

**NORD STREAM II: SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR  
UKRAINE**

By

**Asad Abbas**

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Thesis/ Dissertation Title: **NORD STREAM II- SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR UKRAINE**

Submitted by: **Asad Abbas**

Registration #: **MP-IR-AS18-ID012**

**Master of Philosophy**

Name in Full

**International Relations**

Discipline

**Dr. Farhat Konain**

Supervisor

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of Supervisor

**Dr. Rizwana Abbasi**

HOD (IR)

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of HOD (IR)

**Prof. Dr. Mustafeez Ahmad Alvi**

Dean (FSS)

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of Dean (FSS)

**Prof. Dr. Muhammad Safer Awan**

Pro-Rector ACAD- NUML

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of Pro-Rector Acad

# CANDIDATE DECLARATION FORM

I Asad Abbas

Son of Manzoor Sultan

Registration # MP-IR-AS18-ID012

Discipline International Relations

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## **DEDICATION**

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATION**

BCM	Billion Cubic Meter
TEN	Trans-European Energy Network
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
ESS	Energy Security Strategy
ST	Securitization Theory
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CAS	Central Asian States
GHG	Green House Gas
RES	Renewable Energy Sources
ETS	European Emission Trading System
GTS	Gas Transport System
NEGP	North European Gas Pipeline
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on Law of Sea
TCM	Thousand Cubic Meter
TFEU	Treaty of Function of EU
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
DCFTA	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
AA	Association Agreement
BRICS	Brazil Russia India China South Africa
NRF	NATO Response Force

## **ABSTRACT**

*In contemporary era, energy trade and energy politics are going vis vis. World powerful countries are always in efforts to dominate the energy trade and protect the energy routes to ensure their needs. However, politics on this field is also underway side by side. Nord Stream II is second of two Nord Stream I and Nord Stream II which is the first project by Russia to supply its gas to a European country Germany. This project is the one which is decreasing Russian and German reliance on Ukraine which served for long as Russian gas transit route. Thus, the project not only deprives Ukraine from huge economic benefits but allows Russia to seek its political ambitions in Ukraine which is the former Soviet Republic. Project is of great importance for Germany because it will fulfil Germany's increasing energy needs. Whereas Ukraine, foresee this project as threat to its national security. After annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 and then unrest in eastern parts of Ukraine has realized Ukraine that Russia by fulfilling energy needs of significant European countries will try to achieve its designs in Ukraine and has tried to securities this at local level. US and NATO both grasped the Russian ambitions and making an effort of collective securitization to refrain Russia from moving further in West. Russia on the other hand sees EU and NATO as main opponent want to further squeeze Russia. In this whole game Ukraine has become the battleground for East and West for New Cold War.*

## Introduction

Nord Stream II is the proposed gas pipeline between Russia and Germany, which is passing through all the way Baltic Sea crossing the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of half of dozen countries and will end up in Germany. Before Nord Stream II, Nord Stream I is actively working between Russia and Germany whose capacity is 55 billion cubic meter (BCM). However, Nord Stream II will double the capacity into 110 BCM. Both Nord Stream I and II starts from Vyborg (Russia) and end in Greifswald the port city of Germany in Baltic Sea.<sup>1</sup> Till Nord Stream I became active in 2011, no country had any reservations on this project but after intensification in tensions between Russia and Eastern European countries such as Georgia and Ukraine, different objections emerged on Nord Stream II while terming the project as economic and political threat for Ukraine.

Just before the World War I, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill made his historical decision by shifting the source of power of the Royal British navy's ships from coal to oil. The idea was to increase the efficacy of Royal British Navy as compared to its German rival. But this switch also meant that the Royal Navy would rely not on coal from Wales but on insecure oil supplies procured from what was then Persia. Since the Churchill's decision, the energy security became an issue of greater significance. However, in the Post-Cold War World, the subject needs to be revisited. As energy security is witnessing a paradigm shift, which demands a critical examination into new factors and variables.<sup>2</sup> This energy transition by Great Britain never went unnoticed by other powerful countries such as Russia which also started transferring source of energy from coal to oil and then on gas later on.

In 1997, Gazprom of Russia and the Finish Company, Neste found a shared company, North Transgas Oy with purpose to examine new, alternative pipeline transit routes from Russia through the Baltic Sea to Germany. In 1998, Company submitted a feasibility study that concluded a technically feasible and economically efficient pipeline project through the Baltic Sea.<sup>3</sup> European Union (EU) validated the pipeline under Baltic Sea as a "Project of Interest" in

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<sup>1</sup> Bendik Solum, Whist, *Nord Stream: Not Just a pipeline.*(Lysaker: Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 2008) 5.

<sup>2</sup> Daniel Yergin, "Ensuring Energy Security," *Foreign Affairs*, no. 2, Mar/April 2006" 69.

<sup>3</sup> Andreas Goldthau, "Assessing Nord Stream II: Regulations, Geopolitics and Energy Security in EU, Central Eastern Europe and UK," Strategy Paper 10, *European Centre for Energy and Resource Security* (2016) 9.

2000 in accordance with the Trans-European Energy Networks guidelines (TEN-E).<sup>4</sup> During 2001 and 2004, two German energy companies, E.ON Ruhrgas and BASF/Wintershall, became closely linked to the project, whereas the Finish company, Fortum (earlier known as Neste), pulled out of this project in 2005 after Gazprom made an announcement in 2004 that made further Finish participation needless.<sup>5</sup> Together these companies started construction of world's first gas pipeline which was about to pass the Exclusive Economic Zones of Baltic States whereas for the first time Russia was going to opt transit route other than Ukraine.

In 2005, Gazprom (51%), E.ON Ruhrgas (24.5%) and BASF/Wintershall (24.5%) instituted the North European Gas Pipeline company (later renamed as Nord Stream AG). In 2006, the Nord Stream AG joint venture was joined by the Dutch energy company Gasunie, which bought from E.ON Ruhrgas and BASF/Wintershall each with the share of 4.5%, a total of 9%. Its youngest shareholder, the French energy provider, GDF SUEZ, joined the Nord Stream AG in 2010.<sup>6</sup> Today, shares of Nord Stream AG are distributed as follows: Gazprom (51%), E.ON Ruhrgas (15.5%), BASF/Wintershall (15.5%), Gasunie (9%), and GDF SUEZ (9%). Construction of Nord Stream-I pipeline started in April 2010 and operationalized by the end of 2011.

This detail of gas companies shows interest of countries in Nord Stream due to its economic importance. Both gas pipelines (Nord Stream-I and II) together have a supply capacity of 55 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year and are one of the longest offshore pipelines worldwide.<sup>7</sup> The source of the gas is located in the Yuzhno-Russkoye oil and gas reserve, Yamal Peninsula, Ob-Taz bay and Shtokmanovskoye fields.<sup>8</sup> Thing to remember is that this Nord Stream is first of its kind where in no land route is included wherein Russia is transporting to Germany from port to port directly.

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<sup>4</sup>Nord Stream, *Project Milestones*. TEN-E guidelines list and rank projects eligible for Community Assistance, accessed on 17 Jan 2011, available [http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/ten\\_e/ten\\_e\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/ten_e/ten_e_en.htm).

<sup>5</sup> Bendik Solum, Whist, *Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline*: (Lysaker: Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 2008)5.

<sup>6</sup>Solum, *Nord Stream*.6

<sup>7</sup>Solum, *Nord Stream*.6

<sup>8</sup>Andreas Goldthau, "Assessing Nord Stream II: Regulations, Geopolitics and Energy Security in EU, Central Eastern Europe and UK" Strategy Paper 10, *European Centre for Energy and Resource Security* (2016)9.

In November of 2015, Nord Stream II AG, a group of five European firms and the Russian energy giant Gazprom was launched. The objective was to increase the existing Nord Stream natural gas pipeline. The proposed project will add two pipes bridging the Baltic Sea between Russia and Germany and will efficiently double the output of the current Nord Stream infrastructure that became operational in 2011.<sup>9</sup> Nord Stream II is an addition to the Nord Stream I pipeline, built earlier by a consortium of five shareholders: the Russian *Gazprom*, German companies *Wintershall* (a subsidiary of BASF) and E.ON, Dutch *Gasunie*, and French *Suez*. If we talk about Germany then Germany is largest European natural gas importer. It receives its gas from Russia (38%), Norway (22%), and the Netherlands (26%).<sup>10</sup> The natural gas consumption of Germany is engrained; Germany first imported gas from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) in 1973 and completed an underwater pipeline to import Norwegian gas in 1977.<sup>11</sup> Due to expected reduction in gas production from countries like Norway and the Netherlands, it is in interests of Germany to ensure the reliability of its Russian source. Russian gas is currently being mostly supplied via the Yamal pipeline, which flows from Poland (via Belarus) and the Ukrainian Corridor network passing through the Czech Republic (via Slovakia and Ukraine).<sup>12</sup> However, only dependence on Russia for energy needs may cause threats to overall EU geopolitical policies.

Most of Eastern European countries responded negatively to the Nord Stream II. European Union (EU) members such as Poland and Slovakia opposed the project with a stance that project is against the basic energy laws of EU however, EU personal interests would be at stake. Both countries are transit states for Russian natural gas as Poland hosts the Yamal pipeline and Slovakia the Bratislava pipeline. Both pipelines pass through Ukraine and according to them there will be loss in revenues if Russia diverts gas supplies to Nord Stream. Out of the ten countries that signed a letter showing reservations on the Nord Stream II pipeline, most of them are transiting states, they are also dependent on gas imports from Russia.<sup>13</sup> Worrisome thing for

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<sup>9</sup>Goldthau, "Accessing Nord Stream II"10.

<sup>10</sup> "Bendik Solum, Whist, *Nord Stream: Not Just a pipeline*. (Lysaker: Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 2008)6.

<sup>11</sup> John S. Duffield, *Fuels Paradise: Seeking Energy Security for Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015)163.

<sup>12</sup> "Europe's Gas Pipelines: The Abominable Gas Man," *The Economist*, October 14, 2010, <http://www.economist.com/node/17260657>

<sup>13</sup>Kai-Olaf Lang and Kirsten Westphal, "Nord Stream II: A Political and Economic Contextualization" (*Issn. 1863-1053, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*1863-1053, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (2017)20.

Russia and Germany is the reservations of Ukraine and support of USA to those reservations. Such as Poland and Slovakia, Ukraine is also having economic reservations on Nord Stream II which will obviously reduce its annual revenue generating from gas transit route. After Russian aggression in Crimea, Ukraine and USA both look at these acts of Russia as reemergence by dominating the EU countries through gas exports.

Ukraine crisis in the years 2006 and 2009 gas disputes raised the importance of energy security within the EU countries especially the security of natural gas supply. Even though the EU states import more oil (90%) as compare to natural gas (60%), the gas supply is considered to be less secure due to the relatively limited sources for gas procurement whereas some of the EU countries are entirely dependent on gas supplies from Russia.<sup>14</sup> This complete dependence of Europe especially the politically and economically powerful countries like Germany and France can affect the EU policies towards Russia, after Crimean adventure US is also warning EU from being totally dependent on Russia.

Due to ongoing crisis, the EU Commission on energy released an Energy Security Strategy (ESS) in 2014 which included a series of “stress tests” to assess European resilience to Russian supply with ban from one to six months. The ESS also offered five long-term elucidations to EU gas reliance: growing energy efficiency, growing internal energy production (to include nuclear, viable fossil fuels, and sustainable energies), completing the internal energy market, merging external energy policy, and strengthening emergency plans.<sup>15</sup> These measures in response to Russian aggression seem not enough because Germany despite reservations over Russian aggression in Ukraine did not revisit its plan for Nord Stream II.

The attainment of the Nord Stream II is dependent on geopolitical changes and the consortium’s ability to navigate the approval of Baltic countries, maintain backing within the German political system, and pass Eastern European and the EU’s scrutiny. As it were, the Commission is presently appraising an objection from Ukrainian energy company Naftogaz. Assuming the status quo, however, Nord Stream II is likely to pass the hurdles as did by its

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<sup>14</sup> “Sakamoto Philemon, “German Energy Security and its Implications on Regional Security”(Calhaun: Institutional Archive of Naval Postgraduate School, Montrey, California, 2016)17,18.

<sup>15</sup>Philmon, German Energy Security.19.

predecessors.<sup>16</sup> Other than these steps taken by countries such as Ukraine against the Nord Stream, Baltic States are also having reservations on Nord Stream, as per them increasing commercial activities will not only damage the sea life in Baltic but increase the Russian influence as well.

### **Statement of the Problem**

The annexation of Crimea ignited the contentions between Russia and Ukraine, which is likely to hamper Nord Stream II gas project proposed between Russia and Germany. Russia seems having intent to increase its influence on the Eastern European region. Recent steps taken by Russia either in Middle East or in Eastern Europe demonstrate that Russia has regained economic strength after disintegration of Soviet Union and is ready to use this strength for political purposes. As according to rules of International Relations, state with stronger economy can play better role in world politics in terms of geo politics. Nord Stream II will further diminution Russian dependence on Ukraine as energy transit route and may continue aggression in areas which are strategically important, as Russia did so by considering the importance of Crimea. Ukraine is observing these developments as threat to its sovereignty. That is why Ukraine is trying to establish the narrative that Russian policies are threat for security of Ukraine whereas it could also hamper security issues in other states which remained part of Soviet Union in past. Germany on the other hand which is biggest recipient of Russian gas in Europe is standing in favor of Nord Stream II with stance that the project is totally commercial and has no political objectives. This is an official viewpoint of Germany against the objections on Nord Stream II but even then Germany has openly condemned Russia either it is annexation of Crimea or arrest of Alexie Navalny the opposition leader of Russia.

Russia, which was on policy of restrain after the end of Cold War, is now resurging in international politics. Being biggest exporter of natural gas to Europe, Russia earns billions of dollars annually, which add into its mounting wealth. Ukraine was central to Russian energy corridor extending to Europe however, after the annexation of Crimea, both Russia and Ukraine are at daggers drawn. Nord Stream I was completed in 2011 and Nord Stream II was initiated in

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<sup>16</sup> “Dymtro Naumenko, “Russian Gas Transit Through Ukraine After Nord Stream II: Scenario Analysis” (*Kiev, Ukrainian Centre for European Policy, 2018*) 6.

2015 are clear indications that Russia does not want to remain dependent on states such as Ukraine which still considered as Russian satellite state. Ukraine not only raised objections against Russia but against Germany as well however, whole West and USA also joined Ukraine against Germany but Germany is still of the view that Nord Stream is a commercial project and Russia will not use it for political gains.

### **Research Question**

1. How could Nord Stream II affect Ukrainian Security?
2. How effectively Russia expanding its area of influence through energy politics in Eastern Europe such as Ukraine?
3. Why could the foreign policies of Germany and Ukraine be compromised due to Nord Stream II?
4. What options Ukraine possess to counter balance Russian and German Energy Politics through its Foreign Policy?

### **Objectives of the Study**

- To explain significance of Nord Stream II and increasing energy dependence of Germany on Russia.
- To discuss growing influence of Russia on Ukraine through revisionist behavior.
- To discuss the possible threats to Ukrainian security due to ongoing Russia-Ukraine contentions.

### **Literature Review**

Rafael Kandiyoti in his book *Ukraine's Change of Heart* unfolds Ukraine's tilt towards Europe after disintegration of Soviet Union and that how USA and other NATO countries tried to increase their sphere of influence on the Eastern European countries.<sup>17</sup> Natural gas as political weapon and Russian geopolitics in Eastern Europe such as Ukrainian war are comprehensively discussed. However, book also discusses the Post-Soviet geographical settlement between Europe, NATO and Russia and its impact on trans-European energy links.

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<sup>17</sup> Kandiyoti, Rafael. *Powering Europe: Russia, Ukraine, and the Energy Squeeze*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. doi: 10.1057/9781137501646.0007.



Lars-Christian U. Talseth, book *Politics of Power* views that Nord Stream, Ukraine and Russian plans such as Russia see energy as foreign policy tool, Putin was trying to build an energy empire through Gazprom, this book also discusses that Russia uses Gazprom as its proxy for Kremlin's neo-imperial ambitions.<sup>18</sup> The reservations of EU states on Nord Stream especially Baltic states and Poland, the reaction of EU states against Russia over Ukraine crisis wherein in start of 2006 Germany remained silent, Russian monopoly in EU through energy pipelines that how Russia gain political objectives through energy politics, this book also unfolds that how Russian President accused EU for creating Ukraine as according to him Ukraine was appendage not a sovereign state.

Lukas Tichy in his book *EU-Russia Energy Relations: A Discursive Approach* comprehensively covers different aspects of European energy relations with Russia.<sup>19</sup> The detail of energy pipelines through which Russia exports its gas to Europe like Nord Stream I and II whereas South Stream which is passing through Turkey are the most important. Economic factors of Nord stream are also part of discussion in this book however, US stance on EU-Russia energy relations with reservations are also part of discussion.

Carol Hager and Christoph Stefes in their book *Germany's energy transition: A Comparative Perspective* gives the reasons compelled Germany to transfer its energy requirement from coal to gas.<sup>20</sup> This book also talk about the Energy Policy of European according to which EU countries will have to decrease the use of nuke and coal energy due to climate changes. German point of view over import of gas from Russia and role of internal politics of Germany in this regard is discussed in detail.

Professor Andreas Goldthau in book *Accessing Nord Stream II: Regulations, Geopolitics and Energy Security in EU, Central Eastern Europe and UK*. This study accesses the geopolitical, regulatory and energy security aspects as discussed in context of Nord Stream II and unveils that the EU import gap will widen with passage of time.<sup>21</sup> This book also sheds light

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<sup>18</sup> Talseth Lars-Christian U. *Politics of Power*.

<sup>19</sup> Lukas Tichy, (*EU-Russia Energy Relation: A Discursive Approach*), 2019.

<sup>20</sup> Hager Carl, Stefes Christoph H, (*Germany's Energy Transition: A Comparative Perspective*), 2016. 1

<sup>21</sup> Goldthau Andreas, *Accessing Nord Stream: Regulations, Geopolitics & Energy Security in the EU, Central Eastern Europe and UK*, (The European Research Centre for Energy and Resource Security (EUCERS), King's College London, 2010). 9

on strategy of Gazprom which consider Nord Stream II as part of its strategy to minimize risk to its prime export market.

Erik Gawal, Sebastian Strunz, Paul Lehmann, Alexandra Purkus in this book *European Dimensions of Germany's Energy Transition: Opportunities and Conflicts* shed light on the reasons why Germany is transferring its energy needs from nuclear to gas. This book also talk about EU climate and Energy Policy beyond 2020 and Import dependency and energy transition, which is new risk field for security of supply.<sup>22</sup>

Olena Viter, Rostyslav Pavlenko and Mykhaylo Honcher, in their book *Ukraine: Post-Revolution Energy Policy and Relations with Russia* discusses about Ukrainian lack of transparency in oil market, fuel crisis and prices control and causes of conflict with Russia.<sup>23</sup> This book is basically a Russian perspective in which Russia alleges Ukraine for corruption and for not making issues related to projects transparent. The detailed discussion about Russia-Ukraine relations and political issues of past between two countries are discussed.

Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska & Rishard Sakwa in book *Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspective* describe the tensions emerged in both European and Global affairs due to rift between Russia and Ukraine, it also talks about ethnic composition of Ukraine and Western sanctions on Russia due to Crimean adventure.<sup>24</sup> However, Policies of President Putin towards Ukraine are also discussed whereas life in Crimea before and after its annexation.

Christophe-Alexandre Paillard in this research paper "Russia-Europe Mutual Energy Dependence" sheds light on Russian ambitions through Gas Pipeline Projects in Eastern Europe, Russian Aims to Gain a Foothold in Various European Energy Sectors and that how Russia is gaining control over European energy sector with every passing day, due to this many Eastern

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<sup>22</sup> Lehmann Paul, Gawel Erik, Strunz Sebastian, EU Climate and Energy Policy Beyond 2020: Are Additional Targets and Instruments for Renewables Economically Reasonable? (*The European Dimensions of Germany's Energy Transition*, 2018).

<sup>23</sup> Viter Olena, Pavlenko Rostyslav and Honcher Mykhaylo (*Ukraine: Post Revolution Energy Policy and Relations with Russia*). GMB Publishing Limited. 120 Pentonville Road London N1 9JN United Kingdom.

<sup>24</sup> Pikulicka Agnieszka, Sakwa Richard, (*Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspective*), E-International Relations www.E-IR.infoBristol, England First published 2015 New version 2016.

European countries are showing reservations on Russian ambitions. Objections on Russian gas giant Gazprom from Europe are discussed too.<sup>25</sup>

Kai-Olaf Lang, Kirsten Westphal in their research article “Nord Stream II: A Political and Economic Contextualization” wherein unfolds the waves created by Nord Stream II in European Union with counter argument that Nord Stream II and its direct link between Russian gas fields and European energy markets will improve European ‘s energy security, however stance of the EU commission that further expansion of Gazprom’s dominant position in the EU market and weakening of current transit countries could hamper the security situation.<sup>26</sup>

Sakamoto Philemon in his thesis, *German Energy Security and its Implications on Regional Security* discuss Nord Stream, Energy Security and Eastern Europe Stability in detail with share of all companies in this project.<sup>27</sup> He concludes his thesis by saying that Europe is continuously becoming dependent on Russia to meet its energy needs which could affect its policies towards Russia and that only purpose of Russia to export its oil and gas to Russia is to bring Europe under its dominance.

Dmytro Naumenko in this research paper “German-Russian gas relations” confers gas relations of Germany and Russia in context of security crisis over Ukraine. Russian gas transit through Ukraine after Nord Stream II: Scenario analysis, this research paper also talk about agreement between Russia and Ukraine on gas transit which is about to end in Dec 2019.<sup>28</sup> Whereas role of Russian gas giant Gazprom is also observed critically with concerns of Ukraine over increasing Russian aggression.

Martin Murphy and Gary Schaub Jr. in their research article “Sea of Peace or Sea of War” Russian Maritime warfare in the Baltic Sea unfold Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine

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<sup>25</sup> Pillard Alexandre Christophe, (Russia and Europe’s Mutual Energy Dependence, Source: Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 2, Rethinking Russia (SPRING/SUMMER 2010), pp. 65-84 Published by: Journal of International Affairs Editorial Board Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24384335> Accessed: 16-04-2019 06:56 UTC.

<sup>26</sup> Olaf, Kai Lang and Kirsten Westphal, “Nord Stream II: A Political and Economic Contextualization” (Issn. 1863-1053, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik 1863-1053, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (2017).

<sup>27</sup> Sakamoto Philemon, “German Energy Security and its Implications on Regional Security”(Calhaun: Institutional Archive of Naval Postgraduate School, Montrey, California, 2016).

<sup>28</sup> “Dymtro Naumenko, “Russian Gas Transit Through Ukraine After Nord Stream II: Scenario Analysis” (Kiev, Ukrainian Centre for European Policy, 2018).

through Nord Stream and in Baltic Sea.<sup>29</sup> This paper argues that Russia uses Gazprom as foreign policy tool that is why Gazprom was taken into official control Russian authorities. Increasing influence of Russia in Baltic Sea and reservations of Baltic countries are also discussed in this paper with concerns of Baltic region countries against Russia for using their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ).

Maili Vilson and Johan Skytte in their research article “The Foreign Policy of the Baltic States and the Ukrainian Crisis” describe the Europeanization of eastern European States and reasons of annexation of Crimea. This article tells about efforts made by the EU to include Ukraine in EU.<sup>30</sup> Efforts of the EU and NATO to extend their membership further to Eastern Europe, However, Russian observations on these efforts of extension of EU and NATO are also discussed in comprehensively.

Keith C. Smith in this article “Gaz promises: Russian Energy Challenges for the West” label activities of Russian gas giant Gazprom the biggest gas company of the world as hegemonic and as an actor which is being used by Russia for political objectives.<sup>31</sup> In 2006 this company cutoff natural gas to Ukraine. This hostile act by Russia's state -owned natural gas company revealed Moscow's willingness to use its energy resources in a coercive fashion for political leverage in the region.

