India had procured approximately 1.2 billion dollar financial aid to Afghanistan.¹⁷³

3.6 Indian Bilateral Agreements with Afghanistan

India made different bilateral agreements with Afghanistan to make it more dependable on India in the realms of security and diplomatic support. Indian engagement in Afghanistan was purely devoid of hard power but the signing of Indo-Afghan Strategic Partnership agreement in 2011 gave an immense chance and opportunity to India to deploy its military in Afghanistan.

This Strategic Partnership Agreement infuriated Pakistan in a sense that the attacks on Indian embassy in October 2009 and the other such attacks pushed India to shift its concentration from soft power towards hard power such as militarily got boots on the Afghan ground, but the Indian government showed restrained which favored them in the long run in

¹⁷³David W. Barno, Andrew Exum, and Matthew Irvine. *Beyond Afghanistan: A regional security strategy for South and Central Asia*. Center for a New American Security, 2011.

sustaining their previous image as a soft power benefactor of Afghan people.¹⁷⁴

India made its presence felt in Afghanistan by engaging in bilateral agreements in Afghanistan which consolidated India's foothold in the war-torn country. Afghanistan's acceptance for the Indian bilateral agreements acted as a proof of success of India's soft power policy and Afghanistan's reliance on Indian support. These agreements bestowed India with the unique emblem of respect and honor, which had never gained by any other country prior. The signature on Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) between India and Afghanistan in 2011 was the first bilateral agreement between the two countries since 1979.

Indian purpose of signing SPA agreement with Afghanistan

The purpose of this agreement was to rebuild the Afghan infrastructure, institutions, tapping Afghan natural resources, promotion of Afghan exports to India and to help Afghanistan in technical and educational fields. Another agreement between the two countries also included Iran and this trilateral agreement was signed between India, Afghanistan and Iran on 2016 for the development of Chahbahar port in Iran that would serve as a pivot for transportation of goods between the three countries by ignoring Pakistan. The main Indian purpose for the development of this port was to alleviate Afghanistan's dependence on overland trade through Pakistan's territory and to counter the Pakistan's Gwadar port in Baluchistan region constructed with the help of China.¹⁷⁵

Indian bilateral agreements and MOUs (memorandums of understanding) with Afghan government enhanced Afghanistan's dependence on India. India effectively impacted on Afghanistan through these legally binding agreements in the different fields like

¹⁷⁴Kelly Fisher, Tejinder Billing, and Harry Chhina. "Indian Military Leadership: An Exploratory Study." (2013).

¹⁷⁵Rani D Mullen., and Kashyap Arora. "Indian development cooperation with Afghanistan and the 'Afghan-India Friendship Dam'." *Policy Brief, Center for Policy Research, link 30* (2016).

rural development, education and regularization. This soft power policy of India brought many positive implications for India which gained praise and confidence of USA in its dealing with Afghanistan in the future. Indian trade with Afghanistan increased dramatically and it stepped up in the race of tapping and benefitting from the untapped natural resources of Afghanistan.

India struck Pakistan in the field of extracting natural resources of Afghanistan which debilitated Pak-Afghan interaction in terms of trade, which was an explicit manifestation of Indian soft power ingress in Afghanistan. India signed three memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with Afghanistan in April 2016, to make joint collaboration in the fields of education, rural development and technical standards. These agreements and MOUs gave India a tremendous leverage in stepping up in the race of tapping untouched natural resources of Afghanistan, which enhanced the attraction of world business community for investing in this hidden treasure. India had been craving since long for establishing democracy in the war ravaged country and finally got the chance by USA invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Indian soft power policy through these bilateral agreements remained successful in assisting Afghanistan towards democratic norms rather than savage and undemocratic dealings.

India's connivance with US in Afghanistan held Pakistan in a vulnerable position as a non NATO ally of US, which undermined Pakistan's credibility in South Asian region. USA president Donald Trump praised India for its positive implications of soft power policy in Afghanistan in the shape of developmental projects, economic aid, infrastructure building and more importantly democratic upbringings in the war torn savage society. Trump frequently accused Pakistan for its soft corner for Haqqani network and deemed Pakistan's sensitive apparatus like Atomic installations under lose security care. This all rhetoric of US

against Pakistan was the clear manifestation of Indian instigation of US against Pakistan through the platform of Afghanistan, where India ensured its presence at every level and in every field with US.

India took support of soft powers in Afghanistan for exploiting the Pakistani backed Taliban atrocities on minorities in the past, which gave room to India to garner support against Pakistan in Afghanistan and to vilify the former globally. India had launched the Heart of Asia Istanbul Process (HoAIP) in 2011 for the first time in history and later launched frequently five such HoAs on Afghanistan's reconstruction and counter terrorism mechanisms. In the sixth HoA inaugurated by Indian PM Narendra Modi along with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani on December 2016, India and Afghanistan signed Amritsar Declaration and the Regional Counter Terrorism Framework. These initiatives were crucial for the betterment of the plight of minorities specially Hindu and Sikh population which had faced stern atrocities by the Taliban regime and remained in a miniscule scale with the mass exodus back into India.¹⁷⁶

Indian support to Afghan women

India impacted on Afghanistan through its soft power ingress by promotion and support to women participation in the local affairs and made bilateral agreements with Afghanistan to change the old conservative stereotyping of patriarchal society towards women. Indian Chambers of Commerce & Industry (FICCI) Ladies Organization, India Art Investment Company signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Afghanistan Women Business Federation in 2017. India impacted on Afghanistan through this MoU for

¹⁷⁶Bawa Singh - Amritsar Declaration Ignored Problems Of Indian-Origin Minorities In Afghanistan. | *EurasiaReviw*. Accessed November 06, 2020.

entrepreneurship growth of Afghan women.¹⁷⁷

India impacted on Afghanistan through different agreements with Afghanistan by usage of its soft power influence and granted concession to Afghanistan on trade, health and in medical field. India also covered small developmental projects and targeted Afghan precarious agriculture sector and made it much beneficial for the country on which it depended the most. These all projects uplifted the village life of Afghanistan in which maximum population of Afghanistan resided.

In March 2003, Afghan president visited India and signed the Preferential Trade Agreement, which gave Afghan exports 100% tariff concession in India. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed agreement on co-operation in the healthcare medicinal sciences, MoUs on Small Developmental projects and another MoU on cooperation in Agricultural Research and Education. India also contributed in the promotion of Afghan rural life by signing MoU on Cooperation in the rural development, cooperation in educational field and in the field of rural development.¹⁷⁸

Pakistan always insisted on cooperation and invited India for bilateral meetings to solve their predicament on the issue of both countries accusation of using Afghanistan against one another. Pakistan responded Indian intransigent behavior in Afghanistan with soft tune and diplomatically tried to assuage the Indian exploitation of Afghanistan's soil against Pakistan. A. Z. Hilali in his article "Pakistan's foreign policy objectives in the post-September 11, 2001 era" says that Pakistan took benefit from SAARC forum in which Afghanistan also had membership and insisted on promotion of peace, stability, cooperation

¹⁷⁷Andrew Beath, FotiniChristia, and Ruben Enikolopov. "Empowering women through development aid: Evidence from a field experiment in Afghanistan." *American Political Science Review* (2013): pp.540-557.

¹⁷⁸Ibid., 19.

and progress among the South Asian members. Pakistan at the 10th SAARC Summit held at Sri Lanka in 1998 and 16th Summit in Bhutan in 2010 started Peace, Security and Development Initiatives to promote regional peace, security and cooperation rather than blaming each other's for every ill fate. In Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) forum, Pakistan played an important role for strengthening socioeconomic relations among the member states, which included Afghanistan also. Pakistan used ECO forum to develop Afghan transport and communication system, gas and oil pipelines in which TAPI had its distinct manifestation.¹⁷⁹

3.7 Infrastructural Building in Afghanistan by India

By using soft power influence, India targeted deserted ignored areas of Afghanistan for developmental projects in which Pakistan was lagging behind, which became the basis of Indian popularity vis-à-vis Pakistan in Afghanistan. Since 2002, India had procured 2 billion USD to Afghanistan for its developmental projects. India had impacted Afghanistan through its assistance projects, which it disbursed in the form of relief financial aid.

Indian small development projects in Afghanistan and their impact

Indian small development projects (SDP) were important in a sense that, these projects uplifted and improved the economic condition of vulnerable isolated areas of Afghanistan. These projects were unique in a sense that they were community driven rather based on any powerful lobby of the country. India initiated its assistance projects in Afghanistan's remote and vulnerable areas which had a positive impact on them in terms of their living standards and improvement in basic amenities of life. These Indian small development projects (SDP) programs had helped India to gain traction in local community

¹⁷⁹A. Z Hilali. "Pakistan's foreign policy objectives in the post-September 11, 2001 era." *Strategic Studies* 32 (2012): 160-185.

in which Pakistan and China lagged behind.¹⁸⁰

After the 2001, US invasion of Afghanistan, India emerged as a great contributor to the infrastructural building of Afghanistan. This infrastructural development of Afghanistan not only transferred Afghanistan into a stable country but courted it towards India and away from Pakistan, which lacked in these all endeavors. Indian soft power policy worked as a counter to Pakistan's hard power politics in Afghanistan, which consisted of frequently clashing with Afghan security personnel across the border and engaged in blame game to each other. India made numerous projects in Afghanistan, which were quite enough for courting Afghanistan in its favour and using it as a pawn against destabilizing Pakistan's security fabric. Examples of some India soft power projects in Afghanistan are as follows:

Indian infrastructural development in Afghanistan (Roads, Dams, Schools, Banks, Bridges) etc

India constructed a 218 km road from Zaranj to Delaram and the purpose of constructing this road was to facilitate the Indian and Afghan goods towards Iran and vice versa. India also constructed 220 KV DC transmission line between region of Pul-e-Khumri and Kabul and a sub-station of 220/110/20 KV at Chimtala. India upgraded telephone exchanges in 11 provinces of Afghanistan, expanded national TV network by procurement of an uplink from Kabul and downlinks in all of 34 provincial capitals of Afghanistan, which effectively integrated the whole country's communication link. India in the large extent worked well for the restoration of water capacity in Afghanistan by building Salma Dam, Doshi and Charikar power substations. India was keen on uplifting the transport infrastructure of Afghanistan and deliberated on handing over 1000 more buses to it. India

¹⁸⁰Supriya Roychoudhury. "India's External Aid: Lessons and Opportunities." *Economic and Political Weekly* (2013): pp.22-26.

had also made difference in the India's Small Development Projects (SDP) scheme with initially procurement of 20 million USD to Afghanistan in 2005 and further 100 million USD in November 2012.¹⁸¹

Indian infrastructural building in Afghanistan through its soft power policy acted as a catalyst in making India's image as a more beneficial country towards Afghanistan and consolidated already strong bilateral relations between the two states. International Republican Institute (IRI) conducted survey, showed that almost a quarter of Afghan prefer India, more than US, Iran, Tajikistan and Pakistan. The same poll showed that 72% of Afghans were having negative views about Pakistan.¹⁸²

The Indian soft power policy in Afghanistan paid off numerously by Afghanistan's support for Indian reconstruction and developmental work in Afghanistan and blamed Pakistan for every mess or ill fortune in Afghanistan. When Indian embassy in Kabul was attacked on July 2008, the Afghan government without any deliberations held Pakistan accountable for this heinous attack. If Pakistan had been engaged in infrastructural and developmental affairs in Afghanistan, this suspecting attitude of Afghan government would have been avoided.¹⁸³

Indian roads reconstruction and restructuring in Afghanistan

Indian reconstruction and restructuring of the road sector of Afghanistan impacted the war torn country in an effective way and pushed it to connect with the regional countries which enhanced its importance for regional trade owing to its geo-strategic importance and richness in natural resources. In the book "China and India in Central Asia: A New "Great

¹⁸¹Ibid., 101.

¹⁸²Shashank Joshi. "India's Af-Pak Strategy." *The RUSI Journal* 155, no. 1 (2010): pp.20-29.

¹⁸³Safdar hussain, and Dr Muhammad Ijaz Latif. "Issues and challenges in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations after 9/11." *South Asian Studies* 27, no. 1 (2020).

Game”? Edited by Marlène Laruelle, Jean-François Huchet, Sébastien Peyrouse, and Bayram Balci says that Afghanistan was having poor road infrastructure till 1980. At that time Afghanistan had 18,000 kilometers of roads and out of which only 3,000 km was waterproof cemented or asphalted. After USA invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the situation had totally changed in this field. Afghanistan had 3,363 km national highways, 4,884 km regional highways, 9,656 km provincial roads and 17,000 km rural roads in the contemporary times. These roads helped Afghanistan in connecting with its neighboring states like Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Among these roads, the Indian initiative of Zaranj-Delaram road had its unique position which connects Afghanistan with Iran and beyond.¹⁸⁴

Indian infrastructural and developmental projects in Afghanistan were totally different from the other international donors like US, Germany, UK, Japan etc. as they were aimed to reward local tribesmen or strongmen. Indian procurement of aid was without any conditionality and complex process, which was largely accepted by the Afghan people with the open heart. Indian construction of Salma Dam and roads infrastructure drew much praise among the local people and they called this Indian strategy, a peace building initiatives. Indian medical missions stationed in various cities of Afghanistan and gained the cordial acceptance of Afghan people. Indian infrastructural building in Afghanistan was highly praised by Afghans as these projects were mostly initiated on the demands of the masses and were need based.

