

**INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS BANGLADESH:
IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN**

**By
Ahmad Jawad Khan**



NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF MODERN LANGUAGES

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By

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
THESIS AND DEFENSE APPROVAL FORM	i
CANDIDATE DECLARATION FORM	ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	v
DEDICATION	vi
ABBREVIATIONS	vii
ABSTRACT	ix
INTRODUCTION	1
Statement of the Problem	3
Research Questions	4
Objectives of Study	4
Literature Review	4
Research Methodology	15
Theoretical Framework	19
Significance of Study	23
Delimitation	25
Chapter Breakdown	25
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH.....	27
1.1 Muslim Homeland within Sub-Continent.....	27
1.2 Muslim Brotherhood and Formation of Pakistan.....	27
1.3 General Iskandar Mirza Regime	31
1.4 General Mohammad Ayub Khan Regime	33
1.5 General Yahya's Regime	37
1.6 Pakistan-India War of 1971	53
2. INDIA-BANGLADESH RELATIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN	57
2.1 Emergence of Bangladesh	57
2.2 Overview of India-Bangladesh Relations	58
2.2.1 India-Bangladesh Water Sharing Issues	69
2.2.2 Border Enclave Issues: A Contestation	74
2.2.3 India-Bangladesh: Transit Trade Issues	78
2.3 India-Bangladesh Partnership: Implications for Pakistan.....	83

3. PAKISTAN-BANGLADESH RELATIONS: HOSTAGE TO HISTORY	85
3.1 Secession of East Pakistan	91
3.2 Initial Contacts and Mutual Recognition	93
3.3 General Zia ul Haq Regime: Normalisation of Relations	97
3.4 Musharraf Regime: Improvement of Ties	101
3.5 Post Musharraf Developments	103
3.6 Indian Interference: An Unending Legacy	107
4. INDIAN INFLUENCE ON BANGLADESH AND HEGEMONIC DESIGNS	109
4.1 Bangladesh Creation: Foreign Policy Cardinals	113
4.2 India-Bangladesh Relations	115
4.3 SAARC and Indian Hegemony	118
4.4 Indian Inference Designs	120
4.5 Akhand / Maha Baharat Decade	128
4.6 Neglect, Mistrust and Suspicion	130
4.7 Plentitude of Might is Right	131
CONCLUSION	133
BIBLOGHRAPHY	i
APPENDICES.....	xiii

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DEDICATION

I DEDICATE THIS

THESIS

TO MY MOTHERLAND PAKISTAN

AND

MY LOVED ONES

ABBREVIATIONS

AL	:	Awami League
BIMSTEC	:	Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
BIPPA	:	Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement
BJP	:	Bhartiya Janata Party
BJI	:	Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami
BNP	:	Bangladesh National Party
BOP	:	Border out Posts
BRI	:	Belt and Road Initiative
BSF	:	Border Security Force (Indian)
BTV	:	Bangladesh Television
CAA	:	Indian Citizen Amendment Act
CSO	:	Civil Society Organisations
CBMP	:	Coordinated Border Management Plan
CDA	:	Critical Discourse Analysis
CIA	:	Central Intelligence Agency
CMLA	:	Chief Martial Law Administrator
CPEC	:	China Pakistan Economic Corridor
DCF	:	Defence Cooperation Framework
Dr	:	Doctor
etc	:	et cetera
EU	:	European Union
GBM	:	Ganges, the Brahmaputra and the Meghna/Barak
Gen	:	General (A rank in Army)
GHQ	:	General Headquarters
GOC	:	General Officer Commanding
GWT	:	Ganges Water Treaty
IB	:	Intelligence Bureau
ICRC	:	International Committee of Red Cross
IDSA	:	Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
IJI	:	Islamic Democratic Alliance
IPU	:	Inter-Parliamentary Union
IR	:	International Relations
ISI	:	Inter-Services Intelligence
JI	:	Jamaat-e-Islami
JRC	:	Joint Rivers Commission (India–Bangladesh)
Km	:	Kilometer
LBA	:	Land Boundary Agreement
LFO	:	Legal Framework Order
MNA	:	Member National Assembly
MPA	:	Member Provincial Assembly
MOU	:	Memorandum of Understanding
Mr	:	Mister
Mrs	:	Misses
MW	:	Mega Watt
NA	:	National Assembly

NGO	:	Non-Governmental Organisations
NRC	:	India's National Register for Citizens
OBOR	:	One Belt One Road
OIC	:	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (earlier known as Organisation of Islamic Countries)
PIA	:	Pakistan International Airlines
PM	:	Prime Minister
POW	:	Prisoners of War
PPP	:	Pakistan People's Party
PTI	:	Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf
RAW	:	Research and Analysis Wing (Indian)
RLP	:	River Linking Project
RTC	:	Round Table Conference
RAAI	:	Rabita Al-Akan-Al-Islam
SAARC	:	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SAFTA	:	South Asian Free Trade Agreement
SAPTA	:	South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement
SCO	:	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
UDI	:	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UN	:	United Nations
UNHCR	:	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
US	:	United States

ABSTRACT

Thesis Title: Indian Foreign Policy Towards Bangladesh: Implications for Pakistan

South Asia is a volatile region characterized by, two nuclear arch rivals India and Pakistan. Security dilemma that lies between the two states shapes the strategic environment of the region. Indian desire to be a regional hegemon that not only increases the instability but also deepens the security dilemma in the region. Indian dubious role since 1947, and influence employed on neighbours, to meet her hegemonic designs, has implications for Pakistan. Owing to the Indian concocted and anti-Pakistan fabricated narratives and Pakistan's weak foreign policy towards its neighbours, Pakistan has deeply suffered on the South Asian canvas. When it comes to major powers of the world, Pakistan's foreign policy appeared as a failure because it remained unsuccessful to exploit her geopolitical importance during the Cold War period. In 1971, East Pakistan was separated due to Indian interventions, and Pakistan could not earn worthwhile support from her allies. Whereas, Indian foreign policy makers had been successful in creating strong lobby in almost all-important countries, thus succeeded in making Pakistan isolated. India's growing influence and employment of interference strategies, in regional politics and the formation of respectable relations with bordering countries, mainly Bangladesh is causing a great threat for Pakistan. This research focuses on the turbulent relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh, which has been in consistent turmoil mainly due to Indian foreign policy. The study revolves around the question that intensification of India-Bangladesh relations and Indian influence on Bangladesh had further deteriorated Pakistan-Bangladesh relations. What are the options available for Pakistan, viable recommendations and way forward for improvement of Pakistan-Bangladesh relations have also been highlighted.

Keywords: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, East Pakistan, Influence, Foreign Policy, Hegemonic Designs.

INTRODUCTION

This study is examining India-Bangladesh relations and its implications for Pakistan. Despite separation, Bangladesh remains intrinsic to the founding ideology of Pakistan, fall of Dhaka dealt a severe blow to the idea and shape of Pakistan, this has a chilling significance of what is left of Pakistan and has altogether different meaning in former East Pakistan. Pakistan lost its eastern half not in terms of territory but the biggest loss was the people of Bengal, people who were the real architect and the founders of the idea of Pakistan, it was the Bengali political leadership which mobilized the Muslim's of subcontinent in their struggle for independence under the banner of All India Muslim League.

In 1971, the separation of East Pakistan was an interplay of excesses and deficits in various realms to include political under performance, military rule, economic variance, social differences geographic challenges and foreign interference.¹ Moreover, the feelings of mistrust amongst Bengalis were exploited by India because of its perennial hostility with Pakistan. India never accepted *Two Nation Theory* and the division of Indian subcontinent, because the *Hindutva* ideology of Hindus, wanted a united subcontinent. *Two Nation Theory* was against the Indian desire of *Akhand* or *Maha Baharat* (undivided and hegemon India), and of unified sub-continent. India conceived, funded and controlled a separatist movement within East Pakistan by launching hundred thousand strong *Mukti Bahini* militia² but after weakening the security apparatus of state from within East Pakistan, it launched an all-out war against Pakistan, the rest is all history and reality is the birth of Bangladesh.³

It would not be wrong to say that with the formation of Bangladesh, Indian planning of creating vassal states around it for the realisation of its expansionist and hegemonic designs has materialised. Unequivocally, Indian role remained negative, leading to the events resulting into the succession of East Pakistan. The negative role of India, being exercised by it through the interference it employs within its neighbouring countries,

¹ Khursheed Kamal Aziz, *Britain and Pakistan: A Study of British Attitude towards the East Pakistan Crisis of 1971* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1974; reprint 2008), 266.

² Ahmed Abdulla, *The Historical Background of Pakistan and Its People* (Karachi: Tanzeem Publishers, 1973), 33.

³ Simon C. Smith, "Coming Down on the Winning Side: Britain and the South Asia Crisis, 1971", *British Contemporary History*, vol. 24, no. 4 (2010): 452.

for furthering its hegemonic designs is not only condemnable, but also gives an overview of its foreign policy.⁴

Post 1971 developments between Pakistan and Bangladesh are no different to the prewar acrimony, Pakistan decided to move forward, recognized East Pakistan as a sovereign state named Bangladesh in 1974, and established full diplomatic relations in 1976. Successive governments in Islamabad had made several efforts to have cordial relations with Bangladesh, and build ties based on mutual respect and shared interest. The results, regrettably have been mixed, oscillating between friendly to less friendly and of recent are faced with an erratic behaviour that borders on belligerence. Pakistan's relations attain a positive outlook under most governments in Dhaka, however, an abrupt hit was felt under one particular parties (Awami League AL) government, which calls for severing diplomatic ties with Pakistan, endorsing Indian acquisitions, prosecuting pro Pakistan political and religious leaders through sham trials, war crimes tribunal etc.

The acquisitions from Awami League on Pakistan are understandable because it suits its election manifesto and Indian inclination. Furthermore, Indian interest in Bangladesh are connected to water issues, border issues, transit / trade issues and defence cooperation.⁵ Successful Indian foreign policy has made Bangladesh its subservient, which has negative fallout for Pakistan within South Asia (South Asian region consists of seven states; Bhutan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka). Indian desire to isolate Pakistan and reduce its influence in South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)⁶ countries, by implementing its influence created through orchestrated and carefully woven narratives achieved over the years by employing multi-faceted discourses for the realisation of its hegemonic designs.

Pakistan being a major regional player (See appendix-I and II) and a nuclear state needs to realize that these growing ties between India and Bangladesh are not beneficial for Pakistan in the regional perspective.⁷ Pakistan should play its part to reduce Indian

⁴ S. M. Hali, "Logic of the Two-Nation Theory," *The Nation*, April 17, 2012, <https://nation.com.pk/18-Apr-2012/logic-of-the-two-nation-theory>.

⁵ Haroon Habib, "Bangladesh Salutes Indira Gandhi." *The Hindu*, July 24, 2011, <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/bangladesh-salutes-indira-gandhi/article2290625.ece>.

⁶ M. H. Syed, *Encyclopedia of SAARC Nations* (New Delhi, Gyan Publishing House, 2003), 31.

⁷ M. Rafique Afzal, *Politics, 1947–1971*, 8.

influence that had witnessed the negative fallout for Pakistan, during the last decade. Pakistan needs to revamp its foreign policy measures through miscellaneous means, like eliminating grass root level hindrances between the two countries, analysing the challenges for Pakistan in maintaining and developing good bilateral relations with Bangladesh⁸ to ward off Indian hegemonic designs, finding possibilities for people to people contact in improving bilateral relations by improving political, economic and defence related interests and the use of strategic partner China by Pakistan as a bait for improving relations with Bangladesh (Bangladesh map is given at appendix-V).

In retrospect, it was difficult to convince the world and counter anti-Pakistan narrative but the Indian involvement and machinations in 1971 conflict had given a ray of hope that the reality of 1971 can be propagated through facts which is helpful countering fabricated narrative. It appears, amid these opposing narratives that better and cordial ties are still possible. In moving forward Pakistan and Bangladesh must look beyond the controversies and impediments of yester years. Thus, the present study is trying to find out misunderstanding between the two states. It also uncovers the propaganda against Pakistan and myths projected through Indian narratives.

Statement of the Problem

India's strong ties with Bangladesh is engendering tense situation between Pakistan and Bangladesh. For pursuing its regional hegemonic designs, India had brewed anti Pakistan narratives and took advantage of protracted conflicts between Pakistan and Bangladesh, and developed good relations with Bangladesh, which has been reciprocated by Bangladesh, owing to Sheikh Hasina's pro Indian tilt. Post 2014, owing to Modi-Hasina nexus there have been tremendous improvement in India-Bangladesh relations, as they have settled majority of mutual issues. Thus, this whole research revolves around the question that ever-growing India-Bangladesh socio, cultural, political, economic, diplomatic and defence related ties during the last decade are effecting Pakistan's relations with Bangladesh and has serious implications for Pakistan within South Asian region.

⁸ Haroon Habib, "Bangladesh."

Research Questions

This research is based on the following questions:

1. Why has Bangladesh been displaying coldness towards Pakistan since its independence?
2. How is India availing the opportunity of bitter relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh and strengthening its influence over Bangladesh?
3. How regional alignment of Bangladesh and India is causing threat to Pakistan?

Objectives of Study

The objectives of this research are:

- To investigate the causes behind the cold relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh.
- To critically analyse, how Indian hegemonic designs resulted into strengthening of its influence over Bangladesh, by using fabricated narrative and employing social, cultural, political, economic, diplomatic and defence related tools.
- To figure out the impact of ever growing India-Bangladesh partnership on Pakistan and suggest viable recommendations for Pakistan.

Literature Review

In order to analyse India's relations with Bangladesh, plethora of books and articles have been consulted. However, partisanship and distorted narration of events has made history a conundrum where Pakistan was painted as untrustworthy partner. In this milieu, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) has been made. It is found that available data, mostly written by Indians, was certainly distorted because the language used in Indian newspapers, electronic media, books and their political statements are spewing hate against Pakistan. The study has found that several historical incidents are actually Indian concocted stories. This study shuns the notion of prevailing mistrust and woe between Pakistan and Bangladesh. It presents an overview of the challenges being faced by Pakistan in maintaining good relations with Bangladesh, and involves exploration of numerous books, surveys, reviews, various news items published in newspapers across the world to logically conclude the study. Literature can be divided in two

categories unequivocally; first, historical literature and later on recent literature. Literature prior to year 2000 is discussed in the initial part of literature review and is categorised as historical literature, however literature from year 2000 onwards has been categorised as recent literature and is discussed in the later part of literature review.

This research focuses on the consistent turbulent relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh, which has been in consistent turmoil mainly due to Indian foreign policy. Own mistakes and lack of resolve has also been a key factor in lack of cordial bilateral relations, between the two brotherly Muslim states. The study recognizes that this is a gap that needed to be addressed, and for doing so, extensive and original research has been conducted. Since the bitter incident of 1971 civil war, Pakistan and Bangladesh are not in close relations with each other, except religion, both Pakistan and Bangladesh do not enjoy common things amongst each other. This difference of interests between both states is a big challenge towards maintaining future good relations.

Data collection and analysis centred upon books, newspapers, archive documents, primary and secondary source literature. There had been so much data which can be put in literature review owing to the diversity of the subject, some details are appended below, however, books, articles and newspapers etc, as and where consulted have been mentioned in footnotes and bibliography. This section gives a review of the literature used for the study. The literature studied, evaluated and reviewed helped in investigating the causes behind the cold relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh. Some books such as the book named *Bangladesh, India and Pakistan: International Relations and Regional Tensions in South Asia, (2000)* written by Kathryn Jacques, and helped in analysing Indian efforts to exert its influence over Bangladesh, available literature helped in examining the relations of Pakistan-Bangladesh which mostly got worse because of India, for instance works of Iftexhar Ahmed Chowdhury has highlighted how Indian influence has been employed to achieve her hegemonic designs, and the divergent interests of Pakistan, India and Bangladesh.

Firstly, the literature on India and Bangladesh is being discussed. Various sources were surveyed for the purpose of the study, prominent among which are the Ganges water treaty (GWT) 1996, The Land Boundary Agreement 2015 and the Defence Cooperation Framework (DCF) of 2017. Apart from it, various treaties, Memorandum of Understanding (MOUs), agreements were also surveyed. A Bangladeshi professor

named Talukdar Munir uz Zaman highlighted these issues in detail within a book named *Struggle for Survival as an Independent State*, (1976).

Kuldip Nayar in his book *Distant Neighbours: A Tale of the Subcontinent*, (1972) has said that Patel believed that the two Bengals would unite one day. Veteran Hindu leader Sarat Chandra Bose had also held similar views. Behind all these expressions of Bengali solidarity was the underlying Hindu objective to exploit Muslim Bengal's human and material resources for economic development of India, particularly of West Bengal, which also prompted PM Indira Gandhi to impose the friendship treaty and the trade pact on Bangladesh. In launching these colonial measures, Indira Gandhi seemed to have lost her characteristic pragmatism in the realm of realpolitik as she was basking in the glow of her tactical triumph of breaking up Pakistan. In the process, Indira Gandhi mainly faulted on two counts, firstly, in assessing the causes of the dismemberment of Pakistan, which were really generated by the suppression of the Muslim Bengali majority and their ethos, besides their political, social and economic deprivation by minority groups backed and supported by the civil and military bureaucracy whose first serious blow was Khawaja Nazim ud Din dismissal in 1953, despite his commanding dominant majority in the National Assembly (NA). Secondly, Muslim Bengal's memories of the long drawn exploitation by Hindus, and subsequently the so called exploitation by West Pakistan, which was successfully over projected by the enemies of Pakistan. Consequently, Indira Gandhi endemic urge to subjugate Bangladesh was exposed and generated adverse feelings in the country against Indian. Nevertheless, India persisted its colonialist efforts in Bangladesh, resulting in adopting an intransigent stand on all issues between the two countries, including the critical Farakka barrage dispute (location of Farakka barrage is given at appendix-VI and appendix-VII) tangle to keep mounting continuous pressure.⁹

Asoka Raina in his book *Inside RAW*, (1981) states that the first mission entrusted to Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) was to break up Pakistan, during 1962–63 Intelligence Bureau (IB) had established contacts with Mujib's crowd (Sheikh Mujib ur Rahman was the leader of Awami League Party, Bangladesh people call him their founding father, its foreign operatives, including K. Sankaran Nair (In the succession of East Pakistan, the role of Sankaran Nair, with the assistance of RAW operatives

⁹ S.S. Bindra, *Indo-Bangladesh Relations* (New Delhi: Deep and Deep, 1982), 17.

remained of paramount importance, Sankaran Nair later became chief of RAW) covertly had a meeting with them at Agartala.¹⁰ *Indo-Bangladesh Relations, (1982)* by S. S. Bindra basically deals with the Farakka barrage dispute between the two countries. India-Bangladesh treaty 1971, border agreement of 1974, India-Bangladesh cooperation on social, cultural and economic fields. The book also probes into the nature of economic relations after 1974, how the border problems arose, the problem of illegal migration and New Moore controversy and so on.

Professor Dilara Choudhury points mentions in her article *India-Bangladesh Ties: From Euphoria to Pragmatism, (1989)* has written in and out that how Indian PM Indira Gandhi personally took care that direct political, cultural, social and economic links were develop between Bangladesh and Bengal, while a confrontation between the two was generated by allowing subversive elements to operate from Bengal against Bangladesh after President Sheikh Mujib ur Rahman's assassination, India-Bangladesh relationships remained highly tense. J. N. Dixit's book titled *Liberation and Beyond: Indo-Bangladesh Relations, (1999)* gives us insightful account of various aspects related to India-Bangladesh relations including the genesis alienation among the East Pakistanis; how India interfered into the east Pakistan crisis, the birth of Bangladesh and so on. Another book *Bangladesh: Promise and Performance, (2000)* edited by Rounaq Jahan deals with the potentials of Bangladesh as a country and its performance till late 1990s. The book deals critical importance of India-Bangladesh relations, and Chakma problem, the book also raises various pertinent issues such as poverty, human development and the problems inherent in building a responsible civil society.

P. Sukumaran Nair's book, *Indo-Bangladesh Relations, (2008)* highlights the importance of India in Bangladesh's foreign policy. The book deals with India-Bangladesh relations, transit, trade, and disputes relating to border and water. Apart from it, the Tin Bigha issue and New Moore island dispute (location of New Moore island is given at appendix-VIII) has also been dealt. In short, the book is helpful for its brief overview on India-Bangladesh relations. Y. M. Bammi's book *India-Bangladesh Relations: The Way Ahead, (2010)* recounts the personal experiences and views of a Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) who participated in the 1971 Indo-Pak war, and talks about

¹⁰ "Agartala Conspiracy Case Was Not False," *bdnews24.com*, February 23, 2011, <https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2011/02/23/agartala-conspiracy-case-was-not-false>.

the history of Bangladesh and touches upon the geography of Bangladesh. The strategic importance of Bangladesh to India, security perceptions of Bangladesh and the major issues in India-Bangladesh relations have also been dealt.

Harun ur Rashid's book named *Bangladesh-India Relations: Living with a Big Neighbour*, (2010) gives us personal account of his experience as a delegate in foreign services. If Dixit's book gives us the Indian side of the story, Rashid provides us with the Bangladeshi perspectives. The author acknowledges that Indian influence and interference is evident in the formation of Bangladesh and its foreign policy. Besides, Rashid also tried to probe into the psychological factors that have impinged India-Bangladesh relations and highlights as to how the attitudes of political leaders of both the countries during the first four decades have had a negative impact on India-Bangladesh relations. The book is interesting in a sense that it gives an appraisal of Bangladesh's foreign policy towards India from 1971-2009, under various governments. In crux, the book has tried to probe into complex, sensitive, and multidimensional nature of India-Bangladesh relations. Another book, *Four Decades of India-Bangladesh Relations: Historical Imperatives and Future Direction*, (2012) edited by Smruti S. Pattanaik, is an important for the current study, as it gives both Indian and Bangladeshi perspectives. While doing so, the book provides a historical background of the India-Bangladesh relations along with the issues that have put their relations into a backburner. It contextualizes India-Bangladesh relations into wider perspectives and explores areas wherein the two can cooperate.

Secondly, the literature on Pakistan and Bangladesh is being discussed. The historical perspective of Pakistan and Bangladesh relations has been taken into account as various authors have given different point of view, analysis has been done, keeping in view the resources consulted and the authenticity of resources.

A book named *Blood and Tears: Atrocities committed in East Pakistan by Awami League militants in March-April, 1971*, (1974) written by Qutab ud Din Aziz is an excellent book on the true account of the events of 1971, and the condemnable role of India. *War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the creation of Bangladesh*, (1991) written by Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, is the best book to find the actual realities about the events of 1971. This book written by unbiased writers, who managed to give the factual account on the war of 1971 and the secession of Bangladesh. The role of

Mukti Bahini and the amount of Indian interference in Pakistan, which ultimately led to the secession of East Pakistan. Shuja Nawaz book titled *Crossed Swords, (2008)* is a study of military involvement in the evolution of Pakistan. People to people contact are important considerations in order to improve the confidence and better understanding amongst the nations, and highlights another aspect of improvement in defence relations between both the countries which was mostly in the era when General (Gen) Muhammad Zia ul Haq was the President in Pakistan and General Hussain Muhammad Ershad in Bangladesh.

Iftexhar Ahmed Chowdhury gives an account of the relations in *India, Pakistan and Bangladesh: Tri-literalism in South Asia, (2009)*,¹¹ this is another point of view by many authors which provide details of the divergent interests of all stakeholders. In an article, *Revisiting Pakistan Bangladesh Relations*, Saman Zulfiqar has mentioned that relations in the past provided an environment, how the future relations should move on. The past cannot be changed, but responsible states and people try and make efforts to eliminate the historical grievances and neutralize the perceptions of each other to move forward in order to set the stage for the peaceful relations in future.

Sarmila Bose hails from India, and is on the faculty of Oxford University, in her book *Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War (2011)*¹² narrates an unbiased account on the liberation war of Bangladesh, she refutes the over exaggerated Indian and Bangladesh Awami League led propaganda campaign of atrocities committed by Pakistan army. Though she had been illogically and just for the sake of it being criticised by the Indian and Bangladeshi lobby, however the world has accepted Sarmila's work as she is an Indian national of Bengali decent, this gives her work immense weightage. The detail of relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh has also been mentioned, which has been successfully exploited by the India through diplomatic / exterior manoeuvres.

Economic Survey of Pakistan (2016) provides an analysis of trade between Pakistan and Bangladesh, which has considerably improved, but the domination of Indians and the feeling of the people of both the states is a point of reluctance in the economic

¹¹ Iftexhar Ahmed Chowdhury, *India, Pakistan and Bangladesh: Tri-literalism in South Asia* (Singapore: Institute of South Asian Studies, 2009), 128.

¹² Sarmila Bose, *Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War* (London: Hurst & Company, 2011), 79-81.

activities. The influence of India on Bangladesh foreign policy¹³ has been seen in a different perspective by various authors. A web source titled *Beyond Neighbours: India Bangladesh Relations between 2009 and 2015*,¹⁴ speaks about the influence which India has on Bangladeshi trade. The source shows that several highest dignitaries level visits have taken place between Bangladesh and India, to materialise Indian designs.

The newspaper *The News* reported in one of its articles in November 2012,¹⁵ that despite formal invitation by Pakistani officials, Bangladeshi PM Hasina Wazed declined the invitation to attend a summit of developing eight groups of nations in Islamabad. It was done due to the viewpoint that no apology regarding the events of 1971 was extended by the Pakistan foreign minister during her visit to Dhaka. Instead of rendering an apology for not visiting, Bangladeshi PM Sheikh Hasina Wazed was of the view that Pakistan had not displayed regret on the events of 1971, on the contrary Pakistan is of the view that it's time to build cordial relations with each other. Since then no official from either of the governments visited either of the country which has widened the diplomatic gulf between the two states and has allowed other regional states to intrude and influence the bilateral relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh.¹⁶ A book named *Creation of Bangladesh: Myths exploded (2016)* by Dr. Junaid Ahmad is another book which has countered false Indian propaganda with the help of credible data. Myths and fables busted in the book are that the West Pakistan exploited Sonar Bengal (East Pakistan), no development was carried out in East Pakistan by the West Pakistan, West Pakistanis imposed their culture on the Bengalis, the Agartala conspiracy case was a fabrication of the West Pakistan, Pakistani backed Kashmiri *mujahedeen's* hijacked the Indian aircraft on 30th January 1971, operation searchlight was launched by the West Pakistani establishment against the innocent civilians of East Pakistan, Pakistani armed forces killed more than 3 million innocent Bengalis and raped 200,000 Bengali women, Pakistani armed forces exclusively targeted and killed the Hindus in East Pakistan,

¹³ M. Rafique Afzal, *Politics, 1947–1971*, 16.

¹⁴ "Beyond Neighbours: India-Bangladesh Relations between 2009 and 2015," *Bangladesh Awami League*, Joy Bangla Joy Bangabundhu. June 03, 2015, <http://www.albd.org/articles/news/31077/Beyond-Neighbours:-India-Bangladesh-Relations-Between-2009-And-2015->.

¹⁵ "Burden of History Actual Barrier in Pak-BD Ties," *Thenews.com.pk*, World, December 16, 2014, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/542920-burden-of-history-actual-barrier-in-pak-bd-ties>.

¹⁶ "Bangladesh asks Pakistan to Apologize for Alleged War Crimes," *dw.com*, Asia, World, November 21, 2011. <https://www.dw.com/en/bangladesh-asks-pakistan-to-apologize-for-alleged-war-crimes/a-6664017>.

Pakistan army is solely responsible for all the violence in East Pakistan, Indian military intervention was a humanitarian action trying for a political solution, Indian military intervention was spontaneous and not planned, India was not supported by international powers, Pakistani forces numbering 93,000 soldiers surrendered to become Indian POWs, and that Sheikh Mujib ur Rahman was a National Liberator of Bangladesh. This book also gives options available to Pakistan for developing better relations between Bangladesh and Pakistan.¹⁷

Few books on Pakistan, Bangladesh and India, relations have also been consulted, W. Norman Brown, wrote a book titled *The United States and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh*, (1972), this book reflects the facts that in 1971 East Pakistan revolted, declared its independence as Bangladesh and now seems to be prematurely estranged from West Pakistan and destined to continue so.¹⁸ S. F. A. Mahmud, in his book named *Concise History of Indo-Pakistan* (1988), in which he has highlighted the 5000 years history and the simple and balanced picture of the regimes and the inhabitants of various religions.¹⁹ Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose's book *War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh* (1990), is a political study of the causes and consequences of this crisis and the war, based on a reconstruction of the real facts, historical events, political processes and developments. It candidly recapitulates the respective roles of the political elites (both of India and Pakistan), their leaders and governments, and assesses their perceptions of the real situation.²⁰ Kathryn Jacques, in his book named *Bangladesh, India and Pakistan: International Relations and Regional Tensions in South Asia*, (2000), provides a broad analytical study of Bangladesh's relationship with India and Pakistan between 1975 and 1990. Bangladesh's role in South Asian international relations has tended to be overlooked and underestimated. The book reveals the complexity of the relationship between Bangladesh, India and Pakistan.²¹

Overall existing literature on the subject is mainly tilted towards Indian narrative, where

¹⁷ Junaid Ahmad, *Creation of Bangladesh: Myths exploded* (Karachi: AJA Publishers, 2016), 26.

¹⁸ W. Norman Brown, *The United States and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 139.

¹⁹ S. F. A. Mahmud, *Concise History of Indo-Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1988), 15.

²⁰ Richard Sisson, Leo E. Rose, *War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 139.

²¹ Kathryn Jacques, *Bangladesh, India and Pakistan: International Relations and Regional Tensions in South Asia* (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 225.

it is proved that India was right in its actions since 1947. Therefore, this study is pertinent as it counters the biased literature, fills the gap and highlights Pakistan's viewpoint, as presently available literature by Pakistani researches, does not cover Pakistan's viewpoint. Books like *Blood and Tears: Atrocities committed in East Pakistan by Awami League militants in March-April, 1971*, (1974) is another book by Qutab ud Din Aziz and *Creation of Bangladesh: Myths exploded*, (2016) by Dr. Junaid Ahmad have amply covered unbiased view point on the succession of Bangladesh. *Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War* (2011) by Sarmila Bose is the ground breaking book chronicles the 1971 war in South Asia by reconstituting the memories of those on opposing sides of the conflict. 1971 was marked by a bitter civil war within Pakistan and war between India and Pakistan, backed respectively by the Soviet Union and the United States. It was fought over the territory of East Pakistan, which seceded to become Bangladesh. Through a detailed investigation of events on the ground, Sarmila Bose contextualises and humanises the war while analysing what the events reveal about the nature of the conflict itself. The story of 1971 has so far been dominated by the narrative of the victorious Indian side, all parties to the war are still largely imprisoned by wartime partisan mythologies. Bose reconstructs events via interviews conducted in Bangladesh and Pakistan, published and unpublished reminiscences in Bengali and English of participants on all sides, official documents, foreign media reports and other sources. Her book challenges assumptions about the nature of the conflict, myths created due to Indian dominated literature and exposes the ways in which the 1971 war is still playing out in the region.²²

This study deals with Indian foreign policy which has an important determinant to isolate Pakistan at regional and international forums. Indian foreign policy to malign Pakistan in international and regional community as terrorist state so that it can be alienated and isolated at global forums was analysed for which numerous books were consulted, few of them are, *Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies* (1974) by Samuel Martin Burke provides a detailed perspective of Indian and Pakistan's foreign policy till 1960s. The author clearly describes early phase of the relationships between the both states and origin of their foreign policies, departure of British, division of India and its consequences on the bilateral relations, Nehru factor

²² Sarmila Bose, *Dead Reckoning*, 163.

in Indian foreign policy and goals of the foreign policies of both countries. Although this study provides a detailed picture of the nature of relationship during the early decades of independence yet it lacks of current data regarding the foreign policies of the both countries.

Another important study, *Indian National Security Dilemma: the Pakistan's Factor and India's Policy Response (2001)* by Rajpal Budania, after providing conceptual framework of Indian national security, it gives a detailed account of origin, determinants and objectives of the Indian foreign policy with special reference to Pakistan. It also highlights the problem of Jammu and Kashmir and provides details about the Indian concerns about the dispute, Pakistan's proxy war in Kashmir, India's Kashmir policy and Kargil war. The author comprehensively discusses arms race, nuclear issue and many other non-military issues and disputes between the two countries and role of United States, Russia (Soviet Union) and China in resolving those disputes. However, the book provides a detailed picture of the subject but lacks unemotional treatment. It also ignores the Pakistan's view point on various military and non-military disputes between Pakistan and India.

The *Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy (2015)* by David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan and Srinath Raghavan, provides a comprehensive knowledge about the Indian foreign policy. As India has become more involved in the global economy and faces China's strategic competition, it has sought to strengthen its relations with the countries of East Asia, Southeast Asia and the Middle East and to improve its links with the major powers. But as this collection of concise and authoritative essays shows, New Delhi has not been able to establish close ties with its immediate neighbours who would provide a springboard to exert significant additional influence. Nor is it effectively linked to international institutions in the areas of trade, finance, arms control or climate change. The decision-making apparatus of the country is dysfunctional. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not sufficient staff and works without significant supervision of political parties, parliament, business community, media or academia. The army lacks the strategic direction of the civil authorities and its service branches barely coordinate. The nuclear weapons program is based on autopilot and the national arms agency has not been able to produce high-end indigenous weapons. Covering all of these topics, the book opens up many fascinating areas for future research. Although, the book

highlights all aspects of Indian foreign policy yet it lacks information regarding its relations with neighbouring countries especially, Pakistan.

Another study, *Indian Foreign Policy in a Unipolar World (2012)* by Harsh V. Pant projects various features of the Review of Economics and Development Studies Vol. 5, No 4, 2019 705 Indian foreign policy in contemporary security environment. India's foreign policy, outside the structural limits of the Cold War strategic framework, has become broader in defining its priorities in recent years. With the increase of its economic and military capabilities and strategic interests, India has forged a diplomacy that is much more aggressive in pursuing those interests. Locating the path of foreign policy of India in the 21st century, this book looks into the factors that fashioned the Indian reaction to this emerging global security atmosphere. Including a new epilogue, this updated volume analyses the main effects that have shaped contemporary Indian foreign policy, in the context of its commitments to strategically important regions around the world and its relations with the main world powers. Although, this book is most important for the students of global politics yet it ignores the Pakistan's factor in Indian foreign policy.

Changes in *India's Foreign Policy towards Pakistan (2017)* by Dr. Nitin Prasad is a comprehensive document which provides a detailed picture of Indian foreign policy. For long times, the central point of the foreign policy of India has been Pakistan. The author asserts that India was the country where the foreign ministry had to split its head most of the time on Pakistan. The four wars and the conflicts like Rann of Kutch and Siachen, the militancy in Kashmir which has caused tens of thousands of lives and terrorist attacks across India cannot be ignored. Pakistan and India divided on the basis of the two-nation theory and the Muslims denied living in India as minority. The dispute over Kashmir emphasizes this division and still arises today. India has fought four wars with Pakistan and since 1980, when the Soviet Union involved in Afghanistan, the Pakistan with United States started anti-Soviet terrorism and Pakistan had the bright idea of using it against India, further worsening relations between the two nations. Narendra Modi's foreign policy refers to the political initiatives taken by the current government towards other states after taking the position of Prime Minister of India on 26th May 2014. Although the book is mostly based on empirical research yet it is not simply a research enterprise. It is also an analytical study aimed at creating and

influencing opinion on the essential elements of the decision-making process which would minimize the possibilities of non-rationality in Indian foreign policy.

The research article titled *Pakistan's Foreign Policy in the Changing International Scenario (2006)* by Adnan Sarwar Khan describes history, objectives, principles, factors and determinant's of Pakistan's foreign policy. The author highlights Indian factor as major determinant of Pakistan's foreign policy. The paper covers almost all aspects of Pakistan's foreign policy towards India but it lacks recent developments in bilateral relations of India and Pakistan.

Another article titled *Modi's Foreign Policy fundamentals: a trajectory unchanged (2017)* by Rajesh Basrur evaluates changes in the principles of Indian foreign policy during Modi regime. The author describes that the advent of Narendra Modi as prime minister has shaped significant argument about the direction that Indian foreign policy could take under his leadership. While there are several ways in which Modi's foreign policy can be assessed against the major powers, three general questions are of fundamental importance. Firstly, having reputation as a loyal Hindu nationalist, to what extent do his ideological inclinations influence Modi's foreign policy, in particular as regards the use of national power? Secondly, how is Indian policy towards the great powers conceived? Are there signs of a classic approach to balance of power that attracts the United States and Japan against China? Finally, how is Indian foreign policy configured to achieve a higher status in the state system? Above all, is Modi considerably different from its ancestors? There is evidence that there is no important change in the use of power derived from "Hindu" content in Modi's foreign policy; that his approach to the great powers reflects continuity (with some variations) focusing on strategic alliances; and that state research is in line with the strategy followed by previous prime ministers. In summary, there is no substantial change in the path of Indian foreign policy and the rise in the future direction of India is likely to remain foreseeable and moderate.

Research Methodology

Discourse is defined as anything filled with meaning it can be a spoken discourse in written form of communications or debate. Discourse analysis is an approach to analyse the use of written, vocal, or sign language. Discourse analysis is a

qualitative method which aims to identify dominant discourses and dominant discourses show how reality has been socially constructed.²³ Discourse analysis can be characterised as a way of approaching and thinking about a problem.

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is a methodology that enables a vigorous assessment of what is meant when language is used to describe and explain. CDA is an interdisciplinary approach to the study of discourse. The analysis of underlying meanings can assist in interpreting issues, conditions and events in which the educators find themselves. CDA examines the form, structure and content of discourse, from the grammar and wording employed in its creation to its reception and interpretation by a wider audience. The employment of verbs, pronouns and nouns within discourse is as much part of this analysis as the assessment of the content and tone of the discourse. The methodology facilitates an assessment based upon more than simple quotations but upon what the discourse is doing and what it is being asked to do in its production, dissemination and consumption.

Texts, language, communication should therefore always be considered in their social context, they both shape and are informed by wider processes within society. In this manner texts do not merely passively report upon the world, but they imbue it with meaning, fabricate it, shape perspectives and call the world into being. The broad term discourse can be employed in these circumstances as it refers to the various ways in which communication between people is achieved. Discourse can be considered as an active relation to reality.²⁴ There is a proliferation of terms within CDA which is reflective of the various influences in the development of the methodology. There is however a broadly agreed agenda in these studies, to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between discursive practices, events and texts, and wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power.²⁵

Terry Locke describes discourse as a practice not just of representing the world, but of signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning.²⁶ On the other

²³ Rus Fulcher, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, (New York: Longman, 2010), 1.

²⁴ N. Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 41.

²⁵ N. Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, (London: Longman, 1995), 132.

²⁶ Terry Locke, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, (London: Cromwell Press, 2004), 5.

hand, McGregor refers to discourse as expressing oneself using words.²⁷ Van Dijk maintained that CDA requires true multidisciplinary and an account of intricate relationships between text, talk, social opinion, power, society and cultures.²⁸ Ruth Wodak, states that CDA is necessary for describing, interpreting, analysing, and critiquing social life reflected in text.

There are three dimensions of Van. Dijk's ideology analysis; discourse, socio-cognition and social analysis. Some other linguistic theorists also present different dimensions of CDA in relation with ideology. Fairclough is of the view that the word Critical is added in discourse analysis in order to be focused on the main issue, ideology or the basic hidden agenda in the text and talk that has an original context. In a nutshell, it can be said that a text reflects and constructs ideology that can only be explored with the help of CDA frameworks. Ideology is the strongest when it becomes invisible. When ideology becomes a part of everyday common sense then the discourse becomes natural. Words are available for the speakers and writers to express themselves unconsciously and naturally. It is the ideology that constitutes the identities and constructions of the world. With the change of ideology, new discourses arise for the people to produce and speak in the world.

Norman Fairclough is a CDA scholar, he is the only person who elaborates the link between power, language and ideology in his research in 1989. Fairclough has presented a model in 1989 and revised it in 1995. His model is considered a hub around which the wheel of CDA revolves. He was the first to design a theoretical framework for CDA and gave guidelines for text interpretation. Fairclough's model consists of three-step process of analysis which is tied to three inter-related dimensions of discourse which are text, text production / text consumption and sociocultural practices.

The very first analytical attention of Fairclough's model is Text, text analysis includes the linguistic analysis. Fairclough state that, Linguistic analysis includes the analysis of the grammar, vocabulary, sound system, semantics and cohesion organization above the sentence level.²⁹ The term text refers to a specimen of language in any medium spoken or written that makes sense to someone who knows the language. When people

²⁷ S.L.T. McGregor, *Critical Discourse Analysis: A Primer*, (Halifax: Mount Saint Vincent University, 2010), 2.

²⁸ T.A. Van Dijk, *Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis*, (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 2006), 252.

