

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Countries with common interests and objectives are urged to maintain strategic alliances to deal with the inside and outside dangers. Every country has its own foreign policy to manage its position in the regional and international affairs. The convergence of national interest between countries makes alliances while the divergence of national interest keeps the countries apart. While looking towards Pak-US relation in historical perspective there are visible ups and down in their bilateral relationships. Different stages like initial hesitation, coordination, withdrawal, disappointment, and then readjustment were the hallmarks of this mutual partnership.

Since 1947 Pakistan-US relationships are regulated by such goals on both sides which essentially address national security issues, regional peace and political considerations. Nevertheless, it can be observed that the key objectives pursued by Pakistan in its foreign policy and all the more so in its ties with the United States are (1) global credibility as an independent state with genuine priorities and objectives; (2) advancement of an appropriate political and financial or economic request in the long run for the welfare of the state and (3) territorial strength. In short, Pakistan's concern about its state security has been the cornerstone of its political past right from its very beginning.

In the view of the unpredictable regional and global trends, the United States has sought after its own vital advantages in the region given the lucrative local and worldwide advancements. U.S. approach targets in South Asia since 1947 described as follows: Satisfying the region's power over vacuum when European pioneer powers departure, regulation of socialism, local steadiness, sway and safety of State, maintenance of the territorial sub-system, hold of local collaboration, a geopolitical closeness in the Indian Sea, diminishing of Soviet (prior Chinese also) impact in the territory, endeavors towards regional level of influence with common adjustment and support of Western nation and professional elites of West throughout a compelling open strategy.

Looking at the international strategic goals desired by both U.S and Pakistan, individual finds a noticeable congregation on the considerable issues, barring that which manages American worldwide procedures and ideological angles. Problems of defense and

territorial soundness generally, have been connected with Pakistani pioneers since 1947. Territorial what's more, domestic factors along their immediate bearing on national security of Pakistan has been progressively unequivocal and straight goals for Pakistan as reflected in its international strategies, though worldwide advancements have been assumed a circuitous job.¹

Pakistan's affirmation of the United States alliance clearly was destitute upon the previous unique journey for a strong accomplice on its side in its dispute with India. After the World War second, United States international strategy towards South-Western Asia and just as towards Pakistan specifically has basically been founded either on the ideological rule and regulation of Communism or the insurance of its monetary advantages. Pakistan's acknowledgment of the United States coalition apparently was needy upon the former dynamic quest for a solid partner on its side in its contention with India.²

World War II created two superpowers that were soon profoundly exposed to the insensitive elements of Cold War and in result the globe was separated in the coalition of US and USSR, both worked so acceptably throughout the Second World War were long broken up also, each started to float towards the far edges of a range coming about in what was then normally alluded to as the unbendingly captivated world. At the end of 1940s, the conflict from multiple points of view was formalized. Not exclusively did the Western security partnership framework come into presence yet in addition the Soviet system of bargains started to take care of business.³

On the other hand, only hasty partition was not the reason of Pakistan's sense of insecurity, but many other factors were involved to intensify it to an alarming stage. Firstly, Pakistan came up short on the profundity regarded to be the base necessity of security. Secondly; Pakistan needed well trained and numerically adequate military. Thirdly, Pakistan did not have an arms industry, not solitary arms industrial facility at the time was actually situated in the region to frame Pakistan and insufficient allotted armed resources were actually moved toward Pakistan. Fourthly, Pakistan acquired an enormous insecure border with India

¹ Iftikhar H. Malik, "The Pakistan-US security relationship: Testing bilateralism." *Asian Survey* 30, no. 3 (1990): 284-285.

² Bilal Hashmi, "The beginnings of US-Pakistan alliance." *Pakistan Forum* 3, no. 6/7, (1973): 3.

³ Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, *Pakistan's Defense Policy 1947-58* (US, Springer, 1990): 62.

which was the cause of many complications. Lastly, the inner heterogeneity combined with the absence of an authoritative structure, rare assets and the quest for a political framework provoked the current feeling of instability. Without any doubt India was the fundamental factor which forced Pakistan to enter into the western camp. Pakistan agreed to sign the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the US in May 1954 for mutual peace and stability. Later in that year it joined SEATO alongside the France, Britain, New Zealand, Thailand, United States, Australia and the Philippines. After a year, Pakistan signed the Baghdad pact, one more shared security association with Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Britain. The US was not involved in this relationship but remained intently connected with it from the very beginning. Baghdad Pact was renamed CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) after the withdrawal of Iraq in 1958.

Pakistan chooses to join the Western coalition framework basically on the grounds that it found the collusion as not just a solution to fulfill satisfactorily its security requirements yet in addition but a wellspring of most wanted financial help. Quick to verify the participation of whatever number neighborhood states as could be expected under the circumstances, the American found Pakistan as an extra significant partner which could assume a significant job in the Middle East and South Asia as well.⁴

1.1 Problem Statement

The main focus of this research is to explore the needs and dynamics which remained involve in forging an alliance and also the impact of these alliances on Pakistan's domestic and foreign political affairs. The chosen time period for this study is 1947 to 1958, these years were very important in Pakistan's history when Pakistani leaders understood the need to develop their defensive capabilities against India for the very first time, while the focus of the US was to combat communism. Therefore, both the U.S. and Pakistan have entered into a structured coalition partnership during these years.

This narration develops multiple questions regarding the politics of defense alliances between the two countries. The study would explore the dynamics due to which Pakistan joined US defense orbit on global front. How US utilized the strategic location of Pakistan

⁴ Cheema, 4.

through those security alliances. What were the objectives of US policy makers fulfill from its relationship with Pakistan? Is that security relationship vital for Pakistan? Meeting of national interests and areas of convergence all these things will be fully discussed in this research.

1.2 Research Objectives:

The principal objectives of this research are following:

- i) To assess the origin and needs of Pak-US defense alliances.
- ii) To explore the various dynamics of Pak- US defense alliances.
- iii) To evaluate the repercussions of Pak-US defense alliances on Pakistan.

1.3 Research Question

- 1) What were the needs which forced Pakistan to enter into the Western Camp?
- 2) What were those dynamics due to which Pakistan agreed to join these alliances?
- 3) What kind of repercussions Pakistan had to face due to its security alliances with the US?

All these important questions have been critically investigated in this study.

1.4 Research Methodology

The research was conducted using historical approaches to move forward and draw conclusions. Different tools such as literature review; primary and secondary sources were consulted to include a wider viewpoint on Pakistan's membership of the U.S. supported pacts in the West and their effect on Pakistan. The qualitative method has been used for this purpose. Primary data were gathered through agreements and official documents. Secondary resources such as books, newspapers, journals have been used for the completion of this research. The time period chosen for this research is 1947-58 as in 1954 both the United States and Pakistan entered into a structured coalition agreement for the very first time. This time witnessed mutual dependency and collaboration which later transformed into isolation and embitterment.

1.5 Literature Review

The chosen subject is spanning over 11 years, reflecting different dynamics in the partnership between the US and Pakistan. The safety partnership has been worked out in some form or the other during all these processes. The literature in collaboration on defense was primarily concerned with particular issues of these relations. In addition, the aim of this study is to collect basics of union and agreement from these resources to provide an accurate and entire picture.

So, for this purpose, the most detailed book about the subject is Abdul Sattar's *Pakistan Foreign Policy*. Pakistan's decision to enter the western camp after its liberation, often discussed in detail in this book that how and why Pakistan entered the western camp expressly designed to contain communism. The main objective of Pakistan to sign these agreements was to develop its security potential against India, where like, the United States these pacts were never meant to be against China but to counter communism. In this book, Abdul Sattar identified, clarified and examined Pakistan's willingness to become a U.S. partner because Pakistan's security and defense strategies were absolutely central to India and the U.S. is able to build up Pakistan's armed and economic capacity against India adequately.

The author Daniel S. Markey in his book, *No Exit from Pakistan: America's strained alliance with Pakistan*; gives a detailed overview of how Pakistan's domestic turmoil and its rivalry with India form Pakistan-U.S. partnership. To evaluate how the US has crafted its Pakistan strategy.

The paper, *The Beginnings of U.S.-Pakistan Alliances*, by Bilal Hashmi is an attempt to track the history of US strategy toward Pakistan. US foreign policy against South-West Asia in common after the end of World War II and Pakistan in particular focused largely on either the political concept of socialism suppression or the defense of its strategic interests. Since the British left the subcontinent of Indo-Pakistan. In 1947, there has been a popular uprising in this region. Foreign policy against Pakistan is based on specific political and economic interests, and Pakistan's recognition of the U.S. coalition evidently deepened the former aggressive quest for a military ally on its side in its dispute with India.

The book *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies*, by Dennis Kux, has a wealth of new information about Pak U.S. relations. It thoroughly

chronicles the major events, main problems and describes the main political and diplomatic personalities on both sides and also explains the twists and turns of the Cold War by highlighting the differences between the US and Pakistan. Kux's book is a concise study of Pakistani-American history.

The book of Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema *Pakistan's Defense policy 1947-58* is also an effort to explore defense policy in the sense of the relevant international political process, Southeast Asian and local impulses, and the function of rulers born in an adverse and problematic climate. In spite of the inclinations of the ruling elites, Pakistan had not many options available. The argument's focus circles around India's perceived security challenges to Pakistan and its counterbalance activities. The report often addresses the significance of solutions that Pakistan has decided to give up.

The literary portal for the *United States Pakistan forum*: by Noor A. Hussain and Leo E. Rose. This compiled book is made up of various papers. The study focuses multiple aspects of Pak-US relations, but the most vital are defense and financial ties between Pak-US. The research explores the concept of the unofficial relationship between them on the basis of regional and foreign policies. Although discussing the scope of the security partnership between both the countries, the book gives a brief overview of how the U.S. and Pakistan became allies when Pakistan claimed front-line government position against communism containment. It also explains how Pakistan's founding father, Quaid-i-Azam took the initiative to establish security ties between these two countries. The US's initial response, though, was not as positive as the US was participating in the rebuilding of Europe through the Marshall Plan. Subsequently, the evolving nature of international politics, communist growing influence and global relativism with India brought obvious shifts in US strategy towards the area which increased Pakistan's significance in the world.

Iftikhar H. Malik in his article *The Pakistan-U.S. Security Relationship Testing Bilateralism*, describes the Pakistan-United States Partnership, in the fifth decade of its life. Consecutive phases of conflict and the relaxation from the time of its creation has marked by various "ups and downs." Various levels of initial reluctance, convergence, Alienation, have been fully explained in this article. Pakistan US since 1947 relationship has been dominated by definite policy goals on both sides which generally speak to the issues of state security,

global stability and national interest, in view of the fluctuating regional and global trends, the U.S tried to design its strategic interest in the area. The main objective of United States in Southwest Asia and South Asia after 1947 can be described as follows: filling the region's popular uprising after the departure of western powers, suppressing communism, stability of the region, individual states autonomy and security all these things are carefully presented in this article which provides complete comprehension about the topic.

Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan the U.S., and an Epic History of Misunderstanding: Hussain Haqqani's book thoroughly traces the historical pattern of this tense partnership from 1947 to onwards, clearly stating both countries role. The main priority of US ties with Pakistan the superpower's closest ally in the 1950s. The book describes Pakistan-US interactions in some chapters by structured analyzes and in others storytelling. Haqqani often speaks of resources missed goals closed-minded and values diverging. According to Haqqani, the main focus of Pakistan-US relations can be defined by the economic needs of Pakistan and the eager donor- ship of the United States. He says the government of U.S has almost given aid in exchange for broken promises, it has almost always reacted to Pakistan's requests. In the case of Pakistan and the US, the difference of priorities greatly overshadowed the parallels, largely due to the need for the Pakistani government to reconcile its need for support with the status of the country as a sovereign entity.

Another book, *The American Role in Pakistan 1947-58:* written by S.M Venkatarmani describes that since Pakistan was founded her perception of threat has remained central to India. The Author writes on the history of the Pak-US relationship from 1947-58 in this book. In order to strengthen its defense, Pakistan's leadership from the father of the nation Quaid-e-Azam to Zia requested help from the US where Pakistan was later used to create its own goals at the periphery. Pakistan was the largest financial and military recipient after joining the western camp. The history and repercussions of the agreements have major effects on the citizens of Pakistan's internal politics, culture and freedom. Besides that, hard-hitting truth the position and leadership of influential citizens and their relationship with the US are further discussed in this book. The author addresses many reasons that are responsible for intensified conflict within Pakistan and the US, the violent Indian structure in South Asia and challenges to Pakistan. After all, the report focuses on the strategic aspects and the diplomatic

implications of Pak-US ties. The book also examines the effects and the advancements that actually happen during the two states constant relationships. A lot of work has been done on Pak-US partnerships but the specific needs and dynamics are always ignored. This research is an in-depth study of Pak-US alliances with the particular requirements and complexities, following the historical path of 1947-58 and discusses all those viewpoints that compel Pakistan to enter the Western camp and the consequences of these pacts that Pakistan had to face after entering these agreements. This research is aimed at filling these gaps.

Pakistan's Foreign Policy- An Historical Analysis, by S. M. Burke is the first authoritative work on the history of Pakistan's external relations. This book provides a comprehensive and straightforward analysis of Pakistan's foreign policy, as well as a detailed history of Pakistan's foreign policy that explains much of the background (Kashmir, Afghan borders, Pakistan's foreign policy challenges and interests). Each volume starts with a summary of the historical context. Non-Aligned 1947-1953, Aligned 1954-1962 and a time of reappraisal 1963-1970 three phases of Pakistan's foreign policy are discussed. The book describes Pakistan-US interactions chapters by structured analyzes. In this book the Author writes on the history of the Pak-US relationship from 1947 to onward.

Munawar Hussain, in his article *Pak-US relations: An historical overview*, presents the relationship between US and Pakistan and with this backdrop, the study will trace the evolution of US-Pakistan relations and elements of inconsistency as a glaring feature of the relationship. It answers how Pakistan, as a weak nation, pursued its security and economic interests once it became significant for US policies for the region and beyond? This study starts with pre-partition period and also discusses variation in the relationship during cold war era, post-cold war period and expected future path of relationship.

India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent, by G. W. Choudhury, focuses on the Soviet Union, the United States, and China's relations with Pakistan and India after 1947. In his novel, the author goes on to claim that the subcontinent's geopolitical position has attracted the intervention of major powers. Professor Choudhury is a professor at the University of Calcutta.

1.6 Significance of the Study

Through emphasizing and understanding the importance of the Pak-US security partnership, the study's significance can be identified by exploring it, because it is an important topic. During the Post-World War 11 the US and the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) appeared as the two dominant states. Several states entered the coalition of Socialists as some states joined the group of capitalists. For security, political support, economic assistance and national independence, Pakistan entered the imperialist coalition. United State and Pakistan formed a joint venture in the 1950s; an important part of this study is that friendship.

The study's significance lies in its recognition of the trend of strong and sustainable relationship in the changing world situation. The US had played its role by suppressing communism while on the other side Pakistan had to address a number of challenges both internally and externally. Pakistan hoped that strategic-economic cooperation with the US and several other domains could also lead to the region's peace. However, Pakistan entered partnerships to achieve its goals. Nevertheless, this investigation has provided an opportunity to explain the different needs and conditions of Pak-US defense partnerships and their future prospects from this perspective of national security and peace, this work is therefore of great importance.

1.7. Theoretical Framework

Realism is a concept used in many different disciplines in various ways. Political realism in international relations is a trend of study that emphasizes the challenges facing the state in adopting a power strategy of interest to the nation. Realist stress the constitutional limitations caused by human egotism and the absence of international entity (anarchy) demanding the centrality of power and security in political life. The essence of reality is created by the synthesis of instability and selfishness and the subsequent paradigms of power politics. In U.S, the emblematic personalities of the twentieth century include George Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr and Kenneth Waltz. H. Carr in the UK. Thomas Hobbes and Machiavelli are generally regarded realist in Western political thinking tradition.

Thucydides considers realism as a philosophy of politics in general. It transfers our focus from political system to human behavior. The disparity between humanity and brutality is an

example of what is basically the same part of the human condition, when it performs under different situations. Egoism is generally greatly limited within states by authoritarian democratic law. Anarchy often promotes to convey the worst aspects of human nature in international relations. It means resolving and handling problems, not preventing them, finding a less dangerous world rather than a secure, pleasant or friendly one. Ethical concerns have to give priority to policy motives. Realism claims that objective moral values cannot be extended to state actions.

Kenneth Waltz has put an almost desirable focus on anarchy, the lack of rigid political doctrine. John Herz claims that the centrality of the fight for power is ensured by anarchy even in the lack of aggressiveness or related factors. The generic tag for such concepts is Structural Realism. Neo-realism is the other popular term, contrasting from older, more experimental realists this systematic conceptual focus. Typically, the two words are used synonymously. Realists often stress human nature without ignoring the centrality of chaos. Morgenthau suggests, for instance, that the social context is but a reflection of humanity onto the common plane. Realists see that confrontation was partly explained in cases, however assume that if not even so, arrogance, greed, and the desire for fame will allow the battle clash of civilizations to continue forever. War and conflict are fundamentally embedded in human behavior. The most popular tag for this situation is classical realism. The predominance of energy, self-interest and competition is emphasized by solid realists but leaves limited room for non-realistic powers and interests that are politically outstanding. Carr, Morgenthau and Waltz, their generation's leading realists, are all in this continuum range. As Carr puts it, "in absolute reality soft or hedged realists support the practical interpretation of global affairs' problem, but are accessible to a broader variety of political options and see key elements of global politics outside the descriptive realism spectrum.