Indian soft power diplomacy through its infrastructural building in Afghanistan had paid off by exceeding trade volume between the two states from 80 million USD in 2001 to 280 million USD in 2010. It was not a good omen for Pakistan which endured the aftershocks

¹⁸⁴Sébastien Peyrouse. *China and India in Central Asia: a new "great game"?*. Springer, 2010.

of India exceeding trade relations with Afghanistan trade. Former Deputy Minister of Energy Ahmad Wali Shairzay said that “The Afghan government was lacking in power sector and was desperate for investment in power importation, then came Government of India to fulfill this shortage”.¹⁸⁵

Indian support in construction of gas pipelines and electricity transmission lines in Afghanistan

India’s positive role in the construction of infrastructure building of Afghanistan in the shape of gas pipelines and electricity transmission lines not only fulfilled the Afghanistan’s energy needs but it could play an important role in ameliorating the ties between India and Pakistan in the future. Indian role in connecting resource rich Central Asian States with the energy deficient region of South Asia, especially Afghanistan had chances of alleviating its energy needs in the future. TAPI (Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India) gas pipeline was very crucial in this regard and the CASA-1000 (Central Asia South Asia) electricity transmission line transferring electricity from Central Asia into Afghanistan region had also its distinct value. Indian endeavors in these mega projects had prospect of ameliorating the tense and old rivalry between Pakistan and India, and further will create an atmosphere of competition between them rather than rivalry. India made its indelible impact on Afghanistan through its soft power diplomacy by constructing and renovating the old precarious infrastructure.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁵Shakti Sinha. "Rising Powers and Peacebuilding: India’s Role in Afghanistan." In *Rising Powers and Peacebuilding*, pp. 129-165. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2017.

¹⁸⁶Stina Torjesen, and Tatjana Stankovic. "Regional Change. How will the rise of China and India shape Afghanistan’s stabilization process?" (2010).

Promotion of democracy in Afghanistan by India

Indian soft power endeavors not only limited up to the infrastructural projects rather it worked harder for promotion of democracy in Afghanistan which drew the ire of Pakistan. Pakistan accused India for perpetrating its heinous agenda of encircling Pakistan in the disguise of installing democracy through its soft power along with the cooperation of US. US-India Global Democracy Initiative (GDI) emerged as a catalyst to promote democratic norms, values and institutions in the war-torn country.

Construction of Afghan Parliament in Kabul by India

India constructed Afghan parliament building, gave training to Afghan officials for parliamentary affairs and fully supported U.N program, "Support to the Establishment of the Afghan Legislature". India also gave support to Afghanistan for elections like voting machines etc. These all developments antagonized Pakistan, which severely criticized Indian aid to Afghanistan since 2001, and charged India with malicious intent to destabilize Pakistan.¹⁸⁷ India had keenly worked on the betterment of Afghan electricity sector by launching various Solar Multi Utility Units to boost local village level micro industry. This Indian technology impacted Afghan local industries like spices grinding units, mills of wheat and rice and cottage industry etc. and now these all could run on an efficient source of energy. Indian Solar Multi Utility Units had transformed Afghan local micro level industries like wheat and rice mills, an artisan cottage industry and spices grinding units etc., which were able to run on this safe and reliable source of energy supply. These Indian Solar Units could bear the productive load of these all industries easily and played an important role in lighting

¹⁸⁷ Jan Cartwright. "India's regional and international support for democracy: rhetoric or reality?" *Asian Survey* 49, no. 3 (2009): pp.403-428.

the dark villages of Afghanistan. India impacted on Afghanistan through its private sector and helped in improving Afghanistan's micro problems. India introduced battery powered refrigerators, solar powered mobiles and home water purifiers for Afghanistan's micro solutions of basic problems. Indian micro initiatives in Afghanistan had increased its reverence among the Afghan people and they assumed India as their true benefactor in the internal sectors which Western traditional donors had neglected since 2001.

Pakistan had remained prudent in responding India's growing infrastructural building in Afghanistan for its silent ingress in the war torn country. Pakistan's collaboration with China and Central Asian states had proved beneficial for Pakistan to quell the Indian dominance in Afghanistan. Pakistan courted Afghanistan in talking with Tajikistan to expand their bilateral trade agreement up to the Central Asia. Pakistan had remained adamant in pursuing Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline despite the noncompliance of India due to US pressure. Pakistan was optimistic to penetrate into the markets of Afghanistan and Iran through offering the products produced in the new SEZs by leveraging comparative advantages.¹⁸⁸

3.8 Indian Cultural, Social and Political Influence in Afghanistan

The demise of Taliban from Afghanistan in 2001 provided India to speed up its cultural, social and political influence in Afghanistan through its soft power. India used its educational, social and cultural influence to make amicable and friendly relations with Afghanistan and diverted them from Pakistan, despite the same religion and cultural similarities between the two Muslim states. Pakistan backed its proxies to attack Indian interests in Afghanistan which had been irritating Pakistan since toppling of Taliban regime.

¹⁸⁸Ibid., 22.

Indian educational scholarships awards to Afghan students and Impact on Pakistan

Pakistan endured more alienation by Indian educational strategy in Afghanistan. India impacted Afghanistan through its educational programs which provided an opportunity to both the Indian and Afghan students to intermingle with each other. Indian students played an important role in winning the hearts of Afghan students which came for study purposes. They disseminated negative propaganda about Pakistan and represented it as an enemy and dangerous neighbor of Afghanistan.

Indian cultural impact on Afghanistan

India welcomed new interim government in Afghanistan in 2001, through its foreign minister's visit to Afghanistan, who instead of food assistance or arms, procured tapes of Bollywood movies and music among the Afghan citizens.. US Director of National Intelligence (DNI) assessed that support to Taliban and Haqqani network was a critical element in Pakistan's strategic asset to counter India's political influence in Afghanistan.¹⁸⁹

Indian soft power influence also maligned Pakistan's image in the eyes of common Afghan. Through its Bollywood movies and social media, India perpetrated its agenda of maligning Pakistan. Indian President once said that "India movie 'Kabuliwala' had earned so much respect and influence of India in Afghanistan which could not have been possible by investing billions of dollars investment in Afghanistan". Indian economic assistance to Afghanistan helped in generating workforce and capital which also promoted democracy over radical extremist ideologies. India relaxed its visa policies for Afghans, which contributed tremendously in imparting the democratic norms and values among Afghans to the detriment of Pakistan, which accused India of disseminating venomous agenda against

¹⁸⁹Mushtaq M. Rahim "The Role of Education Exchange in Strengthening Afghanistan-India Relations."

Pakistan from Afghanistan's territory.

India had also impacted Afghanistan through its media and advent of different NGOs in the conservative country of Afghanistan, which was the clear manifestation of India soft power policy. India had uplifted and rejuvenated Afghanistan's precarious media sector by encouraging independent media broadcasts. India played its role in the proliferation of independent media broadcast in Afghanistan through its NGOs particularly. India promoted democratic institutions in Afghanistan through the National Solidarity Program (NSP), which is under Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), facilitated by international organizations particularly along with Indian organization.¹⁹⁰

Indian soft power tactics had impacted Afghanistan's youth by its burgeoning and famous entertainment industry in Afghanistan. Indian soap operas, dubbed in Dari language gained much traction and popularity among Afghan masses. India media contributed in attracting Afghan people towards glory of Indian heroes and portrayed negative image of Pakistan. Indian political clout in Afghanistan pushed the regional countries to seek attention towards Afghanistan's development. Indian influence impacted Afghanistan in a sense that it became the hub of regional investors to invest in this war-torn country.

India hosted the Delhi Investment Summit on Afghanistan on June 28, 2012 to encourage participation of regional countries for making investment in Afghanistan. Even Pakistan did not remain aloof from this partnership Summit, which highlighted the Indian political superiority in Afghanistan in comparison with Pakistan. Around 160 Indian delegates with 80 regional countries' delegates participated in the Summit. Similarly, India

¹⁹⁰ Brendan Whitty, and Hamish Nixon. "The impact of counter-terrorism objectives on democratization and statebuilding in Afghanistan." *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 5, no. 1 (2009): pp.187-218.

hosted another Official Meeting of the Heart of Asia countries in New Delhi in January 2014 at the Heart of Asia Process and large numbers of bilateral high level visits were held between the two countries. These summits proved as a stamped post for the Indian political influence and grip on the politics and government of Afghanistan in a robust manner.¹⁹¹

Indian political grip on Afghan affairs

Indian political grip in Afghanistan could be gauged from the initiative of different economic processes related to Afghanistan's development and progress. These initiatives increased the credibility of India in the eyes of local Afghans and India remained successful in articulating its rosy picture through its soft power influence. India started "Afghanistan Reconnected" consultation in New Delhi to invite investments in the war-torn country. Through this initiative India tried to fulfill its objectives vis-à-vis Afghanistan and endeavored for becoming a regional hub for the decision making process of the future of Afghanistan. India impacted through this initiative on Afghanistan in a sense that it encouraged the Istanbul process for instituting an "Industries for Peace" initiative for controlling cross border illegal crossings and further building industrial parks in Afghanistan.¹⁹²

By using soft power policy, India tried its level best to ignore and down cast Pakistan's relevance in Afghanistan despite the important stake of the former in the later and Afghanistan had always supported such Indian dubious policy towards Pakistan. India while hosting the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectorial Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) in India in October 2016, invited Afghanistan and Maldives, as a member countries of SAARC but

¹⁹¹ Khaibar Tagge. "India-Afghanistan Relations." *Academia* (2014): pp.23

¹⁹² Sarah Stern, Anna Mitri. *Afghanistan Reconnected: Regional Economic Security Beyond 2014. Afghanistan Reconnected*, (2014). (2014).

ignored Pakistan. Pakistan responded on India's derogatory behavior and refused to shift the venue of SAARC summit in India.¹⁹³

Indian cultural impact on Afghanistan

Now a day, every wedding in Kabul witnessed the sari clad women, which showed Indian cultural influence in Afghanistan and it departing Afghan culture away from Pakistani culture. Approximately 90 percent of Afghans strongly supported Indian presence in Afghanistan and looked it as a favorable country towards them.¹⁹⁴ Indian music centers had contributed their due share to train Afghan musicians and Indian songs, movies; TV serials had encouraged Afghan people to get familiarity with Hindi language. Indian cultural centers had also stepped forward in rendering shared cultural heritage of both the countries. Indian cultural diplomacy ushered Indo-Afghan relations towards a joint collaboration in every sphere of life as they both intertwined in one another's cultural posture, which had made their interaction easy and productive.¹⁹⁵

India aspired to install democracy in Afghanistan through its soft power politics and gained strong foothold on the steering paddle of decision making process of government. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during speech at the 2014 BRICS Summit said that "India is committed to assist Afghanistan in building its governance system", which was a serious setback and challenge to the Pakistan's credibility in Afghanistan.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹³Romi Jain. "India and SAARC: An Analysis." *Indian Journal of Asian Affairs* 18, no. 2 (2005): pp.55-74.

¹⁹⁴Anwasha Ghosg. *Afghanistan from "enduring Freedom" to "enduring Chaos"?: Implications for India*. Kw Publisher, 2012.

¹⁹⁵Hamayun Khan, Himanshi Aplani, Mohammad Arif, DeepshikaKumari, and AnchalSood. "Indians' Perception of Afghanistan with a Special Reference to Punjab State."

¹⁹⁶Shakoor Ahmad Dar, Sadhana Pandey, and Rouf Ahmad Bhat. "India's interests in Afghanistan since Post-Taliban Era."

3.9 Indian Security and Weaponry Support to Afghanistan

Indian massive support to Afghanistan in the realm of weapons and military shook the security related institutions of Pakistan, which sensed the showing of provocation of India through the western border of Pakistan. The USA invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 provided an immense opportunity to India to upgrade Afghanistan's security fabric and to enhance bilateral arms trade between India and Afghanistan. The purpose behind this enhancement was to equip Afghanistan with the latest weaponry, which India earlier eschewed, owing to avoid the wrath of Pakistan. India had stepped forward to train Afghan Nation Police and Army personnel, trained Afghan Judges and lawyers in Indi, for the promotion of law in Afghanistan. This training was not only limited to Judges and lawyers but different parliamentary members and journalists were also trained by India to flourish democratic norms in Afghanistan. The purpose of Indian generosity in giving security assistance to Afghanistan was due to the large presence of Indian diplomatic missions in Afghanistan and its numerous running projects.¹⁹⁷

India provided military helicopters and logistics equipment to Afghanistan soon after the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) with Afghanistan in 201. Prior to this agreement India was reluctant to procure this support, owing to the fear of Pakistan's wrath. Until 2013, India was reluctant to procure arms and weapons to Afghanistan to avoid Pakistan's wrath. India supplied two military transport helicopters and some logistics weapons to Afghanistan in 2013. India made an agreement with Russia in April 2014, to supply weapons to Afghanistan against paying the payment of weapons to it., which was a clear manifestation

¹⁹⁷Roshni Kapur. "Rising powers and peacebuilding: Breaking the mold?" (2019): pp.128-130.

of security threat to Pakistan.¹⁹⁸

Pakistan's security witnessed the huge threats with the announcement of US drawdown of western troops in the wake of 2014. It enhanced the prospects of Indian growing military role in Afghanistan to the detriment of Pakistan. Afghanistan government's desperation by US announcement of troop's withdrawal in 2014 increased the Indian military role in Afghanistan. Karzai made a wish list to India for different weaponry support like tanks, mortars, transport aircraft, artillery and helicopters. India had already stepped forward in giving training to Afghan police and army personnel in Afghanistan and India also. India was carefully deliberated on fulfilling this vacuum by assenting to the wish list of Afghanistan through its military up gradation in Afghanistan other than Border Forces for safeguarding roads in Afghanistan.¹⁹⁹

India increased its security threats to Pakistan by giving training and stabilizing Afghan women police and trained two battalions of Afghan women police under the garb of women participation in the wellbeing of the war-torn country. India tried to impact Afghanistan not only directly but also in indirect way by insuring its presence in the Central Asian States bordering landlocked Afghanistan.

India made its first small air base abroad in the area of Tajikistan, which joint hands border with Afghanistan. Pakistan felt security risk by these Indian initiative, as these three borders of Pakistan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan were closely connected with each other. Pakistan was of the view that India might use this air base to attack Pakistan in the case of

¹⁹⁸Sandra Destradi. "Regional powers and security governance: ISAF withdrawal, regional competition, and domestic norms in India's Afghanistan policy." *Asian perspective* 38, no. 4 (2014): pp.565-587.