Hannes Adomeit, in his research article “The EU and Russia: The Conflict over Nord Stream” while quoting Russian president Putin and Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller that Russia is seriously thinking about decreasing its dependence on Ukraine to export gas and for this south stream passing through Ankara is important.<sup>32</sup> This article raise concerns of Eastern European

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<sup>29</sup> Murphy Martin, Schaub Gary, “Sea of Peace or Sea of War”, Source: Naval War College Review , Vol. 71, No. 2 (Spring 2018), pp. 122-148 Published by: U.S. Naval War College Press Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26607049>.

<sup>30</sup> Vilson Maili, (The Foreign Policy of Baltic States and Ukrainian Crisis: A Case of Europeanisation), Institute of International Relation, Source: New Perspectives , Vol. 23, No. 2 (2015), pp. 49-76 Published by: Institute of International Relations, NGO Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26470109>.

<sup>31</sup> Smith Keith C. Gaz Promises: Russian Energy Challenges for the West. Source: Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Winter/Spring 2007),pp. 51-58 Published by: Georgetown University Press Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43134146> Accessed: 16-04-2019 06:56 UTC.

<sup>32</sup> Adomeit Hannes Per, German-Russian Relations Balance Sheet Since 2000 and Perspective until 2025, ETUDE Prospective & Strategique.

countries like Ukraine that why Russia is trying to decrease its dependence on Ukraine to export its gas to Europe.

Martin Russel in his research article “Gazprom’s controversial Nord Stream II pipeline” critically discusses the role of Gazprom in Nord Stream II and views that this company is taking control of countries through its projects. However, Russia uses Gazprom as tool to influence other countries.<sup>33</sup> This article also discusses role of Gazprom during tensions between Russia and Ukraine. The resolution of EU parliament is also part of article in which Nord Stream II was declared harmful to energy security, diversification and European solidarity.

Evert Faber Van Der Meulen in this article “Gas Supply and EU-Russia Relations “sheds light on EU energy relations with Russia as interdependence policy of EU whereas Russia on the other hand has taken control of companies like Gazprom.<sup>34</sup> Gazprom which was earlier an independent company but Russian authority taken control of it due to its increasing business and with ambitions to use it for political victimization against the EU countries. Writer also argues that EU energy policy towards Russia damages security of supply because it neglects the aims and propensities of Russia and Gazprom.

Daniel Gugan in this research article “The Re-emergence of Russia and its Collision Course with Europe “unfolds that increasing dependence of Europe on Russia for energy is kind of wakeup call for Europe wherein the EU countries are warned from Russian ambitions, this article prescribes that if the EU loses Ukraine then it might also lose its entire Eastern and Southern neighborhood. This article also discussed objections of Eastern European countries on Russia for using its energy exports as foreign policy tool.

Bjorn Moller in his research article The Concept of Security: The Pros and Cons of Expansion and Contraction expressed the definition of security and its application by different IR

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<sup>33</sup> Russel Martin, Gazprom’s Controversial Nord Stream II Pipeline

<sup>34</sup> Meulen Van Der Evert Faber , Gas Supply and EU-Russia Relations. Source: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 61, No. 5 (Jul., 2009), pp. 833-856 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27752304> Accessed: 16-04-2019 06:57 UTC.

theorists.<sup>35</sup> This article basically talks about referent object in the Securitization Theory (ST) while giving the example of Bangladeshi immigrant in India who were becoming burden on India and India as referent object was under threat due to those immigrants. The writer seems a bit biased in this article but clearly defines referent object in his writings.

Nicholas Glover in “Does Security exists outside of the speech act” tried to compare the concept of security by Copenhagen School of Thought and concept of security which Realist school of thought possess, in the article writer maintains that speech act is an influential part of securitization process initiated by actor but there are also other means like social interaction. According to him, concept of security is different in different social systems as it can be constructed physically through administrative system of states whose concept and experience of security maybe different not just centered on speech act.<sup>36</sup>

Meena Roldan Oberdick in this thesis “*Reconceptualizing the Actor-Audience Dichotomy in Securitization Theory*” argues about multiple securitizing actors and multiple audiences.<sup>37</sup> Thesis finds out that an actor oriented approach in securitization allows better chances of conceptualizing an issue. By using the Securitization theoretical framework it was analyzed that how actors in multiple ways acted in executive and administrative set ups of US govt to increase the expansion in detention of immigrants after 9/11.

Sezer Ozcan in this research paper “Securitization of Energy Through the Lenses of Copenhagen School” talks about domination of securitization concept of Copenhagen School with role of actors and speech act in it.<sup>38</sup> He also maintains that threats to national security should not only be conceived in military terms. Writer reiterates the idea of Copenhagen School that securitization move takes politics beyond the established rules or framework. Writer

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<sup>35</sup> Moller Bjorn, The Concept of Security: The Pros and Cons of Expansion and Contraction, International Peace Research Association, IPRA, Aug 2009.

<sup>36</sup> Glover Nicolas, Does Security Exists Outside of Speech Act?, 2011, <https://www.e-ir.info/2011/10/09/does-security-exist-outside-of-the-speech-act/> 5.

<sup>37</sup> Oberdick Roldan Meena, “Reconceptualising the Actor-Audience Dichotomy in Securitization Theory”. A Thesis submitted to the Board of Examiners in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts in Conflict Studies & Human Rights. Utrecht University 3 August 2018.

<sup>38</sup> Ozcan Sezer, “Securitization of Energy Through the Lenses of Copenhagen School”. PhD Fellow, Bielefeld Graduate School in History and Sociology (BGHS), Bielefeld University, Germany, Paper prepared for the 2013 Orlando International Conference, 21-23 March, 2013, West East Institute, Orlando/USA.

discusses the securitization in context of energy security by linking the security issues of contemporary era and threats to not only state but to global security as well. He maintains that EU institutions or member states as securitizing actors have portrayed issue of energy security as an survival issue of people of Europe, as concept of safest supply from producer to consumer.

Josy Joseph an Indian based journalist in this article “Securitization of Illegal Immigration of Bengalis to India” debates about “Referent Object” in Securitization theory in detail. He also talks about securitization of various actors on one issue.<sup>39</sup> He explains that referent object could be an individual, state of an organization we well whereas referent object possess the legitimate right to survive.

Cote Adam in this Phd thesis “*Social Securitization Theory*” in 2015 comprehensively discussed whole securitization process of Securitization Theory.<sup>40</sup> He therefore, maintains that audiences are most integral part of whole securitization process. He terms the policy makers as main actors. He shifts the role of audience in securitization from passive to active and an effective contributor in constructing a security threat.

Stephen Velychenko in his book “Ukraine The EU and Russia: History Culture and International Relations. The writer in detail describes the history of Ukraine and its relations with Russia and EU.<sup>41</sup> Book also sheds light on geography and ethnic diversity of Ukraine and political challenges after disintegration of Soviet Union and its emergence as Ukraine in 1991. Book also covers the orange revolution in 2004 which pushed country closer to EU and away from Russian Federation.

“Nor Stream II, Environmental Impact Assessment, Denmark, North-Western Route” is basically the publication of Rumboll institute Copenhagen, Denmark and shares detail of possible threats to climate and Baltic Sea belt due to Nord Stream. This publication concludes

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<sup>39</sup> Joseph Josy, *Securitization of Illegal Migration of Bangladeshis to India*, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Singapore, 2006, 20.

<sup>40</sup> Côté, A. (2015). *Social Securitization Theory* (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/27817 <http://hdl.handle.net/11023/2477> doctoral thesis.

<sup>41</sup> Velychenko Stephen, (*Ukraine, The EU and Russia: History, Culture and International Relations*), Studies in Central and Eastern Europe Series Standing Order ISBN. Munk Centre for International Studies University of Toronto, Canada. 2007.

that no significant threats will emerge due to any economic activity in Danish Waters or EEZ. However, threats are of smaller magnitude.

Bendik Solum Whist in this article “Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline” An analysis of political debates in Baltic Sea region regarding the planned gas pipeline from Russia to Germany. It talks about criticism on Nord Stream since emergence of its concept by different countries and endorsed the stance by different states that this project is not only politically motivated one but will increase Russian influence in Eastern and Northern parts of Europe. This volume also includes stance of Germany and Russia who totally negate the suspicions over the project.<sup>42</sup>

Oleksandr Merezhko writes in his paper “Crimea’s Annexation by Crimea-Contradiction of the New Russian Doctrine of International Law” observes that Russia violated the International Law by invading Crimea. Basically this paper is an analysis of Crimean crisis in light of existing global laws. This effort is also refutes the stance adopted by Russia’s justification regarding its offensive in Crimea.<sup>43</sup>

Felix Dodds, Andrew Highman and Richard Sherman in their book “*Climate Change and Energy Insecurity*” gives a detail brief about changing climate and its implications for different countries, they also talk about energy consumption policies of different countries and their part in rapid climate change all over globe.<sup>44</sup> Basically the book is a comprehensive effort who discuss all factors with more emphasis on energy sector responsible for climate change.

Nataliya Esakova in this book “*European Energy Security, Analyzing the EU-Russia Energy Security Regime in Terms of Interdependence Theory*” discuss the theory of interdependence in detail and links it with energy trade between Russia and EU.<sup>45</sup> Writer explains that countries producing energy and the consumers are interdependent more than in past

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<sup>42</sup> Bendik, Adomeit, Solum Whist, Nord Stream: Not Just a pipeline. (Lysaker: Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 2008).

<sup>43</sup> Merezhko Oleksandr, (Crimea’s Annexation by Russia-Contradictions of New Russian Doctrine of International Law, Max-Plank Institute für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 2015).

<sup>44</sup> Dodds Felix, Highman Andrew, Sherman Richard, (Climate change and energy security: The challenge for peace, security and development), Earthscan, 2009.

<sup>45</sup> Esakova Nataliya, (European Energy Security Analyzing the EU-Russia Energy Security Regime in Terms of Interdependence Theory, Globale Gesellschaft und internationale Beziehungen, Frankfurt, Germany. 2012).



and this interdependence is guarantee of strong commercial partnership and for long lasting supplies.

Dominique Finon and Catherine Locatelli in their article “Russia and European Gas interdependence, Can market forces balance out geopolitics” sheds light over hegemonic Russian place in EU energy markets especially in case of Gazprom the Russian gas giant. The article endorses the idea that EU states must go for additional energy sources. However, writers also adopt that politicization of energy by Putin administration to act as energy super power through Gazprom is witnessing control over prices in EU markets.

Aurelie Bros, Tatiana Mitrova and Kristen Westphal in this research paper “German-Russian gas relations, A Special Relationship in Troubled Waters” analyses that German-Russian trade relations are based on expansion, development and business to business ties as well.<sup>46</sup> Whereas, Germany’s significance for Russia is because Germany is biggest importer of Russian gas vis a vis important geographical position in Europe. However, Europe foresee emerging Russia- Germany ties are an effort to weak the European Union.

James Sperling and Mark Webber in this paper “NATO and Ukraine Crisis: Collective Securitization” debates about actors in Securitization Theory (ST) collectively. Both scholars claims that NATO is consistently remained engage in securitization of so many issues around the globe. However, over issue of Russian aggression in Ukraine, NATO has successfully securitized the issue as part of collective securitization as regional security organization.<sup>47</sup>

Nusrin Atesoglu and Visne Kormaz in their paper “The Energy Interdependence Model between Russia and Europe: An Evaluation of Expectations for Change” discuss concept of interdependence and energy dialogues between Russia and West in Cold War era.<sup>48</sup> Papers endorses that interdependence on Russian energy was politicized in Europe which led to change

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<sup>46</sup> Bros Aurelie, Mitrova Tatiana, Kristen Westphal, (German-Russian gas relationship, A special relation in troubled waters), German Institute for international and security affairs, 2017.

<sup>47</sup> Sperling James, Webber Mark, NATO and Ukraine crisis: Collective Securitization, European Journal of International Security (EJIS), Volume 2, Part 1, British International Studies Association, 2016.

<sup>48</sup> Atesoglu Nusrin and Kormaz Visne, “The Energy Interdependence Model between Russia and Europe: An Evaluation of Expectations for Change”. PERCEPTIONS, Autumn 2014, Volume XIX, Number 3, pp. 35-59.

in their energy security measures. However, this fear among European states arose in recent years.

Sunita Meena and Indian Ph.D scholar in her paper “Energy as a Political Weapon of Foreign Policy: The Russian Case” examines that how Russia uses its energy as political weapon with its neighboring countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asian States. Scholar while taking a hard stance says that while using the energy as foreign policy tool, Russia rewards its friends and punishes its enemies as strategic source.<sup>49</sup>

Congressional Research Service in its March 2019 article “Nord Stream II: A Faith Accomplish?” discusses about US objections over Nord Stream II and increasing Germany’s energy dependence on Russia. This article expresses that US administration has supported all EU efforts to end their dependence on Russian gas after Russia halted its gas exports to Europe in 2006 and in 2009.

F. Stephen Larrabee, Peter A. Wilson and John Gordon in their coauthored book “*The Ukraine Crisis and European Security: Implications for United States and US Army*” talks about increasing aggressive behavior of Russia under presidency of Putin. Authors argue that order developed after Cold War is not suitable to Russia.<sup>50</sup> Thus, Russia wants to change making it more applicable to its interests. Whereas this situation has also implications for United States as some EU countries are reluctant to impose sanctions against Russia after Crimean adventure just because of their own interests with Russia.

Piotr Kosowski and Katarzyna Kosowska “The Geopolitics of Gazprom’s Pipeline” sheds light over Russian efforts to eliminate Ukraine as its transit energy route.<sup>51</sup> As it was viewed that transit trade agreement between Russia and Ukraine were about to expire in 2019 and new terms imposed by Ukraine were not acceptable for Russia.

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<sup>49</sup> Meena Sunita, (Energy as a Political Weapon of Foreign Policy: The Russian Case), International Journal of Academic Research and Development, ISSN: 2455-4197. 2018.

<sup>50</sup> Larrabee F Stephen, Wilson A Peter, Gordon John, (The Ukrainian Crisis and European Security-Implications for United States and US Army), Rand Corporation, URL: [www.jstore.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt15sk8s2.9](http://www.jstore.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt15sk8s2.9), 2015.

<sup>51</sup> Kosowski Piotr, Kosowska Katarzyna, The Geopolitics of Gazprom’s Pipeline, Article · January 2016. DOI: 10.7494/drill.2016.33.4.757, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320034230>.

Simon Pirani, Jonathan Stern and Katja Yafimava in this study “The Russo-Ukrainian Gas Dispute of Jan 2009: A Comprehensive Assessment” remarks that Russia-Ukraine crisis was big landmark with long term consequences.<sup>52</sup> This article argues that gas relations between Russia and Europe as mutually dependent which means Russia and Gazprom are heavily rely upon revenue generated from Europe.

Barry Buzan in his famous book “*People States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*” discusses the concept of security in detail, Buzan talks about social problems of state and then individual security and state or national security.<sup>53</sup> He also tells about nature and types of threats to a state. However, according to him state is the object of security.

Kataryna Wolczuk and Darius Zeruolis in this research Paper “Rebuilding Ukraine An Assessment of EU Assistance” while analyzing the Ukraine’s economic conditions remarks that EU is the biggest donor to Ukraine as gesture of soft power for improvement in Ukrainian governance as part of AA-DCFTA agreements. Paper analyses that there needs more measures to support economy of Ukraine.<sup>54</sup>

Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver in their book “*Regions and Power: The Structure of International Security*” projects that after the era of decolonization, the concept of regional security has become more relevant in global politics.<sup>55</sup> They empirically analyzed the security situation for different parts of world such as Central Asia, Africa, Middle East and EU and says that instead of a global structure, these countries are opting for regional security order.

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<sup>52</sup> Pirani Simon, Stern Jonathon, Yafimava Katja, *The Russo-Ukrainian Gas Dispute of 2009: A Comprehensive Assessment*, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.

<sup>53</sup> Barry, Buzan, *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, (ISBN 0-7108-0101-7, A member of Harvester Press Group, 1983).

<sup>54</sup> Wolczuk Kataryna, Zeruolis Darius, *(Rebuilding Ukraine: An Assessment of EU Assistance)*, Chatham House The Royal Institute of International Affairs, August 2018.

<sup>55</sup> Barry, Buzan, Waever Ole, *(Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security)*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 2003.

Eugene Rumer in the book “*Russia and the Security of Europe*” puts focus on political, economic and security developments in Russia and former Soviet States and United States policy towards this region.<sup>56</sup> The stance also emerges that annexation of Crimea by Russia was expression by Russia to reject the post-Cold War European-Atlantic order.

Andrew Radin and Clint Reach in this book “*Russian Views of the International Order*” depicts that current international order under US hegemonic designs.<sup>57</sup> Book presents that enlargement of NATO and EU, efforts for democracy in newly independent states (CIS) are the sectors where Russia is keenly observing and responding towards US. For instance, in response to US led actions against Russia, Russia is undermining US actions in Middle East.

Raphael Cohen and Andrew Radin in the Report “*Russia’s Hostile Measures in Europe: Understanding the Threat*” analyses the Russian activities in Europe and predicts that Russia may further create threats for Europe in near future.<sup>58</sup> This report also tells that Russia may use all its sources to achieve its objectives in Europe.

Dr Hab Agnieszka Legucka in the article “The NATO-Ukraine Relations After Annexation of Crimea” explained that how Ukraine developed its relations with NATO after annexation of Crimea and NATO responded as defendant of eastern edge of its alliance.<sup>59</sup> Article also tells that countries of Eastern Europe pledged for strengthening of NATO in their region. However, NATO opened its doors for Ukraine for cooperation but no membership.

Marianne Stone in “Security According to Buzan: A Comprehensive Security Analysis” defines security as an act to pursue the freedom from looming dangers against the hostile

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<sup>56</sup> Rumer Eugene, (*Russia and the Security Europe*), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2016.

<sup>57</sup> Radin Andrew, Reach Clint (*Russian View of The International Order*), RAND Corporation, Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2017 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark.

<sup>58</sup> Cohen Raphael S, Radin Andrew, (*Russia’s Hostile Measures in Europe: Understanding the Threat*), RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.

<sup>59</sup> Legucka Agnieszka Dr Hab, “The NATO –Ukraine Relations after Annexation of Crimea, Polish Institute of International Affairs, UA: The Ukraine Analytica . 2 (8), 2017.

forces.<sup>60</sup> The writer also further explains the sectors of Securitization Theory with examples to different issues. Writer also appreciates Barry Buzan for his tremendous work.

Anthony Ramicone and Jeffrey Metzger in this article “The Ukraine Crisis: A Disputed Past and Present” discuss the Russia and West relationship after the collapse of Soviet Union and declares both the West and Russia for deterioration in their ties.<sup>61</sup> As West including NATO adopted the policy of expansionism instead of pursuing integrity of Russian Federation.

Dmitri Trenin in his paper “The Ukraine Crisis and Resumption of Great Power Rivalry” analyses that Ukraine crisis which emerged in 2014 put end to post-Cold War status co created by West.<sup>62</sup> Argument emerges in this paper that Russia felt betrayed because of regime change efforts by West in Ukraine as Russian steps meant to secure its interests in that part of world.

### **Theoretical Framework**

Stephanie Lawson in his book “Theories of IR Contending Approaches to World Politics” defines theory as an organized system of ideas devised to explain certain set of phenomenon.<sup>63</sup> Many other theorists define theory with same words. A comparative study of international relations theories suggests that Securitization appears to be more closely interlinked with development of Nord Stream II. This theory by Barry Buzan tells how issues are perceived in parameters of security threat.

**Securitization** is a theory of International Relations in which Barry Buzan through his work “People, State and Fear” looks at security from all angles going from micro to macro, wherein he tells that how people construct or securitize threats.

Securitization is a process a formation of security, which stands different to early methods of classical security studies. Early approaches of security focus on the material natures

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<sup>60</sup> Stone Marianne, (Security According to Buzan: A Comprehensive Security Analysis), Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs- New York, 2009.

<sup>61</sup> Ramicone Anthony, Metzger Jeffrey, (The Ukrainian Crisis: A Disputed Past and Present), Harvard IOP Policy Program, May 2014.

<sup>62</sup> Trenin Dmitri, (The Ukraine Crisis and the Resumption of Great Power Rivalry), Carnegie Moscow Centre, July 2014.

<sup>63</sup> Stephanie, Lawson *Theories of International Relations: Contending Approaches to World Politics*. 2.

of the threat including distribution of power, military skills, and divergence, whereas securitization observes how an actor into an issue of security to use of extraordinary measures converts a certain issue. Furthermore, to make act of securitization successful, must be accepted by the audience, irrespective of the subject matter being a real threat. According to Thierry Braspenning-Balzacq, "securitization is a rule-governed practice, the success of which does not necessarily depend on the existence of a real threat, but on the discursive ability to effectively endow a development with such a specific complexion".<sup>64</sup> The audience may take several forms including technical, bureaucratic, public, and policymaking, and different audiences can perform different functions by accepting a securitization.

This theory involves four components:

- A securitizing actor/agent: an entity that makes the securitizing move/statement.
- An existential threat: an object (or ideal) that has been identified as potentially harmful.
- A referent object: an object (or ideal) that is being threatened and needs to be protected.
- An audience: the target of the securitization act that needs to be persuaded and accept the issue as a security threat.

After analyzing the political and economic situation of Eastern Europe, it seems obvious that Russia is only hegemon in the region, which can influence its policies by any means, as being part of past Soviet Union, Ukraine is at front facing Russian aggression like annexation of Crimea. Russia which earlier used Ukraine as transit route to export its gas to Europe is now finding other routes like Baltic Sea and Turkey (South Stream) which decreases its dependence on Ukraine, whereas Ukraine perceives this development as economic and strategic threat. Ukraine is losing billions of dollars due to change in Russian plans but main concern of Ukraine is security after annexation of Crimea. This is the reason Ukraine is raising objections on Nord Stream II, though apparently its objection is specific to economy but Ukraine knows Russia's aggressive posture. Ukraine can project Nord Stream II as security threat and may construct same narrative in front of global actors and persuade them to accept this issue as security threat too.

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<sup>64</sup> Barry, Buzan, *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, (ISBN 0-7108-0101-7, A member of Harvester Press Group, 1983)1, 2.

## **Research Methodology**

Research methodology is a systematic approach of solving a problem. It is a science of learning how exploration is to be conducted out fundamentally, the procedures by which researchers go about their work of unfolding, elucidating and predicting phenomena is called research methodology. Research Methodology is defined as the learning of techniques by which information is acquired. Its aim is to provide the work plan of exploration. The under consideration study will be qualitative methods of research. All the three fundamental components of research i.e. description, elucidation and recommendation will be used to scrutinize all the issues linked to this subject.

To carry out this research work, secondary sources will be used to fetch the data in order to facilitate the research. The secondary source data will be from authentic books and research articles / papers relevant to the subject, written by well-known writers. So, in nature this research is going to be qualitative. It will explain problem under explanation through consulting the historical practices and backgrounds while relating it to the present explanations of social practices and events further analyzing the future prospects of the Nord Stream II and ongoing geopolitics around this topic.

## **Significance of the Study**

Nord Stream II is the topic, which will contain newness for readers as this development is mostly unnoticed by most of people having an eye on International Relations. Keeping in view the strategic importance of Ukraine, Russia and Germany and prominent role by both Germany and Russia, this study will be an addition to academic discourse since 2015 the time Nord Stream II was initiated. Moreover, while analyzing the Nord Stream II, this study will also discuss the energy relations between Russia and Ukraine after collapse of Soviet Union and developments later on which lead to annexation of Crimea. German energy policy under EU law will and its agreement with Russia like Nord Stream I and II, its geo strategic implications for Eastern Europe are main significant of the topics. Hence, this study will help in articulating some solid and effective new information regarding this topic which is new as yet in world politics as most of work by researchers surrounds tensions between Russian and Ukraine in political way and

those researches are not covering the phenomenon of energy security. This study will be useful in future to discuss ongoing energy politics and its implications for various regions.