²⁹ N. Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, (London: Longman, 1995), 57.

speak or write they produce text with which readers and listeners engage and interpret. So text is a process of making meaning in context. All the notable grammarians think that a text is a complex, rich and many-faceted phenomenon that means in many different ways. It can be interpreted from different perspectives.³⁰

Text production / text consumption means processing analysis (interpretation), which shows the relationship between discourse processes and the text. Reading is a product of an interface between the properties of the text and the interpretative resources and practices which the interpreter brings to bear upon the text. The range of potential interpretations will be constrained and delimited according to the nature of the text.³¹

Sociocultural practices means social analysis (explanation), this stage shows the relationship between discourse and social and cultural reality. The immediate condition, from which a text is evolved, is important for the authentic interpretation of the text. This analysis focuses on the language and individual words that shape a text. This approach does not mind if the analyst begins the analysis by selecting the step of his own choice. One can select any stage to start the analysis which ultimately collaborate all the three steps in the end of discussion. Discourse is a part of social life is the main belief of this framework.³²

In order to reveal the concealed ideologies behind the texts, the study uses Critical Discourse Approach as one of the purposes of CDA is to show up discourses by deciphering idiolects. To find out how power relations are exercised and negotiated in discourse. It is found that India has used such kind of language as a tool to reflect and reproduce power relations in South Asia. Critical Discourse is being deployed in the present study that provides tools to examine the visual communicative resources in order to connote a specific set of discourses. Hence, the study focuses on the constitutive character of discourse to debunk subjectivity in Indian narrative which has created rifts between Pakistan and Bangladesh. In this backdrop, the present study has presented texts as a source of evidence proving, people to people level brotherly bonds between Pakistan and Bangladesh. The study looks into certain historical developments in India-Bangladesh relations and analyses it in broader framework of Indian influence over Bangladesh, and probes into contentious issues between India and Bangladesh,

³⁰ N. Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, 58.

³¹ Ibid, 59.

³² N. Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, 60.

and provides a derivative understanding of the employability of Indian hegemonic designs by engaging Bangladesh into various agreements, which has implications for Pakistan.

An attempt has been made to figure out India's false claims and distorted historical facts, so that Pakistan's efforts to ensure peace between two Muslim states can be presented. Interviews with ambassadors, military and civil officials had helped in making of this thesis, especially in ascertaining and understanding the historical perspective and suggesting future options. The research has confronted certain ethical challenges, as dealing with India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, was never an easy subject owing to the mindset barrier for Pakistanis, having lost its eastern wing due to own absurdities and Indian interference. Non availability of credible material was of immense hindrance, as most of the published material on the subject is of Indian origin, therefore it is biased. Painstaking effort had been undertaken to find the credible information / material to carry out a balanced research. For fact finding, data has been collected by reading, analysing and evaluating plethora of books, journals, articles, newspaper and all relevant / available published material. The details of material consulted is appended in the footnotes and bibliography of this study.

Theoretical Framework

Realism is one of the oldest and well established paradigms in International Relations (IR), and is considered to be as the most dominating international theory. There are different nuances of this theory as different scholars have largely contributed in the establishment of the Realist paradigm of IR. Shared ideas and common believes are visible in Classical, Neorealist and Neoclassical schools of thought. Realism, has a rich tradition going back to Thucydides and Chanakaya Kutilya, both assumed international politics as a domain of self-centred states acting in recurring patterns within international anarchic system. The system is characterized by widespread clashes of interests and by the lust for power, which assures survival of states.

The major dimensions of classical realism of pre or post-cold war, are classical political realism of E. H. Carr / Hans Morgenthau and structural realism of Kenneth Waltz. International relations theories has been dominated by debates over theories of international politics, lately there has been a surge of interest in theories of foreign

policy. These seek to explain, not just the pattern of outcomes from state interactions, but also the behaviour of individual states.

In 1998, Gideon Rose published an article *Neoclassical Realism and Theories of International Policy* which became the foundation of neoclassical realist approach and the major concept was that domestic politics and conditions of states must be taken into account while analysing, as drivers of their behaviour are not just national interest or systemic factors. Neoclassical realism argues that the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by the country's relative material power (this aspect has been borrowed from structural realism). Yet it contends that the impact of power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening unit level variables such as decision makers perceptions and state structure (this aspect has been borrowed from classical realism). Understanding the links between power and policy thus requires close examination of both the international and the domestic contexts within which foreign policy is formulated and implemented. Neoclassical realism is a combination of classical realist and neorealist and it explains the foreign policy behaviour of states, thus seeks to understand international politics by taking into account the nature of the international system and the political environment within which states interact. The central view of neoclassical realism is the result of international structure, domestic influences, and a complex relation between the two.

This is a new development to the previous realist concepts, as classical realism states that, it doesn't matter what is the nature of political regime, or what is the system of decision making over the states foreign policy, or who really occupies the presidential chair, or who is the head of state, or what are his aides or what does the decision making process within the country entails. Argument is that the ignorance of domestic politics which resulted in the analytical inability of realism to explain the collapse of Soviet Union which was driven by domestic issues not systemic issues.

Introduction of domestic politics, or domestic issues into the foreign policy analysis explains the seemingly irrational behaviour. Fareed Zakaria co-founder of neoclassical realism published two works related to neoclassical realism, *Wealth to Power the usual origins of American's World Role* and *Realism and Domestic Politics*. As highlighted by Gideon Rose, Fareed Zakaria also combined domestic politics and realism and

claimed that domestic politics must not be ignored. Neoclassical realism also argues that perceptions matter (perceptions of one's place in the system is the important variable perhaps even more important variable than the actual place of any particular actor in the international system, thus is an addition of constructivists element into realist thinking).³³

The paradigm of neoclassical realism has several shades, explaining the foreign policy behaviour of states and assumes that domestic factors (political regime the nature of political system, decision making process, values, culture and narratives of the country) matter and influence state behaviour. It is not just the global strategic environment and not just the geography of the country and the objective national interests but have domestic factors that transcend these objective factors and result into the actual policies that states pursue, while external threats are still considered as key drivers of foreign policy.

Neoclassical borrows from neorealism the idea that systemic factors determine the general direction of policy but it also recognizes that domestic variables intervene in the policy decision made by the decision makers.³⁴ Thus while relative material balance establishes the parameters of states foreign policy, the reason why different states or even the same state pursue particular policy in an international context is dependent on variables within state. As Gideon Rose argued “there is no immediate or perfect transmission belt linking material capabilities to foreign policy behaviour. Foreign policy choices are made by actual political leaders and elites, and so it is their perceptions of relative power that matter, not simply relative quantities of physical resources or forces in being. This means that over the short to medium term countries foreign policies may not necessarily track objective material power trends closely or continuously”.³⁵

Neoclassical realism puts the focus of analysis back from the global system to the behaviour of states, and the major difference was introduction of domestic issues, domestic politics and thus irrationality. This study uses neoclassical realism to highlight the fall of Dhaka as it was driven primarily by domestic issues not systemic

³³ Fareed Zakaria. “Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay”, *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1992): 177-198.

³⁴ Brian Rathbun, “A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism”, *Journal of Security Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2008.

³⁵ Gideon Rose, *Theories of Foreign Policy* (1998), 147.

issue, but with influence and interference of external Indian factor and the perception created by Indians through its fictitious narrative. It also highlights how India is utilising the internal and external factors of its foreign policy to make Bangladesh its subservient.

In state foreign policy choices, national power and the state's position in the international structure are pivotal elements, however, domestic variables can also shape a state's foreign policy. Hence, neoclassical realists bid to solve a problem by constructing a bridge betwixt the state and international system. Interestingly, neoclassical realism is a multilevel theory and India's relations with Bangladesh can be framed in neoclassical realism. Available researches highlighting the misperceptions of leaders effected on their decision making. There was a disparity in Pakistan's administrative and political set up between the two wings, which was the most favourite Indian narrative and painted as a hateful act. Books on the separation of East Pakistan began to appear immediately after the end of 1971 war.³⁶ However, these books were generally memoirs of self-selected participants which contributed in spreading false accounts.

Hence, neoclassical realists frame appositely explains the case of India and Bangladesh's fostering relations and its effects on Pakistan's foreign policy behaviour. India's regional hegemonic designs are to create imbalance in the region, its close ties with Bangladesh is mounting pressure on Pakistan. Certainly, Pakistan and Bangladesh have experienced many twists and turns in their relations from which India has gained advantage and is exerting its own influence on Bangladesh. These increasing ties are causing more gaps between already cold relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh.³⁷ As the anarchy compels states to maximize their power to pursue their national interest, India is no exception. Due to Indian desire to become a regional hegemon and have a greater say in international politics, it is not only expanding its power and influence regionally but also globally. While pursuing regional hegemony, India is trying to expand its power by making Pakistan, the only competitor of India in the region, isolated from regional as well as international politics.

³⁶ J.A. Hussain, *History of the Peoples of Pakistan: Towards Independence* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 18-19.

³⁷ J.A. Hussain, *Peoples of Pakistan*, 29-33.

Significance of Study

Present study is important in terms of its regional scope and will give viable options and recommendations for improvement in Pakistan-Bangladesh relations. Pakistan and Bangladesh share similarities in religion, economic, political, commercial and social features. However, Indian influence³⁸ on South Asian states especially pro Indian tilt of Bangladesh owing to Modi-Hasina nexus is disturbing regional peace. This study is an effort to figure out causes of bitter relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh, which Indian has achieved through narrative building by employment of discourses and usage of cultural, socio, economic, political, diplomatic and military tools through which India for furthered its hegemonic designs.

The economic issues and threats faced by Pakistan have recently been the focus of lot many researches both in media and academia, with divergent views of thought. The two school of thoughts suggest that there is a requirement of a paradigm shift in our strategic orientation, by shifting our focus towards removal of obstructions for establishing close ties with regional countries, others advocate following the lines of various international platforms such as European Union (EU), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and SAARC for an economic surge and establishment of friendly relations with our neighbour's especially the smaller states.

The bitter events of 1971 and the feelings on both sides as an aftermath coupled with Indian influence / interference in Bangladesh has overshadowed any prospects of improving ties between Pakistan and Bangladesh. Normalization of relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh is a daunting task which cannot be achieved through any short term policy. If achieved Pakistan's position within South Asia will tremendously improve. The sole reason of nonresolution of rifts between Pakistan and Bangladesh, is due to Indian influence through its foreign policy towards Bangladesh, which India has managed by exploiting domestic factors alongside external factors, and subverting Bangladeshi minds through carefully planned and executed narrative building, thus having negative implications for Pakistan within South Asia. In order to usher a new period of relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh, pragmatism from both states is required, the lessons learnt from the history and economic viability with mutual benefits

³⁸ M. Rafique Afzal, *Politics, 1947–1971*, 47.

is enhanced and encashed for furthering future relations rather than beating about the bitterness of the past.

This study is new and important because it has employed CDA to expose Indian based anti-Pakistan concocted narrative, which it has carefully crafted internationally and within Bangladesh by using all sorts of discourses. These anti-Pakistan concocted Indian stories when encountered by a common Bengali, creates an image and perception against Pakistan. The actual historical realities have been explained within this study, Pakistan's perspective explained and Indian agenda had been unleashed, which was spread through fabricated narrative. CDA is a methodology which is in synchronisation with Neoclassical Realism, as this study has exposed fictitious Indian narrative along with exposure of internal and external factors employed by India to make Bangladesh her subservient, thus casing implications for Pakistan within South Asia.

Thus, the research is useful as it finds out the possible measures that Pakistan should undertake in order to counterweigh the emerging challenges which are causing hindrance in developing good relations with neighbouring countries particularly Bangladesh. Secondly, options has been discovered through which Pakistan can counterbalance Indian hegemonic designs within South Asia, for which Pakistan-Bangladesh cold relations is an important paradigm. Moreover, this study also explores the different channels that can prove constructive in providing smooth and stable options for Pakistan and Bangladesh to build healthy relations. Thirdly, this study is significant as it identifies a common medium for establishing close ties based on mutual interests, either by using people to people contact, employment of economic incentives, utilising economically strong friendly country to attract Bangladesh, utilising Organisation of Islamic cooperation (OIC) as an Islamic card or using the platform of Islamic countries with growing economies to make an organisation. Meaningful cooperation between Bangladesh and Pakistan is largely dependent on the political factor, therefore, the research has analysed the inter and intra state political factors, as the same cannot be underestimated in examining the prospects for furthering cordial and friendly relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh.

The study has found that several historical incidents are actually Indian concocted stories built through propagating carefully woven anti-Pakistan narrative within Bangladesh, and gives an overview of the challenges being faced by Pakistan in

maintaining good relations with Bangladesh. Study is pertinent as it counters the biased literature, fills the gap and highlights Pakistan's viewpoint, as presently available literature by Pakistani researches, does not cover Pakistan's viewpoint.

Delimitation

This study focuses on pro India tilt of Bangladesh since its independence, especially during the last decade. Modi-Hasina nexus developed since 2014, has tremendously improved India-Bangladesh relations, which has serious implications for Pakistan within South Asian region.

Chapter Breakdown

This study is divided into five chapters. A brief sketch of chapters is being discussed here.

The study begins with the "Introduction" which is an overview of the research, it summarizes India's relations with Bangladesh and its effects on Pakistan.

The first chapter "Historical Background of Pakistan and Bangladesh" takes the origins of India's relations with Bangladesh. A brief account of historical events resulting into the 1971 civil war of East Pakistan has been presented. The opening session focuses on the interference of India in Pakistan's internal matters. Moreover, the use of anti-Pakistan propaganda created within East Pakistan by Indians through concocted narratives, resulting into the war of 1971 and the formation of Bangladesh, has been discussed in detail.

The second chapter "India-Bangladesh Relations: Implications for Pakistan" delineates India's relations with Bangladesh since its inception. Indian subservient foreign and defence policies of Bangladesh, resulted into settlement of mutual issues and improvement in India-Bangladesh bilateral relations. Modi-Hasina nexus resulting into pro Indian tilt have set the tone of Bangladesh's foreign policy and its relations with Pakistan.

The third chapter "Pakistan-Bangladesh Relations: Hostage to History" presents an analysis of Pakistan's relations with Bangladesh. It examines the measures taken by various Pakistani governments, in reaching out to Bangladesh for the development of cordial relations. However, Indian hegemonic designs, concocted propaganda and

influence created within Bangladesh through anti-Pakistan narrative building has resulted into anti-Pakistan perceptions, thus are reasons for sour relations.

The fourth chapter “India’s Influence on Bangladesh: Indian Hegemonic Designs” focuses on the amount of Indian influence exercised on Bangladesh, by means of its foreign policy tools of culture, social, economic, political, diplomatic and military means. The chapter delineates that Indian foreign policy exemplifies the ethos of power strategies, and utilisation of internal and external factors within Bangladesh for achieving *Akhand Bharat*. Since 2014, Modi-Hasina nexus resulted into tremendously improved bilateral relations which resulted into the settlement of major disputes and conclusion of various agreements, which India has utilised to concrete as influence tool for strengthening its hegemonic designs.

The concluding section is an assessment of the foregoing chapters. It also contains recommendations.

CHAPTER-1

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH

This chapter includes the historical reasons and events resulting into the 1971 civil war of East Pakistan, due to Indian interference and influence, thus resulting into the formation of Bangladesh. Owing to the weak foreign policy towards its neighbours, Pakistan had to suffer on the canvas of South Asia. When it comes to major powers of the world, Pakistan's foreign policy appeared as a failure because it remained unsuccessful to exploit its geopolitical importance during the cold war period. Indian foreign policy makers had been successful in creating strong lobby in almost all important countries, thus succeeded in making Pakistan isolated. Resultantly in 1971, East Pakistan was separated due to Indian intervention's, and Pakistan could not earn worthwhile support from its allies. Pakistan-India war of 1971 changed the dynamics of South Asia, post war acrimony resulted into signing of Simla agreement, which was meant to settle down their relations.

1.1 Muslim Homeland within Sub-Continent

On 30th December 1906, Nawab Sir Khawaja Salim Ullah Bahadur (Nawab of Dhaka) founded All India Muslim League in Dhaka.³⁹ Prominent leaders like Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, Nazim ud Din, Mohammad Ali Bogra, Mr. Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, Malik Feroz Khan Noon, Aga Khan III, Hakim Ajmal Khan and Chaudhry Khaliq uz Zaman also attended the meeting.⁴⁰ It was a long journey from 1906 to 1947 and the Bengalis played a pivotal leading and dominant role in this independence movement of Pakistan. Bengalis were called the elder brother for their sacrifices and leading role in the Pakistan movement.

1.2 Muslim Brotherhood and Formation of Pakistan

Consequent upon joint struggle of the Muslims of the subcontinent, Pakistan

³⁹ Graham P. Chapman, *The Geopolitics of South Asia: from Early Empires to India, Pakistan and Bangladesh* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 28-56.

⁴⁰ Graham P. Chapman, *Geopolitics of South Asia*, 58.

(East Pakistan and West Pakistan, two wings had a crow flight distance of 1372 miles or 2208 kilometres *kms*) came into existence on 14th August 1947.⁴¹ In this struggle for independence, all factions of Muslim community took part with extraordinary zeal, zest, enthusiasm and nationalistic approach. The Muslims of subcontinent worked selflessly and whole heartedly for the formation of an independent homeland for the Muslims of sub-continent based on *Two Nation Theory*.⁴² In this wave of achieving a separate homeland for themselves, they never kept in mind any type of differences whether racial, sectarian, regional, linguistic or of any other type. They proved and demonstrated themselves to be one Muslim nation only,⁴³ all of them worked passionately and ambitiously to get a separate and autonomous homeland of their own so that they may practice their religious rituals freely and independently.⁴⁴ During that time, they never considered themselves as a Sindhi, Punjabi, Balochi, Pashtun, Bengali⁴⁵ or from any other ethnicity, rather they were only Muslims who were fully determined to get a separate autonomous state and homeland for Muslims.⁴⁶ Succeeding paragraphs will discuss the objectives resolution, constituent assembly, basic principle committee, resolution of constitutional impasse (recognition of Bengali language as an official language).

The objectives resolution of Pakistan, linked the constitution making with the will of Allah Almighty (resolution asserted that Pakistan's future constitution is required to be sculpted completely on the philosophy and the faith of Islam).⁴⁷ This had grave and unforeseen consequences, the religious political parties arrogated to themselves the sole right for ordering all life in Pakistan, since they alone were qualified to interpret Allah Almighty's will. The religious political parties had little representation in the constituent assembly of 1947,⁴⁸ because their recognition and support were reduced, considering the period from 1920-1946. The objectives resolution gratuitously provided

⁴¹ Nurul Islam, "Islam and National Identity: The Case of Pakistan and Bangladesh," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 13 (1) (1981): 57.

⁴² S. M. M. Qureshi, "Pakistani Nationalism Reconsidered," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 45(4), (1972/1973): 557-58.

⁴³ Nurul Islam, *National Identity*, 57.

⁴⁴ G. W. Choudhury, "Bangladesh: Why It Happened," *International Affairs*, Royal Institute of International Affairs Vol. 48 (2) (1972): 242.

⁴⁵ Richard Symonds, *The Making of Pakistan* (London: Faber and Faber, 1950), 115.

⁴⁶ Kazi S. Ahmad, *A Geography of Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1972), 33.

⁴⁷ Akbar Ahmed, *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin* (London: Routledge, 1997), 27.

⁴⁸ Aitzaz Ahsan, *The Indus Saga and the Making of Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996), 89.

them with a lever to make or break laws, to make or break governments. In a quarrel between two parties the stronger one does not go to a court of law.

After the independence of Pakistan, as things turned out in the early years the West Pakistanis held power and had little desire to change the order of things. The East Pakistanis tried for their share of power through the constituent assembly and were confronted by the phalanx of religious political parties. Unfortunately, these parties were based in West Pakistan and they classified all dissent as heresy. The East Pakistanis found that in their efforts for rightful share of power, through constitutional means, they were bracketed with heretics. Constitution making, therefore instead of being a joint venture, became a tug of war between East and West Pakistan. In August 1947, a total of 69 members were the part of Pakistan's first constituent assembly, after the accession of princely states, the membership was increased to 74.⁴⁹ The additional 5 seats were distributed over Tribal areas and the states of Bahawalpur, Khairpur and Balochistan. At the time of Pakistan's independence, there was Muslim League and Congress only two political parties. The Muslim League held 59 seats, on 12th March 1949 the constituent assembly set up a basic principles committee to draft basic principles, in accordance with the objective's resolution, for framing a constitution for Pakistan.⁵⁰

On 7th September 1950, PM Liaquat Ali Khan submitted the basic principles committee report to the constituent assembly.⁵¹ The interim report proposed two houses, (details of two proposed houses is attached as appendix-IX) with equal powers, the head of state to be elected by a joint session, also, any disputed issue was to be resolved by a joint session. The East Bengali members took serious objection to the loading of dice against East Pakistan. Mr. Nurul Amin gave a written representation to PM Liaquat Ali requesting that the majority of East Bengal in no case be converted into minority, as the East Bengali members pleaded for parity.

⁴⁹ "First Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (1947-1954)," *History Pak*, August 08, 2012, <https://historypak.com/first-constituent-assembly-of-pakistan-1947-1954/>.

⁵⁰ Craig Baxter, ed., *Pakistan on the Brink: Politics, Economics, and Society* (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2004), 215-16.

⁵¹ Mushtaq Ahmad, *Government and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1959), 49.

On 4th and 5th November 1950, a provincial convention was held in Dhaka. The convention recommended that, there should be an autonomous government for East and West Pakistan with a central parliament based on population, and the central government has powers to deal only with foreign affairs, currency and defence. Few people in West Pakistan took serious note of the warning, on 16th October 1951, Liaquat Ali Khan was fired upon resulting into his death when he was addressing a public rally in Rawalpindi. Governor General Nazim ud Din stepped down and accepted the appointment of PM. Sir Malik Ghulam Muhammad, a civil servant, became Governor General.

On 22nd December 1952, PM Nazim ud Din presented a second draft of the basic principles committee report,⁵² (recommended membership of the two houses is at appendix-X). The house of people originated money bills, the house of units could only recommend revision in legislation, this second draft was not welcomed in West Pakistan. In January 1953, opposition to the second draft in West Pakistan forced the constituent assembly to postpone its consideration indefinitely.⁵³ On 6th March 1953, Martial Law was declared in Lahore. On 17th April 1953, Governor General Sir Malik Ghulam Muhammad dismissed the PM Nazim ud Din. Nazim ud Din was too much of a gentleman to contest the Governor General and left without a word, in doing so he overlooked his historical responsibility. Sahibzada Mohammad Ali Bogra, Pakistan's Ambassador in Washington, took over as the PM, like Nazim ud Din, he was also an East Pakistani.⁵⁴

On 7th October 1953, PM Sahibzada Mohammad Ali Bogra presented to the constituent assembly a new formula to resolve the constitutional impasse, (Bogra formula is given at appendix-XI). From 8th to 11th March 1954, provincial elections were held in East Bengal, (election results at appendix-XII). United front swept the elections, manifesto of United Front was that, Bengali language to be recognised as an official language as Urdu is being recognised, Constituent assembly to be dissolved and draft constitution to be rejected and constituent assembly to be replaced by a directly elected body, East Pakistan to be given complete autonomy, central government to only deal with

⁵² G.W. Choudhury, *Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule* (Buckhurst Hill, Essex, England: Scorpion, 1988), 19-20.

⁵³ Mushtaq Ahmad, *Politics in Pakistan*, 52.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 55.

currency, foreign affairs and defence, and complete freedom for East Pakistan from Centre over export of jute.⁵⁵

The recognition of Bengali as official language had to overcome a mental barrier in West Pakistan,⁵⁶ Bengali with its Sanskrit script was identified with Hinduism. It could not be equated with Urdu, its Persian script and its rich heritage of Muslim literature. It may be pointed out that in those early days Pakistan was beset with a multitude of problems. There was a genuine fear that giving in to the demands for Bengali would trigger a chain reaction in favour of Punjabi, Saraiki, Brohi, Pushto, Makrani, Balochi, Gligiti and a host of dialects,⁵⁷ thus a lava of regionalism and ethnicity would have spread as a disintegrating volcano.⁵⁸

1.3 General Iskandar Mirza Regime

On 5th August 1955, Major General (Maj Gen) Sahibzada Iskandar Ali Mirza took over as President of Pakistan. Iskandar Mirza was commissioned into the Indian army in 1919, after a very brief service in military on 2nd August 1926, Iskandar Mirza was transferred to the Indian Political Service. Iskandar Mirza was a Bengali by birth, who considered himself a Persian by descent, before partition he had been associated with North West Frontier Province (NWFP) for most of his service as a political agent.⁵⁹ Succeeding paragraphs will discuss the, West Pakistan oriented constitution of 1956 and the deprivation of Bengalis, demand of complete autonomy by East Pakistan assembly and the sacking of Bengalis and resultantly the demise of 1956 constitution.

Power distribution between centre and provinces, under the 1956 constitution, was defined by means of three lists, i.e. federal, provincial and concurrent. The very discussion of lists mounted an alignment of political parties against each other reminiscent of those between Muslim League and Congress leading to the partition of India. The geographical and cultural problems were not given sober, professional, long term consideration. The central government and all its organs continued to be in West

⁵⁵ Jaffreot Christophe, ed., *A History of Pakistan and Its Origins* (London: Anthem Press, 2002), 34.

⁵⁶ Altaf Gauhar, *Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 37-45.

⁵⁷ Yu. V. Gankovsk, *The Peoples of Pakistan: An Ethnic History* (Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, 1971), 67.

⁵⁸ Mushtaq Ahmad, *Politics in Pakistan*, 69.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 72.

Pakistan,⁶⁰ the civil and military establishments and training institutions remained in West Pakistan. The headquarters of business organizations had little choice but to follow suit, under the circumstances the East Pakistanis felt deprived. Every decision made by the Central Government was taken as an incursion into the governance of East Pakistan, every concession wrung from the centre was celebrated as a victory of East over West.⁶¹

Four PMs ruled Pakistan, during the life of 1956 constitution, they were Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, Mr. Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, Mr. Ibrahim Ismail Chundrigar, Malik Feroz Khan Noon. The only East Pakistani out of all the four PMs were Mr. Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, Suhrawardy was the most capable political leader at the time, and he was the only one who could command attention in both wings (East and West Pakistan). In 1957, the East Pakistan assembly passed a resolution in which the demand of complete autonomy was agreed upon. Central government to deal with the currency, defence and foreign affairs. In West Pakistan there was little appreciation of the susceptibilities of East Pakistan. (representation in the central cabinet, given at appendix-XIII).

In October 1957, the West Pakistan assembly passed a bill in which it was recommended that one unit should be dissolved, thus it led to the sacking of Mr. Suhrawardy. During Mr. Suhrawardy's tenure a total of eight East Pakistanis, were included in the central cabinet, against a total of six West Pakistanis, this was the only occasion in Pakistan's history when proportion was in favour of East Pakistan. On 16th December 1957, six ministers in the central cabinet (belonging to Mr. Suhrawardy's party Awami League) resigned. On the morning of 7th October 1958, President Iskandar Mirza was redistributing portfolios to a new cabinet, to be headed by Malik Feroz Khan Noon.⁶²

On 7th October 1958, at 2230 hours, Iskandar Mirza issued a proclamation for abrogating 1956 constitution, and dismissing central and provincial governments, dissolving central and provincial assemblies, abolishing all political parties, and

⁶⁰ J.A. Hussain, *Peoples of Pakistan*, 42.

⁶¹ Mushtaq Ahmad, *Politics in Pakistan*, 75.

⁶² Mushtaq Ahmad, *Politics in Pakistan*, 80.

declaring martial law and appointing General Mohammad Ayub Khan as Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA).⁶³

1.4 General Mohammad Ayub Khan Regime

President Iskandar Mirza soon comprehended his blunder by declaring Ayub as CMLA and publicly regretted his action.⁶⁴ On 27th October 1958, at 2200 hours President Iskandar Mirza resigned, Ayub took over as President, and the office of PM was abolished, the rest of cabinet was unchanged. Succeeding paragraphs will discuss the, distribution of portfolios, signs of Indian interference, 1962 constitution, role of RAW, six points of Sheikh Mujib ur Rahman, Agartala conspiracy case, an acting President from East Pakistani, 1968 ordinance, a besieged government, 1969 Round Table Conference (RTC), demise of Agartala conspiracy case and Yahya's lust for power.

From East Pakistani point of view the distribution of portfolios was a reminder of the Viceroy's executive council in pre partitioned India. Indeed, it was more galling, until 1946 the portfolios of defence, foreign affairs, finance and interior were reserved for British civil / military officers. On 30th September 1959, the editor of a Bengali language daily newspaper, published from Dhaka, was arrested, the editor was arrested on the charges of causing alarm and despondency and creating dissatisfaction towards the armed forces.⁶⁵

Under the supervision of supreme court, a commission for the preparation of new constitution was formed, it was to carry on with the preparation of constitution, later Ayub enforced the authority of government, with the help of constitution in promulgation. Political freedom was also restored by ending martial law. 1962 constitution gave value to Islam, but there was no mention that Pakistan is an Islamic Republic and Islam is a state religion. Ayub's greatest achievements are considered to be industrialization, rural development and development of foreign relations with

⁶³ Jaffrelet Christophe, *A History of Pakistan*, 84.

⁶⁴ Aitzaz Ahsan, *The Indus Saga*, 91.

⁶⁵ Lawrence Ziring, *The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958–1969* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1971), 54.

European Union and United States. This replicates that good policies though difficult to adopt but always have rich dividends.

RAW the Indian intelligence agency has a vital role to play in supporting the Indian efforts and designs for furthering her dominance in SAARC countries and she emerge as a regional superpower on the global stage. The first mission entrusted to RAW was to break up Pakistan, during 1962-1963, Intelligence Bureau (IB) established contacts with Mujib, and covertly had a meeting with them at Agartala.⁶⁶ In 1969, RAW was able to lay an underground network and in the next two years, train and arm more than a hundred thousand fighter guerrillas of Mukti Bahini. According to Asoka Raina, RAW agents were spread out in every nook and corner of East Pakistan and were actively coordinating with the rebel forces.

In April 1971, immediately before the army action, RAW took political and student leaders of Awami League to Calcutta, where they formed a government, with the Indian support and influence. Bengali officers of the Pakistan army provided leadership to the guerrillas of Mukti Bahini. Indian army commandos along with the guerrillas of Mukti Bahini defeated Pakistan armed forces and entered Dhaka, that sealed the fate of East Pakistan. The veil on this dark chapter of history has now been practically removed and the whole world has become aware of the diabolical role of RAW, but it is a matter of shame that the Indians count it to their and RAW's credit. RAW's game plan did not end with the creation of Bangladesh, President Mujib had realized that he was a hostage in the hands of Indians, who were exacting a very heavy price for utilising their assistance. Mujib's act was taken as a betrayal by the Indian's, after Mujib openly pinned responsibility for all of Bangladesh's ills on India and tried to have closer relations with United States (US), resultantly he never survived for long and was assassinated. Even US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) could not save him from the hardboiled RAW agents who had been detailed for this dirty plot to eliminate President Sheikh Mujib ur Rahman.

RAW's game in Bangladesh continues, it has penetrated deep into the Bangladesh army including the military intelligence, agents of RAW are working on every tier within Bangladesh. Every now and then agents are apprehended from within different

⁶⁶ "Agartala Conspiracy Case Was Not False," *bdnews24.com*, February 23, 2011.

departments who had even infiltrated into the Military Intelligence Directorate of Bangladesh armed forces. The RAW agents who were apprehended had accepted that they are involved in the training of Shanti Bahini and Chakma tribals, hence India had actively been sponsoring Indian influenced political parties within Bangladesh.

In April 1966, Mujib who was under heavy Indian influence gave his six points and demanded a nationwide referendum of his six points,⁶⁷ as originally drafted these consisted of only four points, (points are appended at appendix-XIV). The four points were accepted by Mujib's party Awami League (the importance of these points was to end the apparent exploitation of East Pakistanis by the West Pakistanis). However, the original draft was amended, (Mujib's amended six point given at appendix-XV). Though there was no harm in accepting the Bengali demands, the stubbornness of political and military elite of West Pakistan was the only hindrance.

On 18th April 1966, Mujib was arrested at Jessore under defence of Pakistan rules, he was promptly released on bail and was rearrested on 23rd April on a nonbailable warrant. For West Pakistanis the six points constituted high treason, for East Pakistanis the six points were an index of their disenchantment with West Pakistan. On 7th May 1966, Mujib's trial began in Sylhet jail. In August, President Ayub visited East Pakistan, he while addressing a meeting of members of National and Provincial assemblies, condemned the six points and secession. The Awami League declared 13th February 1967 to be celebrated as six points day.

Dividing Pakistan was the first mission entrusted to RAW, for which covert connections were established with the political leaders of East Pakistan. In July 1962,⁶⁸ Sheikh Mujib had a meeting with Indian officials at Agartala, resultantly, RAW lay an underground network within East Pakistan for the next two years. By end seventies, Indian establishment trained and armed more than a hundred thousand fighters, and guerrillas of Mukti Bahini and infiltrated Indian army commandos into East Pakistan. Pakistan government filed a case against Mujib, for his anti-state activities, the case is famously known as Agartala conspiracy case.

⁶⁷ Omar Noman, *Pakistan: A Political and Economic History since 1947* (New York: Kegan Paul International, 1990), 77.

⁶⁸ "Agartala Conspiracy Case Was Not False," *bdnews24.com*, February 23, 2011.

On 29th January 1968, Ayub Khan fell ill, under article sixteen of the constitution whenever the President could not perform his duties due to ill health the NA speaker will act as the President (Mr. Abdul Jabbar Khan, an East Pakistani, who was doing as the NA speaker). There was no announcement in respect of Mr. Jabbar to act as the President of Pakistan, it was another grievance added in the list for the East Pakistanis. On 22nd April 1968, a government ordinance was issued, titled, the criminal amendment (special tribunals) ordinance 1968. Under this ordinance the government could, whenever it chose, set up a special tribunal to deal with offences relating to conspiracy, mutiny in the armed forces, or inciting or seducing a member of the armed forces against or from allegiance or duty. The ordinance overrode all laws in effect for the time being in Pakistan including the evidence act and the provisions of the ordinance could not be questioned in any court including the supreme court.

By December 1968, opposition to President Ayub had taken the usual step to the streets, there were ever expanding cycles of protest marches, police action, strikes and angrier crowds. On 7th December 1968, Ayub visited Dhaka, the opposition parties staged protest demonstrations, in the consequent police action two persons were killed. On 23rd January 1969 the Dhaka session of the NA was summoned, the government behaved as if she is besieged by an alien hostile population.⁶⁹ In order to complete the quorum, NA members were surreptitiously smuggled inside the chamber.

On 1st February 1969, President Ayub broadcast his intention to invite leaders of opposition for a RTC. The events took a drastic turn, on 17th February 1969, First Sergeant Zahoor ul Hassan and another person were shot “While trying to escape”, the house in which Justice S. A. Rahman was staying in Dhaka was set on fire. A few days later Dr Shams ud Doha (Rector Rajshahi University) while trying to restrain the students from clashing with law enforcement forces was killed, the troops were promptly blamed for the death. On 21st February 1969, Ayub Khan’s decision of not contesting during the 1970 elections for the seat of President was made public.

On 22nd February 1969, the government announced withdrawal of the criminal law amendment (special tribunal) ordinance 1968,⁷⁰ this virtually killed the Agartala conspiracy case, Justice Rahman’s special tribunal was also closed. In middle February

⁶⁹ Stephen Cohen, *The Pakistan Army* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 78.

⁷⁰ Rafi Raza, ed., *Pakistan in Perspective, 1947–1997* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 54.

1969, Mujib was approached by government representatives whether he would agree to attend the RTC on “parole”. In West Pakistan all the political leaders insisted on the withdrawal of the case against Mujib. Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto said, on 21st February 1969, that the participation of Sheikh Mujib in the RTC was necessary for finding a lasting solution to national problems, however later Bhutto himself boycotted the RTC. The RTC assembled on 26th February 1969, and after some polite conversation was adjourned till 10th March 1969, meanwhile the law and order situation worsened. Indeed, the crowds were behaving as if there was no government, or whatever there was had little will to enforce the governmental authority. In the army there was a general feeling that Ayub’s regime was in its last throes, very few political leaders foresaw that a breakdown of the RTC would give birth to another Martial Law.⁷¹

General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan was neck deep in plotting against Ayub Khan regime. General Yahya met Mujib and assured him that he can go on with his protests and campaign against Ayub’s regime, and army will not have any objection, nor any interference will be shown by the army. Meanwhile, Maj Gen Ghulam Omar (close aide of General Yahya who later remained as national security advisor in Yahya’s regime) was secretly preparing advance draft for Yahya’s address to the nation.⁷²

1.5 General Yahya’s Regime

On 25th March 1969, President Ayub did resign, but actually it was not a resignation, it was another orchestrated coupe, where General Yahya along with his aides entered the office of President Ayub, and forcibly made Ayub sign his resignation.⁷³ Yahya made it clear to his fellow officers that the army should be ready to rule Pakistan for the coming fourteen years. Field Marshal Ayub was given a clean exit, as he tendered his resignation, and transferred the power to General Yahya Khan who was the Commander in Chief (CNC) of Pakistan army. In his broadcast Ayub accused the political leaders for putting up demands which spelt disintegration of Pakistan. The transfer of power from President Ayub to the Commander in Chief army was a failure of our political leadership. There was little reassurance for the East Pakistanis that their problems of sharing political power would be resolved by

⁷¹ Damodar P. Singhal, *Asia: Pakistan* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972), 33.

⁷² Aitzaz Ahsan, *The Indus Saga*, 91.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 93.

constitutional means or otherwise.⁷⁴ Succeeding paragraphs will discuss the, electoral reforms by Yahya Khan (Yahya's two point agenda for assuming power), resentments owing to delay in elections, Yahya's address and arrogance towards East Pakistanis, escalation of political temperature, climacteric elections, civil disobedience and military action of March 1971.

On 1st April 1969, General Yahya assumed the office of President and on 10th April he addressed his first press conference, (details of press conference are given at appendix-XVI). By July 1969, Yahya was neck deep in committees for reorganizing and streamlining almost every aspect of national life. In August 1969, Mr. Justice Abdus Sattar (an East Pakistani) was appointed as Chief Election Commissioner.⁷⁵ General Yahya announced that electoral rolls to be ready by June 1970. On 8th August 1969, Yahya made a speech in Karachi confirming his adherence to six points.⁷⁶

On 28th November 1969, General Yahya addressed the nation, he made two major decisions, firstly, that the upcoming elections in East Pakistan and West Pakistan for the NA will held on the 3rd October 1970, a draft constitution was required to be produced by the NA, the duration allotted was of initial 120 days, and secondly, One Unit (West Pakistan) would revert to its former four provinces. The election to National Assembly would be held based on the principle of "One man One Vote", thus cancelling out the existing equality between West and East Pakistan, and it would indeed ensure a permanent majority by East Pakistan in the NA.

In early August 1970, there were serious floods in East Pakistan, on 16th August, the government announced that the elections would be postponed to 7th December 1970, for NA and in case of Provincial Assemblies, will be postponed to a date not later than 10th December 1970. It may be remembered that on 28th November 1969, General Yahya, in an address to the nation had announced 3rd October 1970, as the date for elections to the NA, Mujib resented the postponement. The East Pakistanis became evermore doubtful about the elections even being held, as in some government and political circles there was talk of a second postponement.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 43.

⁷⁵ Ian Talbot, and Gurharpal Singh, *Region and Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Subcontinent* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 67-78.

⁷⁶ Aitzaz Ahsan, *The Indus Saga*, 54.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 69.

Yahya addressed the nation on 3rd December 1970 (Yahya's address to nation is appended at appendix-XVII). Yahya's address to the nation was full of arrogance towards the issues of East Pakistan and was starkly contrary to his press conference when he took over from Ayub in April 1969. With the approach of elections, the political temperature escalated on daily basis. In army messes West Pakistani officers talked freely of shedding any amount of blood for the unity of the country. The East Pakistani officers were equally willing to shed blood for their equality. In their keenness to shed blood they overlooked a fundamental lesson of human struggle that, "means always determine the end". A professional army does not breakup into civil war on the spur of the moment, the crack up comes when negative influences (Indian) prove stronger than service traditions and the pride of belonging to an honourable brotherhood.⁷⁸

During the election campaign all political leaders were unanimous on one point that the elections would be climacteric. Our people participated in the elections with caution, optimism and silent prayers, as if superstitious of their good luck. Elections in the past had occasions for rioting or at best large scale brazen cheating. Army supervised the elections, there were mobile patrols frequently visiting polling stations, the elections were fair,⁷⁹ (1970 elections result at appendix-XVIII, party position in East Pakistan 1970 elections is at appendix-XIX).

The election results indicated emergence of two strong political parties, People's Party was the majority and popular party of West Pakistan and Awami League was the majority and popular party of East Pakistan.⁸⁰ People's Party had no interest in East Pakistan, and the Awami League had minute interest in West Pakistan. It seemed that the people in the two Wings were already apart in their political thinking. NA had a total of 313 seats, Mujib won 167 seats (including women). Mujib had no desire to share his electoral victory with Bhutto, as Bhutto was a dangerous and unpredictable contender.⁸¹ On the other hand Bhutto declared that since his party represented majority

⁷⁸ M. Rafique Afzal, *Politics, 1947–1971*, 9.