Hobbes state of nature makes three clear hypotheses, Men are the same they communicate with each other in anarchy. Competition, diffidence, and pride motivate them. The combination of these situations tends to lead to a war between everyone there. Men are equal in the basic context that the smallest has sufficient strength to conquer the best, either through hidden contrivance or through union with others. By achieving this equality of capacity, equality of hope emerges Waltz and structural realism. The traditional realism of

Hobbes gives anarchy and selfishness roughly equal emphasis. While neo-classical realism made a small return, more or less systematic research has been the most practical since the 1970s as an effect of the power of Kenneth Waltz. Waltz claims that startling conceptual differences exist between the politics of agreed law and the politics of chaos. Most of these variations are the subject of the sub-sections that follow. Hierarchy includes super- and subordination relationships within sections of a structure, which means their distinction. Nevertheless, anarchic systems have little distinction in structure. Each unit has to position itself in a position to take care of itself as no one else can be counted on to do so. Differences between states are capable, not working. Federal policy is made up of distinct groups that perform specific roles. World politics is like a domestic politics. It is made up of like groups which repeat the actions of each other. If all domestic orders are anarchic, and this means little operational distinction, therefore international political frameworks vary only in their capability distribution. The rising fortunes of great powers describe them. Quite descriptively, the number of major forces depends on the number of international orders.

Balancing Structural realism's main philosophical assumption is that order rather than bandwagon systems of chaos. Under centralized political orders, actors prefer to jump on a leading candidate's bandwagon or a recent champion, since losing does not endanger their safety. Others power especially great powers are always a risk when there is no state for defense to run to. Through resisting the majority party, balancers attempt to minimize their threat. Poor states have little alternative but to predict right and assume that early cooperation with the champion would carry favorable treatment. That risk would only be accepted by foolish great powers. Alternatively, they must manage this internally through resource allocation for national security and internationally, mainly through partnerships and other formal and informal arrangements.

Balancing systemic forces clarify essential but otherwise confounding aspects of international relations. Consider the relations between the Soviet and the United States. The U.S. supported the Russian Revolution and was actively aggressive to the Soviet Union for two decades. Nonetheless, the American-Soviet coalition was formed in the Second World War by a common enemy, Hitler's Germany, in the Second World War, formed the American-Soviet coalition. They balanced against a common threat, given their extreme internal

differences and the background of hostility. The U.S. and the Soviet Union both became rivals after the war. In this version of history economic caused hostility, that superpower is the only real threat to the safety of the other in a bipolar universe. Everyone has to compete against each other, despite their desires or inclinations. In this view, the Cold War was not induced by anyone, but the product of bipolarity is normal. Soviet penetration into Central and Eastern Europe emerged neither from ruthless. Moscow leaders nor militant Washington anticommunists. It was the typical behavior of a country destroyed from the south, with catastrophic consequences, twice in twenty-five years, and again a century ago. Similarly, the wars of the Cold War in Vietnam, Central America and South Africa were not part of a global communist conspiracy, but rather common attempts by a major power to maintain its global influence. This example shows a level of view that is very significant.

Realism is a philosophical view of the workings of the universe. Realism's philosophical frameworks were used to perform this analysis. The hypothetical framework will describe that Pakistan has established relations with the United States. Any alliance's life depends on states needs and interests. The theoretical framework has described the following areas: power first, political and economic balance second. Thirdly, there are security issues and fourth is Mutual Independence. According to the practical model, states are key players in the global system. Both states primary concerns were self-interest and sustainability.⁵ Human beings are violent, competitive, and self-centered by essence, according to the rational model, they often believe that a state's strength relies on its military strength; state will be powerful if its military is good. A state's behavior focus on the state's desire and a state's strategies are made on the basis of that competitiveness between states.

1.8. Delimitations on Research

Due to the nature of the topic in term of the time span concerned, the emphasis was largely on understanding the protection partnership demands, needs, challenges and implications, which was useful in making specific assumptions about the feasibility and form of this relationship in the years to come.

⁵ Scott Burchill et. al, *Theories of International Relations* (US, Palgrave 2005): 29-34.

1.9. Organization of the Study.

This thesis comprises of following chapters:

Chapter 1: Introduction; chapter first addresses the issues and explains the intent of the research, providing a quick overview of the alliance definition literature on the issue. This research thesis identifies research questions that need to be answered. It also includes the aims and methodologies followed for performing this research.

Chapter 2: Pak-US relation in historical perspective; looks at the roots of the defense relationship in the early 1950s. It explains the security situation of Pakistan at the time of independence and its choice of a foreign protector in the war against India for survival.

Chapter 3: Pak-US relations: The needs and dynamics for strategic alliances; This chapter describe that which conditions forced Pakistan to enter in to an alliance system and also the various dynamics due to which Pakistan became most allied ally of US.

Chapter 4: Repercussions; This chapter has focused on the analyses of Pak-US military alliances that how the objectives of US policy makers were fulfilled from its relationship with Pakistan and what kind of repercussions Pakistan had to face during and after those pacts.

CHAPTER 2

PAK-US RELATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Foreign policy is a mixture of politics and armed conflict. International diplomacy deals with planning and security policies in response to real or future military wars with a global adversary on the one side and domestic sources dispute on the other. Security policy of a government implies the steps and acts that are taken in compliance with potential risks that are likely to jeopardize the rights and principles that the nation cherishes. However, Security planning is not pursued in isolation and is still responsive to the demands of both actual and potential eventualities. The development of security policy is based on reviews (both domestic and outside) and expectations. Among the internal inputs, individuals, society, government framework and ideologies weigh relatively small, while the external contributions come from the geo-political background, the global and regional security situation, the global economic environment and the adversary's relationships. Those results are weighed against governing class standards. In accordance with its evaluation of the inputs creating a protection agenda, this sets out a security plan and its perception of threats and fragile critical interests.⁶

Through a traditional concept, a country's fundamental interests are those principles with which it is able to participate in significant cultural, political, and military intervention at all costs. These rights shall be protected and given such high priority that even carrying out a military action shall be deemed to be a fully justifiable act. Nevertheless, there is hardly an agreement on a national security policy or even national interests in most developing countries, but the right of defining what are nation's vital interests and determining security policy resides with the dominant classes. The alignments and orientations of these initiatives are subjected to complexities of political and economic circumstances to a large extent.

No particular strategy can clarify Pakistan's defense policy in depth or even do justice, because its understanding of the international environment (both global and provincial) is dynamic and multi-layer. As several other nations, it wants to portray the environment in its

⁶ Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, *Pakistan's Defense Policy 1947-58*:
(US, Palgrave 1990): 1-5.

own terms; it is Islamic and aspires not only to be quite similar to other Muslim countries but also to see itself as one of the main members of the Islamic bloc; which has tried to play roles concurrently in the Middle East and Southeast Asia; he saw himself as the protector of the conventional invasion path, but this geographical aspect was not granted much attention either to the neighbors or to the other major powers concerned; he tried to play a strategic role, but faced a more aggressive neighbor; It has an immense pool of skilled labor but is overshadowed by giants such as Soviet Union and India. So, another approach to study the security strategy for Pakistan is to look at its appearance in the international political environment of the post-war era, the global compulsions which include neighborhood irredenta and ambitions for closer ties with the Islamic world, Perceptions of risks like the risk of advancing communism and India's overarching challenge and the philosophy, desires and role of the political class. A country's defense mainly involves preserving its national interests and inculcating a sense of defense among its nation through forces preparedness. When setting out to devise a country's defense policies, policymakers also begin to identify challenges from both internal and external outlets. Further they proceed onwards to the assessment of the way and the force of the apparent dangers⁷.

Historically, Pakistan-U.S. relations have been both agreeable and conflictive, extending from lack of interest to closeness to threatening vibe. The checkered history is to some degree because of the inborn confinements and logical inconsistencies associated with a connection between a little state and superpower. For Pakistan the collusion with the U.S. has been the basic factor in its international strategy, while for the U.S. the ties with Pakistan have been one of numerous other fringe ties. The geopolitical real factors and vital impulses will in general unite them. The amazing thing isn't consequently that the historical backdrop of Pakistan-U.S. relations is a checkered one. Interestingly, the relationship has endured all the anxieties and strains that it has been exposed to and in any event, during the most noticeably awful of times the two have figured out how to have at any rate a working relationship.⁸

⁷ Cheema,7.

⁸ Rais A. Khan, "Pakistan-United States Relations an Appraisal." *Journal of American Studies*, 23, no. 1 (1985): 83-85.

2.1 Role of US in the Subcontinent before partition

There was no overt communication between the US and the Indian subcontinent during the post-division era. From a security point of view, the Indian subcontinent was a region of negligible concern to the US government. When the US arose from its protectionist policies in the early decades of the 20th century, its focus was on the struggle for power in Europe and the emergence of Japan's presence in the Indian Ocean. Such trends were challenging the traditional balance of power and disrupting the key economic and political interest of America in those areas. India was a backward British agricultural colony which gave little to the US. Token military, financial and economic relation between the two countries represented the low priority. The formal American involvement in India has been by diplomat services in the Calcutta, Mumbai, Madras and Karachi port areas. Delhi did not have a military presence so all government communication was passed via the British Government.

Throughout World War II, India acted as a supply center for the Burmese and Chinese theaters in response to the fight against the Japanese. This even supplied forces to battle alongside British and American forces. During this time, the US government closely watched the political changes within India and was eager to observe the Indians support in fight against the Nazi regime. In South Asia the Japanese attack immediately caught the Allies. In short order, the British hegemony collapsed in Malaya, Singapore and Burma. By the fall of 1941, the Indian Subcontinent was within reaching distance of Burma's Japanese troops. The US was deeply engaged with China at this point, and India served as an important base for logistics and air support Centre. The US government has become worried that India's political revolution will severely affect this emerging war stab. The first US Commissioner Thomas Wilson was appointed by the President Roosevelt in India in October 1941, indicating a significant job for the area. The main purpose was just to investigate the possibilities of participation in the maintenance of road and other transportation development project in India. At the same time, in the US the first Indian Attorney General Sir Giraj Shankar Bajpai was appointed. The US soon enhanced its role in 1942 by nominating Colonel Lewis Johnson as the first US envoy to India. Upon his return, he took an active role in informal discussion on the future constitutional dispensation with the political leader of India. Infect Prime Minister

Churchill was requested by the President Roosevelt that all ethnic and racial classes of India should be given sovereign status, though he did not force this proposal very aggressively because the British Empire was already a significant participant in the entire war.⁹

The American government watched closely and contributed their message to make certain political compromises to the Indians, and British Government was supporting numerous political actions. During this period, they remained in touch with Gandhi and Nehru the main leaders of Congress who were famous among the political circles and in the US government as well.¹⁰ They have also exchanged correspondence with President Roosevelt on the topic of Indian freedom. As for the Sub-Continent's Muslims, the American government, politicians and media have not been so popular. In the Sub Continent the Muslim movement actually received little attention just before the 1940s. Then the effort became too strong to combat in the sense of emergence of the Pakistan Movement in 1930 and Allama Iqbal propounded the idea of the two nations in the Subcontinent for the Muslim, before this the Americans were completely ignorant in this large world about the condition of the 100 million Muslims. The Muslim league leaders also had no interaction with the government of the US as compared to the members of the Congress.

One of the earliest examples to the Pakistan Revolution in US media reporting to India based on Congress leaders like Jawhar Lal Nehru and Gandhi. The US military mission in India was carried out by the embassy facilities in the main ports of Karachi, Madras, Calcutta and Mumbai and all government communication were passed through the British Government because Delhi did not have the Military role. Once the embassy of US submitted a thorough briefing in Calcutta on the historic resolution of Lahore in April 1940, he said "Pakistan may be postponed or put aside; it would be a major mistake to ignore Pakistan's resolution as anything of declining significance or of no value."¹¹ Throughout World War II, as the Indian nationalist revolution acquired support, a lot of stories emerged in the US newspaper related

⁹ Muhammad Asim Malik, "*Pakistan-US Security Relationship 1947-2006: Analysis of Areas of Convergence and Divergence*." Unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of Education 2010), 43-44.

¹⁰ Malik, 45.

¹¹ Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies* (Washington DC. Woodrow Wilson Centre Press ,2001): 5.

to Jinnah and the Muslim league. Jinnah is identified as “The man who has more influence in his hands for good or bad than any other Indian leader.”¹²

Pakistan’s proposal was not drawn quite favorably by the US government. In August 1942, in a conference with British in New York, President Roosevelt articulated his resistance to the notion of dividing India, “The partition of India sounded terrible, after the US experience of Civil War.”¹³ As the movement was increasing strength in Pakistan, the American press took notice.

Time Magazine’s cover depicted Muhammad Ali Jinnah in April 1946, with the headline, “His Muslim Tiger wants to eat the Hindu Cow”¹⁴ The reports had been strongly dismissive of the partition concept. British proposals for a United India were also firmly backed by the American Government. Loy Henderson, Head of Near Eastern and African Policy wrote a report from the State Department, in which Muslim League was criticized for the diplomatic situation and indicated that the UK Parliament would carry out institutional amendments instead of the resistance from the Muslim League. Therefore, the Cabinet Mission Project, a final attempt to preserve Indian cohesion, assumed additional value for US State Departments. Jinnah approved the plans, but Nehru, who originally accepted, later refused on some of the main provisions that would guarantee that Muslim interests in a Unified India should be secured. The performance of the Muslim League's Cabinet Mission Strategy to maintain the country's cohesion was a significant occurrence. On 16 August 1946, Quaid-e-Azam called for a free protest for Pakistan and proclaimed it the “Day of Deliverance.”

This has resulted in massive violence and anti-Muslim protests all over India. The U.S. government at this point, concerned about the possibility of violence and took a further constructive position toward the negotiation with both the Muslim League and Congress. The Jinnah and Nehru both were invited by the British to London for talk in December 1946. Such negotiations collapsed so the Department of State maintained its own actions. US leaders in India had a separate meeting with Jinnah and Liaquat and said to them to consider United India Cabinet Plan. In one of those talks the Spark the Vice President of the United States and Jinnah, were involved. The US delegate demanded that with Congress the Muslim League would decide

¹² Kux, 6.

¹³ Kux, 6.

¹⁴ Kux, 8.

to work. The Jinnah said, “Say to your government that we are working for the same ends, but do not be chloroformed for God's sake by meaningless gestures of Congress made for propaganda effect.”¹⁵ The US department and Muslim League clearly did not hold common opinion for the future of India.

The British elections in 1946 had seen the Labor Party's increasing power. They were more likely to give Indian freedom compared with the losing Conservative Group. The Government of Atlee has named Lord Louis Mountbatten introduce successful methods of departure from India. Mountbatten has planned to give independence in June 1948 to the Sub Continent. He accelerated the Independence deadline to August 194, as he knew that it was the only realistic alternative to prevent more instability and abuse in the nation.

Sadly, those things were not going well for the Sub-Continent's future, particularly for Pakistan. Within three months to divide a nation as large and complex as India, overcoming all sticky points has become an almost impossible mission. The division of land, the unity of 562 Princely States and the demarcation of frontiers were among the main problems that had to be settled.¹⁶ The downside, of course, rested with the smaller annexing territory. Uncertainty fueled the fires of religious conflict and resulted in widespread displacement of Indian Muslims. Pakistan, acknowledged by Congress only reluctantly, was in all ways short shifted. Quaid-e- Azam 's words have it been a “moth eaten Pakistan”.¹⁷ In these crucial days the Priorities of US were an orderly transition of control, desire for united India then stability and peace.¹⁸ The government of US has not expressed views regarding India's partition with the Muslim League. They voiced profound concerns, worrying that the Sub-Continent will be destabilized. When Pakistan's establishment was a guarantee, though, the US government recognized the new nation and acted swiftly to officially recognize it. As can be seen in the message given to Quaid by President Truman on the day of freedom, “I extend sincere good wishes to you, to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and to the people of Pakistan on behalf of the American people. I want to assure you that the new dominion

¹⁵ Kux, 9.

¹⁶ Malik, 48.

¹⁷ Kux, 13.

¹⁸ Malik, 48.

embarks on this course with the firm friendship and goodwill of the United State America.”¹⁹ Given this optimistic move, the US had much critical things to address than the²⁰Subcontinent's developing states. For many years following the Second World War, the US wanted Britain to look after the needs of the West in the area and to obey its advice.

The previous white allies in the war against Nazi Germany on the world stage; the West headed by the US and the triumphant communist under Stalin were now heading into another conflict of the Cold War. The Soviet Union and US had risen in the post-World War era as the two strongest nations, this was the start of a new military confrontation on politico. When the Soviet Union continued to expand its impact in Europe, the US became nervous about losing territory and agreed to help Greece and Turkey's collapsing economies. Britain, politically exhausted by the war effort, has told the US that these two nations would no longer be sponsored. President Truman issued a new policy declaration, on March 12, 1947 “The Truman Doctrine,” which fixed assistance for the two younger nations to keep them from slipping under the control of the communists. President Truman said: “I think it will be U.S. policy to help free men who oppose attempted subjugation.”²¹

In June 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall announced another major policy initiative to support the European economic recovery, what’s becomes popular as the Marshal strategy. In China, in spite of huge financial and military aid in China, the US supported Chaing Ki Sheik’s nationalist regime was gradually for the Chinese Communists lost the support. In the previously mentioned wider sense, the subcontinent was an area outside of the communist struggle. To be of immediate concern to the US it had no significant military and economic importance. In McMahon's terms it was an area of “peripheral significance” for the leadership of the US.²²

2.2 After 1947 US Defense Concern in the Sub-Continent

The independence of Pakistan and India in 1947 arrived at a moment, when the British Empire devastated in less than four decades by the catastrophic consequences of two world

¹⁹ Malik, 49.

²⁰ Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2005: A Concise History*: (US, Oxford University Press, 2000): 41.

²¹ Malik, 50.