### **Delimitation**

Although Nord Stream was initiated since 2005 as early agreements were signed in 1997-98 but this study will focus mainly from 2015 since Russia and Germany signed agreement for Nord Stream 2 and after that when the Eastern European countries like Ukraine raised objections on it.

### **Organization of the Study**

Analyzing the potential of energy politics and energy security centered to almost few top economies of the world, this study will make efforts to present all aspects creating tensions between Russian and Ukraine (annexation of Crimea) and the aspects which of steps taken by Russia posing threat to security and sovereignty of different countries. Chapter I “Theoretical Framework” will discuss the portion of theory comprehensively to understand the whole theme. In this chapter, efforts will be made to relate the theory with topic. Chapter II “Germany-Russia Energy Collaboration: Historical Background” Details about Nord Stream I and II, reasons why Germany opted Russia for the fulfillment of its energy needs. Possible affect to German policies due to increasing dependence on Russian gas. Chapter III “Chessboard of Energy Politics: Germany, Russia and Ukraine” Germany’s energy needs as biggest EU economy. Political concerns of Eastern Europe over Russian gas supplies to Germany. Annexation of Crimea and Nord Stream II, the US concerns over increasing dependence of Europe on Russian gas.

Chapter IV “Nord Stream II: Security Implications for Ukraine” History of Russia-Ukraine relations, Ukraine as transit route for Russian gas supplies, emerging political challenges between the two. Reasons behind annexations of Crimea, Policies of EU/ USA about Ukraine and reservations of Russia will be discussed too. Chapter V “Policy Options for Ukraine: Challenges and Prospects” Internal politics of Ukraine, challenges being faced by Ukraine from Russian Diaspora and hurdles created by domestic issues in making of foreign policy.



## Chapter 1

### Theoretical Framework

#### 1.1 Theory of Securitization: Definition and Characteristics

Security is considered an act to pursue the freedom from any kind of threat and power of countries to maintain their integrity against any aggression and hostility meant for change. The word security can be sum up with word survival only but it also includes the concerns that understand the intimidations and adaptation of exceptional measures including force.<sup>65</sup> These practices however, become part of everyday life of states in this concept of security. In contemporary era, issue of security has become a great concern and states seem involve in opting multiple measures to retain their territorial integrity and sovereignty.

The word security has engrossed the IR experts since long, in traditional concept of security the state has always been considered the main actor. However, this view seems influential till era of world wars wherein states struggled for more power. Nevertheless, after the world wars, the concept of security was almost changed and complex. Barry Buzan in his book *People, States and Fear* viewed the concept of security too narrow and then offered a vast look of security.<sup>66</sup> Then new concepts were incorporated that previously were not considered part of security such as Regional Security, or societal and environmental sectors of security.

Buzan in his writings tried to cover all angles of Securitization from micro to macro while addressing the social aspects of security that how people, society or state construct or securitize threats. Broad analysis of Buzan on security gives his audience a complete understanding of complexities of security and capability to apply the concepts on current existing issues for instance war on terror.<sup>67</sup> This approach of Buzan can be called constructivist that not only allows people to analyse Buzan's concepts of security but their effects on individuals, society and on states as well.

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<sup>65</sup> Buzan Berry, *New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty First Century, International Affairs*, 1991, 432-433.

<sup>66</sup> Stone Marianne, (*Security According to Buzan: A Comprehensive Security Analysis*), Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs- New York, 2009, 2.

<sup>67</sup> Stone, (*Security According to Buzan: A Comprehensive Security Analysis*), 2.

## 1.2 Multiple Levels/ Sectors of Security

There are also multiple levels and sectors of security designed by Buzan for broader understanding. The levels, which Buzan has discussed, are Individual, States and International Systems. However, the sectors that he addressed in “New Patterns of Global Security in Twenty First Century” are Political, Military, Economic, Societal and Environmental.<sup>68</sup> These concepts discuss concept of security separately. All sectors are interlinked with each other and do not operate in isolation. This complex order of security as per Buzan is not completed without state that is assumed as main referent.

While analyzing the different sectors of security in context of threats then the most pressing concerns originate from Military, capable of posing danger to all components of state. Whereas protection of citizens is of main concern with an adverse effect on layers of social and individual interests.<sup>69</sup> The level and purpose of military threat is different in terms of importance which involves the use of force to combat any threat posing to a state.

Political Threats are also of great concern to any state in terms of security, Political Threats may more ambiguous and hard to identify as compare to Military Threats. As we know that State itself is a political entity therefore, a political threat meant for weakening that state. These threats may be from within a state or from outside as well.<sup>70</sup> The threats originate from outside state could be structured one from impact of foreign alternatives on legitimacy of states. Thus any state may have political insecurity more from outside as compare to internal politics.

Military and Political sectors of security go together with three more sectors Economic, Societal and Environmental. Economic threats are based on ambiguous economic conditions, which is an uncertain situation. This insecure status of economy makes it hard to straighten out. The economic sector is interlinked with Military sector as military security is totally dependent on economic security.<sup>71</sup> That is why economic security can be considered main indicator to

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<sup>68</sup> Buzan Berry, *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, Department of International Studies University of Warwick, 1983, 36.

<sup>69</sup> Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, 119.

<sup>70</sup> Stone Marianne, (Security According to Buzan: A Comprehensive Security Analysis), Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs- New York, 2009, 5.

<sup>71</sup> Stone, (Security According to Buzan), 2009, 5.

overall security situation of a state. The comparison of developed and less developed countries makes us understand the economic security.

Societal security is also interlinked with Political security as weaker states are unable to tackle the differences within society regarding culture and identity. Study of Societal security becomes more important if we analyze the situation of Afghanistan where we see so much cultural difference as well as ideological and ethnic. The tribal boundaries within a state (Afghanistan) are so pertinent that are hard to reconcile in case of any issue. However, these issues also spillover into Pakistan, which is Afghanistan's neighboring state.<sup>72</sup> With the following instances, it becomes clear that societal security is so much interlinked not only with political security but with military security as well. As most of conflicts today are based on societal elements.

The Environmental Security or Ecological Security is another sector of Securitization Theory (ST). This sector can be concluded as most important among all other sectors. Environmental threats include the natural dangers being faced by human being such as climate change, global warming, earthquakes and hurricanes. These all above-mentioned threats are difficult to control but are considered as human being responsible for. However, if these issues will keep appearing at human forefront consistently then will be considered main threats to human existence.<sup>73</sup> These issues can only be addressed by possible initiatives such as Kyoto Protocol which meant to reduce the emission of carbon dioxide to save mankind from increasing global warming. However, thinking locally can include the initiative within Pakistan, which is plantation of millions of trees to reduce the global warming. If talk about the link of environmental threat with others then dealing environmental threats is based on economic security as well as political security. These issues can be considered threats not only to an individual state but to entire globe too with the widespread effects

All these aforementioned sectors have own significance however; military security or threats have always remained at top historically. But with advancement of perception about

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<sup>72</sup> Stone, (Security According to Buzan), 2009, 5.

<sup>73</sup> Stone, (Security According to Buzan), 2009, 6.

security, other sectors such as economic and political threats have emerged with of great importance. Role of Securitization Theory (ST) has been explained briefly in synopsis and then in above discussion too. However, a detailed discussion in this chapter will explain all sectors of Securitization Theory in context of Nord Stream II and its security implications for Ukraine. Here an effort will be made to establish relevance of Securitization Theory with Ukrainian conflict by using all its sectors and further points will be enhanced for better understanding.

### 1.3 Securitization and Nord Stream

As we know that ST is a process by state actors wherein a matter is transformed into an issue of security with extreme politicization, though it is not necessary that an issue being politicized or securitized is that essential for survival of a state but on some occasions it is necessary so that a real threat can be securitized.<sup>74</sup> However, main purpose of ST is to understand who is securitizing (actor), what (threat) is securitizing, securitizing from whom (the subject, in case of Nord Stream II, the Russia is the subject from whom threat is emerging), why and then what outcomes are emerging in specific scenario or conditions.

### 1.4 Process of Securitization

Securitization is based on four components like **Securitizing Actor/ Agent** which is the body who initiate the securitizing move or statement. Then, an existential threat or an **Object**, which can be termed as extremely harmful. **A Referent Object** is an object which is under threat and needs to be secured. **An Audience** are the target of securitization act who are meant to be convinced to take an issue as security threat.



<sup>74</sup> Buzan Barry, Wæver Ole, and Wilde De Jaap, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 32.

Actors in securitization or securitizing actors means those who initiate or assert to securitize an issue. According to Copenhagen School, proper securitization of a referent object depends upon claim made by an actor either legitimate or illegitimate. However, certain elements such as state elites or statist elites hold position to declare an issue as threat.<sup>75</sup> Due to statist elite, the securitization process has resulted towards negative and positive consequences as well for the world. For instance, arms race during cold war wherein arms were sold out on name of security but in reality that led to political repression and armed rebellion in client states.

Same was the case in Iraq wherein issue of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) was reported as process of securitization. In some cases, securitization process by actors was resulted positive too like NATO attacks on Yugoslavia after acts of war crimes. When it comes to Russia-Ukraine crisis then it seems the securitizing actors from West and East as well. Such as Russia portrayed EU and NATO as consistent threat for its borders. However, in Western side EU and NATO countries consistently termed Russia as an aggressor and positive thing for Western actors is that Ukraine's incumbent administration is with them. Initially it was Ukraine who started acting as Securitizing actor. Therefore, when it comes to actors in issue of Ukraine in context of Nord Stream then we see multiple actors come at forefront. Ukraine is the one obviously main actor in this issue who actually initiated the securitization process. However, USA, UK and all likeminded countries with countries of Western Europe are among actors. If we talk about regional economic and military blocs then NATO and EU are also among main actors.

Speech act philosophy in Securitization theory has aroused as most interesting methods among many others developed so far. As per Copenhagen School to securitize an issue, the linguistic competence of an actor is required for successful securitization. Speech Act theory was first spelled out by John L. Austin. Security issues are perceived or presented the way speech act pinpoint to identify a security issue.<sup>76</sup> Speech act is something expressed by an individual that not only present information but possess an action as well. There is an act of saying something which meant to create an effect on audience. Speech act can be used for purpose of labelling an

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<sup>75</sup> Charrett Catherine, (*A Critical Application of Securitization Theory: Overcoming the Normative Dilemma of Writing Security*), International Catalan Institute for Peace, Dec 2009, 24.

<sup>76</sup> Balzacq Thierry, The Three Faces of Securitization, Political Agency, Audience and Concept, *European Journal of International Relations*, 2005, 6,7.

issue as existential threat for security of a state or community. Speech Act to somehow is part of actors in securitization because actors direly need speech act philosophy to spread out their narrative like Ukraine, USA, NATO and EU while using the global platform of media declared the aggressive acts of Russia in Crimea as war crimes. This was an act of collective securitization wherein speech act played a pertinent role. As a result, Russia faces multiple sanctions from all around the world and travel ban on its many political and business elite.

After securitizing actors, there comes object in securitization which as per Copenhagen School are real threat to any state, actors assume or declare something as threat is called object. After successful speech act by actors like Ukraine, US, NATO and EU, Russia was globally termed as an open threat to Ukrainian national security. However, Nord Stream II was portrayed as Russian designs to enslave European states through its energy politics. But here the referent object is considered important part of securitization wherein a state comes up as referent object. State under consistent threats from other states is referent object of security. According to most dominant school of thought in IR the Realism has also termed state as only referent object of security.<sup>77</sup> The referent object in security is applicable in all factors of securitization such as military, political, economic, environmental or societal security.

As per Buzan's Copenhagen School, Referent Objects are things which are under threat and have complete right of survival. Meanwhile, in macro securitization, an issue is securitized (by actors or elite). Then an issue is further securitized by claiming a security threat (object) for another state or community (referent object) is accepted by audience at last stage of securitization process.<sup>78</sup> Likewise when we look as Nord Stream II and its security implications then ultimately as referent object Ukraine emerges as sole reference object in this issue. Because as soon as Nord Stream II will active, Ukraine will lose huge chunk of its finances which it receives from Russia in terms of transportation. Economic miseries will make Ukraine more dependent on Russia as still Russia is still biggest trade partner of Ukraine. Whereas Russia still considers Ukraine as its former colony and through actions proved that Russia wants Ukraine

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<sup>77</sup> Moller Bjorn, *The Concept of Security: The Pros and Cons of Expansion and Contraction*, International Peace Research Association, IPRA, Aug 2009, 4.

<sup>78</sup> Joseph Josy, *Securitization of Illegal Migration of Bangladeshis to India*, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Singapore, 2006, 20.

back in its territory. Ukraine in this overall securitization process emerges as referent object as after losing Crimea Ukraine is still under threat for possibly chances losing more territories from east and economic difficulties due to Nord Stream II.

Audience in Securitization process comes at last stage, according to Copenhagen School Audience are the main target of securitization. To whom a securitizing actor want to convey about a specific threat are called target audience. These audiences could be a person, group of people, an organization or world top organizations. Security process mainly relies on actor and audience. Hence and issue is securitized successfully when audience accept it. Prominence of audience in securitization process is most important thing as successful securitization is done by an actor through successful speech act.<sup>79</sup> However, according to Thierry Balzacq, model of speech act is based upon the idea that securitization process is aimed at persuading the target audience to accept a specific development as a threat and an urgent policy is required to eliminate it. Balzacq while being little critically analyst of Securitization Theory amends that securitization is a strategic effort and power struggle wherein actors by aligning with likeminded swings audience's support towards a policy or towards any course of action.<sup>80</sup> Thus, audience in Ukraine and Nord Stream project are multiple. Individually there could be so many countries and collectively organizations like UNO and EU with the purpose to pressurize Russia over its aggression in Ukraine and further enhancement in those actions. World leading trade organization and Multi-National Companies (MNCs) could also be among audience so that in later stage economic pressure on Russia can be used as a tool.

### **1.5 Sectors of Securitization and Nord Stream**

There could be number of sectors within society on which Securitization may have an impact as this impact is imminent but here we will try to relate those impacts with Ukraine and Russia while centering Nord Stream II pipeline project.

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<sup>79</sup> Glover Nicolas, Does Security Exists Outside of Speech Act?, 2011, <https://www.e-ir.info/2011/10/09/does-security-exist-outside-of-the-speech-act/> 5.

<sup>80</sup> Balzacq Thierry, The Three Faces of Securitization, Political Agency, Audience and Context, Centre For European Policy Studies, Belgium and Sciences of Po Paris, France, 173.

### **1.5.1 Military Security**

At first, there is Military factor or military security emerges due to process of securitization on an issue, primarily it can be analyzed as a capability of state to defend it against any aggression. In current era the concept of military security has changed a lot from conventional warfare to non-conventional one.<sup>81</sup> In case of Russia and Ukraine, obviously Ukraine has an open threat from Russia that is military might of the Eastern Europe region. However, Ukraine after annexation of Crimea with the help of US, NATO and EU is securitizing the military and security implications of further Russian aggression in other parts of Ukraine.

### **1.5.2 Political & Economic Security**

Copenhagen School of Thought also talks about political and economic security in result of military security, in case of military oppression there may lot of implications on political setup of any nation state, like when it comes to Ukraine, there could be threat to political structure of Ukraine. Ukraine, which is currently, tilted much towards West who is considered champion of capitalism but Russia could be hurdle as Russia won't allow any of its neighboring country, which remained part of Soviet Union as well to get in hands of capitalism. On the other hand Ukraine's incumbent leadership seems firm against Russian ambitions. Other than aspect of capitalism or communism, there is aspect of stable income resources to support any nation for its economic security, Nord Stream II project will remove billions from Ukrainian national exchequer which comes in due to transit trade between Russia and Germany through Ukraine. However, possible attack from Russia is another threat to economic security of Ukraine.

### **1.5.3 Collective Security**

Other aspect of ST is concept of collective securitization wherein actors commence securitization in collective way. In this regard, we see NATO consistently engaged in securitization in different parts of world including Ukraine/ Crimea issue. In issue of Ukraine, NATO and Ukraine and triggered successful move of collective securitization by alliance have unfailingly posed Russia as source of threat.<sup>82</sup> Now this aspect of collective securitization talks

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<sup>81</sup> Paleri, Prabhakaran, (*National Security: Imperatives And Challenges*). New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill. p. 521. ISBN 978-0-07-065686-4. Retrieved 23 September 2010.

<sup>82</sup> Sperling James, Webber Mark, NATO and Ukraine crisis: Collective Securitization, European Journal of International Security (EJIS), Volume 2, Part 1, British International Studies Association, 2016, 1.



about act of securitization by not only states but other actors as well such as NATO and EU. ST offers a fecund framework to address the issues between NATO and Russia. If we analyses the incidents in Eastern Europe especially in Ukraine such as Ukraine closeness with EU and NATO were perceived as clear threat by Russia.

Russia annexed Crimea, which was big surprise for Europe and USA. Europe and NATO felt it as undermining the international order though Ukraine was neither part of EU nor of NATO. But the issue which securitized foremost was European security and governance was at stake.<sup>83</sup> As mentioned earlier, ST in its actors is not limited to states only. ST assumes that expressions of security are lesser to the states acting alone, however, collective securitization relaxes this assumption and them it advances in different ways.

If we talk about Copenhagen School regarding ST then according to its concept of actor and audience an organization articulates question of security among its members repeatedly as this process is called (recursive interaction) wherein members states validate the securitization move. Therefore, a body like NATO can successfully initiate and define securitization process. Whereas Ukraine finds itself in best condition to endorse the securitization process after economic losses due to energy projects like Nord Stream and then increasing Russian aggression in Crimea and in Eastern Europe.

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<sup>83</sup> Buzan Berry, Wæver Ole, and de Wilde Jaap, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, pp. 42, 45.

## **Chapter 2:**

### **Historical Synergy of Germany-Russia Energy Collaboration**

In order to comprehend the historical roots of ongoing political rivalry between Russia and West, we need to have a look over brief history of Russia, Germany and Ukraine with political aspects and their animosities in past and present. This chapter is the second among others in my thesis about Nord Stream II: Security Implications for Ukraine. Thus, effort will be made one by one to cover all political, economic and military facets of this subject. Energy relations between Russia and Europe, reemergence of Russia under leadership of President Putin after end of Cold War, enlargement/ expansionist efforts by NATO and EU towards Eastern Europe and then Russian aggression in Crimea and in other parts of Ukraine with energy politics of Russia will be analyzed amicably under theories of international relations to conclude the debate logically.

#### **2.1 Europe and Russia in Stages of History**

Relations between Europe and Russia which lies in Europe and Asia both as centuries old, where current history Europe and surroundings can be traced back to 1950s. Russia formerly part of Soviet Union emerged as biggest state out of Soviet Union and center of Communism.<sup>84</sup> Relationships between Russia and West are consists of many stages wherein normal stage wherein trade relations especially energy trade were improved and kind of interdependence developed. However, critical stage emerged when both West and Russia tried to follow their instinct of expansionism. As per these stages, history between two blocks incidents and accidents are common.

##### **2.1.1 Emergence of Russia in World Politics.**

History of Russia is classic story of power, misery, and existence. This could be trend as a boisterous play performed on a massive stage in big area, where huge players from ordinary background frequently drafted for surprising historical scenes so that that credibility that truth is different than fiction can be achieved. Russia is still the largest country on the map of the world

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<sup>84</sup> Lazareva Marina, (The European Union and Russia: History of the relationship and cooperation prospects), Studia Juridica Et Politica Jaurinensis, 2013, 37.

despite downsizing from days of Russian Empire and Soviet Union.<sup>85</sup> Russian under Czarist regime and during time of Soviets had vast area consisted of 8.5 million square miles but still it has 6.5 million square mile of area which is biggest in the world.

Russia is largest country on two continents Asia and Europe because of its unique Eurasian geography, which means its boundaries, lies in Europe and Asia both. Because of this unique geography, Russia has cultural and ethnic bondage with Europe and Asia.<sup>86</sup> During the history, Russia not only progressed in agriculture and cultural activities but its industrial progress always increased its respect in world ranking. Russian leaders such as Stalin used his agricultural achievements to become modern industrial power and then powerful military one day. Russian story of progress is as long as of other European powers.

Amongst other European powers, Russia also maintained its minimum military power and not only occupied different territories of Ottoman Empire but many territories in West towards Eastern Europe as well. It has been revealed that Germany remained as main ally of Soviet Union in 1<sup>st</sup> world War but strong opponent in 2<sup>nd</sup> World War. Same like this Russia has same history of wars and differences with whole of Europe.<sup>87</sup> Finally, the defeat of the Germans by hands of Russia in 2<sup>nd</sup> World War, led to start of cold war era wherein world witnessed the Russian policy of expansion westward western expansionist designs towards east in Russia. Establishing communist regimes in Eastern European countries provoked defensive reaction of United States, Britain and other democratic and capitalist countries. This defensive reaction of west finally resulted to breakdown of the wartime alliance against Germany and then during the 90s whole world witnessed disintegration of Soviet Union.

### **2.1.2 Germany: Russia Relations since World War I (WWI)**

Though after collapse of Soviet Union, Russia rebuilt its relations with Germany which tarnished in World War II but there is need of brief sketch of relationship between both countries in past. History of Germany-Russia relations is not much old though but despite tensions both

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<sup>85</sup> Kort Michael, *A Brief History of Russia*, (An imprint of Info base Publishing 132 West 31st Street New York NY 10001, 2007), XIII

<sup>86</sup> Kort, *A Brief History of Russia*, 175.

<sup>87</sup> Suny, Ronald Grigor. *The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States*. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1998.

nations remained engaged in trade relations.<sup>88</sup> If we discuss the Europe then one cannot ignore the Germans and Russians in Eurasian continent, relations between both have always been characterized by adverse thoughts. Germans and Russians remained in alliance against Napoleon and then in First World War with Pact of Rapallo. But later on turned against each other in Second World War.

Since 1990s relations between two developed into positive and pragmatic direction and today German- Russian relations are considered as massive scale cooperation. For years Germany has been main partner of Russia in trade, as currently China is taking place of Germany but Germany is still biggest importer of Russian oil and gas in the world.<sup>89</sup> Since 1990, so many bilateral agreements were signed between Germany and Russia, in these agreements Good Neighborliness, Partnership and Cooperation and cooperation in times of emergency and cooperation in road and air transport. Later on cooperation between both countries extended to other fields such as trade in oil and gas and other goods as well.

Germany Russian relations are dynamic because of the reason that there are no issues such as unresolved border issues, ethnic or religious issues or any rivalry relating to dominating the world like in past. Despite cooperation, Russia's image in Germany is mixed. At government level, good relations are always given prominence but not on media and cause of it is the way Russia deals with its citizens and with its neighboring states.<sup>90</sup> Use of force against its own citizens like Chechens and against Common Wealth of Independent States (CIS), Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia who want detachment themselves from Moscow.

### **2.1.3 Close Energy Ties between Germany and Russia**

Relationships between Germany and Russia witnessed so many ups and downs whereas recently after annexation of Crimea from Ukraine, Russia has not only been taken critically by the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (USA) but Germany as well. Interestingly despite criticism on Russia, Germany has still continued its energy relations with

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<sup>88</sup>Statistisches Bundesamt, Rangfolge der Handelspartnerim Aussenhandel 2004, (Ranking of Commercial Partner in Commercial Trade) [www.bundesstatistik.de](http://www.bundesstatistik.de) (1.2.2006)

<sup>89</sup>See [www.welpolitik.net/Regionen/Russland%20und%20Zentralasien/Russische%20F6deration](http://www.welpolitik.net/Regionen/Russland%20und%20Zentralasien/Russische%20F6deration) (1.2.2006).