⁷⁹ Sarmila Bose, *Dead Reckoning*, 78.

⁸⁰ Iain Cochrane, "The Bangladesh Liberation War and it's Causes: Literature Survey," *unpublished paper* for the Ph.D. Program at Royal Holloway, University of London, 2005, 1-38.

⁸¹ Amber Abbas, "Review of Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War, by Sarmila Bose," *H-Net Reviews*, H Memory, March 2012. <https://www.hnet.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=34415>.

opinion in West Pakistan his exclusion from power would mean, depriving the whole of West Pakistan.

Succeeding paragraphs will discuss, Mujib-Bhutto political manoeuvring campaigns, stubbornness and intransigence, revolt by Awami League and Yahya's extra-curricular activities. Bhutto suggested that the political impasse be resolved by a committee consisting of two representatives from each Province. This was regarded as an unscrupulous sleight of words by means of which Awami League majority would be converted into minority, or 70 million East Pakistanis would be equated with 2 million Balochis, or People's Parties minority would be converted into majority. Bhutto declared that there were three contenders for power i.e. the Army, People's Party and Awami League.⁸²

As a result of 1970, elections Mujib's party had gained majority in the NA, and Bhutto's political party emerged as a minority party in NA. Bhutto had no constitutional claim to gain the power, unless the electorate in two wings was regarded as politically separated. The only means by which the People's Party could worm its way to power was to set the army and the Awami League on a collision course. A whispering campaign was started in among the armed forces, it was said that with Mujib in power relatively junior East Pakistani officer would be promoted over the heads of West Pakistani officers in order to balance the share of higher ranks between the two wings.

On 20th December 1970, Bhutto declined to sit on the opposition benches in NA, Bhutto's view was that if he sits in the opposition, the problems of the West Pakistanis (who gave him a dominating vote) will not be addressed. Bhutto was of the view that the waiting for another five years, will not resolve the promises he made to his voters. In fact, out of power, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) would have disintegrated, the very same argument could be put forward by majority parties in NWFP and Balochistan, Bhutto was indeed reinforcing Mujib's demand for six points.⁸³

On 3rd January 1971, Member National Assembly (MNA) and the Member Provincial Assembly (MPA) belonging to Awami League elected in 1970 elections, were assembled at Ramna racecourse, where a map of Bangladesh was displayed. They were

⁸² Damodar P. Singhal, *Asia*, 44.

⁸³ Aitzaz Ahsan, *The Indus Saga*, 46.

administered an oath pledging loyalty to six points. On 12th January 1971, General Yahya Khan visited Dhaka and held a three hour meeting with Mujib, both described the meeting as satisfactory. On 14th January, General Yahya Khan while at Dhaka airport on his way back to Karachi stated that Sheikh Mujib will be the next PM of Pakistan.

Neither Bhutto nor Mujib seemed to care that their intransigence was driving the country towards the civil war, in fact, both were busy in piling up wood for the fire. On 4th March, Mujib started East Pakistan on the road which would eventually lead to civil war. Government offices in Chittagong were attacked by Awami League supporters, radio and television were forced to broadcast Bangladesh national anthem. On 5th March, civil workers in telephone and telegraph department went on a strike, and on 6th March, General Yahya broadcasted that on 25th March 1971, the first session of newly elected NA will be held.⁸⁴

On return from Dhaka, General Yahya Khan and some of his advisers visited Naudero (a town in Larkana district, Sindh) and stayed as Bhutto's guests, the purpose of the visit was given out as rest and *shikar* for the President.⁸⁵ Yahya was neck deep in immoral activities, he was always found drunk, in the company of filthy women, thus was ignorant of the critical crises, Pakistan was passing through.⁸⁶ The price of which Pakistan paid in the form of secession of East Pakistan and humiliation of losing to India in 1971 war.⁸⁷

On 13th February 1971, an announcement was made by Yahya that the first session of newly elected National Assembly will be held on the 3rd March 1971, Bhutto refused to attend the session. By end of February 1971, all the political parties who won seats from West Pakistan except Qaiyum Muslim League and PPP decided to attend NA session in Dhaka scheduled on 3rd March 1971. Bhutto's decision to boycott NA session was condemned by all political parties, it was obvious that the uncertainty of NA session, and transfer of power, would result in irrevocable estrangement of East Pakistan, therefore, Bhutto could not be innocent of this corollary. On 13th February

⁸⁴ M. Rafique Afzal, *Politics, 1947–1971*, 9.

⁸⁵ Aitzaz Ahsan, *The Indus Saga*, 56.

⁸⁶ Qutubuddin Aziz, *Blood and Tears: Atrocities committed in East Pakistan by Awami League militants in March-April, 1971* (Karachi: United Press of Pakistan, 1974), 56.

⁸⁷ M. Rafique Afzal, *Politics, 1947–1971*, 12.

1971, Bhutto had a meeting with General Yahya, about a fortnight later Bhutto declared that if the NA session was held on 3rd March 1971, he would launch a popular movement, had he done so the People's Party would have disintegrated, like an overinflated balloon.⁸⁸

Succeeding paragraphs will discuss the, postponement of assembly session, nexus between Yahya and Bhutto, Mujib's plan and acting as a stooge to his Indian masters and Mujib-Bhutto stubbornness, which resulted in the division of Pakistan. On 1st March 1971, Yahya again announced that the first session of newly elected NA will be postponed. Yahya's lust for power and unnecessary delay in resolution of issues can never be forgiven. The indecisiveness of Yahya coupled with the non-realisation of the ongoing realities of East Pakistan's situation was a criminal and traitorous offence.⁸⁹

The bare fact was that Yahya's decision favoured Bhutto at the expense of Mujib and Pakistan, indeed except for Bhutto the entire nation had its hopes fixed on the NA session. A great majority of Pakistanis and the army officers believed that once the NA started its deliberations the army would be relieved of any political mishap and the looming danger of civil war would recede. A consensus was made, much earlier than the conduct of 1970 elections, and was decided that the upcoming constitution of Pakistan will be prepared by the newly elected NA on the basis of simple majority. Yahya emphasized, in his 1st March 1971 announcement, that the NA would meet only after consensus of all the political parties had been obtained on constitutional issues. Mujib's response to the postponement of NA session was defiance of government authority. This defiance was an act minutely short of our worst fears, the widening of gulf was quite apparent.⁹⁰ Mujib, acting as a stooge to his Indian masters, called for a general strike on 2nd March.⁹¹ In a press conference he announced that he would address a public meeting on 7th March, where an outline plan and programme of work will be disseminated for attaining self-determination for the people of Bengal. On 3rd March 1971, General Yahya Khan invited twelve elected members of the parliamentary group

⁸⁸ M. Rafique Afzal, *Politics, 1947–1971*, 14.

⁸⁹ Butalia Urvashi, *The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India* (Dehli: Penguin Books 1998), 3.

⁹⁰ Chatterji Joya, "New Directions in Partition Studies," *History Workshop Journal*, vol. 67 (2009): 213-20.

⁹¹ Antara Datta, "Scattered Memories of 1971," *Bangladesh Watchdog*, February 06, 2008, <http://bangladeshwatchdog.blogspot.com/2008/02/scattered-memories-of-1971.html>.

to meet him at Dhaka on 10th March,⁹² (list of parliamentary groups invitees is attached as appendix-XX).⁹³

On 7th March, Mujib announced his plan to run his own government in East Pakistan, Bangladesh flag was hoisted on his house. Inter provincial telecommunication was stopped, and the banks were ordered to stop remittance to West Pakistan. Mujib issued directives to government officers, bank and business houses as if he was the head of an independent Bangladesh. The directives were obeyed, it was decided that the first session of the freshly elected NA will be held in the last week of March 1970, preferably on the 25th March. Mujib said that he would consider attending if four conditions were met, firstly, martial law to be lifted forthwith, secondly, military troops to immediately return to their peace time location, thirdly, it must be inquired about the casualties inflicted during the shooting and fourthly transfer of power to elected representatives before 25th March.⁹⁴

Bhutto warned Yahya that the immediate lifting of martial law would leave a legal vacuum, this much concern for legality by Bhutto was something new for Pakistan (it may be remembered that on 21st December 1971, Bhutto, a civilian, took over from General Yahya as CMLA).⁹⁵ On 14th March 1971, Bhutto came out with a new demand for transferring the power to the majority parties of each wing of Pakistan, meaning that Awami League to form a government in East Pakistan and PPP to form a government in West Pakistan. The famous quote of Bhutto *idhar hum udhar tum*, is attributable to the same demand,⁹⁶ thus was an unambiguous call for dividing the country into two separate states, and the Awami League also termed Bhutto's announcement as the desire to divide the country.⁹⁷

Mujib was virtually ruling East Pakistan, and he was being offered a role subordinate to the Governor. On 17th March, Lt Gen Tikka Khan (Governor of East Pakistan from 6th April 1971 – 31st August 1971) arrived in Dhaka as a replacement of Lt Gen

⁹² M. Rafique Afzal, *Politics, 1947–1971*, 19.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁹⁴ M. Rafique Afzal, *Politics, 1947–1971*, 21.

⁹⁵ George Curlin, Lincoln Chen and Sayed Babur Hussain, *Demographic Crisis: The Impact of the Bangladesh Civil War (1971) on Births and Death in a Rural Area of Bangladesh* (Dacca: The Ford Foundation, 1975), 129-38.

⁹⁶ M. Rafique Afzal, *Politics, 1947–1971*, 22.

⁹⁷ Yasmin Saikia, "Beyond the Archive of Silence: Narratives of Violence of the 1971 Liberation War of Bangladesh," *History Workshop Journal*, vol. 58 (2004): 284.

Sahabzada Yaqub Ali Khan. Tikka Khan was a distinguished soldier and was famous for his perseverance and his down to earth simplicity. He was not given to deep philosophizing about the merits of his mission, in a purely military situation he would have given a good account of himself, but in the political snake pit of East Pakistan during the 1971 March, survival required political mesmerism rather than use of military stick. On 17th March, Lt Gen Tikka issued an order to set up a commission of inquiry to inquire into the circumstances under which the army was called in aid of civil power on the 1st March 1971. The Chief Justice of Pakistan had to nominate a judge from East Pakistan high court, who will head the commission, it was to consist of four different back ground members, taken from Pakistan civil service (a member each from Pakistan police service, Pakistan army and East Pakistan rifles). On 18th March, Mujib rejected the commission of inquiry, on the pretext that, the Bengalis cannot accept such a commission.⁹⁸

Succeeding paragraphs will discuss, Yahya's quest for compromise by meeting Mujib, Resistance day of 23rd March 1971, blueprint for splitting Pakistan, evidence of Indian influence and interference in East Pakistan, hate Pakistan passion and implications of Mujib's victory.

On 19th March 1971, at 1100 hours Mujib called on President Yahya and insisted that legislative powers should be invested in National and Provincial assembly, and there should be a full-fledged representative government both at the centre and in the provinces, and asked for complete withdrawal of martial law.⁹⁹ After this meeting the President's teams drafted another martial law regulation, this provided for, the setting up of central and provincial cabinets, investing the national along with provincial assemblies with legislative power vested in them according to the constitution of 1962 and abolishing the offices of the martial law administrators and military courts, but keeping intact the office of the CMLA in order to prevent any legal vacuum. Yahya emphasized, that it was essential that all political leaders are required to make an unambiguous agreement so that the power can be transferred in a peaceful manner.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ Willem van Schendel, *A History of Bangladesh* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, February 12, 2009), 79-87.

⁹⁹ Angela Debnath, "British perceptions of the East Pakistan Crisis 1971: hideous atrocities on both sides," *Journal of Genocide Research*, Special issue: The East Pakistan War, 1971, vol. 13, no. 4 (2011): 421-50.

¹⁰⁰ Graham P. Chapman, *Geopolitics of South Asia*, 197.

It was agreed by all that the further discussions should be continued on issues like, lifting of martial law, setting up of central and provincial cabinets, investing central and provincial assemblies with legislative powers, conceding more autonomy to East Pakistan in view of its geographical position.

From 16th March, onwards right up to the end of the talks, Awami League kept on raising their demands. The President's team tried to meet these demands as best as they could, but Mujib's goal was Bangladesh, and at that stage he had the bone in his jaws. On 23rd March 1971, resistance day was celebrated by Awami League, the national flag of Pakistan was burnt, and Bangladesh flag was unfurled on government buildings. The British high commission and Soviet consulate general also hoisted flag of Bangladesh.

On 23rd March 1971, the Awami League team brought their own version of the draft for the transfer of power. This was discussed with the government team on the evening of 23rd March 1971. The draft showed a hardening of attitude by the Awami League, it was virtually a blueprint for splitting Pakistan into two separate states. The same evening the Awami League team had a final meeting with government team.¹⁰¹ One did not have to decipher government top secret hieroglyphics to discover who had lit the fuse and who would be the chief beneficiary from the detonation.

On 30th March 1971, Indra Gandhi moved a resolution in the Indian parliament, the contents of the resolution included concern, sympathy, unity and backing to the public of East Pakistan. The resolution reassured complete Indian backing to the public of East Pakistan. This interference in the affairs of another country by India is condemnable as it has grown overtime, rather than receding. It is easy to blame General Yahya Khan for initiating military action which ended in our military humiliation and the secession of East Pakistan. General Yahya was the CNC and the President, the ultimate responsibility for any presidential decision was his. However, there is little doubt, that Yahya arrived at a time when the Bengalis were totally disenchanted with being governed from the West. They may not have wanted total secession, but they wanted to run their own house. Yahya made decisions which were out of tune with the current of events. Mujib-Yahya-Bhutto and Indra cannot be exonerated for the tragedy of East

¹⁰¹ Philip Oldenburg, "A Place Insufficiently Imagined: Language, Belief, and the Pakistan Crisis of 1971," *Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. XLIV, no. 4 (1985): 714.

Pakistan in 1971.¹⁰² The fashion in which Mujib-Yahya-Bhutto and Indra (involved in 1971) met their demise is a manifestation that the manipulators who make the other humans suffer, will have to pay the price themselves.

In early 1968, sign boards in Urdu / English were replaced by Bengali, in early 1970 it became impossible for West Pakistanis to move around individually or in small groups. The Bihari colonies were set on fire in Dhaka, West Pakistani civilians living in the town were hounded and had to sought refuge in cantonments, food supplies to cantonments were interfered with. Mujib and Bhutto made little effort to ease the path for Yahya, in a most difficult and dangerous political situation. In fact, they contributed whatever, wherever and whenever they could to widen the tear, both wanted power, and wanted it at once. The time to put an end to Mujib and Bhutto's political play was before the elections. Mujib had openly cast aside the Legal Framework Order (LFO) when he made six points as his election manifesto, and Bhutto had declared that there would be no government without his participation.¹⁰³

As long before the elections Mujib had worked up hate Punjabi passion to an inflammable point. On 21st November 1970, Pakistan army was handed over the problem of handling the cyclone relief operation, at some places the pilots and crew unloaded the supplies until the locals felt ashamed to stand by idly. The local press started off by howling for the army to take on the relief work, but when army handled the emergency with great skill and devotion there was not even a word of thanks for the army. At Patuakhali, an army battalion was conducting the relief operations, Mujib was impressed and confided to the commanding officer, a Bengali, that the army was doing a splendid job. The officer said, "sir, why don't you say this to the press" on that Mujib replied "oh, but that is a different matter".¹⁰⁴ The Bengali people bracketed every non-Bengali as *Shala Punjabi*, this rekindled the centuries old ill will, the Bengali grudge against the non-Bengali. Few people are free from some sense of inadequacy or failure of deprivation, and the sweetest song is one that conjures some villain who can be made

¹⁰² M. Anisuzzaman, *The Identity Question and Politics in Bangladesh: Promise and Performance*, ed. Rounaq Jahan (London: Zed Books, 2001), 47-48.

¹⁰³ Archer K. Blood, *The Cruel Birth of Bangladesh: Memoirs of an American Diplomat* (Dhaka: University Press, 2002), 220.

¹⁰⁴ Archer K. Blood, *Birth of Bangladesh: Memoirs*, 139.

responsible for our own inadequacies. Naturally, among most Bengalis, Mujib was successful who had made up quite a ledger of ills attributable to the Punjabis.¹⁰⁵

There may have been some trouble but nothing comparable to whatever happened after Mujib's overwhelming victory in the elections, after his election victory Mujib became ever more truculent, with this victory under his belt Mujib would become totally intractable. During the period from January to March 1971, Mujib's strength and truculence escalated at a frightening pace, even the Bengali civil and military servicemen were showing signs of stress and strain caused by their inner conflict between loyalty to service and loyalty to their own people. When the killing started, there were a few Bengali military officers and men who fought shoulder to shoulder with their brothers in arms.¹⁰⁶

After the election, best course for Yahya was to let Mujib run the country, the Bengalis would have got disenchanted with Mujib in less than six months, and Bhutto's party would have come apart, without the perks of power. This was not to be, our fate was decided by the fires of night 25th / 26th March 1971.

The average West Pakistani had a poor understanding of the East Pakistani terrain or the character of the people. East Pakistan was enveloped by Indian Territory from three sides, in the south it was defined by the Bay of Bengal. The border with India measured approximately 2,000 miles, there were hundreds of enclaves,¹⁰⁷ access to these enclaves was by mud tracks, mostly unfit for vehicular traffic (location and maps of enclaves are given at appendix-XXI). These varied in size from a field measuring 500 yards square to the salient of Belonia (four by twenty miles), or the enclave of Titalys (seven by twenty miles). Three river systems, originating from India or beyond divided East Pakistan into four parts, the rivers were, Meghna, Braham Putra and Ganges.¹⁰⁸ The main rivers and their hundreds of tributaries fragmented the land into island and lakes. The water level varied up to fifty feet between dry and wet sessions, waterways were the main means of communication.

¹⁰⁵ M. Rafique Afzal, *Politics, 1947–1971*, 21.

¹⁰⁶ M. Rafique Afzal, *Politics, 1947–1971*, 22.

¹⁰⁷ Meghna Guhathakurta, *The Politics of British Aid to Bangladesh: An Analytical Model* (Dhaka: Dana Publishers, 1990), 13-331.

¹⁰⁸ Peter Gill, "Still No End to Bengal Flight," *The Sunday Telegraph* (London), July 25, 1971. Reprinted in *Bangladesh Documents*, vol. 1, 483-84.

The terrain was tailor made for supporting guerrilla operations, the geographical situation of East Pakistan, the shape of its border, and the orientation of its communications made it particularly vulnerable to attack from India. Chittagong was the main port, and all rail / road traffic inland from his port had to pass through the bottleneck of Feni. Khulana was the second important port, but it could not berth large sea going vessels. The ships were loaded or unloaded at Chalna anchorage, about forty miles downriver from Khulna. At Ashuganj was the only bridge spanning river Meghna, and at Bahram-Mara the only bridge over Ganges.¹⁰⁹

Dhaka was the geographical and political heart of East Pakistan; it was surrounded by major rivers. The capture of Dhaka was essential to achieve the kind of political victory which Mukti Bahini and India wanted. The climate of East Pakistan was humid and sapped the will of all newcomers, food was easily obtainable from the fat earth and the pregnant rivers and lakes, but there were too many mouths competing for the available sustenance. The people were immune to the enervating climate, the scanty food, scanty clothing and scanty shelter, this was their strength. They had developed an extraordinary stamina for survival and an extraordinary disregard for life. They were good Muslims and performed congregational prayers with great devotion, with equal devotion they sang and danced, perhaps to overcome the discomfort of the climate or the uncertainty of the next minute. The East Pakistanis were warm hearted people, easy to love but difficult to live with, they loved and hated with incendiary passion.¹¹⁰

To the average West Pakistani, the landscape gave little comfort or cheer, the giant trees with their outsize talons cut out fresh air and sunlight, they enclosed a fetid dankness which reduced one in body and mind. The bank less rivers seemed to reach out to suck everything within sight into their opaque mysterious depths. The sodden earth carried myriad of apparently poisonous vermin, it sucked men's energy through the soles of their feet, in barking squelches. The West Pakistani was an alien and found little comfort or cheer in the giant trees, the bank less rivers and the hostile earth. When he bedded down for the night, in door or outdoors, he was haunted by the prospect or a

¹⁰⁹ M. Rafique Afzal, *Politics, 1947-1971*, 29.

¹¹⁰ J. King Gordon and Thomas W. Oliver, "Review of the United Nations in Bangladesh," *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 52, no. 4 (1979-1980): 709.

reptile or a bat approaching the folds, altogether the West Pakistani felt oppressed, reduced in psyche and slowly losing energy to cope with the environment.

On 1st March 1971, Mujib called for a complete strike. The entire Province came to a standstill. Transport, shopping centres, financial institutions, offices of Provincial Government obeyed Mujib's call.¹¹¹ The civil aviation staff at Dhaka closed the airport and switched off the lights, a Boeing plane from West Pakistan, only half an hour from Dhaka, had to be landed with the help of Pakistan air force. To keep the operations running, pilots and technical personnel had to be flown in from West Pakistan. Sheikh Mujib started issuing decrees which were obeyed by government officials and private business as if Mujib was the head of state.

On 4th March, Lt Gen Yaqoob (GOC Eastern Command) talked to General Yahya Khan and requested the President to talk to Sheikh Mujib on telephone. As a result, General Yahya Khan agreed to visit East Pakistan on 15th March, but later on, Yahya called and informed Yaqoob, that he would not be visiting on 15th March. Yaqoob dispatched Maj Gen Farman to inform the President about the criticality and gravity of East Pakistan situation. On 5th March, Lt Gen Yaqoob rang up Lt Gen Pirzada (staff officer to president) and conveyed his resignation in case the President did not visit, next he confirmed his conditional resignation in a signal.

On 5th March, Sheikh Mujib sent an emissary to Maj Gen Khadim saying he (Mujib ur Rahman) was under great pressure to make Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI).¹¹² Therefore Maj Gen Khadim should provide military escort to bring Sheikh Mujib under arrest to the cantonment. Khadim saw through the ruse, Mujib's suggested action would have triggered mass violence. Khadim told the emissary, "If Mujib feels threatened he can drive in his own car and be my honoured guest for as long as he wishes to stay."¹¹³

There were no mutinies, or any serious cases of insubordination till after the military action on night 25th / 26th March. It was a military action as if imperial people disciplining some wayward tribes. We the West Pakistanis called it counter insurgency

¹¹¹ J. King Gordon and Thomas W. Oliver, *United Nations in Bangladesh*, 709.

¹¹² Thomas M. Franck and Nigel S. Rodley, "After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force." *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 67 (1973): 286.

¹¹³ S.F.A Mahmud, *Concise History of Indo-Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1988), 22-29.

or civil war as if imperial people bringing order to a rebellious population. Maj Gen Khadim had no illusions on the subject, while briefing his subordinate commanders he said in unambiguous terms “this is a civil war”, of course, the mass of West Pakistani people was not fighting against the mass of East Pakistan, fortunately the geography of the area, prevented such conflict. It was a West Pakistani army fighting against the mass of East Pakistani people, it was a war fought on East Pakistani soil, and the Bengalis would suffer the ravages, the West Pakistanis would remain unscathed and generally indifferent to the sufferings of East Pakistan. Twenty four years is too long a time to gamble on one card, for the East Pakistanis the objective was independence, the alternative seemed perpetual military subjection or perpetual insurrection.¹¹⁴

Succeeding paragraphs will discuss the, faulty strategy of military action, errors which led to the tragedy, Indian propaganda and the biased international community. For the West Pakistani troops, the objective was military victory. The alternative was military humiliation, which with normal human weakness we buried in the depths of our minds. For the government in Islamabad the objective was to, somehow keep a semblance of unity between the two Wings. The government could not acquiesce to secession for fear of the not spreading in West Pakistan. Or perhaps the government hoped that knocking a few heads would put the Bengali in a better frame of mind.

Government in Islamabad and General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi had a poor opinion of the revolutionary strength in the Bengali. Most West Pakistani officers believed that but for Indian interference we could wrap up the affair in East Pakistan in matter of weeks. This belief betrayed monumental ignorance of revolutionary conflicts, as much as of Indian public opinion. Revolutionary wars are not ended through political negotiations.¹¹⁵

They end only when one or the other side is knocked down and out. Violence in a revolutionary war expands in ever widening cycles of sabotage, reprisals and counter reprisals. Ideological issues gradually merge with personal issues and the entire nation is involved. Thereafter, there is little chance for negotiated settlement. No revolutionary war has ended so tamely. Secondly, the greatest inhibition for man is to take another man’s life. Once a man has broken through this barrier, he feels nothing in respect of

¹¹⁴ Kazi S. Ahmad, *Geography of Pakistan*, 39.

¹¹⁵ Mazhar Ali Khan, *Pakistan, the Barren Years* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 24-27.

theft or rape. In normal war the application of violence is impersonal. The soldier fires at an abstraction called enemy, in guerrilla war the soldier encounters mostly unarmed civilians, who may or may not be enemies. The act of killing at closer range, becomes personal, therefore, it is extremely difficult to impose conventional military inhibitions on the soldier. Thirdly, any community in the modern world, urban or rural, lives by predictable routine. Once the routine is shattered the people must quickly readjust their living, and once they have readjusted to the change there is little compulsion to retract their commitment against the government¹¹⁶.

On 17th March, Lt Gen Tikka called Maj Gen Khadim to his residence, Maj Gen Farman was already there. Tikka thanked the other two officers and told them to start planning for a possible military action throughout the province. On 18th March, Khadim and Farman worked out the essentials of the military action Eastern Command may be called upon to take, (salient aspects of the plan are given at appendix-XXII).

On 4th April 1971, Lt Gen A.A.K. Niazi arrived in Dhaka to assume the Command of Eastern Command from Lt Gen Tikka Khan. Skirmishes between Mukti Bahini (who had the support of Indian army) and Pakistan army gained momentum from March 1971 onwards. Indian army was also escalating on the western border of East Pakistan.

By deploying the troops at the western border of East Pakistan, which was with India, Lt Gen A.A.K. Niazi's implemented a faulty strategy. Owing to the geography¹¹⁷ and landscape of East Pakistan and the number of total fighting troops available with the Eastern Command, deploying of troops at the border was a death trap for own troops, there was no gain defending the marshy land, when the vantage points and important tactical grounds were well defined in the shape of populated areas, important ports. Our obsession with sealing the border enabled Mukti Bahini to plan and conduct their operations with accurate appreciation of our reaction. The Mukti Bahini would come across from India and set up positions with fifty to a hundred yards inside Pakistan, from there they would fire on our positions whose locations they obtained from the local population. Our military troops were at considerable disadvantage in dealing with the situation. They had to move and fire parallel to the border in order to avoid hitting

¹¹⁶ S.F.A Mahmud, *Indo-Pakistan*, 53-69.

¹¹⁷ Kazi S. Ahmad, *Geography of Pakistan*, 89.

Indian Border outposts (BOP). Whenever our fire ricocheted into Indian positions, we were punished with pre-planned fires.

By the end of May 1971, Pakistan army had reached the highest point of success, it ever would in East Pakistan. Government authority had been restored in almost all the towns, the mutinous troops had either been killed, captured or dispersed, the political leadership of Awami League had gone underground or had escaped to India. The Bengali police, and civil servants gradually returned to their posts and were apparently cooperating with military authorities. The general population in the countryside, and the towns adjusted with life, in accordance with the new rules, they learned to survive, and it seemed that the Bengali people had accepted the new order of things.

In the power corridors, and within the military circles, a false picture was painted that, the people of East Pakistan (Bengalis) can be subdued and made to obey for another half century, it was a deceptive picture and a jaundiced appreciation. By the end of May 1971, Pakistan army was stretched out and nailed down on all fours. Infantry Battalions were dispersed, on an average over a stretch of 400 square miles, it took 48 hours for a news of one casualty to travel from one end of forward localities to the other end, which was the Battalion headquarters. Formations were sorely deficient in authorized establishments of arms and services and were deficient of heavy communication equipment. Almost all the transport was commandeered from civil sources, the logistic problem was managed by troops by appropriating whatever they could lay their hands on, it was a dwindling source. Hospitals were short of staff, drugs and even bandages. There was hardly a battalion or a company which has retained its original integrity. In the process of restoring government authority, we had destroyed the fabric of security, which is the only rationale for government authority. The gun had become the law, a dead body lying in the open was not an occasion for police investigation, it was assumed that the body was either a member of or a victim of Mukti Bahini, and the dead lay unburied a food for scavenger dogs. As the gun became the law, the side with larger numbers would represent the law. Thus, the sole purpose for which military action was taken was lost.¹¹⁸ On the other side, the rebels, after the first chastening, began to recover and reorganize. More than 50 percent of regular Bengali military troops (ex-

¹¹⁸ Salahuddin Ahmed, *Bangladesh: Past and Present* (New Delhi: A.P.H. Pub. Corp., 2004), 32-38.

Pakistan army) had escaped to India, they would set to work to create Mukti Bahini, among them were some very courageous, very dedicated and very intelligent officers.

The dispersal of Pakistan army troops over the large areas in an unfamiliar and alien environment incubated the sense of insecurity. From June 1971, onwards Pakistan army was chasing the ghosts, during the period from June to November 1971, Indian press and political leaders conditioned world opinion to accepting Indian armed forces intervention into East Pakistan. The Indian army through Mukti Bahini succeeded in establishing bases inside our borders, which would facilitate further operations. In middle October 1971, Eastern Command apprehended that Indian army with Mukti Bahini in front would capture a landscape and setup Bangladesh. It would, rather promptly answer Bangladesh call for armed support, in fact such rumours had been afloat since June 1971. The Indian army would have intervened, in any case, at a time of their choosing and at a time of our greatest inconvenience. Eastern Command response to these rumours in June had been to search and destroy, in October the order went out, “seal the border”. This was quixotic dreaming, the border was not a bottle, it remained a sieve. The troops needed some rest before the end game was played out, but it was not to be.¹¹⁹

1.6 Pakistan-India War of 1971

During the period from the last week of October to 20th November 1971, Indian army started encroaching into East Pakistan’s territory and was engaged in setting up forward bases for invading into East Pakistan, as early as the first week of April 1971, Indira Gandhi had instructed Indian Border Security Forces (BSF) to provide shelter and training to the Mukti Bahini guerrillas.¹²⁰ During September and October Indian army’s support to Mukti Bahini operations was escalated, since most of the operations were carried out with in the short distance of international border, it was inevitable that some of our shots ricocheted into Indian territory. It was the necessary excuse for the Indian army to directly intervene in the operations. By 20th November 1971, Pakistan had lost most of the border outposts, Indian forces had completed their preliminary phase of operations against East Pakistan. Indians had established forward bases well inside the East Pakistani territory, to facilitate offensive operations, as a result of this

¹¹⁹ Salahuddin Ahmed, *Bangladesh: Past and Present*, 40-43.

¹²⁰ Mazhar Ali Khan, *Pakistan, the Barren Years*, 35-37.

Pakistan armed forces had little time to consolidate into brigade or even battalion defensive positions.

On the day of *Eid Ul Fitr*, 21st November 1971, Indian started its invasion into East Pakistan, due to readjustments most of the Pakistani troops were caught on the move. The geography of East Pakistan was not particularly favourable to the defence against the attack by India but considering the relative geography it favoured the attack from India in certain respects. Most of the rivers ran from India territory through East Pakistan, Indian army could enter deep into East Pakistan from several directions without having to cross Meghna, Jamuna or Ganges, the geography fragmented defence as much as attack.¹²¹

When a General officer, basis his strategy and war plans on the courage and hardihood of his rank and file, he has already lost his charter to command. There were many acts of heroism where officers and men preferred to die fighting rather than surrender, with such material Eastern Command could have put up a fight worthy of any professional army.¹²² For Eastern Command, trading space for time, made little sense, it broke the command structure. The space was not ours to trade and time was certainly not on our side, our only asset was the courage and hardihood of our soldiers, and this was squandered away in the profligacy of “trading space for time”. The war lasted barely two weeks from 3rd – 17th December 1971, on 16th December 1971, Pakistan’s military commander, Lt Gen Niazi, with troops surrendered¹²³ (details of Pakistani troops surrendered is given at appendix-XXIII), at the Dhaka stadium, signalling the birth of Bangladesh.

The conduct of general elections in December 1970 was universally acclaimed as an outstanding achievement by the Pakistan army. Yahya had promised fair elections; the elections were fair, within three months of this achievement, Pakistan army was trapped into a civil war in East Pakistan. For nine months the political leaders fought for chunks of power, while the civil war deteriorated into a quagmire of revolting misery, deepening bitterness and devouring waves of brutality. During the following nine months, few people made honest attempt to prevent the civil war in East Pakistan from

¹²¹ M. Rafique Afzal, *Politics, 1947–1971*, 69.

¹²² Altaf Gauhar, *Ayub Khan*, 69-70.

¹²³ Sarmila Bose, *Dead Reckoning*, 174.

being engulfed by war against India. Indeed, many of them goaded the army towards the precipice. Thereafter, there was nothing to stop us from going over the precipice, Pakistan was a bold experiment with history, it had given us the challenge that two peoples separated by geography, language and race but inspired by an identity of ideals could live and love each other together.¹²⁴

An adolescent may find some excuse for the failings by blaming the upbringing, a forty year old adult has no room for such rationalisation, all his decisions, all his actions are entirely of his own making. In 1971 all our General officers were well above 40 years of age, they were mature men, with more than 25 years of military service and at least according to their service records, being professionally well groomed. Very few of our General officers tried to resist the decisions leading to civil war and tried to limit the spread of violence. They were too few and were quickly swept aside by the shrieking hawks, of course after the disaster everyone was whiter than white.

Yahya asked to be tried in an open court, had he been tried we may perhaps have been torn out of our petrified hypocrisy. We may perhaps have emerged as cleaner people, we may perhaps have dealt honestly with our past. We may have acquired the ability to honestly recognize the consequences of our actions, we may have tried for ever greater precision in our decision making, but Yahya was not tried, he was put under house arrest, and was left to live with the memories of his disastrous end game; and die with them.¹²⁵

The emergence of Bangladesh is a new milestone in the history of both the nations although these were one and the same in their recent past. It is nothing surprising in the lives and histories of nations. Many examples in the history of mankind are found where nationalism thrust and shoot away with new dimensions, the examples of last couple of decades are Serbia, Bosnia, Czech Republic, Slovenia, East Timor and South Sudan. Nationalism is like a volcano that may erupt any time and change the geography and political division, but one thing is definite. This is called history which cannot be refuted nor be changed. Twenty five years of close affiliation, fraternity and unity split away because of treason and unjust and cold behaviour of unconscientiously dormant

¹²⁴ Kazi S. Ahmad, *Geography of Pakistan*, 75.

¹²⁵ Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan under Bhutto, 1971–1977* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), 13-18.

and ineligible, non-visionary rulers and institutions. Nation had to suffer because of this dilemma and innocent people had to offer their lives. The people who sacrificed for the newly emerged Pakistan felt this grief of separation by heart because only they could realize the worth of freedom.¹²⁶

The moving finger writes and having written moves on, some of our best Pakistanis were killed, there were huge losses of human lives, (both East and West Pakistanis), and there had been humiliation of human beings. Those who had survived had only one thought in their mind's accountability, even accountability could be buried in official files and under the debris of fallible memory, but the scars of humiliation and lost lives seldom disappear. Accountability will pave a way forward in establishing cordial relationships between the Pakistan and Bangladesh.

¹²⁶ Kamal Matin Ud Din, *Tragedy of Errors* (Lahore: Wajidalis, 1994), 27.

CHAPTER-2

INDIA-BANGLADESH RELATIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

This chapter includes India-Bangladesh disputes and their mutual settlement. Salient events since the independence of Bangladesh have been highlighted, which has set the tone of Bangladesh foreign policy and relations within South Asia.

Indian influence and interference with especially smaller and weaker neighbours are evident when India-Bangladesh relations are seen. It is interesting to note here that Indian influence did play a significant part in the road to independence for Bangladesh. The Mujibnagar government (the Bangladeshi government in exile) had got a safe haven in India along with the millions of Bangladeshi refugees. India had intervened in East Pakistan under the garb of humanitarian grounds and the fact that Indian military barely took two weeks to secure Bangladesh's independence, is a clear manifestation of Indian hegemonic designs and its undue influence on its neighbours especially the smaller or weaker states.¹²⁷

2.1 Emergence of Bangladesh

Bangladesh was born on 16th December 1971, however India recognized Bangladesh as a sovereign country on 6th December while the armed conflicts between India and Pakistan continued.¹²⁸ The new nation was named Bangladesh on 10th January 1972 and became a parliamentary democracy under a constitution which enshrined four basic principles of nationalism, secularism, socialism and democracy.¹²⁹

Bangladesh's emergence was a major historical event in the sub-continent, with the major chunk of its territory surrounded by India and its backing for the Liberation War, Bangladesh was bound to have intimate ties with India. Further, its domestic challenges made it imperative to establish close links with India in the immediate years of

¹²⁷ S.S. Bindra, *Indo-Bangladesh Relations*, 17.

¹²⁸ H. U. Rashid, *Bangladesh-India Relations: Living with a Big Neighbour* (Dhaka: A.H. Development Publishing House, 2010), 6.

¹²⁹ Y.M. Bammi, *India Bangladesh Relations: The Way Ahead* (New Delhi: Vijay Books India, 2010), 29.

independence. Two macro-level challenges which Bangladesh faced immediately after coming into existence were, domestically to ensure politico-economic consolidation, and to gain international recognition for its sovereign existence.¹³⁰

2.2 Overview of India-Bangladesh Relations

The exploitation of Bengalis by the West Pakistan elite made them look askance at religion as Islam was the basic pillar behind the formation of Pakistan, but emphasis on Bengali culture and language brought them closer to Hindus, India and West Bengal questioning the *raison d'être* of their separate existence. This also once again created a problem of identity for Bengali Muslims. As a result of this dilemma, Bangladeshis felt that their relations with India, especially West Bengal must be carefully regulated. The help of India in the liberation war was inspired, by Indian hegemonic designs. India was also seen as seeking to dominate the internal and external policies of Bangladesh and could also have Indian territorial designs. It could threaten the riverine economy of Bangladesh by cutting off the headwaters of the shared rivers.¹³¹ Separation from West Bengal was also needed to protect the distinct culture of Bangladesh. It was feared that a culturally more developed West Bengal could have easily overwhelmed the cultural development of Bangladesh. Succeeding paragraphs will discuss, pre 1975 Mujib era and post Mujib era.

Despite the fact, that President Sheikh Mujib ur Rahman being in power, the great expectations of free and open cultural relations between Bangladesh and India were belied within a year of the birth of Bangladesh. After President Mujib's assassination in 1975,¹³² this cultural policy noticeably shifted away from secularism and even further from the unity of Bengali culture, towards a policy of discovering and constructing a Bengali Muslim cultural heritage. After 1975, there was an attempt to redefine the Bangladesh national identity. Mujib believed that there was a Bengali cultural heritage that was common to both the Hindus and Muslim of West Bengal and Bangladesh, but after him the common Bengali language was used to construct different cultural identities. A section of Bengali Muslims believe that they speak Bengali just because

¹³⁰ J. N. Dixit, *Liberation and Beyond: Indo-Bangladesh Relations* (Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1999), 130.

¹³¹ S.S. Bindra, *Indo-Bangladesh Relations*, 18.

¹³² Shahnawaz A. Mantoo, "India-Bangladesh Relationship (1975-1990)", *Journal of South Asian Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 3, (2015), 73.

they are living in Bengal, however until the first quarter of the twentieth century the *Ulama* were the leaders of the Bengali Muslims, and for them Islam was everything.¹³³ Even the pan Islamic movements of the subcontinent that reached the masses through the medium of Bengali, promoted Islamic identity and loyalty to the Muslim *Umma*, and not kinship for the *Sanskritisation* of Bengali culture.

After the assassination of Mujib, there was a modification in the cultural strategy of Bangladesh, and it was to create a Bengali Muslim identity. The large majority population of Bengalis are Muslims, thus a reconciliation between the other Bengali communities and Muslims was considered the need of an hour. There was an attempt to cleanse the Bengali language of terms laden with overtly Hindu religious or *Sanskritic* imagery. Regarding the Bengali cultural heritage, there was a greater emphasis on highlighting and promoting the contribution made by Bengali Muslims. In the public media, Islamic symbolism was given weightage and was given reintroduced prominence, which had declined during President Mujib's period. When General Zia ur Rahman¹³⁴ took overpower in 1975, he mandated that all citizens of the country be known as Bangladeshis and not Bengalis. This was done ostensibly to draw a distinction between Bangladesh citizens and the Bengali speaking nationals of India.¹³⁵

A section in Bangladesh started criticising the leadership of Mujib and his political party Awami League, for professing secularism which they perceived as an Indian ploy to increase Hindu influence. This anxiety of Bangladeshi Muslims to emphasise their separate identity marked the beginning of opposition politics in Bangladesh. This politics was often characterised by anti-Indian feeling. The Islamic consciousness among the majority of Bengali Muslims was enhanced. Muslim cultural embers from the past were reignited all over the country to keep the masses religiously stirred. There was also a rising trend in the upper middle class of assimilating Islamic values.¹³⁶

It was in this context that India had earlier imposed the treaty of friendship on Bangladesh in 1972, article 9 of which, implying mutual defence in the case of any attack on the Dhaka regime, would have enabled India to militarily intervene in support of its *protege* President Mujib or anyone else supporting the Indian supremacy in order

¹³³ Akbar Ahmed, *Islamic Identity*, 34.