²² Malik, 50.

wars, breathed its last. In reality it represented in Asia and Africa the beginning of the decades of European colonial control. During World War II, the burden of Western supremacy transferred firmly to the US. On the collapse in the Middle East and Asia, the new threat to Western ambitions emerged in the shape of the communism of European influence and prestige. Mainly worried about the danger of Communism gaining influence in Europe's economically and politically insecure nations the US planners often feared that the new states of Asia would collapse into the Soviet sphere.²³

India and Pakistan in the viewpoint of US were important enough, however out of immediate consideration, due to the scale, wealth and position of the two nations that collectively represented one quarter of the population of the world. Although the planner of the US failed to economically get Germany and Japan back to them through the Marshal Plan and in other opportunities as well, they did not neglect the interest of India and Pakistan. They believed that British diminishing power in this area would be an opportunity for the communists to exploit. Doubtful about the countries' potential nature and worried about the likely effect of these countries slipping into the Soviet Zone, the US military advisors sought to determine possible alternative for these developing states. The foundation of relations between the two countries during these developmental years was basically the fight for control against communism. The Truman Administration viewed both countries in term of their future gains in the prolonged Cold War. A late 1948 CIA analysis stated that the subcontinent should be “a potentially important base for all sides in the event of a global war between the US and the USSR”²⁴ The U.S. Joint Chief of Staff acknowledged Karachi and Lahore's geographical position and significance as possible grounds against communism and Middle Eastern security.

Therefore, in the early years of democracy, the primary goal for the US leaders was to turn these nations India and Pakistan towards the US and Western economies and keep them away from the Soviet Union. However, the US strategic experts found Pakistan more essential for the US security interest. The two reasons rendered the cold war fight very profitable for this new nation.

²³ Malik, 50.

²⁴ Malik, 51.

Firstly, it's near proximity to the Soviet Central Asia, which has rendered it an excellent location for collecting information and supplying airfields to strategically target Russian manufacturing centers in the Urals. "Pakistan is of enormous strategic significance for USSR long range bombardment."²⁵ Secondly, Pakistan's connection to the Persian Gulf makes it theoretically essential for any Middle East security scheme. Pakistan can be used as a meeting point for the powers involved in the preservation or recovery of Middle East oilfield. Both these factors, in the view of US policy leaders all these aspects merged to give strategic and military importance to Pakistan as compared to the India. State Secretary George Marshall in his July 1947 report to President Truman; outline the geopolitical value of Pakistan.

"I believe it would be in our national interest to accord recognition to the new Dominion of Pakistan at the earliest possible date by responding favorably to the anticipated request for an exchange of ambassadors. Pakistan with a population of seventy million persons will be the largest Muslim country in the world and will occupy one of the most strategic areas in the world."²⁶

Pakistan and India have been deemed important to the United States for numerous purposes. The significance of India derived from the fact that it was the British Raj's eventual heir and ruling power in South Asia.²⁷ Pakistan was important at the time, as the largest Muslim region, that could help to overcome the widening gap between the East and West by its historical relations and religious affiliation with those countries. The Western section of the upcoming fight against the Soviets had strategic importance for the American policymakers. At this point The US desired to establish strong ties with both countries.²⁸ Nevertheless, the emergence of the cold war as described earlier, was far from the Sub-Continent.

2.3 Security Dilemma in Pakistan on the Eve of Partition

The climate around the liberation of Pakistan was highly vulnerable. More than a thousand miles of aggressive Indian Land divided the two wings of the newly founded nation. The hostility and anger concerning the struggle for freedom was expressed in the abduction

²⁵ Malik, 52.

²⁶ M.S. Venkataramani, *The American Role in Pakistan, 1947-1958* (New Delhi: Radiant, 1982),7-8.

²⁷ Sattar, 44.

²⁸ Malik, 53.

and violent killings by Hindus and Sikhs of thousands of Muslims. There have also been cases of forced displacement and killing of Hindus in regions currently including Pakistan. Wholesale rioting and robberies have taken place in Punjab.

Lahore was filled with migrants, with their horror accounts, assassinations and massacres. Hatred and distrust intensified the separation, which had previously been an intensely painful process. As Dennis Kux points out, “The tragic birth of Pakistan should have made the friendship between India and Pakistan complicated and brutal despite the best of circumstances.”²⁹ Yet the conditions were far from perfection, alas. This was attributed to the speed of which Mountbatten split India and the strong hostility against the new nation.

“Mountbatten's partition agreement treated Pakistan as a stepchild. India, as the successor state to the British colonial regime received the lion's share of the trained administrative personnel, armed forces and financial reserves of British India; Pakistan, as the seceding state, inherited little more than table scraps.”³⁰

From the defense point of view, the issues at the beginning were attributed largely to factors relating to the way the Mountbatten Administration divided the Subcontinent.³⁴ Insecure boundaries which contribute to disparities right from the beginning within three months of division, these disparities transformed into war. This was a direct example of the failure of forethought and reasoning in the boundary commission decisions, completely insufficient defense infrastructure, in particular the army which inevitably left the nation weak and in need of material support. The weak economic condition, the absence of any adequate government system and services, the refugee issues all largely depended on the new government of Pakistan. For just 17.5% of British India's reserves, the nascent nation was lifted up with the challenge of constructing and operating from scratch the entire government network. As pointed out by Mc Mohan, “Pakistan's economic plight compounded its security dilemma, making it nearly impossible to supply a military force adequate for internal security purposes, no less capable of protecting Pakistan from external threats.”³¹

After freedom, two very troubling defense problems erupted almost instantly. The first emerged from the Pakistan's western neighbor Afghanistan's pessimistic mindset. The

²⁹ Kux, 19.

³⁰ Malik, 54.

³¹ Malik, 56.

Government of Kabul voted against Pakistan to the UN. On 30 September 1947, Afghanistan was the sole party in the United Nations General Assembly to speak against Pakistan. This endorsed the demand for an autonomous state of Pathans in the region comprising the Khyber Pakhtun Khwa (NWFP.). This declined to recognize the results of the NWFP plebiscite which led to the province entering Pakistan. It also challenged the legitimacy of the Durand border, established by the British in 1893, between Afghanistan and Pakistan³².

The Government of Pakistan believed that the Russians were secretly supporting these statements. The second, much more dangerous question emerged from the question of the Princely States' accession. Minority rulers administered the two broad princely states, Hyderabad and Kashmir. In 1947, Lord Mountbatten proposed the partition rules under this plan it is said that these states could recover complete freedom after the Raj's termination. Nevertheless, they were firmly encouraged to enter either India or Pakistan in the light of their geographical place and population density.³³ Hyderabad's Muslim Nizam decided to maintain its autonomous position, but his aspirations went against the common will of the majority of Hindu citizens. Situated in the center of the Indian Sub-Continent, it clung to its territory, despite growing demand from India to join.

Kashmir, the other large princely state, located over 85,000 square miles in northwestern India, was administered by a Hindu Maharaja which comprising about 85 percent of the Muslim community. The state had whole travel and economic relations with Pakistan. The only road link with Jammu, the winter city, was via the town of Sialkot in Pakistan. Similarly, Kashmir protected the headwaters of all large running rivers in West Pakistan. Maharaja Hari Singh, who controlled the oppressed Muslim populace as a real dictator, could not afford to lose his important asset. He concluded a "Standards Deal" with Pakistan awaiting a final judgment on the state's status. Actions afterwards, though, presented enough indications that it was a negotiating strategy with the minimal goal of preventing entering Pakistan. The most significant indication was the decision by the boundary commission to grant Gurdaspur district of Muslim majority to India, presenting them with access to land to the rocky state largely dominated by Pakistan. A scheduled uprising and

³² Kux, 20.

³³ Kux, 20- 21.

forced displacement of the Jammu Muslims preceded this, dramatically altering the racial makeup of the City. At the same time, the Indian government was quickly attempting to construct an alternative road route from Pathankot to Jammu to the Kashmir Valley. Noticing the future, in October 1947 the Kashmiri Muslims rose up against Maharaja.

They were also supported by some 2000 NWFP tribesmen. When they conquered the mountainous territory of Kashmir bordering Pakistan and marched towards Srinagar, the capital, on 24 October 1947, Maharaja signed an association agreement with India. The Indian Armed Forces landed at Srinagar Airport within two days. The sheer speed about such a complex air- mobile activity further reinforced Pakistan's concerns that accession preparations should have been ready long before the actual date. In granting accession to Kashmir' Lord Mountbatten, currently governor general of India, issued a strong remark "As soon as law and order have been resorted and the soil cleared of invaders, the question of state's accession should be settled by reference to the people."³⁴ With the Indian Army moving towards rag tag rebels in Kashmir and seeking to forcibly take hold of the territory, Pakistan's government and citizens felt helpless. Pakistan's military was in no position to react to any major threat. The deployment of supplies and weapons, produced out of established Indian Army divisions, was quite lopsided. With most of the ordnance factories and stores located in India, Pakistan has never arrived at much of the promised equipment and material. Major general Fazl-e-Muqim Khan writes, "Much of the mechanical transport was deficient and there were neither reserve to replace vehicles nor were tools and spares to repair them. There was complete absence of procurement machinery for good, lubricants and oil."³⁵

Not only was Pakistan gravely deficient in stores, but most divisions still lacked cohesion. The condition of these units is identified by Field Marshal Ayub Khan: "When partition came, our men from units in India began to trickle back in small groups. In some cases, they were unarmed and in others they had to fight their way out. So, we had to start our army with bits and pieces like gigantic jig saw puzzle with some of the bits missing."³⁶

³⁴ Malik,57-58.

³⁵ Malik

.59.

³⁶ Kux, 18-20, 59

Unenviable national security, administrative condition and an army missing almost all Hindu India's fear of supremacy emerged as the single most prevailing force affecting Pakistan's foreign policy formulation in this critical era. Acharya Kripalani (President of the Congress Party) said this, "Neither Congress nor the nation has given up claim for a United India", and Sardar V. B Patel (Indian Home Minister) said "Sooner than later, we shall again be united in common allegiance to our country."³⁷

The new US consulate in Pakistan summed up this disconcerting series of issues in an October 1947 dispatch as the difficulties faced by Pakistan's new Dominion government in August 1947 were compounded in September and acquired dimensions that challenged the very life of the new state. In these incredibly challenging conditions, Pakistan's leadership was looking for urgent financial and military assistance from other nations. The leadership of Pakistan planned to appeal to the United States for aid. Subsequently the key determinant of the U.S. strategy towards South Asia has been the U.S. impression of the locale's importance to the quest for its worldwide monetary, geopolitical and key objectives. The area has been raised or brought down on the size of American needs as per its apparent significance to America's interests in the East-West clash. American strategy in the area has been formed less concerning the nations of the district yet regarding America's relations with the Soviet Union and China. The Americans needed Asia to pursue an organic process of change that was dedicated to democracy and free trade. Helping that method the U.S. initiated the Point Four Plan that, according to historian Harry Magdoff, was to "maintain a position of influence around the world and retain a large number of countries that would inevitably crumble or join the Communist bloc."³⁸

The fell victim to the notion of a Moscow-controlled centralized socialist government and after North Korea occupied South Korea in Asia; they were assured that the Socialist giant was on the march. China's loss also caused worries in American minds that Asia's ruling classes could perhaps lack the will, experience and resources to contain communism. Asia's cold war they suspected could be lost. So, the issues that gave birth to the Marshall Plan and NATO in Europe have now been functional in Asia, the arrangement of control with its

³⁷ Malik, 60,

³⁸ Rais A. Khan, "Pakistan-United States Relations: An Appraisal" *American Studies*, 23, no. 1 (April 1985): 85.

elements of monetary help, military guide and U.S. security umbrella so effective in Europe, now reached out to Asia.

All along the Southern borders of China and Soviet Union, a barrier of partnership was to be established. American policy makers continued looking for partners in South Asia, didn't from the start show a lot of enthusiasm for Pakistan. Just a little gathering of experts both in the State Department and the Pentagon were aware of Pakistan's vital location. Pakistan then had a view on both South-East and South-West Asia, was part of both South Asia and Central Asia, and enjoyed a peculiar geo-strategic position that was both its advantage and weakness. The American public however, had little knowledge of Pakistan and could not understand the reasoning behind the partition of the Sub-Continent and the development of a political state. As expressed in a report by Brookings Institution, the American perception of division was, "It was an arbitrary fracturing of a region that had formed a rational economic whole with coordinated communications and defense."³⁹

At first, the Truman administration ignored Pakistan. It took the U.S. six months to name its first ambassador to Pakistan, and when this envoy returned home due to ill health, the position sat empty for two years. In comparison, the nation of Gandhi and Nehru became better known to the Americans. The scale, economy and promise of India as an economic counter-force to China fascinate American international-policy makers. So, it was not unexpected that Jawaharlal Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, was the first South Asian leader to be welcomed to Washington. Nehru's world-view and cultural views, though, varied from those of the Americans. Indian foreign policy intellectuals gave different reasons for India's estrangement from the US.

Two factors largely influenced the initial response of India. Nehru had a fantasy of India's significance in her own right. (It might be reviewed that in a fairly comparative circumstance in 1823 when the British proposed a joint Anglo-U.S. restriction to a non-existent risk of Holy Alliance obstruction in the American side of the equator, the Secretary of State John Quincy Adams commented, "For what reason be a cockboat in the wake of British warship."⁴⁰ The subsequent factor was that India didn't have a security issue. Russia was at a protected separation, Afghanistan and Pakistan established valuable supports. None of her quick neighbors aside from

³⁹ Khan, 85.

⁴⁰ Khan, 86.

China was enormous and sufficiently able to represent a risk. China was occupied in post Revolution reproduction and it was a time of Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai (Indians and Chinese are siblings). The Indians, subsequently, while inviting American financial and military help, would not go into any enemy of Communist alliance with the U.S. Truth be told they dismissed the general concept of an American security umbrella over the area as it sometimes fell short for their view of India's future job in South Asia. It was then that the U.S. gone to Pakistan.

Pakistan finds itself in a very hostile security situation at the time of its independence. It was met on its eastern border with Indian aggression, and on the western border with Afghanistan. While the enmity towards Afghanistan, though unplanned and irritating, was controllable, the hostility towards India was a more serious issue. India and Pakistan, burdened by the weight of history, began their lives as independent states. The two countries were to live peace and harmony under Jinnah's partitioning system, not eternal war. In a speech at Delhi on May 21, 1947, just twelve days before the announcement of the partition plan, he said, "I urged that we separate in a friendly manner and remain friends thereafter."⁴¹ He even considered a common interest partnership, pact or treaty between Pakistan Hindustan. He also proposed an agreement, partnership or deal between Hindustan and Pakistan arrangement, in the shared benefits of all and against any aggressive intruder. However, for the Indian leadership division their hope of a single continent collapsed, and their response to Pakistan was one of aggression. Top Indian politicians, from both Congress and the Hindu Mahasbha, spoke of trying to reunite the Sub-Continent. In legal terms, men like Nehru thought reunite, many like Sardar Villabhbhai Patel, and B. N. Khare stood for the use of power.

Pakistan's vigilant system was substantiated by a number of Indian actions: withholding Pakistan's share of assets including cash and military supplies, the blockage of water way and the invasion of a large part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir persuaded Pakistanis that the downfall of Pakistan was a settled Indian strategy. From May 1948 to September 1949, the Kashmir dispute led to an unjust war between the two States. Twice-in the beginning of 1950 and the summer of 1951- an all-out battle between the two states almost broke out. Although the crises of 1950 and 1951 ended without the start of the war, Pakistan had lived through the traumatic experience of those stressful days. It left a profound impression on the minds of the Pakistani people and their leaders. According

⁴¹ Rais,86

to a Pakistan Army writer, “In the wake of India's 1951 war scare, General Ayub Khan began to think in contexts of Pakistan's coalition with the United States.”⁴² It must be said that it was India's hostile approach towards Pakistan that forced the latter into the arms of the United States, yet this is only part of the truth. Like India, Pakistan had started with a policy of neutrality in the conflict between East and West. Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan's first Prime Minister, stated, “I want it to be clearly known abroad that Pakistan is continuing its career without any peculiar commitments and without prejudice in the international sphere.”⁴³ In a speech on 8 March 1951, in these terms Liaquat Ali Khan describes Pakistan’s foreign policy.

“The pillar of foreign policy of Pakistan is good ties with every country in the world Pakistan is not connected to the Anglo-American block apron strings, nor is it Communist bloc camp follower. It has a foreign policy that is completely independent. Pakistan will take an unlimited path, because it is not under any foreign country's obligation. No country in the world has provided us help and whatever we have done has been through our resources.”⁴⁴

In the above initial stage of Pakistan's international relations, Pakistan's representatives do not come across anti-Communist comments. In fact, an American correspondent Liaquat Ali Khan said in response to a question that he did not fear Russian invasion. “Pakistan is too tiny for Russia to worry with,” he added. Liaquat reportedly refused to send a token force to Korea in exchange for an American promise to supply the Pakistan army with an entire division. While Pakistan could not continue to alienate the West relative to India, it played a leading role in the fight for decolonization, both within and outside the United Nations. In this way one finds an interesting statement. Between 1947-51, when the Indian antagonism towards Pakistan was most pronounced, Pakistan followed an impartial strategy and after 1951, when the Indian danger began to vanish a little, Pakistan began moving towards alignment with the United States.

The reason probably lies in the disappointment of Pakistan in establishing its security's pan-Islamic system and in Pakistan's worsening political and economic condition. At first Pakistan tried to resolve its unfavorable security environment by establishing an Islamic bloc their lifestyle so if the Communist countries may shape a barrier on the grounds that they have an agenda why the Muslim people cannot come together to defend themselves and expose themselves to the world

⁴² Rais,87.

⁴³ Khan, 87.

⁴⁴ Khan, 87.

and if on the basis that they had an objective, the communist countries might create a barrier instead. This policy was misguided, unrealistic and over-optimistic. The Muslim world at the moment didn't contribute too much in terms of capability and control.