¹⁹⁹Eva Gross. "Afghanistan: The View from India." *European Union Institute for Security Studies* (2014).

any future misadventure between Pakistan and India.²⁰⁰

Pakistan adopted the stern behavior for Indian weaponry support to Pakistani dissidents and sheltering them in Afghanistan. The attack on Indian embassy in Kabul was well perceived by USA, Indian and Afghan authorities, as the reprisal of Pakistan's antagonism against Indian encirclement of Pakistan from the two fronts. Pakistan's intransigence in accepting Indian maneuverings in Afghanistan in the disguise of rehabilitation and development gave chance to authorities in Afghanistan to suspect Pakistan's role behind sabotaging Indian developmental projects in Afghanistan. The deadly car bomb attacks on Indian embassy in 2008, 2009 and subsequently attack on Indian people in 2010, attack on Indian military surgeons and consular official's office surged Indian, US and Afghan authorities' accusation barrages against Pakistan's involvement in these incidents.²⁰¹

In the ensuing circumstances, Pakistan increased its diplomatic reach towards Afghanistan and tried to court them in the favor of Pakistan's altruistic aims to quell the insurgency from the border region of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The then Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan, General Raheel Sharif went Kabul on May 2015 and met with his counterpart and ISAF chief. General discussed the sealing of the Af-Pak border which was occurred on 5 April 2015 and Pakistan's determination to quell the insurgency emanating from this border. ²⁰²Pakistan de-stretched its army's presence in the area and launched approximately 15,000 Army personnel across the border against mere 4,000 insurgents

²⁰⁰Jean-Luc. Jean "Post-post-colonial India: from regional power to global player." *Politique étrangère* 5 (2008): pp.65-78.

²⁰¹Jason A.Kirk "India's Season of Discontent: US-India Relations through the Prism of Obama's "Af-Pak" Policy, Year One." *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 37, no. 3 (2010): pp.147-166.

²⁰²Malcolm S. "IGlobal, South Asia, I. West, IAI Qaeda, and Region IEast." *Charting Global Transitions*, (2016).

between April and July 2009.²⁰³

Indian nurturing and support to Baloch dissidents and TTP faction of Pakistan in Afghanistan

Pakistan was in a critical situation in terms of the safety of its security when Afghanistan responded in a positive nod for Indian security providence to this war-torn country. Afghanistan and India jointly accommodate, sheltered and armed the Baluchistan Liberation Army against Pakistan. Muhammad Fayyaz in article “The Global War on Terror in South Asia” says that Afghanistan welcomed Indian provocative activities along the Pak-Afghan border area by allowing the Indian Border Roads Organization to build Ring Roads, which India availed through the usage of its Indo-Tibetan Police force for its organization’s security. The connivance between India and Afghanistan spurred the hidden presence of Baluchistan Liberation Army in Afghanistan, which were sheltered in the provinces of Helmand and Kandahar and also armed with latest weapons for subversive activities in Pakistan.²⁰⁴

3.10 Indian Educational Support to Afghanistan

Indian executed its soft power policy in Afghanistan through educational sector and this Indian educational development in Afghanistan was also not without its interest. Pakistan allegedly held Indian officials accountable for recruiting Afghan students in its clandestine secret intelligence agency RAW. India offered Afghan national’s training in different fields through allocation of 500 ITEC slots annually, ICAR scholarships under India-Afghanistan Fellowship Program during the years 2012-13 to 20120-21.

²⁰³Syed Farooq Hasnat. "Pakistan's strategic interests, Afghanistan and the fluctuating US strategy." *Journal of International Affairs* 63, no. 1 (2009): pp.141-155.

²⁰⁴Muhammad Feyyaz. "The Global War on Terror in South Asia." *Pakistan Horizon* 62, no. 4 (2009): pp.39-53.

India had announced 1000 ICCR under graduate scholarships to Afghans every year in various Indian universities and trained Afghan National Agriculture Sciences and Medical students at different universities of Afghanistan. Indian assistance to Afghanistan in the field of education had impacted positively the relations between the two neighboring countries irrespective of their religious dissimilarities and geographic distance. More than 16,000 students of Afghanistan were offered educational assistance from Indian in 2016 in its major countries of New Delhi, Pune, and Mumbai etc.²⁰⁵

In December 2017, India initiated Self-Employed Women's Association (SEWA) program to train women and imparting skills in various fields. Indian "women-centric" training centers in different provinces of Afghanistan, which not only empowered women rather it, raised the country's GDP also. Indian education support to Afghan students had made them dependent on India and afterwards India exploited their dependence and brainwashed these Afghan students against Pakistan. This was the clear manifestation and cleverly usage of Indian soft power influence in Afghanistan and its negative consequences for Pakistan's security.

India had contributed much in providing school's accessories to various Afghan students and initiated various teacher training programs. India had volunteered its civil servants to guide nascent Afghan bureaucracy mired with corruption and nepotism. In 2010, India announced to assist 200 graduates and 100 post graduates/PhDs for the tenure of five years in the field of agriculture. India distributed approximately 9,000 educational kits to Afghan students and reconstructed Habibia School in Kabul and procured 20,000 school desks, laboratory equipment and sports accessories in province of Nimroz. **Pakistan's**

²⁰⁵Mr Gaurav Dixit. "India's Growing Presence in Afghanistan: Manifestation of its Soft Power and Diplomacy." *Usiofindia.Org*, 2017.

reaction against Indian exploitation of Afghan educational sector

Pakistan severely rebuked India when Indian government deputed its 30 civil servants to train and groom Afghan nascent bureaucrats and ensured the banking expert services to Afghan Banks along with Indian English teachers. Pakistan alleged that these civil servants were indoctrinating the nascent Afghan bureaucracy against Pakistan, which will affect Pakistan's peaceful coexistence with neighboring Afghanistan. Indian procurement of these all facilities to Afghan masses upgraded Indian popularity graph in Afghanistan. The ABC News and German news agency ARD surveyed in December 2009 and assessed that 71% Afghans had favorable perception for India.²⁰⁶

Pakistan was deeply antagonized with the Indian remarkable ingress in the field of education sector of Afghanistan. Though Pakistan didn't give the tough time to India by coming into the same field and procuring its contribution in the education sector to uplift Afghan education system rather it severely blamed India for its strategy of encirclement of Pakistan in its neighbor.²⁰⁷

3.11 Indian Diplomatic Support to Afghanistan

India used its soft power influence in Afghanistan and ensured its diplomatic presence in Afghanistan after US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 to destabilize Pakistan under the garb of efficient diplomacy in the neighbor Afghanistan.

²⁰⁶Nathaniel Fick, and Clare Lockhart. *The Economic Imperative: Stabilizing Afghanistan Through Economic Growth*. Center for a New American Security., 2010.

²⁰⁷ Sergei Leonidovich Danilchenko, "Investments in Education – Investments in the Future," *Development of Education*, no. 1 (1) (2018): pp. 15-18, <https://doi.org/10.31483/r-11335>.

Reopening of India embassy and consulates in Afghanistan

India reopened its embassy in Kabul and established various consulates in various cities of Afghanistan after the US invasion. Afghan government amicably accepted Indian diplomatic role in Afghanistan and offered it more leverage in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. This increased diplomatic relations between the two states, antagonized Pakistan severely and India remained successful in bridging more differences in the already severed relations between the two neighboring states.

Payoff to India by Afghanistan

The success of Indian soft power influence in Afghanistan was manifested by the visit of the then Indian External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh to USA in October 2001, who stressed upon international community to usher Northern Alliance government in Afghanistan. The successful Indian diplomatic lobbying internationally enabled the establishment of an interim government in Afghanistan by electing pro-Indian Hamid Karzai as an interim president and its cabinet mostly dominated by the Northern Alliance members. The success of Indian lobbying in Afghanistan was a severe struck to the precarious Pakistan's security situation, which endured deadly attacks after the formation of interim government in Afghanistan, largely consisted of Tajik based NA.²⁰⁸

USA invasion of Afghanistan resulted in the total dependence of Afghan government on USA and India for its financial needs. It was the successful diplomacy of India that on the occasion of heart of Asia conference in India, the Afghan president rebuked Pakistan on its offer of economic support to Afghanistan and rejected it. The result of Gallup poll of 2010, which interviewed the thousand people and among them 50 percent gave approval to Indian

²⁰⁸Ashraf, Fahmida Ashraf. "India-Afghanistan Relations: Post-9/11." *Strategic Studies* 27, no. 2 (2007): pp.90-102.

overall performance in Afghanistan. Another study also highlighted the same result, in which maximum Afghan Adults liked Indian leadership in Afghanistan rather than USA, Chinese or any other regional or international state.²⁰⁹

Pakistan's reaction

Pakistan also used its diplomatic right to condemn Indian malicious diplomatic maneuverings in Afghanistan. Pakistan had been criticizing Indian overtures towards Afghanistan since 2001 and this Pakistani stance drew ire of India, which blamed Pakistan for its unobtrusive support to mujahedeen of Afghanistan against India during the Soviet-Afghan war. Pakistan responded diplomatically on Indian training and arms support to Afghan military personnel and policemen.

Khalid Rahman in article “India-Iran Relations and Current Regional Dynamics” says the Indian Prime Minister’s visited to Iran in March 2001, and signed ‘Tehran Declaration’. India discussed ways of curbing extremist and terrorist wave emanating from the divergent cleavages between the tribal elites and sects, mainly between Taliban and Northern Alliance. Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani met with NATO Chief of Defense and its Partner Chiefs to offer Pakistan’s assistance in training Afghan army and Police. The same offer was articulated by Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi to Afghanistan in the London Conference on Afghanistan, which was turned down.

Harsh V Pant in a report “India’s Afghanistan policy should rapidly adapt to the evolving realities” says that Pakistan was adamant in its policy of using mujahedeen against India since 1979 –Soviet Afghan war. Pakistan had linked its Kashmir policy with

²⁰⁹Wajid Ali. "Historical perspective of indo-Afghan relations." 2019.

Afghanistan after the Indian abrogation of Article 370 of its constitution. Pakistan threatened India to revoke the special status of Kashmir otherwise it will repeat the same story of militant intransigence in India from Afghanistan during the Soviet Afghan war.²¹⁰

It was the success of Indian soft power policy which made an indelible impact on Afghanistan by India joined cooperation with Iran to tackle the joint scourge of terrorism and ethnic rivalries in the region. This soft power of India in the region persuaded Iran to support the Indian stance on categorization of “good “and “bad” Taliban of Pakistan. Indian PM Narendra Modi met more than five times with his counterpart, Ashraf Ghani, since December 2015 and during this time, India also participated in the various international conferences related with Afghanistan that showed Indian persistent diplomatic support and commitment to Afghanistan vis-à-vis Pakistan.

Indian soft power policy continued even at the time of signing of historical pact between Afghanistan Taliban and US in February 29, 2020 Pakistan was wary of any Indian involvement in Afghanistan’s future meetings but India seized the opportunity of the Khalilzad-Baradar pact. Though India was not satisfied with this pact and had not been acknowledged prior about this but it hedged its bets through its active diplomatic lobbying and participated in the Doha conference in Qatar. One day earlier of Khalilzad-Baradar pact, Modi wrote a letter to Ghani and ensured his commitment to articulate Indian position which best suited to Afghanistan, which should be Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan controlled. Indian stance on Afghanistan’s future uplifted Indian image among the Afghan

²¹⁰ Harsh V. Pant. “India’s Afghanistan Policy Should Rapidly Adapt to the Evolving Realities.” *Observer Research Foundation*, (2019).

people and enhanced its credibility in Afghan imbroglio.²¹¹

Indian growing diplomatic clout in Afghanistan had impacted Pakistan severely. Concerned with the increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan, Pakistani government officially asked former Afghan President Hamid Karzai to restrain Indian presence in the country. Former Pakistani army chief general Ashfaq Parvez Kayani presented a non-paper to then US president Barack Obama and urged the same demand from him.²¹²

3.12 Indian trade relations with India

India used its soft power ingress in Afghanistan and decided to establish its direct air freight corridor between Kabul and New Delhi initially in June 2017 and later extended it to the Kandahar to New Delhi respectively, which increased trade volume between the two countries.

Implications of air freight corridor between India and Afghanistan on Pakistan

The implications of this corridor directly implicated Pakistan's dominance on giving a safe, cost effective and shortest route to both India and Afghanistan through its overland territory. India's initiative would boost the bilateral annual trade between the two countries from 700 million USD to 1 billion USD in the next three years. It will impact Afghanistan's agricultural and carpet industries in a positive nod and will give India an immense benefit in selling perishable products to Afghanistan without fear of being rotten by Pakistan's involvement. Through this initiative India gave two messages to Pakistan that the former is fully committed with its stance to stand with Afghanistan in every circumstances and Pakistan could not be able to stop India's entry and influence in Afghanistan and further in

²¹¹Khalid Rahman. "India-Iran Relations and Current Regional Dynamics." *Policy Perspectives* (2010): pp.27-49.

²¹²Afifa Kiran. "Indian quest for strategic ingress in Afghanistan and its implications for Pakistan." *ISSRA Papers* 1, no. 2 (2009): pp.12-29.

Central Asian States.²¹³

Reconstruction of Indira Gandhi Children's Hospital in Kabul

India reconstructed the Indira Gandhi Children's hospital in Kabul, which it constructed earlier and was debilitated with the passage of time. The new hospital has 150 beds and started its first cerebral palsy centre in Afghanistan in 2004. Indian government also opened an artificial limb center which could fit up to 1000 people with Jaipur legs. This breakthrough in Indian health sector more enhanced the soft image of India among common Afghans vis-à-vis Pakistan.

Indian establishment of Afghan National Agriculture Sciences and Technology University (ANASTU) in Kandahar

ANASTU was inaugurated in Afghanistan on 15 February 2014 by the then President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai and Indian External Affairs Minister of that time H.E. Mr. Salman Khurshid. Indian Agricultural Research Institute (IARI) will conduct two courses on the topics like 'Principles and Practices of Weed Management' and 'Principles and Practices of Water Resource Management by using e-learning. The initiative like this enhanced the production capability of Afghan soil by the active and concentrate efforts of India, which enhanced its soft image of India among the people of Afghanistan.

Building of cricket stadium in Kandahar

India officially granted \$1 million for the construction of the stadium under the Small Development Project Scheme. This cricket field consisted of eighteen acres of land and India invested \$618,000 USD, on this stadium, which is the clear manifestation of India's soft power ingress in Afghanistan.