¹³⁴ Shahnawaz A. Mantoo, *Relationship (1975-1990)*, 76.

¹³⁵ S.S. Bindra, *Indo-Bangladesh Relations*, 18.

¹³⁶ Akbar Ahmed, *Islamic Identity*, 35.

to ensure that Bangladesh remains an Indian backyard.¹³⁷ Although RAW's glaring failure to anticipate a coup which was against the then President Mujib surprisingly held India's hand from intervening and saving Mujib ur Rahman and his regime, it did try to do so subsequently on more than one occasion, especially during the army coup and counter coup of 3rd November 1975 in which most of the pro India leadership was wiped out. It is also alleged that Brigadier Khaled Mosharraf who briefly held power from 3rd to 7th November 1975, was about to invoke the treaty when he was toppled and killed.¹³⁸ These grave implications of the treaty have all along prompted most of the opposition political parties, apart from the Awami League, to press for its abrogation.

The trade pact signed under the influence of India with Bangladesh, as a token of gratitude to India for its role in the independence for Bangladesh had also evoked considerable resentment amongst the people of Bangladesh and created tension and wedge between the relations of India and Bangladesh. The pact had mischievously allowed formation of a free trade zone (17 kms) on each side of India-Bangladesh border, in which jute, a vitally needed commodity for India's vast but idling jute industry, foodstuff and relief goods were collected and then smuggled into India. In the same way medicines and low quality consumer goods were dumped by India in Bangladesh. This process inflicted heavy economic losses on the Bangladesh government and raised the cost of living in the country by 50 percent. Consequently, people pressed President Mujib to cancel the trade pact, which on the aggregate, was causing Bangladesh through the massive smuggling, a loss of 15 billion takas annually according to official estimates, more than three times its export earnings per year.¹³⁹

President Mujib's haste in signing the trade pact with India and his failure to secure India's agreement for the solution of Farakka barrage and the border disputes, led the people to believe that he was colluding with India at the cost of Bangladesh. The free trade zone provided in the trade pact compounded the people's suspicions generated by many implications of the friendship treaty, and thus Mujib's acquiescence to India became clearly evident to the masses who started fearing Indian hegemony and, through it a resumption of their exploitation by Hindu moneyed and influential classes of West

¹³⁷ Bhabani Sen. Gupta, "Regional Security: The Indian Doctrine," *India Today*, August 31, 1983, 20.

¹³⁸ Ishtiaq Hossain, "Bangladesh-India Relations: Issues and Problems," *Asian Survey* (California), Vol. XXI, No.11, (November 1981): 1116.

¹³⁹ Anand Kumar, *India-Bangladesh Trade: Problems and Prospects* (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2012), 32.

Bengal, which they had experienced for generations before the founding of Pakistan. Thus, the Indian influence factor and hegemonic designs became an overpowering source of apprehensions for the people of Bangladesh, the political elite, and the civil and military bureaucracy. Despite, the fact that India had a dubious and interfering role in Bangladesh's creation, even than the relations between India and Bangladesh started showing signs of stress and strain by the advent of 1972. This is because the Bengalis had always been difficult to live with, this unease was not at the top level, but at the grass root and people to people level.¹⁴⁰

The tragic end of Mujib on 15th August 1975, earned Bangladeshis severe displeasure of the Indian PM Indira Gandhi. Indira's hegemonic designs and attitude towards Bangladesh was of a province than of a separate state. President Mujib's elimination was of a negative impact and hurtful to Indira Gandhi and her imperialistic ego, which had upset her applecart in Bangladesh. Revengeful as she was, PM Indira Gandhi immediately started pressurising Bangladesh politically and economically, highlighted by unilateral withdrawal of 40,000 cusecs of Ganges water in clear contravention to the India-Bangladesh agreement on Farakka barrage dispute, which had been signed on 18th April 1975, creating a crisis in Bangladesh. PM Indira Gandhi hardened her attitude on the issue so much that all efforts of Bangladesh for reconciliation remained unsuccessful. Thus, PM Gandhi's intolerance to a non Awami League regime in Dhaka and her coercive and destabilising tactics against the Bangladesh government in the wake of Mujib's demise clearly brought out the fact that she had no love lost for Muslim Bengal. On the contrary, she was motivated to dismember Pakistan by her own long term perspective to turn all smaller neighbours into client states which would be subservient to India forever and Bangladesh was designed to be the first of these states in PM Indira Gandhi's scheme of things. Careful of the political and cultural strength of Bengali nationalism, she had deftly given a separate identity of Bangladesh to the former East Pakistan, while renaming India's state of West Bengal as Bengal. There were reports of Indian troop concentration on the border, and numerous incidents involving the Bangladesh rifles and the Indian border security force were reported in the Meghalaya and Tripura border areas, particularly in the Muhuri Char area (location of Muhuri Char is given at appendix-XXIV). India also provided sanctuary to the

¹⁴⁰ Dilara Choudhury, "India-Bangladesh Ties: From Euphoria to Pragmatism," *Regional Studies* (Islamabad), Vol.VIII, No.2, (1989): 49.

insurgents who operated with impunity against Bangladesh.¹⁴¹ The Bangladeshi reaction towards India has also been highlighted by the reputed *Economist Intelligence Unit*, which stated that ironically relations with India have been marked by growing animosity since independence while those with Pakistan have become increasingly cordial. Disputes related to the water sharing of Ganges and the border between India and Bangladesh have particularly soured the relations between the two countries.¹⁴²

PM Indira Gandhi's approach towards Bangladesh was inspired by the traditional outlook of Hindu leaders towards Muslim Bengal. The Indians from 1946 onwards had fervently hoped that East Pakistan would sever its ties with the western wing, and it was these calculations which had led Indian leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel to reject the proposals for a greater Bengal.

Despite India's political and military pressures, Bangladesh acquired a fairly stable government under President Zia ur Rahman, who also set a new course in dealing with external affairs with a closer orientation with the West, China, and the Muslim nations including Pakistan. To the great annoyance of PM Indira Gandhi, President Zia ur Rahman, in desperation launched measures to internationalise the Farakka barrage issue by dispatching delegations to various countries, raising it at the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) foreign ministers meeting on May 1976, at the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit during August 1976 and during the session of United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), which was held in September 1976. While India maintained a tense posture, it was induced by these international pressures to resume bilateral negotiations and sign an agreement with Bangladesh for the solution of the Farakka barrage tangle. PM Indira Gandhi's ouster from power in 1977, however, did bring some relief to Bangladesh from India's coercive tactics.¹⁴³

Possessing pro India propensities, President Hussain Muhammad Ershad became the President of Bangladesh, after toppling the government, by means of military coup on 24th March 1982, and removed President Abdus Sattar who had earlier been elected Vice President by an overwhelming majority in an impressive and disciplined turn out of voters. His response towards India was characterised by a cautious and calm

¹⁴¹ Dilara Choudhury, *India-Bangladesh Ties*, 54.

¹⁴² "Country Profile-Bangladesh," *The Economist*, London, 1986-87, 7.

¹⁴³ Shahnawaz A. Mantoo, *Relationship (1975-1990)*, 77.

approach in dealing with disputes with India, whose list had further widened during the Zia ur Rahman regime. Moreover, as is typical with all military rulers, President Ershad lacking in internal legitimacy was in search of some foreign policy gains to lift his personal image and in this context a pilgrimage to New Delhi was much sought after. President Ershad's sojourn to New Delhi (6th to 7th October 1982)¹⁴⁴ was marked by a high profile welcome to him and President Ershad succumbed to PM Indira Gandhi's desires by denouncing the 1977 Farakka barrage pact, agreeing to an interim Ganges waters distribution arrangement and a Joint River Commission besides undertaking not to internationalise the issue. The Indians had also extended the carrot of very extensive cooperation in economic, trade, scientific and, technological fields which caused a transient euphoria and President Ershad's ministers of foreign affairs and finance started having pipe dreams of India playing a large benevolent role in the development of not only Bangladesh, but other smaller countries of the region as well. PM Indira Gandhi's game plan was, however, to concede nothing material to Bangladesh as subsequent events proved clearly for very little progress was made in the next three years to improve India-Bangladesh relations, while she gained much in terms of time as well as a favourable international public opinion by manifestation of magnanimity towards a small neighbour. She also ensured that President Hussain Muhammad Ershad remained saddled in power, as in her calculations Ershad could be much more valuable to India than the Awami League, whose well known pro India identity had become counterproductive and could not easily install it in power at Dhaka.¹⁴⁵ Ershad, with his quiet links with New Delhi, was a more useful horse as he kept away both civil and military opponents of India from coming to power in Bangladesh, while the Awami League political opposition continued as an significant part of resistance to the government within Bangladesh, ostensibly against President Ershad but occasionally conniving with him.¹⁴⁶

The assassination of PM Indira Gandhi provided a short respite to Bangladesh as Rajiv Gandhi, after becoming the PM, exhibited a desire to mend fences and improve ties with Bangladesh. However, no progress could be made, apart from the extension of the interim agreement on Farakka barrage by two years, while differences between the two

¹⁴⁴ Dilara Choudhury, *India-Bangladesh Ties*, 56.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 58.

¹⁴⁶ Shahnawaz A. Mantoo, *Relationship (1975-1990)*, 82.

countries widened due to the Chakma refugee problem and India's decision to enact a fence on the India-Bangladesh border to prevent the alleged influx of Bangladeshi immigrant into Assam. General Ershad's pro-Islamic measures exacerbated Indian antagonism and Indian supported subversive movements were intensified. The defeat of Rajiv Gandhi and Congress in the 1989 elections and the end of the Nehru dynasty's rule held a lot of promise for a cordial turn in the perennially sour ties between Bangladesh and India. The Indian PM Vishwanath Pratap Singh from National Front had also expressed the desire to change the pattern of Indian attitude towards small neighbours. Allaying the fears of small neighbours from India's growing military strength, PM V.P. Singh was of the view that he was afraid this image acquired during the Rajiv Gandhi regime, that India is trying to be a regional bully will be counterproductive. He had further given an assurance that his approach to neighbouring countries would be one of friendliness, not arm twisting or bullying.¹⁴⁷ PM V.P. Singh's limitations in maintaining the balance of power in New Delhi, especially against the intentions of Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) and the reunification's of its campaign against Babri Masjid along with the intra party manipulations of his close associates, did not allow him to bring about a singular shift in India Bangladesh relations during his relatively short tenure as PM. Meanwhile, Bangladesh underwent important political changes due to the success of opposition groups in removing President Ershad by holding of well organised elections in which Begum Khaleda Zia the leader of Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), became the PM by defeating the pro Indian Awami League. She further consolidated her position after successfully amending the constitution and changing the presidential form of government to a parliamentary system.

After Indian PM Narasimha Rao had established his minority government, he invited PM Begum Khaleda Zia for parleys in New Delhi, which were held in May 1992. Earlier the two countries discussed pressing issues of Ganges waters, Chakma refugees, Shanti Bahini insurgency and other long standing disputes. Although the talks ended on a positive note, no specific progress has materialised while an additional dimension has been added by India's pushing back (operation pushback) of 132 alleged Bangladeshis living in New Delhi, into Bangladesh, on 11th September 1992 in spite of

¹⁴⁷ Raj Kumar Singh, *Relations of NDA and UPA with Neighbours* (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2010), 19.

protests by Dhaka, while threatening to push many more of them into Bangladesh as a pressure tactics.¹⁴⁸

Meanwhile the major disputes continue to embitter India-Bangladesh relations are, Farakka barrage is the main dispute, which is based on India-Bangladesh water sharing issues, the water of common rivers running from upper riparian country India to the lower riparian country Bangladesh has historical ownership disputes. Much against Bangladeshi hopes, India has adopted an uncompromising attitude, even after Bangladesh's formation, on the release of the much needed waters from the Ganges during the dry period to Bangladesh as well as on plans for long term augmentation. India is forcing Bangladesh to accept the proposal of constructing a 200 miles long link canal in its territory for diverting river Brahmaputra's waters into the Ganges which Dhaka is not accepting as it would adversely affect the river's flow downstream besides causing other problems in Bangladesh. Dhaka, on the other hand, has been insisting on conservation of monsoon flows of the Ganges through the dams constructed for storage within the territories of India and Nepal, which would be beneficial to all the three countries in more ways than one. Meanwhile, the Indians have been steadily reducing the flow of water in the Ganges so drastically that it remained just 10,000 cusecs in March 1993 from 13,521 cusec a year earlier and an average of 75,000 cusec in March 1975. Simultaneously, the quantum of water withdrawn by India upstream of the Ganges has increased enormously. This denial of the vital Ganges water is causing Bangladesh to suffer huge loses which amounts to 3,000 crore *taka's* annually and is likely to multiply manifolds in the long term.¹⁴⁹

Commencing with the training, financial support and political patronage of pro Mujib guerrilla forces soon after his death, India has throughout continued these subversive hostilities from its territory against Bangladesh through various recalcitrant groups. In this regard, India's involvement with the Shakti Bahini led Chakma tribal insurgency since 1977 remains significant as India, employing its typical refugee card, has sucked in thousands of Chakma tribals and has been keeping them in camps, obstructing the return of stability and implementation of rehabilitation and development plans for Chakma tribes by Bangladesh, while exerting constant political pressure on it. India's

¹⁴⁸ Patralekha Chatterjee, "India Sends Bangladeshis Home," *The Christian Science Monitor*, November 18, 1992, accessed August 26, 2017, <https://www.csmonitor.com/1992/1118/18061.html>.

¹⁴⁹ S.S. Bindra, *Indo-Bangladesh Relations*, 19.

constant efforts to destabilise Bangladesh through recalcitrant elements have been conducted through the Indian intelligence setup RAW, whose efforts came to surface when security forces of Bangladesh arrested five RAW agents in November 1992 while three had escaped, one of the two RAW field agents nabbed at Jessore was working for the Bangabhumi movement whose chief, Chittaranjan Sutar, a former Member Provincial Assembly (MP), lives in self-exile in Calcutta since he fled there in August 1975.¹⁵⁰

According to Bangladesh, the Indians have forcibly annexed Talpatty island, called New Moore island by India which emerged in 1970-71 on the Bangladesh side of the bordering river Hariya Bbangan in the Sundarbans. In the Belonis sector as well nearly 50 years of newly surfaced land on the river Muhuri was occupied by India, which according to Bangladesh, contravenes the Mujib-Indira agreement of 1974 on the issue. Although Bangladesh handed over Berubari to India in 1974, India has failed to give Bangladesh Tin Bigha in return, all these disputes have led to scuffles between India and Bangladesh security forces, on several occasions.

The Indian decision in 1983 to build a fence for sealing Bangladesh's borders with adjoining Indian states to prevent the alleged influx of illegal Bangladeshi infiltrators further embittered the ties between the two countries. Bangladesh refuses any responsibility for pre 1971 migrants who had entered Indian states either during the traditional population shift due to social and economic pressures, or through India's own inducements which were intended to destabilise former East Pakistan.

The people of Bangladesh have all along been expressing pro Islam and pro Muslim sentiments to the chagrin of the Indians. The vehement protests by Bangladeshi Muslims on the issue of Babri Masjid held throughout the country for several days, signified the interplay of their Islamic identity. Led by *Shaykh Ul Hadith Allamah Aziz Ul Haque*, several thousand Muslims started the long march to Ayodhya in early 1993 which, however, was not allowed. The country's Parliament also unequivocally condemned the destruction of the mosque and called upon India to rebuild it to its

¹⁵⁰ S.S. Bindra, *Indo-Bangladesh Relations*, 19.

originality at the actual site, the Bangladesh representative also condemned the incident in the UNGA.¹⁵¹

Bangladesh resents the Indian demand to remain eternally grateful to it for aid in its liberation struggle and the exploitation of the Awami League by India as an instrument of its domination. The Indian insistence on treating Bangladesh as a hinterland for its relatively advanced industry, going back on the promised developmental assistance and attempts to superimpose Indian cultural ethos, are also a source of growing anti-India sentiments in Bangladesh. When India has started increasing pressure on Bangladesh to supply natural gas to West Bengal and allow India the transit facilities through the country to its north eastern states, the resentment increased within Bangladesh. These well-known Bangladeshi sentiments vis-a-vis India have been given expression by an Indian writer Parakash Nanda, who states that “In 1975, pro Indian sentiment of the liberation war evaporated quickly, and an anti-Indian movement surfaced particularly after the elimination of President Mujib”. Bangladeshi patriotism asserted itself against India’s cultural domination and economic penetration. Since then, all major problems in that country have been attributed to India. It is a common feeling amongst the Bangladeshi people, that India has vested interest in keeping Bangladesh weak and dependent.¹⁵²

Indian interests in Bangladesh have been defined by a former Indian foreign secretary A.P. Venkateswaran. Venkateswaran states that they have three basic interest’s vis-a-vis Bangladesh. The most important is to retain a legitimate proportion of the lean season flows of the Ganga and other rivers that they share with that country, they have an interest in the welfare of the minorities in Bangladesh, since any marked deterioration in their living conditions provokes immigration to India and adds to an already festering problem, and lastly the illegal migration that had already taken place has caused enormous social and economic problems in our bordering states. It is in Indian vital interest to see that this process stops and is reversed, with the return to Bangladesh by those who have illegally entered Indian territory.¹⁵³

¹⁵¹ S.S. Bindra, *Indo–Bangladesh Relations*, 21.

¹⁵² Parakash Nanda, *Elusive Friendships* (Allahabad, India: Probe, August 1987), 37.

¹⁵³ A.P. Venkateswaran, *India and Her Neighbours: Need for Perspective* (New Delhi, Mainstream, 11 July 1987), 32.

The two countries in order to extend their cooperation to another level signed the India-Bangladesh Friendship Treaty on 19th March 1972. The 1972 friendship treaty which India and Bangladesh had signed began to be criticized. Soon the signing of the treaty was seen by many as either unnecessary or as something imposed by India on Bangladesh, within months after the signing of the treaty a few opposition parties in Bangladesh were annoyed because they believed that the treaty demonstrated mistaken set of priorities between the two countries. This view has led many to conclude that India's assistance to Bangladesh during the Liberation War was motivated primarily to assert its dominance in South Asia. A smaller Pakistan without the territory of Bangladesh would hardly be a match for India.¹⁵⁴

This was perhaps the beginning of the change of the Bangladeshi perceptions towards India and the inherent bilateral problems only compounded to it. Due to the trade pact signed in 1972, consumer goods, medicine, tobacco, etc., found their way into Bangladesh from India. Bengalis felt that medicines and low quality consumer goods were dumped by India in Bangladesh. This process inflicted heavy economic losses on the Bangladesh government and raised the cost of living in the country by 50 percent, resultantly Indian biased trade pact was cancelled.

The issue of Prisoners of War (POW), weapons and military stores captured by the Indian army from the Pakistanis became another issue of contention in India-Bangladesh relations. The Indian military advisers were not very enthusiastic about returning the weapons and other material captured from the Pakistanis. They felt that returning these weapons to Bangladesh would become the basis for Bangladesh's future dependence on the Pakistani weapon systems, this might increase the Bangladeshi dependence on US or Pakistan.¹⁵⁵ Apart from it, the improper behaviour of the Indian soldiers during and after the war also came to fore. Indian army were greedy and unscrupulous in their conduct and forcibly took away foreign made cars and other consumer goods as booty from Bangladesh.¹⁵⁶ On 8th February 1972, an elite para military force (Rakhi Bahini) was created by India to challenge the Bangladesh army

¹⁵⁴ H. U. Rashid, *Relations: Living*, 16.

¹⁵⁵ S.S. Bindra, *Indo-Bangladesh*, 29.

¹⁵⁶ H. U. Rashid, *Relations: Living*, 8.

and the part played by freedom fighters and that it could be used as a disguise by the Indians to re-enter Bangladesh.¹⁵⁷

It was also alleged that India interfered in the day to day administration of Bangladesh. It was believed that the Awami League was a puppet in Indian hands (the perception is now a reality, as till today Awami League led governments has acted as a puppet and stooge to its Indian masters and had succumbed to Indian designs). They did not like the Indian advisers coming to Bangladesh to advise the government at the time of preparing the five year plan, budget etc.¹⁵⁸ Indian advisers in most cases was found to be less qualified than his / her counterpart in Bangladesh, the attitude of many of the Indian advisers was perceived to be arrogant to Bangladeshi officials, as they behaved as if Bangladesh officials were somewhat inferior to them in terms of competence, experience and skill. In fact, the appointment of Indian advisers led many bureaucrats to believe that the move was a pretext on the part of India to influence the decisions of Bangladesh government. Thus, from the very beginning, this perception did not seem to advance a healthy and balanced relationship between India and Bangladesh.¹⁵⁹

The most pertinent factors however, that impinged India-Bangladesh relations, during the initial years was the failure to resolve the three critical issues between them. Firstly, Ganges waters sharing and Farakka issue, secondly the delimitation of sea boundary in the Bay of Bengal, and thirdly redrawing the land boundary between the two countries.

2.2.1 India-Bangladesh Water Sharing Issues

India-Bangladesh water dispute is an outstanding specimen of interstate conflict, water is one of the most crucial security issues in the contemporary times.¹⁶⁰ The sharing of water resources between India and Bangladesh is a major contentious issue, water sharing problem between India and Bangladesh is by no means confined to Ganges, among the most prominent are the issues revolving around the sharing of waters between Teesta (location of Teesta is given at appendix-XXV), Feni, Dharla, Dudhkumar, Manu, Muhuri, Khowai and Gomti. Yet the primary emphasis is to understand the Ganges water or the Farakka dispute between India and Bangladesh.

¹⁵⁷ Y.M. Bammi, *Relations: The Way*, 30-31.

¹⁵⁸ S.S. Bindra, *Indo-Bangladesh*, 23.

¹⁵⁹ H. U. Rashid, *Relations: Living*, 9-10.

¹⁶⁰ Michael T. Klare, "The New Geography of Conflict," *Foreign Affairs*, 2001: 163.

This is because the Farakka dispute has been contentious since the partition days, when Bangladesh was part of Pakistan and which has now been resolved in the form of the GWT 1996. Succeeding paragraphs will discuss, origin of Ganges / Farakka problem (GWT 1996), Teesta water sharing issues, Tipaimukh dam controversy and India's River Linking Project (RLP).

India and Bangladesh share the water of 54 rivers, but the major rivers are Ganges, Brahmaputra and the Meghna / Barak (GBM), which terminate into the Bay of Bengal (major rivers of India-Bangladesh are given at appendix-XXVI). Both countries are heavily dependent on these rivers, resulting into a major conflict flash point owing to the scarcity of water during the dry weather period. Bangladesh has major concerns owing to its dependence on the fresh water supply through the 54 common transboundary inflows from India.¹⁶¹

Rising from Himalayas, the Ganges flows through India, before entering Bangladesh, among its several tributaries from the north are the river Gandhak and Kosi whose headwaters lie in Nepal.¹⁶² Ganges problem is a problem which has been commonly faced by the upper and lower riparian counties.¹⁶³ Barrage gates control, water quantity, mechanism of sharing, measures to augment, water available are the major issues, hence is a source of tension and causes clash in India-Bangladesh ties.¹⁶⁴ Nonetheless, Ganges issue and Farakka is resolved by the conclusion of Ganges Water Treaty, Teesta water dispute became the fore along with some of the common rivers that flow between India and Bangladesh.

The crux of the Farakka issue lay in the sharing of the Ganges water throughout the months of January till May, which are termed as the dry season, enough water is available for both countries, for the rest of the seven months of the year. Bangladesh complained that India had diverted Ganges water from Farakka without any consent and intimation to Bangladesh. Thus, whenever Bangladesh was stricken by a calamity

¹⁶¹ Medha Patkar, ed., "India-Bangladesh: 21st Century Battle For Water Sharing," *River Linking: A Millennium Folly?*, National Alliance of People's Movements, Mumbai, India, January 2004, <http://www.sosarsenic.net/english/groundwater/waterbattle.html#1>.

¹⁶² S.S. Bindra, *Indo-Bangladesh*, 66.

¹⁶³ "Policy On Sharing River Water Between India And Bangladesh," *Uday India*, May 16, 2015, <https://udayindia.in/2015/05/02/policy-on-sharing-river-water-between-india-and-bangladesh/>.

¹⁶⁴ K. J. Joy and S. Paranjape, "Understanding Water Conflicts in South Asia," *Contemporary Perspectives*, Vol. 1 (2) (2007): 49.

like drought or by floods, India was rightly made responsible, owing to its insensitivity towards its neighbours, Indian misuse of Farakka was also criticised for the calamities.¹⁶⁵

Indian perceptions were that Bangladesh was extremely inflexible and irrational on this Farakka issue. Bangladesh was also accused for overstressing the negative effects of reduced flows of water. India did use its influence and employed strategies to deal with the Farakka issue and that India's use of its influence became inapt to solve the bilateral dispute regarding water at that point of time. The Farakka issue became a solitary matter, which dominated India-Bangladesh relationship.¹⁶⁶ PM of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujib, visited India and in May 1974, resultantly a Joint River Commission (JRC) was entrusted the responsibility of discovering a solution and the commission accordingly took up the augmentation issue.¹⁶⁷

Sheikh Mujib was assassinated in August 1975, in the post Mujib era, there was a general reluctance on the part of the then Indian government to negotiate with the new military regime under Maj Gen Zia ur Rahman who came to power in November 1975. Zia ur Rahman's policies contrasted with Mujib's policies.¹⁶⁸ During Janata Party rule in India which lasted for 28 months, there was a perceptible shift in the Bangladesh policy of the previous government.¹⁶⁹ On 5th November 1977, in New Delhi a five year treaty was signed,¹⁷⁰ the treaty was meant to regularise the use of water from Ganges river. Bangladesh was the clear benefactor of the treaty, as Bangladesh being a lower riparian country was given the lions share over the waters of Ganges river, and India accepted the right of Bangladesh.¹⁷¹

In 1980, Congress rose to power in New Delhi, the friendly relations between India and Bangladesh turned bitter.¹⁷² On 26th March 1982, government in Bangladesh changed and General H. M. Ershad took over through a military coup, Farakka issue was on the

¹⁶⁵ R. Tiwary, "Conflicts over International Waters," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 41 (17), (2006): 1688.

¹⁶⁶ R. Tiwary, *Conflicts*, 1688.

¹⁶⁷ S.S. Bindra, *Indo-Bangladesh*, 61.

¹⁶⁸ Ishtiaq Hossain, "Bangladesh-India Relations: The Ganges Water-Sharing Treaty and Beyond," *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 25 (3) (1998): 137.

¹⁶⁹ J. N. Dixit, *Liberation and Beyond*, 241.

¹⁷⁰ S.S. Bindra, *Indo-Bangladesh*, 113.

¹⁷¹ R. Tiwary, *Conflicts*, 1689.

¹⁷² P. Pandey, "Revisiting the Politics of the Ganges Water Dispute between India and Bangladesh," *India Quarterly*, Vol. No. 68(3) (2012): 272

top priority of this new government. On 7th October 1982, President H. M. Ershad's visited India, India and Bangladesh agreed on an interim solution for two years on Ganges water problem, and an agreement was signed in the form of an MOU.¹⁷³

The assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984 provided a short respite to Bangladesh as Rajiv Gandhi, after becoming the PM, exhibited desire to mend fences and improve ties with Bangladesh.¹⁷⁴ In October 1985, President Ershad met with Rajiv Gandhi at Nassau (Bahamas) and a MOU was signed with the validity period of three years.¹⁷⁵ In 1988, massive floods struck Bangladesh, almost two third of Bangladesh was submerged. Bangladeshi masses and authorities held Farakka responsible for the deluge.¹⁷⁶ In February 1991, Khaleda Zia party, BNP, won the parliamentary elections of Bangladesh and took over the government.

In 1996, India (coalition government of Deve Gowda) and Bangladesh (Awami League government of Sheikh Hasina Wazed) had new governments coming into power.¹⁷⁷ After a 20 years gap Awami League returned to power and India was extremely anxious to encash and make friendly terms with the Bangladesh ruling government.¹⁷⁸ On 12th December 1996, during Sheikh Hasina's three days state visit to India a treaty on Ganges water sharing was signed in New Delhi between India and Bangladesh.¹⁷⁹

Sheikh Hasina personal commitment and inclination towards India, due to the support given to her father Sheikh Mujib by India, resulted into the solution of long outstanding issues between Bangladesh and India.¹⁸⁰ In December 1996, the resolution of water dispute and finally the signatures on the Ganges water treaty (GWT) can be termed as an influence imposed on a weaker and smaller neighbour by India. Treaty was signed for the duration of 30 years, resultantly 90 percent share of water will be given to

¹⁷³ Ishtiaq Hossain, *Relations: Issues*, 1137.

¹⁷⁴ S.A. Zafar, "Indo-Bangladesh Relations: Problems and Prospects," *Pakistan Horizon* 46, no.3/4 (1993), 96.

¹⁷⁵ P. Pandey, *Revisiting the Politics*, 272.

¹⁷⁶ S. Hasan, *Environmental concerns in South Asia* (London: Adelphi Papers. 1991), 35.

¹⁷⁷ P. Pandey, *Revisiting the Politics*, 275.

¹⁷⁸ T. A. Karim, "The Bangladesh-India treaty on sharing of the Ganges waters: Genesis and significance," *BISS Journal*, 19 (2) (1998): 228.

¹⁷⁹ Ishtiaq Hossain, *Relations: Issues*, 1140.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 1141.

Bangladesh.¹⁸¹ 1996 Ganges water treaty resolved the Farakka dispute,¹⁸² however there is no progress regarding the water sharing of other major rivers (timeline of Farakka negotiations is given at appendix-XXVII).

Sharing of the water of 53 other rivers has remained unresolved for years, Bangladesh contends that it is necessary to settle disputes over the sharing of seven rivers water, (Teesta, Dharla, Dudhkumar, Manu, Muhuri, Khowai and Gomti), on priority basis with Teesta having a top priority. Since September 2011, water sharing issue of Teesta river, has emerged as a major problem with the potential and underlying factor to cause sourness in the bilateral relations of Bangladesh and India, thus became the most contested problem, for the bilateral relations of both the countries.¹⁸³ Teesta river flows from India to Bangladesh. A barrage on Teesta river with the name of Gajoldoba barrage has been constructed by India some 60 kms upstream, in the north of Bangladesh. This barrage has been constructed by India primarily with the aim to divert the waters of Teesta river. Bangladesh has been complaining that India diverts water to the Gajoldoba barrage (location of Gajaldoba barrage is given at appendix-XXVIII) at the cost of Bangladesh's lower riparian needs.¹⁸⁴ At present the main point of contention is the distribution of Teesta river water on a 50:50 basis and Bangladesh's demand for a minimum guarantee clause, which is fixed at 3,500 cusecs of water for Bangladesh, during lean season 3,000-4,000 cusecs of total water is available in Teesta river. This means that even after applying the distribution formula Bangladesh would not get more than 2,000 cusecs, a figure which is unacceptable to Bangladesh.¹⁸⁵ Non-cooperation of India to resolve the issue has created resentment, mistrust and suspicion amongst the people of Bangladesh.¹⁸⁶

On Barak river, India has planned to construct Tipaimukh dam (location of Tipaimukh dam along with an image is given at appendix-XXIX), the sole purpose of the dam is to generate hydropower of 1500 megawatt (MW). Tipaimukh dam was originally

¹⁸¹ S. B. Colombi, and Robert W. Bradnock, "Geopolitics, Water and Development in South Asia: Cooperative Development in the Ganges-Brahmaputra Delta," *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 169 (1) (2003): 51-52.

¹⁸² Ishtiaq Hossain, *Relations: Issues*, 1155.

¹⁸³ Ishtiaq Hossain, *Relations: Issues*, 156.

¹⁸⁴ Gauri Noolkar, *Geopolitics of Water Conflicts in the Teesta River Basin* (Netherlands: Both ENDS, 2017), 59, https://gaurinoolkar.files.wordpress.com/2017/12/teesta-conflicts_gno.pdf.

¹⁸⁵ Inamul M. Haque, "What Happened to Teesta Waters?" *The Daily Star*, September 27, 2011, <https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-204060>

¹⁸⁶ Ishtiaq Hossain, *Relations: Issues*, 1156.

conceived for holding the flood waters flowing in from Assam's Cachar plains, nevertheless later the concentration drifted to the generation of hydroelectricity. A high capacity dam with a height of 162.8 meters would thus be built in Tipaimukh.¹⁸⁷ New Delhi contends that Tipaimukh is run on the river project, however, Bangladesh contends that the construction of the Tipaimukh dam will inflict huge damage on Bangladesh's economy, ecology and will mean disaster for its population.¹⁸⁸ Water flow will diminish with in Kushiyara, Meghna and Surma rivers, these are the three main rivers which flow through Bangladesh. Resultantly will increase in the rate of sedimentation, which in turn would gradually decrease the water carrying capacity of these rivers, in the Hoor area of Bangladesh.¹⁸⁹

River Linking Project (RLP maps is given at appendix-XXX) is a gigantic project which involves major civil engineering works. RLP has been conceived to conserve on the wastage of water within India and will involve construction of canals and reservoirs for channelizing water from eastern part of India to the Western and Southern part of India, the plan includes both the Himalayan and peninsular rivers of India. Bangladesh argues that RLP is a tremendous security threat to Bangladesh. The proposed RLP would further reduce the inflow of freshwater from upstream which would gradually lead to a reduction of ground water. The decreased water flow in the river will increase sedimentation as well as salinity intrusion in the rivers. The impact of RLP on Bangladesh will be multi dimensional, thus affecting agriculture, fisheries, navigation, environment and geomorphology.¹⁹⁰

2.2.2 Border Enclave Issues: A Contestation

Border disputes are the most contentious issues between India and Bangladesh. The border dispute, however, has twin dimensions, the first pertains to the dispute emanating from the land boundary and the other, the maritime boundary dispute. Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) 1974 tried to revisit the border problems. Land Boundary Agreement of 1974 was not ratified by the Indian Parliament. Consequently, India-Bangladesh border problems remained unresolved, efforts were also made in 2011 but

¹⁸⁷ Ishtiaq Hossain, *Relations: Issues*, 1151-52.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 1153.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 1154.

¹⁹⁰ Smruti S. Pattanaik, (ed.), *Four Decades of India-Bangladesh Relations: Historical Imperatives and Future Directions* (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2012), 151.

in vain. Finally, in June 2015, Indian PM Narendra Modi visited Bangladesh, and LBA was signed, thus ending a long outstanding irritant.¹⁹¹ Succeeding paragraphs will discuss the, LBA, border related problems (illegal migration and trade, maritime boundary, New Moore island controversy and border fencing problems).

It is ironic that the border which was drawn by the British in 1947 to rationally reorganise the political space in the region has eventually not only generated its own irrationality but has also created many new problems for the region. Cyril Radcliffe (boundary commission head), spoiled the job on all sides,¹⁹² undue favours were given to India, which has resulted in the consistent and unending problems faced by the countries of South Asia,¹⁹³ (Radcliffe boundary demarcation map is given at appendix-XXXI). The unjust and biased demarcation of boundary between Pakistan and India by Radcliffe coupled with forcible annexure of Muslim majority states by India,¹⁹⁴ speaks of Indian hegemonic designs. A total of 4096 kms, of border on land is shared by India and Bangladesh, only 6.1 kms of land, at three sectors, is agreed as disputed territory by India and Bangladesh. India-Bangladesh border disputes are linked with problems like illegal migration, border killings, smuggling, trafficking and other cross border criminal and terror activities.¹⁹⁵ The porous border also makes it easy for terrorists to move at will, other problems pertaining to the border relates to the exchanges of the enclaves and the question of adverse possessions. The three problems attached to the LBA have, however, been resolved but the other problems pertaining to the boundary persists.¹⁹⁶

The India-Bangladesh border has host of complexities, first effort to resolve the border complexities came in the form of the Bagge Award of 1950 but was unable to resolve India's border issue. On 10th September 1958, an agreement was signed to address the disputes related to border of West Bengal, border of Assam, and border of Tripura

¹⁹¹ Smruti S. Pattanaik, *Four Decades*, 155.

¹⁹² Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 63.

¹⁹³ Sumanta Banerjee, "Indo-Bangladesh Border: Radcliffe's Ghost," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 36 (18) (2001): 1505.

¹⁹⁴ Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, *Emergence of Pakistan*, 79.

¹⁹⁵ Piyali Dutta, "India-Bangladesh Relations: Issues, Problems and Recent Developments", *IPCS Special Report*, Vol. No. 97 (2010): 7.

¹⁹⁶ Deb Mukharji, *Distant Neighbours: India and Bangladesh in Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities* (New Delhi: Foreign Service Institute. 2007), 559.

between India and East Pakistan, which is known as Nehru-Noon agreement.¹⁹⁷ It was comprehended that the LBA of 1974,¹⁹⁸ between Bangladesh and India had resolved the issues of border demarcation, enclaves exchange, and land possessed adversely.¹⁹⁹ India retained southern Berubari and adjacent Muslim enclaves, and Bangladesh was given Angarpota and Dahagram enclaves of Tin Bigha area (location of Tin Bigha is given at appendix-XXXII and appendix-XXXIII).²⁰⁰

On 6th June 2015, LBA was signed during Narendra Modi's two day visit to Bangladesh, according to the agreement, Bangladesh was handed over 111 enclaves (17160 acres of land) from India's possession (in the districts of Nilphamari, Lalmonirhat, Panchagarh and Kurigram) and 51 enclaves were received by India (7110 acres of land) from Bangladesh in West Bengal's Cooch Behar area.²⁰¹ The effects of the LBA are manifold, firstly, the successful conclusion of the LBA will ensure national identity to over 50,000 stateless people living in these enclaves, secondly, the enclaves would cease to exist, thirdly, it will help India to fence its borders with Bangladesh, fourthly, it will alter the physical map of India and Bangladesh and fifthly, it will facilitate in a better management of border which in turn is a harbinger of peace and stability.²⁰² India is surrounding Bangladesh from East, West and North, there are numerous problems and issues relating to border disputes between the two neighbouring countries.

The large influx of Bangladeshi migrants into India is of utmost significance and concern to India for numerous reasons. India envelopes Bangladesh from all sides less south. Border areas demography of India has been altered by illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, resulting into the imbalance in ethnicity, irregularity in electoral process and employment opportunity loss for Indian nationals.²⁰³ Bangladeshi migrants, are seen in as far off places as Delhi, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. Bengalis have taken over most of the low paying jobs in several states, thereby

¹⁹⁷ N. S. Jamwal, "Border Management: Dilemma of Guarding the India-Bangladesh Border," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 28 (1) (2004): 5.

¹⁹⁸ N. S. Jamwal, *Border Management*, 9.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 8.

²⁰⁰ N. S. Jamwal, *Border Management*, 11.

²⁰¹ Mahmood Hasan, "Land Boundary Agreement and Bangladesh-India relations," *The Daily Star*, 2015, <https://www.thedailystar.net/op-ed/politics/land-boundary-agreement-and-bangladesh-india-relations-81550>.

²⁰² *Ibid.*

²⁰³ Anand Kumar, *Trade: Problems*, 17.

depriving the local Indian population of sources of livelihood.²⁰⁴ Illegal trade (arms, ammunition, jute, rice, cattle and human capital) is smuggled between India and Bangladesh due to the porous borders (land and maritime borders), even fake Indian and foreign currency is smuggled through Bangladesh.²⁰⁵

India and Bangladesh share their maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal. There are two disputes, one pertaining to the boundary and second relating to the sovereignty of 1975 born island known as New Moore / Talpatty island.²⁰⁶ Bangladesh coastline is concave, which bounds its border running in the sea, southwards from the corner of its border running on the land. India claims its claim of border is eastwards and south for thousands of kilometres from the coast till inside the Bay of Bengal.²⁰⁷ The maritime border demarcation also involves Myanmar. If India and Myanmar, prefer resolution of the issue constructed on the standard of equidistance and not on the principle of equity, Bangladesh worries that it might get sea locked or zone locked by Myanmar and India.²⁰⁸ PM Modi's visit to Bangladesh in June 2015, has paved the way forward and India has decided to opt for international arbitration to settle its maritime boundary with Bangladesh. Inclination of Sheikh Hasina towards India, and Indian influence on Bangladesh, resulted into the way forward of the issue, thus growing trust between the two states.²⁰⁹

Indian plans of border fencing have led to strong resentment within Bangladesh, especially in villages that straddle the dividing line and trade in both directions.²¹⁰ However, Indian stance is that the main aim of border fencing is to thwart against illegal activities like smuggling, immigration, crossing of border by insurgents and criminals. India toughened its stance and in 1987, India started fence work on its mutual border with Bangladesh, 3286.87 kms is the total length of India-Bangladesh border, 2735 kms

²⁰⁴ Madhav Godbole, "Management of India's International Borders: Some Challenges Ahead," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 36(48) (2001): 4443.