In comparison, many Muslim states regarded Pakistan's often-repeated claim to be the largest Muslim country as indicative of a leadership role, and was not well accepted by them respectful because they were of their own culture and history. In September 1948, Pakistan lost the Father of the Country and in October 1951, by a bullet from an attacker, its first Prime Minister passed away. Deprived of its two very devoted leaders and without any strong ties in the places that created Pakistan, the Muslim League broke into divisions and fell victim to power struggles. The nation was seeing the rise and fall of a variety of regimes both at the Center and in the Provinces in rapid succession. The lack of a framework and the politician's incompetence and irresponsibility caused the administrators to establish political interests, both in democratic and standardized words. Names such as Iskandar Mirza, Chaudhary Mohammad Ali and General Ayub Khan were all promoted themselves into ministerial positions which the elected representatives of the people would ordinarily have served in. The bureaucrats-turned-policymakers opposed the values of the constitution of democracy and plurality. People's disillusionment and anger was reflected in centrifugal and religious trends. General Muhammad Ayub Khan wrote, "The political turmoil that occurred in the aftermath of the assassination of the Prime Minister (Liaquat Ali Khan) persuaded me that we must not waste any time constructing an army that alone could hold the country together and protect it against future attacks."⁴⁵ Pakistan's political uncertainty was intensified by its financial crises. Pakistan, like every developing country, desperately needed international financial and professional support. Agricultural production, the backbone of Pakistan's growth, steadily declined due to lack of interest and funding, and extreme storms in 1951 caused a condition of severe famine. In 1952 Pakistan's political elites were in a very extremely difficult situation. The early years ' optimism and political consensus had been swept out; the political situation stayed hostile and the financial situation had become severe. Almost unavoidable was the desire to abandon the strategy of peace and nonalignment, to gain the support of the greatest and richest country on Earth. When American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and later

⁴⁵ Khan, 89.

Vice President Richard M. Nixon visited Pakistan in 1953 in their search for Asian allies, they found the climate in Pakistan very welcoming The U.S. and Pakistan joined the coalition with essentially different objectives, the U.S. to suppress Communism and Pakistan to control India and to maintain political peace and economic development.⁴⁶

However, in the initial years of the cold war efforts did not produce results because most of them determined the sort of non-alignment rather than entering cold scores with India, joined the foreign camp in or reinforce their power against India through the strategic advancement of their military capability through the U.S. goal by such training exercises in South Asia. Today Washington has gained access to various services to meet its strategic goals. The first and most significant characteristic of Pakistan's foreign policy from 1947-1958 was its involvement in the network of Western alliances and its defense relationship with the US⁴⁷.

⁴⁶ Khan, 89.

⁴⁷ Madhurendra Kumar, "American strategy in South Asia from Cold War to Post-Cold war." *The Indian Journal of Political Science* (2006): 610.

CHAPTER 3

PAK-US RELATIONS: THE NEEDS AND DYNAMICS FOR STRATEGIC ALLIANCES

Various factors form the defense policy of a country. The important ones included the country's geopolitical and economic position, the existence of its geographical boundaries and the structure of interactions with its neighbors.⁴⁸ The history of the partnership between the US and Pakistan over the year is inconsistent, and uncertain. U.S has its own policies and methods influenced by its strategic position, past perspectives, values and ideals, whereas Pakistan's ties were based on the complexities and impulses of the South Asian zone, especially in the early year's strategy of Pakistan was influenced by the Indian element. Foreign policy was designed to acquire a safeguard against that giant neighbor.

The US faced Soviet communism's overwhelming challenge after World War II, and developed a national policy to avoid its growth. Throughout the years the primary aspect in constructing U.S strategy towards other nations was Soviet communism. This creates further pressure between the US and USSR. Both nations experienced a greater degree of vulnerability and both considered each other as potential enemies challenging territorial integrity and national sovereignty. Global bipolarization contributed to a prolonged Cold War. The US subcontinent policy was designed over the initial years not only to reverse the success of communism but also to support energy resource management. A strategic review revealed the presence of large supplies of oil field which significantly increased the importance of the region. Throughout search of these parallel goals, the United States kept a strong interest in the Middle East's affairs and sought to establish friendly relations with each nation.

The bipolar atmosphere generated an extreme competition in foreign relations, as both superpowers tried to expand their influence further. US military experts were constantly identifying US priorities and Pakistan's regional importance. While, newly independent Pakistan faces major political and economic challenges. This was attempting to establish the institutional framework of its armed forces organized by the federal government. Geographical location in

⁴⁸ Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Pakistan's Defense Policy" *Pakistan Horizon* 36, no. 1 (1983): 35.

American eyes was very important. As in these words George Marshall explains the strategic position of Pakistan to President Truman, "Pakistan will be the largest Muslim country in the world with a population of 70 million people and will occupy one of the most strategic locations."⁴⁹ On the eve of its freedom, President Truman sent a letter to Muhammad Ali Jinnah, first Governor General of Pakistan, "I wish to assure you that the new dominion embarks on its course with the firm friendship and goodwill of the United States of America."⁵⁰ Jinnah, a visionary figure, reacted enthusiastically in recognition of the growing need for military services. While, he certainly understood the requirement combat supplies for the defense forces and for financial support of nation in common.

In 1947, Military resources were shared between Pakistan and India. But India deliberately denied the authorized portion to Pakistan because India decided to destroy the young state. The Maharaja of Kashmir of this substance had signed a declaration of accession and included the state in the Indian Union. It strangled Pakistan with actions like this one in its early stages. M. A. H. Ispahani became Washington's first envoy. On October 8, 1947, he delivered his credentials saying that the Pakistanis were ancestors of great Central Asian Muslims. All countries have shared common heritage since the American's era. Positively, Truman said, "We stand ready to assist Pakistan in all which might naturally benefit our two countries and the profound hope for continuing peaceful and constructive between Pakistan, her sister dominion and other countries"⁵¹ The US policy makers emphasized the geo strategic importance of Pakistan after few months. They looked at bases of Karachi to start up air procedure against communism. It was an area in Middle East for the security of oil resources. Those were the years when Politicians of Pakistan sought to justify the country's geopolitical significance. Malik Ghulam Mohammad then finance and later Pakistan's third Governor General, wanted to mitigate the country's economic problems. He contacted Charles W. Lewis in Karachi, but Lewis provided no confirmation. He proposed that the government would draft a paper assessing the assistance expected and then give it to Washington and also suggested that the appeal should be applied by the Pakistan's ambassador to Washington. So, for this purpose Mir Laik Ali who was appointed by Jinnah to serve as his special representative

⁴⁹ Mussarat Jabeen and Muhammad Saleem Mazhar, "Security game: SEATO and CENTO as instrument of economic and military assistance to encircle Pakistan." *Pakistan Economic and Social Review* (2011): 111.

⁵⁰ Jabeen,11.

⁵¹ Jabeen,112.

and ambassador Isphani started their efforts to make contact with different officials at various level in Washington for the loan of \$ 2 billion. So, in this way Pakistan made a plea for assistance. Next Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan tried to impress the Truman's administration by highlighting the Pakistan's geo-strategic position for the stability of Asia, during his visit to US. While Liaquat's visit generated awareness of Pakistan, its policies and issues. But he could not get military aid and funding.⁵²

Territorial shifts in the mid-fifties compelled the US to shift its armed forces to protect Asia from Soviet effects. The loss of Chiang Kai Shek's authoritarian regime in China in 1949 was a shock to the US, which also a direct indication of communist growth. Mohammed Mossadegh of Iran and Anglo-American energy company nationalization heightened US fears in March. In 1953 CIA threw Mossadegh and restore Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi to control for the prevention of Soviet expansion towards Persian Gulf. Throughout the Europe, collective protection courses of action under military cooperation of the Treaty Organization (NATO) had resolved the question of Soviet growth. These proposals, however, had been for Middle East or South East Asia as well.

India at first needed monetary guide from the US but its ties weakened, but its Indo-American ties were undermined when India denounced China alongside its Korean War alliance for non-recognition. As a result, US offered assistance to India during its 1950-51 severe food emergency. The conceding and retaining of monetary guide were a significant instrument in US arrangement. Its approach in this manner shifted with one nation then onto the next. India for instance would not accept the Japanese Peace Treaty in 1951 at a diplomatic gathering in San Francisco and subsequently lost the regard of US, while Pakistan signed its noticeable conformity and received recognition in Washington.

In February 1951, American policymakers viewed that a major military response would need strong flanks in Pakistan Iran and Turkey in order to advance the vital interests of South Asia. In this sense, an advancement of Pakistani forces was of the utmost significance. The assembly of US leaders in Colombo (Sri Lanka) affirmed Pakistan's involvement in Middle East safeguard. Envoy George McGhee was especially impressed by the Pakistani administration's readiness to support the US attempts struggle to avoid socialist violation in South Asia. Likewise, he prescribed

⁵² Jabeen, 114.

a restricted lead to Pakistan for the U.S army. Both British and American authorities decided that Pakistan's determination would most definitely be the decisive factor in maintaining the region's stability, in April 1951. The British had found in any situation that it might affect India. US strategy was gone ahead as the Eisenhower rule after the Korean war.

It was intended to help all countries that were opposing socialism. Eisenhower organization arranged a progression of defense or common resistance settlements just as help understandings. The fundamental goal was to deflect socialist hostility. These coalitions were basic portion of American national security strategy. Eisenhower instruction assured the United States to do battle, if important to keep USSR from the West Asia, overseeing oil rich zone, this arrangement of provincial safeguard coalitions recognized as fresh look of the Republican Organization. It was put together with respect to military guide as well as on financial help and political association.

The development of socialist belief system in South East Asia and the foundation of Socialist China made the US eager to pursue an approach of regulation. The US administration supported numerous measures to combat communist attack for the one third of the worldwide population. In the idea of aggregate protection, the US point was to facilitate the countries and sort out their commitments as per their capacities. Provincial collusions were intended to hinder socialism. They submitted the US to give military, monetary and specialized helps to well-disposed countries. This was additionally an approach to contain socialist animosity' without drawing American soldiers. The US characterized its new situation by giving sign of its association on the world actions. The post-Korean War discernment in Washington focused on its quest for new partners. Before the end of 1952, the Truman organization embraced the possibility of a Middle East Defense Organization that was recently supported by Britain to support its drooping situation on the globe. The thought was not just contradicted by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt yet additionally by Nehru in India. In November 1952, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, head of the US maritime staff showed up in Pakistan to meet with Governor General Ghulam Mohammad and General Ayub Khan, president. These conversations prompted resulting military agreements between the two nations. On 9 May 1953, John Foster Dulles set out on a long visit to Asian nations, including India, Pakistan, Turkey, Greece, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq for his visit. He visited Pakistan from 23 to 24 May to investigate the possibility of union. Dulles valued Pakistan's endeavors and needed to solidify Pakistan's help for an aggregate security understanding.

Head administrator Mohammad Ali Bogra, Governor General Ghulam Muhammad and Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan focused on their devotion to the counter socialist agreement. They were anxious to join the coalition and demonstrated their longing to join the free world resistance group. Dulles valued the help just as the soul and presence of arm powers of Pakistan. It is expressed in a link to Washington by him, "Socialist China verges on northern regions held by Pakistan, and from Pakistan's northern outskirts one can see the Soviet Union. Pakistan flanks Iran and the Middle East and gatekeepers the Khyber Pass, noteworthy intrusion course from the north into the subcontinent".

Nehru was met by Dulles in India and both discussed the relationship of the US with India and assured him about the US assistance to Indian advancement ventures. Discourse on armed gathering in South East Asia bombed as Nehru would not connect to any arm coalition because of strategy of non-alignment. After the gathering Dulles stated, "One of my most clear impressions was that of the extraordinary and earnest fellowship which pioneers of Pakistan feel for the United States. I was incredibly intrigued with their comprehension of the world issue and they will oppose the hazard of socialism as their quality licenses."⁵³

The positive Pakistani position towards the US was consequence of help given before the Dulles visit. The US exhibited generosity by speeding up Pakistan's solicitation of one million tons of wheat estimated of \$ 74 million. It was expediently conveyed to the port of Karachi at no charges. The main open report of US-Pakistan military coalition showed up in *The New York Times* on November 21, 1952. The US utilized monetary, political and strategic measures to contain socialism in Asia. It received an approach of gigantic reprisal to counter the Soviet atomic threat. So, in terms of its position, Pakistan was militarily significant for US.⁵⁴ On the other hand, Pakistan was in a very adverse security environment when it was established. It was met on its eastern border with Indian aggression, and on the western border with Afghanistan. While the hostility towards Afghanistan, while unforeseen and irritating was manageable, the hostility against India was more severe. Between 1947-51 when the Indian animosity against Pakistan was quite intense. Pakistan followed a peaceful strategy and after 1951, when the Indian challenge started to subside slightly; Pakistan began moving towards alliance with the United States. The approach is probably

⁵³ Jabeen, 117.

⁵⁴ Jabeen, 117.

the disappointment of Pakistan in building a pan-Islamic security system and the worsening political and economic situation.⁵⁵

The causes for the sense of insecurity in Pakistan were not limited to the complicated problems which were the result of hasty annexing. A variety of factors which were functional not only contributed significantly to the growing level of insecurity but also intensified it and increased it to a disturbing point. In the first place Pakistan missed the scope that is called the essential security requirement. Not only did its primary communication channel pass close to the Indo Pakistan man-made line, but some of its large cities were also geographically located near this boundary. Second, Pakistan needed well-trained, well-equipped, well-disciplined, well structured, and statistically appropriate military. Third, Pakistan did not have a single ordnance factory in the arms industry, at the time it was actually located in those places that shaped Pakistan. In fact, not much of the reserved military resources were even moved to Pakistan. Fourth along with the existing problems and uncertainties, Pakistan inherited a very huge and uncertain man-made frontier. Fifth, Pakistan's two wings were divided from each other by vast Indian Territory tracts. Due to the increasing conflicts between India and Pakistan East Pakistan's security became a massive undertaking for Pakistan's military planning. The only roads open to East Pakistan were either by boat, or by air. Pakistan did not inherit sufficiently naval ships or planes for the air force at the time of partition.⁵⁶ Sixth, ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan did not take off on usual neighborly foundations.

Furthermore, the internal instability especially the lack of an administrative system, the flood of migrants, limited resources and the quest for a political structure intensified the sense of insecurity there. Pakistani security planners didn't really need to quest too hard to find the causes of uncertainty, stress, and terror. All other domestic and foreign factors which generate a feeling of insecurity were identified very easily. But India was undoubtedly the leading actor, led by Afghanistan, border disputes, domestic problems, and limited resources.⁶²

India's unfriendly ties with Pakistan have been the result of many reasons. Surprisingly, the border conflicts have significantly contributed to the hostilities, but the major causes of tensions

⁵⁵ Rais A.Khan, "Pakistan-United States Relations: An Appraisal." *American Studies International* 23, no. 1 (1985): 87.

⁵⁶ Pervaiz Iqbal. Cheema, *Pakistan's Defense Policy 1947-58* (US, Springer, 1990),74. ⁶² Cheema,75.

were the problems arising from the partitioning processes and Congress— League rivalry before an independent state of Pakistan was formed. The Indian were quite determinants to overthrow it. Pakistan wanted to overcome its border problems as soon as the conditions allow, although border disputes could not be resolved with in turn, so these disputes were closely tied to other problems.

Pakistan attempted to determine its outskirt issues as fast as the condition allowed. Since the outskirt questions couldn't be treated in separation as these debates were inseparably connected with different issues. On almost every problem that appeared in relation to India, Pakistan was faced with the inability by New Delhi to address the discrepancies on the grounds of Law and justice.

Either it was the transition of British India's inherited possessions of Pakistan, Princely State accession, or continuing flow of river water, India tried to enforce its own will, in violation of the terms of the resolution on the partitioning of the two nations. Taking advantage of the imbalance of resources, India ignored justification and fairness in talks, resorted to neutral diplomatic means of resolving conflicts, and did not hesitate to use force or threat of force to enforce its own desires. India's Jammu and Kashmir military intervention and its failure to conduct a plebiscite, as decided in Security Council resolutions, infused a sense of danger into the young state's mind.⁵⁷ In the back of this hostile past, Pakistan considered India as its greatest adversary. However, the main reason for animosity between them is Kashmir. Pakistan tried to justify the ideology of two nations by success in Kashmir.

The 1947 Indo- Pakistan War is perceived to be the first war on Kashmir's princely state. Several small skirmishes occurred throughout 1948. On 31st December 1948 a formal ceasefire was confirmed. Another evidence of strategic exposure of India was her police action in September 1948 in the state of Hyderabad. Under the 3rd June Policy Hyderabad tried to maintain her independent status. Dialog has started between the Hyderabad Nazis and the Indian government. But those talks did not produce any positive outcomes. The government of India waged a raid on the city of Hyderabad on September 13, 1948. Its armed forces defeated on 17 September 1948 after a powerful confrontation that area was occupied by the Indian troops.

One more instance of brutal Indian strategy was the capture of Junagadh by force. Most of its people are Hindu but the state governor was Islamic. After liberation the state made an access

⁵⁷ Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1947-2005: A Concise History* (US, Oxford University Press, 2007): 37.

to Pakistan, as it was linked with Junagadh by the Arabian. India was told of that accession as well. The Indian Government made a strong protest. Consequently, the Indian forces on November 7th invaded and after two days the entire part was captured by India. Being a newly independent state Pakistan was not in a position to defend. Another reason of clash between them is Pakistan's east sector shared ties with India too. India surrounded East Pakistan, with the distinction of sharing a tiny frontier with Burma in the South East. Radcliff had arbitrated all of East Pakistan's boundaries. The Radcliff boundary needed careful delineation after independence, in order to avoid potential border conflicts. Dispute, however, broke out between India and Pakistan at the frontier of East Pakistan Assam in the beginning of 1948. Indian government suspected Pakistani armed forces of capturing territories at 43 Square Miles. Indian prime minister affirmed that the conflict is about 22 Square Miles territory, which the boundary commission had awarded India with. Indian prime minister gave Pakistan a strong message and threatened that India could use alternative. Nonetheless, both states decided to create a commission to resolve the problem peacefully. The two governments signed a dispute resolution deal on December 1948 to prevent any adverse situations. The committee's report was made public on February 1950 however the boundary demarcation deadline was postponed to August 1950. Though, communal riots occurred at the end of 1949 which rendered enforcing this agreement very challenging. Throughout early 1951, the Indian Government showed similar disposition. Indian prime minister cited in June 1951 that "we will not accept any nonsense concerning Kashmir" Such warnings welcomed Indian armed forces marching at Pakistani borders. That is why it was India's perceived threat that compelled Pakistan to enter the Western alliance system that made it feel secure.