<sup>90</sup>Gotz Roland, Russia and Germany – Strategic Partners? (Geopolitical Affairs) 4/2007. 4

Russia.<sup>91</sup> As mentioned earlier Germany is biggest importer of Russian oil and gas. Some analysts call it German dependence on Russia whereas some observe this fact as energy security. Another fact is that Germany's energy needs are rising day by day whereas Russian supplies are also increasing.

#### **2.1.4 Status of Ukraine before and after Soviet Union.**

Among Russian leaders Boris Yeltsin tried to establish peaceful relations with USA since disintegration of USSR which later on continued by Vladimir Putin and cooperated with US after 9/11 as well.<sup>92</sup> With this cooperation, Putin also wanted to limit and if possible then eliminate US influence in countries which earlier remained part of Soviet Union such as Ukraine, Belarus, Caucasus region and the Central Asian states (CAS).

This policy of Russia to shrink the influence of the US and the European Union (EU) from former Soviet states was termed as Near Abroad policy of Russia according to which Russia regained or maintained its influence in former Soviet states. These policies later on lead to annexation of Crimea in Feb-March 2014 which further raised tensions between Russia and USA/ EU at same time.

In 1991, Ukraine became independent not because of any revolution but because of collapse of Soviet Union. Then later on two revolutions touched the Ukrainian soil as one in 2004 and second in 2014. Since independence, Russia offered its cooperation to Ukraine by making an alliance with Communist elite but that really did not help Ukraine in terms of economy and in other matters.<sup>93</sup> As a result, Ukraine became most corrupt Eastern European States. Despite all wrongdoings, Ukraine kept on moving till Russia invaded Crimea in 2014 the part of Ukraine usually called Crimean Peninsula on bank of Black Sea region.

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<sup>91</sup> Gots, Strategic Partners. 5

<sup>92</sup> Kort Michael, *A Brief History of Russia*, (An imprint of Infobase Publishing 132 West 31st Street New York NY 10001, 2007),245

<sup>93</sup> Wilson Andrew, *Ukrainian Politics since Independence*, University College London, (*Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives*, 2016). 96

### 2.1.5 Crimea: The Autonomous Republic after Annexation

A chaotic situation developed in Crimea and on Crimean people after annexation because of Russian Federation. People of Crimea were forced to change their passport with new one (Russian) and even food items were replaced by Russians. Russian tanks rolled into whole of Peninsula and occupied everything including the strategically important port city of Sevastopol. After this whole process, a treaty was signed on March 18, 2014 which was accession of Republic of Crimea with Russia.<sup>94</sup> While the capture of Crimea was treated as an abrupt turn of geopolitical events, it is clearly understood as a predictable event that might have been predicted if Crimea had been a focus of consideration by world. The existence of pro-Russian sentiments, have been a concern on and off for decades.

It was already being speculated from 1995 and 1996 that Crimea will sooner or later be part of Russia. The spring revolution in 2014 and annexation by the Russian Federation is therefore more accurately viewed as the most recent chapter in a much longer story.<sup>95</sup> It is to be added that Russian annexation of Crimea has been referred to one of the biggest crisis of Europe since Cold War. Russian President soon after annexation announced reforms and facilities to Crimean Tatars the big Muslim minority and indigenous dwellers of Crimea.

Ukraine has always been a struggling in economy and found itself apart with forces of EU enlargement and NATO expansion whereas Russia also carefully analyzed the whole situation. Western powers also underestimated the importance of Ukraine and Crimea to Putin. On the other hands, Russia's trade relations with EU are still ongoing even after annexation of Crimea. Supply of Oil and Gas from Russia is mostly being done via Ukraine the main gas transit route of Russia. However, despite challenges to energy security, supply of gas is continue uninterrupted.

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<sup>94</sup> Uehling Greta, *Everyday Life After Annexation: The Autonomous Republic of Crimea, (Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives, 2016)*, 68

<sup>95</sup> Raik Kristi, RaczAndras, *(Post Crimea shift in EU-Russia relations: From fostering interdependence to managing vulnerabilities)*, International centre for defense and security, Tallinn, Estonia, 142.

## 2.2 Gas Ties between Germany and Russia.

For better understanding of gas relations between Russia and Germany within the context of Ukraine, political and other factors needed to be analyzed. Natural gas relations are formed within political, institutional, legal and regulatory framework, with composed socio technical assemblages' commercial and contractual transactions. Historically, German-Russia gas relations was embedded to German Ostpolitik. Solid cooperation in field of economy was major element to bring change for rapprochement.<sup>96</sup> Gas relations between both Germany and Russia started in Soviet eras however, relation became strong after disintegration of Soviet Union. After reunification of Germany strategic partnership was proclaimed in early 1990. So many agreements of cooperation were signed between two wherein energy remained at top always. Important thing is that energy relations between Germany and Russia kept boosting despite observations from the EU and USA.

### 2.2.1 European Union Constitution and German Energy Policy

Though Germany adopted independent stance over gas relations with Russia but being member of EU it had to follow the rules formed by union. Therefore, it is essential to discuss the EU energy policy in brief with detail discussion about these energy relations as transition process will be discussed in next chapters.

The European Union (EU) is rushing a set of obvious climate and energy targets for the year 2030. So that to cut out the Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions up to 40% than the level in 1990 however, energy efficiency is to be improved by 27%. The share of Renewable Energy Sources (RES) in total energy consumption is to be increased to 27% as well. It is to be noted that RES targets are not binding for EU nations in contrast to previous 2020 climate targets and no party (member state) can be held in case of not meeting the RES targets.<sup>97</sup> According to EU Commission 2014, the EU is in fact holding back from credible RES targets in future. Politically RES targets are set with multiple objectives to be attained, such as climate change, environmental and source conservation and security of supply. In Germany, private individuals,

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<sup>96</sup> Bros Aurelie, Mitrova Tatiana, Kristen Westphal, (German-Russian gas relationship, A special relation in troubled waters), German Institute for international and security affairs, 2017, 5.

<sup>97</sup> Lehmann Paul, Gawel Erik, Strunz Sebastian, EU Climate and Energy Policy Beyond 2020: Are Additional Targets and Instruments for Renewables Economically Reasonable? (*The European Dimensions of Germany's Energy Transition*, 2018). 12.

farmers and cooperatives installed nearly half of the RES capacity in 2012, which was primarily owned.

### **2.2.2 European Union's Policy on Climate Change**

There are so many climate related policies in EU and at national level of member countries as well. However, three main policies are mostly known sectors of European Economy. 1) An aggregate target for greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction, which is supported by the European Emission Trading System (ETS) in the power sector, heavy industry and intra-EU aviation. 2) A target for the share of final energy consumption that should come from renewable sources. 3) A target for improvements to energy efficiency (measured as reductions in energy consumption), relative to a baseline projection.<sup>98</sup> All EU countries including Germany formed their energy policies keeping these points in their minds. However, Germany almost remained at top in taking measures against climate change, recent energy projects like Nord Stream II have stance by Germany about climate friendly fuel and zero use of coal and nuclear.

### **2.2.3 German Energy Transition (Energiewende)**

After EUs energy policy, countries of Europe have their own energy policies as well keeping in mind the energy needs of them with growing demands. German energy transition which is called Energiewende is the project to transform German energy system until 2050 whereas critiques are taking this project which lacks integration with EU. However, this Energiewende is in full progress and Germany will shut down its last nuclear power plant in 2022. It has been assumed that Germany by imposing Energiewende is going opposite directions of the EU and Germany should follow the policies which are aligned with the EU framework.<sup>99</sup> Criticism on German energy policy seems misleading approach as phasing out nukes and adopting RES are same policies like other members, Germany stands alone in attaining these targets.

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<sup>98</sup> Dodds Felix, Higham Andrew, Sherman Richard, (*Climate change and energy security: The challenge for peace, security and development*), Earthscan, 2009, 71.

<sup>99</sup> Lehmann Paul, *The European Dimensions of Germany's Energy Transition*, 228



#### 2.2.4 German Reliance on Russian Energy

Germany's energy transitions not only include shutting down the Nuclear Power Plants and abandoning of coal energy but to adopt the renewable energy as soon as possible, in this regard Germany has been in close ties with Russia and importing gas from Russia on large scale. Although Germany is surrounded by energy exporting countries such as Netherland and Norway and Germany is also buyer of their gas as well but due to industrial growth Germany look towards Russia to fulfill its demands.<sup>100</sup> Whereas, Russia on the other hand is having 10 % of conventional oil and 34% of world's conventional gas. Russia is supplying cheaper gas to Europe through network of pipelines since Soviet times from fields of Western Siberia.

It is expected that German gas needs will increase till 2025 up to 105 billion cubic meters (BCM) as it is also being predicted that there will be decline in imports to Germany from other EU markets such as Netherland and Norway whereas imports from Russia will rise about 60 billion cubic meters (BCM) from 2020. Due to this rise in dependency on Russia, Germany could be in same situation as other Eastern European States.<sup>101</sup> This rise in gas export to Germany from Russia raises concerns of security of transit routes. The transport, which passes through Russia and Europe are often, threatened by earthquakes rather than by terrorist attacks.

By since arose of tensions between Russia and Ukraine, the future of these pipelines is already under question. However, pipelines passing through Baltic Sea in north are being considered much safer than the previous ones. Baltic States strongly protested against the proposed Baltic pipelines project such as Nord Stream I at initial stages because of stance that Germany and Russia bypassed them in their agreement.<sup>102</sup> Not only Baltic States but Eastern European states such Ukraine also showed reservations on the northern Baltic pipelines because of threat of losing transit fee.

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<sup>100</sup> Gotz Roland, Germany and Russia – Strategic Partners? (Geopolitical Affairs, 4/2007). 5

<sup>101</sup> See Roland Gotz, Nachdem Gasconflikt. WirtschaftKonsequenzen fur Russland, die Ukraine and die EU, SWP-Aktuell 3/2006, [www.swp-berlin.org](http://www.swp-berlin.org) (1.2.2006).

<sup>102</sup> Gotz Roland, Germany and Russia – Strategic Partners? (Geopolitical Affairs, 4/2007). 7

### **2.3 End of Cold War and Russian Open up Policy.**

Russia went through dramatic political and foreign policy change soon after the disintegration of Soviet Union. As once Russia was considered big power in bi polar world but collapse lead the might in state of social, economic and political turmoil. Whereas lack of law & order within its boundaries such as emerging conflicts in Chechnya and financial crisis pushed country into worst situation.<sup>103</sup> When Putin took charge of presidency then crisis were at its peak. Moreover, whole economic and political transition made by Russia in 1990 ended up in disappointment and more complications.

Decade of 2000 has witnessed Russian reemergence at international arena, under leadership of Putin, Russia not only improved its economy but overturned the internal security challenges, formed and open up foreign policy for west as well. Russia liberalized its policies and economic reforms but these reforms proved to be disastrous for Russian Federation (RF). The reason of all this was weaker institutions who were incapable of welcoming these liberalized reforms.<sup>104</sup> Since 2000, Russia started pulling away from west as Putin exerted his strong leadership which appealed the populace. However, Russia's foreign policy measures in 2000 showed aggressiveness and confrontational front after Russia's attempt to take control of Kerch straight from Ukraine. This aggressiveness of Russia was in response to NATO expansion and color revolution in CIS and Balkan States.

Despite challenges, Russia opened up its domestic markets for western multinational companies such as food chains and textile but this also gave chance to Russia to approach western markets. Boost in Russian economy witnessed due to its oil and gas export to Europe, it was 1970 since business started flourishing, The initial gas supplies from the Soviet Union to West Germany commenced in Oct 1973, when the company (Ruhrgas) serving as the buyer.<sup>105</sup> But before this in same year, natural gas supplies started getting shipped from the USSR to East

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<sup>103</sup> Govella Cristi, Aggarwal Vinod K, (Responding to a Resurgent Russia: Russian Policy and Responses from the European Union and the United States, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4419-6667-4\_1, © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

<sup>104</sup> Govella Cristi, (Responding to a resurgent Russia: Russian Policy and responses from European Union and United States. 6

<sup>105</sup> Aurélie Bros, PhD thesis, *Good Bye Ukraine! How Does Gaz-prom Aim to Ensure the Security of Demand in a Context Where Europe Is Reshaping Its Energy Architecture?*, October 2014.

Germany, according to the inter-governmental agreement signed in 1968. Not only had this Russia started supplying gas to many other Eastern European countries such as Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Poland.

## **2.4 Gas a Tool of Dominance in EU Markets**

The European Union is large purchaser of natural gas, with more than a quarter of the imports from Russia. Since late 1960s, many short pipelines of Western Europe have evolved into gigantic pipeline networks linking Russia's vast gas fields with many of the EU states. However, the EU's gas equation is about to change. Projections suggest that Norwegian and domestic EU production will decline over the next fifteen years; over the same period, the EU demand is expected to rise.<sup>106</sup> Despite the increase in relations both Russia and EU including North Treaty Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) suspected each other wherein Russia suspected the EU and (NATO) tandem to expansion towards Russia and West perceived Russian markets more strict and non-friendly.

Ukraine an Eastern European State played a pivotal role in transmission of Russian gas westward. Due to tensions between EU and Russia, Ukraine has been in situation of turmoil and victim of proxies of both blocks. The United States of America (USA) always tried to press the EU countries from importing gas from Soviet Union and later from Russia because of threat that Russia may use gas trade as a tool to enter in the EU market to create dependence and later on using that dependence as political weapons but all these efforts from USA remained fail.<sup>107</sup> Later on World witnessed Russian aggression in Ukraine by seizure of gas supplies. Since the start of 21st century, Gazprom the Russia's state owned oil company continued export natural gas to former Soviet states at subsidized rates. Economically weaker states such as Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia and Armenia were charged with lower gas prices as compare to Europe.

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<sup>106</sup> Kandiyoti, Rafael. *Powering Europe: Russia, Ukraine, and the Energy Squeeze*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. doi: 10.1057/9781137501646.0007. 3

<sup>107</sup> Smolansky, O. M., 'Ukraine and Russia: an evolving marriage of inconvenience,' *ORBIS*, 48/1 (Winter 2004), pp. 117–134, <http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/00304387/2004/00000048/00000001/art00117>.

### **2.4.1 Monopoly of US-UK Based Esso and Shell Companies and Fuel Market.**

It is fact that Russia used gas exports as tool to enter EU markets for political gains through price manipulations. This manipulation of prices enabled Gazprom and the Kremlin to exercise some political leverage over ex-Soviet republics that experienced payment difficulties. But there were some other reasons which compelled countries such as Germany to obtain oil and gas from companies and countries of their own choice.<sup>108</sup> Import of natural gas from the Soviet Union seemed potential for several reasons to European countries. It seems German and Austrian elite circles desired to reduce the potential monopoly of the US–UK-based Esso and Shell group’s working in the Dutch fields.

Other possible reason was, gas prices fell down all of sudden when prospects of importing Soviet gas came to be discussed by many states. However, construction expenditure and distance of pipeline was also relatively short.<sup>109</sup> After analyzing these prospects we see decade of 60s witnessed so many contracts signed by countries such as Austria which became the first country to import natural gas from the Soviet Union, 1969 and 1972 Italy, Germany, Finland and France signed supply contracts with Mingazprom.

### **2.5 Ukraine as Transit Route for Energy Cooperation.**

Ukraine is the country that like many others appeared from the debris of the Soviet Union. Former United States Secretary of States Henry Kissinger once stated that “Ukraine is a large and complex society that does not easily fit into thumbnail sketches. Western part of Ukraine is mostly Catholic and the eastern part is Russian Orthodox. The western speaks Ukrainian language whereas the person living in eastern part of country speaks mostly Russian.<sup>110</sup> This phenomenon has developed this society as one of most vulnerable societies of

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<sup>108</sup> Per Hogselius, “*Red Gas: Russia and the Origins of European Energy Dependence*” (Palgrave Macmillan Transnational History Series), London, New York, 2012. Kindle Location 5264.

<sup>109</sup> Note: The Ministry of the Gas Industry (Mingazprom; Russian: Министерство газовой промышленности СССР) was a government ministry in the Soviet Union. It was created in 1957 as the Main Administration for the Gas Industry; renamed State Production Committee for the Gas Industry in 1963. It received its ministerial title in 1965. In 1989 Gazprom was established as a successor to the ministry. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, assets outside of Russia were transferred to national companies such as Ukrgazprom and Turkmengazprom.

<sup>110</sup> Henry A. Kissinger, Washington Post, 5 March 2014, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html).

the world. Reason behind this is the huge Russian speaking population residing in Ukraine. However, presence of industrial and military hardware in Ukraine always gave the importance to this former soviet state.

Despite this ethnic and sectarian division, Ukraine is an important transit routed of gas supplies. The natural gas market over the years has been strongly dependent on pipeline transport and on its basis a gas market was created and functioned. The Soviet Union sent its natural gas exports almost exclusively through the Ukrainian gas transit system, which had been built up since the 1970s.<sup>111</sup> From twentieth century to twenty first century, Russian natural gas reached to Europe via three major land routes. The First pipeline was “Brotherhood” Pipeline and “Soyuz” passing through Ukraine, this is the pipeline whose contribution in handling Russian gas to Europe is ninety percent that has the highest rate of transit from Ukraine than any other country.

Countries benefitting from these two pipelines are Slovakia, Hungary, Austria, Czech Republic and Germany. Second big pipeline is called Yamal Pipeline, from Yamal peninsula in Russia to Western Europe, from western Siberia to Belarus, Poland and Germany. Blue Stream Pipeline passing through Turkey and further towards southern Europe. It is essential to mention here that Gazprom the Russian giant always tried to took control of gas sectors of former Soviet states such as Ukraine because of increasing debts to Gazprom.<sup>112</sup> Main concerns of Russia are over Ukrainian Gas Transport System (GTS) the central transport route for Russia to Europe. This network of pipeline called GTS consists of total length of 38.55 thousand km whose capacity at the input amount is 287.7 billion cubic meter (BCM) and output 178.5 BCM per year.

With the passage of time this number of gas transport is declining and the reason is increasing energy security concerns for Russia and an effort to create hegemony on gas sectors of former Soviet States. In 2007, Ukrainian government passed law and prohibited the privatization of national gas system to avoid the possible takeover of Naftogaz by Gazprom.<sup>113</sup> Ukraine took this step after announcement from Russian President Putin wherein he stated that

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<sup>111</sup> Kosowski Piotr, Kosowska Katarzyna, The Geopolitics of Gazprom’s Pipeline, Article · January 2016 DOI: 10.7494/drill.2016.33.4.757, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320034230>.

<sup>112</sup> Palyura A.: „Gazpromu” vkhod vospreshchen. Neft’ Rossii, no. 10, 2014.

<sup>113</sup> Pusenkova N.: *Rossiyskiy «Gazprom» v gazpromovskoy Rossii*. 2010, <http://www.ru-90.ru/node/1320> [Access 03.07.2016].

Russia and Ukraine are working together on joint gas project in Russian gas fields in exchange of shares of Naftogaz to Gazprom. However, on the other hand, Belarus which defended since long from selling its strategic gas company Beltransgaz to Russia but in 2007 Gazprom purchased most of shares of Belarusian gas operator.

Ukraine them this is the traditional transit route for Russian gas to European markets as this route was developed since Soviet era but after disintegration of Soviet Union, differences between Russia and Ukraine started emerging over different issues, Russia started replacing Ukrainian route through developing other pipelines such as Nord Stream passing through Baltic Sea to Germany, Blue Stream passing through Black Sea, Turkey and then to Europe and then South Stream passing through Black Sea to Bulgaria and Serbia. These all developments show that Russia is clear in its plans that to decrease its transit dependence on Ukraine and to increase Ukrainian dependence on Russian gas.

## **2.6 Nord Stream I**

Over years Russia charged so many allegations against Ukraine for Russian gas to the EU, both Russia and Ukraine concerned not only to any kind of settlement systems such as often barter type of transport for gas but also the timeliness of settlements and the level of prices. Due to such circumstances Gazprom decided to solve problems by building a gas pipeline directly to Germany.<sup>114</sup> Bypassing transit countries such as Ukraine and others, it seems like when Russia could not overwhelm the Ukrainian Naftogaz then in 2005 Russia decided to build Nord Stream, starts from Russian area of Vyborg under the Baltic Sea to the German area Lubmin near Greifswald.

### **2.6.1 Importance of Nord Stream Project**

Nord Stream or Nord Stream I, earlier the North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP), is 1200 km long dual pipeline for natural gas from Vyborg, Russia to Greifswald, Germany through Baltic Sea. It is among the longest offshore gas pipelines of the world having the capacity to

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<sup>114</sup> Kosowski Piotr, Kosowska Katarzyna, The Geopolitics of Gazprom's Pipeline, Article · January 2016  
DOI: 10.7494/drill.2016.33.4.757, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320034230>.) 7

supply 55 billion cubic meters (BCM) of natural gas each year.<sup>115</sup> Gas will originate in the already developed Yuzhno-Russkoye field and later on in the Yamal Peninsula Ob-Taz Bay and the Shtokmanovskoye (Shtokman) fields. Germany and Russia created a consortium for its construction of Nord Stream gas pipeline. The shares of companies Gazprom (51% of shares), Wintershall Holding GmbH and E.ON Ruhrgas AG 15.5%, and NV Netherland's Gasunie and GDF SUEZ 9% of shares. Capital expenditures, equal to 7.4 billion euros, were covered in 30% by the shareholders and in 70% by bank loans.

Initially, the pipeline had some issues regarding offshore service platform, which would be placed northeast of the Swedish island of Gotland in the Swedish Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) but later this issue was resolved because as per advancement of technology platform was not needed. The cost of the project at early stage in 2005 was estimated at €4 billion, but this cost gradually risen and till (spring 2008) set to €7.4 billion.<sup>116</sup> However, these estimates only cover construction costs not operation, maintenance and decommissioning costs. Nord Stream AG clarifies that the shareholders will take 30% of the costs, and 70% will be financed through loans and export credit agencies.

## **2.6.2 Constitutional Framework on Nord Stream**

According to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea's (UNCLOS) Article-79, every state is entitled to lay submarine pipelines and cables under the continental shelf. Whereas the coastal state cannot create any hurdle to lay off pipelines but it may take 'reasonable measures' to preserve the environment and its natural resources.<sup>117</sup> In addition the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, commonly known as the Espoo Convention or (EIA) Convention, sets out an obligation to prepare an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of any project likely to cause a significant adverse transboundary impact,' including 'large diameter oil and gas pipelines.

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<sup>115</sup> Solum Whist Bendik, Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline, ISBN: 978-82-7613-546-6-print version 978-82-7613-547-3-online version, **Copyright © Fridtjof Nansen Institute 2008.5**

<sup>116</sup> Solum, Nord Stream. Not Just a Pipeline, 7

<sup>117</sup> Langlet David, (Nord Stream, the environment and the law: Disentangling and a multijurisdictional energy project), Scandinavian studies in law, 2015, 84.

The Nord Stream consortium, wherein possible alternatives to the proposed activity will also be included, including a no-action Alternative, will prepare the EIA. Finland, Denmark and Germany are parties of Origin to the Espoo Convention because pipeline will pass through their EEZs.<sup>118</sup> Russia is also a Party of Origin. Now, Russia is only a signatory power but still takes part in the EIA process. Parties of Origin give construction permits when they have approved that the EIA is satisfactory.

### **2.6.3 Nord Stream: Importance for Germany**

There is no doubt that Nord Stream will run ashore in Germany and that this project will serve this state more than any other in the European Union. Germany is Russia's oldest gas partner in the region and Germany is using Russian imported gas as 55 BCM per years which is about to increase.<sup>119</sup> Germany is rapidly shutting down its nuclear power plants and till 2022, this development will increase German dependency on Russia for trade more than before. However, sudden nuclear phase out will also create problems for Germany.