²⁰⁵ Pinak R. Chakravarty, "Bangladesh-India Ties: Pragmatic Transformation in Debate: India-Bangladesh Relations," *Scaling Newer Heights*, (2016), 215.

²⁰⁶ Y.M. Bammi, *Relations: The Way*, 135.

²⁰⁷ Piyali Dutta, *India-Bangladesh*, 8.

²⁰⁸ Ishtiaq Hossain, *Relations: Issues*, 1164.

²⁰⁹ Mahmood Hasan, "Land Boundary Agreement and Bangladesh-India relations," *The Daily Star*, 2015.

²¹⁰ Harsh V. Pant, "India and Bangladesh: Will the Twain Ever Meet?" *Asian Survey*, Vol. 47(2) (2007): 241.

of border fence was enacted by March 2011.²¹¹ During the 2015 Modi's visit, India and Bangladesh agreed and signed an MOUs to deal with smuggling prevention, coast guards cooperation, fake currency and human trafficking prevention.²¹²

2.2.3 India-Bangladesh: Transit Trade Issues

India-Bangladesh economic relations have been affected by the legacy of history. In interstate relationships all over the world, economic and political relations are intertwined. Close or strong economic relationships, including trade and economic cooperation between countries, have often been propelled by the prevailing close political relations or by a desire to strengthen future political relations and vice versa.²¹³ Bilateral economic relations between India and Bangladesh has been on a constant progression as Indian exports to Bangladesh are on the increase, however, there remain some major challenges in their bilateral economic relations.²¹⁴ Indian exports to Bangladesh witnessed a sharp increase from US dollar (\$) 3.7 billion in 2011-12 to US \$ 6.4 billion in 2014-2015 (more than 70 percent increase in a short duration of four years). India-Bangladesh trading partnership within the SAARC countries, is calculated to be the largest.²¹⁵ During the fiscal year of 2014-2015, India-Bangladesh aggregated trade stood at US \$ 7 billion. Indian exports and trade with Bangladesh have been observed in India's favour at US \$ 6.4 billion.²¹⁶ (India-Bangladesh bilateral trade is given at appendix-XXXIV, major items of export at appendix-XXXV and major items of imports at appendix-XXXVI).

Succeeding paragraphs will discuss the, India-Bangladesh trade relations (key challenges in trade relations, trade deficit, informal trade), and India-Bangladesh transit issues. On 10th June 1972, the two countries decided to cooperate in the areas of atomic

²¹¹ M. Aminul Karim, "Bangladesh-India Relations: Some Recent Trends," *ISAS Working Paper*, Vol. No. 96. (2009): 8.

²¹² Karim, *Recent Trends*, 9.

²¹³ Nurul Islam, "Indo-Bangladesh Economic Relations: Some Thoughts," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 39 (36) (2004): 4069.

²¹⁴ CUTS International Report, "India-Bangladesh Trade Potentiality: An Assessment of Trade Facilitation Issues," Jaipur: MS Printer, 2014, http://www.cuts-citee.org/ibta-ii/pdf/Assessment_of_Bangladesh-India_Trade_Potentiality.pdf.

²¹⁵ Government of India, "Annual Report," *Ministry of External Affairs*, New Delhi, 2014-15, 5.

²¹⁶ Serajul Quadir, "India, Bangladesh sign historic land boundary agreement," *The Daily Star*, June 06, 2015.

energy, space research and higher education.²¹⁷ On 5th July 1973, another agreement was signed between the two neighbours for the duration of three years, which replaced the earlier agreement. Resultantly, Most Favoured Nation (MFN) dealing was agreed upon by India and Bangladesh (India granted MFN status to Pakistan in 1996, and Pakistan reciprocated in 2011), for each other coupled with devising an arrangement of Balanced Trade and Payment Arrangement (BTPA).²¹⁸

The prevalence of drought in 1972-73 and floods in 1973-74 in Bangladesh economy kept India's influence in Bangladesh at bay as the former could not combat with economic crisis faced by Bangladesh's economy. Hence, Bangladesh became suspicious about India's ability to meet Bangladesh's requirement. On 12th January 1976, India and Bangladesh signed a Trade protocol which visualized higher volume of trade of coal and newsprint in order to balance the trade. On 14th August 1976, India and Bangladesh agreed on Nepal's trade with Bangladesh through Indian territory.²¹⁹ On 5th October 1976, Bangladesh requested that Balanced Trade and Payment Arrangement (BTPA) is extended for next three years till 27th September 1979, which was agreed by India, the emphasis was given on increasing the volume of mutual trade. Trade between India and Bangladesh remained stagnant until 4th October 1980, when the two countries signed another three years trade agreement and reiterated MFN treatment to each other.²²⁰

On 7th October 1982, a summit meet took place between Indira Gandhi and Mr. H.M. Ershad in New Delhi, which gave fillip to India-Bangladesh economic relations. A Joint Economic Commission (JEC) was set up in order to promote mutual trade and to identify the areas of joint ventures and mutual economic cooperation, with the establishment of JEC, private trade was also allowed. In May 1986, India and Bangladesh extended their bilateral trade agreement of 1983 and renewed it on numerous occasions in the succeeding years.²²¹ With the visit of Sheikh Hasina Wazed in January 2010 to India, after years of disappointment and arguments, a fresh impetus

²¹⁷ Davinder K. Madaan, *Indo-Bangladesh Economic Relations and SAARC* (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications. 1998), 70.

²¹⁸ M. Kabir Hassan, "Trade Relations with SAARC Countries and Trade Policies of Bangladesh," *Journal of Economic Cooperation*, Vol. 21 (3) (2000): 110.

²¹⁹ Davinder K. Madaan, *Indo-Bangladesh*, 72.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, 73.

²²¹ CUTS International Report, "India-Bangladesh Trade Potentiality: An Assessment of Trade Facilitation Issues," Jaipur: MS Printer, 2014, 5.

was given to India-Bangladesh bilateral economic ties. In January 2010, for establishing the border *haats* (place established on the border of both the countries which is opened once a week and is used for meeting of divided families and goods trade) a joint communique was initiated between the two countries. The *haats*, are important in generating people to people contact and is an domestic level influence generating strategy by the Indians,²²² however, an agreement on border *haats* was signed on 23rd October 2010. The impact of the visit in turn created a congenial business atmosphere which is evident from the fact that Bangladeshi exports augmented towards India by 56 percent during the initial three quarters (10 months) of 2010-2011. India's export for the same year was US \$ 3.2 billion against US \$ 2.4 billion in the previous financial year, and marking a 33 percent increase.²²³ Thus, it is obvious that after 2010, there are enough influence generating references created through narrative building and employment of internal and external foreign policy tools, which India has employed in its relations with Bangladesh to achieve its hegemonic designs.²²⁴

During September 2011 a visit to Dhaka was conducted by the Indian PM Manmohan Singh during the visit, it was announced that 46 textile items will have duty free access to and from India and vice versa. This was not taken in good taste by Bangladesh, as she had been pressing India to get a duty waiver on 61 products.²²⁵ After the general elections in India in May 2014 Narendra Modi ascended to power in India. The most significant milestone towards the betterment of India-Bangladesh ties was set by the June 2015 visit of Indian PM Narendra Modi to Bangladesh, a plethora of agreements concerning trade and investment were finalised. Interestingly, we can locate plenitude of Indian influence and its implications in it, in this regard, the economic aid of US \$ 2 billion assumes supreme importance.²²⁶

New Delhi took several steps to develop the trade and commercial ties with Bangladesh through institutional arrangement. As part of concessions under the SAARC

²²² IDSA Scholars, "India-Bangladesh Relations: Towards Convergence," *Task Force Report*, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, IDSA, New Delhi. September 2011, 47. https://idsa.in/system/files/book/book_indiabangrelations_0.pdf.

²²³ IDSA Scholars, "India-Bangladesh Relations: Towards Convergence, 48.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, 49.

²²⁵ Sabir Mustafa, "Indian PM Singh Ends Bangladesh Trip without Key Deals," *BBC News*. September 06, 2011. accessed July 26, 2018. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-14799350>.

²²⁶ CUTS International Report, "India-Bangladesh Trade Potentiality: An Assessment of Trade Facilitation Issues," Jaipur: MS Printer, 2014, 7.

framework, South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) and South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), India has given a liberal package to Bangladesh, which includes duty free access, quota free access on all items excluding tobacco and alcohol.²²⁷ It is evident, that India-Bangladesh trade relations has taken a positive turn, especially with the visit of Indian PM Modi yet there remain some key challenges that can be a hurdle when it comes to the betterment of their bilateral trade relations.²²⁸

Despite geographical proximity, India-Bangladesh economic integration is faced by multidimensional and multifarious challenges, it is estimated that Bangladesh's bilateral trade deficit with India has tremendously increased and can be termed as an annual increase of 9.5 percent. Huge trade gap in the favour of India has resulted into a visible Political discontentment in Bangladesh, this is supported by the fact that India imposed nontrade barriers on the exports of Bangladesh. Despite healthy growth rate of Bangladeshi exports, the reduction of trade gap cannot be achieved anytime soon.²²⁹ Further, Indian concessions under the SAPTA have made little impact and have not resulted in expected gains.²³⁰

The most primary problem about trade in India-Bangladesh relations is the huge trade imbalance between the two countries. Bangladesh has been asking India to address the growing trade gap between the two countries which has been hovering at around US \$ 1 billion in favour of India. In 2012-2013, official trade between India-Bangladesh was of US \$ 5.1 billion with the trade deficit of US \$ 4.5 billion. The total volume of bilateral trade in the financial years 2013-14 was US \$ 6.6 billion which in 2014-15 was US \$ 7 billion. While for the 2015-2016 (April to November), the total volume of trade stood at US \$ 4.1 billion. However, the trade deficit for the financial years 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16 (April to November) are US \$ 5.6 billion, US \$ 5.8 billion and US \$ 3.2 billion respectively.²³¹

²²⁷ Muzammil Ahad, *Regional Cooperation in South Asia: A Study on India's Role in SAARC* (Dehli: Kalpaz, 2018), 29.

²²⁸ Smruti S. Pattanaik, "Notun Projonmo-Nayi Disha in India-Bangladesh Relations," *Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses*, New Delhi, June 07, 2015, https://idsa.in/idsacomments/NotunProjonmoNayiDishainIndiaBangladeshRelations_sspattanaik_110615.

²²⁹ Piyali Dutta, *India-Bangladesh*, 1.

²³⁰ Deb Mukharji, *Distant Neighbours*, 565.

²³¹ Sanjay Kathuria, *A Glass Half Full: The Promise of Regional Trade in South Asia* (Washington DC: World Bank Group, 2018), 68.

India-Bangladesh trade relationship is overwhelmingly in favour of India, and the gap has steadily widened as India's exports have increased faster than its imports. Huge trade deficit of Bangladesh with India has become not only an economic issue but a political issue too.²³² The issue of trade deficit has created resentment and fans the perceived fear that Bangladesh is dominated by India in the minds of many Bangladeshis. This has led to the generation of general perception in Bangladesh that India desires to restrict Indian markets from Bangladeshi products.

An extended, long, porous border exists between India and Bangladesh, which resultantly gives a natural ground for the rise to informal trade which is carried out through the porous border which exists between India and Bangladesh thus further compounding trade deficit.²³³ Informal trade is a major hurdle and a serious concern when it comes to India-Bangladesh trade relations. There are two important aspects of informal trade its size and nature. The volumes, in terms of the informal trade between India and Bangladesh are however quite significant.²³⁴ Bangladesh to India, unofficial imports are dominated by, electronic goods, synthetic yarn and spices.²³⁵ Other issues are intertwined with trade deficit, like transshipment, export of natural gas and transit.²³⁶

Transshipment through Bangladesh is expected to benefit India by cutting the distance between India's mainland and the northeast, thus facilitating the transport of goods. These goods can also be exported through Chittagong port. This will also bring in significant amount of revenue to Bangladesh as port fee.²³⁷ Trade and transit facilities interest both India and Bangladesh and are essential for their economic development, hurdles to the granting of these facilities are political. India considers that its security and political agencies felt that allowing transit facilities to Bangladesh through their territory to Bhutan and Nepal would only increase the problems that India already faced in terms of illegal migration and security threats.²³⁸

²³² H. U. Rashid, *Relations: Living*, 191.

²³³ Piyali Dutta, *India-Bangladesh*, 2.

²³⁴ Anand Kumar, *Trade: Problems*, 116.

²³⁵ De, Prabir and B. Ghosh, "Reassessing Transaction Costs of Trade at the India-Bangladesh Border," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 43 (29) (2008): 72.

²³⁶ Loknath Acharya, and Marwaha Ashima, "India-Bangladesh Economic Relations," *Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry*, (2012): 27.

²³⁷ Anand Kumar, *Trade: Problems*, 115.

²³⁸ J. N. Dixit, *Liberation and Beyond*, 253.

2.3 India-Bangladesh Partnership: Implications for Pakistan

Pakistan being a major regional player and a nuclear state needs to realize these growing ties between India and Bangladesh and should play its part to reduce the Indian influence that had witnessed the negative fallout for Pakistan. Pakistan needs to revamp its foreign policy measures through miscellaneous measures, like eliminating the grass root level hindrances between the Pakistan and Bangladesh, analysing the challenges for Pakistan in maintaining good bilateral relations with Bangladesh to ward off Indian hegemonic designs, finding possibilities of people to people contact in improving bilateral relations. Pakistan must address the outstanding issues related to Bangladesh like, stranded Pakistani's and asset sharing issues. Secondly, Indian desire to reduce Pakistani influence in SAARC countries and Indian strategy of causing disadvantage to Pakistan from SAARC and economically integrating the region without Pakistan is a big concern for Pakistan. Pakistan could use means to develop a sustainable growth path for its economy and the same can be used by Pakistan to engage South Asian countries in projects like China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), by doing this Pakistan can counter Indian hegemonic designs. Actively pursuing Bangladesh will have and engaging it through the influence of Chinese economy, will make way for bettering Pakistan-Bangladesh relations, thus will have same effects on India as Pakistan is facing in Afghanistan.

Using strategic partner China by Pakistan as a bait for improving relations with Bangladesh. For instance, Bangladesh will be receiving two submarines from China at the cost of US \$ 203 million, an outcome of the visit of Chinese President to Dhaka in October 2016. Creation of Bay of Bengal initiative for multi sectoral technical and economic cooperation (BIMSTEC), thus scuttling 19th SAARC summit (planned to be held in Islamabad during the mid of November 2016), has been its major milestones. India is extremely unhappy with One Belt One Road (OBOR) / Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for which CPEC is an integral part, and houses huge potential for engaging Bangladesh. US \$ 26 billion Chinese economic and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) engagement with Bangladesh opposes Indian regional ambitions, summarized as "Modi's Look East Policy". This competition however is largely in Chinese favour, China is cautious and has shown its concern to Bangladesh government against growing Indian influence in Bangladesh recently. Bangladesh, with a population of 160 million

has achieved 7-8 percent growth in recent times. The country will also be eligible to graduate to developing status from its Least Developed Country status by 2024. Bangladesh has leaped forward because of its pivotal geographic location, and the country's ability to effectively leverage its location, allowing Chinese interests to progress and managing India's desire to protect its influence. This approach packs both economic and security advantages.

CHAPTER-3

PAKISTAN-BANGLADESH RELATIONS: HOSTAGE TO HISTORY

This chapter focuses on Pakistan-Bangladesh relations after 1971, the measures taken by various Pakistani governments to reach out to Bangladesh for cordial relations have been highlighted, but Indian built narrative through employment of discourses and influence generated on Bangladesh are reasons for sour relations. Due to several reasons Pakistan's relations with several countries of SAARC, do not get proper attention at home and abroad. Besides, politico diplomatic establishment and academic community, national and international media too do not give due importance to Pakistan's relations with SAARC countries less India. However, discussion of Pakistan-Bangladesh relations in the media is often prompted by some unhappy and negative developments.

Pakistan's relations with Bangladesh are important, after an in-depth analysis, it is ascertained that Pakistan-Bangladesh relations suggest that there exists a large amount of goodwill for each other among the people on either side which could possibly be used to develop a multifaceted and mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries. The regional and international issues of mutual interests / areas of convergence between Pakistan and Bangladesh can be viewed in different aspects for instance, the voting pattern or voted side in the UN and other forums are same of Pakistan and Bangladesh as both are developing countries, both countries support the candidature of either countries on various international forums and bodies.

In regional context it is pertinent to highlight the Bangladesh-India relations have remained comfortable due to the present regimes, their mutual relations had not always been like this or are destined to remain so and there exist possibilities that relations will be strained as soon as the change of regime takes place within Bangladesh. There is huge potential on strengthening Pakistan-Bangladesh ties, patience and perseverance is the way forward, where India has an advantage of being a neighbour to Bangladesh, it is simultaneously its biggest disadvantage and there exists huge percentage within Bangladesh which has anti Indian sentiments. Once viewed in regional context for

Bengalis, Pakistanis are at number three position when it comes to hating, India is at the top and Sri Lanka is at number two.

Pakistan and Bangladesh signed an agreement on culture in 1979 which provides for cooperation in the fields of culture, arts, archaeology, archives, sports, education and broadcasting. In pursuance of the agreement, cultural exchange programmes were drawn and implemented. In 1989, Pakistan was Bangladesh's second largest trading partner after the USA. Bilateral trade between the two countries has hovered around US \$ 750 million with the balance in Pakistan's favour. In 2015 and 2016, Pakistan's exports to Bangladesh totalled to US \$ 694 million while imports were US \$ 50 million.

Under special assistance program for South Asian countries (SAP-SA), an amount of rupees 10 million is spent by Pakistan every year on various assistance projects in Bangladesh. Three bilateral MOUs were signed in 1991, 1992 and 1994 which encompass training, cooperation and sale of military equipment. Bangladesh is the largest recipient of gratis training in Pakistan, till 2018, Bangladesh armed forces have availed about 1723 vacancies in military institutions of Pakistan. Economic area of engagement included participation of Pakistani exhibitors in the Dhaka International Trade Fair in January 2016. There also exist a number of trade promotion agreements, the bilateral Joint Economic Commission (JEC) has held eight meetings so far. The MOU on cooperation in tourism between Pakistan and Bangladesh was signed in February 2006. However, there are limited number of visitors to each other countries and therefore, modest in people to people exchange.

The absence of major conflict, in post 1971 period, between the two seems to validate the contention, however, past almost five decades of history provide a bleak picture. Ever since 1971, Bangladesh has been constantly raising three key issues; firstly, offer of an unconditional apology for the crime committed by Pakistan army against the innocent East Pakistani citizens; secondly, provide Bangladesh its due share in assets; and thirdly, take back Pakistani citizens stranded in Bangladesh. Despite several high-profile meetings and assurances, Pakistan could not resolve these issues to the satisfaction of Bangladesh. Better assimilation and comprehending the nitty gritty of

this relationship, it's necessary to understand and investigate the history and various important developments after Bangladesh's emergence in 1971.²³⁹

Bangladesh's relationship with Pakistan during the regimes of Zia ur Rahman, Ershad and Khaleda reflected the influence of a wide variety of stimuli, ranging from unique, catalytic events, to pervasive, long term effects, such as those deriving from colonial domination. In resolving the multiplicity of pressures which have impinged on Bangladeshi foreign policy, three perspectives were applied: general, regional and domestic. This approach was used to counter the considerable bias in the contemporary and secondary sources and to appraise the common view that Bangladesh's foreign relations and the difficulties experienced in the course of pursuing those relationships were shaped largely by Bangladesh's inherent political and economic instability. The study of Bangladesh's most significant relationships, show that they have a much broader and more intricate foundation than one which rest on stereotypical notions such as Bangladesh's inability to establish a stable regime for long; its national chauvinism; its anti-Indianism; its disruptive role in South Asia's northeast; or its heavy dependency on foreign aid.

Many other pressures, apart from Bangladesh's domestic problems, have been identified as playing influential roles in Bangladesh's relations with India and Pakistan. While no single ingredient can be isolated as being the main determinant for the conduct of Bangladeshi foreign relations, the evidence presented suggests that it is possible to place the most prominent causal pressures within a loose hierarchy. At the broadest level, Bangladesh's foreign policy is considered to be most influenced by pressures emanating from within the South Asian region. Indian influence dominates these pressures, such pressures have been consistently the most influential in shaping Bangladesh's foreign policy. Bangladesh's domestic realm has been placed second in the hierarchy; with the extra regional arena considered to have had the least influence of the three. While the pressures exerted by the regional machinations of the superpowers and Bangladesh's aid donors have played a part in determining the character of Bangladeshi foreign policy. The ending of the war on terrorism has not

²³⁹ "Why Pakistan Cannot Say Sorry to Bangladesh," *Dhaka Tribune*, April 27, 2018, <https://www.dhakatribune.com/opinion/2018/04/26/pakistan-cannot-say-sorry-bangladesh>.

precipitated a reduction in South Asian tension nor an improvement in Bangladesh's relations with Pakistan.

India-Pakistani rivalry, reinforced by the ongoing territorial dispute over Kashmir, and Indian interference within Pakistan through Afghanistan, has been a feature endemic to the South Asian region, pervading all South Asian interstate relationships. India's treatment of Bangladesh has not been coloured by this rivalry, but to the same extent India has influenced Bangladesh's relations with Pakistan, instilling relations between the latter parties with comparative coldness and instability. India-Pakistani rivalry has therefore been considered as the most influential category of pressures to affect Bangladesh-Pakistan relations. While comparatively cordial, Bangladesh's relations with Pakistan can be based on shared insecurities, from India, and the same can be exploited by Pakistan.

More than 180,000 Bihari's have been repatriated to Pakistan, the remaining are facing persecution, and undergoing extreme amount of issues and problems. Problems faced by Bihari's are unprecedented as Bangladesh government is treating Bihari's as sons of lesser God, Sheikh Hasina is of the opinion that the Bihari's are unacceptable to Bangladesh, which is against the 2008 rulings of Supreme court of Bangladesh, which gives Bangladeshi citizenship to all Bihari's. There is slump rather negativity in Pakistan-Bangladesh relations due to historical legacy, negative and hostile attitude of Hasina Wazed, meagre trade and commerce, lack of connectivity, Indian clout in Bangladesh, indifferent behaviour of both the countries to seek betterment in their ties and Bangladesh commercial dependency over India.

There is polarisation in Bangladesh society, Pakistan being a democratic state cannot interfere in the domestic politics and affairs of any country. However, the decade long tenure of Awami League at the helm of affairs in Bangladesh had adversely effected Pakistan-Bangladesh relations. Pakistan should engage the rulers of Bangladesh may it be of any political ideology, to develop a relationship on mutual respect, it may take engagement of mutual friendly countries. Khaleda Zia has suffered immensely by boycotting 2014 elections and BNP is not likely to commit the same mistake ever in future again. Khaleda being jailed in 2018 on corruption charges have also adversely affected anti Indian lobby within Bangladesh. Dual policy of India is evident, as of late

Indians are planning to engage Khaleda Zia and BNP politicians for creating her as a formidable rival to Sheikh Hasina.

The rhetoric of fabricated narrative about 1971 atrocities by Pakistan and the creation of International Crimes Tribunal of 2009, is how Awami Leagues is neutralising its opponents, pro Pakistan circles and anti-Indian elements within Bangladesh. The Bangladesh government is vigorously pursuing trial of so called war crimes committed during 1971 which cast a shadow on bilateral ties. The International War Crimes Tribunal (ICT) has so far delivered 26 judgments resulting in execution of members from Jamaat-e-Islami and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Trials are always held by treaties between two countries, UN resolution or agreement with UN. Bangladesh did not enjoy such facilities and passed unilateral legislation to try those alleged people after 45 years whose names were not brought in 1972.

Pakistan recognized Bangladesh in 1974, established diplomatic relations, worked for progress, developed and established friendly relations and signed Tripartite agreement in which it was decided not to proceed with the trials as an act of clemency, according to para 13 of Tripartite agreement, Prime Minister of Bangladesh stated to forget the atrocities of 1971 and move forward. 195 x Pakistanis labelled as collaborators and war criminals by Bangladesh government were repatriated to Pakistan as a result of Tripartite agreement. Lot of amendments were made in International Crimes Tribunal-2009 in 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 to try the desired people as per intended motives. Indemnity order of 1973 could not protect the Bangladesh national's fundamental constitutional right and demand of right of appeal were also abrogated.

Levelling war crimes against pro Pakistani elements particularly Jamaat-e-Islami activists after 45 years and hanging of Abdul Quader Molla along with few others reopened the wounds and was clear violation of tripartite agreement of 1974. Resolution and condemnation by Parliament of Pakistan against hanging of Abdul Quader Molla was considered as an interference in internal affairs by Awami League government which provided a chance to the hardliners to turn the tide. Hangings were politically motivated to fulfil Awami League election manifesto and please the Indian government. There were procedural flaws that is why various international Human Right organisations asked Bangladesh government to stop the violence in the name of trial. Since the beginning of the trials, several Human Rights organisations such as Human

Rights Watch and Amnesty International have raised their objections to the proceedings of the court. The UN and the EU along with many countries have also criticized the tribunal, Bangladesh war tribunal was named as international but there was no international signature involved in it. In 2009 Bangladesh government asked for technical assistance for the tribunal which was refused by UN and all other international organisations as the facts brought after 45 years were fabricated. Uninterrupted and transparent right was not provided to the accused to defend themselves in the courts.

During the process of the trial, state ministers were issuing hostile and provoking statements against the accused to influence the courts. Judges and lawyers were very close associates of the liberation movement / Mukti Bahini and to Awami League, thus were having biased view point. There was lot of political interference in the trial process. It was visible that decision of the trial is already taken and conduct of trial is just a formality. There was no option available to the accused to challenge the composition of the court. Life threats were given to the councils of Abdul Quader Molla. Punishments already given by the courts to the accused were converted into death penalties. The evidences were removed and trials were conducted on hearsay, that was not an independent prosecution rather had personal interests and agenda. Trials were very fast with quick execution to drum up political support. UN human rights commission questioned the retrial of the accused being fundamentally flawed.

The domestic preoccupations of the Pakistan and Bangladesh governments have also been of considerable influence on relations, but domestic irritants have not been sufficient to sour relations irreparably. Pakistan's domestic problems have been somewhat more influential in impeding relations than have those of Bangladesh. The lack of progress in relations in the twenty first century represented a prime example of how Pakistan's domestic difficulties could impinge on the relationship. Sheikh Hasina's regime, beset by the tasks of quelling ethnic violence and holding on to power, had little hesitation in sacrificing relations with Pakistan in the interests of making India happy. The Bangladesh government's embryonic, somewhat naive, efforts to pursue a mediatory role in South Asia and to take a generally more independent stance were looked upon by neighbours with suspicion rather than respect. The Bangladesh leadership also failed to explore fresh diplomatic avenues, tending instead to harp almost reflexively on time worn disputes between the two states. Personalities, rather

than compatible regimes, also played an integral role in the course of Bangladesh–Pakistan relations. Forceful leadership held considerable personal sway over foreign policy, the effects of Bhutto’s response to Mujib’s assassination, and Musharraf’s goodwill represented a typical example. At the same time, the abrupt removal of such influential individuals from positions of power did not negate the stabilising and unifying effects of a mutual fear of Indian regional dominance.

3.1 Secession of East Pakistan

Comprehension, realisation of issues and difficulties faced by East Pakistani’s and lack of distribution of due share to the brothers of East Pakistan by the West Pakistani ruling elite had resulted in the parting of ways between the two halves of Pakistan.²⁴⁰ This happened within twenty five years from the emergence of Pakistan. The birth of Bangladesh was unique in the sense that international relations history does not have an earlier example of this kind, where possibly as an only instance, a numerical majority, waged a successful armed struggle against West Pakistan,²⁴¹ this only happened because of the Indian narrative and employment of internal and external factors as explained in Neo Classical Realism.

After an in-depth analysis of the events, fall of Dhaka, blame can be put on the policies of West Pakistani rulers towards East Pakistan, and the negative role of India of first creating a rift between both the wings of Pakistan and then exploiting the differences and in the end pushing for the secession of East Pakistan, can never be forgotten. The *Maha Baharat* theory²⁴² of undivided India, died with the creation of Pakistan in 1947, and Indians were never comfortable with it, hence since 1947 India started off with its nefarious designs against the United Pakistan. Indian propaganda to cover its own misdoings in East Pakistan and propagating its narrative that it was the inadequacy of religion to forge a long lasting unity between the two wings, is a myth which is no more a secret,²⁴³ it is now an open secret that it was an Indian conspiracy behind the birth of Bangladesh and has been busted.²⁴⁴ It was elements from India, which soon after 14th

²⁴⁰ M. J. Akbar, *Tinderbox: The Past and Future of Pakistan* (Noida: Harper Collins Publishers, 2012), 312.

²⁴¹ Ayesha Jalal, *The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics* (London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), 6.

²⁴² Ahmed Abdulla, *Pakistan and Its People*. 45.

²⁴³ Javed Jabbar, *Pakistan: Identity and Destiny* (New Delhi, Har-Anand, 2012), 82.

²⁴⁴ Ayesha Jalal, *Pakistan: A Muslim*, 6.

August 1947, began to stoke sentiments among the people of East Pakistan with baseless propaganda, versus the people of West Pakistan. Barring a few exceptions, many in India are persistent on their narrative, and declare the succession of Bangladesh as incoherent national ideology,²⁴⁵ lately a book name *Dead Reckoning* from an Indian based Bengali writer Sarmila Bose, gives the best and unbiased account ever written on the succession of Pakistan's Eastern Wing.

It was the selfless leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and the leaders of the Pakistan movement who based their stance of Hindu / Muslim community differences, on which Two Nation Theory was formulated thus demanded and got an independent country for the Muslims of South Asia. It was not the Muslims who won Pakistan, the Muslims with their souls, blood, hands and feet made tireless efforts for the creation of Pakistan and voted against staying in India.²⁴⁶ Islam and Two Nation Theory gave Pakistan a unique identity and ideology through which the nation building project was taken up and completed. However, owing to Indian designs and interference coupled with the insensitivities of few rulers from West Pakistan, the Two Nation Theory faced a major blow. The Indian propaganda and narrative about the two wings were, that between East and West Pakistan, there were only three common things and they were Islam, English language, and Pakistan International Airlines (PIA). Indian media, and pro Indian politicians of Bangladesh even today make fun by cracking jokes that, the PIA connection was the strongest among the three common things Islam, English language, and PIA.²⁴⁷

The unfortunate aspect other than the Indian influence was the West Pakistani politico security elite, which came to dominate the state of Pakistan soon after 1947, never ever considered Bengalis equal partner and ridiculed them as weak and un-martial. Due to irrational attitude and prejudiced strategies of West Pakistani elite, towards the brothers of East Pakistan, the ethno-linguistic and cultural variances and minor differences, when not addressed turned into genuine politico-economic grievances. Thus, with the passage of time these unaddressed grievances alienated East Pakistan from West Pakistan and former came to believe that the latter is using it as its colony. The situation

²⁴⁵ Javed Jabbar, *Pakistan: Identity*, 83.

²⁴⁶ K. K. Aziz, *The Murder of History: A Critique of History Textbooks used in Pakistan* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2013), 2.

²⁴⁷ Mani Shankar Aiyar, *Pakistan Papers* (New Delhi: UBS Publishers Distributors Ltd, 1994), 98.

got complicated after the result of 1970 general elections when Mujib turned out to be victorious. The election results confirmed a wide gap between both the wings of Pakistan. Out of a total 313 seats (300 general seats, plus 13 uncontested reserved seats for women), Mujib led Awami League got 167 (160 general seats, plus 7 uncontested reserved seats for women) while Bhutto led PPP secured 85 seats (81 general seats, plus 4 uncontested reserved seats for women). Usually looking into these figures, one would logically assume that Awami League won a landslide victory and was entitled to rule over Pakistan.²⁴⁸

A close look into the matter made it amply clear that Mujib won 160 / 162 directly contested seats in the Eastern part of Pakistan, while PPP won 81 / 138 directly contested seats in the Western part of Pakistan. Both the parties could not open their account in the other wing meaning that PPP did not get a single seat in the Eastern part of Pakistan and Awami League could not open its account in the Western part of Pakistan. In a parliamentary system, numbers matter the most and, in this case, Awami League had the required numbers with itself.²⁴⁹ However, the politico-security establishment did not want to hand over power to a Bengali. Military regime of Yahya Khan deliberately delayed the process by not inviting Mujib to form the next government which brought Bengalis on the streets for protest and demonstrations. Talks after talks failed to resolve the deadlock and Yahya Khan ordered a military crackdown on the protesting Bengalis in East Pakistan.²⁵⁰ The details of 1971 events and the secession of East Pakistan, have been discussed in chapter number one.

3.2 Initial Contacts and Mutual Recognition

Given the brutal violence and bloodshed which preceded the creation of Bangladesh, it was not easy for Pakistan and Bangladesh to normalise their relationship. For Pakistan, the loss of half of the territory and population was like a trauma that posed a big question mark on its national identity and ideology. Bangladesh too was in no position to forget the sufferings easily. However, as the popular saying goes that life doesn't stop, so both the countries had to move on. The problem was that

²⁴⁸ Kamal Matin Ud Din, *Tragedy of Errors*, 54.

²⁴⁹ Gary J. Bass, *The Blood Telegram: India's Secret War in East Pakistan* (Noida: Random House, 2013), 137.

²⁵⁰ Omar Noman, *Pakistan*, 77.

the two leaders, Bhutto and Mujib set conditions for talking to each other. Mujib ruled out any discussion with Bhutto until Pakistan recognised Bangladesh, while the latter linked the recognition of Bangladesh with the resolution of all major issues, especially the repatriation of POWs. Succeeding paragraphs will discuss the, complicated mutual issues between Pakistan and Bangladesh, Simla accord and its effects, complexities of mutual recognition and UN membership of Bangladesh.

The most complicated issues, immediately after the end of 1971 war, were; firstly, the hindrances involved in the Bangladesh recognition. Secondly, 90,000 POWs of Pakistan were with India, how to get them repatriated. Thirdly, Bangladesh wanted a share in the assets from Pakistan. Fourthly, repatriation of Pakistanis, commonly referred as Bihari's, stranded in Bangladesh, and fifthly, repatriation of Bengalis from Pakistan to Bangladesh.²⁵¹

These issues were not easy to resolve, Bangladesh wanted to try at least 195 POWs on charges of genocide while Pakistan wanted all the POWs back as soon as possible. As per Geneva convention of 1949, POWs were required to be released unconditionally soon after the cessation of hostilities.²⁵² Meanwhile Bangladesh in August 1972 moved an application to the United Nations (UN) for membership which was vetoed by China on behalf of Pakistan. Pakistan wanted all issues to be resolved before settling the issue of recognition, Bangladesh too was in no mood to be soft on the issues. With the passage of time, international pressure grew on India to resolve the POWs and other issues that came to the fore because of the 1971 war with Pakistan.

In July 1972, Pakistan signed an agreement with India, which is commonly known as Simla Accord, the agreement paved the way forward and a set of mutually agreed guiding principles were decided upon, which were to be followed by both countries in their future relationship. However, there was no agreement over the repatriation of POWs to Pakistan, as India on Bangladesh's insistence, linked the issue with the recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan. Later India persuaded Bangladesh to de-link the repatriation and recognition issue. on 17th April 1973, Bangladeshi foreign minister visited India, there was a mutual announcement, which set the stage for repatriation of

²⁵¹ Farzana Shakoor, "Pakistan-Bangladesh Relations-A Survey," *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 42, No. 2, (1989), 109-10.

²⁵² Farzana Shakoor, *Relations-A Survey*, 111.

all POWs, except 195 POWs detained by Bangladesh for trial, and stranded Pakistanis in Bangladesh to Pakistan and detained Bangladeshis in Pakistan to Bangladesh.²⁵³ This joint declaration was followed by a formal agreement between India and Pakistan in New Delhi on 28th August 1973 which devised a three way repatriation scheme.²⁵⁴

The agenda points of required agreement were, firstly, repatriation of all POWs, except 195 held by Bangladesh for trial, and civil internees held in India to Pakistan. Secondly, repatriation of all Bengalis in Pakistan to Bangladesh. Thirdly, repatriation of all non-Bengalis, who opted for Pakistan, stranded in Bangladesh to Pakistan.²⁵⁵ Pakistan, however, agreed to take only four categories of Pakistanis, firstly, persons of West Pakistan domicile. Secondly, central government employees and their family irrespective of their domicile. Thirdly, members of families living on either side of the border and are divided irrespective of their domicile and fourthly, and some hardship cases.²⁵⁶

The question of recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan could not be resolved even after this agreement because the former wanted to try 195 POWs on the charges of war crime, but the latter wanted all of them back unhurt before settling the recognition question. With Bangladesh's continued insistence to try 195 POWs, Bhutto got infuriated and at one point of time even threatened to try Bengalis held in Pakistan.²⁵⁷ To make Bangladesh believe that he was serious, Bhutto decided to detain 203 Bengalis against the 195 soldiers held by Bangladesh. The hardening of positions and tough statements from both sides did not produce any tangible result. Finally, a visible change was noticed in Pakistan's attitude in early 1974 which later led to a thaw in the relationship. In February 1974, Pakistan was to host International Islamic Summit and Bangladesh being a Muslim country was supposed to be invited.²⁵⁸ In late January 1974, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, while addressing a public meeting in Sukkur, stated that, when we have invited Muslims from all corners of the world, how can we keep our door closed to seven crore Muslims of Bangladesh who lived with us for 26 years, as our Eastern Wing, with this he extended an informal invitation to Mujib. Initially there

²⁵³ Farzana Shakoor, *Relations-A Survey*, 113.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 115.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 117.

²⁵⁶ Farzana Shakoor, *Relations-A Survey*, 118.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 120.

²⁵⁸ Amir Mir, "Dhaka's decision on trials in absentia to affect ties with Pakistan," *Daily Times*, Lahore, December 16, 2014.

was no enthusiasm on the part of Bangladesh but Shaikh Sabah who was doing as the Kuwait's foreign minister, who led a seven member delegation to Bangladesh, persuaded Mujib to participate in the summit. Possibly, the Kuwaiti foreign minister conveyed Bhutto's message of recognising Bangladesh on the occasion which changed Mujib's mind.²⁵⁹ Bhutto used the occasion of summit to officially recognise Bangladesh. In return, Bangladesh accepted Pakistan's demand, not to pursue the trial related to 195 POWs, however Pakistan accepted Bangladesh's plea to take back all non-Bengalis stranded in Bangladesh, this included the four different types of Pakistanis which were not of Pakistani decent. Therefore, the arbitration of International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) working in Bangladesh was able to repatriate some stranded Pakistanis (between 1973 to April 1974), around 170,000 Bihari's to Pakistan.²⁶⁰

On 10th June 1974, finally as an aftermath to the OIC meeting, Pakistan and Bangladesh recognised each other, which paved the way forward to UN opening its membership for Bangladesh, as the same was vetoed by China in the UN. During the month of June 1974, Bhutto also visited Dhaka and even went to Bangladesh national memorial. In his first visit to independent Bangladesh, he held discussions with Mujib on a range of issues which resulted in signing of two agreements to resume trade relations and stop hostile propaganda against each other. He later argued that while demanding a share in assets, Bangladesh was not interested in liabilities. On the question of repatriation, Bhutto was of the view that since Bihari's, as the stranded Pakistanis in Bangladesh are called, had originally migrated to East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, why should Pakistan take them back.²⁶¹ Despite mutual recognition in February 1974, Mujib's tough stand on some of the complicated issues and Pakistan's insistence to resolve those issues on its own terms did not allow the two countries to overcome the trauma of 1971 and develop a healthy relationship. Since Mujib had linked the division of assets and repatriation of Bihari's with establishing formal diplomatic relations, the two countries could not move forward to establish resident diplomatic missions. Mujib tried hard

²⁵⁹ Farzana Shakoor, *Pakistan-Bangladesh*, 123.

²⁶⁰ Shahnawaz A. Mantoo, *Bihari Refugees Stranded in Bangladesh Since 1971* (Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2013), 123-124.