²¹³Ibid., 19.

Building of cold storage warehouse in Kandahar

On October 2005, India made an investment of 5 million US dollars to build the cold storage warehouse in Kandahar to store perishable fresh fruits and vegetables for a period of up to six months. This Indian investment was crucial in a sense that, it provided an immense opportunity to Afghanistan to store the perishable fruits and vegetables which Pakistan didn't allow Indian stuff to cross Pakistan's territory and enters into Afghanistan. It was a direct and befitting Indian reply to Pakistan's intransigence in allowing Indian vegetables and fruits into Afghan territory. This clever Indian move gave Afghanistan an opportunity to save the perishable products to decay in the Pak-Afghan border.

Expansion of national television network in Afghanistan by India

India also endeavored in the realm of expanding Afghan national TV channels and radio stations, on which India had full command and monopoly. This developmental work of India in Afghan also derelict Pakistan's TV channels access to Afghanistan, which played an important role in enlarging the gulf of already strained relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Conclusion

India gained the special status in Afghanistan through its massive aid soon after the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. India covered all the fields of life in Afghanistan in which it progressed and ensured its participation to uplift the war-torn country to the level of stability and development. Pakistan tried to match the Indian actions in Afghanistan but due to its fledgling economy it did not compete with India. This weakness of Pakistan gave India a great leverage and open ground in Afghanistan to play its game. The regional countries, owing to their interests in Afghanistan fully endorsed and cooperated with India, which

strengthened Indian real agenda to sideline Pakistan from the Afghan affairs. India gained so much popularity in Afghanistan that Pakistan could not match its any endeavors in Afghanistan. The future generation of Afghanistan would be in the favour of India, which will increase Indian clout in Afghanistan in the future, as India focused on Afghan people's education and made such agreement with Afghanistan which would enhance Indian engagement with Afghanistan in the future also.

CHAPTER 4

INDIA'S SOFT POWER INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS SECURITY IMPLICATIONS TO PAKISTAN

India started an international campaign to label Pakistan as a terrorist country after the golden time in Afghanistan in post-9/11 era and connected the Pakistani backed insurgency in Kashmir with the global terrorism. India gave diplomatic support to Afghanistan with the special mission of targeting Pakistan's internal security. India also struck Pakistan's trade with Afghanistan in a robust manner and made different economic agreements with Afghanistan to more shrink Pak-Afghan trade. India prepared Afghanistan as a war mongering country towards Pakistan after 9/11 and supplied heavy ammunitions and weapons to Afghanistan to attack Pakistan.

4.1 Indian Kabul Embassy and Consulates Role in Training and Assisting Separatists in Pakistan

Through soft power influence, India stepped up in establishing of its embassy and consulates in Afghanistan once again in 2001 with the invasion of US in Afghanistan, which had been remained close since the Taliban rule from 1996-2001. Indian consulates had been engaged in sheltering and aiding the Baloch dissidents from Pakistan's restive province of Baluchistan since 2001, which was the clear manifestation of Indian consulates underground real agenda in the different cities of Afghanistan. Indian government accused Pakistan for the heinous attacks on its consulates in Jalalabad a few years ago. Afghan Ministry of Tribal Affairs were funding and arming rebel groups in Pakistan. Indian consulates had used Taliban's splinter group of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) against Pakistan by organizing

an escape adventure of TTP's top aide from the custody of Pakistan's army. India also used another fault line in Pakistan in the shape of Muttahida Qaumi Movement through the consulates operating near the Pak-Afghan border.

Implications of diplomatic overtures of India in Afghanistan on Pakistan's security

India so called construction of these consulates and embassy for communication purposes had remained fail to assuage Pakistan's aversion. Pakistan had frequently accused India for its duplicitous policy in the disguise of developmental works in Afghanistan. Indian consulates in Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Qandahar and Jalalabad had engaged in funding Baloch separatist for their sub-nationalism in Pakistan. Indian malevolence through its consulate's work in Afghanistan played a key role in up surging political violence in Pakistan and also sabotaged Pak-Afghan relations by erecting obstacles in the implementation of Pak-Afghan transit trade agreement.²¹⁴

Pakistan's Reaction

India posed security threats to Pakistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan had pointed out multiple times the subversive behavior of India in Pakistan through Afghanistan. Different Pakistani officials spoke out against India and exposed its malevolence in the internal affairs of Afghanistan from the neighbouring Afghanistan. The then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali on July 2003 alleged Indian consulates in Afghanistan in perpetuating a deadly attack on the Quetta mosque in connivance with the Indian diplomatic office in the Zahedan of Iranian city. Likewise, Pakistan's foreign ministry on August 2003 held India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) accountable for terrorist operations and running espionage at Pakistan through its consulates in Kandahar and

²¹⁴Imran, Sumeera Imran. "Sino-US Involvement in Afghanistan." *Strategic Studies* 39, no. 3 (2019): pp.53-65.

Jalalabad. Pakistan's Interior Minister Faisal Saleh Hayyat's charged India for meddling in Pakistani Baluchistan through Afghanistan and attributed violence in northwest Pakistan after 2005 with these activities of India.²¹⁵

Proofs of Indian underhand terrorist activities against Pakistan through Afghanistan

Pakistan had gained/retrieved the irrefutable evidence of Indian interference in Pakistan's internal sensitive areas and the Indian exploitation through Afghanistan with the help of its consulates in the different cities of Afghanistan. Pakistan used these evidences as a pressure tactic against India and Afghanistan internationally to stop and subvert their malicious activities against Pakistan. Saima Perveen, Jehanzeb Khalil, Manzoor Ahmad and Jehangir Khalil in article "Post 2014 Spillover Effects of Afghanistan's Crisis on Pakistan's Foreign Policy" says that Indian's RAW, USA's CIA and Israel's MOSSAD intelligence agencies were active in Pakistani Baluchistan and had also operated in Swat region of Pakistan through their combined center in Mazare Sharif (Afghanistan). India was behind these all heinous crimes on the basis of solid proofs, which were manifested clearly from the recovery of weapons at the Swat operation with the labeling of 'Made in Banaras' (India).²¹⁶ Pakistani army officers showed a letter in Dari language which displayed Indian officer's four meetings with the Taliban's splinter group operating in Pakistan's tribal areas for organizing terror attacks in Pakistan. Indian maneuvered in Pakistan with the creation of ISIS chapter in Pakistan by relocating Daesh militants from India to the Pak-Afghan border. The army officer further claimed to have the names of the Indian ambassadors and consular general in Jalalabad along with the bank transactions receipt of money which gave financial

²¹⁵Prakash Katoch. "Indian Military in Afghanistan" *Indian Reference Review*, 2013.

²¹⁶Saima Perveen, Jehanzeb Khalil, Manzoor Ahmad, and Jehangir Khalil. "Post 2014 Spillover Effects of Afghanistan's Crisis on Pakistan's Foreign Policy." *FWU Journal of Social Sciences* 1, no. 1 (2015): pp.13.

support to the TTP members and Baloch dissidents. They showed the first payment of 28,000 USD which was transferred by Punjab [National] Bank in India and the second transaction of 55,851 USD by Indian bank, received by Afghanistan International Bank.²¹⁷

Afghan intelligence agency's connivance with India against Pakistan

Afghan intelligence agency NDS was equally responsible for the brutal underground Indian war against Pakistan through consulates operating in Afghanistan. Secretary defense of Pakistan said that Afghan intelligence agency NDS had been in a joint collaboration with Indian intelligence agency RAW in launching operations against Pakistan by using Indian consulates in Afghanistan. He said that without the prior knowledge and support of Afghan intelligence the operations of India against Pakistan could not be operated. The Indian agency RAW was operating a cell at NDS headquarter in Kabul for organizing anti-Pakistan activities.²¹⁸ Sajjad Shaukat in article "India's Offensive-Defensive Doctrine" says the former director of Afghan intelligence agency NDS, Rahmatullah Nabil and TTP chief Mullah Fazl Ullah planned this attack on the direction of Indian National Security Advisor to the PM, Ajit Doval. Indian consulates in Afghanistan paid three million rupees to the militants for the completion of this deadly and heinous attack.²¹⁹

To befittingly reply Indian maneuverings in Afghanistan, Pakistan could restrict Afghanistan's export to India through Pakistan, abort TAPI pipeline and by fostering bilateral pipeline project with Iran and ensure its military convey presence in Afghanistan near the Indian consulates to counter this threat. Pakistan could start diplomatic campaign

²¹⁷Michelle Hughes, and Michael Miklaucic. *Impunity: Countering illicit power in war and transition*. ARMY WAR COLLEGE CARLISLE BARRACKS PA CARLISLE BARRACKS United States, 2016.

²¹⁸M. Haider "RAW runs Special Cell to sabotage CPEC, says Secretary Defence." (2016).

²¹⁹Sajjad Shaukat. "India's Offensive-Defensive Doctrine" *Kashmir Valley* (2016).

against Indian malicious activities through its consulates in Afghanistan against Pakistan.

4.2 Indian Influence in Afghanistan and Set Back to Pakistan's Trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia

Afghanistan is a rich country in terms of natural resources, which had attracted several countries towards its resources and India was no exceptional in this race. Pakistan was the largest market of Afghan exports, but its share had declined due to different factors like Indian and Iran's increasing trade with Afghanistan. India had increased its imports from Afghanistan despite the fact that it doesn't share direct transit route with Afghanistan.

Afghan natural resources gained by India abundantly

The success of Indian soft power in Afghanistan was manifested by Indian Steel Authority's success in gaining Afghan minerals, hydrocarbons, and mining bids. To diminish the importance of Pakistan's APTTA agreement for Afghanistan, India constructed a rail and road network to link Afghanistan with Iran's port. The construction of Delaram Zaranj highway in south-west Afghanistan to the Iranian border region of Zaranj ensured an alternate route for trading by avoiding Pakistan's land route. It gave Indian Steel Authority an easy and reliable route to import Afghan mineral resources like hydrocarbons and mining potentials at the Afghanistan's Hajigak mine in Bamiyan province.

Impact on Pakistan's trade with Afghanistan

India had made progress in this field by investing 2 billion USD in Afghanistan and got the bid for the maximum iron ore of the region, which ensured an approximate 10.7 billion USD of Indian investment over the next 30 years of period. This development over the next decades and more would enhance Indian propensity in Afghanistan and decrease the

Pakistan's trading option with the former.²²⁰ Pakistan had also tried to assuage the trade barriers with Afghanistan owing to the increasing Indian involvement in the latter country. Pakistan provided approximately 24.3% of total Afghan imports to Afghanistan in FY13, but due to political instability and suspension of NATO supply shipment along with Indo-Iran increased share in transit trade, Pakistan shares in transit trade with Afghanistan started decline. With the signature of new transit trade agreement between India, Iran and Afghanistan, the prospect of Pakistan's trade with Afghanistan had also been in lowest trajectory. Despite the lack of transit access to Afghanistan, India had become the second largest state for Afghan exports, which boosted up to 27% and Pakistan owing to the direct access to Afghanistan, stood at 32.2% of all Afghan exports.²²¹

Pakistan took tremendous steps in this regard by redesigning of APTTA and its extension up to Tajikistan. To assuage the strained relations with Afghanistan, Pakistan redesigned its APTTA Agreement in 2010 with the former and convinced Afghanistan not to restrict Pakistan's transit trade in Central Asian through its region. This agreement allowed Afghan exports transportation through Pakistan via Wagah border into India, also via Karachi seaport and Gwadar. This agreement also led to the formation of a joint chamber of commerce between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Pakistan was allowed to transport its products all over the Afghanistan. Pakistan's made remarkable endeavor in the establishment of a north-south trade corridor by extending the APTTA to the extent of Tajikistan. Ministry of Commerce and Trade Development Authority of Pakistan revealed that Pakistan had approved the transportation of trains twice a week from Torkham border to Tajikistan under

²²⁰Larry P. Goodson. "The New Great Game: Pakistan's Approach to Afghanistan after 2014." *Asia policy* 17 (2014): 33-39.

²²¹Ishrat Hussain and Muhammad Ather Elahi. *Future of Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade Relations*. US Institute of Peace., 2015.

the APTTA.²²²

To scale up exports to Afghanistan, Pakistan further phased out subsidies and increased both power and gas tariffs and allowed private sector to enter and create competitive pricing for consumers. These firms were facing difficulties in exporting in Afghanistan due to the pressure from India and Iran, as the trade costs had increased over the time. India and Iran pressurized these exporters to compete in Afghanistan as the insurance cost was almost one-third of the consignment cost, which discouraged the smaller traders specifically by the larger traders of India in Afghanistan.²²³

Indian maneuverings in debilitating Pakistan's trade with Afghanistan

India had struck Pakistan's trade with Afghanistan by decreasing tariffs and customs on Afghan exports to India. This resultantly helped in the growth of plastic industry in Afghanistan and decline of plastics exports from Pakistan. Pakistan levied high tariffs on imports from Afghanistan, which were acting as a constraint in the trade realms between the two countries. These already strained relations had further witnessed great blow from Indian side, which reduced the custom duties and taxes on Afghan goods in India by 50%. Afghanistan had a fast booming industry of plastics, rubber and paper, which were facing high tariffs in Pakistan. Pakistan charged average tariff on plastics and rubber of Afghanistan of 17% and 15.8% respectively but the case in India was different, which charged 9.5% and 9.1% respectively for these products. As a result, the plastic industry boomed in Afghanistan and established gradually and witnessed in decline of exports of plastics from Pakistan.²²⁴

Indian collaboration with regional countries through Afghanistan against Pakistan

²²²Ayesha Tabbasum. " Afghanistan as Future Market, for the promotion of trade for Pakistan." *Academia*, no. 2 (2016): pp. 71-29.

²²³Vaqar Ahmed. *Pakistan's Agenda for Economic Reforms*. Oxford University Press, 2017.