Nord Stream II is big project for Germany and Russia but at same time is bringing so many issues with it, bypassing transits states such as Ukraine has risen economic, political and security concerns. However, many of the EU countries are also worried over likely increase in dependence of EU states on Russia. Western states such as United Kingdom and United States suspect Russia of using its energy trade for political influence. In this regard, USA has already warned Germany from Nord Stream and Turkey from Blue Stream. However, future developments will decide Russian actions towards Europe. In third chapter of this thesis, political issues emerging due to Nord Stream II with security viewpoint will be discussed. Ukrainian stance of increasing EU energy dependence on Russia and its economic implications for Ukraine will also be included in the debate. However, effort will be made in upcoming chapter to answer the question Implications of Nord Stream II on Ukraine and ongoing politics between Germany, Russia, Ukraine and West on this matter.

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<sup>118</sup> Langlet, (Nord Stream, the environment and the law), 90.

<sup>119</sup> Goldthau Andreas, Accessing Nord Stream: Regulations, Geopolitics & Energy Security in the EU, Central Eastern Europe and UK, (The European Research Centre for Energy and Resource Security (EUCERS), King's College London, 2010). 9



## Chapter 3

### Chessboard of Energy Politics: Germany, Russia and Ukraine

This chapter encircles around the energy politics ongoing between EU countries and Russia with stance of Eastern European countries such as Ukraine over developing energy relations between the two blocks the EU and the Russian Federation (RF). This chapter will also discuss the RF viewpoint regarding energy relations with West and so the Russian efforts to portray its energy ties as creating harmony through interdependence. The overall aim of this chapter is to identify the different aspects of energy relations between EU and RF. This chapter will be an effort to answer the question that how could Nord Stream II hinders Ukraine's security due to policies of Germany and Russia.

#### 3.1 Harmony through Energy Interdependence.

Economic interdependence is widely being discussed these days in world politics in multiple perspectives. Some of thinkers view it as big benefit as some take it as a threat, in this portion study will cover the phenomenon of interdependence and complex interdependence in energy trade between Europe and Russia. While answering a question during an interview, Russian President Vladimir Putin remarked that increasing gas relations between Russia, Europe and especially with Germany is creating an interdependence, which is good as no side is in hegemonic position and all are equally dependent on each other, Putin used the word "artificially politicized" on this issue.<sup>120</sup> Putin's purpose behind using these words was to undo the efforts of people who were looking suspiciously at energy relations between EU countries and Russia. However, this idea of interdependence is not new one in World Politics as since centuries this idea was promoted by many thinkers such as Adam Smith, Hugo Grotius and Richard Cobden.

These thinkers stated that mutually dependence in trade, forms an environment wherein conflict becomes less likely. On the other side, annexation of Crimea tensed the relationship between the European Union and Russia which led to sanctions against Russia. However, in response Russia announced withdrawal from various projects of cooperation. This act from both

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<sup>120</sup> Whist Solum Bendik, *Nord Stream II Not Just a Pipeline*, Fridtjof Nansens Institute), Nov 2008, 15

sides has made the concept of interdependence fragile between Russia and the EU.<sup>121</sup> There is need to realize that politicization and securitization of interdependence is closely linked with the sensitivity and weakness of interdependence. Despite this debate, much of thinkers consider Russia as an oppressor in Eastern Europe.

The Eastern European countries including Baltic States often expressed their grievances with the EU against Russian assertiveness by using energy card for economic and political gains in former Soviet states.<sup>122</sup> The Eastern European states have not only expressed their concerns for the first time but on many other occasions as well. Initially, decision makers of the EU such as France, Germany and UK did not pay much attention to the concerns of Eastern Europe and considered these acts as politicization of energy. This stance was all because how these countries were perceiving Russia while sitting in different environment of Western Europe and were becoming more active in promoting harmony.

Western European countries adopted the policy of harmony and by Russia too until 2014 the annexation of Crimea which has been considered a wakeup call for European actors. But even then interdependence continued because of heavy reliance of Eastern and Southern European states on Russian oil and gas.<sup>123</sup> Though European countries are meant for energy transition as soon as possible, it is expected that in case EU countries achieve their targets related to transition will decrease their dependence on Russia.

### **3.1.1 Russian Perspective on Economic Interdependence.**

While studying the politics and security threats to energy trade between EU and Russia, it is pertinent to analyze the concept of interdependence through the lens of Russia. It is essential to realize that system before Cold War both in the West and in Russia was based on confrontation that became lesser when Cold War was about to an end, Gorbachev made significant economic,

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<sup>121</sup> Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, World Politics in Transition, Boston, Little Brown and Company, 1977, pp. 12-13.

<sup>122</sup> Oliver Geden, Clémence Marsalis and Andreas Maurer, “Perspectives for the European Union’s External Energy Policy: Discourse, Ideas and Interests in Germany, the UK, Poland and France”, SWP Working Paper, 16 (2006); Jonathan Stern, *The Future of Russian Gas and Gazprom*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005; Janina Sleivyte, *Russia’s European Agenda and Baltic States*, London, Routledge, 2010.

<sup>123</sup> Atesoglu Nursen, Kormaaz Visne, ‘The Energy Interdependence Model between Russia and Europe: An Evaluation of Expectations for Change, 2015, 38

political and military changes (glasnost) which compelled the West to reciprocate in same way.<sup>124</sup> However, collapse of Soviet Union led both West and Russia to get closer to each other and idea of moving beyond the nation states started becoming dominant in both blocks.

It has become universal truth now that after annexation of Crimea, most of countries of Europe have started viewing relations with Russia in terms of security, so if countries of Eastern Europe such as Ukraine are securitizing trade relations with Russia then they have big example of annexation of Crimea and war in Georgia in front of them.<sup>125</sup> In this situation scope for interdependence is decreasing as interdependence in energy supplies to Europe are creating division rather than harmony. It seems that on this chess board of energy politics Russia took step regarding Crimea after too much consideration. Before taking this step, Russia made most of European countries dependent on its oil and gas and thus named it as interdependence.

### **3.1.2 EU Perspective on Interdependence After 2014**

For decades, interdependence has been professed positively in European countries with the reason that this phenomenon will decrease the global tensions, for the sake of strengthening peace and for economic cooperation rather than fighting. However, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye argued same in 1977 about increase in economic interdependence and reduction of military force.<sup>126</sup> But it seems Russia due to consistent misuse of this concept such as war with Georgia and then annexation of Crimea as methods of hybrid warfare, Europe is making efforts to reduce its internal vulnerabilities being originated from interdependence wherein reducing their dependence on Russian gas could be the first step.

Idea of interdependence or complex interdependence was widely accepted by West and Russia to avoid tensions. During the times of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, concept of interdependence was perceived in positive way with Europe. When it comes to West then they regarded

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<sup>124</sup> Raik Kristi, Andras Racz Eds, (*Post-Crimea Shift in EU-Russia Relations: From Fostering Interdependence to Managing Vulnerabilities*), 2018, 80

<sup>125</sup> Sherr James, *Russia's View of Interdependence: The Security Dimension*, 94

<sup>126</sup> Keohane Robert, Nye Joseph, (*Power and Interdependence Revisited: Longman Classics in Political Science*). 58, 2011.

interdependence to establish order of peace.<sup>127</sup> But under President Putin, apparently interdependence became an opportunistic slogan with purpose to promote the Russian interests. Under cover of interdependence, Russia used its humanitarian policy for its compatriots in neighboring countries such as in Estonia and Ukraine for political gains. As once, Ukrainian deputy defense minister said that Russia prefers to use the weaknesses of its neighbors as its strength.

Energy politics is the core topic of discussion and it has central status in policy making in contemporary era, either it is Middle East, Asia, Europe or America oil and gas trade and then security measures of routes of this trade are part of World Politics. However, when this politics comes to Russia, Ukraine and Germany then this chessboard of energy politics becomes more complicated due to politicization and securitization of energy projects, wherein Russia seems in dominant position.

### **3.2 Russian Energy Policy: A Policy to Influence Europe**

Energy is one of the most debated issues in international relations and this becomes so true when we talk about EU-Russia energy relations because EU is largest global consumer and importer of oil gas which makes this issue not only important for domestic politics of EU countries but for all member states as well.<sup>128</sup> Difference in position of EU and Russia in global supply chain of energy have made both dependent on each other however, example of Germany is in front of us which is fulfilling almost ninety percent of its energy needs through Russia.

Energy relations between EU and Russia are not new whereas at same time issues between the two are also there since 1990. The European countries at forums like European parliament and European commission discussed emerging issues due to economic boom in Russia because of gas exports. Gas disputes of Russia with its Western neighbors such as Ukraine and Belarus in years 2006, 2007 and 2009 caused disturbance among the EU countries.<sup>129</sup> 2014 tensions between Russia and Ukraine led to economic, political and individual

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<sup>127</sup>Raik Kristi, Andras Racz Eds, (*Post-Crimea Shift in EU-Russia Relations: From Fostering Interdependence to Managing Vulnerabilities*), 2018, 98,99

<sup>128</sup> Lukas Tichy, (*EU-Russia Energy Relation: A Discursive Approach*), 2019, 1

<sup>129</sup> Lukas, *EU-Russia Energy Relation*, 2

sanctions against Russia who in response reduced the supply of gas to Europe through Ukraine that obviously endangered the EU's energy security.

### **3.2.1 Main Objectives of Russian Energy Policy**

If we talk about main objectives of Russian energy policy then this policy is mainly moving around Presidential, bureaucratic and parliamentary sectors of Russia though Duma has not much role in it but bureaucratic structure wherein ministries do come, have key role in forming this policy. However, main objectives of this policy are to improve economy by increasing Gazprom's role in Europe as Gazprom contributed 20 percent in Russian economy.<sup>130</sup> Gazprom is not only adding to economy of Russia but is supporting Russian interests in different EU countries by establishing independent gas pipelines other than transit lines such as Nord Stream which enables both Russia and Germany to work freely and strengthen Russian position in EU gas market as well.

By analyzing the role of Gazprom in energy sectors of EU, one can evaluate what Russia is meant to achieve its objectives politically. Russia has always tried to use its dominant geopolitical and energy trade positions to crush its political rivals by means of interruption in supply, transit disputes, diverse pricing policies, exploitation of poor financial positions of Eastern European states and hostile control of corporate assets and infrastructure.<sup>131</sup> But at same time these tactics of Russia failed to produce the desired results and position of Russia as trustworthy energy supplier in Eastern Europe is becoming weaker day by day.

### **3.2.2 The Geopolitical Aspect of Russian Energy Policy**

It has been mentioned above that how much gas supplies are important to Russian economy with the key role of Gazprom in it. Another important thing which has recently been observed is that Russia with the passage of time wants to decrease its dependence on energy trade with EU via transit routes. For this purpose Russia has formed its Asia Pacific policy to have energy trade with China, Japan and with South Korea by manufacturing mega pipelines

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<sup>130</sup> Proedrou Filippou, (Russian Energy Policy and Structural Power in Europe).ISSN: 0966-8136 (Print) 1465-3427 (Online) Journal homepage: <http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ceas20>. 2018. 5

<sup>131</sup>Proedrou, Russian Energy Policy and Structural Power in Europe, 6

from the fields of Siberia.<sup>132</sup> This will not only make Russia independent in its policies towards Eastern European states but will remove the threat of sanctions from EU if Russia goes for another misadventure like Crimea. However, trader partners such China won't react if Russia takes any political or military step anywhere in Europe.

Keeping the above viewpoint in mind we see that the sporadic changes in Russian foreign policy regarding energy trade are becoming frequent. It seems that Russia is adamant in mounting pressure to gain influence in Eastern Europe by using its energy policy as pressure. In this regard, Russia is in search of new avenues of trade to secure its interests in Eastern Europe. The example of energy trade agreements with China, Japan and South Korea are in front of us.

### **3.3 Russia and Natural Gas as a Political Weapon**

As mentioned above, European Union and especially countries of Eastern Europe are heavily dependent on Russia for oil and gas, as Russia has proven highest gas reserves in the world, second largest coal and eighth largest oil reserves in the world. With this huge amount of reserves Russia always try to exploit and benefit its neighboring countries, states either of East Europe or in central Asian states of Caspian Sea.<sup>133</sup> This is the fact that due to changing stance of Russia in its relations with EU countries, Ukraine consistently perceives Russian designs over energy trade as a security threat. By securitizing Russian energy plans mean Ukraine thinks that Russia can move further after annexation of Crimea.

Because of abundant natural resources, Russia seems aggressive in energy power politics. After Gorbachev and Yeltsin, the period of Putin is considered the time of resurgence of Russian power. To achieve the power again, Putin is using gas trade as political weapon and as a foreign policy tool. Russia used energy tool in both terms, to reward its friends and to push its enemies as well. For example Russia gave gas to Ukraine on cheap prices in 1994-2005 when there was President Leonid Danylovykh Kuchma who was pro-Russian.<sup>134</sup> However, Russia treated same like to Belarus in 2006. Later whole picture changed when dispute aroused between Russia and

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<sup>132</sup> Lukas Tichy, (*EU-Russia Energy Relation: A Discursive Approach*), 2019, 25

<sup>133</sup> MeenaSunita, (Energy as a Political Weapon of Foreign Policy: The Russian Case), *International Journal of Academic Research and Development*, ISSN: 2455-4197. 2018. 2

<sup>134</sup> Meena, *Energy as a Political Weapon of Foreign Policy: The Russian Case*. 3

Ukraine when later adopted pro-western policy. When Kuchma leadership changed in 2006 and President Viktor took oath as Ukrainian president then Russia demanded \$230 per Thousand Cubic Meter (TCM) from Ukraine however, at same time Belarus was paying \$47 for per TCM.

### **3.4 Ukraine and Crimea in Russian Geopolitics**

It is an open secret now that Russia uses its energy to influence other countries for economic and political objectives. However, recently the annexation of Crimea has strengthened this narrative among the Western countries. This development in 2014 also proved that still how much Ukraine is important for Russia even after disintegration of Soviet Union.<sup>135</sup> As Ukraine plays a pivot role in transmission of Russian gas to West. Due to the strategically important position of Ukraine, EU, NATO and Russia are trying to impose their own agendas on it. Where, on one hand we see Western influence in Ukrainian politics and on the other hand strong impact of Russia thus, Ukraine seems to become a sandwich between two blocks.

With important geostrategic location, Ukraine has always been very important in Russian Geopolitics. However, large number of ethnic Russians in Ukraine is another phenomenon which consolidates Russian politics through use of force. Including Crimea, there are many other eastern cities of Ukraine with majority population of ethnic Russians plays key role for Russian policies. However, western part of Ukraine is abundant with people of Ukrainian ethnicity who are inclined towards Europe and are considered pro-democracy which create difference among two large groups.<sup>136</sup> Whereas when we specifically get into detail analysis of Crimea then it shows that this region of Crimean peninsula was transferred by USSR to Soviet Republic of Ukraine in 1954 and this was the only region having predominantly ethnic Russians. However, officially Crimea was added into USSR in 1946.

One thing also to be noticed that after collapse of USSR it was Crimean republic which decided to separate them from mother Russia. Kremlin approved their request after a referendum in December 1991, Crimean people took part in Ukrainian referendum and only 54 percent voted

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<sup>135</sup> Kandiyoti, Rafael. (*Powering Europe: Russia, Ukraine, and the Energy Squeeze*). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. doi: 10.1057/9781137501646.0005. 2,3

<sup>136</sup> Pikulicka Agnieszka, Sakwa Richard, (*Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspective*), E-International Relations [www.E-IR.info](http://www.E-IR.info) Bristol, England First published 2015 New version 2016. 18

in favor of Ukrainian independence from Russia.<sup>137</sup> Due to this clear divide based on ethnicity, situation between Crimea and central government of Ukraine always remained tense. Russia in start did not respond to any situation in Ukraine and Crimea though in 2014 after ousting of President Yanukovich, situation became troublesome in Ukraine and people came on streets demanding restoration of president.

In East of Ukraine, Donbas is the city which is full of people from Russian ethnicity whereas in Western Ukraine, Galicia is the city considered home of people of Ukrainian ethnicity and closer to West as well. After analyzing this situation, it becomes clear that sudden removal of President Yanukovich who was considered pro-Russian erupted tensions among ethnically Russian Ukrainian people.<sup>138</sup> It is also being said that use of force against people of Donbas by Ukrainian authorities strengthened the narrative against Ukraine and in favor of Russia.

Though Ukrainian interior minister Arsen Avakov brushed aside this narrative by saying that war can have salutary cleansing effects. However, over discrimination to Russian culture will lead to resentment among people of Russian ethnicity and Ukrainian govt will not be able to deal the situation because of its poor economic and political conditions.<sup>139</sup> Due to these actions of Ukrainian government, Russian President Putin also stated that he will not allow the eradication of Russophone Ukrainians. Russian president also in his interview presented two demands one is that population in east and south to be safe and second demand was that they should be part of political process.

### **3.5 New Cold War: Rising Tensions between Russia and the West**

It has proven that Eastern Europe and Ukraine have great importance in Russian geopolitics and Russia is not ready to lose even a single portion of its hegemony in Eastern Europe especially in Ukraine. In previous headings, it has been discussed that Russia wants total hegemony in Eastern Europe either directly or indirectly with the help of its proxies. However, it has been twenty years to collapse of USSR and since then American objectives all around the

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<sup>137</sup> Pikulicka, Sakwa, *Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspective*. 23

<sup>138</sup> Petro Nicolai N, (Understanding the other Ukraine: Identity and Allegiance in Russophone Ukraine). 30

<sup>139</sup> Petro, Understanding the other Ukraine). 31



world remained unchallenged as USA is consistently posing threats to Russian designs anywhere in the world. This tug of war between both previous and incumbent super powers Russia and USA is about to push to another cold war and Ukraine could possibly be the set arena for them.<sup>140</sup> Whereas China and Russia who are rising day by day, are challenging US and Western hegemony. However, Russia is a bit aggressive in challenging US hegemonic designs as we witnessed in Middle East in Eastern Europe.

After analyzing the current state of tensions between USA (its Western allies) and Russia, a new Cold War has begun once again between the two blocks. Actions took by Russia and USA in Syria and Ukraine for regional influence brought ramifications for both.<sup>141</sup> Earlier, soon after the end of Cold War in 90s, NATO started inviting former Soviet States to join the NATO and USA followed the expansion of NATO that was against the agreement with Kremlin in 1990. It is believed that Arab spring was end of US hegemony and strengthening of Russia and China in World Power Politics.

### **3.5.1 Ukraine as Battleground for New Cold War**

In February 2014 Russia backed President Yanukovych was forced to leave government which resulted in huge mass protest among ethnically Russian population in the east of Ukraine. In this situation, West backed the new government came in to power and then as a result Russia started supporting ethnic Russians by providing them the weapons.<sup>142</sup> Mearsheimer believes that tensions (new Cold War) initiated when EU and NATO started expanding their influence by injecting democracy in Ukraine. However, same was in Syria which was to gain influence where Russia supported Syrian government and US supported the rebels which were of Sunni school of thought and later USA could not sustain its support to later and at the end whole country turned into rubble.

Among many other battle grounds such as Middle East and North Korea, Ukraine has also become important for world powers. Power game based on ideologies of Capitalism and Communism is the sole reason of Ukrainian conflict whereas Ukrainian public seems divided

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<sup>140</sup> Turner Ian, The New Cold War, Research Gate, 2015. 2

<sup>141</sup> Charap and Shapiro, *Consequences of a New Cold War*, pp 39

<sup>142</sup> Mearsheimer, John. "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault."

among Russian and Western agendas. Both Communist (Russia) and Capitalist (Whole Western world) bloc are in fighting tug of war to consolidate their narratives.

### 3.5.2 Proxy Wars by Russia

Support to governments and non governmental groups through indirect means by US and Russia became the reason of new cold war in Ukraine and Syria. Both sides (Russia and USA) are not having active war against each other but through their proxies as the only difference is that Russia supported incumbent govt in Syria whereas USA was supporting groups seeking independence whereas case is different in Ukraine. As result Russia took control of Crimea by consolidating the Russian ethnic groups and produced same favorable results to some extent in Syria.<sup>143</sup> Though at the end Russia directly entered in Syrian war by establishing its military bases in Syria. When it comes to Ukraine then Russia did not enter directly in Ukrainian territory but reportedly, Russia is supporting the ethnic Russians in Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine. Things do not stop here, as whenever situation gets severe then Russia starts heavy military exercises near Ukraine border as a gesture to respond any unfavorable situation to its interests in the region.

This new Cold War is not only in fields of geopolitics but in fields of diplomacy and economy as well. West has imposed so many economic sanctions against Russia in response to what Russia did in Crimea and has threatened Russia for more sanctions in case if Russia does not withdraws its support to rebels groups in Ukraine.<sup>144</sup> But due to increasing cooperation between Russia, China and other emerging economies, Western sanctions on Russia are merely having an effect on Russia.

By analyzing the emerging challenges in Eastern Europe and in Syria, it can be easily estimated that the new Cold war between Russia and West has reach to its peak however, both Russia and US are responsible for their destructive role in these regions through their proxies, as this role is also covering entire social structure the political, economic and diplomatic miseries. Ukraine on the other hand is reacting openly to Russian energy projects such as Nord Stream II

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<sup>143</sup> McFaul, *Faulty Powers: Who Started the Ukraine Crisis?*, pp 1

<sup>144</sup> Charap and Shapiro, *The looming New Cold War and its consequences*, pp 1-2

by securitizing it as threat to its economy and security. Germany the recipient of Russian gas in Nord Stream II project seems fully committed to this project and wants to this project to be completed despite all hurdles.

### **3.6 Nord Stream II: Importance for Germany**

While discussing the reasons of new Cold War between Russia and West, it is duly essential to discuss the reasons why Russia is becoming more aggressive than before. It is an open truth now that Russia is main source of energy to Europe however, in Europe it is Germany, which fulfils 90 percent of its energy needs through supply of gas from Russia. Same is the case with many other EU countries. Question here also arises that why Germany is too much anxious about importing gas from Russia despite different political and economic challenges with Russia as recently Germany strongly opposes the Russian aggression in Crimea, then arrest of Alexie Navalny but still work on Nord Stream II is continue.

As discussed earlier, Nord Stream II is the sequel to Nord Stream I, which is set to bring 55 billion cubic meter BCM gas from Russia to Germany through Baltic Sea. However, Russia's Gazprom (fifty percent stakes), Germany's Uniper (ten percent) and Wintershell (ten percent), UK's Royal Dutch Shell ten percent), Austria's OMW (ten percent) and France's Engie (former GDF Suez, ten percent) stakes are there.<sup>145</sup> Technically this pipeline is 1200 km in length under the Baltic Sea belt which is one of the largest under sea gas pipelines. These indicators tell that Germany is not following the energy policy which has been adopted by European Union and despite warnings from US and EU is following its state interests instead.

#### **3.6.1 German Energy Policy**

Nord Stream I and II are the gas pipelines which make Germany the top user of Russian gas, question arises that why Germany is interested in Russian gas rather than using other means of energy resources such as nuclear, wind energy or thermal. It is acknowledged fact that Germany is famous for its renewable energy development and for implementing its specific

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<sup>145</sup> Goldthau Andreas, (Assessing Nord Stream II: Regulation, Geopolitics and Energy Security in the EU, Central Eastern Europe and UK), The European Centre for Energy and Resources Security (EUCERS), 2010. 7

energy policy (2000). Germany is rapidly transitioning from fossil fuels to renewable.<sup>146</sup> This is the official energy policy of Germany which is to change all of its energy requirements from fossil fuels and nuclear energy to environment friendly energy. The Energywende (energy transition) of Germany started transition of energy after multiple nuclear accidents and other environmental harms due to those fossil fuels.