²⁶¹ Shahnawaz A. Mantoo, *Bihari Refugees*, 126.

diplomatically and raised the issue at various international fora, including UN and Commonwealth, to push Pakistan but with no success.²⁶²

On 15th August 1975, complete family except two daughters of Sheikh Mujib were assassinated, Sheikh Hasina along with her sister Rehana were the only survivors. The military coup, conducted by junior officers, brought Khundkar Moshtaq to power. Islamabad without any delay recognised the military regime and PM Bhutto dispatched, as a friendly gesture, 50,000 tons of rice for the brotherly people of Bangladesh.²⁶³ Pakistan friendly gesture included, rice and cloth, the cloth was measuring approximately 16 million yards and the quantity of rice was almost 60 thousand tons. President Khundkar Moshtaq appreciated Pakistan's goodwill gesture and expressed hope of normalisation of relations. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto even appealed to other Islamic countries to recognise the new government in Bangladesh. By October 1975 both countries agreed to establish diplomatic relations. The Moshtaq regime could not last long because the 3rd November 1975 coup was followed by a counter coup, on 7th November 1975 which elevated Zia ur Rahman to the presidency. Under the new military regime of Zia in Bangladesh, there was a new wave of friendly relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh, after the mutual recognition by the two countries, during the year of 1976, diplomatic ties were established, and Pakistan and Bangladesh established their embassies in either country in January 1976, with this the initial engagement between the two countries got institutionalised.²⁶⁴

3.3 General Zia ul Haq Regime: Normalisation of Relations

With the departure of Mujib and Bhutto from the scene, relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh improved.²⁶⁵ In August 1977, Tobarak Hussain, foreign secretary of Bangladesh, visited Pakistan and held discussions with Pakistani leaders over several important issues. There was a joint communique, mutually agreed and issued by both the countries, at the culmination of the visit, asserted that there is a need

²⁶² Shahnawaz A. Mantoo, *Bihari Refugees*, 145.

²⁶³ Syed Badrul Ahsan, "Pakistan's Bangladesh Problem," *bdnews24.com*, The Opinion Pages, December 14, 2014, <https://opinion.bdnews24.com/2014/12/14/pakistan's-bangladesh-problem/>.

²⁶⁴ P. B. Singh, "Dhaka-Pindi Relations and Ziaur Rahman's visit to Pakistan," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 1. No. 10, (1978), 13-18.

²⁶⁵ Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia ul-Haq* (Boulder: Westview Press; Lahore: Pak Book, 1991), 11.

for cooperation between the peoples of two brotherly countries.²⁶⁶ In December 1977, Bangladeshi President Zia ur Rahman visited Pakistan and held discussions, on several issues, with his Pakistani counterpart Fazal Illahi Chaudhry and CMLA General Zia ul Haq. During their discussion, leaders of the two countries emphasised the shared past and common religio-cultural linkages and agreed to strengthen brotherly relationship between Pakistan and Bangladesh. In their view strengthening of relationship between the two South Asian countries would significantly contribute to improving the peace and stability of the region. On the economic front, both parties agreed to increase overall trade volume. They also agreed to form a commission jointly, for the promotion of economy, trade, tariff and cooperation in the technological field.²⁶⁷ During the discussion a suggestion, from Pakistani side, came up regarding entering a loose confederation with Islam as a common link in which President Zia ur Rahman took no interest. There was no substantial progress on the contentious issues of asset distribution and return of Pakistanis stranded in Bangladesh back to Pakistan. The visit is a watershed in Pakistan-Bangladesh relations, as it paved the way for cooperation and engagement in multiple sectors such as trade, banking, shipping, telecommunication, air services etc. Later, showing some generosity, Pakistan gifted a 707 Boeing passenger aircraft, 28 railway carriages for passenger's, and 8,520 tons of cement to Bangladesh.²⁶⁸

The next important development was Bangladeshi foreign secretary's visit to Pakistan in July 1978 during which he pushed Pakistan on the repatriation issue, with active help from UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and financial assistance from Saudi Arabia and Libya, by September 1979, 2,800 more Bihari's were sent back to Pakistan.²⁶⁹ In May 1981, President Zia ur Rahman got assassinated, after his death, army supported a civilian regime for a while and later in March 1982, General Ershad imposed martial law.²⁷⁰ During Ershad's regime, relationship between Pakistan and Bangladesh improved for better, yet the contentious issues could not be resolved to the full satisfaction of Bangladesh.

²⁶⁶ M. H. Syed, *Encyclopaedia of SAARC*, 132.

²⁶⁷ C. M. Shafi Sami, "Pakistan-Bangladesh Relations in the Changing International Environment," (Pakistan Horizon, vol. 44, No. 4, 1991), 23-29.

²⁶⁸ Farzana Shakoor, *Pakistan-Bangladesh*, 129.

²⁶⁹ Shahnawaz A. Mantoo, *Bihari Refugees*, 128-29.

²⁷⁰ D. Chowdhury, *Bangladesh and the South Asian International System* (Dhaka: Academic Publishers, 1992), 301.

Defence collaboration between Pakistan and Bangladesh was at its peak during the eighties, as the realisation was common on the fact that India is a common enemy of Pakistan and Bangladesh. Personal equation of rulers of both countries inclined strategic collaboration and cooperation. In 1983, Pakistan gave a gift of almost two hundred F-6 fighter aircrafts, which were later used by Bangladesh Air force. During the 1988 floods of Bangladesh, these F-6's were destroyed, Bangladesh media showed the F-6's upside down in a pool of water and reported that most of the fighter jets were on the tarmac in front of flight operations and they never got a chance to move them and only a few were saved, now these aircrafts are placed in front of every major city and official building.²⁷¹

During the year of 1985, Pakistani President General Zia Ul Haq visited Bangladesh, and had a meeting with a delegation of Bihari's.²⁷² In July 1986, as part of an official visit to South Asian countries, General Ershad visited Islamabad and held discussions with General Zia ul Haq, at the end of the visit, agreements regarding trade and cultural exchanges were concluded. The two countries also signed a memorandum of understanding reciprocally exchanging plots in diplomatic areas in Islamabad and Dhaka so that a building could be constructed for the diplomatic mission of each country. In July 1986, General Zia ul Haq signed an agreement with a humanitarian organisation called Rabita Al Akan Al Islam (RAAI). Under the terms of this agreement later in July 1988 Rabita Trust Deed, with Zia ul Haq as chairman, was established. The trust had the responsibility of mobilising funds to repatriate around 250,000 Bihari's. The government of Pakistan and RAAI jointly donated rupees 300 million to the trust.

On 17th August 1988, General Zia ul Haq's was on a visit to Bahawalpur, on his return his plane crashed, resulting in the death of all the passengers, the plane crash was under shadowy circumstances, hence some are of the opinion that US CIA and Indian RAW was behind the elimination and assassination of Zia. However, with the death of Pakistani President in an air crash, and the lack of inclination of Bangladeshi

²⁷¹ R. S. N. Singh, *Asian strategic and military perspective* (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers & Distributors, 2005), 243.

²⁷² Z. Haider, "Repatriation of the Biharis Stranded in Bangladesh: Diplomacy and Development," *Asian Profile*, Vol. 31, No. 6, (2003), 534.

government towards Pakistan, the repatriation got postponed.²⁷³ Not to forget, that still there are so many Bengalis stranded in Pakistan, especially Karachi.²⁷⁴

Pakistan's relations with Bangladesh remained normal during the decade of nineties. Pakistan had the regimes of Benazir and Nawaz Sharif, both Nawaz Sharif and Benazir, during the democratic interlude, served twice as PM.²⁷⁵ The general elections on November 1988, were held in Pakistan in which Benazir Bhutto led PPP won against the *Islami Jamhoori Ittehad* (IJI), by securing 92 seats that went up to 108 after inclusion of elected members from tribal and minority seats and Benazir Bhutto assumed the office of the PM.²⁷⁶ In August 1989, Pakistan-Bangladesh economic commission met for the third time in Dhaka in which it was agreed that both the parties would work to widen and diversify their trade and economic relations. In October 1989 PM Benazir Bhutto visited Bangladesh. This visit was publicised as introducing a new period of friendly relations coupled with cooperation between Pakistan and Bangladesh. In official circles, it was maintained that Pakistan was very much willing to cooperate with Bangladesh in almost all areas.²⁷⁷ The two countries signed an agreement for cultural exchanges, this undoubtedly pleased many in Bangladesh.²⁷⁸ Benazir and her counter parts at Dhaka agreed to resettle Bihari's permanently in Bangladesh and agreed to secure financial assistance for the purpose through contributions by Pakistan and other Islamic countries.²⁷⁹

Benazir Bhutto, during her second term in office, visited Bangladesh in October 1993 to participate in a conference. On the side lines of the conference, Benazir met with her Bangladeshi counterpart Khaleda Zia and discussed various issues, which resulted into further softening of ties and development of friendlier relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh.

²⁷³ Wikipedia contributors, "Stranded Pakistanis in Bangladesh," *Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia*, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Stranded_Pakistanis_in_Bangladesh&oldid=879792164.

²⁷⁴ "The stateless Bangalis," *Dhaka Tribune*, June 12, 2017, <https://www.dhakatribune.com/around-the-web/2017/06/12/woes-bangalis-karachi>.

²⁷⁵ Feroz Hassan Khan, *Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb* (California: Stanford University Press, 2012), 227-228.

²⁷⁶ Benazir Bhutto, *Daughter of Destiny* (Noida: Harper Collins, 2009), 390.

²⁷⁷ "Benazir, Ershad for expansion of ties," *Dawn*, Karachi, October 2, 1989.

²⁷⁸ "Call for intensified cooperation," *Dawn*, Karachi, October 4, 1989.

²⁷⁹ Kathryn Jacques, *Bangladesh, India and Pakistan: International Relations and Regional Tensions in South Asia* (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 169-170.

Nawaz Sharif, during his first tenure in office, made some progress on the repatriation issue and constituted three committees to accelerate the process. Soon it was agreed that a symbolic repatriation would take place by December 1992 with a batch of 325 Bihari's coming back to settle permanently in Pakistan. In November 1991, the Muslim League urged world Muslims to fund the repatriation of Bihari's to Pakistan. In August 1992, Bangladeshi PM Khaleda Zia visited Pakistan on an official tour, talks were held between Khaleda and her Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif over a variety of issues including the repatriation of Bihari's, sharing of assets and liabilities. The joint statement issued by Pakistan and Bangladesh stated that the repatriation would begin soon, but dismissal of Nawaz Sharif government changed the situation and the issue was put into cold storage.²⁸⁰

During his second tenure in office, Nawaz Sharif in January 1998 visited Bangladesh to attend India-Bangladesh-Pakistan business summit.²⁸¹ Nawaz Sharif described the 1971 debacle, which led to the birth of Bangladesh, as a result of political injustice, and was welcomed in Bangladesh. During her meeting with Nawaz Sharif, Sheikh Hasina Wazed made it quite clear that the Bihari's were unacceptable to Bangladesh and her government could not support them indefinitely.²⁸²

3.4 Musharraf Regime: Improvement of Ties

When General Pervez Musharraf came to power in October 1999,²⁸³ 11th September 2001 terrorist attack brought Pakistan back into the focus of international attention. Under intense international pressure, Pervez Musharraf succumbed and decided that Pakistan will act as a frontline state to beat the terrorists, in war on terrorism being fought under the US umbrella.²⁸⁴

Musharraf gave priority to the relations with Bangladesh and visited Bangladesh in July 2002. In fact, Bangladeshi PM Khaleda Zia and Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf met each other in early 2002 during the SAARC summit held in Kathmandu.

²⁸⁰ Kathryn Jacques, *Bangladesh, India and Pakistan*, 171.

²⁸¹ Moonis Ahmar, *Pakistan and Bangladesh: From Conflict to Cooperation* (Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, 2003), 22.

²⁸² Moonis Ahmar, *Conflict to Cooperation*, 23.

²⁸³ Sanam Noor, "Outstanding Issues between Pakistan and Bangladesh," *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 58, No. 1, (2005): 47-60.

²⁸⁴ Sanam Noor, *Outstanding Issues*, 65.

In her interaction with the President, Khaleda Zia invited Musharraf to visit Bangladesh to which he agreed. The July 2002 visit was portrayed as highly successful because a chief of Pakistan army who was also a Pakistani President, voiced his concerns and regrets for 1971 events. Soon after landing in Dhaka, Musharraf went to national war memorial at Savar to pay homage to the national heroes of Bangladesh who died during the 1971 debacle.²⁸⁵

Bangladesh welcomed Musharraf's statement, PM Khaleda Zia thanked Musharraf for his candid expression and expressed hope that it would help mitigate the old wounds. Speaking to the reporters, Bangladeshi foreign minister Morshed Khan said that "We welcome what President Musharraf wrote in Savar and (said) at the banquet last night."²⁸⁶ Bangladeshi media welcomed President Musharraf statement, the two sides signed several trade agreements and a cultural exchange programme and agreed to hold regular foreign ministerial meetings. Pakistan, for its part, agreed to allowed Bangladeshi jute / tea without being charged for the customs duty, and the two parties also decided to extend the existing defence cooperation treaty.²⁸⁷ President Musharraf visit proved to be an important landmark in many ways.²⁸⁸ Firstly, Musharraf was the first head of state of Pakistan to visit Bangladesh. Although, he was not the first Pakistani leader to express regret for the events of 1971 but certainly was the one and only Chief of Army Staff who made such comments openly.²⁸⁹

In September 2003, Pakistan's foreign minister Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri, in his capacity of a special envoy of PM Mir Zafar Ullah Khan Jamali, visited Bangladesh to invite PM Khaleda Zia to the 12th SAARC summit. During the visit, Kasuri echoing the line of Musharraf expressed regret for the 1971 event. During the month of January 2004, PM Khaleda toured Pakistan, in connection with a conference of SAARC. During the course of the conference, meetings were held between the state heads, a momentum to improve Pakistan-Bangladesh relations was built during her interactions with

²⁸⁵ "Bangladesh welcomes Musharraf's apology", *Rediff*, July 31, 2002.

<http://m.rediff.com/news/2002/jul/30bang.htm>.

²⁸⁶ Sudha Ramachandran, "Bangladesh, Pakistan and the country in between," *Asia Times Online*, August 21, 2002, accessed March 13, 2018, <http://atimes.com/atimes/South Asia/DH21Df02>.

²⁸⁷ Sumit Mitra, "India Concerned at Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf's Overtures to Bangladesh," *India Today*, July 26, 2012, <https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/neighbours/pakistan/story/20020812-india-concerned-at-pakistan-president-pervez-musharraf-overtures-to-bangladesh-796507-2002-08-12>.

²⁸⁸ "Musharraf Wraps up Bangladesh Visit," *BBC News*, World, South Asia, July 31, 2002.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2163374.stm.

²⁸⁹ Amir Mir, "Dhaka's decision."

Pakistani leaders. These interactions paved the way for further cooperation in various fields.²⁹⁰

In February 2006, Khaleda Zia came to Pakistan on a state visit where she received a red carpet welcome. Instead of pushing to resolve the complicated political issues, both sides emphasised to improve economic ties between both the countries. In a remarkable development, both countries not only signed various agreements, which included four MOUs. These MOUs were related to cooperation in tourism, paving way forward for smooth conduct of trade, quality control and standardisation in the field of agriculture. An agreement was also reached on the finalisation of agreement through which free trade can be facilitated, by a date not later than 30th September 2006.²⁹¹ Speaking at the joint press conference Shaukat Aziz said that Pakistan wanted to benefit from Bangladesh's experience in a number of sectors including microfinance, population welfare, social sector, while it could help Bangladesh in sectors like information technology etc.²⁹²

3.5 Post Musharraf Developments

During 2008, Pakistan underwent the elections, post-election scenario forced General Pervez Musharraf to resign from the portfolio of President in August 2008. Domestically Pakistan was struggling hard to deal with the growing internal security challenges, while its foreign policy remained entangled with US led war on terrorism in the region. PPP government on Pakistan's side, made attempts to strengthen ties in the areas where cooperation was possible, however, as always there was meagre reciprocation from Bangladesh side.²⁹³ Succeeding paragraphs will discuss the, anti-Pakistan Awami League government (formation of international crimes tribunal, hanging of Abdul Quader Molla a revenge from Pakistan), and the developments on contentious issues.

In 2009, with two third majority in the parliament, Awami League government came into power in Bangladesh. Awami League government in Bangladesh is a pro Indian regime and hostilities towards Pakistan were nothing new. Awami League government

²⁹⁰ M. H. Syed, *Encyclopaedia of SAARC*, 240.

²⁹¹ Shahzad Raza, "Pakistan, Bangladesh sign 4 memoranda," *Daily Times*, Lahore, February 14, 2006.

²⁹² "Pakistan-Bangladesh Ties," *Dawn*, Karachi, February 15, 2006.

²⁹³ Amir Mir, "Dhaka's decision."

decided to set up international crimes tribunal to investigate and prosecute people who helped Pakistan military in suppressing the 1971 liberation movement. The tribunal, through an official gazette notification, came into being on 25th March 2010. It consisted of three judges with one chairman and two members, soon after the establishment of the tribunal, several top leaders of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (BJI) including Abdul Quader Molla were arrested. At the time of liberation war in 1971, Molla was an activist of *Jamaat-e-Islami* (JI) student wing. Molla is also blamed that his involvement is there in founding of Al-Badr militia and the false charges against him and propaganda by Awami League made him known as the butcher of Mirpur.²⁹⁴

To make her Indian masters happy, Sheikh Hasina started a trial which was bound to revive the memories of 1971 and ultimately strain ties with Pakistan. Sheikh Hasina's government intention to try 195 Pakistanis, who were given immunity and repatriated to Pakistan, led to the deterioration of ties with Pakistan.²⁹⁵ Islamabad argued that since the war crimes dispute between Pakistan and Bangladesh was settled long back, the Hasina government should not proceed with the trials. Contrary to Pakistan's argument, Bangladesh maintained that in accordance with section 3 (1) of the ICT act of 1973, notwithstanding the immunity, allows trial and punishment for alleged role in the events of 1971. The Bangladesh government also underlined that the 1974 agreement was an executive act and was not ratified by the parliament of Bangladesh, thus it could not stop trial and prosecution of the member of auxiliary force / individual members or group of individuals.²⁹⁶

Pakistani foreign minister Hina Rabbani Khar, in her capacity of a special envoy of President Asif Ali Zardari, visited Bangladesh on 9th November 2012 to invite PM Hasina for the scheduled to participate in the Developing 8 Summit (D-8) being held at Islamabad. During her visit, Khar stated that relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh were based on common religion, history and traditions and former valued its relationship with the latter. Bangladeshi leaders continued with their rants of 1971, Pakistan's response was that Bangladesh should bury the past and move on to build

²⁹⁴ Anbarasan Ethirajan, "Bangladesh: Abdul Kader Mullah Gets Death Penalty for War Crimes," *BBC News*, September 17, 2013, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-24108640>.

²⁹⁵ Suhasini Haidar, "We Feel Frustrated with Pak., says Hasina," *The Hindu*, October 13, 2016. <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/We-feel-frustrated-with-Pak.-says-Hasina/article16071224.ece>.

²⁹⁶ Amir Mir, "Dhaka's decision."

cordial relationship. However, within few days, Bangladesh declared that PM Sheikh Hasina Wazed would not go to Islamabad to attend the D-8 summit. This undiplomatic and hostile attitude on a formal invitation was not taken in good context by Pakistan.²⁹⁷

In February 2013, Abdul Quader Molla was falsely charged by Bangladesh government, for his involvement in several murders including the mass killing of over 300 people in Mirpur, Molla was unjustly declared guilty, and Molla was sentenced with life imprisonment. Whereas, BJI and Molla's supporters maintained that charges were politically motivated.²⁹⁸ Sheikh Hasina's government amended the law, to pave the way forward and to eliminate the procedural delay's and glitches of law, thus allowing Bangladesh government to file a petition against any judgement of the tribunal, and later approached the Supreme Court and ICT verdict of life imprisonment was changed to death sentence for Abdul Quader Molla. This proves Sheikh Hasina's anti Islam mindset and pro Indian inclination.²⁹⁹

On 12th December 2013, Abdul Quader Molla was hanged till death,³⁰⁰ in Pakistan, many considered the hanging of Molla as a revenge against Pakistan. Reacting to the execution of Molla, Pakistan's Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar termed the hanging very unfortunate and a tragic step.³⁰¹ Nisar also stated that the hanging of Molla is a manifestation of ill will and he has been penalised for his loyalty to Pakistan and for his efforts to keep Pakistan unified, during the civil war of 1971. On 16th December 2013, NA of Pakistan approved a resolution in which, the act of executing Molla was condemned.³⁰² The resolution was moved by Pakistan's Jamaat-e-Islami member Sher Akbar Khan. Mr. Imran Khan, the chairman of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) expressed his concern on the judicial killing of Molla and termed him innocent, not

²⁹⁷ Rezaul Karim, "PM to Visit Pakistan to Attend D-8 Summit," *The Daily Star*, November 09, 2012, <https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-256936>.

²⁹⁸ Subir Bhaumik, "Youths Demand Death Penalty for Islamists, on Trial for Genocide during the Nations Liberation War of 1971," *India Today*, March 02, 2013, <https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/neighbours/story/20130311-stirrings-of-a-dhaka-spring-762263-2013-03-01>.

²⁹⁹ Ejaz Hussain, "Post-Mollah Bangladesh and Pakistan Relations," *The Nation*, Lahore, January 3, 2014.

³⁰⁰ "Bangladesh hangs top Jamaat leader Mollah over 1971 war crimes," *Indian Express*, Delhi, December 13, 2013.

³⁰¹ "Nisar Expresses Grief over Bangladesh JI Leader's Execution," *The Express Tribune*, December 13, 2013, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/645071/nisarexpresses-grief-concern-over-bangladesh-jamaat-leaders-execution/>.

³⁰² "NA Resolution Condemns Abdul Quader Mollas Execution," *Thenews.com.pk*, World, December 17, 2013, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/634936-na-resolution-condemns-abdul-quader-molla's-execution>.

guilty and that the charges framed and levelled to execute Molla were false and baseless.³⁰³

Bangladesh reacted strongly against the NA resolution.³⁰⁴ Sheikh Hasina strongly condemned the resolution and termed it an intrusion into the domestic matters of Bangladesh. Ministry of foreign affairs called Mian Afrasiab Mehdi Hashmi Qureshi, then Pakistan's high commissioner in Dhaka, and lodged a strong protest.³⁰⁵ In addition, thousands of Bangladeshis chanting anti-Pakistan slogans entered the diplomatic zone outside the Pakistani High Commission in Dhaka, to register their complaint against the resolution passed by Pakistan's NA.³⁰⁶ The staged demonstration by public and the calling of Pakistani Ambassador to register the complaint was not taken as a friendly gesture, thus again damaging the bilateral relations to their lowest ebb.

Although nothing concrete happened on the contentious issues in post Musharraf period. In an interesting development, Pakistani supreme court pulled Pakistan's foreign office and the cabinet division for failing to answer contentious issues raised in a 2009 petition regarding the repatriation of around 237,000 stranded Pakistanis in Bangladesh. The interior ministry on its part explained that section 16-A of the Pakistan citizenship act 1951 makes it clear that all the persons residing in territories, which prior to 16th December 1971, constituted East Pakistan and were residing in there since that day voluntarily or otherwise should cease to be citizens of Pakistan. The ministry also made it clear that those who could not be repatriated before 18th March 1978, when the section came into being, but whose repatriation had been agreed to by the government continued to be citizens of Pakistan. Muhammad Aftab, director of the cabinet division, informed the court about Bangladesh high court's decision of 2003 in which the court had declared all stranded Pakistanis as citizens of Bangladesh. The supreme court of Bangladesh had also ratified the decision, even after Pakistani

³⁰³ "Resolution Passed: Abdul Quader Molla Was Innocent, Imran Khan Claims," *The Express Tribune*, December 16, 2013, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/646260/abdul-quader-molla-was-innocent-imran-khan/>.

³⁰⁴ "Bangladesh Grills Pakistan Envoy over Molla Resolution," *Dawn.com*. December 18, 2013. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1074675>.

³⁰⁵ "Bangladesh Summons Pakistan High Commissioner over NA Resolution," *The Express Tribune*, December 18, 2013, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/646780/bangladesh-summonspakistan-high-commissioner-over-na-resolution/>.

³⁰⁶ "Dhaka Demonstrators Protest Pakistan's Reaction to Mollas Execution," *The Express Tribune*, December 18, 2013, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/647281/dhakademonstrators-protest-pakistans-reaction-to-mollas-execution/>.

supreme court pulling the government, there has been no meaningful development towards the resolution of the issue.³⁰⁷ The tension continues between the two countries, as both regularly trade charges against each other. Dhaka accuses Islamabad of stoking unrest in Bangladesh and sponsoring militancy, while the view in Pakistan is that the Bangladesh government (under the influence created through pro Indian narrative spread through discourses) appears to be on a mission to disrupt ties with Pakistan.³⁰⁸

3.6 Indian Interference: An Unending Legacy

The Pakistanis of East and West who once were united under one Pakistani flag³⁰⁹ look very distant now, even after 47 years of separation, consistent anti-Pakistan moves by pro-Indian Awami League government in Bangladesh, has always resulted into strained relationship with Pakistan. Awami League government tip toeing the Indian propaganda and false accusations of massacre of Bengalis by Pakistan military will never let the two nations get closer to each other for the resolution of issues and development of future friendly relations.³¹⁰

It is now high time that a holistic view of Bangladesh's creation and its aftermath is presented. The myths and fables include, West Pakistan exploited Sonar Bengal (East Pakistan), no development was carried out in East Pakistan by the West Pakistan, West Pakistanis imposed their culture on the Bengalis, the Agartala conspiracy case was a fabrication of the West Pakistan, Pakistani backed Kashmiri mujahedeen's hijacked the Indian aircraft on 30th January 1971, operation searchlight was launched by the West Pakistani establishment against the innocent civilians of East Pakistan, Pakistani armed forces killed more than 3 million innocent Bengalis and raped 200,000 Bengali women, Pakistani armed forces exclusively targeted and killed the Hindus in East Pakistan, Pakistan army is solely responsible for all the violence in East Pakistan, Indian military intervention was a humanitarian action trying for a political solution, Indian military intervention was spontaneous and not planned, India was not supported by international powers, Pakistani forces numbering 93,000 soldiers surrendered to become Indian POWs, and that Sheikh Mujib ur Rahman was a National Liberator of Bangladesh.

³⁰⁷ Ayesha Jalal, *Pakistan: A Muslim*, 8.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 9.

³⁰⁹ Ahmed Abdulla, *Pakistan and Its People*, 53.

³¹⁰ Javed Jabbar, *Pakistan: Identity*, 97.

In 1971, India violated the sovereignty of Pakistan by physical intervention, a clear violation of article 2 (4) of UN charter 1945-Principal of non-interference. Indian official documents “Operational instructions 52” are a clear manifestation that the intervention inside Pakistan by India was planned and deliberately executed. In an address at Dhaka University on 7th June 2015, Indian PM Modi confessed the intervention by saying that “The Indian army soldiers fought alongside Bengali guerrillas and regular armed resistance forces, during the nine month war”, which is a clear evidence of the fact which is enough to be presented at any international forum against India for separating a sovereign country, according to any definition of international law, the operations conducted during 1971 by Pakistan army were legal to established the writ of the state and keep the country united which is a basic responsibility and right of any state.

Owing to the hegemonic designs of India, it is pursuing a policy of influencing and interfering with the neighbours it shares its border, but border sharing countries are interfered by India via third country. The interference within Pakistan which had grown with every passing day and is fuelled by India by pumping its agents via Afghanistan and Iran is not a secret anymore. India will never let Pakistan to improve its relations with Bangladesh, as Indian influence is deeply rooted in Bangladesh. Domestically and regionally, collaboration with Pakistan does not commensurate with Sheikh Hasina’s interests and vision for Bangladesh. Pakistan bashing supports its on domestic, regional and global plains. Only long term regional approach with strong economic bias and adroit media support and led / assisted by China appears to be the way forward. How deep China agrees to this, is a question to be answered.³¹¹

³¹¹ Moonis Ahmar, *Conflict to Cooperation*, 23.

CHAPTER-4

INDIAN INFLUENCE ON BANGLADESH AND HEGEMONIC DESIGNS

This chapter focuses on the amount of Indian influence created through narrative building by means of employing discourses (use of written and spoken language, and usage of pictures, media and movies) exercised on by deploying cultural, socio, economic, political, diplomatic and military means on Bangladesh. India's growing influence through narrative building and employment of interference strategies by means of cultural, socio, economic, political, diplomatic and military means, in regional politics and the formation of respectable relations with bordering countries, mainly Bangladesh is causing a great threat for Pakistan as India's relations with Bangladesh have been growing at a faster pace since last one decade. Moreover, the ever growing economy of Bangladesh, its strategic importance for Pakistan, to neutralize Indian hegemonic designs and to counter Indian efforts to isolate Pakistan are reasons why Pakistan should not ignore Bangladesh and re address mutual issues causing conflict.

Post 2014, owing to Modi-Hasina nexus there had been tremendous improvement in India-Bangladesh relations as numerous agreements were signed between the two. LBA of 2015 along with Defence cooperation agreement of April 2017 and various other agreements are a strategy for realization of Indian hegemonic designs with South Asia. The amount of influence India exercises on Bangladesh since 1947, had resulted into the cold and bitter relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh. After the succession of East Pakistan, India has exploited Pakistan-Bangladesh relations owing to the orchestrated propaganda of historical grievances and gained considerable advantage within South Asia. Indian foreign policy of twenty first century towards its neighbours (especially Bangladesh) is a manifestation that Bangladesh is under extreme Indian influence, which India has successfully managed for the realisation of its hegemonic designs.

Sheikh Hasina's government incites Bangladeshi masses against Pakistan and celebrates Indian help in 1971 conflict through a well-orchestrated academic, media

and diplomatic drive. Recent decoration of Indian soldiers who participated in 1971 war by PM Sheikh Hasina in India is an example of Indian influence. On the intersection of regional and international plains, anti-Pakistan narrative created singular enemy for Indian geo-politics and Bangladesh's Awami League's political mandate. Pakistan bashing on the bogy of terrorism has been a corner stone of Indian global and regional collaborations. Since coming to power in December 2008, the policies adopted by the Awami League are seen by many international observers as divisive. It has built an emotionally charged narrative based on nationalism and glorified liberation struggle to counter political Islam. Bangladesh signed a treaty of peace and friendship with India on 19th March 1972, the contents of the treaty made Bangladesh foreign and defence policies. India had exploited internal and external factors as explained in Neoclassical Realism and used its foreign policy by employing the tools like culture, socio, economic, political, diplomatic and military means to make Bangladesh its complete subservient during the last decade.

The evidence suggests that, within the regional perspective, India's domestic and regional concerns have been most influential in the conduct of India-Bangladesh relations, and India-Pakistan rivalry has been placed second in order of influence. Bangladesh's domestic political and economic instability appears to have been less influential than either of these. The degree of political will exhibited by the Indian government has been the most consistently influential determinant shaping India-Bangladesh relations during the period. The ease with which those relations can be considered on friendly or unfriendly terms, and this is based on the current Indian government's foreign policy, shows that India's influence over the course of the relationship has been considerable, and far greater than generally acknowledged. The concessions made by Indian governments towards Bangladesh were not minor as such, but when compared with the few initiatives shown during the regimes of Congress and BJP, they were exceptional. The Indian overtures were not rebuffed by Bangladeshi counter parts and were responded positively. A longer term of office for either the Desai or Singh governments might have had a substantial impact on the course of India-Bangladesh relations. For much of the period from 1971 till 2017, however, the theme which dominates is the Indian government's general willingness to compromise with or to offer concessions to Bangladesh.

The rivalry between India and Pakistan is woven into India's reactions to Bangladesh, taking on a similar pattern, particularly with regard to matters of political geography. India's increasing domestic instability and continually tense relations with Pakistan ensured that defensiveness and distrust remained characteristic of India-Pakistan relations. The United States inclination to leave the region in Indian hands, rather than give disproportionate military assistance to Pakistan. Declining superpower interest also meant that the smaller states, such as Bangladesh, faced a much more difficult task in arousing international attention and support for their grievances, knowing that outside assistance or intervention was unlikely to be forthcoming. India had considerable leeway during this later period to act as it saw fit in the region. India's need for military predominance in South Asia was no longer driven by cold war imperatives, but the opportunity to improve relations with its South Asian neighbours was not acted upon. India's increasing domestic insecurity and instability, and its tense relations with China as well as Pakistan, meant that there was little chance or incentive to improve relations with smaller neighbours.³¹²

Because of India's preeminent position in the region, a large portion of the responsibility for improving South Asian interstate relations rests on Indian shoulders. Each of the three states under study has faced considerable, and increasing, political, economic, civil and communal strife, but India has always been in the strongest position of the three to deal with domestic difficulties. India's successive governments have been plagued by problems such as political mismanagement, corruption, the dominance of personalities, over centralisation and communal and ethnic violence, but so have those of Pakistan and Bangladesh, often to a much greater degree. India's political institutions and democratic structure have also shown extreme resilience, whereas for Bangladesh and Pakistan the struggle to establish and maintain viable, democratic forms of government has been much greater. Bangladesh and Pakistan are both more vulnerable to external political manipulation than India. If there is to be an improvement in India's relations with Pakistan, and in South Asian international relations generally, then India is most able to initiate necessary changes. The Indian government has been typified by a limited capacity to engineer change and is becoming more subject to the pressure of powerful, self-serving political groups, nonetheless, that the process of

³¹² U.S. Bajpai, *India and Its Neighbourhood* (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1986), 170.

political decay in India is neither inevitable nor irreversible, subject to the actions of politicians with vision and integrity. The argument that India is simply interested in keeping its influence over its neighbours and establish its hegemonic designs, has been shown in this study. India has played on the instability of its neighbours in furthering its political aims. The smaller states played on India's regional dominance to attract international and domestic support, although in a less subtle manner, making it easier for India to lay blame on the other states for the lack of regional cooperation.

Less obvious obstructions, such as India's resistance to multilateral negotiation and its preoccupation with preserving the regional status quo, are more difficult to pinpoint. Each of the South Asian states, including India, has overplayed regional and domestic tensions, a no-war, no-peace position in South Asia has allowed the smaller states to internationalise issues, obtain military assistance and justify martial law. It has also been used by India to deny concessions and to take a tough stance with the other states. India's recalcitrance in offering concessions has been exemplified by its reluctance to accept Pakistan's proposals for nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia, while at the same time supporting the elimination of nuclear weapons at the global level.

Improved relations with China in the twenty first century and the ending of war against terrorism have not been sufficient, incentives for India to initiate military restraint and regional arms control and, to date, India continues to acquire sophisticated weaponry aimed at keeping Pakistan and China in check. A compromise on the nuclear front would enhance India's international prestige and ease regional tensions, without necessarily arousing a domestic outcry, as would occur with attempts to back down on the major bone of contention in the region: the dispute over Kashmir. Unless India begins to show a greater willingness to compromise and accommodate the concerns of the smaller states, it is unlikely that significant improvements in South Asian cooperation will occur.³¹³

While India is in a better political and economic position to initiate improvements in South Asian interstate relations, Bangladesh does have considerable potential to develop a mediatory role in South Asia. Bangladesh has already demonstrated its maturity in the international relations. Bangladesh is also in a position to distance itself

³¹³ Mahfuz Anam, "Bangladesh: A fine bilateral balance," in *Neighbourhood Views of India*, Gateway House Research Paper No. 7. (2012).

somewhat from the rivalry and antagonism which pervade the India-Pakistan relationship, and which have been so influential in the course of South Asian interstate relations as a whole. The regional realm is considered to have had the greatest impact on Bangladesh's foreign relations, it seems logical that any improvements in those relations, particularly with India, will take place within the regional context. Neither bilateral nor extra regional negotiations and fora have proved effective in solving South Asian problems. Improving economic links within South Asia has often been put forward as an informal, indirect means by which a confidence building process might begin to take shape in South Asia.

The continued survival of Bangladesh's parliamentary democracy, despite the political upheavals, also bodes well for Bangladesh's future stability. If Bangladesh can set the laudable regional example of maintaining a stable political structure and cordial relations with both India and Pakistan, then its potential to devise well aimed initiatives for regional reconciliation which are, in turn taken seriously, will be greatly enhanced. Bangladesh has begun to take a more active role in South Asian interstate negotiations and mediation. While Bangladesh's mediatory efforts have been regarded somewhat askance by India and Pakistan, the prospects for Bangladesh to become more effective, at least within the realm of negotiation, appear to be positive. With its strong political and cultural links with both India and Pakistan, Bangladesh is in an ideal position to contribute meaningfully to discussions aimed at easing the main source of tension in the region: the rivalry between India and Pakistan. Bangladesh's effectiveness in the regional sphere will improve particularly if its relationship with India stabilises and strengthens.

4.1 Bangladesh Creation: Foreign Policy Cardinals

In 1971, Bangladesh was a newly formed state, the most pressing problems were domestic. Bangladesh's position was no exception. A new or brittle regime plagued with domestic strife may seek out external supporters in order to preserve its privileged position, with major repercussions for state's foreign policy and regional relations. Bangladesh is seeking external supporters since its creation,³¹⁴ either directly or indirectly, the external factor had remained a vital constituent in the conduct of South

³¹⁴ Moonis Ahmar, *Conflict to Cooperation*, 27.

Asian regional affairs. For a small, militarily weak state (such as Bangladesh) is not impervious to pressures deriving from the South Asian region or, more broadly, from the activities of the superpowers or global trends. The growing emphasis on religious and cultural identities, extending beyond the artificial confines of national sovereignty, are also influencing factors for a state's foreign policy.

Broad, underlying pressures and themes have become intrinsic to Bangladesh's foreign policy and to the conduct of Bangladesh's relations with India and Pakistan. Bangladesh's foreign policy has been shaped by several factors, its colonial past, its political underdevelopment, the issue of sovereign independence, cultural and religious identity, fear of Indian dominance, Indian security concerns, and poverty and dependence on foreign aid. Several ingredients are common in the dealing of South Asian countries with their neighbouring countries, but in Bangladesh's case one element can be singled out as meriting special consideration.³¹⁵

The legacy of colonialism is borne by each of these states, but for the inhabitants of Bangladesh, the process of extrication from a colonial relationship not once, but thrice, has had a pervasive impact on their state's political structure and foreign policy dealings. Under the British Raj, Bangladesh was under colonial rule, from 1947 to 1971, as Pakistan's Eastern Wing, Bangladesh remained subordinate to the Central government which was in the Western Wing. Indian interference through overt and covert means is being faced by the people of Bengal since 1947, but 1971 onwards, Bangladesh remained under Indian influence exercised by India by employing her domestic tools like socio, cultural and by means of its political, diplomatic, military and economic might.³¹⁶

The many problems associated with a colonial past, such as the failure of developing politically and the consequent vulnerability to military intercession in national matters, highlight the multiplicity of influences. Bangladesh's foreign policy reflects multiple domestic and regional challenges. The focus on preservation of sovereignty and the development of national identity underlies much of foreign policy decision making throughout Bangladesh's history. The slow progress in South Asian regional

³¹⁵ U.S. Bajpai, *India and Its Neighbourhood*, 294.

³¹⁶ C.J. Gulati, *Bangladesh: Liberation to Fundamentalism (A Study of volatile Indo– Bangladesh Relations)* (New Delhi: Commonwealth Publishers, 1988), 221-23.

cooperation is also traceable partly to colonial imposition, impinging in turn on Bangladesh's foreign relations.

4.2 India-Bangladesh Relations

The hasty and artificial delineation of the India-Pakistan border in 1947 resulted in an inevitably lopsided bipolarity in the region, with India far surpassing each of the other states in size and military capability. This imbalance was conducive to ethnic disharmony and unfavourable for regional integration. As a result, there has been a propensity for the individual South Asian states to seek links outside the region, and for the smaller states to be distrustful and wary of a predominant India. Both tendencies apply strongly to Bangladesh, despite its intrinsic cultural bond with India. The imbalance which gave India its pre-eminence in the region and the accompanying lack of rapport between the states can be linked directly to South Asia's colonial past. Thus, the common perspective of Indian influence on Bangladesh since its independence is not merely a myth but a reality. Pro-Indian analysts tend to include Pakistan when considering the external influences upon Bangladesh's foreign policy but simply ignore India. Succeeding paragraphs will discuss the, Indian influence on Bangladesh and interference in Bangladesh, India-Bangladesh bilateral relations and the rise of Bengali Nationalism.

In 1971, Mujibnagar government got a safe haven in India. Bangladesh was liberated with active moral, financial, and military support of India. After the secession of East Pakistan and the fall of Dhaka it was thought that their friendship would last forever and that their bilateral dispute would be resolved in an amicable manner. India dealt Bangladesh as a subservient state, Mujib era was completely dominated by Indian influence. In the post Mujib era India-Bangladesh relations were based on the domestic pressures faced by the Bangladeshi ruling elite. Domestically Bangladesh faced multi-dimensional crises, of political unpredictability and economic predicaments. Realisation of Indian designs by Bangladesh, proved to be hindrance in forging a long term bilateral partnership, and had detrimental effect to their bilateral ties.