²²⁴Mairajulhamid Nasri. "Afghanistan, Trade and Regional Stability" *Academia* (2019)

India had joined hands with Iran in gaining strong footholds in Afghan economy to strike the tough competition to Pakistan nexus with China in perpetrating the trade relations in the region. Indian leader met with Afghan president Hamid Karzai in the Nonaligned Movement summit in Tehran in 2012 and discussed to develop a “Southern Silk Road”. This trade route would traverse Iran by railroads and roads and would help in connecting South Asia to Central Asia and Gulf of Oman.²²⁵

India had commenced an air freight corridor between India and Afghanistan in 2017 and reaped the benefits of this freight corridor in the shape of enhanced trade relation between the two states, which were barred for two way trade before this initiative from Pakistan side. This air freight decreased the Pakistan’s monopoly over Afghanistan’s trade and diverted the latter’s directions towards India. India had transported more than 5, 000 metric tons of cargo in over 500 flights between the two states, which benefited Afghan farmers and small traders. Prior to this initiative the perishable goods of India had gone rotten by many times due to the Pakistan’s reluctance to allow crossing the Pakistan’s territory straight into Afghanistan. This initiative had diminished Afghanistan’s dependence on Pakistan for trade with India and over the period the bilateral trade between India and Afghanistan stood at 1.5 billion USD, which was the clear manifestation of the success of this corridor.²²⁶

Pakistan and China had a sharp eye on India’s emboldened trade relations with Afghanistan and shared the common goal of uplifting the depreciated situation of their comparatively less privileged areas the two states joined hands for the establishment of CPEC. It had the ability to accommodate the participation of the most important regional

²²⁵Alireza Nader, Ali G. Scotten, Ahmad Idrees Rahmani, Robert Stewart, and Leila Mahnad. *Iran’s influence in Afghanistan: Implications for the US Drawdown*. Rand Corporation, 2014.

²²⁶Rudra Chaudhuri and Shreyas Shende. *Dealing with the Taliban: India’s Strategy in Afghanistan After US Withdrawal*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2020.

actor like Russia in it and that would be a great challenge to the hegemonic character of India in Afghanistan, most probably in terms of trade relations. CPEC had great potential for Afghanistan's inclusion in it and opening of vast trading potentialities between the regional actors would be a clear setback to India's trade with Afghanistan.²²⁷ Pakistan was in a joint collaboration with China in constructing Gwader-Kashger railway line, which will uplift Pakistan's dependency on Afghanistan for the trade relations with CARs and China. It will minimize the interference of India in the affairs of Pakistan in terms of its economic relations with energy rich Central Asian States.²²⁸

Indian setback to CPEC project vis-à-vis Afghanistan

India used soft power policy in Afghanistan and tried to sabotage CPEC project in every possible way and also played its role in barring Afghanistan to join the CPEC, which was the game changer for the regional economic status. Pakistan had great fear and paranoia due to the increased Indian role in the Afghan economy and foreign policy. Owing to the increase Indian influence in the Afghan economy and foreign policy, the latter will not be able to decide independently to cultivate trade relations with Pakistan in the shape of CPEC. India will prefer to push Afghanistan to join the non CPEC project like Iranian Chahbahar project to strike the great blow the Pakistan's economic ambitions in the region.²²⁹

India was awry of Pakistan's intransigence in giving the transit route to Indian goods transporting into Afghanistan and sought out alternative ways to carry the respective tasks safely and reliably. India planned to initiate the air cargo transportation vis-à-vis Afghanistan

²²⁷Lora Saalman, GulzhanAsylbekkyzy and Jiayi Zhou. "China-Russia Relations and Regional Dynamics: From Pivots to Peripheral Diplomacy." SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2017.

²²⁸Mr Samran Ali. "China's Afghanistan Policy." *CISS Insight Journal* 6, no. 1 (2018): pp.50-69.

²²⁹Richard Ghiasy and Jiayi Zhou. "The Silk Road Economic Belt: Considering Security Implications and EU-China Cooperation Prospects." *Sweden and Germany, SIPRI & Friedrich Ebert Stiftung* (2017).

over Pakistan's territory. Pakistan intransigence in giving India a transportation route to Afghanistan pushed the latter to look towards Iran to continue the trade with India and importing the necessary goods from India that resulted in the decrease trade ratio between Pakistan and Afghanistan and increased ratio between Afghanistan, Iran and India.

Pakistan was stepping ahead in more alienating itself from Afghanistan with the planning of signing of a quadrilateral transit agreement with Central Asian republics and China. In the sixth Heart of Asia Conference-Istanbul Process in India, both the countries of India and Afghanistan negotiated to initiate air cargo transportation over the Pakistan's territory. This air cargo would allow Indian medicines and other goods to be imported to Afghanistan. Pakistan was much worried due to the construction of Chahbahar port by the Indian investment which could be resulted in the loss of transit customers such as Central Asia and Afghanistan. Afghan imports from Pakistan witnessed gradual decrease with the time due to the Pak-Afghan transit and trade problems. Afghan imports from Pakistan in 2008-2009 were 60% but in 2016 but witnessed the stark decline and stood at 30%. This scenario increased the ratio of Afghan imports from Iran, which reached at 37-40% from the 15-20% in 2008-2009.²³⁰

India was the main hurdle between the Pakistan's trade relations with Central Asian Republics and it created the strained atmosphere for Pakistan in CARs region. Pakistan had also stepped forward to elevate its dependence on Afghanistan for trading with Central Asian States with the help of China. India had played its active role in defaming Pakistan in Central Asian countries by reinvigorating the Pakistan's past cooperation with Taliban against the USSR and further relations with extremist outfits in the region. That was the reason that,

²³⁰Ibid., 20.

these Central Asian States were having more inclination towards India rather than Pakistan. Pakistan had endeavored for elevating its dependence on Afghanistan for trade relations with the Central Asian States.²³¹

India had stepped forward in the Central Asian State's domain of economic trade by setting up numerous flight links with CARs and developed local industries. India started to import larger quantity of raw materials and goods from CARs, which diminished the Pakistan's trade opportunities with these states and ensured the Indian monopoly over the resources of CARs via Afghanistan.

Indian Connect Central Asian policy through Afghanistan and implications for Pakistan

India launched the "Connect Central Asia" policy in 2012 via Afghanistan to expand its regional presence vis-à-vis Pakistan. India launched 14 flight links with Central Asian States; developed its local industries of IT, banking, energy, pharmaceuticals and e-networks. Indian Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) were bidding to buy ConocoPhillips 8.4% shares in the Kazakhstan's Kashagan oil field. India imported cotton, zinc, uranium, iron, steel, raw materials and dried fruits from the CARs in the large quantity and exported textiles, leather, rice, tea, pharmaceuticals and chemical products into these states. These all Indian steps had sidelined Pakistani trade options vis-à-vis Central Asian States.²³²

The vivid proof of Indian successful soft power policy in Afghanistan was passage of Afghanistan's approximately 60 percent trade via a road network built by India and Iran for expanding a south-north vector of the transcontinental trade. These figures were a great

²³¹Mr Samran Ali. "China's Afghanistan Policy." *CISS Insight Journal* 6, no. 1 (2018): pp.50-69.

²³²Roman Muzalevsky. *Unlocking India's Strategic Potential in Central Asia*. ARMY WAR COLLEGE CARLISLE BARRACKS PA STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE, 2015.

setback to Pakistan's monopoly over the transit trade route hitherto given to Afghanistan to trade with other countries.²³³

India had imported more than 3,500 tons of uranium from Kazakhstan from the 2009-14 but its main focus was Afghanistan, which was India's safe transit route towards CARs. That was the reason that India had invested more than 2 billion USD in the country and won the bidding of Hajigak iron ore deposits. Besides its funding for roads, railways, medical facilities, and power networks, India helped Afghanistan to become a SAARC member. Indian move for the inclusion of Afghanistan in the SAARC organization extended its trade options in Central Asia and Middle East. India was also looking forward to see regional republics of CARs specially Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to join SAFTA forum for the more secured position of India in the region.

India tried its full energies for the Central Asian States to join SAARC, SAFTA, the twelfth Bay of Bengal Multisectoral Technical Economic and Cooperation, and the India-Association for Southeast Asian Nations deal. Indian ONGC Mittal gained 30 percent of shares of two oil sites in the Caspian in 2007 to import energy from Turkmenistan. India was also engaged in the exploitation of gas and oil factories in Uzbekistan and interested in expanding trade with Kazakhstan which already accounted for 75 percent of India's trade with the region. These all endeavors of India decreased the prospects of Pakistan's trade relations with the Central Asian regional States.²³⁴

Pakistan also joined hands with China to befittingly reply the maneuvering of India in the region to diminish Pakistan's trade relations with the regional actors of Afghanistan

²³³ Mustafa Rezaie, "Trade Relationship Between India and Pakistan." Academia (2018).

²³⁴ Ahmad Idrees Rahmani. "Regional Trade Regime and Declining Rate of Private Investment in Afghanistan" *Research Gate*, 2008.

and Central Asia. Pakistan made a deal with China in signing of a 7 billion USD contract with the latter to extend the Iran-Pakistan pipeline towards China, by avoiding India.

Indian monopoly in IOR-ARC forum in Afghanistan and smear policy against Pakistan

India politically alienated Pakistan regionally through its soft power ingress in Afghanistan by using different forum among them one was IOR-ARC. The Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) was launched in 1997 and the Indian Ocean Rim Consultative Business Network (IORCBN) and the Indian Ocean Rim Business Forum (IORBF) were two forums formed under its auspices. The aim of IOR-ARC was to facilitate trade and investment among the member countries by 2010. China, Egypt, France, Japan and the UK were IOR-ARC dialogue partners. India vetoed Pakistan's inclusion in the IOR-ARC, despite its 805-km coastline on the Indian Ocean and its ability to link landlocked Afghanistan and Central Asian states to the Rim.²³⁵

Pakistan gave a befitting reply of Indian intransigence in its inclusion in the forum and signed a protocol with Kazakhstan to help it in gaining the membership of WTO and offered Kazakhstan a road link to join Karakoram Highway that would enable the CARs to use Karachi ports and Gwadar as well. Pakistani PM has also acknowledged the requirement for the creation of an ECO free trade area and oil and gas pipeline for effective regional energy grid. Pakistan took some positive steps to contain the Indian tirade against Pakistan to limit its trade dealings with Afghanistan and CARs. Pakistan arranged a two days conference in Islamabad in which oil and energy ministers of Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan and Tajikistan participated in 2006. Pakistan disclosed at this conference that it was going to import 4000 megawatts of electricity from Tajikistan via Afghanistan. Pakistan

²³⁵Ibid., 21.

could trade off India's transit rights through Pakistan for trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia against Indian concession on Kashmir.²³⁶

4.3 Indian Maneuverings in Labeling Pakistan as a Terrorist Harboring Country

With the USA invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, India unanimously decided to support USA in its so-called war on terror. The objectives behind this support was to stem Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan and gain support of USA in designating Pakistan as the facilitator of the 9/11 attacks in USA. Indian newspaper Mint in January 2010, wrote that "Pakistan would perpetrate terrorist attacks on India if the former get success in gaining its compliant government in Afghanistan. It will increase insurgency in the Jammu and Kashmir regions against us and will help in prevailing Pakistan's terrorist policy against us". According to a retired Indian Brigadier "the most prioritized work for India after 9/11 was to stop Pakistan's hegemonic ingress towards Afghanistan because it will boost the proxy war against India".²³⁷

Indian regional and international venomous stance against Pakistan through Afghanistan

India maligned Pakistan's image successfully through Afghanistan and tried to influence the international community against Pakistan and left no stone unturned in designating and labeling the country as an originator and spreader of terrorism. India successfully stopped SARRC countries especially Afghanistan and Bangladesh from inclusion in SAARC summit organized in Pakistan, which later did not happen due to Indian controversy. India organized the Heart of Asia conference and lambasted Pakistan along with Afghanistan for the former's

²³⁶Ajmal Kakar. "Afghanistan Towards Independent Transit Trade: A Decay of Affiliation to Pakistan." *Global Business Review* (2020): 0972150920906993.

²³⁷Tawseef Ahmad Khan. "Objectives of Indian engagement in Afghanistan." *International Journal of Research in Social Sciences* 8, no. 1 (2018): pp.762-767.

alleged role in the perpetration of terrorism in the region.²³⁸

Indian PM paid several visits in Afghanistan for instigating venom against Pakistan and even called it the “mother ship of terrorism”. The USA administration under the government of Donald Trump called Pakistan a traitor and refuted it’s all sacrifices in the so called war on terror. Trump even gone so far that he said, Pakistan a country which deemed USA a fool by the former’s lack of action against terrorist’s despite of the fact that US had paid hugely for this purpose. This hard stance of USA against Pakistan was highly praised by India which afterwards blatantly defamed Pakistan at every regional or global forum.²³⁹

At international level, the Indian government fully supported and encouraged the USA pressurized campaign against Pakistan for allegedly harboring terrorist groups. Indian campaign reached its nadir since the Trump ascended to the power corridors, when he gave its NSS report regarding Pakistan and Afghanistan.

India connected the legitimate struggle of Kashmiri people in Indian Occupied Kashmir with the incident of 9/11, as an extension of Pakistan’s regional terrorism campaign against India. USA started to suspect Pakistan for the tragedy of 9/11 and pressurized Pakistan to ban different freedom organizations which were taking part in the Kashmir’s struggle against India.²⁴⁰The USA along with the international community started believing that the freedom movement in Kashmir was mere the Pakistan’s coercive measures against India and they called the violence in Kashmir the grave militancy which could not be justified in any manner. India took the advantage of this loophole between the Pak-USA relations and

²³⁸Ashfaq Ahmad Malik, and Nazir Hussain. "Indo-US Nexus to Isolate Pakistan: Options and Responses." *Journal of Political Studies* 25, no. 1 (2018): pp.113-124.

²³⁹M. Ali Samay. "Afghanistan and Pakistan between the US new strategy and Eurasioan Great Powers." *Köz-gazdaság-Review of Economic Theory and Policy* (2020).