3.1 Insufficient Military

One question that Pakistan's government felt most deeply in the first years after independence was its utter military vulnerability, a direct result of India's inability to cooperate with the armed forces partition agreements. India refused to produce Pakistan's negotiated share of the military equipment that undivided India owned. In addition, the troops who came to Pakistan to form their army belonged to pieces of units of the army that had to be brought together to create new units? Pakistan's army practically had to be put together from scratch. The military personnel who opted for Pakistan belonged to the Hindus and Muslims mixed army units. They needed to come together as brand new formations. (British Conservative Party Advisor on Defense) stated and class unit

Dogras, Mahrattas and Sikhs should be assigned to India automatically, as they were all comprised of Hindu families. Yet Punjab infantry regiments and all the cavalry included mixed companies and squadrons of Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims. Much more difficult was the question of splitting the different units and ancillary forces all institutions in which Muslims and Hindus had to be divided and sent to different branches, new homes and new loyalties nearly all of Pakistan's army had to be reassembled into new divisions, and put together.

Throughout the context of an efficient structured and well- equipped military, it can be claimed that Pakistan had virtually no army at all for a while. A big loss to the Pakistan army was the inability to arrive at its proper share of military hardware and stores allotted to it under the partition agreement that was situated in far southern India during the war with Japan. Under General Auchinleck, an official Supreme Command has been set up to tackle the logistical challenges of unscrambling the two armies and splitting power between them. A joint council of security was also formed to manage this. Though both had to work at the end of March 1948, they were disbanded prematurely in November 1947, on Indian initiative. Birdwood remarked;

“It was Pakistan's bitter complaint that although the Defense Council might allocate stores and supplies to her army, in fact the orders were never translated into action.”⁵⁸ For this cause, the Pakistanis were dismayed at the decision to shut the Supreme Command in November. They had not earned their equal share so they saw little hope of ever doing so with the removal of a single representative body. Only the official records and papers of the Pakistan Army HQ nucleus that was built from the old GHQ in New Delhi have been left behind. Under these conditions it is not shocking that the reorganization and army hardware was an important issue for Pakistan. Pakistan had few choices. Europe had recently returned from a very destructive battle, and was obsessed with restoring its battle-torn societies after the war. The only possible source that Pakistan desperately required for the equipment was the US. Pakistan's government wasted no time on making an appeal to the US to buy weapons and hardware for its military, navy and air force.⁵⁹

So, it can be said that actual threats from India and particularly the first Indo-Pakistan war on the Kashmir issue highlighted an urge to improve the security arrangements for Pakistan. It therefore followed a strategy of generating the greatest portion of the state budget to defense;

⁵⁸ Hamza Alvi, “Pakistan-US military alliance.” *Economic and Political Weekly*, 33, no. 25, (1998): 1552.

⁵⁹ Alvi, 1552.

nevertheless, its finances remained insufficient to fulfill the demands of reforming its defense system. As Pakistan pursued international funding and coordination to strengthen its strategic ability, the U.S. was able to provide aid but only if Pakistan entered in coalition structure that was part of the U.S. strategic policy to counter the Soviet Union. So, Pakistan did not find this a high price, In the face of the importance of improving its security.⁶⁰

3.2 Financial Problems.

Another main issue which created bitter tension between the two countries was the problem of fair financial distribution. On 14 August 1947 the former British Indian government's currency deposits in undivided India amounted at 4,000 million rupees. Pakistan reported one fourth of the current cash balances which India refused to admit entirely. The question was put before the arbitration tribunal to settle the conflicts. By early December 1947 both governments signed an agreement that granted Rs 750 million to Pakistan as its rightful portion. Pakistan had already been paying a tranche of Rs 200 million as an emergency payment. Under the deal, the remaining Rs 550 million were to be given to Pakistan quickly but India began to create needless delays. Sardar V.B. Patel, announcing the financial arrangement at the Indian Constituent Assembly, announced that the adoption of the arrangement would be aligned with the resolution of the Kashmir conflict.

This was a strong indication that India would be relating the Kashmir problem to the cash deposits settlement. In a rejoinder, the Pakistani Finance Minister, Ghulam Muhammed, pointed out that the topic of Kashmir was never discussed or seriously considered at any level of the negotiations that led to the signing of the agreement, had it been, Pakistan would never have become a part of that agreement. Nonetheless, the Kashmir situation emerged well before Financial Agreement talks started. What appeared very odd in Patel's approach toward the legal arrangement was that he was behaving as if he were going to give Pakistan 550 million out of the Indian total balance portion. India's guidance to the Reserve Bank of India not to credit its rightful share of assets in Pakistan though, India's guidance to the Reserve Bank of India not to credit its rightful share of financial assets in Pakistan. However, Pakistan found that withdrawing its portion of the cash balances was not just an unfriendly gesture but also an act of violence. The Government of India declared on January 15 that it would allocate the pending sum to Pakistan. Two days later

⁶⁰ Noor A. Hussain and Leo E. Rose, *Pakistan-US Relations: Social, Political, and Economic Factors*, 22. (California, 1988): 8.

the Reserve Bank was allowed to pay just Rs 500 million to Pakistan, and not the whole sum, Rs50 million was kept by India as an advance modification of certain charges against Pakistan. Therefore, the unfair distribution of the cash balance produced other problems for Pakistan as well.

3.3 The Indus Waters

The Indus River controversy began when East Punjab in April 1948 shut off the supply of canal waters to West Punjab. Agriculture was largely based on the Punjab Canal Irrigation Network. Both the canals were filled by the Indus River and its five tributaries (Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej) Infect the Indus River network in particular is the very basis of existence in Punjab, while the Indus river also supplies vast areas in Sind. In several cases the Radcliffe prize has its roots in the conflict. Not only did Radcliffe give India a vast number of Muslim areas in violation of the fundamental theory adopted for the Punjab divisions, but also provided India two very significant headwork that supplied the channels in West Pakistan. Upper Bari Doa was managed by the Madhopur headwork on the Ravi River and Ferozpur headwork on the Sutlej River. Radcliffe was told by his Indian and Pakistani counterparts in the Boundary Commission that every government retained control over the headwork before the latest collective agreements were made, the agreements that prevailed at the time of partition should be respected. Moreover, as far as there was no breakup of the Arbitration Tribunal (established to deal with contested cases), the flow of water from headwork's assigned to India proceeded.⁶¹

On 1 April 1948 the Tribunal was dismissed. The next day, India stopped the flow of waters in Central Bari Doab and Dipalpur Canals without prior notice, inflicting severe misery for thousands of highly dependent farmers. This moves not only disturbed Pakistan's trust in Indian intentions but also revealed its insecurity, causing uncertainty about the future of its agricultural fields. Then a temporary arrangement, declared on 4 May 1948, restored water resources but India proceeded to slowly reduce Pakistan's resources and progressively raise its water appropriation. The two governments kept having meetings to resolve the problem, but the issue ca not be solved. Pakistan argued its argument on the grounds of the privileges of a lower watershed's region, associated with the promises made by India at the time of partition, while India claimed that the lack of any clear allowance of Indus water supplies at the period of separation indicated that Pakistan had to be taken to have consented to India's ownership of the river.

⁶¹ Cheema, 32-33.

This indicated that Pakistan had to agree to India's water regulation. Pakistan has tried to bring the Indians before the International Court of Justice, but India declined to do so. World Bank President Eugene Black immediately initiated his attempts to settle the conflict. In 1952 both governments agreed to the deal. Thus, a long and complicated negotiating process started, running at the rate of the snail, talks were not completed until September 19, 1960. So, it can be said that no conflict created as much hostility and tension as the dispute over the allocation of the Indus River waters caused for Pakistan.

3.4. Issue of Insecure Borders:

Uncertain and undermarked borders also offer rise to four forms of dispute: (a) territorial disputes, disputes in which one state claims to another's land or water; (b) geographical disputes, disputes arising from the differences between the concept of boundaries and the demarcation of boundaries; (c) technical disputes, often arising out of those situations in which the boundaries are stayed; Functional conflicts arise mainly from certain situations when the State offers a corridor waiver and often places limits on the usage of the corridor; (d) resource conflicts concerning the utilization of other properties beyond the borders, such as dams, or oilfields etc. The inherited boundaries of Pakistan were surrounded by conflicts of territorial and strategic type. While boundary disputes with Burma and Iran revolved around both territorial and positional disputes, Pakistan's ties with neither Burma nor Iran were harmed. But links with Afghanistan and India did not improve with usual neighborhood. The boundary disputes with Afghanistan have become a topic of considerable controversy. The Durand Line was specifically related to the question of Pakhtoonistan. Despite Pakistan's continued efforts to create stronger relations with Afghanistan, but advertising and promoting the Pakhtoonistan problem have given both sides negative impression.

India's unfriendly ties with Pakistan have been the result of several reasons. Unsurprisingly the frontier conflicts have added substantially to the strains, however the main causes of tensions were the problems arising from the partitioning processes and the Congress League conflict prior to the formation of a sovereign Pakistani state. The instability that stemmed from boundaries was partly the result of the British legacy and partly the manner in which Pakistan came into existence as an autonomous state. The Indian tried to motivate other neighbors that Pakistan cannot survive anymore, but when the condition was fine, they sought to seize a piece of land, supporting

the arguments by using the context selectively. It is true that after the withdrawal of British from Indian Empire, the boundaries wrong demarcation created lot of problems. Pakistan has tried to address its border problems as soon as the conditions warrant. Because boundary conflicts could not be dealt with in isolation, as such conflicts were integrally connected to other problems. Efforts were directed more towards resolving the major issues affecting relations between the two countries and special attention was given to the border disputes during the negotiation process, But Pakistan still struggled to deal with any of these circumstances.⁶²

3.5 Economic and Political crises

The Indian animosity against Pakistan was most intense, during 1947-51. Pakistan followed a peaceful stance and after 1951, when the Indian challenge started to fade away slightly, Pakistan has begun working into cooperation with the US. The reason possibly lies in the disappointment of Pakistan in establishing a pan-Islamic security structure and it's worsening political and economic situations. Pakistan initially tried to resolve its adverse economic and security situation by forming an Islamic bloc. But the Islamic nation at the time did not contribute to anything of strength and control.

In September 1948, Pakistan lost the Father of the Country and in October 1951, its first Prime Minister, by a bullet from an assassin, Pakistan lost its two most devoted politicians. So, with no strong roots in the places that shaped Pakistan, the Muslim League (the movement that founded Pakistan) split into divisions and fell victim to struggle of power. Nation experienced the rise and collapse of many regimes in quick succession, both at the Middle and in the Provinces.

The lack of a constitution and the legislator's ineptitude and selfishness prompted both civil and uniform officials to establish personal ambitions. People such as Ghulam Mohammad, Iskandar Mirza, Chaudhry Mohammad Ali and General Ayub Khan were recruited into Ministerial vacancies that would usually have been filled up by the people's elected leaders. The officials decided to turn-policymakers opposed political values and popular law. People's disenchantment and anger was reflected in religious trends.⁶³ Pakistan's internal turmoil has been combined by its economic crises. Pakistan, like any developing nation, desperately needed international economic and technical support. Agriculture, Pakistan's key industry, deteriorated dramatically due to lack

⁶² Cheema, 33-34.

⁶³ Khan, 87-88.

of interest and funding, and heavy floods in 1951 culminated in a near disaster situation. By 1952, Pakistan's governing leaders were in a very unsustainable state of affairs. The early year's optimism and national unity had been ruined; the climate of defense remained unfavorable, and the economic condition had become crucial.

This was almost impossible to exploit the strategy of neutrality and nonalignment to gain the support of the most influential and wealthiest country on earth.⁶⁴ Increasing security problems budget limitations and political instability and India's manipulation of its military and economic supremacy and repeated challenges were the deciding factors that forced Pakistan to pursue international cooperation in defense.

3.6 Pakistan's Defense and Financial Needs and its relation with the US

Met with formidable obstacles to its stability and survival as a state, Pakistan's leadership looked for urgent financial and military assistance in these extremely difficult circumstances. The move has far-reaching effects for the potential unity of the nation. Two main driving factors to this move, first was at this point a question of options open to the government and second was Pakistan's leaders' preference with respect to the country's choices, this was the time directly after World War II. Three countries stick out from the winning nations Canada, Russia and Britain.

Pakistan wasn't willing to demand anything from Britain when it won the war but destroyed a kingdom. Lord Mountbatten's position in the partition deal wealth, separation and the Kashmir Conflict have showed a clear prejudice against India. He became also Governor General of India and exercised great power in London's political circles. In Eastern Europe Russia had emerged triumphant and now it's military had started geopolitical and financial operations. The Communist philosophy had no interest for the government of Pakistan. During a cabinet meeting on 7 September 1947, Jinnah pointed out the ideology of Pakistan; "Pakistan is a democracy and communism does not flourish in the soil of Islam. It is clear therefore that our interest lies more with the two great democratic countries, namely the UK and USA, rather than with Russia."⁶⁵

At another place Jinnah emphasized Russia's danger to Pakistan "The safety of NWFP is of world concern and not Pakistan alone". The Quaid expressed concern that it was Russia who

⁶⁴ Khan, 89.

⁶⁵ Muhammad Asim Malik, "Pakistan-US Security Relationship 1947-2006: analysis of areas of convergence and divergence" (2010): 61.

encouraged the government of Afghanistan for all.⁶⁶ In this grim climate, the US came as the solo nation with the political and economic capabilities to tackle the numerous problems facing Pakistan.

From the very beginning, Pakistan's leadership was inclined westward. Former British Raj civil servants took some key positions by the new administration. The Finance portfolio went to Ghulam Muhammad, Hyderabad's former finance minister. The limited scope of governmental expertise in the bureaucracy of the Muslim League indicated that in the country's formative years, retired bureaucrats gained greater exposure to power. As it is described by an author, "Pakistan leaders belonging to the Westernized upper class have formulated pro-Western policies."⁷³ Laik Ali who was the close associate of the finance minister Ghulam Muhammad was sent to Washington in September 1947 as Quaid-e-Azam 's personal emissary. The intention of this visit was to ask for US defense support of \$2 billion. The request was received by the office led by Ray L Thurston and it was answered on 30 October 1947 by the State Department.

"The United State does not have funds to loan of the magnitude contemplated for essentially developmental project."⁶⁷ Pakistan's desire at this stage did not even value highest consideration. Then Pakistan received 10 million amounts from the administration of war funds which is almost 5% of its real demand.⁶⁸ By this it was discovered that there was no remarkable opinion with respect to the new nation that would merit U.S. assistance of this degree. But Pakistan continues its attempts to cooperate with the U.S. But the US little interest in this region is also shown by its envoy to Pakistan Paul Alling who had returned in July 1948 to US but after passing one and half year his replacement did not arrive. By this thing it is cleared that Pakistan had less importance in American eye.

The urgent need for security support, in October 1947, was closely related to the events of the Kashmir conflict. The original US response to the crisis in Kashmir was halfhearted. US leaders, active in Europe, and do not want to be the part of any other problem. In October 1948, the first high-level conference between the leadership of the Pakistan and US was conducted in Paris. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan spoke with State Secretary George. C. Marshall on the margins of the

⁶⁶ Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 ' Disenchanted Allies: (2001), 20.*

⁷³ Muhammad Ahsan Chaudhry, "Pakistan and the United States; Pakistan United States Relations" edited by Rais Ahmed Khan, (Islamabad: 1982): 11.

⁶⁷ Malik, 63.

⁶⁸ Malik, 63

conference of the UN General Assembly. He explained the need for financial support for Pakistan; its main objective was to stand up against communism, and to motivate the US for assistance to deal with the Kashmir problem as well.

In particular, Marshall also spoke with Indian Prime Minister Nehru. General Marshall described the aggressive attitude of the Indian leader as “He found it difficult to speak reasonably about Kashmir when his turn came.” General Marshall preferred to pursue a purely objective position on the US. He also urged Premier Liaquat to try private capital for economic aid.⁷⁶ At this point, Pakistani leadership was unable to obtain any meaningful help on either Kashmir or on assistance to defense. Rejection by the US was related to two factors. Firstly, in the Soviet Union’s strategy of containment, Pakistan has not yet scored highly. Secondly, the US also harbored a tendency to establish cooperative policies in India as well as in Pakistan. In consultation with the British they were keen to pursue South Asia policy.

The US policy officials, however, had recognized Pakistan's latent interest against communism in times of hardship. As Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was told by the State Secretary Marshall, “The administration was focusing on Project that was still in the planning stage.” Two major incidents only aggravated Pakistan's defense problems in the fall of 1948. The Quaid- e-Azam died on September 11. This was a huge setback to Pakistan. His commanding character had held the Muslim League united and tried to give the newborn nation confidence. The state of Pakistan lost in an air accident in December 1949, those were Major General Sher and General Iftikhar Khan. After this incident in 1951, the way is paved for Major General Ayub Khan who was appointed in Pakistan Army as Commander in chief, to replace General Gracey. From the viewpoint of international affairs, “the role of the future commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army acquired additional value for the military strategists in Washington.” General Ayub Khan is known as the primary proponent to increase safety relations between the US and Pakistan.