### 3.6.2 Germany Nuclear Energy Phase out

Energywende, energy transition or change in energy policy of Germany began in almost 1970 when a group of people in village Weisweil in Germany started protesting against the nuclear power plant in their area and raised questions about threats to environment and to human being, soon people in protest started raising questions about other nuke power plants in Germany.<sup>147</sup> German authorities in result of a so called referendum initiated work on nuke power plants but protests took hype which later on lead to delay in work and due to intervention of court in March 1977 construction at Wühl nuke power plant was stopped, here one thing is essential that this protest which started from a village spread throughout Germany which compelled the German authorities to change their energy policy, and to adopt more environment friendly policy which is secure to lives of human as well as forest lives too.

In Nov 1977, few scientists from protestors found Institute of Applied Ecology to help citizens case in court, later on same institute coined the term Energie-Wende which was the proposal that Germany will completely withdraw from nuclear energy.<sup>148</sup> Due to this complete ban on use of nuclear energy in Germany, the German scientists moved to look for alternate means of energy resources which finally led them to explore solar energy. In 1975 in an exhibition in Germany many people came with their idea about solar energy which laid foundation for mass production of solar energy.

Germany is not only investing on solar energy but on other alternate renewable resources as well, the EU green energy policy and Germany's green energy policy are meant to reduce the

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<sup>146</sup> Hager Carl, Stefes Christoph H, (*Germany's Energy Transition: A Comparative Perspective*), 2016. 1

<sup>147</sup> Rucht, Dieter (*Von Wühl nach Gorleben: Bürger gegen Atomprogramm und nukleare Entsorgung*), 1980, 82.

<sup>148</sup> Hager, Stefes, (*Germany's Energy Transition*), 2016, 10.

emission of GHG at their best. Reportedly, Germany in 2014 reduced Green Houses Gases GHG up to 27 percent in 2014 which will result to 34 percent decrease in 2020.<sup>149</sup> After analyzing all this detail, it is pertinent to add that Germany is adopting so many alternate energy resources other than nuclear energy to fulfil the demands of its growing industry but Germany has to import a lot to meet those demands. This increasing demand is compelling Germany to have huge gas supplies from Russia despite the fact that there is lack of energy security and many political and security issues such as Ukraine and other Eastern European Countries.

### **3.7 Ukraine's Reaction over Germany-Russia Energy Relations**

As it is mentioned above that Russia is building Nord Stream II to export gas to Germany via Baltic Sea, however, Ukraine which is main transit route for export of Russian gas to Europe is critically viewing these developments. This increasing gas relation between Germany and Russia has geopolitical and economic implications for Ukraine.<sup>150</sup> However, there are enormous developments behind the scene which could be possibly the reason for change in Russian policy to export gas to Germany via any route but not from Ukraine.

If we talk about Germany-Russia gas relations then it is obvious that Germany has relentlessly adopted Russia first policy and gave lesser importance to its relations with West and countries on other side of Atlantic Ocean (USA) to form relations in field of energy imports. These are the perceptions prevailed in countries of Eastern Europe and especially in Ukraine.<sup>151</sup> However, this stance of Germany consolidated the narrative in Ukraine about threats to its security and economy due to independent energy relations between Russia and Germany.

The energy transit agreement between Russia and Ukraine has possibly ended in December 2020 which was enforced in 2009. After the end of this agreement and start of Nord Stream will allow Gazprom to reduce the amount of flowing gas through Ukraine. For instance till 2020 agreement of gas transit via Ukraine was 58.9 bcm per year but after that it will reduce

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<sup>149</sup> Eric Heymann, "German 'Energiewende': Many targets out of sight," ed. Lars Slomka, Deutsche Bank Research, June 2, 2016, [www.dbresearch.com](http://www.dbresearch.com), 3.

<sup>150</sup> Pirani Simon, Stern Jonathon, YafimavaKatja, The Russo-Ukrainian Gas Dispute of 2009: A Comprehensive Assessment, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 1

<sup>151</sup> Adomeit Hannes Per, German-Russian Relations Balance Sheet Since 2000 and Perspective until 2025, ETUDE Prospective &Strategie, 2

up to 30 bcm. In this situation not only the income of Ukraine will reduce but it will be difficult for Ukraine to maintain the pipeline network.<sup>152</sup> Due to these reasons, Ukraine completely opposed the Nord Stream project, whereas Ukraine also thinks that European countries will also compromise on different political issues such as annexation of Crimea when they would have no interests at stake in Ukraine. On the other hand there is another project called South Stream passing through Turkey which will further decrease reliance on Ukraine transit.

In this chess board of energy politics, every country has their interests and own stance on different matters, in case of Nord Stream I and II Germany calls it totally a commercial project with no interference from government officials. This stance of Germany has generated a storm of protest in Ukraine, some EU countries and in USA as well, USA the sole super power of the world is consistently observing the situation being developed due to increase in energy relations between Germany and Russia and thus, for number of times USA has opposed this project. Ukraine's protest seems quite logical when it comes to its economy and the security the most however, USA is also of the view that Russia may become more aggressive towards Ukraine after former will be able to supply its gas via Baltic Sea instead of Ukraine.

### **3.8 EU Gas Market Transformation and its Implications for Russia**

It has become obvious that Ukraine is not ready to accept the stance of Germany over Nord Stream however, USA is also not in favor of this project but reality is that project is almost completed and about to start now, while analyzing this phenomenon, we also need to look over the conditions and environment in the EU for trade relations especially energy trade with Russia.

As energy is long term priority issue of EU with Russia. The EU in first decade of 21<sup>st</sup> century made legislations for common energy policy. The new Treaty of Function of the EU (TFEU) was an important step taken in 2009 which provided the framework for energy cooperation and it is also called Lisbon Treaty.<sup>153</sup> This policy allows EU states to have common share of powers in field of energy sectors such as energy security, efficiency and development of new sources but it gives less control to states over this strategic subject.

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<sup>152</sup> Adomeit, German-Russian Relations Balance Sheet Since 2000, ETUDE Prospective &Strategique, 6

<sup>153</sup> Lokas Tichy, (*The Energy Cooperation Between European Union and Russia: A Discursive Approach*), Springer, 27

Despite the formation of a unified energy policy EU states are reluctant to adopt this because of having different stance over energy security, taking energy as component of national security and so countries are unwilling to give up on part of sovereignty. As it is noted that EU energy policy is an area of shared power between the EU and its member states but at same time member states prefer to prioritize their interests first and some member states opt to have personal energy relationship with Russia then to negotiate via EU.<sup>154</sup> The main example of such bilateralism is German-Russian energy relations over Nord Stream gas pipeline project and Russian-Italian negotiations over South Stream.

### **3.8.1 EU Energy Policy and Russia**

As mentioned earlier that EU member states have diverse interests varying government, strategic, geopolitical and economic which directly influence the goals of EU energy policy. In October 2011 EU commission formed a new plan to build a gas pipeline and power transport system with the purpose to interconnect the member states for ease, strengthening, stability of energy supply and to support the construction of unified EU energy market.<sup>155</sup> This step of EU to interconnect the national transport system and transit routes of EU among member states will allow free flow of electricity and gas to EU countries, which will make it possible for EU to replace the Russian gas with gas from other sources in case of energy crisis such as partial or complete interruption of gas to EU states. This will also reduce the chances of using gas as political weapon by Russia as it does in recent past. However, EU also has options of importing LNG from Qatar and USA as an alternate to Russian Federation (RF).

After analyzing all factors and elements contributing in energy sectors between the EU and Russian Federation (RF), it is pertinent to conclude that energy trade between EU member states and Russia has always been in trouble, due to having different geopolitical objectives such as Russian stance towards Ukraine the issue of securitization is emerging in Eastern European countries and they are taking Russian diversion over gas transit routes as economic and national security threat to their countries. However, Russia is also on many occasions proved that it is

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<sup>154</sup> Lokas, (*The Energy Cooperation Between European Union and Russia*), 28

<sup>155</sup> Muftuler-Bac Meltem, Baskan Deniz, (*The Future of Energy Security for Europe: Turkey's Role as an Energy Corridor*), Taylor & Francis Ltd, 13

using energy trade as political weapon. EU on the other hand is also taking multiple steps such as formation of energy policy so that it is not fully dependent on Russia for its energy needs. With end of this chapter, next chapter will further enhance the debate the question of security implications of Nord Stream II on Ukrainian soil. Not only security implications for Ukraine but implications for whole region of Eastern Europe after annexation of Crimea will be tried to discuss comprehensively.



## Chapter 4

### Nord Stream II: Security Implications for Ukraine

This forth chapter of this thesis is basically covering the main theme which is Nord Stream II and its implications on Ukrainian national security. However, efforts to be made to acquire the answer by having little discussion on others dimensions wherein Eastern European stability due to increasing energy trade relations between Germany and Russia. While writing down the security implications, here the stance of USA on Nord Stream will also be discussed as USA is the country which is warning Europe and especially to Germany against its increasing dependence on Russia in field of energy.

#### 4.1 Eastern Europe Stability and Shifting Russian Hostile Attitude

Stability of Eastern European states is very link to their immediate neighbor in east, which is Russia. In fact, countries of Eastern Europe are largely dependent on Russia to become stabilize in terms of security, economy and politics. We also need to discuss the role of Russia after the Cold War wherein Russia remained silent till the annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Through this action, Russia openly rejected the outcomes of Cold War and the Euro Atlantic Security Order.<sup>156</sup> Whole Europe including USA remained shunned on this step of Russia. Now after this Western countries needs to adjust their measures in Europe. This step also shows that Russian elites consider Europe as an encroacher towards security, economy and geopolitics of the Russia.

Russian uncertainties are there but at same time countries of Eastern Europe are also looking worried, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Moldova are facing all kinds of security, economic and geopolitical implications due to Russian behavior. These above mentioned countries remained in effort to become part of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) so that to avoid any tussle with Russia. However, Russia also perceives them in same way.<sup>157</sup> These countries were as we know part of former Soviet Union and now Russia wants them to under its influence by using military forces and by using energy trade as political weapon. It also seems that for the time being West is not ready to let these states of Eastern

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<sup>156</sup> Rumer Eugene, (Russia and the Security Europe), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2016, 9.

<sup>157</sup> Rumer (Russia and the Security Europe), 10

Europe as part of the EU or NATO due to which these states has become an arena between West and Russia.

#### **4.1.1 Russia and Stability of Baltic States**

While debating about the stability of Eastern European states, it is imperative to have a look over Baltic states which also remained part of Soviet Union in past such as Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The other thing which makes Baltic states important in terms of security is because Nord Stream is passing through Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of these states. These countries also shares borders with Russia, but significant thing is that these are members of NATO as well and Russia has always viewed NATO with an expansionist agenda against Russia.<sup>158</sup> Another pertinent thing about these countries, which we discussed in case of Ukraine, is that these Baltic States have significant number of ethnic Russians which are usually attached and sympathetic towards Russia. Despite the membership of NATO, Russia has deep economic ties with these countries.

#### **4.1.2 Russian Motives in Eastern Europe**

After discussing the ethnicity factor in Eastern European States and some of those states with having NATO membership clarifies that these states are to somehow want to completely get out of Russian influence. However, on the other hand Russia seems to be always in effort to maintain its influence on these states.

There could be multiple motives, which enable Russia to act independently in Eastern Europe, and this act could be either related to economic security cultural security or military security as well. Russia could successfully demonstrate the failures of the EU and the NATO through large presence of Russian speaking diaspora.<sup>159</sup> Despite being part of NATO the security concerns of Baltic States in North East of Europe have always remained hard. The countries of Eastern Europe which became the member of the NATO always securitize their issues and presented Russia as security threat for them, remaining countries like Ukraine are in effort to be part of NATO with same stance, here theory of Ole Waever and Berry Buzan “The

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<sup>158</sup> Cohen Raphael S, Radin Andrew, (*Russia's Hostile Measures in Europe: Understanding the Threat*), RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif, 19.

<sup>159</sup> Cohen, (*Russia's Hostile Measures in Europe*), 20

Securitization” seems becoming true though issues of security are real one and annexation of Crimea and war with Georgia proves that these countries are securitizing the issues to remain safe from Russian aggression.

There may also a mindset in Russia with the view that it is easy to undermine the security of Baltic NATO members as compare to others and NATO may abandon its members of Eastern Europe. However, there may be thinking among NATO members that stakes of NATO members of East Europe are not fully taken seriously, which is why President Barak Obama in his speech in Telinn in September 2014 urged for NATO commitments in Baltic States.<sup>160</sup> This speech of President Obama was outspoken and clear-cut message for Baltic State like Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania that NATO will be there to defend them. But after annexation of Crimea in same year, there are doubts as to whether NATO will follow its commitments or not because response of the EU and NATO remained limited to Ukrainian crisis.

There are also chances that Russia may perceive threat from Baltic States to materialize its hostile measures against these states. Russia, which always suspects the EU and NATO for expanding their area of influence, could view Baltics as launching ground for color revolutions, for promoting democracies and for activities that could be direct threat to Russia.<sup>161</sup> However, if we talk about internal situation of Russia then not everyone is in favor of interfering in internal matters of other countries. Russian direct interference in Crimea was unpopular in Russia. Therefore war or other forms of Russian aggression in Baltic States of Eastern Europe may lead to significant backlash among public.

So these are some aspects of Russia through which Russia can exert its influence in Eastern Europe and Baltic States of Eastern Europe, with only reason that these countries were part of Soviet Union in past. It is to worth mention that Russian desire of influencing countries of Eastern Europe becomes much higher when it comes to Ukraine and Moldova.<sup>162</sup> Some scholars

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<sup>160</sup> White House, “Remarks by President Barack Obama to the people of Estonia,” September 3, 2014.

<sup>161</sup> Harley Balzer, “The Ukrainian Invasion and Public Opinion” *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, March 20, 2015.

<sup>162</sup> Olga Oliker, Christopher S. Chivvis, Keith Crane OlesyaTkacheva, Scott Boston, (*Russian Foreign Policy in Historical and Current Context, Santa Monica, Calif, Rand Corporation, PE-144-A, 2015, P. 20.*)

like Robert Person the professor of International Relations in United States Military Academy views that “Ukraine is special for Russia though status of Baltic States is a bit different but his views consolidates the stance that Russia always wanted to have Crimea and maybe whole Ukraine in future because Russia has not digested the retreat in Cold War. This view also amalgamate the idea of securitization by Buzan and Waever wherein they say that states securities an issue to avoid further escalation, however, example of Ukraine is there who is securitizing the Nord Stream as Ukraine believes that Russia may further occupy their areas after Crimea.

#### **4.2 German Energy Reliance on Russia: Economic Implications for Ukraine**

Under this heading, the economic implications for Ukraine due to increasing energy trade between Germany and Russia will be discussed in detail as economy is the key factor, which plays an important role in security of any country. Economy is directly linked with national security of any country. However, Ukraine’s reservations on Nord Stream I and Nord Stream II are economic leading to security as well.

Twice in past two years Russia and Ukraine got involve in dispute which led to cut off natural gas to Ukraine and Europe. However, now there is chance of another confrontation between two as agreement has ended and Russia does not seem agree to have transit through Ukraine and reason is Nord Stream and Turkish Stream. Gazprom the Russian giant transit significant number of gas to Europe through Ukraine is completing the projects like Nord Stream and Turkish Stream.<sup>163</sup> As mentioned above the contract of transiting gas through Ukraine is ended in 2019 which was ten years contract and now Moscow wants to restrict this contract till one year which is not in favor of Ukraine. Ukraine is clearly watching over the Russian gas pipelines through Baltic Sea and through Black Sea and is raising objections from day one.

Ukraine is also aware that it has full dependence on Russia for gas as domestic production of Ukraine is very less and that shortage is being filled by Russia, which automatically gives advantage to Russia over Ukraine. It is pertinent to mention here that Russia-Ukraine gas relations have always remained complex since independence of Ukraine from

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<sup>163</sup> Pifer Stefan, (Heading for Another Russian-Ukraine Gas Fight?), Brookings, 30 August 2019.

Russia in 1991. Ukraine also matter for Russia and Gazprom to transport gas to Europe which is also bit leverage to Ukraine and Ukrainian economy also get boost. But after Nord Stream and Turkish Stream things are becoming troublesome for Ukraine as huge revenue will be stop.

It is worth mentioning that gas fights in year 2006 and 2009 became the reasons which provoked Gazprom to go for transit trade routes other than Ukraine with the purpose of energy security. It is estimated that by 2021 Gazprom will need very little of Ukraine to transit its gas to Europe.<sup>164</sup> This increasing uncertainty in Ukraine can cause more trouble to gas supplies to Europe as EU wants to have a new agreement between the two countries and EU commission has suggested a ten year accord with transit volume of 60 BCM per year. This agreement was suggested to be materialized in January 2020 with support from Germany which also wants completion of Nord Stream but continuation of gas transit through Ukraine as well at same time. At the moment, this deadline has passed and no agreement has taken place so far.

Incentive to Ukraine lies only with the status as transit route for Russian gas as much of Russian gas flows to Europe is through Ukraine. Despite long term agreements, Gazprom and Naftogaz of Ukraine remained under disputes for long time due to which Ukrainian gas supplies cut in 2006 and in 2009 as well. However, Ukraine also responded by disrupting Russian gas to Europe. In response Europe compelled Russia to resume supplies. These disputes led Russia to diversify its transit route towards Europe. So the project of Nord Stream came up with an alternate route which decreased Russian reliance on Ukraine by 28%.<sup>165</sup> Nord Stream I and Nord Stream II are the projects which allows companies involved such E. on, BASF and Wintershell to access and sale out cheaper gas while avoiding the transit countries. Obviously this is an important development for EU countries and beneficial but sign of worry for Eastern EU states and Ukraine whose sovereignty is already at stake.

Poland and Slovakia once stated that this project Nord Stream is against the national interests of many countries. Poland which hosts Yamal Pipeline and Slovakia hosts Bratstvo pipeline which are also passing through Ukraine. All these countries till now have lost millions

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<sup>164</sup> Pifer, (Heading for Another Russian-Ukraine Gas Fight?).

<sup>165</sup> Duffield John S, (*Fuel's Paradise: Seeking Energy Security in Japan, Europe and United States*), 15 June 2015, 189.

of dollars revenue which they used to enjoy before Nord Stream.<sup>166</sup> Ten nations that signed a letter against Nord Stream are all transit countries of Russian gas. It is feared that these Eastern European countries fulfil around sixty percent of their gas needs from Russia and some of them like Estonia, Latvia, Finland and Lithuania are completely dependent on Russia and their reservations could further put them into trouble.

Usually Russia has capitalized this high level of dependency in its favor. It is also feared that further reduction in gas transit will isolate the region and make these countries vulnerable to Russian manipulation. So, economic losses to Ukraine due to Nord Stream are main cause of its hue and cry as Ukraine knows that it will become more dependent on Russia to improve its economy and energy needs as well.<sup>167</sup> To save Ukraine from going totally under influence of Russia, Ukraine is securitizing this issue. Berry Buzan and Ole Waever seems true where energy politics has led Ukraine to securitize this project of Nord Stream to the whole world whereas the reasons or basis of securitization are real as well with involvement of no propaganda.

### **4.3 Energy Security and State Security**

From aforementioned discussion, it has become obvious that Nord Stream and projects like South Stream will bring huge economic setback for Ukraine however; finally this economic problem will become issue of national security for Ukraine. Ukraine is securitizing this issue to retain its energy security whereas Russia and Germany also want to ensure their energy security. Therefore we need to thoroughly discuss and evaluate the phenomenon of energy security as by understanding this prospect one can easily understand the whole contention.

If we talk about energy security then it should be defined first that what exactly energy security is, however, different theorists and philosophers have defined it in different ways. Daniel Yergin describes energy security as accessibility of enough gas supplies at reasonable rates.<sup>168</sup> Same like this another thinker name Faas points out that energy security is related to security of supplies and abundance of basic energy resources namely gas and oil. He also includes supply chains and infrastructure built around these energy resources.

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<sup>166</sup> Liuhto Kari, (*Eu-Russia Gas Connections*), Electronic Publications of Pan-European Institute, 2009, 49.

<sup>167</sup> Liuhto, (*Eu-Russia Gas Connections*), 166.

<sup>168</sup> Daniel Yergin, "Ensuring Energy Security" *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 2 (Mar.–Apr. 2006), 70.

Important thing is that energy security means different and vary for countries who export energy and different meaning for countries who consume it. Like the consumer want affordable price primarily whereas for Russia which exports energy thinks about nationalizing energy sector by controlling energy infrastructure. On the other hand thinkers like Bohi and Toman argues that changes in prices and availability of energy not only effect energy security but economy as well.<sup>169</sup> It was observed since 1980s and 1990s that energy security got shape of economic when different countries started protecting their economies from supply disruptions. Whereas recent developments like September 11 2001 attack by terrorists, US-Iran tensions, attack on Nigerian oil facilities and Russia-Ukraine tensions over natural gas have increased threats about energy security. In this regard more popular argument is that 21<sup>st</sup> century world war will be on resources.

Finally, energy security involves reliability and safety of infrastructure and energy resources within a state, it also concerns to external threats emerging from natural disasters or because of some political events. If we talk about West then energy security is being ensured through making transmission system more reliable by advancing the system and by liberalizing the markets. However, energy security can also be pursued by force or by political maneuvering like USA ensured or consolidated possible threats to its energy security by attacking Iraq.<sup>170</sup> When it comes to Germany and Nord Stream then in Germany's viewpoint, they improved their energy security by favoring liberalized markets. Germany produced its own energy market rules rather than totally following the EUs by naming it as to liberate the supply from elites and cartels. Another point of view is that on issue of Ukraine, Germany went for Nord Stream to save the transit money going to Ukraine and to avoid the possible disruptions due to troubles between Russia and Ukraine.

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<sup>169</sup> Douglas R. Bohi and Michael A. Toman, *Economics of Energy Security* (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996), 1.

<sup>170</sup> Richard Youngs, *Energy Security: Europe's New Foreign Policy Challenge* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 16.

### **4.3.1 Liberalized Factor in Energy Security**

The worth mentioning point here is that most of EU countries or Western countries are keenly following the liberalize factor of market trade and energy security. According to liberal theory, form of gov't in any state does matter when it comes to energy security. Liberal theory endorse democracy in country as due to this form of gov't countries have check and balances which prevent them from acting unilaterally on an issue. Democracy makes system more transparent due and lessens the chances of conflict and improves the economic interdependence or liberalizing the energy market.<sup>171</sup> Liberal theory sports economic interdependence and consider it essential for stability and security. This view of liberal theorists apparently fits to western countries where EU is amicably adopted and practically observed liberal views in trade and especially in energy trade. But recent incidents between Russia and Ukraine and UK's BREXIT from the EU indicate that this all is matter of interest and when interests of any state becomes low or finishes then specific idea like liberalism becomes wipeout.

### **4.3.2 Germany Energy Security**

Liberalism is school of thought in study of international relations which is widely being followed in West as we discussed earlier however, to understand the Nord Stream I & II we should analyze the factor which led Germany to ensure its energy security. Since long at the time of agreement between Germany and Russia over Nord Stream I, it is being speculated that Germany is adopting an energy policy which is suitable to only itself not to whole Union but Germany has always rejected this narrative.

Apparently Germany's energy policy emphasize more on transition and environment friendly renewable energy resources like transition from coal or nuclear to renewable energy resources wind thermal and solar. This could improve energy efficiency and measures to ensure security of supply. By analyzing whole energy policy of Germany one can say that it is revolving around climate change clean energy and better transmission but after 2007 harsh criticism on Germany because of Nord Stream II, Germany Bundestag in its press release confirmed that this pipeline will promote energy security and is totally commercial venture which does not violate

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<sup>171</sup> Bruce Russett and John Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 179.



the EU's regulations.<sup>172</sup> This stance of Germany indicates that earlier Germany insisted for clear and clean energy but on the other hand Germany went for a project (Nord Stream) which is controversial politically and environmentally as well (environmental aspects of Nord Stream will be discussed in upcoming headings) considering the nature of its interests. Despite the whole environment of interdependence and liberal views in the EU, Germany opted to go for managing personal interests. Germany is trying to ensure its energy security through this independent pipeline project where there is no transit countries but only Baltic Sea which will also put off the chances of transit disruptions which earlier happened due to tensions between Russia and Ukraine.