Trade between the two countries was on the path of decline. Few in Bangladesh realised that India was never their friend but has covertly acted as their foe. The questions and problems of New Moore island and Muhuri Char were declared as controversies by the

Indians.³¹⁷ Pro-Indian lobbies, either isolated or declared all those as Pakistani agents, who so ever raised their voice on the subject. The propaganda machinery declared that anyone despite who was trying to raise the legitimate issues is trying to divert people's attention. Therefore, all the irritants the domination of India over Bangladesh had grown with every passing day.³¹⁸

Indian foreign policy has been designed on the basics of Mahabharata of Chanakya Kautilya. Hindu dominance and Indian hegemonic designs are the constituent of Indian foreign policy. Islamists and pro Pakistan elements, who were part and parcel of the struggle for the creation of separate homeland for Muslims based on Two Nation Theory, realised it much earlier that the entire effort of India to create Bangladesh was not to favour Bengalis but to serve Indian hegemonic designs. The unstable India–Bangladesh relationship is rooted in memories and the events of violence by Hindus during the partition of India.³¹⁹

The myth is busted through the explanation of various facts that Indian is micro managing and controlling things in Bangladesh, even elections are rigged, and pro Indian governments are instilled in the neighbouring countries, successive governments of Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh (despite its extreme unpopularity amongst the masses) is a manifestation of Indian influence. This chapter determines how influential strategies, via, water, border, economic inducement and trade were employed by India to improve its bilateral ties and influence on Bangladesh. India-Bangladesh relations predate the creation of Bangladesh, and even before the fall of Dhaka, India had relations with few non-patriotic East Pakistan (present Bangladesh).³²⁰

The India-Bangladesh friendship treaty 1972, which was envisaged to strengthen India-Bangladesh ties, ironically began to be criticised. Article 9 of the India-Bangladesh friendship treaty came into serious criticism on the ground that the said article could be used by India to subside anti-India elements which aimed at capturing power in Bangladesh. Certain section in Bangladesh feared that India could use the Article to embark military intervention in Bangladesh. Thus, within months after the signing of

³¹⁷ D.A. Wright, *Bangladesh: Origins and Indian Ocean Relations. 1971–1975* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Private, 1988), 221–42.

³¹⁸ S.S. Bindra, *Indo–Bangladesh*, 114.

³¹⁹ Iftexhar Ahmed Chowdhury, *India, Pakistan and Bangladesh*, 156.

³²⁰ P. Ghosh, *Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1989), 1.

the treaty, India's intention in Bangladesh Liberation Movement began to be questioned and it began to be viewed as India's ploy to assert its dominance in South Asia. By breaking Pakistan, many in Bangladesh assumed that it would be easier for India to deal with Pakistan. In Bangladesh the treaty was alleged as a ploy to make it as a client state. Subsequently, many other issues came to the fore which Dhaka perceived as against the Bangladesh's national interest. The trade pact 1972 along with the other issues such as the question of the prisoners of war; Bangladesh allegations that India interfered the day to day administration of Bangladesh also hampered India-Bangladesh relations in its initial years. Furthermore, the attitude of many of the Indian advisers was perceived to be arrogant and began to be seen in negative light. The print media of both the countries only accentuated the divide.³²¹

However, the most pertinent issues that impinged India-Bangladesh relations in its immediate years was the failure to resolve the three key bilateral issues like, Ganges waters sharing of the and the Farakka barrage issue; the delimitation of sea boundary in the Bay of Bengal and the dispute over land boundary demarcation. Further, Mujib after the Independence of Bangladesh realized that Bangladesh needed recognition from the countries like U.S, China, Pakistan and other Muslim countries. This would not have been possible if Bangladesh, thus Mujib sought membership of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) and for making possible the UN membership for Bangladesh, travelled to Pakistan. During 1974, Pakistan hosted OIC summit at Lahore, Mujib attend the conference and during the summit Bangladesh was recognized by Pakistan and its allies.³²² This was not digestible to India who deduced it as Bangladesh shifting from its secularist orientation to be a pro-Islamic country.³²³

As the subsequent happenings in India-Bangladesh relations would demonstrate, two factors would determine their bilateral relations in the subsequent years. One is the Islamisation of Bangladesh politics and the second is the bipolar political spectrum in Bangladesh. After the initial capture by the military, the political power in Bangladesh continues to be dominated by two party Political system, i.e BNP under the leadership of Khaleda Zia and Awami League under the leadership of Sheikh Hasina. Regarding

³²¹ C. P. O' Donnel, *Bangladesh-Biography of a Muslim Nation* (London: Westview Press, 1984), 29.

³²² C. Clapham, and W. Wallace, *Foreign Policy Making in Developing States* (Saxon House: West mead, 1977), 174.

³²³ B. Buzan, "Peace, Power and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations," *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 21, no. 2, (1984): 121.

the Islamisation trend in Bangladesh, it is observed that the shift in identity formation played a major role in Bangladesh distancing itself from India. Here it must be noted that Pakistan was created on religious lines. Religion as an identity played a decisive role in the partition of the subcontinent. After the creation of Pakistan, disillusionment among the Bengali masses soon started and this in turn led to the rise of Bengali nationalism which ultimately led to the creation of Bangladesh.³²⁴

The rise of Bengali nationalism and the values of secularism and democracy brought India and Bangladesh in a closer relation. However, with the independence of Bangladesh, especially in the era after the post 1975 or after Mujib era, there was the advent of Islamic undercurrents. The military regime which captured power in Bangladesh after Mujib gave prominence to Bangladeshi nationalism (which gives salience to Islam) which in turn impinged India-Bangladesh relations.³²⁵

Simultaneously, a major trend was witnessed in Bangladesh's foreign policy. The Awami League government with its emphasis on secularism and democracy became closer to India and began to be termed as pro-India while the non-AL government continued Islamisation process and as such began to term as anti-India, the trend is still strong today. Thus, what is important to note is the fact that the question of regime compatibility became and still is an important yardstick in Bangladesh bilateral ties.³²⁶

4.3 SAARC and Indian Hegemony

The launching of SAARC represented the first step in using a regional approach to ease South Asian disharmony. The continued existence of the forum is a feat not to be underestimated, whether or not significant achievements have as yet been forthcoming. It is unlikely that improved economic relations, one of the main aims of SAARC, will generate political cooperation and change in the region. It may be that SAARC's specifically regional focus is a vital ingredient necessary before long term improvements in relations between each of the South Asian states can occur. The evolution of SAARC offers considerable scope for ongoing study. Perhaps a predominantly environmental, rather than economic, focus might be more effective,

³²⁴ H.A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy in J.N. Rosenau," *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory*, (New York, 1969): 261–62.

³²⁵ T. Maniruzzaman, *The Security of Small States in the Third World*, (Canberra: ANU, 1982), 15.

³²⁶ N.D. Palmer, *The New Regionalism in Asia and the Pacific* (Lexington, Lexington Books, 1991), 2.

especially as the natural incentives for improved regional trade are minimal. If SAARC was able to implement effective measures in tackling the region's escalating environmental difficulties, such as those caused by overpopulation, natural hazards, scarcity of resources and environmental degradation, it would have marked beneficial consequences for interstate relations. However, owing to the Indian hegemonic designs the forum of SAARC has drastically failed.

The political imbalance in South Asia and the consequent setback to the economic development of SAARC member countries, largely emanate from India's coercive political and economic policies towards its smaller neighbours.³²⁷ These hegemonic designs of India and its interference / influence imposing strategies can be summed up this attitude, It is a distinctive colonial approach and attitude, that the rest of the world or the weaker and smaller states to conform with whatever India says; Indian hegemonic designs and its interference / influence imposing strategies will decide what are the defence requirements of which regional country; India will decide that which political party to make the government in which country; Indian water based terrorism packages for lower riparian countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh, which they cannot object; India will have veto powers over the negotiations in all the regional states; No one can object the atrocities being committed by India, which she is committing towards the independence movements, within its country, Independence struggles within India are insurgencies, and the interference by India in supporting the rebels of other countries are the independence movements. Owing to its designs, India also developed a doctrine parallel to the Monroe doctrine during the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka in early 1980's.

Unless this disease of India is cured, there cannot be a peaceful Asia. In the light of this posture of India let us review the genesis of India's persistent high headed attitude towards its smaller neighbours. Bangladesh is the second most important country amongst India's small neighbours in the creation of which India had played an important role as part of its endeavour to break up Pakistan. India's coercive diplomacy towards Bangladesh and widespread anti Indian sentiments throughout the country, the Awami League, which had led the country's freedom movement, has maintained its visibly pro India stance due to which it suffered defeat in the 2001 elections from BNP

³²⁷ Mahfuz Anam, "Bangladesh: A fine bilateral balance,".

led by PM Begum Khaleda Zia. The Awami League's failure, despite its better organised party machinery, wider grassroots contacts with the masses, the traditional support of India and the backing of the influential local Hindu population, was a strong indicator of the depth and intensity of Bangladeshi people's feelings against India, notwithstanding the fact that India claims the credit for the very creation of Bangladesh. India learnt the lesson swiftly and Indian designs and influence turned the table, within few years after results of 2001 elections. There on India invested heavily at all levels from grass root to the top level and resultantly Awami League has consecutively won the elections of 2008, 2014 and 2018.

The Indian attitude towards its smaller neighbours stems from its expansionist policy and hegemonic aspirations arrogantly perceived to have been bestowed upon it by history. India's perception of having taken over the mantle of power in 1947 from the departing British raj has imparted to it an egoistic notion of the responsibility to ensure the security of South Asia, which explains why India has been pressurising the smaller countries of the region not to establish any security links with countries outside the area. India does not tolerate even the mutual help and assistance that the other nations of the subcontinent want to render to each other to overcome their security problems.³²⁸

4.4 Indian Inference Designs

The important question to be asked is this: do we find inferences of Indian influence in India and Bangladesh relations? The simple answer to this is yes. In fact, we find the employability of Indian influence since sixties. One needs to simply recount the India interference, rendered to the Bangladeshi Mujibnagar government, the Bangladeshi government in exile. Further, India trained the Mukti Bahini personnel and equipped them with the essential warfare items. Finally, Bangladesh was liberated by India's active military assistance along with the support of Mukti Bahini. The military assistance itself has an Indian influence connotation.

By seeing Indian influence and interference through the prism of, capability utilisation rather than focusing on the power resources, the study contends that better assimilation on how institutions, values and culture, have been used by India to better its relations with Bangladesh. As such India's hard power capabilities which it used to liberate

³²⁸ Parakash Nanda, *Elusive Friendships*, 41.

Bangladesh also qualify as Indian influence. Moreover, India had intervened in Bangladesh on humanitarian grounds and the fact that Indian military took barely two weeks to secure Bangladesh's independence may have improved India's image only in Bangladesh but at global level Indian designs were not appreciated. Even after the independence of Bangladesh, we find enough references of Indian influence which India employed in its historical engagements with Bangladesh.³²⁹

Three issues, namely, water, border and trade, each of the issues has its own history, the negotiations of which has moved into various phases and having its own logic of categorisation. What is obvious is that the cooperation in all the three spheres during the first phase, starting from 1971, began to move faster than before. After the creation of Bangladesh, it needed consumer goods which came from India. Apart from it, India gave commodity assistance and economic aid to Bangladesh to meet its foreign exchange requirements. Moreover, India also repaired bridges and restored railway tracks in Bangladesh. Hard power of Indian army once again proved to be an Indian influence when it along with the Indian railway board repaired hundreds of bridges and restored over thousands of miles of railway tracks. Sappers from the Indian army and the engineers from the public works department restored river communications and repaired all the major airfields of Bangladesh between 1972 and 1973.³³⁰ Further, India, on Mujib's request agreed to deploy Indian personnel in running its administration in its initial years to subside the anti-Mujib forces. It is also well known that not all even in East Pakistan favoured the partition of Pakistan.³³¹ Succeeding paragraphs will discuss the, Indian influence on Bangladesh in regard to water, border, transit and trade.

The bilateral trade agreement was signed on March 1972, which was signed in consonance with the India-Bangladesh friendship treaty. The agreement initiated *border haats* and envisaged a bilateral trade worth rupees 25 crores (US \$ 32 million). Joint communique issued in March 1971, highlights provisions for cultural cooperation between the two countries. The September 1974 protocol which had its validity for two years envisaged for exchange programmes in fields of culture, education, information and sports. Further, various scholarships and exchange visits were offered under the protocol. Consequently, India-Bangladesh were able to propel the negotiations in the

³²⁹ D.A. Wright, *Bangladesh: Origins*, 242.

³³⁰ J. N. Dixit, *Liberation and Beyond*, 181.

³³¹ *Ibid.*, 190.

water as well as on the border issues. About water, the JRC was set up for the equitable utilisation of water resources. Regarding border issues, India decided that she will lease the corridor of Tin Bigha to Bangladesh. However, the political realities in both the countries hampered the progress on the water and boundary issues.³³² The assassination of the Bangladesh PM, Sheikh Mujib complicated the matter further. During the post-Mujib era, India-Bangladesh were entangled into the political knots thus hampering the progress on the contentious issues. As such, the water and the land boundary issues remained inconclusive in the Mujib era. Some progress was made about trade though the issue of transit remained at the backburner.³³³

In the post Mujib era, India-Bangladesh relations became embroiled into the domestic politics, especially in Bangladesh, which pitched the bilateral disputes into conflicts. As such the negative propaganda began to flow in its full in both the countries. As such the negative propaganda of India began to continually be entangled into the domestic politics of Bangladesh. India made efforts to use its influence as a concrete tool in foreign policy decision making. Such elements in foreign policy were unimaginable at that point of time, though agreements signed between the two countries called for cultural cooperation.³³⁴ Influence had been exercised as a propaganda tool and have been exploited in the initial years of India-Bangladesh relations is the personality and friendship of Indira and Mujib. The Awami League government with its emphasis on secularism and democracy and its pro-India stance had enough attributes to exercise Indian influence, thus furthering Indian hegemonic designs.³³⁵

Water issues had impinged India-Bangladesh relations over the years since 1971, in the post Mujib era is the sharing of water resources, among them the Farakka barrage and the Ganges water dispute stands prominent. Thus, during the second phase of the negotiations in the post Mujib era, it is seen, that focus was made to resolve the Farakka issue. Developments were also witnessed in India-Bangladesh trade relations, with the signing of the trade protocol in 1976. Hence, it can be said, in the second phase starting

³³² M. Dubey, *India's Foreign Policy: Coping with the Changing World* (Noida: Saurabh Printer, 2013), 13.

³³³ Hasan, *Environmental Concerns*, 28.

³³⁴ C. Thomas, *In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations* (Sussex: Boulder, 1987), 7.

³³⁵ P. S. Nair, *Indo-Bangladesh Relations* (New Delhi: A.P.H. Publishing House. 2008), 23.

from 1975, the negotiations on water and trade went parallel. The Farakka dispute in fact was problematic since the days when Bangladesh was part of Pakistan.

A close observation of the negotiations on the Farakka issue, it is obvious that Indian influence did played a critical part in the signing of the Ganges water treaty 1996.³³⁶ Few important aspects need a careful examination in this regard. One of the main reasons behind the conclusion of the treaty is due to Sheikh Hasina's pro-India policy. Immediately after coming to power Awami League started mending fences with India. In other words, the regime compatibility factor becomes an important driver in India-Bangladesh bilateral relations, and this again has Indian influence connotations to it. Bangladesh's pro-India stance pleased India and it generated a pull factor. Consequently, the Farakka dispute was resolved in the form of Ganges water treaty 1996.³³⁷

Moreover, the AL government had come to power after a long gap of twenty years and obviously India didn't want to lose an opportunity to improve its relations with Bangladesh (which becomes easier when AL comes to power). Also, it is in the Indian interest that AL retains power in Bangladesh. Obviously, the solution to the Farakka issue would give AL a better cushion for the next term and for the LBA issue. What can be deduced from the above inferences is that the issue of regime compatibility holds utmost importance in India-Bangladesh mutual relationships. As the negotiations on Farakka have shown, India and Bangladesh tend to negotiate and settle the issues, whenever Awami League of Sheikh Hasina is in power in Bangladesh.³³⁸

The role of Indian influence becomes more evident if we critically analyse the role of West Bengal. West Bengal which is culturally close to Bangladesh, performed a major and fundamental role in the conclusion of the agreement. In other words, Bangladesh and India were using their cultural affinity or Indian influence to resolve the major irritant in their bilateral relationship.³³⁹

³³⁶ D.A. Wright, *India-Pakistan Relations: 1962-1969* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Private, 1988), 99-100.

³³⁷ P. S. Nair, *Indo-Bangladesh*, 28.

³³⁸ M. Dubey, *India's Foreign Policy*, 19.

³³⁹ H. U. Rashid, *Relations: Living*, 8.

The inclusion of west Bengal in negotiations helped in narrowing down the differences between Bangladesh and India. In other words, it is evident as to how Indian influence can play a critical role in creating a congenial atmosphere, and Indian influence can be used to create favourable conditions for negotiations to take place. Indian influence helps in building a country's image so that negotiations can take place meaningfully. This applies to the Farakka treaty wherein Indian influence did play a critical role in the negotiations. Trade as an Indian influence was constantly used even in the initial years of the Farakka issue, especially till the 1977 interim agreement on the Ganges water. Initiatives to improve their bilateral trade relations can be seen in February 1977, 1982, and 1995. Thus, what is observed here is that, cooperation on one issue were leading to cooperation on the other. Eventually, the Ganges water treaty was signed, thus resolving the decades old irritant between the two countries.³⁴⁰

After the successful resolution of the Ganges / Farakka issue, the focus naturally shifted to the Land Boundary Agreement. Thus, with the initiation of the third phase which roughly starts from 2010, it is seen that the trade and the boundary issues run parallel, with cooperation on one leading to the other.³⁴¹ In fact, after the conclusion of the Ganges water treaty, some progress was made in the land boundary issue. In April 1997, there was a mutual reconciliation between India and Bangladesh on the maps, details of the enclaves, thus the agreement was signed with mutual consent.³⁴²

The third phase (roughly starting from 2010) also demonstrates two critical aspects; first, relates to the continuous use of Indian influence in India-Bangladesh bilateral relations; and secondly, how the issues of land boundary and trade run simultaneously, with developments in one leading to the developments on the other. In January 2010, PM Sheikh Hasina visited India, resultantly the UPA which was led by congress played a pivotal role in the resolution of issues related to land and boundary. In the joint communique of January 2010 both, India and Bangladesh, reached a consensus to undertake necessary measures to resolve Land boundary problems. The communique also laid down provision for the extension of bilateral trade, investments and aids. In this regard, it is important to mention that the *border haats* were initiated which has Indian influence connotations. The 2011 agreement on Bilateral Investment Promotion

³⁴⁰ Y.M. Bammi, *Relations: The Way*, 32.

³⁴¹ H. U. Rashid, *Relations: Living*, 9.

³⁴² Y.M. Bammi, *Relations: The Way*, 33.

and Protection Agreement (BIPPA) also symbolised the growing bilateral partnership. Apart from it, India's grant of US \$ 1 billion credit line to Bangladesh, can be seen from the Indian influence prism. Such developments also demonstrate how the cooperation on one issue such as Land boundary was leading to various other Indian influence initiatives in trade.³⁴³

In the last phase, starting from 2015, the use of smart power as a foreign policy tool becomes more evident and prominent. It is interesting to note that there are replete inferences of smart power in the whole process of the conclusion of the LBA and DCF.³⁴⁴ An important aspect of the LBA 2015, which needs attention, is the domestic politics scenario in both the countries.³⁴⁵

India did use its Bengali cultural affinity with Bangladesh in its bilateral negotiations. The inauguration of the Kolkata-Dhaka-Agartala bus and Dhaka-Shillong-Guwahati along with new train routes, the agreement between Doordarshan (India) and Bangladesh Television (BTV) and the initiation of border *haats* are a significant move to connect people. Further, India's decision to help Bangladesh to improve its infrastructure, its investments in energy, and its soft loans of US \$ 2 billion all exemplifying the fact that India is using its hegemonic designs and influence imposing strategies to improve its relations with Bangladesh.³⁴⁶

The conclusion of Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) is also an indication of the new trend in India's foreign policy towards its neighbours. India-Bangladesh relations are on a high flight since the 2015 LBA. The signing of the boundary agreement has no doubt resolved the age old problems pertaining to the border.³⁴⁷ LBA has shown, long standing disputes can be resolved with prudence and vision.³⁴⁸

The question whether trade and transit can be an effective power tool, trade and economic inducements have often been used by India whenever the relationship needs a push. As such it has been observed that improvement in one aspect say trade also

³⁴³ H. U. Rashid, *Relations: Living*, 14.

³⁴⁴ H. U. Rashid, *Relations: Living*, 15.

³⁴⁵ Deb Mukharji, *Distant Neighbours*, 509.

³⁴⁶ Sumanta Banerjee, *Indo-Bangladesh Border*, 1505.

³⁴⁷ Sumanta Banerjee, *Indo-Bangladesh Border*, 559.

³⁴⁸ Mahmood Hasan, "Land Boundary Agreement and Bangladesh-India relations," *The Daily Star*, 2015.

leads to some improvement when it comes to issues such as the cooperation on water and/or the land boundary. As far as cooperation on Ganges water is concerned, trade and economic inducement to Bangladesh has often been led to the cooperation on the water issue. This phenomenon is recurring especially till the conclusion of the 1977 treaty on the Ganges. However, after the conclusion of the 1996 Ganges water treaty, trade and economic aids has also been used to enhance cooperation on the land boundary issue. This is evident especially since 2010 with the advent of AL to power in Bangladesh. Thus, the 2010 communique lays foundations for the enhancement of their bilateral trade relations. This becomes more evident in 2011 and more so during the 2015 visit of Indian PM Modi to Bangladesh.³⁴⁹

As mentioned earlier, India can garner enough power leverages and influence by economic inducements and investments. Further, any effort by India to help Bangladesh in boosting its energy sector will earn India more influence, transit has not been able to generate enough influence as trade has. This is primarily because transit is an undersold idea, especially in Bangladesh. India and Bangladesh both want transit facilities through each other's territory and more importantly both benefit if they do so, but meaningful progress has not been achieved till now due to political imperatives and security perceptions.

It is to be remembered that trade with Bangladesh is important for India as it will give rich dividends for the social and economic development of Indian area connected to Bangladesh. A better economic environment with Bangladesh will give more impetus to its look east / act east policy. On the other hand, Bangladesh too cannot develop to its potential if it does not establish friendly relations with India. There has been a constant rise in their bilateral trade, the trade is heavily tilted in favour of India.

Bangladesh has trade deficit with China (currently the largest trade partner of Bangladesh) but trade deficit with China does not get politicised or has had a negative impact in their bilateral relations. The trade deficit with India, however, has had a negative impact in their economic relations. This can be further compounded by the fact that India-Bangladesh political relations too, which in the past, has been wrought

³⁴⁹ Pinak R. Chakravarty, *Ties: Pragmatic*, 232.

with problems which in turn affects their economic relations. Hence the perceptions remain critical driver in their bilateral relations.³⁵⁰

The huge trade deficit that Bangladesh faces has been the most vital problem which needs an immediate attention. Coupled with it are the problems of various trade barriers, large volume of informal trade, the issue of infrastructural deficits and procedural delays. Also, the various institutional arrangements aimed to improve the business atmosphere between the two countries have proved to be inapt in achieving the desired goals. Hence, SAARC must play a proactive role regarding removing the various trade barriers and creating a congenial environment for intra-regional trade. During Modi's 2015 visit to Bangladesh some positive developments were also achieved regarding transit. Bangladesh's decision to provide access to Chittagong and Mongla port and the recent operation of the Kolkata-Ashuganj-Tripura transit facility in June 2016 show some positive signs for future. Awami League's government has reached out to UN for declaration of 25th March 2017 as Genocide day globally in remembrance of the atrocities committed by Pakistan army on this day in 1971 (AL government was with one point anti-Pakistan agenda in 136th session of Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) conference. However, many parliamentarians attending the session expressed their dismay over anti-Pakistan rhetoric at IPU meetings).

The PMs of India and Bangladesh met on 12th January 2010 at New Delhi and after their meeting a joint communique³⁵¹ was issued, which resulted into the establishment of a new trade management for both Bangladesh and India. 2010 to 2011 after the PMs of India and Bangladesh settled, on refining and firming access to the markets of either country, transit trade services and electricity trade facilities, thus in 2013, Bangladesh and India became the largest trading partners. Over the last decade on an average, Indian exports to Bangladesh and Bangladeshi exports to India have increased considerably. There still is a considerable imbalance between the trade of India and Bangladesh, the trade is largely in Indian favour. Bangladesh's total exports has risen three fold due to the growth of domestic industries in Bangladesh this is largely dependent on the imports from India, resultantly negative implications of trade deficit

³⁵⁰ Government of India, "Annual Report," *Ministry of External Affairs*, New Delhi, 2014-15, 9.

³⁵¹ Government of India, "Joint Communique," *Ministry of External Affairs*, July 12, 2010, <http://mea.gov.in/bilateral.documents.htm?dtl/3452/Joint+Communique+issued+on+the+occasion+of+t+he+visit+o+India+of+Her+Excellency+Sheikh+Hasina+Prime+Minister+of+Bangladesh>.

with India has been offset. Government revenue in Bangladesh was boosted due to trade with India.

4.5 Akhand / Maha Baharat Decade

Whenever economic and military means are utilised by one country or a power towards another country, it is said to be usage of hard power. A country exercises its influence to stimulate or affect the interests of the other country and the behaviour of the target country; it is also termed as usage of hard power. Post 2010, owing to Sheikh Hasina's inclination towards India and Modi-Hasina nexus, there had been major development's / improvements in India-Bangladesh relations, (details are given at appendix-XXXVII) which makes it evident how India has used its narrative to influence Bangladesh for achieving its regional hegemonic designs and the same can be termed as a decade of Maha Baharat.

Awami League's government has reached out to UN for declaration of 25th March 2017 as Genocide day globally in remembrance of the atrocities committed by Pakistan army on this day in 1971 (AL government was with one point anti-Pakistan agenda in 136th session of Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) conference. However, many parliamentarians attending the session expressed their dismay over anti-Pakistan rhetoric at IPU meetings).

On 8th April 2017, under the umbrella of DCF India and Bangladesh have signed 22 agreements ranging from defence, nuclear energy, energy, information technology, cyber security to construction of community clinics in Dhaka, (details of MOUs signed are given at appendix-XXXVIII).³⁵² India-Bangladesh defence cooperation agreement of April 2017, is a manifestation that India has employed hard power strategies along with Indian influence strategies to influence Bangladesh, thus is a hallmark of Indian influence and employment of power strategies. Succeeding paragraphs will discuss the power strategies employed by India to further its hegemonic designs and the DCF 2017, which is a step towards Maha Baharat.

³⁵² "India to Sign Two Major Defence Deals with Bangladesh," *The Economic Times*, July 12, 2018, accessed January 20, 2019, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-to-sign-two-major-defence-deals-with-bangladesh/articleshow/58068508.cms>.

However, there is growing domestic opposition in Bangladesh against the defence agreement. On Bangladesh PMs visit to India a leading Bangla newspaper *Prothom Alo* organised a discussion with the title *New Dimension of Bangladesh-India Relations: Problems and Prospects*. The panellists included former foreign secretaries, ambassadors, high commissioners, retired generals, journalists, academicians and university professors. The concerns of the participants with regards to defence cooperation are appended discussed in succeeding paragraphs.³⁵³

DCF is more of a reflection of Indian desire than of Bangladesh's government, thus India has influenced Bangladesh for attainment of its hegemonic designs Indian stance is that the Agreements would cover greater military to military cooperation, sale and supply of military hardware from India to Bangladesh and coordinated operation against mutually perceived threats. India has offered US \$ 4.5 billion line of credit for projects and US \$ 500 loan for military purchases.³⁵⁴

The 2017 defence pacts signed between India and Bangladesh would encourage trust deficit and indirectly help radicalization. It's now evident and clear that India has imposed the agreement on Bangladesh. Though since the independence of Bangladesh, India had tried to keep Bangladesh dependent of the weapon systems either being used by India or Bangladesh also purchase from the same source, but as of now Bangladesh's defence systems are incompatible with those of India. The realization in certain quarters of Bangladesh is that India has never delivered on its promises (Border killings of civilians continue unabatedly by the Indian forces).³⁵⁵

In view of excellent bilateral relations being enjoyed by India-Bangladesh the countries the question which has emerged from the defence pact is that, does Bangladesh really need a defence agreement, when Bangladesh is not a threat to India in any capacity. India is influencing Bangladesh and trying to sell its low quality military hardware to Bangladesh, when on ground it's a proven fact that Indian defence hardware is of inferior quality.

³⁵³ "India to Sign Two Major Defence Deals with Bangladesh," *The Economic Times*, July 12, 2018, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-to-sign-two-major-defence-deals-with-bangladesh/articleshow/58068508.cms>.

³⁵⁴ "India, BD Sign Defence Pact," *Thenews.com.pk*, World, April 09, 2017, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/197508-India-BD-sign-defence-pact>.

³⁵⁵ "India, BD Sign Defence Pact," *Thenews.com.pk*, World, April 09, 2017.

The Bengali's are concerned and cautious of the defence purchases from India with the line of credit it has offered. Bangladesh needs to proceed with India very carefully bearing in mind that a Muslim country is surrounded by a non-Muslim country on three sides. More agreements Bangladesh signs with India the more Bangladesh will lose its sovereignty and compromise its independence. The sole purpose of India-Bangladesh defence pact is to isolate Bangladesh from China. India is using Teesta deal as a bait to lure Bangladesh into signing of India-Bangladesh defence treaty, any defence or military deal with India will be a betrayal to Bangladesh and its people, such a deal will threaten the sovereignty of Bangladesh and people will thwart such anti-state deal.³⁵⁶

India is exploiting Bangladesh through its stooge government in Bangladesh led by Sheikh Hasina and is successful because of no visible opposition in parliament. The decades old grassroots level hard work done by India, to create its influence within Bangladesh has started to pay off to India. The elections are its results are mere eyewash as every result is pre planned and rigged to ensure pro-Indian government in Bangladesh.

The argument of pro-Islamic patriotic Bengalis is that since, there was no possibility of war between Bangladesh and India, there was no requirement for a defence pact. To augment their argument, they present a logic that Bangladesh did not gain much out of transit and transshipment facilities it offered to India. Hence, DCF will be a no gain option for Bangladesh. The second largest political party of Bangladesh is BNP, and it has come up very openly with regards to India-Bangladesh defence cooperation framework. India is heavily investing on the BNP leadership to keep her options open within Bangladesh.³⁵⁷

4.6 Neglect, Mistrust and Suspicion

The historiography of India-Bangladesh relations suggests that their bilateral relations have been plagued by neglect, mistrust and suspicion. Influence generated through power strategies and approach holds importance regarding India-Bangladesh relations as cultural and civilizational connections exist between the two neighbours. As such West Bengal will always play a pivotal role when it comes to India-Bangladesh

³⁵⁶ "Pakistan-Bangladesh Ties," *Dawn*, April 3, 2017, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1324426>.

³⁵⁷ "Pakistan-Bangladesh Ties," *Dawn*, April 3, 2017.

relations. Yet the most important aspect lies in certain policies being made West Bengal centric as it is through West Bengal that India can use the aspects of Bengali nationalism to the utmost. Culture has Indian influence potentials; India have been able to use it to the potential. This is evident from the fact that three agreements on cultural cooperation has been reached coupled with few other academic, scientific and technological engagements. In addition, MOU on cooperation between *Doordarshan* and Bangladesh television was also signed in 2011 and 2015 respectively.

India is exploiting, Bengali culture, literature, movies and music to build pro Indian narrative coupled with employment of foreign policy tools like domestic and external factors exploitation. Rabindra Sangeet is another source of Indian influence, academic and literary exchanges have resulted into Indian influence and improved the psyche among the people of two countries, for instance, the India-Bangladesh food festival, Hilsa festival etc.

Hasina generates a pull factor for Bangladesh in its bilateral relations with India, especially on the ground being the daughter of Sheikh Mujib. India and Bangladesh need to exploit these Indian influence assets and should try and address the other impending bilateral issues.

4.7 Plenitude of Might is Right

What is evident however, is the fact that India has a plenitude of soft and hard power resources when it comes to exercise its influence and interference within Bangladesh. Yet the most important aspect lies in certain policies being made West Bengal centric as it is through West Bengal that India is using the aspects of Bengali nationalism to the utmost. Moreover, the most important challenge lies in using the available Indian influence potentials into policy outcomes.

Nevertheless, it is beyond doubt that Indian influence helps in creating a congenial political atmosphere wherein negotiations between countries can foster. The utility of Indian influence as is the case with cultural diplomacy is that it has no embargo for carrying out talks with the states, where political contacts are threatened, thus it will help in the smoothening and establishment of fresh relationships. As India-Bangladesh

relations has demonstrated, the conclusion of the 1996 Ganges water treaty, passing of the LBA, and the DCF offer a very good example.

India's foreign policy exemplifies the ethos of power strategies, the conclusion of LBA 2015, various other agreements and the DCF of 2017 are an apt testimony of the fact that India now recognises the utility of Indian influence and regards it as a concrete tool of diplomacy. India has found ways and means to transform its influence capacities into capabilities and secondly, Indian influence has developed in consonance with its hard power.

CONCLUSION

This part covers two segments i.e findings and recommendations. It reflects that since independence India is interfering in the internal socio-political and economic affairs of neighbouring states. Pakistan, Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka are victims of Indian sponsored terrorism and subversion. The present study found that 1971 conflict and separation of East Pakistan is the result of Indian machinations, through which faults at the end of West Pakistani establishment were exploited and anti-Pakistan propaganda was unleashed. More than four decades have past but the relationship between Pakistan and Bangladesh have not been normalized as yet. It is found that mistrust, suspicion and Awami League government's propensity to state false facts have kept Pakistan away from fostering a cooperation and sustainable relationship with Bangladesh. Major findings of study are as follows;

Findings

- 1971 conflict is still being played and manipulated in the South Asian region, the narratives built by India and Bangladesh are still dominating, partisanship of 1971 war is still being propagated and mythologies not facts are a dominant part of these narratives.
 - Indian propaganda with the employment of anti-Pakistan narrative and support to anti Pakistan elements within East Pakistan is no more a secret. India has employed various narrative's through discourses (language used in the form of written, spoken and usage of pictures, movies and sketches) to build a pro Indian and anti-Pakistan narrative, which has been used for creation of favourable external and internal environment within Bangladesh for achieving Indian hegemony in South Asia, for realisation of *Akhand Baharat*.
 - Few of the myths and fables were created through fabricated narrative after the 1971 conflict which are creating anti-Pakistan sentiments within Bangladesh. A deliberate effort is made by the Bangladeshis and Indians to bypass facts like: the Indian security dilemma, Awami League and its fascist political policies, the terrorist Mukti Bahini with 50,000 Indian soldiers, the propaganda campaign of the Indians and some global media outlets, the Indian diplomatic campaign at the global level, the political confrontation between West and East Pakistan, and the

- colonial legacy in terms of economic disparity between East and West Pakistan.
- The exaggerated narratives accuse the Pakistani Armed Forces of gruesome massacre of innocent Bengalis yet giving a clean chit to Mukti Bahini and the Indian armed forces. The atrocities committed against the Bihari's, Punjabis, Pathans and other West Pakistanis by Awami League miscreants, terrorists of Mukti Bahini, disguised Indian soldiers and later the loot and plunder by the Indian army after the fall are overlooked conveniently.
 - Although Modi's admission to Indian crimes has exposed the true face of India, but the Bengalis are still not prepared to accept the facts that the East Pakistan insurgency and Mukti Bahini were funded by India. The Mukti Bahini was predominantly populated by Indian army soldiers, some of which were of Bengali descent who deserted from Pakistan army.
 - Over forty-five years have passed India and Bangladesh have continuously spread false propaganda against Pakistan, Pakistan through its inaction and a policy of ignoring the issue has failed to establish its narrative based on facts and evidences. The Awami League miscreants and Mukti Bahini committed appalling atrocities in the name of freedom fighting, these have not been revealed properly.
 - In East Pakistan, Pakistan army did its duty to control the insurgency and Indian sponsored violence. It has been demonized by the Bengali and Indian propaganda, whereas Bengali and Indian atrocities have not been remembered. They reject the fact that Pakistan army, though limited in number and short on logistic resources, fought gallantry with the enemy and displayed unprecedented courage.
 - The various military and civil governments in Pakistan never attempted to identify, try and punish those involved in the dismemberment of Pakistan, only a few army officers were retired and that was all, thus accountability remains a sour aspect in the history of Pakistan.
 - Immense goodwill exists between the government of Pakistan and Bangladesh, the same is required to be exploited. Pakistan has consistently tried to maintain

a positive approach in bilateral relations by highlighting commonalities and convergence of interests.

- Indian machinations and Awami League as its tentacle has resulted into making Bangladesh subservient to India in almost all walks of life. Pakistan has consistently tried to maintain a positive approach in bilateral relations by highlighting commonalities and convergence of interests. Indian influence and Sheikh Hasina's inclination towards India is evident, because domestically Bangladesh is clamping down on all pro-Pakistan circles by dubbing them as extremists and terrorists. Indian foreign policy of twenty first century towards its neighbours (especially Bangladesh) is a manifestation that India has employed its influence through propagation of its narrative for realization of its hegemonic designs.
 - Pakistan's ties with Bangladesh have not always progressed smoothly, for instance, Bangladesh joined India and refused to attend SAARC summit, planned to be held in November, 2016 in Islamabad.
 - India has larger ambitions in South East Asia, it looks to itself being a super power. India is practically annexing Bangladesh by these political, diplomatic manoeuvre's and holding of these trials held in Bangladesh. Bangladesh and Myanmar are the corner stones of Indian "Look East, Act East policy".
 - India is extremely proactive in engaging Muslim countries (Afghanistan, Iran) which are neighbours to Pakistan, Indian policies their interactions and interventions are hostile to Pakistan. There is no response from the government of Pakistan.
- It appears that Bangladesh is bound to keep its strategic priorities aligned with India to maintain its relevance to the West and pro Indian world block. However, Bangladesh by playing its cards carefully will try to maintain its relevance to both Western (India included) and Sino-Russian club. This approach packs both economic and security advantages. India has been able to create an alliance of banana states, around it in the region, as it has been consistently working on global and regional isolation of Pakistan.
 - Bilaterally India and Bangladesh have largely settled disputed territories along Bangladesh's eastern borders, Sheikh Hasina takes all credit

domestically. India has strongly objected to Bangladeshi efforts to acquire Chinese military hardware including submarines. India-Bangladesh military to military collaboration is already at a very high pace and will further speed up as a result of recent agreements.

- Bangladesh is seen to be increasingly gravitated toward India's sphere of influence in recent years. However, India is apprehensive over the growing engagement of Bangladesh with China.

Recommendations

In the existing milieu, Pakistan should continue its efforts to foster ties with Bangladesh. By all available means, Pakistan have to make friends with Bangladesh, to achieve this and to influence and scuttle the current trajectory of India-Bangladesh relations, following steps are recommended:-

- Pakistan needs to counter the anti-Pakistan narrative created by India and pro Indian elements within Bangladesh. Historical myths and fables needs to be warded off, following measures are recommended.
 - Pakistan and Bangladesh are two Muslim states and cannot live in an environment of hostility towards each other for long, an effort is required to be made to start the process of dialogue to resolve contentious issues.
 - Conducting dispassionate analysis of Indian and Awami League propaganda about 1971 to discern the narratives, themes, approaches and objections being pursued. Through reverse engineering accentuating genocide of Bihari's etc.
 - Cessation of propaganda against each other is required, to at least not to aggravate the situation.
 - Pakistan's balanced narrative relating to 1971 war occurrence needs to be propagated in Bangladesh through media, books and magazines and history books in Pakistan need to be revised accordingly.
 - Pakistan needs to build its own narrative comprising of historical facts with evidence, so that perceptions within Bangladesh can be improved. This can only be done by rewriting of historical books and propagation of facts by means of all available discourses.

- The truth may be propagated by investing in authors like Sarmila Bose and Dr. Junaid Ahmad who gave more balanced and authentic accounts of the events of 1971, thus will dispel current negative sentiments. Investigative journalism is a very interesting term in this regard.
- The book *War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the creation of Bangladesh, (1991)* written by Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, needs to be translated in Bengali, and a movie in Bengali may be made on the script of this book. Writers of this book managed to give the factual account on the war of 1971 and the secession of Bangladesh, the role of Mukti Bahini and the amount of Indian interference in Pakistan, which ultimately led to the secession of East Pakistan.
- There is need to formulate a fact finding and reconciliation commission led by independent jurists from both the countries with a mandate to resolve the issue and restore the relations instead of spreading hatred and blame game.
- Pakistan-Bangladesh media needs to established linkages to reduce negative narrative against each other.
- Pakistan should seek and work on many commonalities including social, cultural and religious. Pakistan must exploit the existing goodwill between the people of Pakistan and Bangladesh, thus creating a favourable public opinion for Pakistan within Bangladesh. This will establish strong bilateral ties in future, Pakistan should develop a long term foreign policy which is not regime centric and is based on engaging Bangladesh by employment of following measures.
 - Despite the shadow casted by Indian role on Pakistan's relations with Bangladesh, there is enough substance in bilateral ties on which to build. There are many bilateral standards of interaction for instance, economic, people-to-people contacts, sports links, increase connectivity, especially through flights, facilitating visas, more trade, social, cultural and even strategy.
 - Pakistan needs to develop a long term foreign policy for Bangladesh and following it consistently, Pakistan and Bangladesh need to be friends with each other, with a consistent and favourable policy, attitude towards each other irrespective of the regime there. Pakistan can formulate a long term strategy of reconciliation with purpose. Ministry

of foreign affairs Pakistan should convey Pakistan's concern to Bangladesh over current situation in diplomatic way.