The US government's South Asian experts have continued to press for partial armed assistance for Pakistan. Assistant Secretary of State George Mc Ghee called vigorously for limited security support to preserve the Pakistani government aligned with the West and to keep the internal conflicts of the country under control. In December 1949, the visit of McGhee visit to Pakistan was also a success because he considered Liaquat Ali Khan, educated in Oxford, quite approachable with common views on matters of US concern. In a letter sent to James Bruce,

Administrator of the armed aid Programme determined that Pakistan was involved in making accessible its bases for the fighting endeavor in the event of a confrontation with the USSR. In 1949, Pakistan's leadership began its attempts to attract US assistance for defense. Defense Secretary Iskander Mirza, Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammad and Foreign Secretary Ikram Ullah, all the main political leaders visited the United States to request military and financial support. Informally and repeatedly, they confirmed their longing to be personally connected with the US in long-range defense arrangement during their meetings. There was a strong lobby inside Pakistan's ruling elite to develop associations with the US. Foreign Minister Sir Zafarullah, Foreign Secretary Ikramullah and Pakistani Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Habib Rahim Tullah, all were included in Pro Western group and were among the leading opponents of any collaboration with the Russians. The Liaquat government's approval of the US invitation without following the Moscow mission established the foundations of an altered foreign policy and military alliance.⁶⁹

3.7 1951-52, Korean War, a Milestone of US-Pak Ties

The Korean War was an important milestone in the relationship between the South Asia and United States in common and defense ties between the US and Pakistan in particular was the Korean War.⁷⁰ The Korean War represented a fresh era of rivalry between the US-led communist community and the western world. In the nonappearance of Indian support and the socialist success in China, the US has become gradually responsive to calls for improved security cooperation of Pakistan, while it must be remembered that the main interests of both countries were not aligned in any situation.

Pakistan tried to increase its economic and military capacity, mainly in opposition to India, as the US found credible allies to combat communism. Pakistan faced no immediate threat from the expansion of the Communist regime. On South Korean assault by the North Korea and the supportive behavior of the Chinese was noticed as a direct example of the communists' hostile plans to expand their sphere of influence. To this latest political struggle, the US reacted aggressively and organized diplomatic measures with allies.⁷¹ Repeated calls for security assistance from Pakistan have met with no response till this period. Pakistan's establishment in the

⁶⁹ Malik, 70.

⁷⁰ Malik, 71.

⁷¹ Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1947-2005: A Concise History*. (US, Oxford, 2007):

US became very disappointed that it had no significant assistance. The communist triumph in China, and the Soviets' possession of nuclear weapons in 1949, came to the US strategists as a double hit. Not only has the US surrendered its nuclear hegemony, but now there has been a Soviet adversary in the most populated nation in Asia. Throughout the Second World War, the lengthy, costly relationship with the Chiang Ki Shek regime came to nothing, as now Mao's Communists controlled the country, and main land of China was thrown out by the nationalist. Prime Minister of India Nehru was invited by the US government through a formal invitation for visit to US because it is considered most significant partner for counterbalance to Mao's China and also in the war in opposition to communism. Though the call could not carry the fruitful results for the US planners, all their dreams were dashed to the ground by the Nehru's nonaligned attitude and the rejection of anti-communism cooperation.

It presented Pakistan with an opportunity it had so long wanted to establish a security alliance with the US. The Korean War offered the first real chance for the US to demonstrate Pakistani usefulness. In Liaquat 's speech to the nation on the radio on 19 July 1950 Ali Khan strongly denounced the North Korean attack and also said Pakistan should give “the utmost” support to the UN for initiatives it took to counter aggression in Korea.⁷³ The US receiving help from countries of the Asia and instantly required that Pakistan send ground troops for the Korean War, but it was impossible for the Pakistan with the unsolved Kashmir problem to send its forces in favors of global invasion. Liaquat Ali Khan shared this issue In July 1950 in his meeting with the Ambassador of US Avra M. Warren, he asked for any kind of protection guarantee from the United States against some military attack from India.⁷⁴ That was unacceptable to the United States and it is clear by the reply of Secretary Dean Acheson to the War, “Kashmir and Pashtun issues were unacceptable to the US.”⁷⁵ Instead, the US offered to equip and keep one Pakistani Division. Pakistan's demand for security warranty was unacceptable to the US because it was not prepared to risk alienating the Hindus, despite the significant variations with India; The US was not in favors of openly joining with Pakistan.⁷⁶ The US still sought to the Indian support for its war effort with the forthcoming Korean offensive.

⁷³ Malik, 79.

⁷⁴ Sattar, 38.

⁷⁵ Malik, 79.

⁷⁶ Kux, 38.

At the beginning of the Korean War, to improve ties with the US there was an opportunity for Pakistan to send its forces to Korea. The Liaquat Nehru meeting were remained unsatisfactory which was related to Kashmir issue and was headed by Sir Owen Dixon. India's reluctance to negotiate in August 1950 made more discussion unimportant. The breakdown of those talks and Pakistan's conviction that the United States had not achieved sufficient help were crucial factors in Pakistan's decision of not sending the forces to the Korea. It appears that the two countries did not have sufficiently shared ground for a successful defense partnership. The continuing demands for aid from Pakistan and its diplomatic backing for the Korean War were not enough. It was, after the Korean War, a union of US plane of safety combined with its dissatisfaction with India, which slowly led to a move to Pakistan. Consequently, a mixture of factors, i.e., raising US defense concerns in the Middle East and in South Asia indicting to the most desirable reward from India and having to offer meaningful response to a pro-Western government contributed to a significant move towards Pakistan in late 1951.⁷⁷

3.8 Regional Alliances and Pakistan/the concept of Middle East Treaty Organization (MEDO)

There was heavy anti-western feeling in Egypt by June 1952. King Faruoq was overthrown and the Colonel Nugieb and Jamal Abdul Nasser government seized control in Egypt. They were firmly anti-Western and viewed as imperialists against the British. Serious disputes emerged and it was concerned to the Egyptian administration and the British regarding the protection of Suez Canal, the British Military Garrison and other Egyptian military bases. Middle East Company didn't look feasible in this case. Another alternative, named Middle East Defense Organization was created by the US and British planners.

It was meant as a mechanism for the participating countries to prepare joint drills and meetings on defense. As anti-Western feelings were still strong in Iran, Pakistan was therefore seen as a desirable partner.⁷⁸ A further advantage was the Muslim origins and the established ties with the Middle East. However, the Egyptian crisis increased the balance of Pro-Western regimes like Pakistan. Nehru demonstrated deep disaffection with the new plans, fearing that some U.S. military assistance against India would be used to compel a Kashmir military solution. He believed

⁷⁷ Cheema, 112.

⁷⁸ Sattar, 43.

that any possibility of resolution of Kashmir and other international tensions would be viewed as a blow and a golden chance for the Soviet Union to expand its presence in the area.

The view of the post-Korean War in Washington focused on their quest for new allies. At the end of 1952, the Truman administration supported the concept of MEDO, formerly promoted at Britain to strengthen its declining role in the region. The plan was failed because the emerging Egyptian administration was deeply opposed to colonization and was looking for options to minimize rather than raise the Western influence. With MEDO an uncertain possibility, US military planners' energies have now shifted to strengthen the region's remaining countries against the expected soviet threat. Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt as well as Nehru in India rejected the proposal.

3.9 The Northern Tier System for Security and its Effects on Pakistan

In 1953, the transition of US policy augured well for the continuing attempts of the Pakistani government to obtain security assistance. President Eisenhower and his management comrade Richard Nixon came to the Oval Office with the intention of more aggressively fighting the communist challenge. As the concept of MEDO appeared to be a wasted opportunity for the British, now the US was planning to search for the substitute and for that reason, on 9 May 1953 Secretary of the state John Foster Dulles set off on a long visit to Asian countries. His tours covered India, Pakistan, Turkey, Greece, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. From 23 to 24 May he visited Pakistan to assess the potential of the alliance. During his visit. He received a warmer welcome nowhere, than in Pakistan. Governor General Ghulam Mohammed, Prime Minister Mohammed Ali Bogra, who succeeded Kawaja Nazimuddin a month ago and Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan all, emphasized their commitment to the anti-communist cause and it was the clear sign of Pakistan's willingness to join the security team of the free world. In a comment to the press during Dulles' visit Prime Minister Bogra said; "Pakistan is both a Middle Eastern and South Asian country. We have an abiding interest in the security of countries in the Middle East. Likewise, we should be interested in any measures likely to promote political and social stability in South and South East Asia."⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Kux, 51-52

Army Commander-in-Chief General Ayub Khan believed that only with the support of a powerful ally could the threat to Pakistan's security be contained. Dulles was impressed by the enthusiasm and behavior of the Pakistani armed forces and their leaders, and had the impression that Pakistan is one nation with the spiritual strength to do its part in resisting communism. The Secretary of State delivered the assessment to the National Security Council following his return to the US. He claimed that the Arab countries were not effective partners against the challenge of communism. For MEDO, Egypt, the Middle East's biggest ally, can't be expected to follow this thread. So, he offered an alternate definition, the "Northern Tier-Defense." He suggested the participation of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Iraq in a new strategic coalition, something much better than the one focused on Egyptian cooperation. He was highly pleased with his visit to Pakistan, and emphasized the value of Pakistan at a Senate hearing on 3 June 1953.

. "What I do think is possible to develop strength along this northern area (indicating), where there is more fear of the Soviet Union. You have got a motivating force there you find a different spirit and recognition of the danger from Soviet Russia and you have something on which to build. We feel that if you have two strong points, here and here [Turkey and Pakistan] it is very difficult, even if Iran itself cannot be made strong, to go through those mountain passes. The trouble with Pakistan at the moment is that we do not have any program of military aid for Pakistan, because we don't dare to do it because of the repercussions on India." He said in a cable to Washington, "Communist China borders on Pakistan's northern territories and the Soviet Union can be seen from Pakistan's northern border. Pakistan flanks Iran and the Middle East and guards the Khyber Pass, a historic invasion route from the north to the subcontinent"

Dulles personally met Nehru in India and spoke about Indo-American relations and American aid to Indian development projects. Military grouping dialog in Middle East or Southeast Asia ended in failure as Nehru refused to join any military bloc because of a non-alignment policy. Testifying on his return on Washington before the House Committee on Foreign Relations, he commended the bravery and resolve of Pakistanis. Just before Dulles arrived in Pakistan, the US displayed its goodwill, showing an understanding of the future value and friendly attitude of Pakistan. In October 1953, the Eisenhower Government accepted a Middle East policy paper called "Simple National Security Strategy."⁸⁰ It has proposed urging Pakistan and Turkey to enter a

⁸⁰ Malik, 95.

national defense alliance. This may be nothing of the core of a larger defense classification that encompasses Iran and Iraq. With the removal of Iran's nationalist Prime Minister Mosaddeq, the likelihood of this defense system improved even more after a US sponsored uprising. The American response to Pakistan's urgent request for 1.5 million tons of wheat was an immediate result of this alignment of priorities and stronger coordination between the US and Pakistan.

A request from Pakistan to supply a million tons of wheat to avoid a food shortage has been handled with exemplary ease by road, the Assistant Secretary of State, urged swift response. In April a US delegation was sent to Pakistan on a study mission. Eisenhower has agreed for speedy action. Dulles testified to a congressional committee in person. Congress provided unanimous support within two weeks and in July Eisenhower passed the order. The \$74 million worth of wheat was delivered free at Karachi. Pakistan's optimistic outlook toward the US was the product of assistance received prior to the visit to Dulles.

To suppress communism in Asia, the US took economic, political, and diplomatic steps. India and Pakistan hold different views on almost all subjects. Relationships of Indo-US became complicated. Indian strategies were not the same as American initiatives, so the former was not able to give full assistance to the latter ones. Referring to this, Pakistan's actions were largely pro-American which forced it into military partnerships designed to combat Soviet communism. On the other hand, things which were desirable for the US were Pakistan's locations. The other thing was Indian Ocean naval bases which were desirable for the US. Pakistan has had significant effect not only in South Asia but also among the countries of the Middle East and the Afro-Asian bloc. The US identified that Pakistan could advocate Western policies and moderate extreme nationalist and anti-Western policies. As a result, Pakistan has been identified as a South Asian friend of America.⁸¹

The American National Security Council, in July 1953, accepted the proposal. Pakistan's negotiated mutual arrangements with Turkey and the US were taken as measures that led to the military structure of the 'northern tier.' In 1953, Ayub Khan visited Washington and sought to persuade President Eisenhower of the mutual importance of joint security ties. Ayub assured him that "Pakistan will stand by you if you stood by Pakistan." Ghulam Mohammad, who also went to the United States in November 1953, failed to get some assistance because the government refused

⁸¹ Sattar, 48-50.

to upset India. This was only during the December 1953 visit of Vice President Richard Nixon that President Eisenhower finally agreed to provide military assistance to Pakistan.

Eisenhower also proposed to approach India and provide India with a parallel deal until this move was made but India refused to join that alliance. However, US interests in the Middle East have driven Pakistan's entrance into the Northern Tier of Security. Pakistan concluded a bilateral diplomatic, financial, and cultural partnership agreement with Turkey on 19 February; 1954 as a prelude to a structured security agreement with the U.S. This move reportedly took Pakistan closer to the visualized Northern Tier Defense Arrangement and offered the reason for expanded U.S. military assistance. The U.S. target for the coalition was specifically defined as reinforcing countries that would create an anti-communist ring across the U.S. Those included Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, Indo-China, Formosa (Taiwan), and Japan. Pakistan became interested in the wider sense.

At this period, the US introduced various forms of aid including direct military support, indirect grants, and procurement of arms export opportunities, and training in foreign institutions. The US issued \$650 million in combat loans in 1954-1965, \$619 million in foreign aid, and \$55 million in cash and industrial credits. Arms revenues ranged from 1954 to 1961. Armed forces support toward Pakistan was meant to include both national defense and region defense as well. India reacted harshly to that move and at a press conference; President Eisenhower announced that the US should be careful not to do anything in Pakistan that could generate trouble for India. The US has announced to India that the Pak-US relationship is by no means a threat to cooperation between the US and India. In reality, the US had its own priorities in both India and Pakistan as well. It was part of a two-way juggling act.⁸²

3.10 The Heydays Partnership, 1950's Pacts

In the history of Pakistan mid 50s periods were considered the most align period. In Asia it took the title of "Most Allied Ally." The segment focuses at the age of the Pak-U.S. Defense Alliance relationship a period that may be defined as the closest. It coincided the US and Pakistan largely to protect the Middle East from the communist invasion. In 1954 a Mutual Defense Agreement was signed by the two countries and after that without any delay Pakistan became the

⁸² Jabeen, 119.

member of SEATO and Baghdad agreement. In mid-1955, Pakistan was the only nation in the Middle East and South Asia to be part of an anti-communist coalition. Pakistan received substantial US financial and defense aid. Pakistan supported the US strategies on international issues.⁸³

3.10.1. Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement 1954.

It was decided that US military assistance to Pakistan should be given in the context of a pact between Pakistan and Turkey. Accordingly, a joint communique released simultaneously in Karachi and Ankara on 19 February 1954, declared that Pakistan and Turkey had agreed to study methods of closer collaboration in the political, economic and cultural spheres as well as ways of strengthening peace and security in their own interest as also in that of all peace-loving nations. On 22 February Bogra told a press conference in Karachi that Pakistan had requested US military assistance under the Mutual Security Act. Three days later President Eisenhower announced in Washington that he had decided to respond favorably to Pakistan's request in the interests of increased stability and strength in the Middle East. Bogra assured his countrymen that the US Government's decision to grant military aid to Pakistan was perhaps the most effective step ever taken to ensure the security and progress of our country. The declaration of intent in the Turco-Pakistani communique of 19 February was given concrete shape in an agreement signed in Karachi on 2 April.⁸⁴

Article IV, dealing with co-operation in defense

1. The Government of Pakistan will receive personnel of the Government of the United States who will discharge in its territory the responsibilities of the Government the United States under this Agreement and who will be accorded facilities and authority to observe the progress of the assistance furnished pursuant to this Agreement. Upon appropriate notification by the Government of the United States the Government of Pakistan will grant full diplomatic status to the senior military members assigned under this Article and senior Army, Navy and Air Force Officers and their respective immediate deputies.

⁸³ Sattar, 53.

⁸⁴ S.M. Burke, Pakistan's foreign policy: An historical analysis. (Oxford University Press, USA, 1990.) p 163-64.

2. The Government of Pakistan will grant exemption from import and export duties on personal property imported for the personal use of such personnel or of their families and will take reasonable administrative measures to facilitate and expedite the importation and exportation of the personal property of such personnel and their families⁸⁵

On 19 May 1954 in Karachi, a Mutual Defense Agreement was signed by both countries Pakistan and the U.S. In which the U.S decided to supply Pakistan with armed hardware primarily to preserve its domestic strength and self-protection to enable its engagement in the defense of the region. On its part, Pakistan has vowed to work with the US in efforts to curtail friction with nations that challenge the existence of global peace. Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra as praised the Pakistan-US pact. He felt there was much in common with the two nations. They held opinions on independence, democracy and moral power in the battle against communism.

3.10.2. Establishment of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)

The proposal came to protect South East Asia from the challenge of communism after the French failure in Indochina in 1954. In addition to its efforts to combat communist danger, the Eisenhower administration pursued numerous steps to reinforce the region's nations politically, economically, and militarily. Collective defense as regards partnerships was envisaged in the form of foreign strategy. In February 1954, a significant U.S. strategic paper, NSS 5409, established Pakistan's suppressed interest in this regard as a nation that could be integrated into any security agreement because of its clear pro-western orientation, the important quotes include: “Support the present government of Pakistan so long as it remains friendly to the United States, and seeks to ensure that any successor government is not communist controlled and is friendly to the United States. Seek greater participation of Pakistan in common front against communism. Encourage Pakistan’s participation in any defense association which is judged to serve the interests of the United States. Priority should be given to the establishment of such an arrangement between Pakistan and Turkey⁸⁶”

⁸⁵Pakistan Treaty Series 1954-60. Vol: 11, (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Pakistan).

⁸⁶ Venkataramani, 236,237.