²⁴⁰Nabila Jaffer. "Troubled India-Pakistan Relations and Major Stumbling Blocks in the Process." *Institute Of Regional Studies, Islamabad*, no. 1 (2018): pp.46-88.

left no stone unturned in connecting Pakistan's sympathies with the Taliban and Haqqani network.²⁴¹ India succeeded in attributing the attack on Indian Parliament in 2016 with the Pakistan and due to USA and international pressure Pakistan had banned Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), which were operating in Kashmir against India. The Pakistani government of General Musharraf on January 2004 at the Islamabad summit promised that the territory of Pakistan will not be used against India in the future and India also urged to use dialogue process to tackle the important issues between the two neighboring countries.²⁴²

Indian fifth generation warfare against Pakistan

India also used fifth generation warfare against Pakistan to designate it a terrorist country. The USA fully supported Indian fifth generation war and intimidating diplomacy for exchange of Indian investment to defend the USA interests in Afghanistan and to counter China in the region. The Indian objective behind this all tirade was to get Pakistan declared a failed and terrorist state. The USA in its South Asian policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan expressed willingness to give India more leverage in its role in Afghanistan.²⁴³

When USA took initiative to take out Taliban from the UN designated terrorist list in the hope of negotiations between USA and Taliban it shocked India. The recently USA and Taliban negotiations in Qatar were proved fatal for India. India had previously played an important role in designating Taliban faction as an international terrorist group under the aegis of UN Security Council Resolution 1267 and endeavored much in connecting these

²⁴¹ Tripathy Sasmita and Saeed Ahmed Rid. "Democracy as a Conflict-Resolution Model for Terrorism: A Case Study of India and Pakistan." (2010).

²⁴² Mohammed Sinan Siyech. "The Pulwama Attack." *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 11, no. 4 (2019): pp.6-10.

²⁴³ Ahmed Awais Khaver, Muhammad Awais Umar, and Shafqat Munir Ahmad. *Evaluating Foreign Policy of Pakistan in the context of Strategic Coercion*. Sustainable Development Policy Institute., 2019.

terrorists with Pakistan.²⁴⁴

Negative effects of Indian lobby on Pakistan

The continuation of Indian smear campaign globally against Pakistan to malign and labeling it a terrorist country could be culminated in the shape of some major USA steps against the interests of Pakistan in the region. It might happen that USA could take back non-NATO strategic partner status from Pakistan and even designate Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism that would embolden India to carry this strategy in the future and strengthen the Indian narrative against Pakistan globally.²⁴⁵

To quell the perception that Pakistan supported Taliban in Afghanistan for its interests in Afghan Jihad in 1979 onwards. Pakistan started supporting every negotiation between USA and Taliban especially after the end of 2011, when USA started negotiations with Taliban for the solution of the Afghan conundrum. These peace efforts were fully endorsed and supported by Pakistan while placing the security interests in front.²⁴⁶ Pakistan also took the help of global forums to convince the world about Pakistan's innocence. Pakistan proposed the list of different terrorist factions operating in Afghanistan under the aegis of Indian support against Pakistan to the UN Security Council. It seemed that international institutions were not taking the allegations of Pakistan against India seriously in Afghanistan which was clear from the Monitoring Team (MT) report about Afghanistan.

Indian usage of TTP faction against Pakistan in Afghanistan

Indian security implications on Pakistan through Afghanistan were clearly showed in

²⁴⁴Sasmita, Tripathy Sasmita and Saeed Ahmed Rid. "Democracy as a Conflict-Resolution Model for Terrorism: A Case Study of India and Pakistan." (2010).

²⁴⁵ Vanda Felbab-Brown. "Why Pakistan supports terrorist groups, and why the US finds it so hard to induce change." *The Brookings Institution* 5 (2018).

²⁴⁶Khalid Homayun Nadiri. "Old Habits, New Consequences: Pakistan's Posture toward Afghanistan since 2001." *International Security* 39, no. 2 (2014): pp.132-168

the MT report. The report showed the Indian inner hand in the destabilization of Afghan peace process and highlighted Indian connivance with Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in Afghanistan against the interests of Pakistan. Pakistan proposed the names of several Indian terrorist enablers to the UN Security Council's terrorism list along with solid proof of their involvement in terrorism in Pakistan. The UN Security Council and UN Secretary General did not bother to share this report and implicated Pakistan rather than India as a stumbling block in the peace process for Afghanistan.²⁴⁷ Indian campaign against Pakistan got the expected response from international institutions with the inclusion of Pakistan to the FATF's gray list. Pakistan took some positive steps to quell the image of terrorist country globally.²⁴⁸

With the passage of time, the international circumstances turned the tide of blame game towards the India and world had acknowledged that the Indian explanation of the cause of South Asian terrorism was one sided and vague. US Secretary of Defense discussed about the true manifestation of the picture of terrorism in the region. US Secretary of Defense, while addressing the people at Oklahoma's Cameron University in 2011 revealed that "India had used Afghan soil against the interests of Pakistan and financed different terrorist outfits to entail Pakistan in an unending war" The motive behind these all smear activities was to weaken the Pakistan's stance on Kashmir, undermine the Chinese investments in the Pakistan's port city of Gwadar.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁷ Naveed Siddiqui. -India using terrorism as state policy to destabilise neighbouring countries including Pakistan: FO.| *Dawn*, accessed October 4, 2020. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1561261>

²⁴⁸ Sahar Khan. *Double Gam: Why Pakistan Supports Militants and Resists US Pressure to Stop*. Cato Institute., 2018.

²⁴⁹ CJ Werleman. -Pakistani dossier on Indian terror sponsorship has big implications.| *TRTWORLD*, accessed November 23, 2020.

Indian blame game on Pakistan and its effects on mutual relation between Pakistan and Afghanistan

India effectively enhanced the chances of physical skirmishes between Pakistan and Afghanistan through different propaganda techniques. Whenever the Indian projects were gone under attack, the blame always imposed on Pakistan, irrespective of the fact that no solid proof of Pakistani participation was recovered. On May 23, 2014, the Indian consulate in Herat, Afghanistan was attacked by four gunmen and soon they were neutralized by the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and Afghan security forces. The Afghan President, Hamid Karzai without any proof on the instructions of India, blamed Pakistan for this attack despite the fact that neither the Taliban nor the LeT took the responsibility of the attack.²⁵⁰

India stepped up to physically train Afghan army personnel

India dispatched its military personnel to train the fledgling Afghan National Army (ANA) to give the impression that Afghanistan had seriously security threats from its neighboring Pakistan. India also perpetrated the process of training Afghan military personnel at its soil in India, which was the more brutal and dangerous move of India against Pakistan.²⁵¹ The Afghan government also got trapped in the propaganda of India against Pakistan. Indian campaign against Pakistan got traction, when Afghanistan's chief executive Abdullah Abdullah at his address to the UNO General Assembly, blatantly blamed Pakistan for its cross-border attacks and destabilizing Afghanistan and connected Taliban's capture of Kunduz city in 2015 with the Pakistan's support and joint venture.²⁵²

²⁵⁰ Rabia Akthar, and Jayita Sarkar. *Pakistan, India, and China after the US Drawdown from Afghanistan*. Stimson Center, 2015.

²⁵¹ Feisal Khan. "Why borrow trouble for yourself and lend it to neighbors? Understanding the historical roots of Pakistan's Afghan policy." *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 37, no. 4 (2010): pp.171-189

²⁵² Shubhankar Dam and Jonathan Hall. *Inside and Outside the Law : Perspectives on Evil, Law and the State*. WORLDCAT, 2009.

If we say that Afghanistan was being run by Indian companies then it would not be a wrong assumption. To build the narrative against Pakistan globally, India harbored terrorists from its country into the neighboring Afghanistan. The growing Indian military and economic involvement in Afghanistan and further its relations with Iran were satisfactory proofs of Pakistan's credibility of fears against India and that the global tirade of terrorism campaign against Pakistan was real.

Pakistan stepped forward in making collaboration with the important regional actors to weak the alliance of Indian regional players. Pakistan gave befitting reply to the USA and Indian malicious campaign against Pakistan by arranging joint military trainings with Russian military in November 2016. Pakistan sent message internationally that Pakistan was not a pariah or isolate country in the region and it could choose its friends as per its interest. To counter the Indian militaristic and hegemonic status in Afghanistan, Pakistan also proposed the training assistance for Afghan Security forces (ASF) in 2011, through the Afghan-Pakistan Joint Commission.²⁵³

Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Maliha Lodhi submitted a dossier to the UN Secretary General about the Indian interference and terrorism in Pakistan. That dossier was containing all the evidence of the RAW's involvement in Baluchistan, Karachi and Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) and Karachi, which were clear violation of the UN Charter, the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on counter terrorism. Pakistan had received/collected the irrefutable evidence of Indian interference in the Pakistan's restive province of Baluchistan through Afghanistan and it gave this evidence to the international peace making institutions but India

²⁵³ Chandra Rekha. "Is Russia Mending its Ties with Pakistan at India's Cost?" *Capsindia. Org.* accessed June 6 (2014): 2015.

had remained adamant in its malicious campaign against Pakistan.²⁵⁴

4.4 India Influence in Afghanistan and Waging Two Front Wars with Pakistan

India used the tragedy of 9/11 against Pakistan with full eager and valor and increased its support to Afghanistan's militant factions to wage a war from the western border of Pakistan. Indian maneuverings in Afghanistan could never be materialized without the connivance of Afghanistan. The Afghanistan had remained a conduit for transportation of weapons, money and training camps from India into Pakistan.

The killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti in August 2006 by the Pakistani authorities provided an immense room to India for exploiting the folly of Pashtunistan, Durand line and nationalism in Pakistan through Afghanistan's Pashtun and Baloch people.²⁵⁵

India used its soft power policy in Afghanistan and supported pro-Indian government of Hamid Karzai diplomatically and economically to destabilize Pakistan. It left no stone unturned in blaming and accusing Pakistan for all the ills in Afghanistan in the shape of terrorism and cross border extremism. India had provided 650 million USD to Afghan Karzai government in economic and military assistance and consolidated its position in Afghanistan against Pakistan. India did not hesitate to continue backdoor discussion and meetings with Taliban faction. India did this to pressurize Pakistan by courting its staunch ally in its own court, which would benefit India in the future for using Taliban against the Pakistan's interest. Shashank Joshi in article "India's role in a changing Afghanistan" articulates that in 2013, India's domestic intelligence service increased pressure to grant a visa to former Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef of India to kick-start the back door channel talks

²⁵⁴ Mir Sherbaz khetran. "Indian Interference in Balochistan." *Strategic Studies* 37, no. 3 (2017): pp.112-125.

²⁵⁵ Barnett R Rubin. *Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate*. Vol. 176. United States Institute of Peace, 2006.

with Taliban.²⁵⁶ The arrest of Indian on duty naval officer Kulbhushan Jadav's arrest from Pak-Iran border in March 2016 was an irrefutable evidence of Indian secret hand in sabotaging Pakistan from its neighboring countries of Afghanistan and Iran. India made the Uri attack as a firm base to destabilize and malign Pakistan internationally and launched a powerful and forceful campaign in 2016 to connect this terrorist act with Pakistan.²⁵⁷

Indian successful lobby against Pakistan and connivance with Afghanistan

India turned no stone unturned to open the multi problems for Pakistan from both sides of the border and courted Afghanistan to join this campaign. Both the states of India and Afghanistan blatantly held Pakistan accountable for this heinous attack in India. Indian PM also took advantage of growing cold relations between USA and Pakistan in perpetrating this agenda of Pakistan's global isolation for blaming it for terrorist activities in the region. India also took support of Russia and Iran intelligence agencies to perpetrate proxy war against Pakistan in connivance with Afghan intelligence agency. India also targeted Pakistan's internal security through the use of massive bribery and incentives to the various strands of Pakistan's officials. The forceful attack on Pakistan's GHQ, Naval and Air Force bases was the manifestation of Indian involvement in Pakistan's sensitive institutions.²⁵⁸

India played offensive-defensive doctrine in Afghanistan against Pakistan. Indian intelligence and NDS are in secret relation with TTP and Islamic State (ISIS or Daesh). The proof of this hidden relationship between these groups was evident from the suicide attack on Pakistani consulate in Jalalabad, Afghanistan and even ISIS's took the responsibility of

²⁵⁶Shashank Joshi. "India's Role in a Changing Afghanistan." *The Washington Quarterly* 37, no. 2 (2014): pp.87-102

²⁵⁷Ahmed S Hashmi., Muhammad Feyyaz, and Militant Landscape-Abdul Basit. "Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis." (2013).

²⁵⁸Arshad Mahmood and Dr Shaheen Akhtar. "TTP'S Safe Havens in Afghanistan: A Constant Threat to Pakistan's Internal Security." *South Asian Studies* 33, no. 2 (2020).

the attack. TTP claimed the responsibility of numerous attack in Pakistan with the connivance of RAW, CIA and MOSSAD with the active guidance and support of Afghan intelligence agency NDS. Indian and Afghan intelligence agencies used TTP, Jamat-ul-Ahrar (JA) and other likeminded factions against Pakistan for neutralizing the Pakistan's successful operations and gaining's in the tribal areas against terrorism.²⁵⁹

When Pakistani government announced the commencement of operation Zarb-e-Azab in Waziristan against terrorist, the Indian secret agencies increased their assiduous financial and weaponry support to the Afghan based militants to launch strong brutal wave of terrorism inside Pakistan. Baluchistan's Home Minister Mir Sarfaraz Bugti in a briefing told that Pakistan apprehended several NDS operatives from the province, which were engaged in planting Afghan refugees against Pakistan, and they confessed to kill more than 40 Pakistani innocent people. These cross border attacks on Pakistan were also masterminded and spearheaded by the Indian authorities. Pakistan had efficiently neutralized this covert Indian maneuvering in Afghanistan and killed many NDS terrorists supported by RAW, CIA and MOSSAD. The reason behind NDS cooperation with RAW was Afghanistan's perennial adversary with Pakistan and massive financial incentives offered by Indian government.²⁶⁰

Pakistan perceived security threats from Indian through Afghanistan and feared that India could use increase its proxy war in Pakistan with the help of Iran. India had constructed the road which connected western Afghanistan with Iran and other links adjoining Kandahar with Pak-Afghan border area. Iran could perpetrate its agenda through these routes by aiding Northern Alliance against its arch enemy Taliban and TTP factions and could repeat its action once again against Pakistan due to its sectarian conflict with Pakistan.