#### **4.4 Nord Stream and Baltic Sea**

By analyzing the German energy security, it is essential to discuss the threats emanating from construction of Nord Stream via Baltic Sea, purpose of this study is not only to discuss the threats to Baltic sea life but to discuss the legal challenges which are generating by not fulfilling the requirements of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

##### **4.4.1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)**

Nord Stream comprises of two parallel pipelines (Nord Stream I & II) with the annual capacity of 110 bcm of natural gas from Vyborg Russia to Greifswald Germany. This pipeline which is also called Submarine pipeline passes through Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of Finland, Sweden and then passes through territorial waters of Denmark (as per UNCLOS territorial waters consists 12 nautical miles of shores of a state are considered part of a coastal state).<sup>173</sup> It is pertinent to include that Estonia rejected the application of Nord Stream AG to build another pipeline project passing through its territorial waters.

However, any sea-based activity UNCLOS plays vital role in laying and operationalizing of any pipeline, some regional agreements like Convention on the Protection of Marine Environmental Impact Assessment of Baltic Sea (Helsinki Convention) and Convention on

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<sup>172</sup> "Antwort der Bundesregierung, Drucksache 18/6526," Bundestag, February 11, 2015, [dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/.../1806526.pdf](http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/.../1806526.pdf).

<sup>173</sup> Langlet David, (Nord Stream, The Environment and Law: Disentangling a Multijurisdictional Energy Project) Scandinavian Studies in Law 1999-2015, 4.

Environmental Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention) are main sources of looking over any negative impact on Baltic Sea region.

As mentioned earlier, UNCLOS establishes a legal infrastructure by determining the executive jurisdiction and legislation different states may exercise in different maritime zones with the purpose to create balance between two opposing interests. When it comes to Nord Stream and the Baltic Sea there is no relative proximity of coastal states because there are no high seas in Baltic Sea. Therefore, any sea-based activity is bound to take place within jurisdictional zones of adjacent coastal states.<sup>174</sup> These jurisdictional zones which are also called territorial waters start from baseline (shores of a state) stretches maximum 12 nautical miles seawards from baseline and allows innocent passage for ships but lacks any relevance for pipelines.

When it comes to Nord Stream and Baltic States like Sweden, Estonia, Denmark and others, they have the jurisdiction provided by UNCLOS with regard to protection of marine life preservation and protection and have exploration rights as well.<sup>175</sup> That is why most of above mentioned countries are against Nord Stream project and considering it threat to Baltic Sea life and environment.

#### **4.4.2 Nord Stream and Possible Threats to Baltic Sea Environment**

UNCLOS is not all about jurisdiction of seas but it also substantive in areas of protection sea environment and the coastal states have obligation of protection and preservations of sea life. This obligation of UNCLOS is under Article 194 (2) obligates all states to take necessary measures to protect sea life and environment.

Former Swedish ambassador and policy advisor to Swedish PM, Krister Wahlback in 2006 stated that this Russo-German pipeline project which is called Nord Stream will finally become a huge threat to Baltic Sea. According to him Russia and Germany while laying this pipeline will stir up the poisonous bottom sediment of Baltic which is containing remnants filled

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<sup>174</sup> Langlet, (Nord Stream, (The Environment and Law), Scandinavian Studies in Law 1999-2015, 6.

<sup>175</sup> R. Lagoni, *Pipelines*, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (e-resource, 2008, updated April 2011), para. 10; Wolf, *supra* note 4, 191.

with lethal substances of Second World War wherein thousands of undetonated mines, great amount of dumped munitions and other chemical weapons are present. He added that all those things that experts mentioned not to do in UNCLOS are being done by Germany and Russia.

This was not the only objection being raised as many countries who showed concerns regarding threats to Baltic Sea environment due to Nord Stream. For example, Endel Lippma, Chairman of Council for Energy at the Estonian Academy of Sciences claimed that Baltic Sea is already the most polluted sea and if the pipelines explode then its effect will be more than fifty nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima.<sup>176</sup> However, proponents of Nord Stream who are obviously from Germany and Russia projects that this whole debate regarding threats to Baltic Sea environment is being politicized and those potential implications of gas pipeline were being exaggerated. In this regard, A Swedish Newspaper in 2006 published that maybe concerns about Nord Stream in Baltic Sea are real but environmental consequences appears to be extremely exaggerated, it is not about a giant tunnel but a 1.2m diameter pipeline. The Baltic Sea bed is full of other types of pipelines and cables but no gigantic catastrophe has occurred since they were laid down.

After analyzing the debate of both sides on Nord Stream's environmental and political challenges, one can analyze that there are no serious threats to Baltic Sea life at all. Concerns being raised by different countries have no proper reasons to justify their claims because Baltic Sea is already having so many pipelines and undersea cables passing through and if these are not threat to its environment and sea life then how Nord Steam could be. One the other hand political concerns of Baltic States and countries of Eastern Europe seems real one. The reason of that is the past of Russia which has not remained transparent, they still realize Russia as an oppressor. According to them Russia is trying to regain its influence in Eastern Europe and in Baltic States silently. Despite the challenges and opposition, Germany and Russia are able to complete most part of Nord Stream II as Nord Stream I is already working. After annexation of Crimea and continuous tensions between Russia and Ukraine, the European importers of Russian gas does not want any more disruption so indirectly they are also compelled to accept this project.

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<sup>176</sup> Whist Solum Bendik, (Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline, An Analysis of Political Debate on Baltic Sea Region), Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 40.

#### **4.5 Energy Trade and Incident of Crimea**

To understand the reservations of Europe/ US and Ukraine, we need to discuss the annexation of Crimea in detail. The causes, which became the reason of annexation of Crimea and the possible objectives of Russia wanted to achieve through this huge development. As we know that since the end of Cold War, annexation of Crimea was the first major direct aggression from Russia. This section will also discuss the possible future steps from Ukraine to avoid the further aggression and escalation with Russia. However, stance of USA and the EU will also be discussed relatively.

Annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 marked serious crisis of contemporary international law and of the world security system. But before this one should know the importance of Crimea for Russia. Crimea as part of Ukraine's Soviet republic was an integral part of Soviet Union. According to constitution of Soviet Union retained the right to freely withdrew from USSR in 1991. During the referendum of 1991, most of people of Crimea voted in favor of Ukraine to become free and independent state.<sup>177</sup> In a letter by Russian Security Council in 1993 to Russian President and to minister of foreign affairs, the desire was shown to establish Black Sea Fleet and Naval bases for Russia in Ukraine and in Crimea. Ukraine showed reservations to this development due to concerns over its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Ukrainian leader asked reliable guarantees from Russia, then in 1994, US after dialogues with Russia, confirmed Ukraine that there will be no threat to its sovereignty.

In 1997, Russia and Ukraine concluded the "Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Russian Federation (RF) and Ukraine" which finally end the possible claims by Russia on Ukrainian territories. However, same rule was applied on Crimea as well because by signing these treaties Russia officially accepted Crimea as part of Ukraine. Even then, Russia annexed Crimea and not only violated the recognized principles of International Law of UN charter but also violated the bilateral and trilateral agreements. Russian President through his speeches and statements tried to justify his act in Crimea and in this regard he used to say that

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<sup>177</sup> Merezbko Oleksandr, (Crimea's Annexation by Russia-Contradictions of New Russian Doctrine of International Law, Max-Plank Institute für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 2015, 4.

Ukraine separated from Russia due to a result of a referendum however, same thing was done in case of Crimea where people of Crimea after right of self-determination decided to become part of Russia. Russian president also argued that Russian intervention in Crimea was based on humanitarian ground and after invitation from people of Crimea.

#### **4.5.1 Russia's Objectives behind annexation of Crimea**

Russian hostile measures against Ukraine and some other European countries have also some reasons and objectives which are needed to be added for better understanding of its aggressiveness. There is strong perception that Russia is following the policy of aggression to avoid possible invasion from outside. Russia's geographic position lacks natural barriers and Russia feels vulnerable. Russia considers itself as great power and seeks recognition from others as becoming great power is key factor of Russian foreign policy.<sup>178</sup> The big factor/ cause behind Russian aggression towards outside is consistent threat from the EU and NATO, Russia sees EU and NATO with an agenda based on expansion. It is obvious that EU and NATO were consistently looking for expanding their sphere of influence, recent govt of Ukraine which was pro West, bell the alarms of danger for Russia which possibly led Russia to intervene in Crimea to demonstrate power to the EU and the NATO and to Ukraine to refrain from taking any step to get united with EU or NATO.

The conclusion speaks as itself that Crimea's annexation by Russia was blatant violation of norms and international rules which is also against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and Russia is still not able to justify its act. This thing also proves that any power in this world is free to do anything, such as per the basic argument of Realism, any state follows its interests and to fulfil those interests' military is one option. On the other hand Ukraine is right in its stance by securitizing Russian designs in Crimea which are according to the Berry Buzan's theory of securitization wherein in Ukraine presenting Russia as a threat who will further move against Ukraine after Crimea.

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<sup>178</sup> Merezko, (Crimea's Annexation by Russia), 2015, 7.

#### 4.6 USA- EU Concerns on Nord Stream II

The US policy makers always supported European Union efforts to reduce their reliance on Russian gas especially after Moscow reduced exports to EU in 2006 and then again in 2009. Though some EU countries have not reduced their dependence on Russia, which accounts for 48 % EU imports from Russia. If we talk about Trump administration and many other Congress members then they opposed Nord Stream II project by stating that the project will further depend EU on Russia and Russia will become more aggressive in its policies either geopolitical or in its economic policies.<sup>179</sup> Here it is important to add that Nord Stream I completed in 2011 whereas Nord Stream II despite opposition from EU governments and EU officials, work launched in 2018. As per statistics, out of 760 miles only 100 miles of construction is remaining on Nord Stream II. Critiques of project were hopeful after EUs regulations, intended to stop the monopoly of Gazprom but Germany while ruling out the restrictions remarked that as project is already under construction that is why restrictions were not applied on their case.

Opposition of the project including USA, EU officials, Poland, Baltic States and Ukraine argued that Nord Stream project will give political leverage to Russia over Germany however, other countries dependent on Russian gas like Ukraine will become more vulnerable to Russian aggression. US Congress in this regard to counter Russia proposed sanctions against Germany and Russia.<sup>180</sup> As a result, in December 2018, House of Representatives passed H. Res 1035, calling for cancellation of Nord Stream II and imposition of sanctions. Due to sanction, on December 2019, All seas a Swiss- Dutch company suspended its activities on Nord Stream II, however, Russian President Putin in response stated that pipeline will be completed in start of 2021 and work will not be halted.

US sanctions against Russia are meant to counter Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2014 to reverse and deter further Russian advancement in the West. However, this series of sanctions started in Obama administration and later some were imposed in Trump administration as well. It seems like US is fully supporting Ukraine against Russian steps whereas, US is also securitizing the Nord Stream II project as threat to Ukraine. Ukraine and United States are not only two

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<sup>179</sup> Belkin Paul, Ratner Michael, Welt Cory, (Russia's Nord Stream Pipeline: Will Sanctions Stop It?), Congressional Research Service (INFOCUS), Feb 2020, 1.

<sup>180</sup> Belkin, Ratner, Welt, (Russia's Nord Stream Pipeline: Will Sanctions Stop It?), 1.

countries who are propagating Russian aggression but many other European states like United Kingdom and Baltic States are also having same views. On the other hand Germany and Russia are firm in completing this project despite narrative being built by US and Ukraine is strengthening with the passage of time.

#### **4.7 Baltic States and Ukrainian Crisis**

Baltic States are important EU countries as recent example of Europeanization wherein Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have established themselves as key supporters of the EU in Baltic Sea region. However, Russian invasion in Crimea and later annexation have led these countries into formidable political challenge since restoration of independence. In this portion, foreign policies of Baltic States from platform of EU will be analyzed.

After the EUs enlargement in 2004 and in 2007, many Central and Eastern European countries have become staunch supporters of the EU amalgamation of former Soviet States. This behavior of countries of Central and Eastern EU states was widely appreciated by the launch of European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2004. Later on Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania declared ENP as priority in their foreign policy.<sup>181</sup> These three countries not only supported the ENP but also encouraged further enlargement of the EU. However, after crisis in Ukraine and Crimea due to Russian intervention in Feb 2014 Baltic States considered it an obligation and opportunity to support Ukraine.

Baltic States openly disclosed their foreign policy by supporting Ukraine against Russia and by showing their allegiance to the EU and to NATO. One can also analyze that Baltic States proved their loyalty to the EU and NATO through their fearless support over Russian aggression in Crimea.

Baltic States open and fearless support Ukraine widely propagated Russia as threat because of their own personal security concerns about Russia. The three governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have simultaneously been reassuring their masses against Russian

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<sup>181</sup> Vilson Maili, (The Foreign Policy of Baltic States and Ukrainian Crisis: A Case of Europeanisation), Institute of International Relation, NGO, JSTOR, 2.

aggression; these countries have also been pressurizing NATO to increase its presence in the region.<sup>182</sup> The whole discussion proves that Baltic States after becoming the part of the EU and NATO have acted openly supported Europeanization process in Eastern and Central Europe, this all is because Baltics have idea that Russia might go for aggression against them just like Russia did this in Ukraine.

This whole chapter shed detailed light over the Nord Stream II, Ukraine, Russia, Germany and USA in context of Securitization theory of Berry Buzan and Ole Waever, in this chapter not only stability of Eastern Europe was discussed but causes and measures they have taken for stability were discussed too. The analysis after discussing different perspectives has emerged that Russia is an aggressor in Ukraine who wants to keep Ukraine and other countries of Eastern Europe under its influence, whereas Russia has this perception that the NATO and the EU under USA have oppressive designs and threat to Russian territories and sovereignty. USA, Ukraine and Baltic States are to somehow managed to establish the narrative that Russia through its energy exports wants to create hegemony to get political benefits in Europe. Western countries have not only helped Ukraine in securitizing the issue in political way but economically as well. Politically Western countries have rightly established the narrative that Russia will move further after annexation of Crimea as Russia wants to reoccupy former Soviet States. However, there seems division among Western states when it comes to adopt a united stance against Russia over its energy exports because Germany sees Nord Stream as commercial project whereas USA and Eastern European countries consider it a move, which further make their security vulnerable. In next chapter policy options for Ukraine by adopting them Ukraine can survive in world politically and economically will be discussed. Then dynamics of internal Ukrainian politics and future security challenges will also be discussed in detail because when it comes to internal politics then there is large number of ethnic Russians residing in Ukraine with their political affiliation with Russia will be discussed.

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<sup>182</sup> Vilson, (The Foreign Policy of Baltic States and Ukrainian Crisis), JSTOR, 12.



## Chapter 5

### Policy Options for Ukraine: Prospects and Challenges

In previous chapter we discussed economic and security implication for Ukraine due to Nord Stream whereas other aspects like stability of Eastern part of Europe, Baltic States, their independent foreign policy including US stance on Nord Stream were covered relatively. In this chapter different types of political and strategic options for Ukraine will be discussed which could enable Ukraine to move forward by avoiding possible threats from Russia or any other outsider. This chapter will also discuss possible options for Ukraine regarding establishing links with the EU and NATO or should avoid these economic and military alliances for the sake of national interests.

#### 5.1 Dynamics of Internal Politics of Ukraine

Before going into details of current internal politics of Ukraine we should look into political and territorial situation of Eastern Europe and Baltic States prior to disintegration of Soviet Union. In 80s, political map of Europe looked quite different as Baltic States lined up as Soviet Socialist Republics and same was status of Ukraine and Byelorussia (now Belarus). These five countries lies between Baltic Sea and Black Sea are of great importance in terms of strategic viewpoint. Warsaw pact of these states, East Germany and Russia formed an alliance against NATO.<sup>183</sup> This was the time when Soviet Union was crumbling and economic situation was miserable, by the time Gorbachev took the charge, things went totally out of hands of govt. When in 1989 crowd put down wall of Berlin the East Germany authorities did not have the courage to stop this and then Gorbachev decided phased withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe.

After the collapse of Soviet Russia, Gorbachev was thrown out of power and Boris Yeltsin got the charge of Presidency, he not only took steps like formation of Common Wealth of Independent States (CIS) to hold newly independent states under Russian influence but also tried to normalize ties with West. Ukraine on the other hand got independence from Union after 1992 referendum wherein people from Western Ukraine mostly and some from eastern Ukraine

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<sup>183</sup> Plokyh, Serhii, "The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union," Oneworld Publications, 2014. [Kindle Edition (Kindle Location 111)].(Kandiyoti Rafael, Powering Europe), 12.

mainly Russian ethnicity opted independence though people of Western Ukraine were being supported by Western Europe. As mentioned in earlier chapters, US former secretary of State once indicating the pillars of internal politics of Ukraine stated that Western Ukraine is mostly Catholic and Ukrainian speaking whereas Eastern Ukrainian people are from Russian Orthodox and Russian speaking as well, therefore any attempt by one to dominate other will eventually lead to civil war.

By analyzing some historical events related to Ukraine it has become obvious that Ukraine is a difficult country with turbulent political and ideological beliefs where Western Ukraine thinks totally against what people of Eastern Ukraine think about. If we talk about recent unrest in Ukraine began in November 2013 then same political and ethnical phenomenon witnessed by world. Mass protests against President Yanukovych refused to ally more closely with Russia by ending agreements with Europe. Police in these protests acted brutally against masses which were widely criticized by USA and EU.<sup>184</sup> Ukrainian government at that time made laws to squeeze protesters which were again criticized and then Ukrainian PM Azarov announced his resignation. After negotiations peace was restored which did not last long and again police killed dozens in protests. It was obvious that Western countries were supporting this protest against pro-Russian Ukrainian govt, Russia was playing behind Ukrainian people of Russian origin and West was behind people of Ukrainian ethnicity.

### **5.1.1 Annexation of Crimea**

It was March 2013 when unrest began in Crimea and after approval from Russian parliament; President Putin started using force by claiming that Russia was saving Russian people in Crimea (Ukraine). Ukraine's interim President Olexander Turchynov called this act from Russia as launch of informal war against Ukraine.<sup>185</sup> Through launch of attack on Crimea, Russia proved that day by day reduction in Russian influence in Ukraine was turbulent for Russia and in response Russia took step to annex Crimea. Not only this, Russian backed protests started in Eastern Ukraine demanding independence from Ukraine, however, government offered

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<sup>184</sup> Ramicone Anthony, Metzger Jeffrey, (The Ukrainian Crisis: A Disputed Past and Present), Harvard IOP Policy Program, May 2014, 4.

<sup>185</sup> Ramicone, Metzger, (The Ukrainian Crisis: A Disputed Past and Present), May 2014, 4.

more facilities and provincial autonomy in Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv but was ignored by protesters and in response Ukrainian govt sent Army to settle the peace.

Referendum in Crimea was held under supervision of Russian armed forces whereas West considered this referendum as an illegitimate step because of low turnout and due to Russian influence on results of referendum. Despite these allegations of illegitimacy, Russia is still ruling Crimea.<sup>186</sup> Due to diverse population, response of Ukrainian govt to protesters first in Western Ukraine, then in Eastern Ukraine backed by Russia and then later in Crimea remained an uphill task. However, the Ukraine government is severely reliant on the EU and on USA because of its inability to tackle domestic unrest alone.

After analyzing this so much activism in Ukrainian politics, one thing is proven that Ukraine seems a battleground between West and Russia. The EU and USA in shape of NATO are trying their best to expand the grip of the organization to Ukraine and then further, whereas Russia by considering both as threat is becoming aggressive with the passage of time. After annexation of Crimea and political unrest supported by Russia, now Eastern Ukraine seems next target for Russia because there are so many similarities like Crimea. East Ukraine has 75 percent population of Russian ethnicity. However, this population of Eastern Ukraine inclines to vote for conservative pro-Russian candidates in election. Like Crimea, whole of Eastern Ukraine is easily accessible to Russia that is why an increase in destabilization by pro-Russian forces is witnessed after Russia took over Crimea. This destabilization is not only military wise but in terms of civil disturbance as well.

## **5.2 Emerging Security Challenges for Ukraine after Losing Crimea.**

As mentioned in earlier point, Russia seems to have eyes on Eastern Ukraine after Crimea. Reason behind annexing Crimea was not only to show the West about Russian aggression but with the purpose to get benefit from strategically important Crimea. Crimean peninsula has been of great importance in Black Sea and Russia considered it as an important

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<sup>186</sup> Tom Cohen, "Legal or Not, Crimean Referendum will Shape Ukraine Crisis," *CNN*, March 15, 2014, <http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/13/politics/crimea-referendum-explainer/>.

place to watch over its energy trade to Europe through Crimea. Ukraine after losing Crimea and consistent instability in its eastern part is facing economic, political and military challenges.

If we talk about the economic challenges to Ukraine after Crimean incident then Ukraine has suffered a lot, sporadic disruptions in gas transit, Russian plans to start Nord Stream and South Stream are the developments which will further increase the miseries of Ukraine, economic disparity obviously effects the security of any state and Ukraine is dealing with same phenomenon. If we look in to indexes of 2015 then Ukrainian national currency is collapsing whereas black market and inflation is increasing day by day. Main trade partner of Ukraine was Russia but due to crisis trade between the two has shirked significantly.<sup>187</sup> On the other hand EU has been supporting Ukraine for its economic boost and cancellation of import duties from EU are being considered as biggest immediate advantages and economic support to Ukraine.

Overall EUs stance is supportive towards Ukraine but two main pillars of the EU, France and Germany look unlike. Neither France nor Germany stood behind Ukraine's pro-Western aspirations and its ambitions towards EU and NATO as well. Former Ukrainian President Yanukovich blamed Germany for turning down the official invitation for Ukraine to become member of Action Plan at the NATO Bucharest summit in 2008. He also blamed Germany for blocking EU from giving membership to Ukraine.<sup>188</sup> Germany showed reluctance in creation of Eastern Partnership which could undermine its interests in the region. In other words, Germany remained careful when it came to Russian interests in the region. These steps by Germany clearly indicate that Germany followed the policy of its own interests which was to import gas from Russia bypassing Ukraine with the purpose of noninterference.

On one side where Ukraine faced economic and political troubles after Russian aggression there on the other side Ukraine was able to get support of EU against Russia. In response to Russian aggression, West responded with sanctions, economic assistance to Ukraine and negotiations with both parties. Whereas if we talk about USA an NATO then US or NATO never directly intervened in Ukrainian matters though there is view that NATO gave military

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<sup>187</sup> Lenc Marek, Kudrec Martin, (Ukraine in Crisis: The Economic and Security Consequence for EU Ukraine and Russia), STRAT Bratislava 2016, 4.

<sup>188</sup> Lenc, Kudrec, (Ukraine in Crisis: The Economic and Security Consequence for EU Ukraine and Russia), 4.

support to Ukraine indirectly. The most direct action from US in Ukraine was announcement of security assistance of worth 18 million dollars. Apart from this US also pledged dollar fifty million to Ukraine for alleviation of 2.2 billion dollar Russian debt in terms of natural gas supplies.<sup>189</sup> NATO on many occasions made it clear that organization will not intervene or invade on Crimea as it will have grave consequences. USA instead, adopted different forums and measures to condemn Russian aggression like economic sanctions and cancellation of agreements.

### **5.2.1 Implications of Ukraine Crisis on Its Neighborhood**

These basic dimensions of internal politics of Ukraine clarify the situation within Ukraine whereas these dimensions have implications outside Ukraine and in Western Europe as well. Through this crisis Russia has openly rejected the post-Cold War post-Soviet settlements in Eastern Europe. President Putin in this regard has publicly adopted the policy of dividing people of Russian ethnicity in countries of Eastern Europe. Russia has also enforced its objectives in internal politics of Ukraine.<sup>190</sup> Now Russia seems focused on reintegration of Eurasia with full attention on Eastward as well which will have implications for rising China. Now Russia has become part of emerging trends in great power politics of world by overruling the post-Cold War led US dominated world order.