On 8 September 1954 Manila Conference resulted in Pakistan being a signatory to the treaty with Britain, France, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines.⁸⁷ Pakistan signed the South East Asia Security Treaty as East Pakistan was located in this area. The Treaty was aimed at preserving harmony in the state and facilitating local financial collaboration, rapidly all SEATO members joined the treaty to achieve their personal goals. Maybe it will be fair to say SEATO has as many ambitions as leaders did. Obviously, the American aim was to encourage joint actions in the area to combat the perceived spread of communism but the aims of other SEATO leaders were all different. Pakistan has joined the pact, as it was generally against aggression. But the US narrowed its ability to intervene solely against communist violence⁸⁸

3.10.3 Baghdad Pact or Central Treaty Organization

The search for US economic and military aid has now pulled Pakistan into another defense alliance, though Turkey and Iraq established the ground for the mutual defense pact in Baghdad which was signed on 26 February 1955. They asked Pakistan to participate but Pakistan was hesitant to do so without the United States and its military being involved. Although the Americans were focused on the idea similar to that put forward by Secretary Dulles in 1953, they themselves were not so excited about becoming part of this alliance. Rather they choose the position of an observer. This option was determined by two contributing factors.

“The first was the worry that becoming a full pact member would worsen U.S relations with nationalist and neutralist Egypt which vociferously opposed the Baghdad Pact as a new form of imperialism. The second concern was that the alliance might jeopardize US relations with Israel”⁸⁹

The US agreed only to develop strong military and political relations with the ties, without joining full membership. He was a leader of the numerous commissions even without being a signatory to the agreement. But Britain and the US provided Pakistan with enough motivation to sign the agreement. Pakistan signed the Mutual Cooperation Pact in Bagdad on 23 September 1955. The other names in the pact included Iran, Turkey and Iraq. To begin with, the Royal regime in Iraq wasn't popular. This was more prone to condemnation of, in particular, the denunciation by President Nasser of the Baghdad Pact in general and the Iraqi government for cutting relations

⁸⁷ Sattar, 46.

⁸⁸ jabeen,119-20.

⁸⁹ Sattar, 49.

with the Arab country. In 1958, a violent uprising overturned the Iraqi government, and the nation withdraws from the agreement. Then in 1959 it was called CENTO.⁹⁰

The Baghdad treaty offered a basis for the programming of military and economic aid could be built. The US envoy James Richard toured the Middle East as well as Pakistan in 1957. He made clear that American policy was not supposed to create any area of control in the Middle East. Situation in the area, however, demanded a power vacuum.⁹¹ The first Asian State who had joined the Central Treaty Organization and Baghdad Agreement was the Pakistan. Due to these pacts. Pakistan has come to be regarded as Asia's "most ally". The Pakistan and the US entered in the coalition with fundamentally different motives, the US containing communism and Pakistan containing India and ensuring domestic peace and financial stability. Due to their education, training and social background, the Pakistani ruling elites were ideologically pro- West, and felt no danger either from Russia or China. The US, though allergic to India's nonalignment, did not accept the possible hazard from India to Pakistan.

Pakistan and the U.S. were mindful of the expectations and intentions of each other, and therefore of the alliance's weaknesses. Everyone chose to ignore the divergences and agreed to step into the coalition and only allow the alliance's positive factors run their path. In the short term, the partnership has been sufficient for both Pakistan and the US. Pakistan received immense U.S. armed forces aid and financial assistance and enjoyed a period of political stability and economic growth. In return, the US was permitted to set up a surveillance base near Peshawar to spy on Russia and China-a major privilege in the days before spy satellites. Pakistan also usually assisted the US on Cold War relevant issues. 1954-60 marked the heyday of an alliance between the US and Pakistan.⁹²

⁹⁰ Sattar, 55.

⁹¹ Jabeen,151.

⁹² Rais A Khan, "Pakistan-United States Relations: An Appraisal." *American Studies International*, 23, no. 1 (April 1985): 98-90.

CHAPTER 4

REPERCUSSIONS

An alliance is a formal contract that brings benefits for contracting parties and places obligations on them. Nations also form partnerships in the context of common objectives. The primary goals of nearly all participating countries are either to protect and enhance desired gains or to reduce their financial obligations by sharing them with others. Undoubtedly, nations are asking themselves many questions, such as what would be the relative advantages of alignment vs. non-alignment, and what would be the cost of such involvement before they decide to join and if the benefits of joining the forthcoming coalition exceed the possible costs, then the chances are greater for a country to join an alliance. Alignment is neither enforced nor is it a result of pressure, it is a nation's measured reaction to a specific collection of circumstances that affects decisionmakers in finding cooperation or even security from others. The coalition effort may be pursued either by a small force or by a large power, depending on the severity of the conditions that the invading states faced.

In accordance with their own perceptions of the current conditions, both Pakistan and the US reacted to the present circumstances. The Americans viewed the alleged communist development with apprehension and they formulated a strategy to monitor and control the growth. To strengthen the adopted policy, they opted for an alliance system that would secure the involvement of most of the willing frontline states, particularly in areas considered vital to the security interests of the United States. The key thrust of the strategy was to reinforce the capability of those willing states which in effect, would contribute significantly to the protection of the free world. Like the US, Pakistani decision-makers also fully calculated the likely gains and probable losses including their flexibility in policy pursuits.⁹³

4.1 Alliance Benefits and Costs

Pakistan's intention to join the pacts was mainly to counter the threat from India, although the United States had very little involvement in it. Yet the need to improve stability in the Middle East with its vital oil riches compelled the US to make use of Pakistan. The United States has been prepared to include Pakistan in its policy of containment and have provided military facilities to

⁹³ Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, *Pakistan's Defense Policy, 1947-58* (US Springer 1990): 145-46.

undertake its global objectives there. Via these agreements Pakistan gained many benefits. First, Pakistan provided foreign assistance in the form of loans, arms purchases and credit to buy commercial weapons. It received \$650 million worth of military grant assistance, \$619 million in defense aid, and \$55 million worth of credit facilities. Pakistan also purchased tanks, cannons, other weapons and arms, armored personnel carriers and army transportation; aircraft for air force including F-104, B-57, F-86 and C-130; coastal protection equipment; and radar and surveillance. Training facilities were provided, and joint naval and air exercises were held, thus helping to modernize the defense services in Pakistan. Second, in the mid-fifties, liberal economic aid gave Pakistanis an increase to a shaky economy. Third, the fact that Pakistan had the protection of a powerful ally was seen as a positive development and a source of power for a nation with an insecurity syndrome.⁹⁴

Benefits were meager at first. The US-announced military aid for 1954, which amounted to just \$29.5 million, deeply frustrated even the leader of the alliances, astonished and it is said by Ayub Khan, For Pakistan it would be better not to be involved with the US in fact it was claimed that the assistance could not compensate for Pakistan by freely allying itself with the US for the extra risks it provided. However, Pakistan's interests in Washington were not ignored; in 1954 the US the US improved the financial support up to \$106 million and increased military aid to \$50 million in 1955the defense arrangement. More importantly, the US promised shortly to provide four divisions of cavalry, one equipped division and another reinforced company to present the air force with modern aircraft for six squadrons and to provide the Navy the twelve sections in the year ahead. In spite of the Indian opposition, US financial and armed assistance quickly grew to Pakistan after 1959. Current offering brought great deal of change. All in all, US financial aid amounted to \$3.5 billion over the periods 1954-1962. Moreover, The US allocated the \$1.372 million for supporting security and to acquire the equipment's. In 1954, Pakistan's military became a formidable protection force with strong arms and guns, the new aircraft and ships, sure in their ability to protect themselves.⁹⁵ In the short term, the alliance proved satisfactory both for Pakistan and the U.S. Pakistan received extensive U.S. military assistance and economic assistance, and

⁹⁴ Husain. Noor A and Leo E. Rose, "Pakistan-U.S. Relations Social, Political, and Economic Factors" 22, (California, 19889): 10.

⁹⁵ Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1947-2005: A Concise History*. (USA, Oxford, 2007): 65-66.

enjoyed a period of political stability and economic growth. In return, the United States was allowed to set up a surveillance base near Peshawar to spy on Russia and China a major privilege in the days before spy satellite. Pakistan has also generally supported the U.S. over issues of the cold war. 1954-60 marked the heyday of an alliance between the US and Pakistan. Further than helping the US against the threat of communism the main aim of Pakistan is to strengthen against the danger of India, and also wanted to win the support of US over the dispute of Kashmir. Pakistan and the US were going to the same direction fir different purposes. Pakistan and the US were going in the same direction. The US was motivated by its international policy to isolate the planet from communism and Pakistan was guided by problems of global security and defense.

This closeness was brought about by the need to each other for separate reasons, rather than concern a specific protection. Pakistan 's positions was at least in line with US views of the globe, with advocacy applied in such a way as to make Pakistan suit the criteria that US politicians found necessary to justify extraordinary support and compassion at the time.⁹⁶ The fundamental difference in purpose, though, would later become a significant factor in this partnership. Yet, the alliance has proved counter-productive for both the US and Pakistan over the long term. American military aid to Pakistan, which helped to rectify the imbalance between Indo-Pakistan, pushed India into the arms of its rival superpower, the Soviet Union. To take India out of the Soviet Union and rectify the Sino-Indian disparity, the U.S. offered India military assistance, but lost Pakistan's trust and friendship, driving them into the arms of the other great communist force, China. While the US caught up in India and Pakistan's global politics. Far from containing the Soviets and the Chinese, the U.S. policy helped these powers to extend their influence in the Sub-Continent; Pakistan has become isolated in its immediate surroundings and in the Muslim world. It turned toward it the other force, the Soviet Union, which had also happened to be a neighbor. The Indian hostility, which receded from 1951, has revived. So, Pakistan's security environment worsened rather than improved.⁹⁷

4.2 Indian Resistance to the Treaties:

At the 1958 SEATO annual conference Pakistan sought to resolve its differences with yet. India has objected that the Kashmir conflict is outside SEATO's control. While the US stayed on

⁹⁶ Hussain, 114.

⁹⁷ Rais A.Khan, " Pak- united states relation an appraisal" *American Studies*, 23, no.1 (1985): 90)

the outskirts; the Soviet Union backed India's stance. It was therefore agreed that the matter should be resolved at the UN or through bilateral negotiations. After 1954, India saw Pakistan as a significant challenge. As illustrated when Israel invaded Egypt in 1956, a tiny nation well-equipped with modern weaponry could do anything against a major neighbor. Pakistan was not hostile to communism; Pakistan's goal was to strengthen its stance against India. India wanted to see the US impose its influence through economic aid. But the US has tried to promote stability by persuading both countries to resolve their interregional conflicts. Nehru commented on those pacts that they were disturbing the area's peace and bringing the Cold War to the subcontinent and upsetting the balance between India and Pakistan. At the Common Wealth meeting in London Nehru shared his concerns with Pakistan's prime minister. Pakistan, in return, proposed a common defense policy but Nehru rejected it on the excuse of diverging foreign policies. He indicated that joint defense could lead to military pacts which are counter to India's basic policy of nonalignment.

The Indians were worried that after exposure to American instruction, Pakistan's military officers began to see themselves as invincible superior people, keeping the Indian armed powers in scornful contempt. But the US made it clear that Pakistan should not use force or even the threat of force to resolve the conflict over Kashmir. Pakistan has been abused generally by being labeled a camp-follower Pakistan was generally abused by being labeled a camp-follower and an imperial and colonial power puppet. When the Congress Party planned large protests, India established a new strategy to condemn military assistance for Pakistan. And Indian diplomats around the world have been instructed to protest against Pakistan's aid. Indian officials in the United States and at the United Nations issued warnings that military support for Pakistan could push India out of the UN and into the Soviet bloc. Pakistan was warned earlier that it was in danger of losing all the ground it had gained in Kashmir, including water from the canal and the evacuee property. The Indian press spread the concept of conflict and a climate of terror among the non-aligned nations generated by American military aid. The Indian government claimed that, through bilateral negotiations, US military aid adversely affected the imminent settlement of the Kashmir issue. India strongly opposed American policy in Pakistan as well as in Korea and China.

4.3 U-2 Incident:

Pakistan provided bases in 1952 for intelligence and surveillance purposes for America at Peshawar. The implications of this culminated in an accident concerning U-2, this put Pakistan

squarely into conflict with the Soviet Union. Russian shot down the spy plane, and its Pilot Francis Gary was arrested by her. Peshawar airfield was used by the spy plane to take photographs of soviet nuclear installations. Khrushchev, the Soviet Leader was warned the Pakistan for serious repercussions.

The political crisis has emerged between them. That base was called the communication center by the US and had not revealed its purpose and was not even admitted to the base by any Pakistani person. It came to be recognized in later years that this facility was also used against China. Since Pakistan declined to prolong the deal for another decade, so in 1968 that Centre was completely closed. Pakistan has not received American support on the Kashmir issue. Neither of the alliances offered sufficient assistance though Pakistan compensates highly for these attacks. The cost of the furious Soviet reaction had been even more solid. India took advantage of Pakistan's decision to enter the coalition with the Soviet veto in the Security Council to abdicate its role in conducting a plebiscite in Kashmir.⁹⁸

4.4 Arab Criticism:

Pakistan's commitment to the pacts was hated by the countries that were not involved and the Arabs who had rejected the Western alliance. These coalitions have been an attempt at extending the Cold War to other areas. Egypt has been swift to take umbrage, particularly bothered about the consequences of the Partnerships for Arab solidarity. The initial coalition was rejected. Radio Cairo said it will be a disaster for Islam to have a Turkey-Pakistan coalition, the first shot in our back. Perhaps the next one will happen as Iraq enters in the story. After joining the Baghdad Pact, the Saudi radio mirrored the Arab Voice from Cairo calling the move as a stab in the core of the Arab and Muslim nations. This made Pakistanis ashamed of being from a land that is the birthplace of Islam.⁹⁹

4.5 Sino-Indian border Clash 1962

Pakistan – United States Ties began to cool in January 1961 with the emergence of Kennedy President John F. Kennedy considered China to be more a threat to the administration. The US has been taking serious actions against Pakistan. Funds were moved from the State Bank of Pakistan to

⁹⁸ Jabeen, 123-124.

⁹⁹ Sattar, 60.

international commercial banks; a commitment of \$4,300,000 was removed to upgrade the Dacca airport; President Ayub's visit to the United States, at the invitation of President Lyndon Johnson, was postponed; and the World Bank Consortium's meeting in July 1965 to offer \$500 million in assistance. The Third Five Year Program for Pakistan has been cancelled. Besides American military assistance to India, the Kashmir crisis was yet another annoyance for Pakistan. The 1962 Sino-Indian border war gave Pakistan the opportunity to settle the dispute over Kashmir, but under pressure from Washington Pakistan let go of the opportunity. The 1962 Sino-Indian border war offered Pakistan the chance to resolve the Kashmir rushing of weapons to India by the Kennedy Government, and its subsequent inability to place adequate leverage on India to uphold its Kashmir commitments, hastened Pakistan's decision to intervene in Kashmir, which led to the 1965 Indo-Pakistan Conflict, which in effect led to the end of American military assistance. This hurt Pakistan more because it relied solely on American arms, while India had specific supply sources alongside considerable internal power. During the war the U.S. followed the ban on military aid with a total halt to economic aid to Pakistan after the 1966 war. In 1968 Pakistan removed the US surveillance base outside Peshawar. For all practical purposes the alliance relationship was dead.¹⁰⁰

4.6 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak Wars

During the 1965 Indo-Pak Conflict, the US believed its participation was not in the national interest of the Americans. It really was a global problem. President L. B. Johnson suspended aid to both countries and entrusted the Soviet Union with the responsibility for managing the conflict. Johnson and his State Secretary Dean Rusk saw little risk in allowing the Soviet Union to bring about peace in the region. Compared with Europe, Northeast Asia or the oil-rich Middle East, South Asia was not vital to US interests. President Johnson refused to participate directly in the 1965 Indo-Pak war, and instead supported UN peacekeeping efforts. Johnson endorsed the Soviet Union brokered Tashkent Agreement.

The 1965 Indo-Pak War put an end to US foreign aid to Pakistan, just for India's satisfaction. During the 1971 Indo-Pak war, President Nixon urged Pakistan to host dissidents in eastern Pakistan. He also offered assistance to India in tackling the refugee crisis. Nixon has wanted to preserve the integrity of Pakistan. So, he sent the 'Enterprise' nuclear aircraft carrier to Bengal Bay. According to Henry Kissinger, 'Enterprise' was intended to deter India from attacking Pakistan at the western frontier. But it was also meant to show China that the Americans supported their regional ally. For more than two

¹⁰⁰ Khan, 90-92.

decades, the 'Enterprise' proceeded to "sail" in Indian papers and authors, epitomizing American animosity against the growing force of India.

Shimla Agreement was signed in 1972 as essentially a national mechanism for dispute settlement. India regarded the US as aggressive to it for being a powerful force at national or global level through much of the Cold War and the decade afterward. The strategic Indian community saw Washington as an unreliable and sometimes hostile state, whereas Moscow frequently sided with India. In the late 1960s, the USSR ended its assistance designed for Pakistan, leading to Indian demand. US assistance to Pakistan was halted during the 1965 and 1971 wars. Pakistan on the other hand saw no reason to continue its membership of SEATO after the loss of East Pakistan. It maintained its CENTO participation, more in deference to its links with Iran and Turkey than to its relations with the United States. Links between them saw some change when the United States restored its economic support and partly removed the weapons embargo. But soon the two countries were locked up in a bitter nuclear controversy.

.4.7 Pushing Pakistan into a different Aid Direction:

Prominent groups in the US were hostile to Pakistan and superpower internationalism, and began to criticize security relations between Pakistan and the US around 1959-60. The first military aid cut to Pakistan came during this time. The victory of the Democrats in 1960 was a turning point of military cooperation in US Pakistan's relations; As of J.F. Kennedy made every attempt to take over India which was unaligned. In 1962, China and India went to conflict over a boundary dispute. The US hastened to return India, pushing Pakistan to repair ties with China. Pakistan has delineated its common border by 300 miles. Then, it formed an air connection with China. Pakistan's air force attained superiority in the 1965 war and its ground forces managed to stop the Indian attack. During this period, the US restricted Pakistan's assistance and the Soviet Union stopped India's support, resulting through a weapons embargo. But the Soviet lifted its embargo within hours, while the United States maintained its embargo until 1967, when it was partly raised for selling of spare parts. Pakistan was forced to switch China during the interim. Pakistan also acquired French jets and submarines. In 1968, the Soviet Union offered guns worth \$30 million, as well as military vehicles and helicopters to Pakistan. It has even offered to develop the Gwader seaport.