²⁵⁹Sajjad Shaukat. "The great game and Pakistan." *Kashmir Valley* (2016).

²⁶⁰Ayaz Ahmed. "India's Spy Warfare Against Pakistan." *Defence Journal* 23, no. 1 (2019): 30.

The construction of road near Pak-Afghan border in Iran was a continuation of this policy. India could use this route for the espionage purposes against Pakistan along with Iran. India also made diplomatic efforts to build an anti-Pakistan block in the region with the active collaboration of Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. These all countries shared common interest of purging Afghanistan from the scourge of Taliban, which encouraged India to ensure the cooperation with these states from Afghanistan into Pakistan.²⁶¹ India had started the construction of road near the Pak-Afghan border, through its state-owned Border Roads Organization which remained the bone of contention between Pakistan and India. India could use this road in destabilizing Pakistan easily and accurately through the friendly Afghanistan's soil. This organization publicly admitted to use this road for the transportation of equipment, vehicles, infrastructure accessories and other tools for the Indian armed forces engaged in Afghanistan for developmental works. Pakistan had a view contrary of this rhetoric and said that India will use this road for the transportation of deadly weapons into the Afghan soil and will use it against Pakistan in the future. India contributed in promoting strained relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Whenever Pakistan started to step forward in making friendly relations with Afghanistan, India played its negative role in escalating tensions between the two neighboring Islamic countries.

Afghan affairs expert, Rahimullah Yousufzai said that whenever Pakistan and Afghanistan started to assuage the strained relations between each other, Pakistan's embassy in Kabul suffered a brutal attack. When the strained relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were on their zenith in 2003, the Pakistani embassy in Kabul came under a brutal attack on the 8th of July of the year 2003 and Indian covert hand behind this attack was

²⁶¹S. Paul Kapur, and Sumit Ganguly. "The jihad paradox: Pakistan and Islamist militancy in South Asia." *International Security* 37, no. 1 (2012): pp.111-141.

evident.²⁶²

Indian usage of ethnicity card in Afghanistan against Pakistan

India used the ethnicity card in Afghanistan to increase the nationalist sentiments and supported the minority groups of Afghanistan against Pakistan. The physical Afghan attack on Pakistan from the western border had nearly escalated the chances of war between the two neighboring states many times.²⁶³ It might be possible that India starts preparing Afghan National Army for physical attacking Pakistan and several incidents of shelling and bombing from Afghan's border into Pakistan had been recorded over the time since 9/11.

Conclusion

India under the garb of soft power influence in Afghanistan, gained its special aims and interest in Afghanistan. These Indian goals were pertaining to the destabilization of Pakistan's security framework, which it gained through making different consulates in Afghanistan. Indian way of execution of these strategies were so hidden that no one had any clue of understanding the hidden agenda of India. India debilitated Pakistan's influence from Afghanistan in such a manner that it reduced its all type of relations with Afghanistan whether it would be business oriented, diplomatic, social or political. Due to Indian ingress in Afghanistan in the post 9/11 era, Pakistan had received rebuke from all the regional and global actors for its alleged role in terrorism, from which it had suffered more than any other country. In short in the near future there are no chances for Pakistan to quell the label of terrorist country from its side, due to the Indian well planned and well-articulated policy

²⁶²Fazal-ur Rahman. "Pakistan and the War on Terrorism." PhD diss., *Central European University*, 2020.

²⁶³Sajjad Shaukat. "The great game and Pakistan." *Kashmir Valley* (2016).

related with Pakistan after 9/11.

CONCLUSION

The Indian foreign policy towards Afghanistan suddenly changed with the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and it opened the doors of opportunities for India to ensure its physical and diplomatic presence in Afghanistan. India fully participated in the Bonn conference in 2001 which was held for the future governmental setup of Afghanistan. Due to Indian lobbying the top government seats were allotted to pro Indian Northern Alliance members who were staunch enemy of Taliban. Indian foreign policy at that time was motivated by the strategy of curtailing Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan and to reach resourceful Central Asian states. India opened its embassy in Kabul in 2003, along with different consulates in different cities of Afghanistan like Jalalabad, Kandahar and Herat. India pressurized Afghan government and international forces in Afghanistan to compel Pakistan to stop funding to militants in IoK. India upgraded its diplomatic representation in Afghanistan from a Liaison Office to an operational Embassy in 2002. Indian PM, Manmohan Singh, became the first Indian head which visited Afghanistan after the period of 29 years in 2005. India pledged approximately 2 billion USD for Afghanistan's reconstruction and development, which made it the largest donor of region and Afghanistan as the second largest recipient of Indian aid. India opted relatively stable areas of north and west of Afghanistan for implementing high visibility big projects and low visibility small development projects (SDP) in relatively lawless, remote and unstable areas to increase its influence all over the country. India procured three Airbus aircrafts to Ariana Afghan Airlines. India contributed towards small developmental projects in Afghanistan, like supplication of 250,000 tons of wheat to Afghanistan and provision of 1,000 scholarships to

Afghan students in India annually. Indian 14 firms bade for an iron mining contract in Bamyan province of Afghanistan in 2011. India was constructing 600-km long road from Chabahar port to the Iranian city of Zahedan, which will reduce the time of reaching Afghan goods to the Iranian port for trading with Iran and India which ultimately benefitted to India. India worked hard for Inclusion of Afghanistan in the SAARC organization to connect with energy rich Central Asian States to cater its energy burgeoning needs.

The Indian growing influence in Afghanistan in the post 9/11 era raised the alarming bells in Pakistan for its security and it started to suspect India's maneuverings in Pakistan through the territory of Afghanistan. India not only remained successful in destabilizing Pakistan from Afghanistan but also gained success in turning Afghanistan in its favor and against its Muslim neighbor Pakistan. India gave massive aid to Afghanistan to goad it in its orbit and owing to the pathetic economic situation; it became difficult for Afghanistan to defy Indian war like attitude towards Pakistan. Afghanistan fully cooperated with India to destabilize Pakistan to settle the old scores and played in the lap of India for economic benefits. The internal security of Pakistan witnessed its calamitous phase in its restive provinces of Baluchistan and KPK, where Indian economic and weaponry support was massively used through Afghanistan to halt the peace negotiations between Pakistani government and dissidents. Pakistan has been marginalized in the region due Indian maximum presence in Afghanistan and its efficient lobbying against Pakistan. India made alliance with all the important countries of the region like Russia, Iran and including China which were on the same page with India and sided with it in Afghanistan against the revival of pro-Pakistan Taliban government. India signed Agreement on Strategic Partnership (ASP) with Afghanistan in October 2011, which gave concession to one- quarter of Afghanistan's

exports to Indian market and bilateral trade expected to reach more than 1 billion USD by 2012. This initiative severely damaged Pakistan's trade with Afghanistan as Pakistan tariffs on Afghan exports were higher than India. Through this agreement, India cooperated with Afghanistan in the fields of Agriculture, mining, rural development industry, information technology, civil aviation, communications, and transport. Being an agriculturist country Pakistan's agriculture exports to Afghanistan witnessed downward spiral due to increased Indian trade relations with Afghanistan. India spurred a new initiative of air cargo corridor launched in June 2017 between India and Kabul. India helped Iran in constructing Chahbahar port connecting Iran, India and Afghanistan with the resourceful countries of Central Asia and relegated Pakistan's importance for Afghanistan. Pakistan was fearful of larger Indian influence in Afghanistan which was clear from the Indian maneuverings for Afghanistan's inclusion in SCO, a Chinese and Russian dominated intergovernmental organization. Through this forum India could join hand with China against Jihadist proliferation in the South Asian region, especially in Afghanistan. These three countries China, Afghanistan and India could force Pakistan to do effective and stringent activities against terrorist's outfits, which would strengthen the rhetoric for Pakistan as a terrorist harbor country. Pakistan's apprehension of increasing Indian involvement in Afghanistan was proved right after the US announcement of minimizing its troops in Afghanistan in 2014. The law and order situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan witnessed downward trajectory, with the increasing suicide attacks, target killings of Army personnel and bomb blasts in the areas of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. Pakistan accused Indian secret intelligence agency RAW's inner hand in destabilizing Pakistan's peace by supporting and nurturing Baloch dissidents and TTP factions in Afghanistan. Delhi had deployed 500 members of the Indo-Tibetan

Border Police (ITBP) in Afghanistan, to secure its workers and diplomatic services against the growing attacks on Indian installments in Afghanistan. Pakistan was wary of Indian increasing number of troops in Afghanistan and viewed Indian surge in troops detrimental to Pakistan's security. India could use these troops against Pakistan from neighboring Afghanistan, in case of a future war between Pakistan and India.

Pakistan was also apprehensive about Indian growing influence in Afghanistan in a sense that it endured nontraditional security threats from India through Afghanistan. Afghanistan completed feasibility report of building hydro-power projects on the river Kabul which would squeeze the water flow of this river reaching Pakistan. India built Afghanistan's Friendship Dam (Salma Dam) on the river Chishti-e-Sharif in Afghanistan's Herat province and constructed hydro-power projects on the Chenab, Jhelum and Indus with the intention to squeeze the water channel coming from Afghanistan into Pakistan. Indian maneuverings in Pakistan through Afghanistan increased the hatred and wave of mistrust between the two Muslim countries. India actively exploited Afghan natural resources and engaged in swap dealing with Iran by using Afghanistan and Central Asian states and getting huge benefits. Indian intelligence agency RAW colluded covertly with CIA against Pakistani in training and supporting Baloch dissidents in the consulates of Afghanistan.

The US invasion of Afghanistan gave India an opportunity to put its interests well beyond South Asia, towards Central Asia and Europe and India perpetrated its foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan through Soft power ingression. India started diplomatic relations with Afghanistan by democratizing the country for peaceful relations with India. India fully supported insurrection in the restive provinces of Pakistan through Afghanistan by supporting and nurturing separatists of Baluchistan and KPK operating in Afghanistan to

force Pakistan to divert its concentration from Kashmir. India maintained its credibility in Afghanistan to reach Central Asian markets safely and made difficult for Pakistan and China to reach Central Asia. India used Northern card against Pakistan by supporting maximum Northern Alliance member's ascension to the power corridors of Government. India built Indian Parliament building, Afghan-India Friendship Dam and the most importantly construction of 135-mile road between Afghanistan's Nimroz province and Iranian port of Chabahar which alleviated Afghanistan's dependence on Pakistan for seaborne transit trade. Indian massive aid to Afghanistan made it dependable on India for economic progress, which India used for a smear campaign against Pakistan. India became the fifth largest donor to Afghanistan since 2001 with the provision of 2 billion USD to the later. India was much dreadful and afraid from the burgeoning influence of Islamic militancy from Pakistan and Afghanistan into India, which affected the India's domestic social fabric and spurred the sentiments of Nationalism among the Hindu populace. Afghanistan was complementary for relations between India and Iran that's why it planned to construct International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) which will connect India, Afghanistan, Russia and Central Asian states. India constructed Chabahar port in Iran as a counter to Gwadar port and alleviated Afghanistan dependence on Pakistan's overland route for trade. India actively exploited Afghan natural resources and engaged in swap dealing with Iran by using Afghanistan and Central Asian states and getting huge benefits. Indian intelligence agency RAW colluded covertly with CIA against Pakistani in training and supporting Baloch dissidents in the consulates of Afghanistan.

India gained its some international objectives in Afghanistan and garnered its support through massive investment and rehabilitation work of war torn country. The international

objective could be described as gaining the favor of Afghanistan for achieving the permanent seat in the United Nation's Security Council. India gave militarily support and training to Afghan personnel by signing a strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan in 2011 to gain their support and weapons, in case of a future war brokered between India and Pakistan. India approached every faction and group, which was active in Afghanistan; even India remained engaged with its staunch opponent, Taliban for ensuring its presence in the region and countering Pakistan's involvement. India used Baloch card against Pakistan and engaged it in quelling its domestic Insurgencies to distract its concentration from Kashmir and further from Afghan affairs. India also used Central Asian states to have an eye on Pakistan and target it at the time of war and established military bases in the Tajikistan.

Along with Afghanistan, India used SCO forum to sabotage Pakistan's relations with Central Asian states and turned no stone unturned in labeling Pakistan a terrorist and fail country in the eyes of Central Asian countries. India used US war on terror (WoR) campaign in Afghanistan against Pakistan and gained US full support to malign and destabilize Pakistan by fully cooperating with US in rooting out terrorists and participating in rehabilitating and developmental works. India also struck Pakistan's trade with Afghanistan with the removal of tariff barriers on Afghan exports. India's engagement with Afghanistan emulates with the East India Company, which they did with Indian subcontinent about 200 years ago. India constructed bulk of roads to turn Afghanistan towards its side and alleviated its dependence on Pakistan for trade purposes. India tried to court Afghanistan to avoid joining China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) by constructing Chahbahar port in Iran and lured it to remain in the anti-Pakistan orbit.

India pursued its foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan through playing diplomatic

regional card to isolate Pakistan regionally with the help of Iran by constructing “southern silk road”, trade route of roads and railroads that would connect the two regions of South Asia and Central Asia through Gulf of Oman. India used its consulates against Pakistan by perpetrating subversive activities against Pakistan’s restive provinces of Baluchistan and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa. India gained the full support of all Afghan factions by providing approximately 2 billion USD aid since 2001.

Despite the stress of Pakistan to US to play its role in restraining India in Afghanistan against Pakistan, US continued its support for India. US looked India as a favorable state to thwart the Chinese and Russian hegemonic ambitions in Afghanistan. So the cooperation between India with NATO improved India’s defensive institutions and they remained successful in sidelining Pakistan from the affairs of Afghanistan. India adopted an efficient way to win the hearts of local Afghans by providing aid to Afghanistan through government to government interaction. India also targeted Afghan gross root level development by women empowerment programs. India deployed its military in Afghanistan by signing of Indo-Afghan Strategic Partnership agreement in 2011, which posed a constant threat to Pakistan’s security. Despite the numerous attacks on Indian projects in Afghanistan, they did not go for hard power, which increased their prestige among Afghans than Pakistan. India gained many benefits internationally due to its soft image in Afghanistan in the shape of foreign investments, technological growth, and increase in tourism. India gained easy access to Central Asian and Asian resources through possible inclusion of Afghanistan in the SAARC and ASEAN.