After getting Crimea back now there is increase in Russian activities in Black Sea, which is another strategic implication for Ukraine. Earlier Russia had small stretch of Black Sea shore but now Russia occupies strategically most important area of whole Crimean peninsula in Black Sea region. Russian stronghold in Black Sea will also give strength to its position in Mediterranean Sea.<sup>191</sup> As a result Turkish Navy which emerged as strongest in Black Sea due to disintegration of Soviet Union will lose its status. Ironically implications of Ukraine crisis do not stop in Black Sea but in Central Western Europe as well.

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<sup>189</sup> Joe Carroll, Nicole Gaouette, and Julianna Goldman, "Ukraine's Unpaid Russian Gas Bills Dwarf U.S. Aid Offer," *Bloomberg*, April 23, 2014, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-22/ukraine-s-unpaid-gas-billsdwarf-u-s-aid-offer.html>.

<sup>190</sup> Trenin Dmitri, (The Ukraine Crisis and the Resumption of Great Power Rivalry), Carnegie Moscow Centre, July 2014, 15.

<sup>191</sup> Trenin, (The Ukraine Crisis and the Resumption of Great Power Rivalry), 2014, 15.

Due to increasing threats from Russia, in March 2015 the President of EU commission Jean-Claude Juncker gave the idea of “EU Army” to defend its borders and values in better way, purpose of this was to give clear message to Russia about Europe’s seriousness and responsibilities around the globe.<sup>192</sup> Although formation and responsibilities of this force are not confirmed yet, but this is clear that this will be a separate platform than US and NATO. This suggestion has come over at the time of tensions in Eastern Europe which is an indirect disbelieve on NATO and on USA. So there might be thinking in Central and Eastern states of EU that US may not be able to help them against Russia as example of Crimea is there in front of them.

After these developments one can be so sure about further escalations in Eastern Europe and increase in tensions. But it is hard to determine whether Russia will seek more escalation or not, both Russia and Ukraine signed an agreement in Geneva pledging escalation in exchange for constitutional reforms within Ukraine. Now after so many years there is silence in Ukraine and no big incident has been witnessed but fire may erupt with a single blow which will have grave consequences for Europe and Russia and obviously Ukraine’s position will become like Afghanistan, a battle ground between two ideologies.

### **5.3 Ukraine and the European Union: An Economic Platform**

In discussion above, Ukraine and Europe has been discussed with multiple perspectives. Ukraine as former Soviet republic has been under influence of Russia since its independence in 1991. However, large Ukrainian population is also under EUs influence and wants to be part of the Union. The EU as per its enlargement or Europeanisation program wants Ukraine to be as its member, though there have been some opposition from countries like Germany and France (discussed earlier) but still there are chances for Ukraine. Main purpose of EU is to reduce Russian influence in Eastern Europe and thus to further expand. EU in this perspective to somehow is adopting Liberal ways to obtain its political motives whereas Russia after annexation of Crimea seems to be acting as Realist by using force to protect its interests in Eastern Europe.

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<sup>192</sup> Eds, Pabriks Artis, Kudors Andis (*The War in Ukraine: Lessons for Europe*), The Centre for Eastern European Policy Studies University of Latvia Press, 2015, 23.

Here in this point we will try to cover Ukraine ties with the EU in terms of economy with political aspects. There is comprehensive agreement between the EU and Ukraine which covers economic and political relationship of EU with Ukraine. The trade related content between two is called Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA).<sup>193</sup> This agreement was prepared in 2012 as in 2013 President Yanukovich refused to sign it at last moment in 2013 which triggered mass protests all over Ukraine, then Russian aggression in Crimea and protests in Eastern Ukraine. Later agreement came into being in two phases under PM Arseniy Yatsenyuk and in March 2014 the political portion and in July 2014 the economic portion was signed. The signing of DCFTA had significant geopolitical importance for Ukraine.

The political purpose of this agreement is to deepen the realization of Ukraine's European choice. This means practically adoption of EU values like democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights. However, economic purpose of the agreement was to help modernize Ukraine's economy by boosting trade with EU.<sup>194</sup> Ukraine after the agreement with EU adopted so many political and economic reforms like free and fair election, independence of judiciary and reformation of electoral rules and made positive changes to protect human rights but on the other hand situation in Crimea and Donbas which are not under government control, became authoritarian and systematic human rights violations under Russian regime are continue. Not only this, several fake cases were charged against Tatars the Muslim minority of Crimea the oldest ethnic majority population of peninsula.

### **5.3.1 Possible Economic Benefits for Ukraine and the EU Membership**

After understanding the political aspects of EU-Ukraine cooperation, there is need to cover the economic aspects or remunerations Ukraine can avail if becomes EU members. By looking at example of Poland and Estonia, it becomes evident that EU investment can give boost to economies of any country. Same like this Ukraine could become another success story in

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<sup>193</sup> Emerson Michael, Movchan Veronika, (Ukraine and Europe: A Short Guide), Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2016, 7.

<sup>194</sup> Emerson, Movchan, (Ukraine and Europe: A Short Guide), 2016, 10.

terms of economy.<sup>195</sup> But for this economic boost Ukraine will have to meet the Copenhagen economic criteria. Before the enlargement of EU in 2004, Ukraine met whole EU criteria except per capita GDP, but since then in these long years Ukraine has been doing sincere efforts to become part of EU. Ukraine also signed an Association Agreement (AA) in 2014 with the EU for political and economic integration with the Union, this includes Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) as disused earlier. This agreement was made after some resistance from EU member states against membership of Ukraine. As per this agreement Ukraine committed to have reforms without having membership of the organization.

All agreements made by the EU with Ukraine were based on political requirements, which EU demanded from Ukraine to be adopted, however the signing of AA was repeatedly postponed, amid EU concerns over general deterioration of democratic standards under President Viktor Yanukovich during his tenure from 2010 to 2014.<sup>196</sup> At that time the EU made signing of AA contingent to adaptation of specific democratic reforms which apparently were not suitable to Ukrainian President whose government was intent to monopolies power, embezzlement of state funds and for having close linkages with Russia.

### **5.3.2 Russian Response towards Increasing EU-Ukraine Ties**

Russia looked to all these developments between EU and Ukraine with suspicions and took it as threat not only to Russia but to other former Soviet states as well. Russia in these years remained keen to exploit this quandary. In 2012 and 2013, Russia tried to pull Ukraine away from EU into its own Eurasian Integration Project. Russia got engage into a trade war with Ukraine in 2013 and threatened to cut its economic ties if Kiev finalizes AA, this was the time when Russia accounted for about one-third of Ukraine's external trade.<sup>197</sup> Russia also offered an economic package to Ukraine in shape of reduction in energy prices during its economic recession in 2013. Due to all these pressures, President Yanukovich refused to sign AA at Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in November 2013, which led to mass protest.

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<sup>195</sup> Syzenko Anastasia, (Ukraine and European Union: Challenges to Integrate), Taras Shevchenko University of Kyiv, Jan 2013, 8.

<sup>196</sup> Wolczuk Kataryna, Zeruolis Darius, (Rebuilding Ukraine: An Assessment of EU Assistance), Chatham House The Royal Institute of International Affairs, August 2018, 5.

<sup>197</sup> Wolczuk, Zeruolis, (Rebuilding Ukraine: An Assessment of EU Assistance), August 2018, 5.



New leadership of Ukraine did not respond to Russian aggression and proceeded to foster close ties with the EU. Later actions by Russia exposed the weakness of Ukraine which later on hit Kyiv with huge economic setback. But despite these challenges AA was signed in 2014. Though, Russia backed armed rebels in Eastern Ukraine are big challenge for EU's foreign policy in its Eastern neighborhood. Ukraine has become a rolling stone between Russia and West. Even people within Ukraine are divided. Russia is playing in country by supporting its proxies whereas EU and NATO have overwhelmed the people of Western Ukraine. There is issue of security for Ukraine not externally from Russia but internally as well. If we look this situation through lenses of Securitization Theory then Ukraine's security is vulnerable internally and externally from both sides. Ukraine has been consistent in securitizing its internal issues to outer world whether it is Russian backed govt in Kyiv against West or EU supported govt against Russia.

#### **5.4 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): Possible Options for Ukraine to Avoid Russian Aggression**

Russia is using all means either through force or through economic benefits for Ukraine with purpose to stop the latter from going in hands of West. However, EU or NATO seems determine in enlargement and expansion of their platforms up to Ukraine especially after annexation of Crimea and political uprising in eastern Ukraine despite reservations of some of members. Overall West is keenly observing the regional politics in the north of Black sea. 2014 crisis in Ukraine marked a tripping point in NATO's relationship with Russia.<sup>198</sup> Whereas, coldness in relationship between both already started in 2008 due to war between Russia and Georgia. Annexation of Crimea completely limited the cooperation and in 2014 summit, NATO declared Russian action as an aggression. This was the stage when many EU countries pledged to increase their declining defense budget as obviously the reason was raising threat from East, which was Russia.

NATO has viewed annexation of Crimea widely, EU as disruption in Europe and international order as this was the order to which NATO itself was custodian. This act of Russia

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<sup>198</sup> Sperling James, Webber Mark, (NATO and Ukraine Crisis: Collective Securitization), European Journal of International Security, Volume:2 part 1, 2016, 1.

not only has raised concerns for NATO members of Eastern Europe but has also raised question of NATO's credibility.<sup>199</sup> There is also another view that NATO did not respond to Russian aggression in Crimea as it should be like after Russian war with Georgia in 2008, then Russian skirmishes with Belarus in 2009 and 2013 military exercises which causes tensions in Poland and other states in Baltic region.

Despite cold response from EU and NATO after Crimean incident both forums became open in their thoughts regarding Russia as numbers of military measures were taken by both sides either increase in number of troops and armaments or vessels.<sup>200</sup> There is also possibility that instead of large scale war, both sides may go for limited war in Ukraine, hybrid war and cyber-attacks to undermine the other one's security infrastructure. This military situation may become a sign of relief for Ukraine who is under consistent threat from Russia and is securitizing his issue of Crimea at global level.

#### **5.4.1 NATO and Securitization Theory**

Here in perspective of Securitization Theory (ST) that mobilizes, that ST did not regard securitizing actors limited to one state as more than one states can construct an issue as threat and this phenomenon is also called collective securitization.<sup>201</sup> Thus, a body like NATO can amicably initiate the securitization process over Russian annexation of Crimea and then its further escalation in Eastern Ukraine. In this regard, coordination between EU and US is important and difficult as well, difficult is because of huge trade relations between European countries and Russia. Germany and Italy, that is why remained against imposition of strict sanctions against Russia.

Ukraine's ties with NATO remained of serious concerns for Russia and all measures taken by Russia were to stop Ukraine having membership of NATO. However, Ukraine in early years of independence remained nonaligned to avoid aggression from Russia as it knew further

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<sup>199</sup> Sperling, Webber, (NATO and Ukraine Crisis: Collective Securitization), 20.

<sup>200</sup> Zellner Wolfgang, Chernykh Irina, (European Security- Challenges at Societal Level), OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, 19.

<sup>201</sup> Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, pp. 42, 45.

NATO enlargement will bring troubles for its main land.<sup>202</sup> With this stance Ukrainian desire of having strong relations with West gradually changed its stance regarding enlargement of security block. On one hand Ukraine became member of Russia led Commonwealth of Independent States and on the other Ukraine signed an agreement of partnership in 1997 NATO summit in Madrid.

#### **5.4.2 Possibilities of EU/NATO Membership**

This agreement was not a direct membership of Ukraine to NATO but a mechanism of exchange of ideas in case of threat to Ukraine. Under cover of this agreement, Ukraine built security relationship with and USA at individual basis. Now after annexation of Crimea and destabilizing efforts in eastern Ukraine, some US officials are suggesting USA to respond Russian aggression in Crimea by admitting Ukraine into NATO.<sup>203</sup> However, this move by NATO can be positive or counterproductive as well and there may chance of military action from Putin administration towards Ukraine. Thus an indirect policy of NATO should be to modernize Ukrainian military infrastructure to counter Russia.

#### **5.4.3 NATO and Military Support for Ukraine**

Physical training and advancement of Ukrainian military is an important factor which Kiev administration really need to work on but this needs strong commitment from both NATO and Ukraine as element of corruption in Ukrainian forces and having soft corner for Russia within Ukrainian military lines would require long-term and sustainable plan to restructure Ukrainian military. Meanwhile to support its steps in Ukraine, NATO should expand its influence in other states of Eastern Europe, which are ready to have NATO shield after Russia became aggressive in Crimea and in Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine.<sup>204</sup> At Whales, NATO approved a plan for Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), a brigade size of (4000 men) rapid reaction force within NATO's Response Force NRF with formation of Aerial and Naval forces for Eastern Europe and for Baltic States. These extra measures in Baltic region by NATO

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<sup>202</sup> Larrabee F Stephen, Wilson A Peter, Gordon John, (*The Ukrainian Crisis and European Security-Implications for United States and US Army*), Rand Corporation, URL: [www.jstore.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt15sk8s2.9](http://www.jstore.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt15sk8s2.9), 2015, 29.

<sup>203</sup> Larrabee, Wilson, Gordon, (*The Ukrainian Crisis and European Security-Implications for United States and US Army*), 31.

<sup>204</sup> Stephen Erlanger, Julie Herschfeld Davis, and Stephen Castle, "NATO Plans a Special Force to Reassure Eastern Europe and Deter Russia," *New York Times*, September 6, 2014. For a detailed discussion, see Jeffrey A. Larson, "The Wales Summit and NATO's Deterrence Capabilities: An Assessment," NDC Research Report, NATO Defense College, November 2014.

can play pivotal role in containment of Russia whereas, possible sanctions may also prove enough to stop Russia from any further aggression.

### **Findings**

- So far Russia has emerged as an aggressor in Eastern Europe.
- Ukraine's economic and political security is highly at risk after annexation of Crimea.
- Ukraine, EU and NATO are performing a collective securitization against Russia after Crimean incident.
- Germany's reliance on Russian gas will increase its dependence on Russia. However, German economic interests may bar it from acting independently on any geopolitical issue such as Alexie Navalny's arrest.
- USA consistent stance against Nord Stream II indicates Russian Gazprom influence in EU and security implications for Ukraine.
- Nord Stream II is about to complete but companies involved in project can leave the project at any time because of fear of sanctions from USA.
- After analyzing the study main finding which emerges is that Russia will further move further in its west after Crimea and diversion in energy transit routes are meant to keep its energy trade smooth and safe.

## Conclusion

In this thesis, we have argued about different aspects of Nord Stream II a huge pipeline project between Germany and Russia by covering multiple dimensions. During the discussion not only historical perspectives were analyzed but the changing perceptions in recent past were also amicably observed through the lens of Securitization Theory (ST). If we talk about Copenhagen School regarding ST then according to its concept of actor and audience, question regarding security articulates among its members repeatedly as a process called recursive interaction wherein members states validate the securitization move. Therefore, a body like NATO at the moment has successfully initiated and defined securitization process. Whereas Ukraine finds itself in best condition to endorse the securitization process after economic losses due to energy projects like Nord Stream and then increasing Russian aggression in Crimea and in Eastern Europe. It has been observed that on one side Germany has increased its energy capacity in shape of Nord Stream II but on the other this development has made Germany more reliant on Russia. However, Ukraine the main pillar of Russian gas exports to Europe is also under economic, political and security threat. Implications of this project are not so straight forward while Germany has almost secured its energy plans by converting security of Baltic and Black sea region at stake.

Nord Stream II is big project for Germany and Russia but at same time has brought so many issues with it, bypassing transits states such as Ukraine has risen economic, political and security concerns. However, many of the EU countries are also worried over increasing dependence of EU states on Russia. Western states such as United Kingdom and United States are consistently suspecting Russia of using its energy trade for political influence. In this regard, USA has already warned Germany from Nord Stream and statements of ex US President Trump and his Secretary of State Mike Pompeo are clear message to Germany. However, Turkey has also been warned from Blue Stream. Future developments will decide Russian actions towards Europe. Ukraine, which is at upfront to swallow the policies of Russian Federation, is likely to lose its influence in places within its territorial boundaries due to regular unrest in its eastern parts bordering with Russia, whereas alternate routes for Russian energy supplies have caused loss of billions of dollars to Ukrainian economy. Implications on Ukraine due to Nord Stream II can be discussed in binary angles. One is economic and the other one is strategic. Russian

motives behind change of routes also seem clear which is to get rid of Ukraine as transit state to extend its territorial frontiers. As I discussed hitherto that Ukraine will lose billions but Russia will save billions by adopting route of Baltic Sea for gas exports to Germany. Russia may also use same route for future trade dealings. But question rises that what caused Russia to go for an alternate route instead of already existing one. The answer is Crimea and increasing Ukrainian relations with West (NATO and EU), annexation of Crimea has made it clear to world that Russia still considers Ukraine part of its territory and demarcation after the collapse of Soviet Union were not acceptable to the Communist regime. Russia also expressed through its actions that any effort to expand NATO or EU on its western borders won't be tolerated. However, any movement within Ukraine for joining EU will not be allowed. Here, this Russian stance seems unreal as Ukraine is mainly dependent on Russia for its ninety percent of economic needs, Russia is also big trade partner of Ukraine. Thus Russian actions in Ukraine and Crimea are totally based on suspicion of EU or NATO expansion Eastward. Russia showed aggression in Crimea to initiate the process of recapturing its former Soviet republic.

After analyzing all factors and elements contributing in energy sectors of the EU and Russian Federation (RF), it is pertinent to conclude that energy trade between EU member states and Russia has always been in trouble, due to having different geopolitical objectives such as Russian stance towards Ukraine, the issue of securitization is emerging in Eastern European countries and they are taking Russian diversion over gas transit routes as economic and national security threat to their countries. However, Russia has also on many occasions proved that it is using energy trade as political weapon. EU on the other hand is also taking multiple steps such as formation of energy policy so that it is not fully dependent on Russia for its energy needs. However, Russia secured its interests after taking over Crimean peninsula, which is strategically the most important in Black Sea region as Black Sea is only hot water coast of Russia. Russia did not stop here as it charged the Russian ethnic population in Eastern Ukraine of Donbas region after Ukrainian president Yanukovich tried to sign Association Agreement (AA) with the EU. Closeness with NATO and USA also sparked Russian minds as threat coming to its doorstep. Now at the moment, it is open and shut phenomenon that after annexing Crimea has shifted the military balanced completely in favor of Russia as earlier Russia had to rely upon on Sebastopol coast of Black Sea but after Crimea, Russia has taken wide-ranging control of region except the

Turkey who due to its strategic location of Bosphorus and Dardanelles is in better position. Earlier due to expansionist policies of Stalin Turkey decided to join NATO in 1952. It is pertinent to mention here that Russia and Turkey both have improved their relations in recent past and Turkey's stance over Black Sea is more relevant to Russian policies as compare to West or USA. However, after purchase of Russian S-400 anti-missile system by Turkey has sparked a series of tensions between USA and Turkey and brought Russia more close to Turkey.

The analysis after discussing different perspectives has emerged that Russia is an aggressor in Ukraine who wants to keep its influence in Ukraine and in other countries of Eastern Europe, however, Russia has this perception that the NATO and the EU under USA have oppressive designs and threat to Russian territories and sovereignty. USA, Ukraine and Baltic States are somehow managed to establish the narrative that Russia through its energy exports wants to create hegemony to get political benefits in Europe. Western countries have not only helped Ukraine in securitizing the issue in political way but economically as well. Politically Western countries have rightly established the narrative that Russia will move further after annexation of Crimea as Russia wants to reoccupy former Soviet States. However, there seems division among Western states when it comes to energy exports as some as if Germany sees Nord Stream as commercial project whereas USA and Eastern European countries consider it a move which further make their security vulnerable. USA has also offered Germany and other European countries to export LNG from USA, the alternate of Russian gas. If we talk about significant actions by EU, NATO or any action by using the platform of UN then no noteworthy efforts has been made so far and if there is any then it did not really damage the Russian designs. Thus, a new cold war has started in Eastern Europe wherein Ukraine which after Cold War chose to maintain balance in its relationship with West and East, is now totally tilted towards West after losing Crimea. Whereas Russia who still considers Ukraine as its territory, doubled its proxy war in Ukraine which has increased the worries of Kiev for the time being with sluggish progress by Ukraine is underway toward NATO and EU.

Another dilemma is that Russia does not seem bothered with any cold stance from West because of new economic ventures and avenues, Russia at the moment is also busy in constructing regional Eurasian Economic Union and global ties with Brazil, Russia, India, China

and South Africa (BRICS). Russia won't be affected much by sanctions from EU or NATO because of China which is big trade partner and buyer of Russian gas. Russia's economic and strategic interests are more cordially being met by forum of BRICS. Therefore, Russia is firm on its stance over Ukraine and for the time being Russia has slowed down the so called process of EU and NATO enlargement/ expansion towards East because in actual no significant former Soviet state has joined the EU and NATO. In this regard both Russia and West fulfilled the viewpoint of Realist theory which is to increase their sphere of influence or expansionism. However, Russian move in Crimea is more offensive than defensive logically.

Russia despite the threats to marine life of Baltic Sea and despite obstructing the United Nations Conventions on Law of Sea (UNCLOS) has managed to almost complete the gas pipeline. Though it is obvious that Russia has clearly violated the territorial waters of Baltic States. It seems that West could not properly secure the issue of threats to marine life of Baltic Sea the way Crimean annexation is being secured. As a suggestion there are still chances of halting the Nord Stream II by using the platform of UN and its legislation on working on Sea such as UNCLOS.

Ukraine after aggressive actions from Russia, tried to create cooperation with NATO with perspective to freeze out the emerging conflict in Donbas region. NATO responded positively to Ukraine whereas other Eastern European states of Baltic region demanded strengthening of forum against Russia for minimum deterrence. Though Ukraine has not been awarded with membership so far but has approved fund for Ukrainian armed forces but this is not enough for Ukraine in front of Russia. Russia is looking strong in its neighborhood and Russian ethnic people in Eastern Ukraine are causing remarkable damages for incumbent Ukrainian govt which is pro West. If such proxy by Russia continues successfully then there are chances of losing other parts by Ukraine to Russia one by one.

If we analyse EU and NATO's role in terms of Securitization Theory (ST), then it seems NATO responded in shape of collective securitization in response to Russian aggression in Ukraine not as a state. However, initially Ukraine and some countries of Eastern Europe initiated the process of securitization at their own but still Ukraine is main actor in this whole



securitization process. Idea of securitizing an issue to region or to world is main point of ST whereas more than one countries constructing one issue becomes part of collective security. But here in this issue the object (Russia, a threat) is stronger one and referent object Ukraine is not at strong, through Ukraine has help of EU and NATO which are efficiently using the Speech Act theory and the Audience which are mainly the EU countries are not completely successful.

So now, NATO with its member countries as USA on top is trying their best to stop Russia from further aggression in East of Ukraine. NATO and EU both are consistently working to consolidate their platforms to whole of Eastern Europe which is being taken as threat by Russia. Thus, threat from West is obvious to Russia and RF after being economically empowered ever than before is silently implementing its aggressive policy. Due to lack of free hand from some of EU states for any sanctions against Russia such as Germany and France, RF seems free to play the game on ground with its own rules.

With changing geopolitical scenario all around the world, policies and issues are changing vis a vis. Nord Stream II on one hand is almost completed as laying of pipes near German coast has almost completed despite US sanctions on multiple companies involved in this project. Germany, despite an open and obvious threat of becoming more dependent on Russian gas has adamantly pursued the project. On the other hand, there is change of administration in USA and Joe Biden has taken over the charge of 46<sup>th</sup> US President. However, Biden during Trump era had already condemned the Nord Stream II project and called this project a threat to EU's sovereignty.

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