A pact of peace was signed between the Soviet Union and India in 1969. While the Soviets stopped all military aid to Pakistan, they nonetheless agreed to set up a steel mill in Karachi. After

carrying out feasibility studies, both the US and West Germany had previously refused the mill project. In 1969, following the visit of President Nixon, the US offered to make a one-time exception, selling 300 armored personnel carriers to Pakistan for \$50 million to counter Soviet influence. Yet for almost six years the deal didn't materialize. In March 1975, President Ford eventually approved it in cash and on a carrying basis. A full embargo was re-imposed upon Pakistan in April 1971. It lasted until April 1972 when it allowed some sales of non-lethal items and spare parts. Meanwhile, India implemented three consecutive five-year defense development plans, giving India by 1977 the world's third largest army, fifth largest air force, and eighth largest navy. India lobbied the State Department and Congress since 1975, as well as the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The Symington-Glenn amendment in July 1977 cut off economic and military assistance to Pakistan for its quest of the nuclear option. But in 1981 military assistance returned with a kit that included 40 F-16s aircraft. But that did not tilt the military balance in Pakistan's favor. Since, from 1953 to 1979, it received only \$6 billion. But in December, 1979, the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan forced both the US and Pakistan to reassess their position and policies.¹⁰¹

4.8 End of Collaboration:

The 1960s decade witnessed the breakdown of the policies of brinkmanship that characterized the Cold War. What followed was a transitional period during which the relations between the nations and their strategic calculations changed. The alliance system had started to collapse. America's support for Pakistan was designed to counter the threat from communist countries not India. After numerous blows including Iraq's withdrawal, CENTO began to collapse. Egypt and Syria's nearby Arab states reinforced their relations with the Soviet Empire, and were unable to engage in CENTO. The Arab-Israeli Conflict, the Indo-Pakistani Conflict, and the occupation of Cyprus by Turkey finally led Britain to withdraw from the alliance). And Pakistan quit SEATO in November 1972, after Indian military action in 1971. Great Britain and the US's half-hearted involvement weakened the alliance system and left little option to war besides diplomacy.

¹⁰¹ Jabeen, 125-126.

CONCLUSION

Historically Pak US relationship has never been consistent. It went through many ups and down in different periods. It was because of convergence and divergence of national interests that kept on switching both nations from friendship to friction. The relationship between US and Pakistan developed from some diplomatic exchanges in 1940s to close relationship in 1950s. This was the time when both nations entered into a Client-Patron relationship that was based on a clear asymmetry of military and economic power. Pakistan was completely dependent on US for defense against threats emanating from India, and Afghanistan. Therefore, Pakistan was bound to serve the security interests of US in the region and could not exercise its autonomy in pursuance of its interests while interacting with US, especially during wars with India. With this backdrop, the study has traced the evolution of US-Pakistan relations and elements of inconsistency as a glaring feature of the relationship. It answers how Pakistan, as a weak nation, pursued its security and economic interests once it became significant for US policies for the region and beyond. This study starts with pre-partition period and also discusses variation in the relationship during cold war era, and expected future path of relationship.

In the early years, the relations between the two countries were not cordial because of four important reasons. First, the US had its global interests and its foreign policy had a global reach. It was the early phase of Cold War and the US was engaged in the containment of Communism. Therefore, priority was given to China and Japan and it had no major foreign policy concerns in South Asia. US policy makers were also of the opinion that Britain would play predominant role in South Asia. The second reason was a natural desire of Pakistan to cultivate brotherly relations with the Muslim countries. In this connection, Quaid-i-Azam frequently criticized western policy towards Palestine opposed the creation of Israel in 1948. Thirdly, Pakistan also wished to keep itself out of the big powers' conflict. The then Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, announced immediately after the emergence of Pakistan that the country would not be party to any conflict of ideologies between the nations. Six months later, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah affirmed, "Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill towards all nations of the world". Fourthly, in the early days of emergence, Pakistan had to face numerous tribulations such as, deprivation of economic and military assets, war on Kashmir with India, influx of refugees, 1000 miles long hostile Indian territory between East and West Pakistan, threat from North West Frontier because of Durand Line issue, and the scarcity of funds to meet the expenses of the government.

These problems made Pakistan fix its priorities to the internal or regional issues, rather than paying attention to global conflicts of super powers.

It was a time when Pakistan needed economic and military aid so as to overcome the critical security situation it had been plunged into. Pakistan made request of economic aid to US. However, the request of \$2 billion military and economic assistance, met a cold response from US and a meagre amount of \$10 million was offered from its relief fund. Instead of giving military aid, on March 11, 1948, for the first time US imposed embargo on the export of military hardware to both the countries under the plea of Pakistan India tension on Kashmir issue. The Chinese revolution in 1949 alarmed US and compelled it to reconsider its Asian policy. Moreover, this alarming situation was multiplied when China entered into thirty years friendship alliance and mutual assistance with the Soviet Union. This development in the region improved the position of Pakistan in the eyes of American policy makers because of its geo-strategic location, being at the doorsteps of the former USSR and China. Of course, Pakistan could help US to keep a vigilant eye over Russia and China.

Initially the relationship between Pakistan and US was not a sort of friendship but a patron-client relationship. One, it was the time when Pakistan was fully dependent on US for defense against India and Afghanistan. Second, during cold war period Pakistan was a crucial military factor for US in South Asia. Third, the Patron-Client nature of relationship between Pakistan and US was well-known arrangement to other nations around the world. Patron-Client relationship established when Pakistan signed Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with US in May 1954. Pakistan was initially reluctant to join, but agreed after the Turks and the Iraqis had convinced Ayub Khan that membership would entail no new security obligation. This agreement was signed for building friendly cooperation in the economic, technical, and defense fields. By this time, Pakistan joined another defense alliance with US, which was known as South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in September 1954. Thus, Pattern-client relationship formally established. The main objective of this alliance was to block the advancement of Communism in Asia. Pakistan became the most allied ally of United States in Asia. It provided US with the facility to establish surveillance and communication post near Peshawar. In return, US provided nearly \$17.5 million military and \$60 million economic aid to Pakistan that strengthened its ill-equipped armed forces enabling them to effectively cope up with the Indian threat. Although, both the countries had different motives for entering into the security relationship, but the alliance proved satisfactory to both in the short run.

After honeymoon period of relationship, the fluctuation started in Pak-US relations. Actually, in 1960 there was a new turn in the international politics. The U-2 incident of May 1960, compelled both US and Soviet Union to realize the intensity of the rivalry. Both adversaries endeavored to achieve rapprochement to diminish the looming danger of war. The Kennedy administration regarded China as a greater threat to the free world than the Soviet Union. It was also the time when US administration tried to reduce the rent, it paid for the Peshawar base and decreased military assistance program. Pakistan joined the alliance system in order to have advantage over its adversary, India. On the other hand, during the Sino-Indian conflict 1962, US and Britain decided to give \$120 million military assistance to India. This development under the Kennedy administration decreased the alliance co-relation with aid.

The new administration took less interest in Pakistan, and instead of military hardware, it extended only verbal assurances of American assistance. American military aid to India changed the balance of power in the sub-continent. Pakistan believed that American military aid to India would not be used against China but against Pakistan. During the Sino-Indian conflict, US urged Pakistan not to take advantage of India's troubles; and pledged to facilitate the solution of Kashmir problem. However, it failed to get any breakthrough in solving the Kashmir issue. Ayub Khan began to assess the cost-benefit ratio of Pakistan's alliance with US, and consequently established relations with China and the Soviet Union. US selfish approach led Pakistan to move closer to China. On March 2, 1963, Pakistan signed a boundary agreement with China. US, which was already pursuing the policy of containing China, was not, of course, in line with Pakistan's new approach. In retaliation, the US State Department announced suspension of promised \$4.3 million aid to Pakistan.

During the Pak-India war of 1965, US imposed embargoes on both Pakistan and India. Pakistan suffered more as a result of this situation than India did, because the later was already receiving arms from the Soviet Union. At this stage, China helped Pakistan. Shift in the US Policy At the end of 1965 War, US policy towards Pakistan enter into a period of neglect. During this period the strategic and political interests of Pakistan and US failed to coincide with each other. Though Americans terminated their military program for Pakistan in 1967 but they still used Pakistani land for spying purposes. They used to monitor the Soviet Union from a base situated in Peshawar through spy planes. In 1968, Pakistan sent a notice to US to close its monitoring base at Peshawar, after the expiry of ten (10) years lease period. In 1971, Henry Kissinger made a secret trip to China via Islamabad that paved the way for the Sino-US détente. It reduced US security concerns in South Asia and improved Pakistan's relations with US. At the

same time, India and the Soviet Union signed the treaty of friendship and cooperation. India intervened in East Pakistan in 1971 that prompted the third Indo-Pak War, resulting in the dismemberment of Pakistan. During this war Pakistan invoked security pact of 1959 for support against the Indian aggression, but US turned down the request on the ground that it did not consider India as a Communist State. The dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 led US recognize India as the preeminent power in South Asia. Pakistan too re-oriented its foreign policy and evolved good relationship with the 'Third World' countries by articulating their grievances against their former colonizers. Pakistan also stressed in its ties with the Muslim World under Pan Islamism. The links with the Islamic states were designed to compensate for the loss of support from Washington. The event of 1971, practically made Pakistan's membership in SEATO absurd and, thus it joined Nonalignment Movement. It continued its membership in CENTO, more in respect to its ties with Iran and Turkey, than because of its relationship with US.

In 1974, India tested its nuclear device that aroused a sense of insecurity in Pakistan. The then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, visited America in 1975, to get the 1965 arms embargo lifted. Bhutto successfully managed to get lifted the arms embargo; however, US ignored Indian nuclear test and also gave assistance to India that raised concerns in Pakistan. Pakistan signed an agreement with France on March 18, 1976 to buy a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in its quest to offset India's conventional and non-conventional military superiority. US reacted sharply against this contract under the policy of non-proliferation. US indirectly threatened Pakistan to make it an example for others.

It is concluded that, firstly, what fits in the interest of global powers, is that they pursue their own vested interests, without even taking care of friendly states interest. Secondly, it was a situation where Pakistan as a client became as an 'Estranged Client'. Though, both the nations, as patron and a client, maintained a cooperative relationship. Nevertheless, Pakistan as a client asserted relatively more freedom and opposed the patron in certain cases like Pakistan's nuclear program. However, their constant concern remains to maintain at least working relationship between them. After reviewing the relationship between Pakistan and the US during different phases one reaches the conclusion that relations between them have always been marked by convergence and divergence of national interests, resulting in a cycle of friendship and friction. The US gained more during the times of convergence of interests but periods of divergence outweighed the former. Although, Pakistan earned the title of 'most allied ally' of US, it is also the most sanctioned country in the world. By making complete dependence on US, Pakistan gained less as it was not given the required support by the US when needed. The US left Pakistan high and dry not only during

the 1965 War but also during the 1971 War, which led to the disintegration of the country. In fact, US later imposed severe penalties, embargoes and sanctions on Pakistan. Moreover, it is also observed that the Patron-Client relationship that started in 1950s with the admission of Pakistan in SEATO and CENTO transformed from dependent client to an 'Estranged Client'. Despite this, both the nations maintained a cooperative relationship like Pakistan army served American interests in Somalia under the umbrella of UN. Nevertheless, Pakistan as a client asserted comparatively more freedom and opposed the patron in certain cases like Taliban in Afghanistan, Kashmir issue and nuclear program. This paved the way for further transformation in patron-client relationship between US and Pakistan.

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APPENDIX A

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 1954

In September of 1954, the United States, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan formed the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, or SEATO.



SEATO Meeting in Manila

The purpose of the organization was to prevent communism from gaining ground in the region. Although called the “Southeast Asia Treaty Organization,” only two Southeast Asian countries became members. The Philippines joined in part because of its close ties with the United States and in part out of concern over the nascent communist insurgency threatening its own government. Thailand, similarly, joined after learning of a newly established “Thai Autonomous Region” in Yunnan Province in South China, expressing concern about the potential for Chinese communist subversion on its own soil. The rest of the region was far less concerned about the threat of communism to internal stability. Burma and Indonesia both preferred to maintain their neutrality rather than join the organization. Malaya (including Singapore) found it politically difficult to give formal support to the organization, though through its ties with Great Britain it learned of key developments. Finally, the terms of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 signed after the fall of French Indochina prevented Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos from joining any international military alliance, though these countries were ultimately included in the area protected under SEATO and granted “observers” status.

Most of the SEATO member states were countries located elsewhere but with an interest in the region or the organization. Australia and New Zealand were interested in Asian affairs because of

their geographic position in the Pacific. Great Britain and France had long maintained colonies in the region and were interested in developments in the greater Indochina region. For Pakistan, the appeal of the pact was the potential for receiving support in its struggles against India, in spite of the fact that neither country was located in the area under the organization's jurisdiction. Finally, U.S. officials believed Southeast Asia to be a crucial frontier in the fight against communist expansion, so it viewed SEATO as essential to its global Cold War policy of containment.

Headquartered in Bangkok, Thailand, SEATO had only a few formal functions. It maintained no military forces of its own, but the organization hosted joint military exercises for member states each year. As the communist threat appeared to change from one of outright attack to one of internal subversion, SEATO worked to strengthen the economic foundations and living standards of the Southeast Asian States. It sponsored a variety of meetings and exhibitions on cultural, religious and historical topics, and the non-Asian member states sponsored fellowships for Southeast Asian scholars.

Beyond its activities, the SEATO charter was also vitally important to the American rationale for the Vietnam War. The United States used the organization as its justification for refusing to go forward with the 1956 elections intended to reunify Vietnam, instead maintaining the divide between communist North Vietnam and South Vietnam at the 17th parallel. As the conflict in Vietnam unfolded, the inclusion of Vietnam as a territory under SEATO protection gave the United States the legal framework for its continued involvement there.

The organization had a number of weaknesses as well. To address the problems attached to the guerrilla movements and local insurrections that plagued the region in the post-colonial years, the SEATO defense treaty called only for consultation, leaving each individual nation to react individually to internal threats. Unlike the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), SEATO had no independent mechanism for obtaining intelligence or deploying military forces, so the potential for collective action was necessarily limited. Moreover, because it incorporated only three Asian members, SEATO faced charges of being a new form of Western colonialism. Linguistic and cultural difficulties between the member states also compounded its problems, making it difficult for SEATO to accomplish many of its goals.

By the early 1970s, members began to withdraw from the organization. Neither Pakistan nor

France supported the U.S. intervention in Vietnam, and both nations were pulling away from the organization in the early 1970s. Pakistan formally left SEATO in 1973, because the organization had failed to provide it with assistance in its ongoing conflict against India. When the Vietnam War ended in 1975, the most prominent reason for SEATO's existence disappeared. As a result, SEATO formally disbanded in 1977.

APPENDIX B

The Baghdad Pact (1955) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)

The Baghdad Pact was a defensive organization for promoting shared political, military and economic goals founded in 1955 by Turkey, Iraq, Great Britain, Pakistan and Iran. Similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, the main purpose of the Baghdad Pact was to prevent communist incursions and foster peace in the Middle East. It was renamed the Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO, in 1959 after Iraq pulled out of the Pact.

In the early 1950s, the United States Government expressed an interest in the formation of a Middle East Command to protect the region against communist encroachment. The nature of some of the ongoing tensions in the region, like Arab-Israeli conflict and Egyptian-led anti-colonialism, made it difficult to forge an alliance that would include both Israel and Western colonial powers. Instead, the U.S shifted its focus to the "Northern Tier," referring to the line of countries that formed a border between the U.S.S.R. and the Middle East. The idea was to conclude an alliance that would link the southernmost member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Turkey, with the westernmost member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), Pakistan. Turkey and Pakistan signed an agreement in 1954 to increase security and stability in the region. In February 1955, Iraq and Turkey signed a "pact of mutual cooperation" in Baghdad to resist outside aggression, and they opened it to other countries in the region as well. In April, the United Kingdom announced its intention to adhere to the Pact, and it was followed by Pakistan and finally, Iran. The King of Jordan considered joining, but he could not overcome domestic opposition to the pact. The United States signed individual agreements with each of the nations in the Pact, but it did not formally join. Instead, the United States participated as an observer and took part in committee meetings.

Developments in the Middle East in the years that followed weakened the Pact. In 1956, Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser seized control of the Suez Canal, an important international waterway. Israel responded by invading the Sinai Peninsula, and British and French forces intervened. The outcome of the incident was a profound loss of British prestige in the region, which in turn damaged its position of leadership in the Baghdad Pact. A series of events in 1958, including an Egyptian-Syrian union, an Iraqi revolution, and civil unrest in Lebanon threatened regional stability. In

response to these developments, the United States invoked the 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine as justification for intervening in Lebanon. The members of the Baghdad Pact except for Iraq endorsed the U.S. intervention, and in 1959, Iraq announced it was formally leaving the arrangement. As a result, the other signatories to the Baghdad Pact formed the Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO. Although the United States was still not a member of the organization, it did sign bilateral military aid treaties with Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, ensuring that it would continue to be active in supporting the CENTO members.

CENTO never actually provided its members with a means for guaranteeing collective defense. After the withdrawal of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact, CENTO moved its headquarters to Ankara, Turkey, and the United States continued to support the organization as an associate, but not as a member. CENTO never created a permanent military command structure or armed forces, but the United States provided assistance to its allies in the region. By the close of the Eisenhower Administration, it had become clear to CENTO members that that the organization was a better conduit for economic and technical cooperation than it was a military alliance. In 1979, the Iranian revolution led to the overthrow of the shah and Iran's withdrawal from CENTO. Pakistan also withdrew that year after determining the organization no longer had a role to play in bolstering its security. CENTO formally disbanded in 1979.