India also gained its foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan by fully supporting Afghanistan’s Pashtunistan rhetoric to weaken Pakistan territorially. India used its business

community in Afghanistan to increase its bilateral business and cultural ties with Afghanistan which contributed in turning the soft corner of common Afghan for the India. India diplomatically damaged Pakistan's image along with Afghanistan by boycotting the 2016, SAARC Summit held in Islamabad and called it as a result of Pakistan's under hand in the Uri attacks. India used its media and film industry to gain traction in Afghanistan and also eased the visa policies for Afghans to encourage Afghan's entry in India. India gave economic assistance to Afghanistan for promotion of democracy and better relations with Afghanistan to curb extremist factions emanating from Pakistan. India made Afghanistan so much dependent on its massive aid that the latter contemptuously rejected the paucity of Pakistan's economic aid in the era of Ashraf Ghani.

The Indian massive financial aid to Afghanistan at the time of Taliban's regaining strength and emergence of ISIS had played an important role in stabilizing Afghanistan and it gained the status of economic enviable country from an economically failed state. The Indian investment in Afghanistan and construction of Chahbahar port increased Afghan imports from India dramatically. Indian allowance of duty free market access to Afghan products in India struck Pakistan's trade with Afghanistan. That was the reason that Pakistan remained reluctant in granting Indian access to Afghanistan market through the overland route of Pakistan.

It was the result of Indian effective foreign policy in Afghanistan that Afghanistan favored India for gaining overland transit rights from Pakistan for the trade purposes with Afghanistan. It fully supported Indian initiation of air freight between Kabul and New Delhi which enhanced the probability of increased trade volume between the two countries and alleviated Afghanistan's dependence on Pakistan for trade purposes. Indian (SDP) programs

had helped India in gaining traction in local community in which Pakistan and China lagged behind. Pakistan also stepped forward for Afghanistan's reconstruction and developmental work, but it did not gain much traction due to its diminutive scale in comparison with Indian aid. Indian 100% tariff concession to Afghan exports under Preferential Trade Agreement with Afghanistan also gave a tough challenge to Pakistan's trade relations with Afghanistan. India also uplifted Afghan rural life by signing different MoUs with Afghanistan.

India made Afghanistan independent in electricity transmission, upgraded communication system by expanding telephone line and national TV network. India increased the capacity of Afghanistan for water storage by building Salma Dam, Doshi and Charikar power substations in Afghanistan. Indian donation of three Airbus Planes and 600 vehicles to Afghanistan contributed in consolidation of relations between them. India worked harder for democratizing Afghanistan through the construction of Afghan parliament building, training of Afghan officials for parliamentary affairs and support to U.N program, "Support to the Establishment of the Afghan Legislature". India impacted on Afghanistan through its private sector's help in improving Afghanistan's micro problems which Western traditional donors have been neglecting since 2001.

India adopted a robust strategy to gain its foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan through participating in different seminars and meetings about Afghanistan's future. India gained grip on the politics and government of Afghanistan in an efficient way and started different initiatives for investment in Afghanistan and totally ignored Pakistan's inclusion in any official meetings related with Afghanistan. India used scholarships opportunities for Afghan students to indoctrinate the young students against Pakistan. India targeted on gross root level development of Afghan society through different initiatives like Self-Employed

Women's Association (SEWA) program.

India also tried to remain engaged in the Afghan peace process and wrote a letter to Ghani one day earlier of Khalilzad-Baradar pact and ensured him of Indian support. Afghanistan welcomed Indian provocative activities along the Pak-Afghan border area by allowing the Indian Border Roads Organization to build Ring Roads, which India availed through the usage of its Indo-Tibetan Police force for its organization's security. India supplied some military and logistic support to Afghanistan and joined hands with Russia to transfer weapons to Afghanistan. India also ensured its military bases near Pak-Afghan for surveillance purposes on Pakistan. US, Indian and Afghan authorities were on the same page against Pakistan and accused Pakistan for every attack on Indian developmental projects in Afghanistan.

India increased trouble for Pakistan through Afghanistan and the former deployed approximately 15,000 Army personnel across the border between April and July 2009, owing to the danger of attack from the western side. Pakistan offered its assistance to Afghanistan to train its army and Police but Afghanistan totally refused due to the interference of India. India used regional actors Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan against Pakistan to gain its foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan. Indian consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad engaged in the spy purposes for Pakistan and destabilized Pakistan by using Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and ISIS which funneled sectarian fights in Pakistan. India took initiatives of developing a "Southern Silk Road" and launched the "Connect Central Asia" policy in 2012 via Afghanistan and sidelined Pakistan from the trade relations with Afghanistan and Central Asia. India and Iran targeted Pakistan's gross root level trade with Afghanistan with the help of their larger traders in comparison with the smaller traders of

Pakistan in Afghanistan. India gave concessions on tariffs of Afghan imports which also contributed in the booming of Afghan plastic industry and decline in plastics exports.

The other steps which India took for achieving its foreign policy goals in Afghanistan include rejection of Pakistan's inclusion in the forum of IOR-ARC and vetoed its entry in this forum. India will prefer to push Afghanistan to join the non CPEC project like Iranian Chahbahar project to strike the great blow the Pakistan's economic ambitions in the region. India tried its full energies for the Central Asian States to join SAARC, SAFTA, the twelfth Bay of Bengal Multispectral Technical Economic and Cooperation, and the India-Association for Southeast Asian Nations deal to more alienate Pakistan in South Asia. India labeled the extension of Pakistani backed terrorism from Afghanistan to the Indian soil to libel Pakistan as a 'mother ship of terrorism'.

India funneled folly of Pashtunistan, Durand line and nationalism in Pakistan through Afghanistan's Pashtun and Baloch people living at the porous border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. India sabotaged Pakistan's peace by taking the help of TTP's collaboration with ISIS and LeJ. Pakistan's successful operations and gains in the tribal areas against terrorism were successfully neutralized by India through TTP, Jamat-ul-Ahrar (JA) and other likeminded factions operating in Afghanistan. Several incidents of shelling and bombing from Afghan's border into Pakistan have been recorded over the time since 9/11 by the effective Indian lobbying against Pakistan. India trained the Afghan National Army (ANA) which might escalate the physical attacks on Pakistan from Afghanistan. India built road near Pak-Afghan border through its state owned Border Roads Organization.

Pakistan was of the view that India will use this road for the transportation of deadly weapons into the Afghan soil and will use them against Pakistan in the future. India always

disturbed the peaceful talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan by attacking and killing. India sabotaged the Pakistan's cleanup operations against the terrorists in the tribal areas of Pakistan effectively, which increased the wave of terrorism inside Pakistan. It was the success of Indian foreign policy in Afghanistan that the latter fully supported Indian tirade against Pakistan. Afghanistan offered Indian agencies to build recruitment camps inside Afghanistan, monitored and circulated terrorist networks inside Pakistan and helped in indoctrination of Afghan refugees living in Pakistan.

It is analyzed after taking detailed research on the respective topic that Pakistan's aloofness in dealing with Afghanistan by using soft power pushed the latter towards India, that was already investing in Afghanistan for gaining the respectable status vis-à-vis Pakistan in Afghanistan. This massive aid and developmental work of India in war torn Afghanistan pushed the latter to join India in destabilizing Pakistan. Afghanistan didn't refuse to Indian maneuverings in Pakistan through Afghanistan due to the fear of rollback of Indian aid to the war ravaged country which was solely dependent on economic aid given by regional and international donors after 9/11. With the inception of India, it started to lure Afghanistan in its orbit by exploiting the sensitive issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan like Pashtunistan issue and Durand Line Agreement. Afghanistan. Afghanistan was also deeming a strong friend like India which could help it against Pakistan for it was having irredentist views in terms of Baluchistan and KPK.

India remained successful in achieving its objectives in Afghanistan vis-a-vis Pakistan. India did its best in Afghanistan in destabilizing Pakistan through nourishing and arming Baloch and Pashtun dissidents of Pakistan operating in Afghanistan. India took the opportunity of 9/11 in its favour and held its tentacles in Afghanistan through massive aid,

developmental works and diplomatic presence in Afghanistan. This comprehensive strategy of India in Afghanistan made the latter totally dependent on India for the smooth working of governmental works. India not only posed traditional security threats but also nontraditional threats in terms of creating water controversy between Pakistan and Afghanistan by building dams on rivers flowing in Pakistan. India did its best in a sense that it made a good image in the eyes of international world by taking active part in the development of Afghanistan in the garb of massive aid but the real purpose of India was to court Afghanistan in its side and destabilize Pakistan from the both sides of the border.

Pakistan frequently accused India for posing security threats from Afghanistan into Pakistan at different forums of world but the international forum mainly headed by US and European countries didn't pay heed towards these allegations. These superpowers looked India's role as a good omen for the development and stability of Afghanistan at the expense of Pakistan's security and considered Pakistan's allegations mere continuation of old rivalry between the two neighboring countries. Despite the fact that Pakistan took some active steps to halt the Indian interference in its internal areas through Afghanistan by showing the proofs of Indian consulates work in Afghanistan against Pakistan, but the world remained aloof with these documents. Had the Pakistan concentrated on soft power behavior in Afghanistan like the India done there the relations between them would have been friendly. So, these all practical steps of India in Afghanistan took the latter to such a stage that it remained difficult for Pakistan to turn the Afghanistan towards its side and away from India. India took the advantage of increased terrorism in Pakistan and made an alliance of regional countries like China, Russia and Iran to increase pressure on Pakistan to stem wave of terrorism emanating from the country.

Findings of this research was that India had invested so much in Afghanistan that in the future, whatever government will come in Afghanistan will face difficulty in excluding India from the internal politics of Afghanistan, owing to the working of different Indian NGOs, consulates and other organizations in Afghanistan. The future scenario goes against Pakistan, as the local Afghans were much indoctrinated against Pakistan and in the favor of India that every possible overture of Pakistan towards Afghanistan has been brutally curbed by the Afghan government, which is not a good omen for the future relations of both countries. As long as Afghanistan would not think positively and act neutrally between India and Pakistan the environment of mistrust between the two Muslim countries will not diminish.

At the end it is highly recommended to both of Pakistan and India to burn the hatches and go for cooperation in dealing with their mutual neighbor Afghanistan. The peace in Afghanistan is interconnected with the peace in the region, so peace should be the prime focus of Pakistan and India, while engaging with Afghanistan. Pakistan and India should cooperate with each other in the Afghanistan and should not see towards each other with suspension or with doubts, as this state of mind and policy will not benefit any of the country whether it is India, Pakistan or even Afghanistan. Afghanistan is an independent country and it has the right to choose its friends and foes, while making its foreign policy. If Afghanistan goes in the orbit of India and praised and cooperate with its developmental projects, Pakistan should not interfere as soon as it destabilizes and attacks its sovereignty.

Similarly, If Pakistan does some positive diplomatic, political and social endeavors in Afghanistan, India should not raise questions or should not smear the Pakistan's credibility as it has done in the hitherto times. Regional actors should be sidelined from

making alliance with the India or Pakistan, as soon as its benefits Afghanistan but the alliances for the purpose of counter alliances should not be encourage by the international world. US should play its positive role in playing a neutral role in Afghanistan and should not adhere with the powerful or favorable country at the expense of other country, which has been witnessed in the case of sidelining Pakistan vis-à-vis India in dealing with Afghanistan.

The inclusion of Afghanistan in CPEC or Chahbahar port should not link with the proclivity to the India or Pakistan rather the joint collaboration of CPEC and Chahbahar Port and inclusion of Afghanistan would open the doors of prosperity for the region and Afghanistan as well. Pakistan and India should avoid proxy war in Afghanistan and should not use it as a mere conduit of reaching resourceful Central Asian states.

The Afghanistan is not in a position of running its economy alone with the available means, so as the largest regional donor of Afghanistan, India should be continuing its aid to Afghanistan for having an independent economic condition. Pakistan should not ban India for its overland trade through Pakistan's territory as it is in the Pakistan's favor that India uses this route and gives taxes to Pakistan which will generate income for Pakistan.

Pakistan and India should leave the past memories and should start the fresh starting in Afghanistan by playing their positive role for the future of Afghanistan and should leave it independently for making relations with regional and international countries. Pakistan should concentrate on imparting education to Afghans which will surely benefit Pakistan as the main problem of the Afghan population is lack of education and unemployment. It is also advisable to India, which had played its crucial role in imparting education in Afghanistan but it gained some criticism in the past due to the discrepancies in imparting scholarships to

Afghan students. India should not leave its endeavors and should concentrate on merit based scholarships to Afghan students rather than on political point scoring.

Pakistan should secure its border from Afghanistan by fencing on its side of the border, as the main problem arises in the border areas of Pakistan due to the open border between the two Muslim countries. The international world specially US, NATO and UN Security Council should listen Pakistan's grievances against India in Afghanistan with full attention and should play a neutral role in restraining Indian smear campaign through Afghanistan against Pakistan.

Recommendations

The peace in Afghanistan is interconnected with the peace in the region, so peace should be the prime focus of Pakistan and India, while engaging with Afghanistan. Pakistan and India should cooperate with each other in the Afghanistan and should not see towards each other with suspension or with doubts, as this state of mind and policy will not benefit any of the country whether it is India, Pakistan or even Afghanistan. Afghanistan is an independent country and it has the right to choose its friends and foes, while making its foreign policy. If Afghanistan goes in the orbit of India and praised and cooperate with its developmental projects, Pakistan should not interfere as soon as it destabilizes and attacks its sovereignty. Similarly, If Pakistan does some positive diplomatic, political and social endeavors in Afghanistan, India should not raise questions or should not smear the Pakistan's credibility as it has done in the hitherto times. Regional actors should be sidelined from making alliance with the India or Pakistan, as soon as its benefits Afghanistan but the alliances for the purpose of counter alliances should not be encourage by the international world. US should play its positive role in playing a neutral role in Afghanistan and should

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