- There are many commonalities including social, cultural and religious between Pakistan and Bangladesh which can be exploited with some effort.
- Efforts should be made to enhance more people to people contact, for countries that share so much in common, to counter the negative perceptions that people of either country have for each other. This would have its dividends in the long run. Establishing links between the artists of both countries, may be a way forward.
- Interactions among the business communities, artists, academicians and students can be important in creating a friendly atmosphere for improving their bilateral economic relations. Pakistan can get influence leverage by encouraging such initiatives.
- Civil society organisations (CSOs) and Non-Governmental organisations (NGOs) need to play an important role in developing sustainable relationship. Pakistani NGOs can also work in Bangladesh particularly to help the stranded Bihari's.
- Trade volume with Bangladesh can be increased as there is a market for its leather, jute, tea, ceramics, pharmaceuticals, etc in Pakistan.
- Promoting connectivity in terms of maximum trade, commerce and commercial relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh, thus increasing the stakes of Bangladesh businessman in Pakistan.
- Economic area engagement is the need of present times, which can include participation of Pakistani exhibitors in the Dhaka international trade fair held in January of each year.
- Pakistan needs to remove both tariff and non-tariff barriers. Direct shipping links needs to be established, joint ventures need to be explored and even a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) may be signed as has been signed between China and Pakistan.
- Focus on positive areas of cooperation by Pakistan and Bangladesh is recommended for promoting institutional linkages.
- Pakistan needs to launch new programmes such as youth exchange particularly in areas of education, sports, science, technology and health.

- Scholarships should be offered to Bangladesh youth in Pakistani universities.
- Pakistani's banks and Financial institutions need to go to Bangladesh.
 - Observing selective reciprocity i.e. targeting government officials while promoting people to people contact., thus exploiting the goodwill prevailing amongst the Bangladeshi people about Pakistan.
 - Geographically, Bangladesh is surrounded by India, which has a definite superiority complex over Bangladesh. Pakistan can be a strategic ally of Bangladesh to minimise the Indian influence.
- Indian machinations and nexus with Awami League needs to be exposed, countered and manipulated by employment of miscellaneous measures and they are appended below.
 - Pakistan must review its apologetic approach on 1971 to counter the venomous Awami League agenda, being managed through joint Indian and AL concocted narratives. Defeating Awami League's anti-Pakistan narrative can also serve to mitigate Indian vested interest in Bangladesh.
 - Highlighting the human right violations committed by Indian army during 1971 at different forums. Pakistan should take up the case in Geneva on human right violations. Pakistan can ask for international commission / inquiry.
 - A strong public demand for regime changes from within may help restore Pakistan-Bangladesh relations, for this investment in Pakistan friendly strata of Bangladeshi society is recommended.
 - Anti-India sentiments must be promoted through optimum utilization of media space.
 - In South Asia, Geo-economics is leading Geo-strategy and Indian economic rise can only guarantee Indian military rise. In order to stop the trajectory, it is pivotal to stop / delay Indian economic rise.
 - Anti-Hasina and pro Pakistan camp needs to be reinforced substantially to increase their inclination towards Pakistan.
 - Capacity building and engagement of BNP politicians to facilitate pro Pakistan environment within the masses of Bangladesh.

- Voice of descent against pro-Indian policies of Awami League with strong patriotic tint needs to be cropped up, by employing all possible means.
 - Domestic perception management needs to be done to pacify anti Pakistan sentiments.
 - Religious parties in Bangladesh be helped and engaged to improve upon their domestic and international image. These should later be exploited to enhance our signature and influence in Bangladesh.
- Utilisation of China for the betterment of bilateral ties between Pakistan and Bangladesh include following aspects.
 - Long term regional approach must be developed alongside China. It should primarily focus on blocking Indian access towards the East. Complete India-Bangladesh cooperation's can be scuttled, by making defence and other collaborations with India domestically questionable.
 - China's influence in Bangladesh expands to the point of suggestive mode, and engagement of Bangladesh through BRI, thus establishing common grounds for long term bilateral relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh.
 - Improved internal security situation and dividends of CPEC raise Pakistan stature in the region forcing Bangladesh to reach out to Pakistan.
 - The internal media and social debate in Bangladesh on the issue of Indian growing influence within Bangladesh, which can also be generated through incentivisation and motivation. Media forums like China central television (CCTV), Russian international television networks (RT) and Al Jazeera media network must also be exploited for presenting the alternate view, however this will require complete Chinese support which may be against Chinese larger thought of an economic-bias only.
- Government of Pakistan needs a multi layered policy, to act simultaneously in all facets to address the existing voids.

- The Indian involvement in Karachi and Balochistan should be of highest concern to Government of Pakistan. The 1971 tragedy should not be allowed to be repeated. International community needs to be educated on the India machinations. The world needs to be informed about the role played by India and her proxies which led to the dismemberment of Pakistan.
- Pakistan needs to strictly observe reciprocity across Bangladesh i.e. responding to all Awami League government's actions to improve bilateral relations.
- Pakistan should raise the issue of Indian involvement in all international forums including UN and other multilateral and bilateral platforms.
- To stop the trials of international war crimes tribunals of Bangladesh, Pakistan should use international forums, diplomatic channels, media discussions and governmental level committees against the injustices of this tribunal.
- Pakistan, through international support, needs to raise its voice against the War of Liberation Denial Act, made by Awami League government to legitimise its narrative.
- Anti-Indian sentiments, this promoted by default and becomes more assertive and overbearing, as it denies Bangladeshi legitimate demands, on miscellaneous aspects, this gives a huge opportunity to Pakistan.
- Indian Citizen amendment act (CAA) and India's national register for citizens (NRC) has a huge anti-Indian sentiment within the majority of Bangladeshi masses. CAA and NRC can be exploited to expose Indian machinations.
- Support social media campaign in Bangladesh raising caution against becoming too close to India especially in the realm of defence and security cooperation; water disputes, divergence of economic interests with India, Indian hidden agendas and need to maintain Bangladesh's sovereignty.
- Islamist, nationalist and anti-Indian elements in the society should be supported through premeditated and well thought out joint strategy, taking cognizance of the past failures.

- Pakistan will only be able to create any influence within the South Asian region or beyond, until and unless Pakistan's economy is stronger and beneficial to other states.
- Internal problems of Pakistan including the security and economic situation during the last decade has seriously left Pakistan lagging behind. Governance needs to be restored in Pakistan, a long term plan is required to be made and implemented, narrative is a part of a long term plan. Narratives are built on the credible reports from unbiased and neutral sources. Way forward is that Pakistan's parliament be more effective and proactive and steers the course of our policies and response.
- Capacity building of Pakistan high commission to Bangladesh with more capable staff.
- Possibilities of mutual apology need to be analysed while rising above the ego for a larger and noble cause.
- Bihari's are now citizens of Bangladesh but they are marginalised, Pakistan needs to push Bangladesh through negotiations and help from UN high commission for refugees and other international agencies to give them opportunities and accept them in the main stream.
- Pakistani media must be educated to play its role in creating an environment within the region.
- Pakistan can also use the platform of Islamic countries with growing economies to make an organisation, through which relations with Bangladesh can be improved.

The historical events are replete with lessons for Pakistani institutions and nation. Nations need sincere leadership to grow and groom, at the time of emergence and later, in the developing and progressing phase, nations need to be cautious, careful and visionary; especially, when their enemies are hypocrite, tactful, cheaters and capable of harming them by underhand tactics. Rulers play a crucial and the most significant role in deciding the destiny of a nation. When they turn out to be traitors, selfish and place personal interests prior to the interest of the nation, humiliation and insult becomes the destiny of that nation. Rulers must keep in mind that they are leaders of the nation and are answerable for their deeds. Leadership demands sacrifices and

selflessness which is the true quintessence of leading from the front, another important point is prejudice and partiality. It is inbuilt in human nature rather it is basic instinct, but it can be declined or lowered with the help of merit, sacrifice and impartiality. Prejudices are strongly fanned and aired by injustice and violation of merit. This is what happened in between West and East Pakistan. The issues were not addressed and were constantly ignored, resulting into the exploitation by the enemies, and thus giving unhindered space to India and AL for exploiting innocent Bengali masses by propagation of fabricated narratives through propaganda campaigns by using all available forms of discourses, and succeeded in creating high level misunderstandings.

India-Bangladesh disputes including Farakka dam project, Teesta water sharing issue, migrations, border alignments don't have enough prospects to flare up a collision course between the two countries, until suitably reinforced. Domestically and regionally, collaboration with Pakistan does not commensurate with Sheikh Hasina's interests and vision for Bangladesh. Pakistan bashing supports her on domestic, regional and global plains. It's already too late for Pakistan, an early action is the call of the hour. No short term solution is available to scuttle rising collaboration between India and Bangladesh, and counter Indian influence on Bangladesh. Economic viability, exploiting people to people contact, Muslim brother hood card, rendering mutual apology, addressing the issue of Bihari's may open the closed doors (which is by India strongly guarding its half a century old covert and overt investment) of Bangladesh towards Pakistan.

India-Bangladesh relations are finding a firmer footing, particularly after 2014, with the signing of 2015 LBA, 2017 DCF and Oct 2019 mutual agreements. To redress the predicament of India-Bangladesh cooperation and considering Indian influence on Bangladesh, a long term strategy is required to be employed by Pakistan, imperatively spanning over a period of 15-20 years. If not planned and employed with precision it will have extreme negative fallout, even worse than those at present or in the past being faced by Pakistan in South Asia, owing to the influence created by the Indian foreign policy towards Bangladesh. Regional environment is not ripe to undertake any unilateral action towards Bangladesh, a plan must be devised in conjunction with China, any act must be a part of a larger visual development collectively with a success story i.e. China. Only long term regional approach with strong economic bias and adroit

media support which is led / assisted by China appears to be the way forward, how deep China agrees to this, is a question to be answered.

Overall, the study reflects that East and West Pakistan were created on one ideology, ideology acts as a soul and the landmass acts as the body, the body is damaged due to the bitterness resulting to the separation of 1971, but the soul and ideology is intact. there exists huge potential between Pakistan and Bangladesh. Policy needs revamping a mechanism can be formulated and cues and lead can be taken from the tripartite agreement of 1974, which asked for leaving the impediments aside and finding common grounds, resorting to mutual forgiveness, thus leading to cohesive agenda coupled with enhanced people to people contact will address all bilateral issues between Pakistan and Bangladesh.

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APPENDIX-I**EAST AND WEST PAKISTAN ON WORLD MAP****Source:**

Wikimedia Commons contributors, "File:Dominion of Pakistan & Indian Controlled Kashmir (orthographic projection).svg," *Wikimedia Commons, the free media repository*, [https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Dominion_of_Pakistan_%26_Indian_Controlled_Kashmir_\(orthographic_projection\).svg&oldid=329638178](https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Dominion_of_Pakistan_%26_Indian_Controlled_Kashmir_(orthographic_projection).svg&oldid=329638178) (accessed March 8, 2019).


APPENDIX-II
EAST AND WEST PAKISTAN IN SUB CONTINENT



Source:


"University of Central Arkansas | UCA," Political Science, , accessed March 08, 2019, <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/asiapacific/region/pakistanbangladesh-1947-1971/>.

APPENDIX-IV
 MAP OF SOUTH ASIA



Source:
 Y.M. Bammi, *India Bangladesh Relations: The Way Ahead* (New Delhi: Vijay Books India, 2010).



APPENDIX-V
BANGLADESH MAP



Source:
S.S. Bindra, *Indo-Bangladesh Relations* (New Delhi, Deep and Deep, 1982).



APPENDIX-VI

LOCATION OF FARAKKA BARRAGE



Source:
 S.S. Bindra, *Indo-Bangladesh Relations* (New Delhi, Deep and Deep, 1982).



APPENDIX-VII
 LOCATION OF FARAKKA BARRAGE



Source:
 S.S. Bindra, *Indo-Bangladesh Relations* (New Delhi, Deep and Deep, 1982).

APPENDIX-VIII

NEW MOORE ISLAND LOCATION



Source:

S.S. Bindra, *Indo-Bangladesh Relations* (New Delhi, Deep and Deep, 1982).

APPENDIX-IX
TWO PROPOSED HOUSES

1.	House of People (membership on population basis)	
	a. East Bengal	165
	b. West Pakistan	135
2.	House of Units (each province to have 20 members)	
	a. East Bengal	20
	b. West Pakistan	80
3.	Combined Session	
	a. East Bengal	185
	b. West Pakistan	215

Source:

G. W. Choudhury, "Bangladesh: Why It Happened," *International Affairs*, Royal Institute of International Affairs Vol. 48 (2) (1972).

APPENDIX-X**RECOMMENDED MEMBERSHIP OF THE TWO HOUSES**

1. House of people
 - a. East Bengal 200 Seats
 - b. West Pakistan 200 Seats
2. House of Units (members elected by Provincial Legislatures)
 - a. East Bengal 60 Seats
 - b. West Pakistan 60 Seats

Source:

G. W. Choudhury, "Bangladesh: Why It Happened," *International Affairs*, Royal Institute of International Affairs Vol. 48 (2) (1972).

APPENDIX-XI

MOHAMMAD ALI BOGRA FORMULA

1. Representation

- | | | |
|----|---|-----------|
| a. | House of People
(Membership on population basis) | |
| | (1) East Bengal | 165 Seats |
| | (2) West Pakistan | 135 Seats |
| b. | House of Units | |
| | (1) East Bengal | 10 Seats |
| | (2) West Pakistan | 40 Seats |
| c. | Combined Session | |
| | (1) East Bengal | 175 Seats |
| | (2) West Pakistan | 175 Seats |

2. Powers of houses and decisions

- a. Both Houses to have equal powers.
- b. Head of State to be elected by a joint session.
- c. Decision in any House to be made by a simple majority, provided that such a majority in any House included at least 30 per cent of members from each wing.
- d. In case of a difference of opinion between the two houses a joint session to be held where decision to be made by a majority, provided it included at least 30 percent of members from each wing.
- e. If the difference could not be resolved, the Head of State could dissolve the Federal Legislature (House of Units and House of peoples).

Source:

G. W. Choudhury, "Bangladesh: Why It Happened," *International Affairs*, Royal Institute of International Affairs Vol. 48 (2) (1972).

APPENDIX-XII
RESULT OF MARCH 1954 ELECTIONS

1. From 8th to 11th March 1954, provincial elections were held in East Bengal. The results were as follows:-

a.	Muslim Seats	
	(1) United Front*	223
	(2) Muslim League	10
	(3) Independent	3
	(4) Khilafat-e-Rabani	1
	Total	237
b.	Minority Seats	
	(1) Pakistan National Congress	24
	(2) Minority United Front	10
	(3) Ganatantri Dal	3
	(4) Communists	4
	(5) Scheduled Caste Federation	27
	(6) Christians	1
	(7) Budhists	2
	(8) Independent (Caste Hindu)	1
	Total	72
c.	Total Muslim Seats	237
d.	Total Minority Seats	72
	Total Seats	309

*Note: Among the other parties, the United Front included, Awami League, led by Mr. Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy. Krishak Sramik Party, led by Mr. Abul Kasem Fazlul Huq, Nizam-I-Islam Party, a religious group.

Source:

G. W. Choudhury, "Bangladesh: Why It Happened," *International Affairs*, Royal Institute of International Affairs Vol. 48 (2) (1972).

APPENDIX-XIII
REPRESENTATION IN THE CENTRAL CABINET

Name	Duration of Tenure		Ministers	
	From	To	From West Pakistan	From East Pakistan
Chaudhry Muhammad Ali	11 August 1955	11 September 1956	10	7
Mr Huseyn Shaheed Suharwardy	12 September 1956	18 October 1957	6	8
Mr Ibrahim Ismail Chundrigar	18 October 1957	16 December 1957	9	7
Malik Feroz Khan Noon	16 December 57	7 October 58	15	12

Source:

G. W. Choudhury, "Bangladesh: Why It Happened," *International Affairs*, Royal Institute of International Affairs Vol. 48 (2) (1972).

APPENDIX-XIV**SHEIKH MUJIBUR RAHMAN POINTS**

1. The Constitution should provide for a Federation of Pakistan in its true sense on the basis of the Lahore Resolution and Parliamentary Form of Government with Supremacy of the legislatures elected on the basis of universal adult franchise and direct voting.
2. The Federal Government shall deal with two subjects, Defence And Foreign Affairs; all other residuary subject shall vest in the federating states.
3. Regarding currency, either of the two following suggestions may be accepted.
 - a. Two separate freely convertible currencies may be introduced.

OR

- b. One currency for the whole country may be maintained. In this case effective constitutional provisions are to be made in stopping the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. A separate banking reserve is also to be made for East Pakistan.
4. Separate fiscal and monetary policy is to be adopted for East Pakistan.

Source:

G. W. Choudhury, "Bangladesh: Why It Happened," *International Affairs*, Royal Institute of International Affairs Vol. 48 (2) (1972).

APPENDIX-XV**AMENDED SIX POINTS SHEIKH MUJIBUR RAHMAN**

1. A Federal Constitution for Pakistan.
2. Centre to be responsible for only Defence and Foreign Affairs.
3. Separate currencies for two Wings
OR
Alternatively restrictions on movement of capital funds from one Province to the other.
4. All taxes to vest in the Province of their collection.
5. All foreign exchange earned by East Pakistan to be at the disposal of East Pakistan.
6. An East Pakistan Militia to be formed.

Source:

G. W. Choudhury, "Bangladesh: Why It Happened," *International Affairs*, Royal Institute of International Affairs Vol. 48 (2) (1972).

APPENDIX-XVI**10 APRIL 1969 - GENERAL YAHYA - FIRST PRESS CONFERENCE**

1. He had not come to stay.
2. Political parties had not been abolished but for the time being their activities would be restricted.
3. The question of regional autonomy would be one for the representatives of the people to decide.
4. The administration was to be cleaned up.
5. No censorship of press had been imposed.
6. Machinery had been set in motion to work out a proper method of dealing with educational problems.
7. Experts had been commissioned to work out a fair wages policy.
8. Peasants needs would have to be met.
9. Concrete proposals had been ordered to establish reasonable prices of essential commodities.
10. The utmost importance was attached to a solution of Indo-Pakistan disputes on an honourable and equitable basis.

Source:

G. W. Choudhury, "Bangladesh: Why It Happened," *International Affairs*, Royal Institute of International Affairs Vol. 48 (2) (1972).

APPENDIX-XVII**3 DECEMBER 1970 - GENERAL YAHYA - ADDRESS TO NATION**

1. Martial Law is supreme.
2. Elections would be held under Martial Law.
3. The new Constitution must be drafted within the prescription of Legal Framework Order.
4. If no new constitution was evolved within the LFO Martial Law would continue.
5. The Government would adopt all measures necessary to ensure orderly and peaceful elections.

Source:

G. W. Choudhury, "Bangladesh: Why It Happened," *International Affairs*, Royal Institute of International Affairs Vol. 48 (2) (1972).

APPENDIX-XVIII

1970 ELECTION RESULTS: POSITION OF PARTIES ON OVER ALL
PAKISTAN BASES

Party Seats	Number of Seats	Number of
	Captured	Contested
AWAMI LEAGUE	170	160
PEOPLES PARTY	120	81
PAKISTAN MUSLIM LEAGUE (QAIYUME GROUP)	133	9
PAKISTAN MUSLIM LEAGUE (COUNCIL)	119	7
PAKISTAN MUSLIM LEAGUE (CONVENTION)	124	2
JAMAAT-I-ISLAMI	151	4
PAKISTAN DEMOCRATIC	105	1
NATIONAL AWAMI PARTY(WALI GROUP)	64	6
NATIONAL AWAMI PARTY (BASHANI GROUP)	19	-
INDEPENDENTS	316	16
JAMIAT-ULEMA-ISLAM (WEST PAKISTAN)	105	7
JAMIAT-ULEMA-ISLAM	50	-

Source:

G. W. Choudhury, "Bangladesh: Why It Happened," *International Affairs*, Royal Institute of International Affairs Vol. 48 (2) (1972).

APPENDIX-XIX

1970 ELECTIONS - PARTY POSITION IN EAST PAKISTAN

Party Seats	Number of Seats	
	Contested	Number of Captured
AWAMI LEAGUE	162	160
PEOPLES PARTY	-	-
PAKISTAN MUSLIM LEAGUE (QAIYUME GROUP)	65	-
PAKISTAN MUSLIM LEAGUE (COUNCIL)	50	-
PAKISTAN MUSLIM LEAGUE (CONVENTION)	93	-
JAMAAT-I-ISLAMI	71	-
PAKISTAN DEMOCRATIC	78	1
NATIONAL AWAMI PARTY (WALI GROUP)	39	-
NATIONAL AWAMI PARTY (BASHANI GROUP)	14	-
INDEPENDENTS	113	1
JAMIAT-ULEMA-ISLAM (WEST PAKISTAN)	-	-
JAMIAT-ULEMA-ISLAM	-	-

Source:

G. W. Choudhury, "Bangladesh: Why It Happened," *International Affairs*, Royal Institute of International Affairs Vol. 48 (2) (1972).

APPENDIX-XX

ELECTED MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS

1.	Sheikh Mujibur Rehman	Awami League
2.	Mr Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto	People's Party
3.	Khan Abdul Qaiyyum Khan	Pakistan Muslim League
4.	Mr Nurul Amin	Pakistan Democratic Party
5.	Mian Mumtaz Daultana	Council Muslim League
6.	Khan Abdul Wali Khan	National Awami Party
7.	Maulana Mufti Mahmood	Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam
8.	Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani	Jamiat-e-Ulema Pakistan
9.	Mr Mohammad Majal Korej	Pakistan Muslim League Convention
10.	Mr Abdul Ghafoor Khan	Jamaat-e-Islami
11.	Major General Jamal Dar	Representing Tribal Area
12.	Malik Jahangir Khan	Representing Tribal Area

Source:

G. W. Choudhury, "Bangladesh: Why It Happened," *International Affairs*, Royal Institute of International Affairs Vol. 48 (2) (1972).

APPENDIX-XXI

LOCATION OF ENCLAVES



Source:

S.S. Bindra, *Indo-Bangladesh Relations* (New Delhi, Deep and Deep, 1982).

APPENDIX-XXII**SALIENT ASPECTS OF THE PLAN**

1. Simultaneous action in all the important towns and cities. As far as possible the action to be initiated at night. It was not possible to keep the plans completely secret, as 60 percent of troops and most of signal battalion were Bengalis.
2. East Pakistan to be cut off from the rest of the World in terms of communication links.
3. Radio communication to be taken under control and all broadcasts monitored by Martial Law authorities.
4. Prominent Awami League leaders to be taken into custody.
5. Student hostels of Dacca University to be searched for arms and miscreants.
6. It was impressed upon all commanders that military action was being taken in a situation of civil war rather than in aid to civil power, because there was no civil government under the control of Central Government.
7. East Pakistani troops in cantonments, wherever possible, to be disarmed.

Source:

G. W. Choudhury, "Bangladesh: Why It Happened," *International Affairs*, Royal Institute of International Affairs Vol. 48 (2) (1972).

APPENDIX-XXIII


CAPTURED PAKISTANI TROOPS

Inter-Service Branch	Number of captured Pakistani POWs	Officer Commanding
Pakistan Army	54,154	Lieutenant-General Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi
Pakistan Navy/Pakistan Marines	1,381	Rear-Admiral Mohammad Shariff
Pakistan Air Force	833	Air Commodore Inamul Haq
Paramilitary/East Pakistan Rifles/Police	22,000	Major-General Rao Farman Ali
Civil government personnel	12,000	Governor Abdul Motaleb Malik
Total:	90,368	~

Source:

G. W. Choudhury, "Bangladesh: Why It Happened," *International Affairs*, Royal Institute of International Affairs Vol. 48 (2) (1972).

APPENDIX-XXIV
MUHURI CHAR LOCATION




Source:

Y.M. Bammi, *India Bangladesh Relations: The Way Ahead* (New Delhi: Vijay Books India, 2010).

APPENDIX-XXV

LOCATION OF TEESTA




Source:

Y.M. Bammi, *India Bangladesh Relations: The Way Ahead* (New Delhi: Vijay Books India, 2010).

APPENDIX-XXVI

MAJOR RIVERS OF INDIA AND BANGLADESH

Source:

Y.M. Bammi, *India Bangladesh Relations: The Way Ahead* (New Delhi: Vijay Books India, 2010).

APPENDIX-XXVII

FARAKKA ISSUE TIMELINE


29 Oct 1951	Pakistan first calls Indian attention to reports of Indian plans to build a barrage at Farakka to divert Ganges water to Calcutta Bay. India responds that the project was only under preliminary investigation.
28 June 1960	Meetings commence at level of 'expert' between Pakistan and India to exchange data on regional projects.
1960-1968	Expert 's level meetings continue; there are five in all, most focusing on data issues.
30 Jan 1961	India informs Pakistan that construction had begun on the Farakka Barrage.
1968-1970	Five meetings continue at the level of secretary. Fundamental disagreements over approaches to Ganges development and the data required to make policy decisions.
1970	India completes construction of Farakka Barrage.
1971	Bangladesh gains independence.
Mar 1972	India and Bangladesh establish Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission, to look into the water sharing issue.
16 May 1974	Prime ministers of India and Bangladesh sign a declaration agreeing to find a mutually acceptable solution to Ganges development, and to turn the question of the best way of supplementing Ganges flow over to the Joint Rivers Commission.
16 Apr 1975	The two sides agree to a limited trial operation of the Farakka Barrage. India continues to divert Ganges water after the trial run, without renewing or negotiating a new agreement with Bangladesh.
June 1975 June 1976	Meetings continue, with little result.
Jan 1976	Bangladesh lodges a formal protest against India with the United Nations, which adopts a consensus statement encouraging the parties to meet urgently, at the level of minister, to arrive at a settlement.
5 Nov 1977	Ganges Waters Agreement signed, covering allocation of Ganges water between the two riparians for a period of five years. No long-term solution was found within that time frame.
Oct 1982	Joint communiqué issued, pledging to resolve Ganges issues within 18 months, a task not accomplished.
22 Nov 1985	Memorandum of understanding issued, on the sharing of Ganges dry season flow through 1988. When accord lapses, no new agreement is signed.
29 Sep 1988	Summit in New Delhi between heads of government. Bangladesh Sec retary of Irrigation and India's Secretary of Water Resources were given the task to work on an integrated formula for the sharing of common rivers between India and Bangladesh.
April 1990 Feb 1992	Secretaries' Committee met six times alternatively between Dhaka and New Delhi.
12 Dec 1996	Ganges Water Treaty signed by the Prime Ministers of India and Bangladesh
1996-2004	Bangladesh's attempts to talk with India over agreements concerning seven rivers are met with non-interest.
Dec 2002	India announces plans for river linking project connecting rivers from north to those in the south and east.

Source:

S.S. Bindra, *Indo-Bangladesh Relations* (New Delhi, Deep and Deep, 1982).

APPENDIX-XXVIII


LOCATION OF GAJALDOBA BARRAGE - TEESTA RIVER



Source:

Y.M. Bammi, *India Bangladesh Relations: The Way Ahead* (New Delhi: Vijay Books India, 2010).

APPENDIX-XXIX
LOCATION OF TAPAIMUKH DAM




Source:
S.S. Bindra, *Indo-Bangladesh Relations* (New Delhi, Deep and Deep, 1982).

APPENDIX-XXX

INDIA'S RIVER LINKING PROJECT (RLP)

The Grand Interlinking Blueprint




Source:

Y.M. Bammi, *India Bangladesh Relations: The Way Ahead* (New Delhi: Vijay Books India, 2010).

APPENDIX-XXXI

RADCLIFFE BOUNDARY DEMARCATION MAP





Source:

S.S. Bindra, *Indo-Bangladesh Relations* (New Delhi, Deep and Deep, 1982).

APPENDIX-XXXII

TIN BIGHA CORRIDOR LOCATION




Source:

Y.M. Bammi, *India Bangladesh Relations: The Way Ahead* (New Delhi: Vijay Books India, 2010).

APPENDIX-XXXIII

TIN BIGHA CORRIDOR LOCATION



Source:

Y.M. Bammi, *India Bangladesh Relations: The Way Ahead* (New Delhi: Vijay Books India, 2010).

APPENDIX-XXXIV

INDIA-BANGLADESH BILATERAL TRADE

Financial Year	India's Export to Bangladesh (In US \$ millions)	% change in export	India's Import from Bangladesh (In US \$ millions)	% change in import	Total Trade (In US \$ millions)	Trade Deficit (In US \$ millions)	% Change
2007-08	2923.72		257.02		3180.74	2666.7	
2008-09	2497.87	-14.56	313.11	21.82	2810.98	2184.76	-22.05
2009-10	2433.77	-2.56	254.66	-18.66	2688.43	2179.11	-0.25
2010-11	3242.9	33.24	446.75	75.42	3689.65	2796.15	22.06
2011-12	3789.2	16.84	585.73	31.10	4374.93	3203.47	12.71
2012-13	5144.99	35.78	639.33	9.15	5784.32	4505.66	28.90
2013-14	6166.93	19.86	484.34	-24.24	6651.27	5682.59	20.71
2014-15	6451.47	4.61	621.37	28.29	7072.84	5830.1	2.53
2015-16*	3713.92	NA	426.92	NA	4140.84	3287	NA

*(April to November)

Source:

Annual Gazette 2017, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.

APPENDIX-XXXV

MAJOR ITEMS OF EXPORT

HS Code	Export Items	2012-13 (in US \$ million)	2013-14 (in US \$ million)	Share (%)
52	Cotton	1506	1577	25.6
10	Cereals	569	924	15.0
87	Vehicles other than Railway or Tramway Rolling Stock, and parts and accessories thereof	374	479	7.8
84	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	268	266	4.3
23	Residues and waste from the food industries; prepared animal fodder	190	252	4.1
72	Iron and steel	130	245	4.0
26	Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes	153	201	3.3

Source:

Annual Gazette 2017, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.

APPENDIX-XXXVI

MAJOR ITEMS OF IMPORTS

HS Code	Import Items	2012-13 (in US \$ million)	2013-14 (in US \$ million)	Share (%)
53	Other vegetable textile fibres; paper yarn and woven fabrics of paper yarn	124	83	17.2
62	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted	52	79	16.3
8	Edible fruit and nuts; peel or citrus fruit or melons	97	57	11.7
63	Other made up textile articles; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags	85	48	9.9
25	Salt; sulphur; earths and stone; plastering materials; lime and cement	27	21	4.3

Source:

Annual Gazette 2017, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.

APPENDIX- XXXVII

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS : INDIA-BANGLADESH RELATIONS

- In September 2011, India and Bangladesh signed a major accord on border demarcation to end the 4 decade old disputes over boundaries. This came to be known as the Tin Bigha corridor. India also granted 24 hour access to Bangladeshi citizens in the Tin Bigha Corridor. The agreement included exchange of adversely held enclaves, involving 51,000 people spread over 111 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh and 51 Bangladesh enclaves in India. The total land involved is reportedly 7000 acres.
- On 9 October 2011, Indian and Bangladeshi armies participated in Sampriti-II (Unity-II), a 14 day long Joint military exercise at Sylhet to increase synergy between their armed forces.
- In 2012, Bangladesh allowed India's Oil and Natural Gas Corporation to ferry heavy machinery, turbines and cargo through Ashuganj for Palatana Power project in southern Tripura.
- From October 2013, India started exporting 500 megawatts of electricity a day to Bangladesh over a period of 35 years. A 125 kilometre Baharampur-Bheramara transmission line, 40 km of it in Bangladesh, connects the two substations. Bangladesh officials believe the export would greatly ease the national shortage once 500 MW flows into the national grid. The two country's Prime Ministers also unveiled the plaque of the 1,320 MW coal fired Rampal power plant, a joint venture between the two countries. The link is being seen as a major milestone in strengthening the bilateral relationship and comes at a time when India is desperate to make up for its inability to deliver on two key pacts with Bangladesh, one on Teesta waters and the Land Boundary pact.
- From November 2013, A Wagah Border like ceremony is being organised at Petrapole (in West Bengal, India) Benapole (Bangladesh) border checkpoint. The ceremony which includes parades, march past and lowering of the national flag of both the countries is now a daily routine, at sundown, on the eastern border. The relations between the countries are definitely moved in positive direction.
- Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj visited Bangladesh in her first official overseas trip in June, 2014. On 7 May 2015 the Indian Parliament, in the presence of Bangladeshi diplomats, unanimously passed the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) as its 100th Constitutional amendment, thereby resolving all 68 years old border disputes since the end of the British Raj. The bill was pending ratification since the 1974 Mujib-Indira accords.
- In June 2014, during her first official overseas visit, Foreign Minister of India, Sushma Swaraj concluded various agreements to boost ties. They include:
 - Easing of Visa regime to provide 5 year multiple entry visas to minors below 13 and elderly above 65.
 - Proposal of a special economic zone in Bangladesh.
 - Agreement to send back a fugitive accused of murder in India.
 - Provide an additional 100 MW power from Tripura.
 - Increase the frequency of Maitree Express and start buses between Dhaka and Guwahati and Shillong.
 - Bangladesh allowed India to ferry food and grains to the landlocked Northeast India's using its territory and infrastructure.

- During Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's state visit to Bangladesh during June 2015 as many as 22 agreements were signed by two sides. During the visit India extended a US \$ 2 billion line of credit to Bangladesh and pledged US \$ 5 billion worth of investments. As per the agreements, India's Reliance Power agreed to invest US \$ 3 billion to set up a 3,000 MW LNG based power plant (which is the single largest foreign investment ever made in Bangladesh). Adani Power will also be setting up a 1600 MW coal fired power plant at a cost of US \$ 1.5 billion. The two countries signed a total of 22 agreements including the ones on maritime safety cooperation and curbing human trafficking and fake Indian currency. Modi also announced a line of credit of \$ 2 billion to Bangladesh.
- At midnight on 31 July 2015, around 50,000 people became citizens of India or Bangladesh after living in limbo for decades. Ending a prolonged dispute, the two nations swapped 162 enclaves on the border region, allowing the people living there to stay or opt out to the other country. While 14,214 citizens of Bangladesh residing in 51 enclaves on the Indian side became Indians, a large number of people in the 111 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh preferred to stay with Bangladesh and just 979 opted to move to India. The total number of new Indian citizens will be 15,193.
- In 2018, the leaders of both the countries inaugurated the 130 km long Bangladesh-India Friendship pipeline to supply 4 lakh metric tonne of diesel to Bangladesh. In September 2018, the Bangladesh cabinet approved the draft of a proposed agreement with India to allow it to use the Chittagong and Mongla sea ports for transporting goods to and from its land locked north eastern states.

- **Defence Relations**

During Sheikh Hasina's four day visit to New Delhi in April 2017, Bangladesh and India signed two defence agreements, the first such agreements between India and any of its neighbours. Under the agreements, the militaries of the two countries will conduct joint exercises and training. India will help Bangladesh set up manufacturing and service centres for defence platforms that both countries possess with the aim of achieving self-sufficiency in defence manufacturing in Bangladesh, and will also provide the Bangladesh military with expert training, and technical and logistic support. India also extended its first ever defence related line of credit to a neighbouring country, by providing Bangladesh with \$ 500 million to purchase defence equipment.

- **Energy Cooperation**

India has recently introduced the concept of the Regional Power Trading System which will help various regions of the country in reducing the power deficit by transferring surplus power from another region. Under the Electricity Act 2003, the Indian companies could pool power in an exchange. A consumer would be free to buy it from anyone. This concept of power pool within India can also be enlarged to cover the neighbouring countries like Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal after the establishment of a sub-regional power pool and necessary inter-connections among these countries are put in place. This can ultimately form a regional power pool thereby generating a huge opportunity for power trading in the region.

India is also looking to export electricity from its north-eastern region with potential to generate some 58,971 MW to its eastern States through Bangladesh. Bangladesh hopes to have access to Nepal and Bhutan's power through India. Bangladesh has formally

requested a ‘power corridor’ to access the Bhutanese and Nepalese markets. It has agreed to allow India to transfer hydroelectricity from Assam to Bihar through its territory. The proposed meeting would attempt to remove irritants in project related areas. In 2016 deal between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was criticized. Bangladeshi critics accused the deal for setting a high price for the import of electricity, especially from Tripura. Equipment for the plant was sent through Bangladesh which waived most the transit fees. Adani Power said on 8 November 2017 its arm Adani Power (Jharkhand) has inked long term pact with Bangladesh Power Development Board to supply electricity from its upcoming 1,600 MW plant at Godda in Jharkhand.

- **Nuclear Energy Pacts**

India would set up nuclear reactors in Bangladesh and technical cooperation and sharing of information in the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection.

- **High Level Visits**

President Ershad visited India in 1982. Sheikh Hasina visited India in 2010 to sign number of deals. Manmohan Singh visited Dhaka in 2011 to sign number of deals. Narendra Modi visited Bangladesh which was historic as land boundary agreement was solved in 2015. Indo-Bangla relations are at their historical best as PM Hasina made a successful visit to India in October 2019.

- **Development Cooperation**

India is very active in development activity in Bangladesh. India has recently given several loans to Bangladesh. It gave \$ 750 million for developing Bangladesh infrastructure in 2011. In 2014 India extended a \$ 1 billion soft loan for infrastructure development.

- **Lines of Credit**

\$ 862 million was given to buy equipment and services from Indian entities such as BHEL, RITES, small and medium enterprises.

- **Small Development Projects**

India announced a grant of nearly \$ 10 million to Bangladesh for the implementation of various small development projects and also assured it to address trade imbalance issues.

- **Health**

India and Bangladesh signed a memorandum of understanding for cooperation in the fields of health and medical sciences that will include joint research in health and exchange of doctors and health professionals. The MoU is aimed at promoting cooperation between the two countries in the fields of health and medical sciences through exchange of scientific materials and information and joint collaboration in research in medical science.

- **Scholarships**

Every year 200 Bangladeshi students receive ICCR scholarships. India has offered scholarships for meritorious Bangladeshi under and post graduate students and PhD researchers to undertake studies in traditional systems of medicines like Ayurveda,

Unani and Homeopathy, according to Indian High Commission in Dhaka. In 2017, 400 Indian medical students protested in Chittagong after they failed to register with the Bangladesh Medical and Dental Council.

- **Trade and Investment**

The trade is set to go at \$10 billion by 2018 through ports. Bilateral trade between India and Bangladesh stood at US \$ 6.6 billion in 2013-14 with India's exports at US \$ 6.1 billion and imports from Bangladesh at US \$ 462 million, representing more than double the value of US \$ 2.7 billion five years ago.

Bangladesh Cabinet has approved a revised trade deal with India under which the two nations would be able to use each other's land and water routes for sending goods to a third country, removing a long standing barrier in regional trade. Under the deal India would also be able to send goods to Myanmar through Bangladesh. It incorporated a provision that the deal would be renewed automatically after five years if neither of the countries did not have any objection.

Source:

Annual Gazette 2018, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.

APPENDIX- XXXVIII

AGREEMENTS SIGNED BETWEEN INDIA AND BANGLADESH

India and Bangladesh on 8th April 2017 signed 22 agreements ranging from Defence, Nuclear, Energy, Information Technology, Cyber Security to Construction of community clinics in Dhaka. Details include:-

1. MOU on Defence Cooperation Framework.
2. Agreement in peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
3. Inter-Agency agreement on cooperation regarding nuclear power plant projects in Bangladesh.
4. MOU signed on cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space.
5. MOU between India's Defence Services Staff College and Dhaka's Defence Services Command and Staff College for enhancing cooperation in the field of strategic and operational studies.
6. MOU between Dhaka's National Defence College and India's National Defence College for enhancing cooperation in the field of national security, development and strategic studies.
7. Arrangement for exchange of technical information and cooperation in regulation of nuclear safety and radiation protection.
8. MOU in the field of Information technology and electronics.
9. MOU on cooperation in the area of cyber security.
10. MOU on establishing Border Haats across India and Bangladesh border.
11. MOU on bilateral judicial sector cooperation.
12. MOU on training and capacity building programme for Bangladeshi judicial officers in India.
13. MOU concerning cooperation on aids to navigation.
14. MOU on mutual scientific cooperation in the field of earth sciences for research and development.
15. MOU and SOPs on passenger and cruise services on the coastal and protocol route.
16. MOU on development of fairway from Sirajganj to Daikhowa and Ashuganj to Zakiganj on Indo-Bangladesh protocol route.
17. MOU on cooperation in the field of mass media.
18. Agreement on audio-visual co-production.
19. Agreement for the regulation of motor vehicle passenger traffic along the Khulna-Kolkata route.
20. MOU for extending a 3rd line of credit by India to Bangladesh.
21. Financing agreement for the construction of 36 community clinics in Bangladesh.

Source:

Annual Gazette 2017, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.